Friday, December 28, 2012

Did losses on "London whale" trade succeed in defanging bank lobbying when financial crisis couldn't?

In his Wall Street Journal article, Scott Patterson lays out how the losses sustained by JP Morgan on its "London whale" trade effectively defanged the bank lobbying efforts when it came to implementation of the Volcker Rule.

Regular readers know that there are two elements to each rule:  what the rule says and how it is enforced.

Your humble blogger showed how this would work for the Volcker Rule.  The rule says that banks are not allowed to engage in proprietary trading.  This is enforced by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants could see if the bank were engaged in proprietary trading and exert discipline to stop this proprietary trading.

Compare this with the 200+ pages that is going to emerge from the bank regulatory complex and that bank examiners are suppose to enforce.  Enforcement which will be problematic because one of the cardinal rules of bank examiners is not to approve or disapprove of an exposure taken by a bank because this gets the bank examiners into allocating capital across the financial system.

Which rule and enforcement mechanism looks more likely to be successful in permanently ending proprietary trading by the banks?

The bank lobby already won when they ended up with a 200+ page rule from the bank regulatory complex.  What the "Whale" trade cost the banks is that it will be a little harder for them to engage in proprietary trading.
Wall Street banks entered 2012 confident they could stall a wave of rules that they feared would hurt profits. But they are ending the year largely resigned that their activities will be constrained and monitored more closely by the government. 
One big reason for the change: J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.'s "London whale" losses. 
The bad trades, ultimately resulting in about $6 billion in losses, disrupted the banks' campaign against the Dodd-Frank financial overhaul, according to regulators, lawmakers and close observers of policy debates in Washington. 
I find this a stunning statement for the simple reason that the banks blew up the financial system prior to the beginning of the financial crisis on August 9, 2007.

Apparently, the regulators tasked with writing the Volcker Rule forgot this and needed to be reminded by the losses on the London whale trade.
The trades damaged the reputation of J.P. Morgan, which suffered less than other banks from the financial crisis, and its chief executive, James Dimon, during a crucial period of policy debate in Washington, putting critics of Dodd-Frank on the defensive. 
Before news of the whale losses emerged, banks were arguing, with some success, that too-tight regulations were crimping lending during a time of slow growth....
And what exactly does banning proprietary trading have to do with crimping lending?

Ending the banks proprietary trading would in fact free up capital that could be used to support lending as the banks would be forced to shed the assets they bet on.
Perhaps the most significant fallout was on the "Volcker rule," which bans banks from making bets with their own money. While the final version of the Volcker rule hasn't been released, people with knowledge of the latest version said that it is likely to be more restrictive of bank's trading activities and might not allow broad hedging of bank portfolios.
Hello, it takes two paragraphs to both write the rule and its enforcement mechanism (see above).

Ordinary folks losing faith in stocks

A must read AP article (hat tip Zero Hedge) discusses how ordinary folks are losing faith in stocks because of a lack of trust.
Andrew Neitlich is the last person you'd expect to be rattled by the stock market. 
He once worked as a financial analyst picking stocks for a mutual fund. He has huddled with dozens of CEOs in his current career as an executive coach. During the dot-com crash 12 years ago, he kept his wits and did not sell. 
But he's selling now. 
"You have to trust your government. You have to trust other governments. You have to trust Wall Street," says Neitlich, 47. "And I don't trust any of these." 
Defying decades of investment history, ordinary Americans are selling stocks for a fifth year in a row. The selling has not let up despite unprecedented measures by the Federal Reserve to persuade people to buy and the come-hither allure of a levitating market. Stock prices have doubled from March 2009, their low point during the Great Recession.
The Baupost Group summarizes how the Fed's efforts to force people to buy riskier assets undermines trust.
Finally, we must question the morality of Fed programs that trick people (as if they were Pavlov's dogs) into behaviors that are adverse to their own long-term best interest.  
What kind of government entity cajoles savers to spend, when years of under-saving and over-spending have left the consumer in terrible shape? 
What kind of entity tricks its citizens into paying higher and higher prices to buy stocks? 
What kind of entity drives the return on retiree's savings to zero for seven years (2008-2015 and counting) in order to rescue poorly managed banks? 
Regular readers know that trust in our financial system is the result of transparency.

This is why transparency is at the heart of the FDR Framework and the government is given one simple responsibility:  ensure market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision.

Market participants are willing to accept either a gain or loss on their investment decision because they "trust" the independent assessment they performed or had a third party perform.

The financial crisis that started on August 9, 2007 showed both opacity across wide parts of the financial system and the degree to which the government has failed to perform its responsibility of ensuring transparency.

Up until August 9, 2007, investors were willing to "trust" the independent assessment of third parties like rating agencies and the government when it came to structured finance securities and banks.  After August 9, 2007, investors knew that neither of these entities could be trusted to provide an accurate assessment.

From the AP article, the result of this opacity and the governments failure to ensure transparency is
"People don't trust the market anymore," says financial historian Charles Geisst of Manhattan College. He says a "crisis of confidence" similar to one after the Crash of 1929 will keep people away from stocks for a generation or more.
So the collapse in trust among ordinary folks was completely predictable.

In fact, they have been adopting Mark Twain's non-trusting view on investing:  more concerned about the return of their capital than the return on their capital.  Remember, ordinary folks understand that under the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware), they are going to have to absorb any losses.

One of the entities that failed to ensure transparency was the Fed.  The Fed is responsible for regulation and supervision for the largest banks.  As the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane says of these banks, they are 'black boxes'.  Black boxes that leading up to the financial crisis the Fed insisted contained very little risk.

This is the same Fed that is now trying to force ordinary folks to take more risk by buying opaque securities that they don't trust.  And the Fed thinks this will work why?

Thursday, December 27, 2012

Are European bank debt funding models broken?

An IMF paper (hat tip The Big Picture) looks at the questions of are European bank debt funding models broken and, if so, how to fix them.

Regular readers know that the answer to these two questions are:  yes, the funding models are broken and fixing them requires the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

European bank debt funding models rely to a significant extent on borrowing money in the wholesale unsecured bank debt market.  This funding model failed at the beginning of the financial crisis because nobody could determine which banks that were looking to borrow were solvent and which were not.

Market participants could not make this assessment because bank disclosure leaves them resembling, in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, 'black boxes'.

The wholesale market is still struggling to unfreeze due to the lack of transparency.

Unfreezing the wholesale market and fixing the European bank funding models requires the banks provide ultra transparency.  With this data, market participants with funds to lend can assess the risk of banks looking to borrow and can price their exposure to the borrowing banks based on this assessment.

Not surprisingly, the IMF paper never looks at the cause of the European bank funding models failing, opacity, but rather throws out a long list of proposals, like holding more capital and liquid assets, that will do not address the problem of "is the bank solvent".

Surprise, big companies used 'enhanced relationship' to minimize taxes

A Reuters article describes how since the UK tax collectors adopted a policy of 'enhanced relationship' taxes from large corporations have fallen at the same time profits at these corporations have increased.

This is likely to be a coincidence as companies and their accountants have become far more aggressive in booking taxable profits in low tax countries.

However, it does highlight how companies have limited their focus on doing well by all their stakeholders to only doing well by one group of stakeholders:  management/investors.

In the not so distant past, management and Boards of Directors use to include the impact of their decisions on stakeholders like the countries they did business in.  It was thought that doing well by the broader set of stakeholders contributed to doing well by the company over the long run.

After all, it was shown by Henry Ford that it is good for business to pay your workers enough so they can buy the company's product.

Big companies in Britain now pay less tax than they did 12 years ago despite a big jump in profitability, a Reuters analysis of official data shows. Tax campaigners say the trend is the clearest signal yet that tax avoidance has blossomed under a more business-friendly strategy at the UK tax authority Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC). 
Large companies' payments of corporation tax - the UK equivalent of corporate income tax - totalled 21 billion pounds ($34 billion) in 2011/12, HMRC data shows. That was down five billion pounds or 21 percent since 2000/01 when the government, then controlled by the Labour Party, took the first steps towards a more collaborative approach to big business. 
At the same time, the gross operating surplus for all companies in the UK - a widely watched measure of companies' profitability compiled by the Office of National Statistics - has risen 65 percent, to 329 billion pounds. The economy has grown by 55 percent over the same period, and receipts of both personal income tax and small companies' income tax are higher....

John Christensen of Tax Justice Network, a tax campaigning group, said the figures show successive governments' attempts to create a more business-friendly administration - which includes a policy known as "enhanced relationship" based on mutual trust - have encouraged companies to use such tactics....

Prem Sikka, a professor of accounting at Essex University who has written extensively about tax avoidance, said that even allowing for the tax cut, the figures were "paradoxical". 
"How are they managing to reconcile higher profits with lower taxes?" he said. "It can't be done ... unless they are booking these profits somewhere else." Companies reporting for tax purposes are increasingly diverting UK profits to lower-tax jurisdictions, he said.

Anya Schiffrin: describes the true cost of austerity in Spain

In a must read column, Anya Schiffrin lays bare the true cost of pursuing the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under the Japanese Model, Spain is bailing out its banks and by extension the banks of other eurozone countries while at the same time subjecting it citizens to austerity.

Regular readers know that pursuing the Japanese Model is the wrong choice as it has failed 100% of the time.  Rather, governments should pursue the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize upfront all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Under the Swedish Model, the real economy and the social contract are protected as the capital needed for growth and reinvestment is not consumed in servicing the excess debt.
In his entertaining lectures at Columbia Business School, the economist Bruce Greenwald likes to employ cite the line often used by Warren Buffett: When the tide goes out, you can see who is not wearing a bathing suit. This is the feeling I have in Spain. 
In year five of the financial crisis, I can see which of my relatives and friends had no swimming trunks. 
The slow downward slide is horrendous for the people living it. Over and over we see the bewilderment of those who worked hard and paid taxes. They don’t understand why they are seeing their first-rate healthcare system being undermined, pensions and salaries cut, and their education system — still not up to par — being squeezed further, while being told they have to bail out the banks because that is what Germany insists on.... 
Please recall that Germany's interest is in seeing that its banks get bailed out of the bad investments that they made and not in the economic well-being of Spain.
In this harsh new world, many people are now irrelevant to the daily functioning of the economy. Architects, graphic designers, book jacket designers–-these kinds of professions now seem like a quaint memory. No one needs them, and the fear is that, if and when the economy recovers, many won’t be needed then. The few friends who have jobs live with the threat of layoffs and repeated pay cuts.... 
Those who did the “right thing” and are managing can be smug — until they realize there are many others who did the seemingly right thing who are suffering. 
The hollowing out of Spanish society continues. Anyone who can leave is doing so, and so Spain is losing the educated people it needs the most and who would be the basis of its future prosperity — if and when it does recover. The existence of a few bright spots does not mean that Spain’s economy is functional. 
In the past, life was full of vicissitudes. Farmers always had work to do, but droughts, collapsing prices, disease, floods could leave them destitute — no matter what they did or how hard they worked. Markets didn’t provide the insurance that would insulate them from these risks. 
As we moved from these primitive economies, the nature of risks changed. Now, it is individuals who face the prospect of no employment. 
Governments need to step in and provide the kind of social protection that people want and need. We can’t simply throw up our hands and say we accept a society in which the only people who get jobs are those with MBAs who speak five languages. 
When a few kids can’t get jobs, it’s not unreasonable to blame them:  They didn’t study hard enough, they chose the wrong subject, they haven’t searched hard enough for a job. 
When half of a country’s young people are unemployed, it’s no longer their fault. 
Let’s be clear. Spain’s economy is in terrible shape and the reckless and irresponsible path of austerity the government is pursuing — a kind of austerity that is especially hard on those who are down and out — is already leading to social and political tensions and constant strikes and demonstrations. After all these years, it is astonishing that the Partido Popular has not learned a thing.

Spain to wipeout Bankia's small investors

Having allowed Bankia to sell stock to small investors with little knowledge of finance, Spain is now taking the next step and effectively writing off their investment as part of recapitalizing Bankia.

Regular readers know that Bankia, which has about 10% of Spain's banking market, does not need to be bailed out and the small investors forced to lose virtually everything.

The reason that Bankia does not need to be bailed out is the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers have effectively become Bankia's silent equity partner while it is rebuilding its book capital from their current negative level.

Wiping out the small investors sends a really bad message.  The message is that the Spanish government cares more about protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses than it does about its citizens.

The bankers who mis-sold the stock were only forced to give back their bonuses for the year preceding the nationalization of Bankia.  The bankers got to keep their bonuses for the preceding years.

Fairness suggests that the bankers and members of the Board of Directors should have been required to return 100% of the bonuses and director fees they ever received from Bankia or its predecessor cajas.  It is bad enough that they get to keep their salary 'earned' while underwriting all the bad debt on Bankia's balance sheet.

As reported by Reuters,

Spanish lender Bankia will wipe out 350,000 shareholders, many of them small savers with little knowledge of financial markets, after it emerged it had a negative value of 4.2 billion euros ($5.6 billion). 
The measure, which will hit shareholders who were encouraged by aggressive marketing tactics to invest in the company, is seen as vital if the nationalised bank is to be refloated. 
A source close to the Bank of Spain said Bankia would receive 18 billion euros of European money by Friday and launch a capital increase in the first half of January when current shareholders will lose practically their entire investment. 
Under the European Union plan to prop up Spain's banking sector, shareholders must be the first in the queue to suffer losses. This has already been the case in Ireland where shareholders in Anglo Irish Bank were left with nothing. 
"Are we looking into leaving shareholders with something? Yes. How much? That's too soon to say. Will it be very little? For sure," said the source on condition of anonymity.
"But that will be purely symbolic. I can assure you they will lose up to the shirt on their back."...
Please note that under the European Union plan, unsecured debt holders are not second in the queue to suffer losses.

In fact, the unsecured debt holders, primarily banks in other parts of the eurozone, are protected from any losses.

Spain's government faced a choice between bailing out banks in other parts of the eurozone or protecting Spain's real economy and citizens.  Spain's government chose to bailout the banks and but the burden of the bad debt on the Spanish economy and taxpayers.

As shown by Ireland and Greece, this choice will only make the situation worse.
Another source with direct knowledge of the process said the final value of the shares would be close to nothing but that neither the Spanish government nor the bank wanted to send the message that Bankia's shareholders had lost it all. 
Hundreds of thousands of Spaniards, some retired people with no in-depth financial knowledge, invested their savings into Bankia shares when the bank was listed in July 2011. Shares have plummeted more than 80 percent since then. 
Some small savers, lured by aggressive marketing campaigns, also bought high-risk instruments, such as preference shares or subordinated debt, on which they will also suffer steep losses. 
Enrique Marquez, a 66-year-old retired technician, said he had invested 7,000 euros in shares and more than 70,000 euros in preference shares with Bankia. 
"The bank manager advised me to buy the shares. He told me it was interesting, that the staff were investing too and that it could be very profitable in the medium term," he said.
"It seems to be to have been managed extraordinarily badly. It is a total cock-up. I've been duped on the preference shares and I've been duped on the ordinary shares. It's been an abuse of trust."...
Your humble blogger predicted that Bankia would be unable to sell its shares in 2011 without providing ultra transparency and disclosing its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  I said this disclosure was necessary so that investors could assess the risk of Bankia.

My prediction was wrong when it came to small investors, but right when it came to institutional investors.  Small investors bought and institutional investors stayed away.

I had not factored in that the Spanish government would let Bankia abuse its position of trust and sell these shares to small investors who relied on the bank to make honest representations about its financial condition.

I had also not factored in that the Spanish regulators would not communicate an honest assessment of the bank's financial condition.  If the Spanish regulators did communicate that the bank was solvent, then the Spanish government has a moral obligation to bailout the small investors as these investors were also trusting the government.

Wednesday, December 26, 2012

Germany: the next victim of the Japanese Model as plans for austerity made

As reported by Der Spiegel, the German government is making plans to adopt austerity as it is about to fall victim of the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.

What this means in practical terms is that rather than banks recognizing the losses on the excess debt in the financial system, the burden of the excess debt is placed on the real economy.  This diverts capital that is needed for growth and reinvestment to debt service and shrinks the real economy.

The German government has aggressively pursued implementation of the Japanese Model throughout the eurozone following the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007.  It has done so to protect the German banks who hold a significant amount of this excess debt.

Unfortunately, this policy has now caught up to Germany.

Germany has an export oriented economy.  With the rest of the eurozone mired in a Japan-style economic slump from the forced adoption of the Japanese Model, there is less demand for German goods.  The result is a decline in the German economy.

A decline that the German government is planning on making worse by adopting austerity.  By design, austerity reduces government funded demand in the economy.  This should hasten the pace at which German slides into a recession.

Of course, all of this is easily avoidable by adopting the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to recognize upfront their losses on all the excess debt in the financial system.

The question that Germany's government faces is whether it should protect its citizens or continue to protect banker bonuses.
The German government and opposition are pledging higher benefits for pensioners, families and the long-term unemployed ahead of elections next year, but Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble is secretly planning cutbacks to prepare for a weakening economy and possible fallout from the euro crisis. 
German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble has an inimitable way of misleading his listeners with a torrent of obfuscating words. 
This torrent of obfuscating words is a useful skill to have in politics as it allows the speaker to say something that implies support of one idea when it fact the speaker is in complete opposition to the idea.
When asked if the Greek bailout would cost more money, he responded: "Not necessarily," adding that there was merely "a greater financial requirement on the timeline."
Of course, Greece is going to require more funds. Its debt has not yet be written down to a level that it can afford.
It could soon be a similar story with yet another gem from Schäuble's repertoire of quotations. "Germany is clearly a gainer from the euro," as the minister likes to say. But if what his team has been writing over the past few weeks is true, Germans will soon find that their presumed winnings have transformed into losses. 
The government in Berlin is living in a dual reality. Strategists in the center-right coaliton parties are planning to enhance benefits for families, pensioners and the long-term unemployed in a bid to woo voters in the upcoming elections. 
By contrast, due to the economic slowdown, experts in Schäuble's ministry are anticipating an entirely different scenario: The next government -- no matter who will be chancellor and which parties will be in power -- won't be able to boost spending. Instead, it will have to impose rigorous spending restraint.
Austerity comes to Germany.
According to the recommendations made by Schäuble's team, in order to brace itself for the consequences of the euro crisis, Germany will have to drastically increase taxes and make painful cuts in social services over the coming years.
Why?  To protect the banks and banker bonuses.
These ideas don't fit with the current political climate in Germany, which has been characterized for months by a passionate debate about how additional money could be used to combat poverty among the elderly and improve life for low-wage earners. 
Schäuble nevertheless feels that his experts' forecasts are realistic. He has expressly approved their proposals and ordered them to continue to work on the cost-cutting program....
A cost cutting program that will undermine the social contract in Germany in the same way that the social contract is being undermined across the eurozone and US.
The Germans face a bitter dĂ©jĂ  vu. It was only 10 years ago that then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of the center-left Social Democrats (SPD) and his conservative challenger Edmund Stoiber fought an election campaign that was primarily focused on social justice. After Schröder's victory, it became clear that Germany was strapped for cash. 
Subsequently, the chancellor introduced his radical -- and widely unpopular -- "Agenda 2010" reforms of the labor market and welfare system. This time, Schäuble's team has calculated that even deeper cuts may be needed.
No matter how deep the cuts are they will be insufficient.  The real economy is unable to support all of the excess debt and continue to grow.
What the Finance Ministry officials have listed under the seemingly innocuous title "Medium-Term Budget Goals of the Federal Government" is nothing less than the most comprehensive austerity program in postwar German history. In order to avoid forcing the government to incur additional debt, the officials are scrutinizing subsidies, entitlements and welfare benefits worth tens of billions of euros.
There are also plans to raise taxes. ... 
Schäuble's team wants to slash €10 billion from the federal government's contributions to the German health fund, which currently helps to stabilize premiums in the statutory health insurance system. ... 
The plan also calls for state pension funds to do their part. ...
It still won't be enough and look at how massively the social contract is being rewritten rather than have the banks absorb the losses and protect the real economy as they are designed to do.

This is an important point.  All of the rewriting of the social contract is being caused by government policy makers refusing to have banks perform as designed.

Banks are designed to continue operating and supporting the real economy even when they have low or negative book capital levels.  Banks are able to do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

When banks have low or negative book capital levels, through deposit insurance the taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partners.  It is the existence of the silent equity partners that allow the banks to continue operating.

Of course, if the banks recognize the losses on the excess debt, this means that banker cash bonuses will be reduced until such time as the banks have managed to rebuild their book capital levels.
Widows and widowers would also have to tighten their belts. Currently, the surviving spouse receives 55 percent of the deceased spouse's pension. The idea is to significantly reduce this level in the future. This initiative would annually save billions of euros for the state pension fund.
And someone in the German government thinks this is better than requiring the banks to recognize their losses.  Unbelievable!
Finance Ministry officials see additional cutbacks in social services as unavoidable if the state is to spend more money in other areas, for example, on repairing roads and improving the education system. These investments would "entail stronger limitations on consumptive expenditure," as it says in the draft paper. 
Of course, there would be plenty of money for both social services and repairing roads and improving the education system if needed capital were not be diverting from the real economy to support excess debt that the banks should absorb the losses on.
The proposals from Schäuble's ministry serve to tighten a regulation that has only been enshrined in the German constitution for the past few years: the so-called debt brake, which calls for the German federal government to "maintain a nearly balanced budget" starting in 2016. 
The government will still be able to take out loans to some extent. In 2016, for instance, it will be allowed to borrow some €10 billion. However, Schäuble and his staff say that Germany should not completely exhaust this scope for borrowing. They want a safety buffer. 
"It is absolutely necessary to maintain sufficient distance to the constitutional limit during budget planning to prepare for unexpected structural expenditure and revenue developments," it says in the paper.
The debt brake is a paid idea on par with pursuing the Japanese Model despite overwhelming evidence that it doesn't work (see Japan and its lost 2+ decades).

Since the Great Depression, government programs under the social contract have been designed to expand, think unemployment insurance payments, when economies have downturns.  By definition, governments will not be able to run a nearly balanced budget during a recession as at the time the government social programs are expanding the tax revenue will drop.
The experts also note that they intend to safeguard the national budget against a series of risks. 
One of the examples that they cite is "a sharp economic downturn." If the economy collapses, as it did in the wake of the financial crisis in 2009, experience has shown that public coffers come under considerable pressure. Tax revenues decline while expenditures, such as for the unemployed, massively increase. 
This can have a devastating impact on state finances. Following the most recent recession, government debt soared from 65 to nearly 83 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). 
Schäuble's experts say that the country cannot withstand another similar increase in public debt and conclude that it's time to take appropriate countermeasures. 
To make matters worse, Finance Ministry officials say that it's also possible that Berlin will have to absorb the costs of its bank bailouts. 
At the height of the financial crisis, the German government supported ailing financial institutions such as Hypo Real Estate, Commerzbank and WestLB with capital injections and guarantees amounting to nearly €180 billion. Large quantities of toxic assets were transferred to so-called "bad banks." 
But it's questionable whether these banks will ever be able to completely pay back this money. If that is the case, the federal government will have to waive its claims and permanently absorb the debt.
Again, the solution lies in having the banks absorb the losses on all the bad debt.
Schäuble's team foresees the possibility of a similar development with the euro rescue. 
Indeed, "irrevocable ESM payment defaults" is one of the reasons they list for their contingency plans. Behind the bureaucratic jargon lies the concern that Germany -- despite the government's solemn statements to the contrary -- will have to pay for the euro rescue. 
Germany is currently supporting the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to the tune of at least €190 billion. A portion of these guarantees and loans could actually be lost if Greece's government creditors forgive some of the country's debt. The losses to German public coffers could then easily amount to tens of billions of euros.
Again, push the losses back on to the banks that are designed to absorb it without putting the burden for paying for these losses on the taxpayers.
Consequently, Finance Ministry officials contend that the government will have to make cutbacks elsewhere in the future. Now, in a scenario that euroskeptics have long been warning about, German Chancellor Angela Merkel's government has finally admitted, for the first time, that to balance out the impact of the monetary crisis it will have to reduce expenditure for pensioners and people taking early retirement.
So pursuit of the Japanese Model and protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses has finally come back to haunt the German taxpayer.
The paper by the Finance Ministry officials contains a further admission. The next finance minister will have to make up for what Schäuble has failed to accomplish. 
Merkel's most important minister forced half of Europe to submit to austerity measures while the Germans were spending money hand over fist at home....
Correct, Germany pursued the Japanese Model when it should have been pursuing the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to absorb their losses.

Had the German government done so, the real economy would have been protected and with it all of the social programs.
And, in keeping with his style, he is carefully preparing the Germans for hard times with his signature inscrutable Schäuble-speak: "We cannot allow ourselves to believe that the current positive situation is automatically secured for the future," he says. 
He goes on to say that sound public finances are "not a notion created by stubborn finance ministers, but rather the prerequisite for prosperity and social security." In plain language: Germany is going to start subjecting itself to some iron fiscal discipline.
In short, rather than admit the mistake of pursuing the Japanese Model and adopting the Swedish Model, the German government would rather rewrite the social contract to the detriment of Germany's citizens.

Portugal to hold fire-sale of state assets

Under intense pressure from Germany and the Troika (IMF, ECB and European Commission), Portugal is about to engage in a fire-sale of its assets.

Regular readers know that this fire-sale will accomplish nothing positive for the citizens of Portugal.

When dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis, the critical first step is to require the banks to absorb upfront all of the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

By taking the first step under the Swedish Model, the link between bank book capital levels and sovereign debt is severed.  

At the same time, the sovereign can continue to guarantee bank deposits.  This allows the banks that are capable of generating earnings before banker bonuses to continue in business and rebuild their book capital levels.  Banks that cannot generate earnings must be resolved or merged into banks that can.

Without taking this first step, countries are tempted to bailout their banks.  This links bank book capital levels.

Even worse, it places the debt service burden of this excess debt on the real economy.  This creates a drag in the real economy since capital that is needed for growth and reinvestment is now being used for debt payments.

Your humble blogger observed that a fire-sale of the state's assets would accomplish nothing positive because it is simply generating capital that will be consumed by the debt service burden of the excess debt.

As reported by the Guardian,
Portugal is to embark on a sweeping fire-sale of state companies over the coming months, possibly even privatising state broadcaster RTP, as it bends to the will of the troika of lenders that bailed it out 20 months ago. 
With the government of prime minister Pedro Passos Coelho hoping to persuade the troika of the European commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund to treat it more leniently in 2013 by lowering interest rates on loans, the sell-off of national companies is seen as one way of winning support....
The lesson from Ireland is not to expect more lenient treatment.

The bailout exercise is all about extracting as much from the country and its taxpayers as possible so as to minimize bank losses and preserve banker bonuses.
The troika has told Portugal to sell €5bn of state companies as part of the deal which saw it receive a €78bn bailout in May 2011. But it looks set to beat that target thanks mainly to sell-offs in the electricity sector and in airports.... 
Under the bailout plans, Portugal is due to return to bond markets in 2013. Its borrowing costs have tumbled in recent months, with 10-year bond yields finally falling back to pre-bailout levels of below 7% shortly before Christmas. A successful return to the markets would be seen as a sign that the euro crisis was finally being solved.
The euro crisis is far from being solved.

For example, Portugal is mired in a deep recession.  Who would buy its debt when both the tax base and asset base is shrinking?
Passos Coelho's government hopes that the troika, which recently eased lending conditions to Greece, might do the same with Portugal – lowering interest payments and making it easier to cut the budget deficit. Portugal's debt is expected to reach 120% of GDP this year and it currently pays 3.6% interest on troika loans. 
Germany has already said it opposes a softening of the bailout loan terms, with its finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, saying that would look as though Portugal was unable to meet targets. "It would be a devastating signal and I would really advise them not to pursue this point any further," he said. 
The government should take this to heart and stop bailing out its banks and selling its state assets.

Instead, the government should require its banks to take the first step towards ending the financial crisis and recognize their losses.
Portugal's economy shrank by 3% this year and the country has lost almost 6% of GDP since the credit crunch of 2007.

Quantifying the harm done by quantitative easing

In an interesting Business Insider article, Mike Norman quantifies the harm done by quantitative easing by comparing the net increase in salaries since 2008 to the private sector's lost interest income since 2008.  He finds the loss of interest income is greater than the gain in salaries.

This finding is not surprising.

As their interest income declines, savers offset this decline by cutting back on current consumption.  As current consumption declines, demand declines.  As demand declines, businesses cut back on hiring and salary increases.

The Fed, having locked itself into the pursuit of quantitative easing, continues to purchase interest bearing securities.  This puts more cash into the financial system and further reduces private sector interest earnings.

In turn, savers offset this decline by cutting back on current consumption...

Of course, the Fed could stop pursuing destructive monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing.  This would imply that the Fed was capable of following Walter Bagehot's rule to never lower interest rates below 2%.  Mr. Bagehot is an authority on modern central banking having invented it in the 1870s.

Every time the Fed announces another round of QE we hear the "know-nothings" in the media, on Wall Street and in the mainstream economics community tell us that we're getting more stimulus....
For as the chart below clearly shows, the Fed actions have removed an enormous amount of interest income from the economy. In fact, it has removed over $100 bln more in interest income than the total net gain in private wages and salaries since it began undertaking these extraordinary measures.... 
So while the net change in wages and salaries since 2008 has been an increase of $317 bln, personal interest income dropped by $425 bln. That's not a stimulus by any means. It's mind boggling that the mainstream economics community and the Fed itself, doesn't understand this when they incessantly call for more "stimulus."



Tuesday, December 25, 2012

Nassim Taleb's anti-fragile system is the FDR Framework

In his NY Times editorial, Nassim Taleb calls for
an antifragile system — one in which mistakes don’t ricochet throughout the economy, but can instead be used to fuel growth. The key elements to such a system are decentralization of decision making and ensuring that all economic and political actors have some “skin in the game.”
Regular readers know that the FDR Framework is an anti-fragile system.

The FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).  This combination promotes decentralized decision making and ensures that market participants have 'skin in the game'.

How does the FDR Framework do this?

Please recall the under the FDR Framework, governments are responsible for ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision.

Each market participant under the principle of caveat emptor has an incentive to assess the disclosed information as they have skin in the game because they are responsible for all gains and losses on their exposures.

This skin in the game builds robustness into the system as each market participant restricts their exposures to what they can afford to lose given the risk of each exposure.

Back to Mr. Taleb.

First, in a decentralized system, errors are by nature smaller....
It’s a myth that centralization and size bring “efficiency.” Centralized states are deficit-prone precisely because they tend to be gamed by lobbyists and large corporations, which increase their size in order to get the protection of bailouts. No large company should ever be bailed out; it creates a moral hazard. 
Consider the difference between Silicon Valley entrepreneurs, who are taught to “fail early and often,” and large corporations that leech off governments and demand bailouts when they’re in trouble on the pretext that they are too big to fail. Entrepreneurs don’t ask for bailouts, and their failures do not destabilize the economy as a whole. 
Second, there must be skin in the game across the board, so that nobody can inflict harm on others without first harming himself. Bankers got rich — and are still rich — from transferring risk to taxpayers (and we still haven’t seen clawbacks of executive pay at companies that were bailed out). 
Likewise, Washington bureaucrats haven’t been exposed to punishment for their errors, whereas officials at the municipal level often have to face the wrath of voters (and neighbors) who are affected by their mistakes. 
If we want our economy not to be merely resilient, but to flourish, we must strive for antifragility. It is the difference between something that breaks severely after a policy error, and something that thrives from such mistakes. Since we cannot stop making mistakes and prediction errors, let us make sure their impact is limited and localized, and can in the long term help ensure our prosperity and growth.
In short, we need to adhere to the FDR Framework and ensure that transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.