Thursday, September 22, 2011

When will bailouts end? When Europe implements the FDR Framework based roadmap!

In his Telegraph column, Andrew Lilico asks the question of when will the bailouts end.  He summarizes the bailouts that have occurred since the start of the solvency crisis in 2007 as follows:

Setting aside the bailouts of late 2007 and early 2008 and just starting when it got serious, we have the bailouts of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in early September 2008, which triggered the collapse of just about everything (most notoriously Lehman Brothers), and the bailouts of Autumn 2008. Then we had the bailouts of Spring 2009. The US version of quantitative easing involved the Fed buying up loads of the loss-making collateralised mortgage obligations that triggered the bust, so the bailouts continued through 2009. Then from early 2010 we started re-branding our banking sector bailouts as "sovereign debt bailouts", as if changing the name would make it any less so that these were bailouts of banks. So we had the "Greek" bailouts of the European and US banking sectors of Spring 2010. Then the "Irish" bailout of the European, US, and UK banking sectors of Autumn 2010. Then the "Portuguese" bailout Spring 2011. Then the "Greece II" bailout of Summer 2011. All banking sector bailouts. All good money thrown after bad.
As predicted under the FDR Framework, all of these bailouts were predestined to fail because they were not accompanied by the necessary disclosure so that market participants could assess if the bailout returned the recipient to solvency.

The answer to his question is the bailouts will end with the adoption of the FDR Framework based roadmap.   The roadmap involves four basic steps:  disclosure of each bank's current asset and liability-level data; analysis of this data by both market participants and regulators; review of alternative solutions by market participants and regulators; and execution of selected solution to solvency crisis.
 

Why zero interest rate policies cause deleveraging

As I was traveling to Minneapolis today, I had a very interesting conversation -thanks Ted - about the Fed's various zero interest rate policies including quantitative easing and Operation Twist.

The key point that came out of the conversation is that interest rates below 2% provide an incentive for households and businesses to pay down their debt.

The incentive is that by paying off their debt they can earn a substantially higher risk-free rate of return than is available elsewhere. 

This is true for households even after refinancing at today's low interest rates.

As for companies, Ted said that his firm surveys CFOs and that interest rates at this level have essentially no impact on the decision to invest to expand as oppose to making the necessary capital investments to maintain existing capacity.

What zero  interest rate policies have effectively done in this financial crisis is changed the association of risk-free from applying to government securities to applying to the debt owed by individuals and companies.

This suggests that continuing low interest rate policies is in fact counter-productive.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Worried about solvency, Lloyd's of London pulls deposits out of European banks

A Bloomberg article reports that Lloyd's of London is pulling its deposits out of European banks over solvency concerns.  This is further confirmation of the on-going run on the European banks.

By withdrawing its deposits, Lloyd's is also confirming that assurances of solvency without disclosure by regulators and banks is insufficient.

As the FDR Framework predicts, it is going to take disclosure of each bank's current asset and liability-level data to restore confidence.  It is only when market participants can assess a bank's solvency using granular information that confidence in the bank returns.
Lloyd’s of London, concerned European governments may be unable to support lenders in a worsening debt crisis, has pulled deposits in some peripheral economies as the European Central Bank provided dollars to one euro-area institution. 
“There are a lot of banks who, because of the uncertainty around Europe, the market has stopped using to place deposits with,” Luke Savage, finance director of the world’s oldest insurance market, said today in a phone interview. “If you’re worried the government itself might be at risk, then you’re certainly worried the banks could be taken down with them.” 
European banks and their regulators are trying to reassure investors and customers that lenders have enough capital to withstand a default by Greece and slowing economic growth caused by governments’ austerity measures.  
Siemens AG (SIE), European’s biggest engineering company, withdrew short-term deposits from Societe Generale SA, France’s second-largest bank, in July, a person with knowledge of the matter said yesterday. 
Lloyd’s, which holds about a third of its 2.5 billion pounds ($3.9 billion) of central assets in cash, has stopped depositing money with some banks in Europe’s peripheral economies, Savage said, declining to name the countries or institutions. 
“We have a very conservatively positioned balance sheet,” Savage said. Lloyd’s also holds about a third of its assets in mainly U.S. and U.K. government bonds and a third in corporate bonds, he said....

Did the IMF endorse the FDR Framework's roadmap for addressing Europe's solvency crisis?

In his Telegraph column, Jeremy Warner analyzes not only what the IMF said in its twice yearly Global Financial Stability Report but what its message to European policymakers was.

Independent of this report, I posted a roadmap based on the FDR Framework for addressing Europe's solvency crisis.

It is clear from what the IMF said and its message to European policymakers that it would support European policymakers adopting the roadmap and addressing Europe's solvency crisis.

Most International Monetary Fund reports are necessarily the result of compromise and negotiation. Rarely is the IMF allowed by its nation shareholders to tell it exactly as it sees it. 
So the warning in the IMF's latest "Global Financial Stability Report" that European Union banks face a possible capital shortfall of €200bn to €300bn as a result of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis comes as quite an eye opener. 
European governments will have fought this assessment tooth and nail, for not only does it seem to add fuel to what is already a raging panic around the solvency of the European banking system, it also provides some indication of quite how much more public money is going to be required for recapitalisation. 
In the absence of asset and liability-level disclosure as recommended under the FDR Framework, it is necessarily public money that is needed for recapitalization.

After all, what private investors would take on the risk of losing their investment in a financial institution where they do not have the data necessary to evaluate if the financial institution will be solvent after their investment?
Banks were stress tested by European banking regulators against bad debt risk less than three months ago, and with a few notable exceptions, were found to be broadly sound....
But these stress test results did not restore market confidence as, for example, the assumptions used in the test were immediately criticized.  One of the criticisms was that the test did not adequately cover the possibility of one or more sovereign defaults/restructurings.

Regular readers know that by definition stress tests do not restore market confidence.  Stress tests are run by regulators.  The source of market confidence is market participants using granular level data from the banks to run their own stress tests.  It is the results of these stress tests that market participants believe.
The IMF is at pains to stress that the €200-300bn cited is an estimate of the increased sovereign credit risk in the EU banking system, not of the extra capital needed by banks as such. None the less, it is the IMF's best guess at the size of capital at risk. This is, if you like, the IMF's assessment of the unrealised losses in the European banking system as a result of the sovereign debt crisis. 
Of course, some of this risk may already have been written off or provided for. The point is that we just don't know, as there is no transparency in the system or commonly applied method of accounting for such assets.  
Since before the financial crisis began on August 9, 2007, I have been advocating for transparency in the global financial system.  This includes both the regulated banking system and the shadow banking system.

The reason I have done so is with transparency (disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner) we could know.

There is no reason given the availability of 21st century information technology that it should be a mystery if a bank has written off or provided for a sovereign credit.
Small wonder that many European banks can no longer access private funding markets.
Who would want to put funds into a bank if they cannot assess the risk of loss?  This assessment can either be done by the market participant or by using trusted independent third parties.
Small wonder too that European governments are so alarmed at this assessment, statement of the bleedin' obvious though it might be. Another round of bank bailouts so soon after the last one is anathma to most Europeans, worse, in some respects than the idea of bailing out sovereign nations directly. 
Yet if this crisis is ever to be resolved, the IMF is surely right in asserting that recapitalisation of the banks is one of the first things that needs to happen.
But not until after there is transparency so that the market can assess whether the recapitalizations actually restored solvency or not. 
Most people will find the idea that more than four years after the banking crisis began, the banking system continues to require squillions of public money almost beyond belief. 
It was reasonable to assume that the balance sheet problems of most banks had been "cured". Plainly they have not. Indeed the process seems barely to have begun....
Actually, assuming that the bank balance sheet problems had been "cured" is just repeating the assumption that bank balance sheets were not risky prior to the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007.

Just because global financial regulators have been saying the problem has been fixed does not mean it has been fixed.
As the IMF Stability Report warns, "Time is running out to address existing vulnerabilities. The set of policy choices that are both economically viable and politically feasible is shrinking as the crisis shifts into a new, more political phase"....
Which is where the roadmap based on the FDR Framework comes in.  It is economically viable as it limits the amount of government money needed to address solvency in the European banks and sovereigns.  It is politically feasible because it addresses the solvency crisis in a way that will result in a credible solution.

The IMF embraces the FDR Framework disclosure requirements

As reported in a Telegraph article about the IMF's twice yearly Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF embraces the FDR Framework disclosure requirements as what is needed for answering the question which European banks are solvent and which European banks are not.

The FDR Framework requires disclosure of each financial institution's current asset and liability-level data.
It estimated that the eurozone debt crisis has directly cost banks in the European Union €200bn since Greece's debt crisis erupted. Of this, €60bn comes from sovereign debt in Greece, €20bn from Ireland and Portugal, and €120bn from Belgium, Spain and Italy. 
The IMF estimated that there was a further €100bn in additional costs linked to the banks of those six countries. 
"This estimate does not measure the capital needs of banks, which would require a full assessment of bank balance sheets and income positions. Rather, it seeks to approximate the increase in sovereign credit risk experienced by banks over the past two years," the global lender said. 
The fund said that while the numbers are "based on market assessments of credit risk, which may reflect a degree of overshooting, the underlying problems that they highlight are real".

The FDR Framework provides a roadmap for addressing the European solvency crisis

Both Ed Harrison on Credit Writedowns (cross-posted on NakedCapitalism) and Larry Summers in a Financial Times column (cross-posted on a Reuters blog) called for a "credible solution" for Europe's solvency crisis.

Fortunately, the FDR Framework provides a credible roadmap for addressing the European solvency crisis.  

It addresses the solvency crisis by requiring banks to disclose all their current asset and liability details to all market participants thereby engaging the market's analytical abilities to determine who is solvent and who is insolvent.  Subsequently, policymakers can work with the market to develop a solution for the insolvent banks and sovereigns and then implementing the solution.

Going through these steps takes time.

Fortunately, by disclosing the facts now and engaging the market's analytical abilities, the roadmap eliminates uncertainty as to who is solvent and who is insolvent and buys a significant amount of time for addressing the issue.

Right now, markets are guessing about who is solvent and who is insolvent  and, if insolvent, by how much and in the process guessing if there are adequate resources to protect depositors from losses.  This has spurred the ongoing runs on the European banks and sovereigns (see here).

With the uncertainty of who is solvent eliminated, markets can see if there are adequate resources, from the host European country or from vehicles like the European Financial Stability Fund, to protect the depositors from losses.  If there are, the ongoing runs will stop so long as the market thinks the solvency issue is being addressed.

Eliminating the uncertainty over who is solvent also eliminates the fear of contagion.  Part of assessing solvency is looking at each bank's exposures and the potential impact of a restructuring on these exposures.

Eliminating the uncertainty over who is solvent also eliminates financial instability caused by brinksmanship in sovereign debt restructuring.  For example, Greece could not use a threat of default and the uncertain consequences of contagion as leverage for additional funds.  Similarly, Germany might be much more willing to help Greece if it were well known to the German public that their banks would be insolvent if Greece was not supported.

What remains to be determined is how to handle the insolvent financial institutions and sovereigns.  Market participants can help in the determination of which of these can regain its solvency on its own, which of these will need to access private capital and which of these will need to be restructured.

Regular readers recall that under the FDR Framework, governments are responsible for ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  Market participants are given an incentive to use this data to assess the risk and reward of an investment because they are responsible for any gains or losses on the investment.

Let's look at how this translates into a roadmap for addressing the European solvency crisis:
  • First, European policymakers and regulators must make a statement describing the current condition of each of the 90 banks that were stress tested.  Regulators should not simply restate the results of the stress tests, but rather state here is the bank's current condition accompanied by disclosure of the hard facts sufficient to support this statement of condition.  For an example of what this statement should look like, policymakers and regulators might want to refer to the recent disclosure by Societe Generale in its bid to win back market confidence.
    • The reason for issuing this statement is to anchor the market to the current facts about the European banks.  This replaces what is happening now where market participant's assumptions are not constrained by these facts.  In a leveraged financial system, when fear of contagion takes over, it always justifies a pre-emptive run on the banks as there is never enough equity in the system.
  • Second, European policymakers and regulators must promise to provide market participants what the Chairman of BNP Paribas called 'utter transparency'.  This involves creating a data warehouse with each bank's current asset and liability-level data.  When finished, this data will be kept current and will be made available at no cost to all market participants.
    • The reason for building the data warehouse is that over the three to four years it will take to build it provides the credibility for the policymakers' and regulators' statements about the condition of each bank.  Market participants know this granular data would not be released if it were going to show that these statements of condition were untrue.
This roadmap has several advantages.
  • It recognizes the need to reassure the markets now by ending uncertainty about the condition of each bank and sovereign.
  • It engages the market's analytical capabilities for thinking through how to address bank and sovereign solvency starting from a common point of reference.  This is critically important because it is this activity that allows market participants to accept the solution that emerges as ending the solvency crisis.
  • It restores confidence going forward because market participants have access to the granular level information they need to assess the risk and reward of investing in each country's banks and the sovereign.
Professor Summers observed,
At every stage from the first signs of trouble in Greece to the spread of problems to Portugal and Ireland, to the recognition of Greece’s inability to pay its debts in full, to the rise of debt spreads in Spain and Italy, the authorities have ... done just enough beyond euro-orthodoxy to avoid an imminent collapse, but never enough to establish a sound foundation for a resumption of confidence....
The roadmap based on the FDR Framework establishes a sound foundation for the resumption of confidence in both the European banks and sovereigns.
The process has taken its toll on policymakers’ credibility.  As I warned European friends quite some time ago, authorities who assert in the face of all evidence that Greece can service on time 100 percent of its debts will have little credibility when they later assert that the fundamentals are sound in Spain and Italy, even if their view is a reasonable one.  
After the spectacle of stress tests that treat assets where credit default swaps exceed 500 basis points as riskless, how can markets do otherwise than to ignore regulators assertions about the solvency of certain key financial institutions. 
Thank you Larry for warning the European financial community about the potential to lose credibility.  This is particularly true when policymakers engage in stress tests and partial recapitalizations without meeting the disclosure standards under the FDR Framework.

I presented a similar warning to the global financial community prior to the onset of the financial crisis (see December 2007 and February 2008).  In doing so, I also outlined the reason the crisis was about to occur and the solution to resolving it which is reflected in the roadmap based on the FDR Framework.

The roadmap increases the policymakers' credibility.  It engages the market participants in the determination of who is solvent and who is not.  More importantly, it engages the market participants in the determination of how to handle those key financial institutions that are not solvent.

In the future after the data warehouse is operating, it eliminates any need for regulators publishing the results of a stress test again and the potential for loss of credibility.
A continuation of the grudging incrementalism of the last two years risks catastrophe, as what was a task of defining the parameters of too big to fail becomes a challenge of figuring out what to do when key insolvent debtors are too large to save.  
By taking the bold step of following the roadmap based on the FDR Framework, European policymakers will firmly address the issue.

Market participants know that to end the solvency crisis requires their involvement from knowing what the facts are to their using these facts to analyze alternative solutions to their input to policymakers in the selection of a the solution that ends the problem.

As Mr. Harrison said,

It was only when the US banks were partially recapitalised in 2009 after the stress tests that the panic ended. And even so, partial recapitalisation means nagging doubts about the health of some institutions like Bank of America persist. If the US economy double dips, you should expect those doubts to increase and the doubts to spread to other institutions.
Simply bailing out financial institutions and sovereigns without the accompanying disclosure required under the FDR Framework does not tell market participants if they are solvent or not and therefore does not end the crisis.

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

European regulators signaling that banks need more capital, but how much more is the question

According to an article in the Independent, European regulators are gearing up to provide more capital to their banks.

Regular readers know that providing more capital without disclosure fails to answer the question of which banks are solvent and which are not.  Like the bailouts of 2009, it leaves open the very real possibility of the markets concluding the banks are still insolvent.

By restarting the downward spiral of relying on public backstops, this recapitalization of the banks only serves to make the sovereign solvency crisis worse.
European Competition Commissioner Joaquin Almunia has admitted that more European banks may need to be recapitalised. 
As the debt crisis deepens and banks in France and Germany exposed to countries like Italy, he said: "The worsening of the sovereign debt crisis, its impact on a fragile banking system and the continuing tensions in funding markets, all point to the possible need for further recapitalisation of banks on top of the nine that failed the stress tests earlier this year," Mr Almunia said. 
The Commission is now expected to extend rules put in place at the time of the financial crisis of 2008 that will enable Governments to provide state aid to their banks after 2011, if necessary. 
"Of course, banks should first try to finance themselves on the markets, and take all possible measures like the sale of subsidiaries and limitation of dividends, before they turn to the use of public backstops, which should be used as a last resort," he added. 
"I would have preferred to go back to normal rules sooner and this was indeed my intention until the summer."
“But the situation we are facing these days calls for an extension of the existing state aid crisis regime." 

Disclosure under FDR Framework moving closer to being Volcker Rule enforcement mechanism

In an earlier post on the Volcker Rule, your humble blogger pointed out how the FDR Framework would approach the Volcker Rule and its enforcement:
[T]here is a simple regulation [regulators] could put in place that would guarantee compliance with the Volcker Rule and eliminate proprietary trading under any name by the large Wall Street firms. 
The regulators should require that the Wall Street firms disclose to all market participants at the end of each business day each and every position in their trading and investment portfolios.
As Warren Buffett would be happy to point out, this simple regulation would dramatically squash the potential profitability of proprietary trading under any name.
According to the NY Times' Dealbook article on the UBS trading scandal, it appears that regulators are leaning to adopting this approach.

As discussed in the article, the regulators are looking at creating a data warehouse to capture the trading position data.   Your humble blogger would be happy to assist in setting up and running this data warehouse.
The Delta One desks operate in a gray area, where the line is sometimes blurred between proprietary trading and client activities like market making. A bank, for example, can buy securities from one customer with the intent of selling them to another client. But if the bank holds the assets too long or lets the stake grow too large, it may look more like a proprietary trade.
“You’re never going to be able to craft a rule that permits legitimate market-making activities that our economy desperately needs while at the same time prohibiting proprietary positions,” said Mr. Seiberg of MF Global. “That’s because one man’s market making is another man’s prop trading.”
Regulators are looking to make the boundaries clearer. After working on a draft of the Volcker Rule for weeks, they now agree on some of the thorniest provisions, including the definition of market making, according to a person with knowledge of the discussions.
But they are still debating how to enforce the regulation. While some are pushing for Wall Street to police itself in proprietary trading activity, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and other policy makers want a tougher crackdown. The agencies could leave open the possibility of a compromise plan for banks to detail their positions to data warehouses, where regulators could keep an eye on the trading. They have also discussed whether to hold executives liable should a bank skirt the rules.
Under the proposal, the definition of market making, at least for now, largely tracks the metric laid out in an earlier report by the Financial Stability Oversight Council, according to the person close to the discussions. For example, positions held for less than 60 days would draw scrutiny, as regulators ensure that the trades are either bona fide hedges or market-making deals.
It is a tough rule to get just right. Make the regulation too broad and it could prove ineffective at keeping banks from taking on too much risk. Make it too specific, and it could crimp legitimate businesses that bolster the economy.
“The challenge for regulators is to thread that needle,” said Donald N. Lamson, a lawyer at Shearman & Sterling and a former Treasury Department official who helped write the Volcker Rule. “You have to draw a line somewhere.”
Actually, the regulators do not have to draw a line anywhere.  By requiring disclosure and sharing this data with all market participants, market discipline plus the fact that it will be harder to make money from proprietary trading when all market participants know their positions will draw the line for the regulators.

Monday, September 19, 2011

Having exhausted monetary and fiscal policy it is time to turn to regulatory policy to restore confidence

As predicted under the FDR Framework, fiscal and monetary policy have not restored confidence in either the capital markets or the economy.

Since the beginning of the solvency crisis, we have tried both fiscal stimulus and austerity (see Greece and Ireland).  Neither has restored confidence nor should they as they are tools for adjusting aggregate demand in the economy at one point in time and not for addressing solvency.

Since the beginning of the solvency crisis, we have tried policies including zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing.  None of these policies has restored confidence nor should they as they are tools for adjusting aggregate demand and not for addressing solvency.

This failure to restore confidence is not surprising, because it is regulatory policy that is the source of confidence and the tool for addressing solvency.

It is the ongoing failure of regulatory policy that is causing the solvency crisis to continue.  It is the ongoing failure of regulatory policy that undermines confidence and stymies expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.

Why has regulatory policy failed?  It has failed because the key to ending a solvency crisis is answering the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent.  This question is the starting point for determining how to address the insolvent banks and sovereigns.

In their defense, the global financial regulators would say that they have adopted policies to answer the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent.  They have engaged in bank recapitalization and stress tests.

These policies were predestined to fail in the absence of the ability of market participants to Trust but Verify.

Why should market participants trust the regulators given their pre- and post- solvency crisis track record?  Before the solvency crisis, the regulators failed to fulfill their number one responsibility of preventing the crisis from occurring in the first place.  Since the beginning of the solvency crisis, regulators have run stress tests that have been discredited shortly after the results were announced.

As predicted under the FDR Framework, it is only by providing market participants with access to each bank's current asset and liability-level data and each structured finance security's current loan-level performance data that the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent can be answered.
  • It is only when market participants have this data that they can value the structured finance securities.  
  • It is only when market participants can value the structured finance securities and all the assets on each bank's balance sheet that they can determine which banks are solvent and which are not.
The reason that market participants must analyze this granular level data for themselves is that it is the only way for them to trust their valuation.  It is this trust in their own valuations that is the source of confidence in both the capital markets and the economy.
  • It is only after doing this analysis that market participants have assessed the risk of an investment in the banking system and are willing to be responsible for all gains or losses on any new investments they make in bank related securities.  
  • It is only when market participants have the confidence to invest in the banking system that they have confidence to invest in the economy.
Until market participants have access to current asset and liability-level data or are promised that they will get this level of disclosure, confidence will continue to deteriorate as the market participants assume that policy makers and regulators must have something to hide.

If market participants cannot have confidence in their banking system, it is impossible for them to have confidence in their economies.

Sunday, September 18, 2011

FDR Framework 101

A Bloomberg article reports that
European banks are “grossly under- capitalized” and the debt crisis is more serious for the region than the 2008 meltdown as governments are constrained by fiscal pressures, former U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown said. 
“In 2008, governments could intervene to sort out the problems of banks,” Brown said at the World Economic Forum in the Chinese port city of Dalian today. “In 2011, banks have problems, but so too do governments.” 
Investor skittishness over Europe’s sovereign debt crisis raised lenders’ funding costs and caused a rout in the region’s banking stocks this month. European Central Bank President Jean- Claude Trichet pressed euro-area governments late yesterday to take decisive action to restore confidence after the ECB extended an emergency lifeline to lenders. 
Brown said that while the ECB is part of the short-term solution, it needs additional assistance. 
The European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, which is run by the European Union’s 27-nation executive arm, is “not enough,” Brown said. “Substantially more resources” are required, including from the International Monetary Fund and lenders including China, he said....
“European banks as a whole are grossly under- capitalized,” Brown said. “We’ve now got the interplay between banks that are not properly capitalized and sovereign debt problems that have arisen partly because we’ve socialized or accepted responsibility for the banks’ liabilities.”
With this background in mind, a quick review of the FDR Framework and how it could restore confidence and help to address the bank and country solvency problems in Europe is useful.

The FDR Framework gets its name from both the President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whose administration introduced the philosophy of disclosure to the capital markets and from the framework's focus on financial disclosure requirements.

FDR introduced disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to accomplish two linked goals.  First, to restore confidence in the markets.  Second, to keep the government out of making investment recommendations.  Disclosure achieves both of these goals because it allows market participants to analyze the information disclosed for themselves to assess the risk and reward of any investment.

There was one part of the financial system that disclosure could not be introduced to:  banking.  Simply put, without access to 21st century information technology, it is not possible to disclose to all market participants each bank's current asset and liability-level data (all the useful, relevant information) in an appropriate, timely manner.

Instead, his administration set up a system where the government both regulated and supervised the banks.  Included in bank supervision was the idea of bank examiners having access to and looking at the current asset and liability-level data 24/7/365.

Unfortunately, the lack of disclosure also meant that the market participants were dependent on the bank regulators to properly analyze the risk of each bank and convey it to the market.

Besides the historically opaque banks, there was another source of opacity in the financial system.  That source was Wall Street and the products it developed.  As Yves Smith observed on NakedCapitalism, no one on Wall Street was paid for developing low margin, transparent products.

Examples of opaque products Wall Street developed include structured finance securities and exchange traded funds.  While both are conceptually simple, that was before Wall Street engineered opacity into the information needed to value these products.  Neither of these products provide investors with all the useful, relevant information on the underlying "assets" in an appropriate, timely manner so that investors can value the product.

The FDR Framework is the backbone for a financial system based on using 21st century information technology both to facilitate disclosure and the analysis of the disclosure.

Under this framework, governments are responsible for ensuring that every market participants can access all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  This includes current asset and liability-level data for banks.

Under this framework, market participants have an incentive to assess each investment using the disclosed information because, under the principle of caveat emptor, they are responsible for any gains or losses on the investment.

Previously, this blog discussed how using the FDR Framework, policymakers and regulators in Europe could restore confidence and address the issue of bank and sovereign solvency.  This involves two steps.

Step one is for the policymakers and regulators to issue a statement that describes what the actual condition of each bank is providing as needed the hard facts to back up the analysis (this is something that Societe Generale did recently in a bid to restore confidence).

Step two is for the policymakers and regulators to promise and implement utter transparency (set up a data warehouse where all market participants can access the current asset and liability-level data for each bank).

Setting up this data warehouse is critically important, because market participants will put far more faith in the analysis if they see that the data is going to be released that confirms or debunks the analysis.  The market is likely to give the analysis the benefit of the doubt because not releasing the data suggest there is something to hide.