Thursday, June 28, 2012

Ecclesiastical fund manager: 'UK banks are the last place an investor should be'

The Telegraph interviewed Ecclesiastical fund manager Robin Hepworth.  Ecclesiastical was formed 125 years ago to address the church's financial needs.  His observation about UK banks is presented without further comment:
“We have had very little exposure to UK banks for around five years, and we maintain that call. UK banks are poorly funded and undercapitalised,” he said. “UK banks are the last place an investor should be.” 

Barclays rate rigging shows 'corruption at the heart of our banking system'

A Telegraph article focuses on the real issue with the Libor interest rate scandal:  five years after the financial crisis began we have still not implemented common sense reforms like requiring valuation transparency in all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Requiring valuation transparency should be a no brainer given that our financial markets are based on the philosophy of disclosure.  Specifically, it is the government's job to ensure that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to make a fully informed investment decision.

Useful, relevant information is not restricted to the last price a security traded at.  As intended by the FDR administration, it is the information needed to independently assess the value of a security in the absence of price.

The FDR administration recognized that the investment process goes as follows:  independently assess the value of the security, look at price shown by Wall Street, and then and only then make a portfolio management decision to buy, hold or sell.

Regular readers know that it was the opaque areas of the financial system that bankers exploited and that failed when the financial crisis began.  Opaque areas included both banks and structured finance securities.  The former saw the interbank lending market freeze and the latter saw a collapse in both primary issuance and in use as security for repurchase agreements.

The Libor interest rate is another example of an opaque area of the financial system that was exploited by bankers for their benefit.

Mr Vicary-Smith [chief executive of Which?] said that four years on from the financial crisis there is “no evidence that the worst culture and practices in banking have changed at all”. 
He said: “Once again another scandal highlights the corruption at the heart of our banking system, with no individuals held to account and senior bankers behaving as if they are above the law.....
Mr Vicary-Smith accused the British Bankers Association (BBA), which represents the banking industry, of being silent on the matter.
“The BBA, which is so visible when it campaigns against banking reform yet today is silent, must not escape scrutiny for its role in managing the Libor scheme. It is surely time for this crucial function to be handed to an accountable authority capable of ensuring the information provided by banks is robust,” he said.
It is already the government's role to ensure the information provided by banks is robust.

The question is why wasn't the information robust?
Meanwhile Brendan Barber, the general secretary of the TUC, said that regulatory failure is behind the crisis. 
“Barclay’s rigging of interest rates, which other banks may well have colluded with, shows how light-touch regulation in the City has allowed dodgy practices and reckless behaviour to flourish unchecked. 
A potential answer is that the regulators did not do their job.
“Directors’ attempts to palm the crisis off with a few lost bonuses is insulting to taxpayers who have paid so heavily for bankers’ incompetence. This scandal needs a tougher response from the bank and the government to stop further abuses from taking place,” said Mr Barber.
The much tougher response would be to enforce those draconian disclosure requirements that are at the heart of our financial system and are a necessary for the financial system to function properly.



British Bankers' Association asks government to regulate Libor

The Financial Times is reporting this morning that the British Bankers' Association is asking the UK government to step in to regulate and supervise how Libor is set.

Regular readers know that the only way to restore confidence in Libor is by basing it off of actual trades that are disclosed to all market participants.

As a result, the BBA is asking the UK government to require that banks provide transparency and disclose all of their asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this data that market participants can cross-check one bank's assets with another bank's liabilities.

It is only with this data that market participants can decide which trades to include in setting Libor.
The British Bankers’ Association has asked the UK government to consider regulating and supervising the setting of the London interbank rate offered rate at the heart of Barclays’ £290m penalty for rates manipulation. 
Under a historical quirk, the process of setting Libor has always been considered a private activity run by the banking trade body, although the banks who participate in the rate-setting process are regulated by the Financial Services Authority. 
Barclays admitted Wednesday that its submissions to the Libor process were improperly affected by requests from traders to move the rate to the benefit of their derivative positions, as well as by a desire to make the bank look stronger during the financial crisis.....
The goal of disclosure is to provide market participants with an accurate picture of what is happening.  Barclays' desire to paint a false picture of greater strength confirms the need for ultra transparency.
The BBA is currently reviewing the way Libor, which is the basis for $350tn in contracts world wide, is set amid probes that have swept in nearly 20 banks and a dozen regulators on three continents. 
In a statement on Thursday, the trade body said: “The British Bankers’ Association is shocked by yesterday’s report about Libor.
Shocked in the same way as discovering that there is gambling going on?
“The current Libor review, with which our authorities are fully engaged, has been under way since March this year and is considering all aspects including the setting process. As part of this review we will now be asking the authorities to consider in what manner the Libor setting mechanism should be regulated in the future.”
Update
The Lex column of the Financial Times supports your humble bloggers call for using actual data.
But it is also important that the industry and the regulators now rethink the way in which Libor is calculated. 
Whenever possible, benchmark rates should be based on actual interbank lending rates, which are more difficult to manipulate.
So that market participants can confirm the actual interbank lending rates and eliminate manipulation requires banks provide ultra transparency.
Estimates should only be used when hard data are not available and these should be routinely cross-checked against other data on bank-risk, with corroboration sought from other banks, so as to identify who is cheating. 
From personal loans to mortgages, Libor affects the entire credit market. A benchmark that cannot be trusted has no point.
Please re-read the highlighted text and remember that in the financial markets trust is a direct result of disclosure!

Update II
Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been writing on and talking about opacity and the harm opacity causes the financial markets since before the financial crisis.  I have always done this talking about the solution:  transparency.

They also know that your humble blogger has focused on structured finance and banks as examples of opaque areas of the financial system that need the sunlight provided by transparency to disinfect them.

Finally, they know that Libor is just another example of opacity and the harm it does to financial markets.

That said, I want to offer a special recognition to ZeroHedge for identifying and calling attention to the Libor scandal.  ZeroHedge has done a terrific job in discussing the who, what and why of the Libor scandal and calling attention to it in the first place.

If your humble blogger has added any value to the discussion, I hope it is in talking about how transparency can be used as the basis for a 'new' Libor that can be trusted and not manipulated by the banks.

'Manipulating Libor is manipulating the price of money itself'

In his Telegraph column, Damian Reece explains the true implications of Barclays admitting that it manipulated the Libor benchmark interest rate means:

Libor – the London Inter Bank Offered Rate – is the primary market rate of interest. The Bank of England sets the official policy rate but Libor is the actual cost to a bank of borrowing unsecured funds from one another overnight. Without that flow of funds the financial system doesn't work. 
Please note that the interbank unsecured lending market froze at the beginning of the financial crisis.  It froze because in the absence of ultra transparency no bank could determine which banks were solvent and which banks were not and as a result they were unwilling to lend.

One of the reasons for requiring banks provide ultra transparency and disclose all of their exposure details is to prevent the interbank unsecured lending market from freezing in the future and keeping the financial system working.
That's why interest rates on subsequent loans of any shape or size are set at a margin above Libor. It's where the market pricing of money, or credit, begins. 
And given these loans become tradeable assets in themselves, with a multitude of derivative contracts – or financial bets – attached to them, Libor is used to price these markets too. It's the rate of interest charged at the very base of the financial pyramid. 
US regulators on Wednesday gave a useful sketch of what that global pyramid looks like and why Libor is so important. At the apex it reckons there are loans worth $10 trillion (£6.4 trillion) priced off Libor. There are then interest rate swaps (derivatives which are insurance against adverse interest rate movements) worth $350 trillion, also priced with reference to Libor, and then at the base of this tower eurodollar futures (short-term loans which are also bets on interest rate movements) worth $564 trillion.
Based on the US regulators pyramid, the value of any change in Libor is calculated by multiplying the change in Libor by $900 trillion by the number of days the change occurs over divided by 360.

If Libor moves up or down by 1/100 of 1%, otherwise known as 1 basis point, we are talking $90 billion on an annualize basis.

This is a really big number.

Said another way, look at the size of the incentive to move Libor by say 3 basis points.  We are talking over $250 billion or a quarter of a trillion annually!  Even by government standards, we are talking about real money.
Given this, it's surprising that setting the rate for Libor is unregulated. But it's not even subject to the full forces of the free market either. It emerges from a 16-strong cartel of banks which, as we now know, was ripe for abuse. 
Regular readers are not surprised that Libor is unregulated.  They know that it is another example of the regulators allowing the banks to bring opacity into the financial system.

Had the regulators required banks to provide ultra transparency, Libor would not have been ripe for manipulation.  Instead it would have been based off of actual trades from the beginning.
By manipulating Libor, up or down, Barclays could variously make profits on its own interest rate punts or give a dishonest impression to the market of its own cost of funding. It was, according to its own staff, "being dishonest by definition". 
It can't get much worse. Except it can, because Barclays is just the first bank to settle. 
There's a string of Libor-related cases about to break, that will drag a number of household names into a scandal. The fines meted out to Barclays totalling £290m ($452m) will surely top $1bn before regulators are through.

Since the cost of manipulating the benchmark interest rate is a small fine which pales in comparison to the value of manipulating Libor, it would be surprising that banks did not manipulate the rate from Day 1.  The regulators were able to track manipulation back to at least 2005.


This fine is a trivial cost of doing business.

At this point, there is only one way to restore confidence in the global financial system.  That is to recognize that sunshine is the best disinfectant and shine it onto all of the opaque corners of the financial system.

Your humble blogger would recommend that we start with the banks and structured finance securities.

Given the Libor Scandal there is no excuse for the global financial regulators not to require banks to provide ultra transparency or require structured finance securities to provide observable event based reporting effective immediately.

Every day the global financial regulators fail to do so will be another day that erodes investor confidence in the markets.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Call by Bank of England to Barclays about Libor makes case for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency

According to a Bloomberg report, during the height of the financial crisis the Bank of England made a call to Barclays that may have triggered the submission of false data for setting Libor.

Regular readers know that the only way investors will ever trust the financial markets is if there is the disinfectant of sunlight being shone on all the opaque corners of the financial system.  This includes bringing ultra transparency to banks by requiring them to provide on an ongoing basis disclosure of their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, Libor could be based on actual trades as opposed to make believe.

With this information, inquiries by regulators don't trigger interest rate manipulation.

With this information, the question of did the regulator request Barclays lie to lower Libor does not get raised (remember, unless the call was recorded (was it and if not why not?), there is plausible deniability about what was said and the action taken).

Without this information, there is the perception that the Bank of England might have had a very good reason for wanting Barclays to lie about Libor as it would make the banks appear to be stronger than they were.

As a practical matter, the interbank lending market had frozen as no one could tell who was solvent and who was not and as a result who was likely to repay any funds and who was not.  As a result, Libor was complete make believe.

Barclays Plc (BARC) deliberately reported artificially low borrowing costs at the height of the 2008 financial market turmoil after a senior manager discussed external perceptions about the bank’s strength with regulators at the Bank of England. 
Barclays, which was fined $453.2 million by U.S. and U.K. regulators for submitting false London and euro interbank offered rates, “believed mistakenly that they were operating under an instruction from the Bank of England” to lower its Libor submissions, Britain’s Financial Services Authority said today. 
The case is the first in an international investigation into whether banks tried to manipulate Libor, the benchmark rate for $360 trillion of securities, to hide their true cost of borrowing as financial markets were roiled by the September 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
At that time, Barclays was concerned about how it was being perceived due to its higher Libor submissions relative to other banks whose reported borrowing costs helped establish the benchmark rate, the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission said in its order today. 
“Even though it maintained that its liquidity position was in fact strong, Barclays was increasingly worried about these market and media perceptions,” the CFTC order said. 
In October 2008, the Bank of England had a telephone conversation with a senior individual at Barclays in which it raised questions about the bank’s liquidity position and relatively high Libor submissions, the CFTC said. 
In reaction to the external pressure and the discussion with the Bank of England, Barclays believed it needed to lower its Libor submissions, the CFTC said.

According to the U.K.’s FSA, the Bank of England did not instruct Barclays to lower its Libor submissions during the phone call. 
Instead, a “misunderstanding or miscommunication” occurred within Barclays as the substance of the conversation was relayed down the chain of command, the FSA said. 
A Bank of England spokesman said the call was one of many regular market calls made by the bank and was conducted by Paul Tucker, who was markets director at the time and is now the central bank’s deputy governor for financial stability. 
A member of Barclays’ senior management later instructed the employees to lower the Libor submissions for dollars and sterling so Barclays would be “within the pack,” or in line with rates reported by the other banks, according to the order. The employees, whose identities were withheld by investigators, reluctantly complied with the request, the CFTC said.

“I will reluctantly, gradually and artificially get my libors in line with the rest of the contributors as requested,” the Barclays employee responsible for submitting dollar borrowing costs said in an e-mail cited in the CFTC order. “I will be contributing rates which are nowhere near the clearing rates for unsecured cash and therefore will not be posting honest prices.”

As a result of the Libor scandal, will Barclay's recognize only providing ultra transparency will restore its credibility?

In his Wall Street Journal Heard on the Street column, Simon Nixon observed
Barclays can live with the fine, but damage to the bank's reputation and that of its top management, none of whom has resigned, could be lasting. 
Barclays says many of those directly responsible now have left the bank. Some employees may yet face disciplinary and even criminal proceedings, according to people briefed on the situation. 
The bank says top managers were unaware of the abuses, cooperated fully with the investigation, settled quickly and have introduced new processes to prevent this from happening again.....
But this isn't good enough. The regulatory documents show that, at best, Mr. Diamond and his team presided over a culture of sloppiness, greed and a lack of concern for clients' interests. At worst, employees' behavior flirted with criminality. 
For all Mr. Diamond's recent homilies about "citizenship," investors will wonder whether an unchanged top team is really best-placed to restore the confidence of clients and regulators....
Certainly, [the Libor scandal] threatens to further undermine public confidence in the investment-banking industry at a time when its business model and ingrained conflicts of interest are under unprecedented scrutiny. 
The scandal also threatens to do further damage to the reputation of London as a financial center. The Barclays settlement comes just days after a U.S. senator publicly noted how many boom-time scandals originated in London. 
All the more reason why Barclays should show real citizenship by taking the sort of action that might signal the world it truly understands the gravity of this scandal.
Regular readers know that there is only one way for Barclays to restore its credibility after it confessed to manipulating one of the key market interest rates to the detriment of investors and borrowers.

Restoring credibility and trust can only be achieved by voluntarily providing ultra transparency and disclosing on an on-going basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this data that market participants can confirm that Barclays is not trying to manipulate Libor again.

It is only with this data that Barclays can show that it is a good citizen and is focused on supporting the real economy and not operating a casino.

It is only by providing this data that Barclays can hope to restore the confidence of clients, regulators and investors.  

The failure to provide this data is an announcement that Barclays has something to hide and should not be trusted.

I look forward to talking with Mr. Diamond shortly and working with Barclays as it steps up to show real citizenship and leadership in the City by providing ultra transparency.

With Barclay's admission of manipulating Libor, banks face billions in claims

No sooner had your humble blogger pointed out the first rule of large numbers, but the Telegraph now reports that banks are facing billions in claims as a result of manipulating Libor.

Regular readers know that manipulating Libor is just one example of what the banks did in every opaque corner of the financial system.  The only way to end these practices is to shine the bright light of transparency and disinfect the financial system.

Damages claims running to billions of dollars against the world’s biggest banks have been given fresh “credibility” by Barclays £290m Libor settlement, lawyers said. 
The British bank is already named as a defendant in various class actions around the world, where investors are seeking compensation for buying financial instruments based on a Libor benchmark that was allegedly manipulated. 
One of the biggest class-action claims has been filed in New York by the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and the City of New Britain Firefighters and Police Benefit Fund.
Barclays is named as one of around 20 defendants, which also include Royal Bank of Scotland and HSBC, as well as US lenders Bank of America, Citigroup and JP Morgan. 
The action is co-ordinated with five other lawsuits, including a claim by discount brokerage Charles Schwab against 11 banks, including Barclays. 
The sums involved are potentially vast. Libor is used to price various financial products. The Bank for International Settlements calculates that the market for over-the-counter interest rate derivatives, such as swaps, had a notional value of more than $500 trillion in 2011. Just a small element of proven mispricing could trigger billions of dollars of claims.


Libor manipulation could have cost borrowers billions

The first rule of very large numbers is:  multiplying a very large number by a small number results in a large number.

When it comes to manipulation of the Libor interest rate, we are talking about small number.  When we are talking about the value of the financial instruments that reprice off of Libor we are talking about a very large number.

By applying the first rule of very large numbers, we know that the result of the manipulation will be a large number.

According to a Telegraph article,

The British and US authorities said they had found evidence Barclays had attempted to manipulate a key borrowing rate for years, meaning that home owners could have paid millions more in mortgage payments than they might otherwise have had to. 
Traders at the bank were discovered to have engaged in regular attempts to determine the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) from as early as 2005. 
The manipulation of Libor saw the bank make submissions to the setters of the rate that they knew to be wrong as they attempted to influence the level at which it was fixed. 
Barclays also attempted to suppress Libor, which means that savers could have potentially lost out on millions in interest due to the rate being lower than it should otherwise have been.
Please re-read the highlighted text as by itself it shows why the only way to restore confidence in Libor going forward is to base it off of actual trades.

Trades that are disclosed as part of each bank providing ultra transparency and disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

By requiring the banks to disclose all of their liability details, banks are prevented from manipulating Libor by cherry-picking one or two trades.

By requiring the banks to disclose all of their liability details, market participants can do a better job of assessing the true cost of funds to the banks.  For example, they might take the average cost of funds for all trades or they might take the average cost of funds for trades after excluding the most expensive and least expensive trades.

Breaking up big banks hard as regulators protect them from market forces

Bloomberg ran a long article on how breaking up the Too Big to Fail banks is hard as regulators protect the banks from market forces.

Regular readers are familiar with how the financial regulators' information monopoly shields the banks from market discipline related to investors adjusting the price and amount of their exposures based on the riskiness of the bank.  This article extends the financial regulators protection into different forms of market discipline.

Politicians and regulators have resisted calls from some investors to split up conglomerates that were assembled over two decades by executives such as former Citigroup Chief Executive Officer Sanford “Sandy” Weill and former Bank of America CEO Ken Lewis. 
These universal banks offered customers everything from checking accounts and insurance to derivatives trading and merger advice....
There’s little sign that market forces are changing the universal-banking strategy. 
Corporate raiders or potential takeovers don’t provide the same impetus for banks as they do in other industries. Laws prohibit non-financial firms from buying lenders, and banks can’t make purchases that give them more than 10 percent of U.S. deposits.... 
Legal obstacles create barriers to market discipline through change in control of the bank.
After the crisis, policy makers, politicians and former bankers began calling for a breakup of too-big-to-fail banks. They’ve included former Citigroup co-CEO John Reed, U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown, an Ohio Democrat, former Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City PresidentThomas Hoenig and Dallas Fed President Richard Fisher.... 
That wasn’t the course taken by Greenspan’s successor, Ben S. Bernanke, and Timothy F. Geithner, who led the New York Fed before President Barack Obama appointed him Treasury secretary. 
They supported legislation that allowed the banking conglomerates to remain intact and sought to address the risks of future collapse by requiring them to hold more capital, submit to new regulations and prepare living wills to help the government dismantle them in the case of a calamity.
To Ira M. Millstein, a senior partner at New York law firm Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP ..... “we’re simply allowing regulators who missed the boat the first time to try again with even more regulation.”
Regulators create a barrier as they want to show they are up to the task of supervising large firms.  Regulators have an ego too.
Fisher, who said he has been underweight bank stocks compared with benchmark indexes for three years, sees another explanation for why banks stick to their model. 
“The inherent nature of a lot of CEOs is to love empire building,” Fisher said. “The ones that love empire-building will do whatever he or she can to dissuade the board of directors” from breaking their companies up.
High compensation for bank CEOs and their boards of directors is another reason they’re resistant to change, according to David Ellison, president of FBR Fund Advisors Inc. in Arlington, Virginia, and chief investment officer of FBR Equity Funds....
High compensation and empire building go together.  The bigger the empire, the more both management and the directors can be paid.
Managements and boards also are protected from market forces in ways they wouldn’t be at industrial conglomerates, said Amar Bhide, a professor at the Fletcher School of Law at Tufts University. Regulators won’t permit leveraged buyouts of banks, and the largest U.S. lenders are too large to be candidates for LBOs, he said. 
“Unless somebody comes in and says, ‘Aha, this bank is trading so far below book value that I can come in and break it up and sell the pieces,’ what’s the incentive for the boards of directors?” Bhide said. “Banking is an industry where these things are simply not allowed.’”
One of the reasons that banks trade so far below book value is that book value is overstated as a result of regulatory forbearance.  It is not at all clear that without ultra transparency under which banks disclose all of their exposure details that anyone would be willing to step up and buy a bank when you cannot tell if it is solvent or not.

Barclay's admission of manipulating Libor confirms ultra transparency needed so Libor can be based on actual trades

Bloomberg reported that Barclay's has admitted it manipulated Libor during the financial crisis, has paid a $453 million fine and has stripped the bonuses from CEO Bob Diamond and three other bankers.

The only way to prevent this ever occurring again is to base Libor off of actual trades and not on easy to manipulate estimates.

The best way to base Libor off of actual trades is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Market participants can use the information from the liability details to calculate Libor.

With all of the liability details, as opposed to a single trade, market participants are in a better position to establish what are the real funding costs a bank faces.  This results in a more trustworthy interest rate.

Barclays Plc (BARC) was fined 290 million pounds ($453.2 million), the largest penalties ever imposed by regulators in the U.S. and U.K., after admitting it submitted false London and euro interbank offered rates. 
Chief Executive Officer Robert Diamond and three lieutenants will forgo their bonuses as a result, Britain’s second-biggest bank by assets said in a statement today. 
Derivatives traders requested the false submissions in the Libor and Euribor setting process, as they were “motivated by profit and sought to benefit Barclays’ trading positions,” Britain’s Financial Services Authority said....
Barclays tried to influence other banks’ Euribor submissions and reduced their Libor submissions during the financial crisis “as a result of senior management’s concerns over negative media comment,” the FSA said. The breaches included “a significant number of employees and occurred over a number of years,” the regulator said....
Please re-read the highlighted text as it is an example of how Wall Street tries to benefit from opacity.  It is also an example of why ultra transparency is needed.
“Libor and Euribor are critically important benchmark interest rates,” said Lanny A. Breuer, assistant attorney general of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division. “Because mortgages, student loans, financial derivatives, and other financial products rely on Libor and Euribor as reference rates, the manipulation of submissions used to calculate those rates can have significant negative effects on consumers and financial markets worldwide.”
A negative impact on consumers and financial markets, but a positive impact on banker bonuses!
Barclays traders in New York, London and Tokyo attempted to manipulate rates to benefit their trading positions in swaps and futures that were tied to the rates, according to the CFTC. 
Traders at Barclays made the requests regularly and sometimes daily from mid-2005 through 2007 and sometimes later until 2009, the agency said in a statement.
How much money did Barclays make as a result of manipulating Libor?
“Banks that contribute information to those benchmarks must do so honestly,” David Meister, the CFTC’s director of enforcement, said in a statement. “When a bank acts in its own self-interest by attempting to manipulate these rates for profit, or by submitting false reports that result from senior management orders to lower submissions to guard the bank’s reputation, the integrity of benchmark interest rates is undermined.”
The only way to enforce honesty and maintain the integrity of Libor is by requiring ultra transparency.
Senior Barclays managers told staff to submit artificially low rates to Libor from August 2007 until early 2009 to boost the bank’s financial condition, according to the CFTC....
I wonder what a banker has to do to get suspended from working for a financial institution if trying to manipulate Libor results in a slap on the wrist from regulators?
Traders at Barclays also coordinated and abetted with traders at other banks to manipulate Euribor, including affecting rates on specific dates when derivatives contracts are settled or reset, according to the CFTC.... 
Libor is derived from a survey of banks conducted each day on behalf of the British Bankers’ Association in London. Lenders are asked how much it would cost them to borrow from each other for 15 different periods, from overnight to one year, in currencies including dollars, euros, yen and Swiss francs. After a set number of quotes are excluded, those remaining are averaged and published for each currency by the BBA before noon. 
Employees responsible for Libor submissions have said in interviews with Bloomberg News they regularly discussed where to set the measure with traders sitting near them, interdealer brokers and counterparts at rival banks. The talks became common practice after money markets froze in 2007, they said, making it difficult for individual bankers to gauge the cost of borrowing from other lenders.
Regulators are focusing on the lack of so-called Chinese walls between traders and employees making interest-rate submissions on behalf of their banks, and whether the banks’ proprietary trading desks exploited the information they had about the direction of Libor to trade interest-rate derivatives.
As I said, it is time for ultra transparency and cleaning up all the opaque corners of the financial system.