Monday, February 21, 2011

Higher Capital Ratios Do Not Guarantee Lower Risk In Banking System

Bloomberg reported that Paul Tucker, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, and Adair Turner, the Chairman of the Financial Services Authority, are hoping that new regulations requiring banks to hold higher capital ratios will reduce both risk in the banking system and executive pay.

By themselves, higher capital ratios do not guarantee a reduction in risk in the banking system or a reduction in executive pay.

In fact, higher capital ratios will most likely lead to the preverse outcome of actually increasing the amount of risk in the banking system.  Compensation driven by either gross net income or return on equity directly drives the bank executive's choice of both assets to put on the balance sheet and how to fund them.

For example, in the US, in the mid-1980s, a large regional bank suffered hundreds of millions in losses because bank executives had a sizable amount of their compensation tied to return on equity.  Prior to the loss, the bank had the highest capital ratio of any major bank in the world.  This high level of capital necessitated the bank purchasing $3 billion of 30 year Treasuries in order to generate the interest income needed to achieve the return on equity target.  Naturally, interest rates moved up and the bank lost roughly half its capital.

What does guarantee a reduction of risk in the banking system, both traditional and shadow, is fully implementing the FDR Framework by requiring the disclosure of all useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.

This information can be used by credit and equity market analysts, as well as competitors, to analyze the risk of a financial institution and price investments in the financial institution.  If a financial institution takes on more risk, it can be expected that its cost of funds will increase to reflect this risk.  [emphasis added]
Bank of England Deputy Governor Paul Tucker said ... that lower returns on equity for banks would give shareholders a greater incentive to cap executive pay. Credit Suisse Group AG cut its profitability goal this month after concluding stricter capital rules will constrain earnings. The Zurich-based bank will aim for a return on equity of more than 15 percent over three to five years, down from a previous target of more than 18 percent. 
“By reducing their return on equity, I think myself that that will eventually have an impact on compensation too,” Tucker said. “As that return on equity comes down, I think they will start to put pressure on the returns that go to managers.” 
Tucker said that policy makers had made some progress in the area of financial reform.
“Basel III is cooked,” he said. “We got many other countries to agree to a higher capital ratio than they wanted to agree to.” 
Financial Services Authority Chairman Adair Turner, speaking at the same event, said that if regulators were “benevolent dictators” working in an “ideal world,” bank capital ratios would be as high as 20 percent. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision said last year it will require lenders to have common equity equal to at least 7 percent of assets weighted according to riskiness, an increase from the current 2 percent standard, including a 2.5 percent buffer to withstand future shocks. 
“When you’ve ended up with too high a leverage, if you try and move out of that too quickly you will slow down the real economy,” Turner said.

Sunday, February 20, 2011

Violating FDR Framework Will Not Work for IMF and European Regulators

At the conclusion of the G-20 meeting, the IMF and European regulators reiterated their intent to continue violating the recommendations offered by the FDR Framework.

The FDR Framework specifies what governments should and should not do with regards to the financial markets.  Governments should insure that all useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.  Governments should not endorse specific investments.

According to a Bloomberg article, the IMF and European regulators find themselves chasing the market and trying to make a convincing case that they have their arms around the sovereign debt crisis.

Their solution, which they have already unsuccessfully tried variations of before, is the exact opposite of what the FDR Framework would advise.

First, the IMF and the European regulators violate the guideline of not endorsing specific investments by trying to convince the market of something.  This strategy is doomed from the beginning as it puts the market analysts in a position to say why what the IMF and European regulators propose as a solution will not work.  Given that the market analysts have been right for the last year, more of the same does not sound promising.

Second, the IMF and the European regulators violate the guideline of insuring that all useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.  Instead, the IMF and European regulators limit access to this data.  This strategy is doomed from the beginning because it is only when the market has and can analyze the data that the market can decide if the IMF and European regulators' solution works.

A much better strategy would be for the IMF and European regulators to announce that all the useful, relevant information will be made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.  They should encourage the market to analyze this data and confirm that their solution will work to address the sovereign debt crisis.  They should also promise to do more if needed.

Then, they should make the financial institution current asset-level data available and see what the market concludes is needed in the way of additional capital at the financial institution and sovereign level.  [emphasis added]
International Monetary Fund Managing Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn said European Union leaders must convince investors that they can fix the region’s debt crisis and he’s “confident” they will do so by the end of next month. 
“Markets aren’t everything, but markets are important,” Strauss-Kahn said in a Bloomberg Television interview with David Tweed in Paris. “You have to do something that will be seen, not only by markets, to work.” 
After rescuing Greece and Ireland, EU leaders are now seeking to overhaul the governance of the 17-nation euro area and create a permanent system to offer members financial support. While talks continue as governments prepare for two summits in Brussels next month, the EU’s decision-making process has sometimes slowed a resolution to the crisis that began more than a year ago. 
If a solution “comes too late, you’re always behind the curve,” Strauss-Kahn said in an interview after meeting with Group of 20 officials in Paris. “Talking with the most important leaders in Europe, I think they understand well the need to have a comprehensive approach” and “I’m rather confident they’ll come up with something rather comprehensive by the end of March.” 
... Euro-region finance ministers shifted the focus away from the near-term crisis management with a decision last week that the permanent said mechanism to be set up in 2013 will be able to lend 500 billion euros ($675 billion), twice the amount of the fund set up in the wake of Greece’s near-default last year. As with the current mechanism, the IMF will contribute 50 cents for every euro from European governments. 
Strauss-Kahn wasn’t alone today in stepping up pressure on EU governments. European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet told the region’s leaders that it’s up to them to retain the confidence of bond investors. 
“We call all governments in Europe without any exception” to “apply the plan they have as rigorously and as convincingly” as possible, Trichet said at a press conference in Paris after the G-20 meeting. “We have a very strong message for Portugal as well as for others. It’s up to countries to be convincing” and make their case to the markets.

Regulators felt a 'sense of shame' over taxpayer bailouts

Bloomberg reported that according to Paul Tucker, the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England, central bankers and regulators felt a 'sense of shame' because their failure led to taxpayers having to bailout the global banking system.

In response, they are proposing new rules that hopefully will allow banks to fail without requiring another taxpayer funded bailout.

The preference here is that instead of focusing on how to unwind a bank after it fails, much greater attention be spent addressing the issue of preventing the failure in the first place.

As has been discussed repeatedly on this blog, preventing failure can be achieved by fully implementing the FDR Framework and making sure that all useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.  This information can be used by the credit and equity market analysts, as well as competitors, to analyze the risk of a financial institution and price any investment in the financial institution.

When the market has the necessary information to correctly price the risk of a financial institution, it also has the ability to exert market discipline.  For example, the cost of funds to the bank will increase as the risk of the bank increases.  This in turn will serve to restrain the risk a bank takes.  [emphasis added]
Bank of England Deputy Governor Paul Tucker said regulators felt a “sense of shame” that taxpayers had to bail out banks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., as they devise rules to prevent a repeat of the financial crisis. 
“This is the worst moment in the working lives of anybody who was in office in central banking or in regulation,” Tucker said at an event at Clare College, Cambridge University, England late yesterday. Regulators are working on new rules that will allow banks to fail “partly because of the sense of shame that we all have that we brought this cost to the taxpayer.” 
Bank regulators and policy makers including finance ministers attending this week’s G-20 meeting in Paris are trying to devise new rules that will allow banks to fail without requiring taxpayer bailouts or damaging economic growth. 

Saturday, February 19, 2011

Geithner, like Haldane, thinks bank supervision needs improvement

In his interview with the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Tim Geithner seconded the observation made by the Bank of England's Andy Haldane about the need to improve the basic craft of supervision.

As regular readers of this blog know, the only way to meaningfully improve the basic craft of supervision is to follow the FDR Framework and insure that all useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.

Disclosure of this information allows the banking supervisors to benefit from the financial markets' ability to understand what this information means and take action based on this understanding.

For example, for all structured finance securities and financial institutions, current asset-level data reported on an observable event basis would be disclosed.  With this data, the credit and equity market analysts, as well as competitors, could independently analyze the risk of and value each security and financial institution.  This would lead to liquid trading markets for the securities and market discipline for the financial institutions.

In addition, this would free the banking supervisors from reliance on asking the firms they regulate for a sophisticated understanding of the regulated firms and the markets.  The banking supervisors could now ask a significant number of fully informed, independent experts. [emphasis added]
Geithner told the panel that supervision of U.S. financial institutions eroded during years of stability and needs to be improved. 
Supervisors aren’t “paid very much, they don’t get much training,” he said. “They don’t spend any time in the market. They’ve got a much less sophisticated understanding of the institutions they’re supposed to supervise than they would need to do it effectively.” 
Geithner said “nothing would make me happier than to have a bunch of generals come in and figure out how to improve the basic craft of supervision and make it tougher again.”
Providing all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants would create the necessary condition for a bunch of generals to come in and improve and toughen supervision. 

Lehman Teaches JP Morgan Lesson on Need for Current Asset-Level Disclosure

Bloomberg reported on how even a global, financial institution like JP Morgan could not value the opaque toxic structured finance securities.  In this particular case, had current asset-level data on the underlying collateral been available, JP Morgan would not have accepted the securities as collateral. [emphasis added]
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. tricked JPMorgan Chase & Co. into holding onto collateral that the bankrupt investment firm internally described as “goat poo,” according to a court filing by JPMorgan. 
JPMorgan was stuck with Lehman’s worst securities backing $25 billion of loans as Lehman was sold to Barclays Plc in September 2008, JPMorgan said in its filing yesterday in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Manhattan. Lehman described the collateral as “toxic crap” and “goat poo” to be scattered “in other people’s backyards,” JPMorgan said. 
“Only later was JPMorgan able to determine that the position in which it unexpectedly found itself was the result of collusion and deception” by Lehman and Barclays, JPMorgan said. 
The accusations appeared in amended counterclaims against Lehman in its lawsuit against JPMorgan. Both companies are based in New York. 
Lehman accuses JPMorgan of siphoning billions of dollars from Lehman, leading to it collapse in September 2008. London- based Barclays bought Lehman’s broker-dealer unit after Lehman’s bankruptcy filing. 
Kimberly Macleod, a spokeswoman for Lehman, and Mark Lane, a spokesman for Barclays, both declined to comment. 
The case is Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank NA, 10-03266, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of New York (Manhattan).

Friday, February 18, 2011

Ben Bernanke Is Still Looking For Cause of the Credit Crisis

Dear Chairman Bernanke,

Please allow me to explain the cause of the credit crisis.  The reason that I am volunteering to do this is I just finished reading your paper, "International Capital Flows and the Return to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003-2007", and I can see that you are still looking for the explanation.

As regular readers of this blog know, the cause of the credit crisis was the failure of the US government to fully implement the FDR Framework.  This framework was developed during the Great Depression and has served as the bedrock for the global financial system since that time.

Under the FDR Framework, there are strict guidelines for what governments should and should not do in dealing with the financial markets.
  • Government should ensure that all useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.
  • Government should not recommend specific investments.
In your paper, you identify a host of factors that contributed to the credit crisis. [emphasis added]
A broad array of domestic institutional factors--including problems with the originate-to-distribute model for mortgage loans, deteriorating lending standards, deficiencies in risk management, conflicting incentives for the GSEs, and shortcomings of supervision and regulation--were the primary sources of the U.S. housing boom and bust and the associated financial crisis.
In addition, the extended rise in U.S. house prices was likely also supported by long-term interest rates (including mortgage rates) that were surprisingly low, given the level of short-term rates and other macro fundamentals--a development that Greenspan (2005) dubbed a "conundrum." The "global saving glut" (GSG) hypothesis (Bernanke, 2005 and 2007) argues that increased capital inflows to the United States from countries in which desired saving greatly exceeded desired investment--including Asian emerging markets and commodity exporters--were an important reason that U.S. longer-term interest rates during this period were lower than expected.
All of these factors contributed to the credit crisis.  However, if one of these factors had not been present, its absence would not have prevented the credit crisis.

The absence of the factor that would have prevented the credit crisis was left off the list.  The factor left off was the failure of government to ensure that all the useful, relevant information was available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.

Had all the useful, relevant information been available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants, the credit crisis would not have happened.

That is a bold statement, what is the evidence to back it up?

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found and reported a considerable amount of evidence showing the critical role the lack of access to all useful, relevant information played in the crisis: [emphasis added]
Furthermore, when the crisis began, uncertainty (suggested by the sizable revisions in the IMF estimates) and leverage would promote contagion. Investors would realize they did not know as much as they wanted to know about the mortgage assets that banks, investment banks, and other firms held or to which they were exposed. To an extent not understood by many before the crisis, financial institutions had leveraged themselves with commercial paper, with derivatives, and in the short-term repo markets, in part by using mortgage-backed securities and CDOs as collateral. Lenders would question the value of the assets that those companies had posted as collateral at the same time that they were questioning the value of those companies’ balance sheets. [ pdf page 256] 
“In a context of opacity about where risk resides, . . . a general distrust has contaminated many asset classes. What had once been liquid is now illiquid. Good collateral cannot be sold or financed at anything approaching its true value,” Moody’s wrote on September.  [pdf page 281] 
The key concern for markets and regulators was that they weren’t sure they understood the extent of toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions—so they couldn’t be sure which banks were really solvent. [page 373] 
Had all the useful, relevant information been available in an appropriate, timely manner, market participants would have purchased far less "toxic" securities in the first place.  They would have seen the deteriorating underwriting standards and that the quality of the mortgages did not match the representations in the prospectus.

Had all the useful, relevant information been available in an appropriate, timely manner, market participants would also have known the extent of each bank's exposure to "toxic" assets and therefore which banks were solvent and which were not.

The issue of "toxic" assets causing solvency concerns would not have occurred because market participants would also have been able to exert discipline on the banks.  As the exposure to "toxic" assets went up, the bank's share price would have decline and the bank's cost of funds would have increased to reflect the increase in risk the bank was taking on.  A decline in share price and an increase in the cost of doing business is an unambiguous and easily understood message to bank management to cease and desist.

I look forward to meeting with you and your staff to discuss how the application of the FDR Framework going forward would restore financial markets where investors bear the risk of loss and governments are not required to bailout financial institutions.

Sincerely,

Your Humble Blogger

Future ECB head Mario Draghi Worries About Shadow Banking System

Reuters reports that Mario Draghi is concerned that increasing regulation on the traditional banking system will drive risk to the unregulated shadow banking system. [emphasis added]
The head of the Swiss-based Financial Stability Board, Mario Draghi, said on Thursday that regulators must turn their attention to the lightly regulated shadow banking sector, according to a source at a closed-door meeting where he spoke. 
Draghi, also the governor of the Bank of Italy, told a conference in Paris that increased regulation on the traditional banking system increased incentives to use other less regulated areas of the financial system. 
He also said that the FSB was looking at areas of the shadow banking sector that remain largely uncovered by oversight, citing in particular credit intermediation, using financial instruments to create new products with different maturities and leverage. 
In the financial markets, regulation and oversight is frequently an inadequate, expensive substitute for the combination of genuine transparency and market discipline.

The US Savings & Loan crisis and the Less Developed Country Debt crisis discredit the notion that heavy regulation and oversight on the traditional banking system is superior to light regulation in maintaining financial stability.

As Alan Greenspan discovered with the recent credit crisis,  market discipline without genuine transparency is not a substitute for oversight and enforcing existing regulations.

Given what has been tried to date, is financial stability, light regulation, oversight and equal treatment to both the traditional and shadow banking systems possible?

Yes, as frequent readers of this blog know.  The solution is to fully implement the FDR Framework globally across both the traditional and shadow banking systems.  This would require that all useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.

Whether it is a bank or a structured finance security or a covered bond, it should disclose current asset-level data on an observable event basis.  With this data, market participants could independently analyze the risk and value of the bank or security.

Disclosure has many benefits.

  • It is flexible enough to apply to both the traditional and shadow banking systems.  
  • It provides market participants with the information they need to properly assess the risk and reward of a bank or security.  
  • It increases oversight from just regulators to all market participants and this in turn improves the stability of the whole financial system.  
  • It is inexpensive and, thanks to 21st century information technology, easy to comply with.

Thursday, February 17, 2011

The Problem with Bank Stress Tests: Regulators

Bloomberg reported on the stress tests currently being conducted by the Fed.  As readers of this blog know, although the stress tests have not been completed, the results of these stress tests are already known.   Most, if not all, of the 19 Too Big to Fail US banks will be allowed to resume paying dividends and the global standard for acceptable capital levels will have been set.

But knowing the results gets us ahead of the story.  [emphasis added]
The banks stress-tested the performance of their loans, securities, earnings, and capital against at least three possible economic outcomes as part of a broader capital-planning exercise.
Since the banks ran the tests, why would any market participant trust the results?
... The Federal Reserve ordered the 19 largest U.S. banks to test their capital levels against a scenario of renewed recession ... “They’re essentially saying, ‘Before you start returning capital to shareholders, let’s make sure banks’ capital bases are strong enough to withstand a double-dip scenario,’ ” said Jonathan Hatcher, a credit strategist specializing in banks at New York-based Jefferies Group Inc. Regulators don’t want to see banks “come crawling back for help later,” he said.
....The Fed has told banks that it expects dividends and share buybacks to be “conservative” and allow for “significant accretion of capital,” according to a November notice. Some capital payout plans may be rejected as “inappropriate,” the notice said. 
Before capital is returned to investors wouldn't it be a good time to let the market determine if these banks are solvent (the value of their assets exceeds their liabilities)?
The review “allows our supervisors to compare the progress made by each firm in developing a rigorous internal analysis of its capital needs, with its own idiosyncratic characteristics and risks, as well as to see how the firms would fare under a standardized adverse scenario developed by our economists,” Fed Governor Daniel Tarullo said in an e-mail.
Maybe Fed Governor Tarullo forgot that the market does not care what the Fed supervisors and economists think.  They had their chance before the credit crisis to show they knew what they were doing.  They were not up to the task.

One of the lessons of the credit crisis is that investors have to do their own homework and not rely on third parties like Rating Agencies or the Fed to do their homework for them.
.... Banks will also have to consider how many faulty mortgages investors may ask them to take back into their portfolios. Standard & Poor’s Corp. estimates mortgage buybacks could cost the industry as much as $60 billion.
Can you say $1 trillion?

After all, every deal that did not have the mortgages transferred to the trustee as described in the pooling and servicing agreement is subject to being repurchased.  While the failure to convey the mortgages to the trusts might not be fraud, it looks like it violates the representation that the mortgages would be put into a trust for the investors.

In addition, as Allstate shows in its lawsuit with JP Morgan, there are also representation and warranty claims based on the difference between what the prospectus claimed was the quality of the underlying collateral and what the quality actually was.
As part of the most recent capital exam, regulators have made one of the largest data requests in Fed history, outside of normal regulatory reporting, asking banks for information about their securities, loans and other holdings. This will give the Fed the ability to check and even challenge the assumptions banks make about their portfolios.
Is it possible that the Fed has listened to your humble blogger?  Or is it just so fundamentally necessary for independently judging the results that the Fed requested asset-level data that was current at the time of the stress tests.

Of course this raises the interesting question of why does the Fed rely on the banks to run the stress tests?  Given that the Fed has the data, they could have made it available to all market participants and let all the analysts and competitors run their own stress tests.  Then, the Fed could have found out what the market's view of the solvency and capitalization of the banks is.
The tests are being overseen by a new financial-risk unit assembled by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke and Tarullo. Known as the Large Institution Supervision Coordinating Committee, or LISCC, the unit draws on the Fed’s deep bench of economists, quantitative researchers, regulatory experts and forecasters and looks at risks across the financial system.
... “The current review of firms’ capital plans is another step forward in our approach to supervision of the largest banking organizations,” Tarullo said. “It has also served as an occasion for discussion in the LISCC of the overall state of the industry and key issues faced by banking organizations.”
... The dividend increases, if they happen, will be one of the most carefully screened payouts in U.S. regulatory history, with more than 100 Fed staff working on the capital analysis of the banks.
And there is the problem with U.S. or any regulators conducting stress tests.  The Fed throws 100+ staff at bank capital analysis.  This is a fraction of what the financial markets would assign to the task.

If the current asset-level data was made available to all market participants, the number of analysts would be an order of magnitude greater.  Think of the resources that competitors would deploy in analyzing each other.
Congress is also watching. The Fed should be cautious about allowing banks to reduce their capital through dividends or stock repurchases, House Democrats, including Representative Brad Miller of North Carolina, said in a Feb. 15 letter to Bernanke. 
“We applaud your undertaking new stress tests on the banks,” the lawmakers said. “It appears doubtful, however, that the stress tests alone can resolve the uncertainty facing those banks to justify reducing their capital.”
Is it possible that Congress has also been listening to your humble blogger?  Or is it just so fundamentally necessary that Congress realizes that unless the market has current asset-level data to confirm bank solvency, there are always going to be significant doubts about the solvency of the banks.
The Fed’s involvement in decisions normally reserved for boards shows how far the Dodd-Frank Act has pushed regulators into corporate governance. 
“It is an uneasy balance between regulating an institution and running it,” said Karen Shaw Petrou, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics in Washington, a research firm whose clients include the nations’ biggest banks. The Fed is moving “far more assertively” on bank oversight, she said.
Actually, it is the Fed's choice not to have the banks disclose current asset-level data.  If the Fed elected to have this data disclosed, it would be regulating an institution under the FDR framework and not running it.

By keeping the data to itself, the Fed violates the FDR framework.  It is recommending a specific investment when it says that a bank is adequately capitalized.

Current Asset-Level Disclosure Succeeds Where Capital and Liquidity Standards Fail

Why have efforts to significantly increase bank capital and liquidity standards failed?  Because they are easily undermined by the 'least common denominator problem'.

What is the least common denominator problem?

In the world of large, global financial institutions, the least common denominator is that regulator with the easiest compliance standards.

For example, take capital at banks.  At the beginning of the credit crisis, Tim Geithner frequently commented on the need for the G-20 regulators to maintain a united front and require banks to hold much more capital.  Next month, Tim is going to set the lowest  capital standard among the global regulators.

How is he going to do this?  Currently, the Fed and the Treasury are stress testing the 19 Too Big to Fail banks.  At the end of the stress test, those banks that pass will be allowed to pay dividends because they are deemed to be adequately capitalized.  The bank with the lowest capital ratio that is deemed to be adequately capitalized sets the global standard.

None of the banks would pass if Tim were adopting the Swiss capital standards.  The Swiss capital standards are essentially the capital standards proposed in Basel III multiplied by 2.

Few of the banks would pass if Tim were adopting the Spanish capital standards.  The Spanish capital standards are essentially a ratio of 8% equity to assets.

How are Tim's easiest capital standards transmitted around the world?

Financial institutions are very good at pointing out that they would be at a competitive disadvantage if they were subjected to higher standards.  They simply have to lobby for a "Level Playing Field".

What they get in return for a level playing field is a race to the bottom in standards.

Long time readers of this blog know that your humble blogger has been pushing for disclosure of current asset-level data.  One of the reasons for this is that disclosure of current asset-level data is immune to the level playing field argument and the race to the bottom.

In fact, if one regulator embraced disclosure of current asset-level data it would create a race to the top as it would become the global standard!!!

Why would there be a global race to adopt current asset-level data?

It is only with disclosure of current asset-level data that the market can determine which banks are solvent and which are not.  As used here, solvent means that the market value of the bank's assets exceeds the bank's liabilities.

Obviously, if a bank discloses its current asset-level data and the market determines that it is solvent, it is also adequately capitalized.  It is also at a competitive advantage over its peers who do not disclose current asset-level data, because it is perceived as less risky.

In the absence of disclosure of current asset-level data, market participants will always question whether a bank is solvent or not.

So long as there are questions about whether a bank is solvent, there will also always be the companion problem of liquidity because of the potential for a 'run' on the bank.  Please recall that runs on a bank occur because of the "perception" of insolvency.  In the absence of current asset-level data, there is no actual information to disprove this perception.

Finally, unlike higher capital ratios or forcing banks to hold more liquid assets, current asset-level disclosure does not interfere in the ability of a bank to generate credit for the economy so long as the pricing of the credit properly reflects the risk of the credit.

Wednesday, February 16, 2011

Does the Banking Industry Have Too Much Capital?

In a recent investor presentation, Jamie Dimon of JP Morgan argued that inside of twelve months the US banking system will have too much capital.

Prove it!

By the end of the year, it should be possible to make available to all market participants on a current basis all the assets held by JP Morgan.  Then credit and equity market analysts, as well as competitors, can analyze these assets and determine if the value of JP Morgan's assets exceeds its liabilities.

With this data also being made available by all of JP Morgan's competitors, JP Morgan can identify and avoid the dumb competitors who, despite having lots of capital, take on too much risk.

As MarketWatch reported: [emphasis added]
By early next year, the U.S. banking industry will have too much capital, rather than too little, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. Chief Executive Jamie Dimon said Tuesday during an investor presentation. 
“I’m worried about how much capital is going to build up in the system in the U.S.,” Dimon said. “In 12 months we’re looking at a lot of capital we can’t use. That may make people do stupid things.” 
A lack of capital and liquidity in the industry turned a housing market slump into a global financial crisis in which hundreds of banks failed and governments committed hundreds of billions of dollars to save some of the largest financial institutions in the world.
According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report, the issue that triggered the freezing of the capital markets was that neither market participants like banks or regulators knew which financial institutions were solvent and which were not.

As this blog has long maintained, the only way to know if a financial institution is solvent is to be able to analyze and value the assets the financial institution currently has and see if this exceeds its liabilities.
Since then, regulators have pushed banks to increase capital so that the industry has more of a cushion for future crises. Basel III is the latest effort, although some of the details have still to be finalized. 
To paraphrase the Bard, Basel III is a lot of sound and fury signifying nothing.

In the absence of marking all of the assets to market, what exactly is the value of reporting a high level of book capital?  Lehman Brothers showed this does not prevent bankruptcy.
Citigroup Inc. (NYSE:C)   Chief Executive Vikram Pandit said Tuesday that the minimum Basel III requirement is for a core tier one capital ratio of 7%. Citi plans to operate with a ratio of 8% to 9% and aims to comply by 2012, the CEO added. 
In contrast, J.P. Morgan’s Dimon said a Basel III ratio of 7% is “completely sufficient.”
“We agree with higher capital and higher liquidity. We just don’t think it should go any further,” Dimon added. “Most of all I want it to be finished.” 
... If J.P. Morgan can’t find good ways to use excess capital, it may hold on to it, Dimon added. 
Update
This is also the end of the ability of regulators to require higher capital levels.

Sometime next month, the US Treasury and Federal Reserve are going to announce the results of the latest stress tests of the Too Big to Fail Banks.  The results are already known.  The banks are going to be found to be adequately capitalized and therefore they can begin paying dividends again.

For banks in the UK or elsewhere, this is great news.  They can make the argument that there needs to be a level playing field and they should not be required to hold more capital than US banks.  If the regulators, like Mervyn King and David Miles disagree, too bad.  The banks now have much more leverage behind their threat to leave to force the regulators to back down.

As this blog has repeatedly said, focusing on the issue of bank capital is a mistake.

Regulators need to fulfill their obligation under the FDR Framework and focus on and assure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.