Monday, July 30, 2012

French regulator: most post-crisis measures are justified

In an IFLR interview, Edouard Vieillefond, a managing director of France's financial regulator, asserted that taken individually, most post-crisis measures are justified.

A defense of the regulatory response to the financial crisis is exactly what should be expected from the Financial-Academic-Regulatory Complex (FARC) as their response exacerbated the financial crisis and has done almost nothing to prevent the next crisis.

One of the key pillars of the regulatory response has been to require banks to achieve a much higher level of capitalization.  For example, EU banks had to reach a 9% Tier I capital ratio by the end of last month.

The result of this drive for higher capital levels has been two-fold: retention of zombie loans on bank balance sheets and an EU-wide credit crunch for creditworthy borrowers.

Together, these have had a major negative impact on the real economy.  Supporting zombie loans siphons capital out of the real economy that is needed for reinvesting in the real economy.  The credit crunch for creditworthy borrowers crushes growth in the real economy.


Equally importantly, the focus on higher capital levels is completely misplaced as a modern banking system is designed so that banks can protect the real economy by absorbing the losses in the financial system.  Banks can do this because with deposit insurance and access to central bank funding banks can operate for years with negative book capital levels.

Regular readers know that the regulatory response by FARC was designed to protect FARC and not to actually address the causes of the underlying financial crisis.  As a result, the French regulator is out trying to defend the indefensible.

We had a crisis that resulted from opacity in the financial system.  Specifically, opacity that prevented market participants from having access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

Examples of this type of opacity are banks (think BoE's Andrew Haldane's "black boxes") and structured finance securities (think your humble blogger's "brown paper bags").

None of the regulatory responses address this type of opacity as doing so would greatly reduce the need for financial regulations.

When it comes to influencing the direction of regulatory reform in Europe, France has a leading role. Indeed, the Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) identified the problems posed by money market funds (MMFs) and exchange traded funds (ETFs) long before they became key issues on the international agenda.   
And France is now witnessing a unique phase in global economic history. Banks are scrambling to meet new recapitalisation requirements imposed to stave off another financial crisis, the eurozone is entrenched in a debt crisis and, with the seemingly unstoppable rise of the Chinese super-power in the east, the world economic order looks set to change dramatically.  
Against a backdrop of so much uncertainty, IFLR took the opportunity to speak with Edouard Vieillefond, the managing director in charge of the regulatory policy and international affairs division of the French regulator. It was a chance for Vieillefond to set the record straight on the views of the AMF, one of the key players on the international stage at this crucial juncture.... 
the French regulator discusses everything from the huge changes in financing economy and what he has learnt from the eurozone crisis, to whether he worries about unintended consequences of regulation. 
Most European banks are on course to implement Basel III ahead of schedule. Do you think we run this risk of going overboard with financial regulation? 
The consequences of Basel III will be crucial for everyone. It will mean big changes in the way the European economy is financed. Sometimes there are complaints about the unintended consequences of regulation. We should be reasonable: taken individually, most of the post-crisis measures such as Basel III are justified.
They are only justified if they address a cause of the financial crisis and not a symptom.
Let’s remember what happened and the reasons why we are asking for more capital and more liquidity. There wasn’t enough capital, probably not enough liquidity and there was insufficient collateral in transactions.
Lack of capital and liquidity were symptoms of the problem.  The problem was opacity.  With opacity, market participants cannot tell if the banks have adequate capital and/or liquidity.
Today banks have two constraints: capital and liquidity. In future, they will have three, with collateral soon to be added to the list thanks to rules such as Emir [the European market infrastructure regulation].
 This doesn't address the opacity problem.  In fact, as discussed above, it only makes the situation worse.
But we probably need to be mindful at the cumulative consequences of all regulations and take into account the overall regional effect of MiFID II [markets in financial instruments directive], Emir, Basel III, and Solvency II for the insurance sector. 
Banks should avoid deleveraging at the expense of the economy. Instead, they should seek where possible to use other tools to reinforce their capital. According to the European Banking Authority (EBA), around 80% of bank restructuring in Europe is carried out not through deleveraging but through the addition of more capital, the transformation of hybrid products into equity, selling non-strategic assets and so on.
As your humble blogger predicted, so long as bank balance sheets are opaque black boxes, there is no one who is going to want to invest in the banks. There is no way to assess the risk of the bank.  You cannot trust what the financial regulators say (just look at how many banks have had to be nationalized after passing stress tests).

As a result, buying equity in a bank is not investing, but rather blindly betting.

With no investors, it was easily predictable (I did) that the banks would not avoid deleveraging at the expense of the real economy.  In fact, what banks have done in the pursuit of higher capital ratios has been devastating to the real economy.
We need to find the right balance between risk and reward and keep in mind that the financing of the economy will shift to equities and long-term products. We therefore need to keep investors interested in buying equities and bonds. That is especially important since more activity will happen through markets than before because there will be less bank financing
I can understand why the large banks with investment banking operations would want to grow the EU bond market.

However, it is the market for the debt of small businesses and individuals that needs to be restarted.  This is a market that is only coming back when there is transparency.  Transparency that results from observable event based reporting.  With observable event based reporting, all activities like payments involving the collateral backing the security are reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

Sunday, July 29, 2012

Stephen Hester: 'RBS faces huge fine over Libor scandal'

In a Guardian article, RBS's Stephen Hester acknowledged that RBS will face a huge fine over its participation in the Libor scandal.  More importantly, he showed that he is part of the problem with reforming the culture of banking.

He blamed a few 'rogue' individuals as oppose to realizing that manipulating Libor reflected a systemic problem.

The boss of the Royal Bank of Scotland is warning the bank faces a further hit to its reputation – and a huge fine – from the Libor scandal, which has engulfed Barclays and caused a fresh wave of anger against bankers. 
While the £290m fine slapped on Barclays has helped to distract from the computer meltdown at RBS, which prevented up to 13m customers accessing their accounts for up to a month, Stephen Hester, RBS's chief executive, said the rate-rigging scandal was bad for the entire industry. 
"RBS is one of the banks tied up in Libor. We'll have our day in that particular spotlight as well," Hester said in an interview with the Guardian. He did not know the size of the RBS fine but said that the investigation by the Financial Services Authority was "in process". 
Hester is preparing to represent first-half figures – showing another loss – on Friday, when the bank's exposure to interest rate swap mis-selling will also be a focus. RBS is said to have paid £25m to just one businessman who was mis-sold products intended to protect against interest rate rises.
On Sunday, HSBC will publish profits for the first half of the year, ahead of a yet be disclosed multimillion-pound penalty for money laundering and other offences through its US arm.
Bad behavior by bankers occurred everywhere that there was and is opacity in the financial system.

The list continues to grow:  Libor manipulation, mis-selling interest rate swaps and money laundering.  A list like this doesn't come about because of a couple of rogue individuals.  It is the result of a culture that encourages bad behavior in pursuit of profits.
Hester said: "Even though when all the Libor [fines] are out most of it is going to be around the wrongdoings of a handful of people at a number of banks. Those wrongdoings taint a whole industry beyond the handful of people and that makes it a huge problem."...
Libor manipulation is a huge problem because it shows that bankers will lie for personal gain, higher bank profits and also to distort the perception of their institutions.
"An element of banks became detached from society around it, an element was for traders making money for themselves or the banks, and customers [were] the means of making money. We have to be sure that banks do it the other way around."
The only way to be sure that banks adopt the right culture is for them to adopt transparency in everything they do.

For example, they need to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This way, Libor can be based off of actual trades and not off of make-believe.
Hester has 18 months left to go of his "clean up" operation of a bank that made record £24bn losses in 2008....The clean up will move a step closer to completion later this year when he expects the bank to exit the asset protection scheme, set up to insure some £300bn of the bank's most toxic assets. 

The adverse link between sovereigns, banks and the real economy

One of the main themes of this blog has been the adverse link between sovereigns, banks and the real economy is the direct result of the policymakers' and financial regulators' choice of the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Japanese model, bank book capital levels are protected at all costs.  This has negative consequences for both the sovereign and the real economy.

In the case of the sovereign, it increases the debt at the sovereign as the state becomes the source of new capital to inject into the banks.

In the case of the real economy, it transfers the capital needed for supporting and growing the real economy to servicing the excess debt in the financial system.  At a minimum, this constrains growth in the real economy.  As the current financial crisis has shown, it puts the real economy into a downward spiral as capital that is needed to maintain the real economy is being transferred to debt service.

Of course, the downward spiral in the real economy feeds back negatively into the sovereign as it reduces tax revenues and the sovereign's ability to service its debts.  This in turn feeds back negatively into the real economy as the sovereign cuts its expenditures, including on social programs.  This is a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop that sacrifices society for the benefit of the bankers.

Protecting bank book capital levels at all costs has other negative consequences.  It crushes interbank lending as banks with deposits to lend still don't know who is solvent and who is not solvent.  It shatters the monetary transmission mechanism because protecting the zombie borrowers drives out loans to the creditworthy.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger champions the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Swedish model, banks protect the sovereign and the real economy.  Banks do this by recognizing all of the losses on the excesses in the financial system today.

Banks can protect the sovereign and the real economy because of the way that a modern banking system is designed.  Deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding mean that a bank can continue to function and support the real economy even if it has negative book capital levels.

As a result of the deposit guarantees, the taxpayers step up as 'silent' equity partners when the banks have negative book capital level.  Please note that as silent equity partners there is no need for an explicit bailout of the banks and a capital injection.

The choice to directly bailout the banks under the Japanese model was and still is driven by bankers wanting to protect their bonuses and policymakers and financial regulators agreeing to protect these bonuses.

The Swedish model was first used in the US by the FDR Administration to break the back of the Great Depression.  It has subsequently been used successfully in Sweden in the 1990s and by Iceland in the current financial crisis.

The Swedish model could still be used today to end the global financial crisis.

I have argued that the Swedish model should be adopted because protecting society (the real economy and the state) is far more valuable than banker cash bonuses.  This is an opinion that is not shared by the Financial-Academic-Regulatory Complex (FARC).


In the 1950s, President Eisenhower identified the military-industrial complex and said that it needed to be carefully watched and controlled less it bring great harm to society.


Unfortunately, nobody bothered to watch FARC.   As much as President Eisenhower feared the military-industrial complex, FARC has been much more damaging to society.

Saturday, July 28, 2012

German Left Party proposes new way to save euro

As reported by Der Spiegel, the German Left Party has put forth a proposal based on the idea of rebooting the market economy and then cushioning the fall.

Regular readers know that this is the basis for your humble blogger's blueprint for saving the financial system.

Step one in the blueprint was for the excess debt in the financial system to be written down and losses realized by the banks.

Step two was to realize that banks can continue to operate and support the real economy even with negative book capital levels.  They can do so because of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  The deposit insurance means that taxpayers are 'silent' equity investors in the banks while they have negative book capital levels.

Step three was to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this disclosure, market participants could confirm the banks had absorb the losses on the excess debt and exert discipline on the banks to restrain their risk taking.

The German Left Party proposed
First and foremost, [Sahra] Wagenknecht calls for a radical debt haircut. "The EU member states should resolve that all sovereign debt above a certain level will not be paid back," she writes. 
Wagenknecht proposes using 60 percent of a country's annual gross domestic product as the cutoff -- meaning that even Germany, with its debt load worth some 80 percent of GDP, would have to partially default.
A call for recognizing losses on the excess debt in the financial system.
Such a euro-zone-wide partial default, of course, would result in the bankruptcies of several European banks and insurance companies due to the amount of European sovereign bonds they carry on their balance sheets. 
"The financial industry has seriously underestimated the risks associated with sovereign bonds," Wagenknecht writes. Banks and insurance companies, she notes, provided euro-zone member states with fresh capital to the extent that their debt loads have now become unmanageable. Her plan, she adds, merely reflects that "risk and liability are linked in a market economy."
It is important to repeat that as a result of taking the losses the banks would have negative book capital levels.  However, they would not have to be closed.

Rather, those banks that had a franchise that was capable of generating earnings could retain 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings until such time as they had restored positive book capital levels.
It is a sentence that could just as well have come from the party platform of the business-friendly Free Democrats on the center-right of the political spectrum. Indeed, the same could be said for large parts of Wagenknecht's approach to the euro crisis. 
But the Left Party politician has also included measures that would reduce the economic effects of a banking crash. 
Following a "technical moment of insolvency," her plan calls for the state to inject fresh capital into the banks so that they can continue serving those sectors that are required for the economy to function. 
In other words, they would manage customer accounts and extend loans to companies in the real economy, thereby fending off a recession.
My blueprint differs from her suggestion because the banks can continue to manage customer accounts and extend loans to companies in the real economy without being recapitalized by the state.
Much of the investment banking sector, on the other hand, would be liquidated as part of the insolvency proceedings.
In my blueprint, the proprietary trading area of the investment banking sector would be eliminated because the banks were required to provide ultra transparency.  The fact that all market participants could see what the banks were doing would make it difficult to profit from proprietary trading.
The state would also guarantee up to €1 million ($1.2 million) per person in savings and life insurance value. "Anything beyond that would be defaulted as part of the insolvency," Wagenknecht writes.
Since the state does not have to invest in recapitalizing the banks, it might set higher guarantees on savings and life insurance value. 
Under her plan, of course, it would not only be banks that became insolvent, but also countries. And when that happens, those countries are generally shut out from international financial markets for many years. 
Wagenknecht, however, believes she has found a way around that problem. 
Euro-zone states would be able to receive a certain amount of financing directly from the European Central Bank (ECB), but only up to a certain maximum -- Wagenknecht suggests capping it at 4 percent of GDP annually. 
Under her plan, the ECB would remain independent and continue to focus on controlling inflation and maintaining full control over the money supply in the euro-zone. However, most of the fresh money the bank pumped into the euro zone would no longer flow into the banks but, rather, it would directly benefit national budgets. 
"At the moment, the ECB is pouring money into the banks in the hope that they will invest a small percentage of it in sovereign bonds," she writes. "It would be much more efficient to give this small percentage directly to the states." 
Finally, she envisions having banks extend loans almost exclusively on the strength of the deposits of their customers.
The experience of Iceland suggests that countries can return to the financial markets fairly quickly.

Rather than try to stretch the ECB's mandate, it might be easier to use the IMF.  It is funded and it has a mandate to support these types of loans until a country can return to the capital markets.
Still, there are a number of positives to Wagenknecht's approach. Her model would finally let the air out of Europe's gigantic debt bubble -- one that has hung over the global economy for almost a decade now. 
As would following my blueprint.
Furthermore, the application of strict market economy principles to the banking crisis could cure them of their addiction to high-stakes gambling. 
Requiring banks to provide ultra transparency would cure them of their addiction to high-stakes gambling.
After all, the supposedly "mandatory" steps that have characterized the euro zone's response to the crisis thus far have done nothing but reward banks for their incredibly risky business models.
This is the result of having adopted the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Banks get to continue doing what they did that led to the solvency problem in the first place.

The German Left Party is effectively endorsing the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  They are requiring the banks to recognize the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets.


Barclays is 'working to become more transparent'

In reporting Barclays' half-year results, its Board Chairman, Marcus Agius turns to transparency to restore both integrity and market participants' trust in Barclays.

Our Citizenship agenda is now more important than ever; we have ambitious commitments that we must deliver and continue to evolve to address the issues that matter most to those we serve. 
We must focus on getting the fundamentals right – serving our customers and clients with integrity and maintaining the highest standards of service – while reviewing our business values and working to become more transparent.  
The question is:  will Barclays actually deliver transparency and begin disclosing on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details?

This is the level of disclosure that is consistent with a bank that says "I can stand on my own two feet and I have nothing to hide".

If Barclays doesn't deliver this level of disclosure, the question is: why would anyone trust Barclays given that it has confessed to lying for the benefit of its bankers and itself and is clearly hiding something?

Friday, July 27, 2012

While writing rules, financial regulators talk to banks 5 times more often than reform organizations

The American Banker reports that Dodd-Frank rule makers met 5 times more frequently with the big banks than with reform organizations.

Regular readers know that these meetings are one of the ways that banks influence the Financial-Academic-Regulatory Complex (FARC).  Specifically, to the extent that the regulators rely on the banks or their lobbyists for technical understanding, the banks or their lobbyists shape how the final rule turns out.

Let me give you an example from the SEC's proposal to revise the disclosure requirements for structured finance securities.  The SEC is proposing that loan level data be disclosed.

The banking industry and its lobbyists have put forth the idea that while loan level detail makes sense for a mortgage-backed security with 1,000 to 5,000 mortgages, it does not make sense for a credit card receivable backed security with 40 million receivables.

The SEC has accepted that this is true.  Proof of this acceptance can be shown by the inclusion of this argument in a recent paper written by Henry Hu, a former senior SEC official.

However, to anyone with any experience using a computer or monitoring a loan portfolio, they know this statement is factually not true.

Nobody looks at 1,000 or 5,000 mortgages by hand.  They use a computer.

A computer doesn't care if it looks at 1,000, 5,000 or 40 million records (and yes, the buy-side can afford computers that can process 40 million records).  So if it makes sense for 1,000 to 5,000 mortgages, it also makes sense for 40 million credit card receivables.

In Mr. Hu's case, he confesses that he doesn't really know anything about computers.  Hence, he is susceptible to being manipulated by the banks and their lobbyists for their benefit.
Regulators implementing Dodd-Frank met with big banks nearly 1,300 times in the past two years, but held only 242 meetings with reform-oriented organizations, according to a reportfrom the Sunlight Foundation. 
The numbers “call attention to the intensity of resources that big banks are devoting to Dodd-Frank rulemaking," Lee Drutman of the Sunlight Foundation tells American Banker’s Rob Blackwell. 
Though it does not necessarily prove influence, “to the extent that regulators are relying on bank representatives to understand the technical side of these rules, they are likely to see the world from the banks' perspective. This is bound to have at least some impact on how the final rules turn out," Drutman says.

Tim Geithner's handling of the Libor scandal exemplifies why financial markets should not be dependent on regulators

A Wall Street Journal column looked at Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner's handling of the Libor scandal and concludes that it is a mistake to make the global financial system more dependent on regulators.

It is always nice to have the Wall Street Journal agreed with your humble blogger.
Timothy Geithner sure does lead a charmed life. As a powerful regulator [before], throughout the financial crisis and its aftermath, he gets to blame every mistake or scandal on the evil bankers while claiming he was hot on their case all along. 
This pose is wearing especially thin on the much-ballyhooed Libor rate manipulation scandal. 
Facing Congress this week, the Treasury Secretary stuck to his story that as president of the New York Federal Reserve in 2008 he was blowing the whistle on Libor manipulations even as he let everyone in the world continue to use Libor as a benchmark—including his own Fed. 
Mr. Geithner told a House committee that he "personally raised [the matter] with the Governor of the Bank of England" and later sent him "a very detailed memorandum" on how to fix the "incentive" and "opportunity" for banks to "underreport" their borrowing costs under Libor. 
Regular readers will recall that the email from Mr. Geithner to the Governor of the Bank of England failed to mentioned that a Barclays trader had told the NY Fed that its Libor submissions were fraudulent.

Regular readers will also recall that the very detailed memorandum on how to fix the "incentive" and "opportunity" for banks to "underreport" their borrowing costs under Libor was a series of six talking points from the banks that were manipulating Libor.

Naturally, none of the six talking points would have done anything to stop the ongoing manipulation of Libor.  Not one talking point suggested that Libor be based off of actual transactions.  Not one talking point suggested that banks provide far greater transparency so that market participants could see how the transactions included in Libor compared with all the transactions the banks did.
At the same time, however, he admitted that the Fed used Libor as the benchmark for several bailout programs because it was "the best rate available at the time." If a rate that the head of the New York Fed knew was subject to manipulation was "the best rate,"....
There really is not much more that needs to be said when one of the most important financial regulators makes the argument that a manipulated rate was 'the best available at the time'.

Not only that, but we know the other financial regulators agreed with him because he had told them Libor was manipulated and they still used it as the benchmark for several bailout programs.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from this statement and the related actions is that where ever possible, the stability of the financial system must be independent of whether or not the financial regulators perform their job.

Based on this conclusion, it is imperative that the financial regulators be stripped of their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information on each bank.  Stripping the regulators of their information monopoly requires that the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, Libor can be based off of actual trades.

With this disclosure, market participants can end their dependence on the financial regulators and independently assess the risk of each bank.  With this assessment, they can adjust the amount and price of their exposures to reflect the risk of each bank.

With this disclosure, market discipline replaces regulatory oversight throughout the financial system.

With this disclosure, market participants can hold regulators accountable for doing their job.
Democrats are defending Mr. Geithner, which is consistent with their line since the crisis that every scandal is another excuse to blame the bankers and give even more power to the same regulators who missed or abetted the scandal. 
Clearly, the Wall Street Journal does not think it is a good idea to give more power to the same regulators who missed or abetted each scandal in the financial system.
Pending more evidence, we're inclined to think Mr. Geithner was more right in 2008 than he is now. But if Libor really was a vast criminal enterprise, then regulators need to be held accountable for doing so little about it for so long.
Former SigTARP Neil Barofsky suggested
Geithner and other regulators should be held accountable, they should be fired across the board.  If they knew about an ongoing fraud, and they didn't do anything about it, they don't deserve to have their jobs. I hope we see people in handcuffs. 

Dodd, Frank rush to defend Dodd-Frank Act

To no one's surprise, Christopher Dodd and Barney Frank have rushed to defend (see here and here) the Dodd-Frank Act and its huge expansion of the financial/academic/regulatory complex in the face of the assault by Sandy Weill with his call for 'complete transparency' and 'breaking-up' the Too Big to Fail.
Former Sen. Chris Dodd defended his signature financial services legislation on Thursday, drawing a sharp contrast with former Citigroup Chairman and CEO Sanford I. Weill, who a day earlier called for breaking up large Wall Street banks.... 
The retired senator staked out different territory from Weill, arguing that “it’s not just the size of an institution,” but the amount of risk carried on its books. 
Dodd told CNBC’s “Squawk Box” that forcing all large banks to downsize was “too simplistic,” saying that Citi's former chief was wrong to call for an end to financial supermarkets. 
“Just breaking up the banks is not the solution,” Dodd said, even as he insisted the tools of Dodd-Frank could, in extreme circumstances, force a systemically risky institution to break up. 
Mr. Weill did not just say break up the banks.  He also said that banks should be required to provide complete transparency.

Regular readers know that it only with ultra transparency where banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants can assess the risk carried on bank books and exert discipline to restrain this risk.
"The legislation allows for that Draconian step to be taken if necessary, not just with banks but with institutions that pose substantial risk to the country," Dodd said. "They have the power and authority under this legislation to actually do that."...
Senator Dodd takes the position that the decision to downsize a bank should be made by regulators.  In addition, regulators should decide how the downsizing should be done.

With ultra transparency, both of these decision would be made by the market.  The market would vote by how it valued the bank and its individual businesses before and after downsizing.
Many critics in Congress and Wall Street have complained about the law's burdensome requirements and complexity, and have called to have the legislation undone completely. 
But in his interview with CNBC, Dodd rejected calls to repeal the law, saying that critics should "give this a chance to see if it's doing its job."
Repealing Dodd-Frank and replacing it with transparency would greatly reduce the size of the financial/academic/regulatory complex.

First, it would end the markets dependence on the regulators to craft regulations that can achieve the same outcomes as transparency.

Second, it would end the markets dependence on regulators accurately assessing the risk of the banks and exerting discipline on the banks to reduce their risk.  With ultra transparency, market participants can independently assess the risk of the banks and exert discipline.

Now's not the time to talk about breaking up the banks, Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA), told CNBC’s“Closing Bell” on Thursday.... 
Since the economy is still recovering and Europe is dragging us down, Frank said, “The notion that at this point we would do something drastic to a major part of the U.S. economy is not a very good idea.” 
“You can accomplish much of what Sandy Weill says he’s now for with the Volcker Rule,” Frank said. The Volcker Rule (Volcker Rule explained) says that banks should not be involved in certain trading and other non-lending activities, he said. 
Frank also refuted the notion that it's difficult to discern between proprietary and non-proprietary trading. 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act (Dodd-Frank Explained), regulators can order divestment for particularly institutions so you don’t need to break-up every single institution, Frank said.
Regular readers know that implementation of the Volcker Rule is simple:  require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

With ultra transparency, market participants, including regulators, have the information they need to discern between proprietary trading, which is against the Rule, and non-proprietary trading.  Naturally, market participants will be only to happy to flag for regulators each bank's proprietary trades.

Will scandals cost banks any of their clout?

In his NY Times' column, Floyd Norris argues that with the Libor scandal and JP Morgan credit default swap trading losses, banks may finally have seen a reduction of their clout with politicians and financial regulators.

Not a chance.

Regular readers know that there is a financial/academic/regulatory complex with the banks at the center.

For example, when the NY Fed needed suggestions for how to prevent manipulation of Libor, who did it turn to?  It turned to the banks that were manipulating Libor.

After the financial crisis, nothing was more surprising than the speed with which the banks regained their self-confidence and their influence, not to mention their haughtiness. 
“They feel more powerful to me than they did before the crisis, when they were healthy,” one regulator told me recently.
 Banks should feel that way after all policymakers and financial regulators are implementing the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under this model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.

Given that neither the banks nor the bankers experienced any negative consequences from the financial crisis and the bankers are back to making near record amounts of money, it should not be surprising that bankers feel like Masters of the Universe.
That sense of power may have peaked this spring, before JPMorgan Chase disclosed its $2 billion — now $5.8 billion and counting — “hedging” loss and before the public firestorm erupted, largely in Britain, over the Libor scandal. 
In trying to understand how it is that an industry whose excesses nearly brought down the world economy could recover so quickly, it may be helpful to remember the answer attributed — probably erroneously — to Willie Sutton, the Depression-era criminal, when asked why he robbed banks: “That’s where the money is.” 
The banks, for all their sins, remain the principal source of capital for people and companies, particularly small ones. Getting them to lend more — without resorting to the excesses that caused the crisis — is a reasonable goal for public policy. That means that any regulation that bankers oppose may be vulnerable to arguments that it will hurt the economy. 
And then there are campaign contributions. People who make millions of dollars a year can make big ones.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Norris has nicely summarized how banks control the financial/academic/regulatory complex.
Now there is a question as to whether that power is in danger of being broken as a result of public revulsion over the JPMorgan hedging fiasco and the Libor scandal. 
The banks had turned this year’s debate into one about “excessive regulation,” and seemed likely to at least win a few concessions.....
Regular readers know that banks like prescriptive regulations as they are a substitute for requiring the banks to provide transparency that the banks can easily circumvent.

Consider the Volcker Rule.

The regulators published a 300-page opus filled with prescriptive regulations for complying with the simple requirement that banks are not allowed to take proprietary bets.  According to JP Morgan's Jamie Dimon, this would not have prevented the credit default swap trade.

Now compare the 300 pages of prescriptive regulations to the 2 pages the Volcker rule would be if banks were required to provide ultra transparency.

  • On page one, in very large type, it would say "financial institutions are prohibited from taking proprietary bets".  
  • On page two, also in very large type, it would say "on an on-going basis, financial institutions shall disclose all of their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details".  With this disclosure, market participants, including regulators, could see if the banks were taking proprietary bets and violating the rule.

Does anyone imagine that JP Morgan could have built up the exposure they did in the credit default swap market without anyone noticing?  Does anyone think that JP Morgan would not have built up this position if everyone could see what it was doing for fear that the market would trade against it?
To understand how the world may have changed, it is worth looking at how perceptions have changed regarding both the JPMorgan loss and the Libor scandal since they were originally disclosed.... 
The invisible hand of the market has many benefits, but it sometimes needs to be restrained. “People of the same trade seldom meet together,” wrote Adam Smith, the patron saint of free markets, “even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices.” 
Market manipulation is at the heart of the Libor — London interbank offered rate — scandal. The idea that such a thing could happen seems not to have occurred to bank regulators for years, a reality that speaks volumes about their mind-set....
Regular readers know that the necessary condition for the invisible hand to operate properly is transparency (disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner) so that the buyer knows what they own.

The Libor manipulation could only occur because the financial regulators let it be set in an opaque manner.  Had banks been required to provide ultra transparency, Libor could have been based off of actual trades.
It is a strange fact that effective regulation can empower banks. American banks are now far better capitalized than most European institutions because the American regulators forced them to raise capital.
This is an assertion of opinion as without banks providing ultra transparency there is no supporting evidence.   We know that US financial regulators have been engaged in regulatory forbearance, so there is no telling how bad the losses hidden on and off the US bank balance sheets are.
Before the current crisis of confidence, that had encouraged banks to step up campaigns to blunt the new rules. European banks, which were not forced to raise capital, face the specter of more regulation, with some of it coming from euro zone institutions that may be less easy to manipulate than were national regulators.
For banks, all of these institutions and national regulators are easy to manipulate.  That is because the regulators' job is dependent on helping the banks protect opacity.  Imagine who many fewer regulations would be needed if banks had to provide ultra transparency! 

Sir Mervyn King admits policymakers made 'major mistakes' leading to financial crisis

The Telegraph reports that the Bank of England's Sir Mervyn King has admitted that policymakers made 'major mistakes' that lead to the financial crisis.  Naturally, Mr. King focuses on economic policies and fails to understand that opacity was the necessary, critical factor.

Mr. King's comments are very important as they demonstrate just why monetary policy and bank supervision should never be combined in the same organization.

Mr. King would have us believe that if the central bankers had managed interest rate policies differently the opaque areas of the financial system like banks and structured finance securities would not have collapsed.

Sorry, but even the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was able to identify the simple fact that interbank lending markets froze not because of macro economic policies but for the simple reason that lending banks could not tell which borrowing banks were solvent and which were not.

The interbank lending market has not unfrozen because lending banks still cannot answer this solvency question.

Mr. King is right that economic policies contributed, but the necessary condition for the crisis to occur was the financial regulators let huge areas of the financial system become opaque.  This meant that market participants could not assess the risks of or value securities in these areas.  

As a result, when central banks kept interest rates too low, it was like pouring gasoline on a fire, it led to over investment in the opaque areas where investors were chasing yield and simply blindly betting.

Your humble blogger has previously observed and Mr. King's comments confirm that macro economists do not make good bank supervisors.  By training and temperament, they like to look at the big picture.  Good bank supervision is all about looking at the details.

If you look at the details, you see that opacity was the basis for bank profitability.  It also allowed bankers to engage in bad behavior by hiding this behavior.  As Yves Smith said, 'no one was compensated on Wall Street for creating low margin, transparent products'.

If you look at the details, you see that the financial system stopped functioning every place there was opacity.

If you look at the details, you see that it was opacity that made assessing the risk or value of banks and structured finance securities impossible.

If you look at the details, you see the "run on the repo" was the result of the simple fact that opacity made it impossible to assess the risk or solvency of the borrower or, in the case of structured finance securities, the value of the security being pledged (the financial crisis started when BNP Paribas announced it could not value subprime mortgage backed securities).  The run was nothing more than simple recognition of the fact that  you don't lend money if you don't think you will get it back.

If you look at the details, you see that opacity prevented market participants from exerting discipline on the banks to restrain their risk taking.

If you look at the details, you see that bank regulators are the only ones with transparency into banks and they are dependent on each bank to explain what it is doing.  They cannot ask experts like the bank competitors for analytical help because opacity means these experts don't have all the useful, relevant information.

If you look at the details, you see that banks regulators do not restrain a bank's risk taking.  This is the result of the simple fact that regulators are not in the business of approving or disapproving any position a bank takes.  This is the market's capital allocation function.  Rather, bank regulators try to estimate the potential loss from a position and try to ensure there is adequate book capital to absorb the loss.

If you look at the details, you find that transparency is the source of trust and confidence in the financial system.  It is only when market participants have all the useful, relevant information and can independently assess the risk of an investment is there trust and confidence.  This trust and confidence comes because the market participants trust their own analysis.

If you look at the details, leading up to the financial crisis, market participants trusted others for help in assessing the risk in the opaque areas of the financial system.  Market participants trusted the analysis of the financial regulators when they said that the risk of the banks was greatly reduced and the rating agencies when they said structured finance securities were rated AAA.  When the financial crisis hit, market participants rediscovered the importance of not trusting others and having transparency so they can do their own analysis.

If you look at the details, even if there had been perfectly co-ordinated macro economic policy around the world, there was and still is so much opacity in the system that a crisis was inevitable.
Speaking at the Government’s Global Investment Conference in London,Sir Mervyn gave the clearest signal yet that as head of Britain’s central bank he is partly to blame for failing to act before the crisis took hold in 2008. 
He said it was “false” to suggest that the crisis was caused by the bad behaviour of bankers. 
“Of course there was bad behaviour. 
But this was a crisis which emanated from major mistakes in macro economic policy around the world, and fundamentally the inability to successfully co-ordinate macro economic policy so that globally you wouldn’t get the imbalances, the capital flows, that created the difficulties in the banking system. 
“We saw this going into the crisis, we kept meeting at the IMF, but we did nothing to solve it collectively, and I don’t think that this was a problem that could have been solved individually.” 
Sir Mervyn said the global crisis will require a collective response....
The governor said that global banking had taken a “series of wrong turns”, but that the reform agenda in the UK would create a more stable framework for the future. He said the measures recommended in the Vickers report should be implemented, and “then [we can] come back and see if we need to go further.”