Tuesday, January 29, 2013

SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes: Sophisticated investors better at valuing contents of brown paper bag

In an astonishing report by Securitization Intelligence, in his keynote address at the ASF 2013 conference, SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes offered
his views on Regulation AB II’s requirement that private 144a offerings include elements of disclosure usually limited to publicly registered transactions, saying that he has previously expressed concern “that we were going too far in treating the private market just like the public market, and that, as a consequence of that, we may compromise the value that the private market brings to bear.” 
He added that the thought that the relative lack of legal protections for investors in the private-label market makes such disclosure requirements important is obviated in part by the sophistication of the investors in the space. 
“I remain unpersuaded that the fundamental reason that the securitization market has been struggling in the last few years is because we don’t have a piling on of regulatory demands,” he said. 
“That’s not to say there is not some room for improvement” in disclosure enhancements, but that the SEC could “end up undercutting the objective of trying to move the ball forward when it comes to the securitization market being conditioned to take off again.” 
To which Deutsch replied, on behalf of attendees who received less resolute answers from some regulatory panelists yesterday, “Hallelujah, brother.” [confirming that ASF is a sell-side dominated group and doesn't represent the buy-side's interests.]
As long as Commissioner Paredes brought up the issue, I thought I might describe exactly what disclosure requirements are needed for both publicly registered and private 144a offerings.

From my post, Turning lemon mortgage-backed securities into lemonade
Disclosure has two components:  what is disclosed and when it is disclosed.  I would like to focus on “when” it is disclosed. 
Everyone knows that structured finance securities involve taking specific assets, like mortgages, and setting them aside for the benefit of the investor.  The physical equivalent of this would be to put them into a bag.

Once the mortgages are in the bag, it is important to know what is in the bag currently. 
 Why? 
If an investor does not know what is in the bag currently, they cannot take the first step in the investment cycle.  
The first step is to independently assess the risk and value the underlying collateral so the investor can know what the investor is buying and, after buying, know what they own. 
The second step is to compare this independent assessment to the prices shown by Wall Street. 
The third and final step is to make a buy, hold or sell decision based on the difference between the investor’s independent valuation of the security and the price shown by Wall Street. 
Please note that without the ability to know what is in the bag currently, it is impossible to accurately assess what is going to come out of the bag eventually. The lack of knowing what is in the bag currently prevents investors from performing their own independent assessment and makes meaningless hiring an expert third party to do the assessment for them.  
Simply put, without current information of what is in the bag, investors cannot go through the investment cycle. 
Buying securities in the absence of an independent assessment is not investing.  Buying securities that cannot be independently assessed is the equivalent of blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.  And, once the securities are purchased, the investor has no ability to know what they own. 
In case you doubt this, let me show it to you using a brown paper bag to hold the underlying collateral. 
On the first business day of last month, $100 went into the bag.  On the third business day of this month, a trustee report with granular level data was issued that showed the bag contained $75 at the end of the last month.  This was made up of 3 $20 bills and 3 $5 bills. 
So the question is:  what is in the bag currently? 
Based on the fact that $25 came out of the bag last month, there are a number of ways of guessing what is in the brown paper bag? First, we could guess that nothing has been taken out of the bag and it still holds $75. Or a $5 bill has been removed and left $70 in the bag.  Or a $20 bill has been removed and left $55 in the bag?  Or both a $5 bill and a $20 bill have been removed and left $50 in the bag? 
By simply asking what is in the brown paper bag currently, I have already created a $25 spread between the $75 a seller might reasonably value the contents of the brown paper bag at and the $50 a buyer might be willing to offer. 
Let me assure you that with this wide a spread, the contents of the brown paper bag are not going to sell. 
This valuation problem has been shown to be particularly acute for mortgage-backed securities since the beginning of the financial crisis.  At that time, buyers came to doubt the ability of the borrowers to make their future payments.  The more doubt, the more likely the market is to freeze as it is impossible to get buyers, who think that the bag is more likely to have $50, and sellers, who look at last month's performance and think the bag has $75, to agree on price. 
Another way we can approach asking what is currently in this brown paper bag is to use a sophisticated model.  We recognize that last month $25 came out of the bag.  This is roughly $0.85 per day.  So we can value the contents of the brown paper bag by multiplying the day of the month it is today by .85 and subtracting the resulting value from the end of the month value shown in the last trustee report. 
Today is the 6th, so the model suggests a value of $69.90 ($75 minus $5.10).  The price suggested by the model doesn't seem unreasonable if a $5 bill is removed from the bag. 
However, a buyer is significantly overpaying if there has been a sharper decline in the value of collateral in the bag and a $20 bill has been removed.  This is analogous to what happened with sub-prime mortgage-backed securities where there was a rapid decline in the value of the collateral. 
This problem of guessing what is in the bag would go away if we were talking about a clear plastic bag.  The investor would know what is in the bag currently as the contents of the bag can be seen and are a knowable fact. 
This is true whether the investor is Commissioner Paredes' sophisticated investor or not.
As a result, investors could independently assess the risk and value the collateral.  With this assessment, the investor “knows what they are buying” and "knows what they own". With this assessment, the investor can make an investment decision to buy, hold or sell based on the prices being shown by Wall Street. 
So turning the mortgage market from lemons to lemonade simply requires recognizing that it is a choice between “Paper or Plastic”.  With “Paper”, you get lemons.  With “Plastic”, you get lemonade. 
So how can each of the structured finance securities be put into the equivalent of a clear plastic bag? 
This can be easily done as the servicer information systems are designed to track and report on the underlying collateral on an observable event basis. 
With observable event based disclosure where all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral are reported before the beginning of the next business day, the investor knows what is in the bag currently. 
Observable event based disclosure is associated with a clear plastic bag.  All other frequencies of disclosure are associated with a brown paper bag and lemons.

Too Big to Jail: Senators Brown and Grassley ask the right questions

In the following letter (hat tip Neil Barofsky) to the Department of Justice, Senators Brown and Grassley look at the emergence of a group of banks that is too big to fail and want to explore how this threatens to undermine the ability to prosecute the individuals employed by these firms (think too big to jail).

The large number of private and government lawsuits since the global financial crisis continues to undermine public confidence in our financial markets.  This confidence can only be restored by demonstrating that there are consistent rules in place that provide accountability for wrongdoing and deter financial predators.

Unfortunately, many of the settlements between large financial institutions and the federal government involve penalties that are disproportionately low, both in relation to the profits which resulted from those wrongful actions as well as in relation to the costs imposed upon consumers, investors, and the market. 

The nature of these settlements has fostered concerns that “too big to fail” Wall Street banks enjoy a favored status, in statute and in enforcement policy.  This perception undermines the public’s confidence in our institutions and in the principal that the law is applied equally in all cases. 

On settling with Swiss Bank UBS for Libor manipulation, for example, you said, “[t]he impact on the stability of the financial markets around the world is something we take into consideration.  We reach out to experts outside of the Justice Department to talk about what are the consequences of actions that we might take, what would be the impact of those actions if we want to make particular prosecutive decisions or determinations with regard to a particular institution.”

In an interview with Frontline, outgoing Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer defended the Department of Justice’s inability to prosecute large financial institutions by saying, “but in any given case, I think I and prosecutors around the country, being responsible, should speak to regulators, should speak to experts, because if I bring a case against institution, and as a result of bringing that case, there’s some huge economic effect — if it creates a ripple effect so that suddenly, counterparties and other financial institutions or other companies that had nothing to do with this are affected badly — it’s a factor we need to know and understand.”

These statements raise important questions about the Justice Department’s prosecutorial philosophy.  In order to explore the Justice Department’s treatment of potential criminal activity by large financial institutions, please answer the following questions and provide the following information:

             1. Has the Justice Department designated certain institutions whose failure could jeopardize the stability of the financial markets and are thus, “too big to jail”?  If so, please name them.
             2. Has the Justice Department ever failed to bring a prosecution against an institution due to concern that their failure could jeopardize financial markets?
             3. Are there any entities the Justice Department has entered into settlements with, in which the amount of the settlement reflected a concern that markets could be impacted by such a settlement?  If so, for which entities?
             4. Please provide the names of all outside experts consulted by the Justice Department in making prosecutorial decisions regarding financial institutions with over $1 billion in assets.
             5. Please provide any compensation contracts for these individuals.
             6. How did DOJ ensure that these experts provided unconflicted and unbiased advice to DOJ?

Our markets will only function efficiently if participants believe that all laws will be enforced consistently, and that violators will be punished to the fullest extent of the law.  There should not be one set of rules that apply to Wall Street and another set for the rest of us. 


Mohamed El-Erian: Wall Street banks are still sicker than you think

In an article in the Atlantic, Pimco's Mohamed El-Erian claims the banks have largely recovered from the financial crisis and sees three issues that must be resolved before banks will be able to complete their recovery.
As analysts pour over the details of the recent earnings announcements by U.S banks, one thing is clear: The banking system has largely overcome a complex set of self-inflicted injuries.... 
Banks fueled the worst of the 2008 global financial crisis with a combination of three crippling, self-created problems: too little capital, too many doubtful assets and a risk-taking culture gone mad.... 
With exceptional public sector support from the Federal Reserve and other government agencies .... 
Meanwhile, popular anger remained high, fueled by what many considered as an overly lenient treatment by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve.  
And it sure did not help that some banks were inclined to quickly resume some highly controversial practices.
The recent set of earning announcements by banks point to significant progress in overcoming the three big problems. Capital cushions are now big and deep, asset quality has improved significantly, and internal incentives are being re-aligned. In addition, banks seem to have placed part, though not all, of their litigation risk behind them.
Given that the banks are 'black boxes', there is no way for Mr. El-Erian to prove his assertion that 'capital cushions are now big and deep, asset quality has improved significantly'. [With the suspension of mark-to-market accounting and adoption of regulatory forbearance, bank book capital and asset quality, think 'zombie loans', is overstated.]

What we do know is that the interbank lending market remains essentially frozen.  This is a market where banks with deposits to lend provide unsecured funding to banks looking to borrow.

The reason that the interbank lending market froze at the beginning of the financial crisis was that the banks with deposits to lend knew the banks looking to borrow were holding doubtful assets.  There was a real question about the solvency of the borrowing banks and their ability to repay the unsecured debt.

The only way to answer this question is to provide the banks with deposits to lend the necessary information for assessing a bank's solvency.

Nothing has happened since August 9, 2007 to provide this information and banks with deposits to lend continue not to lend.

Mr. El-Erian lays out his three big remaining issues
(1) Most important among these is the still-unresolved debate on whether and how to break up large banks that are "too big to fail," "too complex to fail, "too interconnected to fail" and"too big to manage." 
(2) Regardless of where they find themselves on the size issue, banks are yet to fully re-align their operating models with current-day realities.... 
(3) Because banks got off way too easily in 2009-2010 -- even escaping a windfall profit tax -- society remains suspicious of bankers and their motivations....

Do not under-estimate the importance of these three factors. 
Absent their timely and comprehensive resolution, the funding of the real economy will remain sub-optimal, liquidity in capital markets will continue to contract, and gains in financial soundness will come at the cost of significant efficiency losses.
Regular readers know that all three of Mr. El-Erian's issues can be easily solved by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency addresses "too big to fail", "too complex to fail", "too interconnected to fail" and "too big to manage" through the use of market discipline.  Specifically, once market participants have the information they need to assess the risk of each of these banks, each bank's cost of funds will move to reflect its risk.

Banks that are too complex, interconnected or un-manageable will pay a much higher cost to access funds than banks that are not complex, have limited their interconnections to what they can afford to lose and are manageable.

This higher cost of funds (and the related lower stock price) is the market's way of disciplining the banks.  Rather than pay this higher cost of funds, banks have an incentive to shrink.  This takes care of the too big to fail problem.

Ultra transparency also helps to align the banks' operating models with today's reality.  Specifically, it ends activities like manipulating benchmark interest rates (see Libor) and taking proprietary bets (disincentive to gamble because market can trade against positions so as to minimize their profitability).

Finally, ultra transparency addresses society's suspicion of bankers and brings with it a new cultural reality.  Market participants know that sunshine is the best disinfectant as bad behavior by the bankers is immediately exposed and can be effectively disciplined.

Pension experts: QE is a 'monumental' mistake

The Guardian reports that pension experts have gone before a Parliament committee and explained why the Bank of England's pursuit of quantitative easing (QE) has been a 'monumental' mistake and how the economy would recover if the BoE stopped pursuing all the related low interest rate policies.

Regular readers of this blog will be familiar with the arguments that the pension experts put forward on why QE should be abandoned as they were presented here first.

The Bank of England's policy of pumping money into the economy has been a "monumental mistake", pensions experts have warned . 
A committee of MPs heard that measures taken by the Bank to drive the economy had backfired by squeezing individuals' incomes – both pensioners and those in work – and forcing companies to divert cash into pension funds rather than investing.
I referred to these two economic headwinds as the retirement fund death spiral.  The trigger for the death spiral is the adoption of zero interest rate and related policies like QE.

Both individuals and companies move to offset the loss of earnings on their savings and reinforce the negative feedback loop.  Individuals do this by cutting back current consumption and saving more.  Companies offset the decline in earnings on pension funds by diverting cash rather than investing.

The actions by both individuals and companies reduce aggregate demand.  Since the BoE wants to boost aggregate demand, it pursues the low interest rate policies even more aggressively.  The result is a further drop in aggregate demand as both individuals and corporations move to offset the loss income.

That individuals change their spending and saving habits in the face of low interest rates has been known since the 1870s.  Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, even stated that interest rates should never be less than 2%.
Ros Altmann, pensions expert and director general of Saga, said current policies devalued pensioners' incomes, making them less willing to spend: "Quantitative easing and ultra-low interest rates have hampered the spending power of those in the economy who were not over-indebted and who would otherwise have spent money." ...
Altmann said ending the QE programme was much more likely to herald a period of growth than its introduction had done. "History will judge this as a monumental mistake," she said. "If we do not have any more quantitative easing, the economy will be freer to grow than if we do."
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ros Altmann has nicely summarized what your humble blogger has been saying about why zero interest rate policies never work to boost demand and why abandoning these policies would actually produce the growth in the economy that central bankers want.
Under the QE programme, the Bank of England has bought £375bn of UK government bonds, or gilts, with newly created electronic money. It now owns almost a third of all gilts in the market. This huge influx of demand has driven gilt prices higher and means yields, or the effective interest rates on them – which represent government borrowing costs – are at record low levels. 
That has the unintended consequence of pummelling pension funds, which use gilt yields to calculate their future liabilities. When gilt yields plummet, pension fund deficits effectively balloon. 
The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) estimated last year that QE had increased pension deficits by at least £90bn over the past three years. 
Current regulations mean companies must plug those holes. Mark Hyde Harrison, the chairman of NAPF, said businesses are now having to contribute to their pension schemes instead of investing for the future, which negates any positive impact of QE....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Harrison has described the retirement fund death spiral triggered by zero interest rate policies.
QE has also reduced the incomes of recent retirees using their pension pot to buy an annuity, which sets the size of their income for life, as annuities are also linked to gilt yields. 
Altmann said monetary easing had acted like a "tax increase" on older people. She said the economy is in "unprecedented territory" and the gilt market had never been distorted in such a way. 
The Bank of England had not properly considered whether carrying out a policy which penalises certain sections of society is acceptable, because it has assumed that the path it has taken was the only option. 
QE is not creating growth and is hampering the spending of people who are not particularly burdened with debt because they are "worried about what's coming next," she said.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Altmann has made a very important point.  Specifically, the pursuit of zero interest rate policies including QE sends a message that undermines consumer confidence as these policies reflect the simple fact that central banks are still in crisis management mode.

SEC's Jesse Litvak case shows the value of opacity to Wall Street

In a must read post, ZeroHedge looks at the SEC's case against Jesse Litvak and his conduct in selling mortgage-backed securities.  What ZeroHedge reveals is just how much money Wall Street makes from  opacity.  Specifically, opacity as it applies to both the securities and trading in the Over the Counter (OTC) market.

Regular readers know that since before the financial crisis even began, your humble blogger has been trying to bring transparency to the opaque structured finance market.

My focus has been on bringing 'valuation' transparency as oppose to 'price' transparency as price transparency without valuation transparency is worthless.

The reason that valuation transparency is critically important is that it is valuation transparency that makes it possible for an investor to go through the three step investment process:

  1. Independently assess all the useful, relevant information to assess the risk and value the security.  This independent assessment can be done by the investor or an expert third party (think fund manager or an expert hired by the fund manager) hired by the investor.
  2. Find out what price Wall Street will buy or sell the security at.
  3. Make a decision to buy, hold or sell the security based on the difference between the price shown by Wall Street and the independent valuation.  If a decision is made to buy, limit the purchase to what the investor can afford to lose given the assessment of the risk of the security.
It is under valuation transparency that an investor is provided with access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that the independent assessment of this information can take place.

Without valuation transparency, it is impossible to complete step one of the investment process.

If a buyer or seller of a security cannot complete step one of the investment process, they are reduced to gambling when they buy, hold or sell a security.  Specifically, the buyer or seller is gambling that the price shown by Wall Street reflects the fair value of the investment.

What the Jesse Litvak case shows is how Wall Street uses the simple fact that the buyer or seller is gambling and doesn't know what the fair value of the investment is to profit.  This profit goes away if there is valuation transparency as the buyer or seller knows what the fair value of the investment is and won't transact if the price doesn't reflect this value.
For many years one of the best jobs on Wall Street in terms of a mix of job safety and compensation, was to be a fixed income trader-cum-salesman working for a major bank with a deep balance sheet, which could hold illiquid securities on its prop account, to dispose of as the "flow" (or clients) required, and on unsupervised and unregulated terms that were simply a verbal arrangement between the bank trader and the end client, usually a counterparty trader working for a major institutional buyside shop, including mutual or hedge funds. 
Since for the most part, the buyside traders operated with other people's money, they were largely indiscriminate on the fine pricing nuances of the acquisition (or disposition) of the securities at hand, and while to the "other people's money" under management whether a given bond was bought for 55 or 55.75, or a given MBS was sold for 72-6 or 72-16 meant little (after all the trade was driven by a big picture view that the security would go up or down much more and certainly enough to cover the bid/ask spread, resulting in much larger profits upon unwind), the transaction price had a huge impact for the bank traders-cum-salesmen arranging said deals. 
Because when one is selling a $40 million MBS block, a 1 point price swing equals a difference of $400,000. Make 15 such deals per year, and one's $1,000,000 bonus (assuming a ~15% cut on the profits) is in the bag....
Bottom line:  the lack of valuation transparency allows Wall Street to extract a significant amount of profits as the buy-side is only gambling when it buys opaque structured finance securities ('trade was driven by the big picture view that the security would go up or down ... resulting in much larger profits upon unwind').

When there is valuation transparency, buy-side firms have a fiduciary duty to use this information.  This immediately ends Wall Street's ability to skim the bid/ask spread.

In short: the highly lucrative and extremely profitable bid/ask skimming that every bond trader engaged in for years has been impossible in equities for the simple reason that the bid/ask spread on most equity-related securities is minute and the market is far deeper and (at least used to be) far more liquid.
And the reason that the equity markets are far more liquid has to do with the ready availability of valuation transparency for most firms ('black box' banks are the exception).
It also explains why 4 years after the Great Financial Crisis, there is still no centralized, computerized trading portal for OTC trades, including corps, CDS, loans, etc. 
Doing so would mean that the banks would give up billions in additional commissions that they could charge if all such trades were facilitiated by the kind of sales coverage middlemen described above. 
Because while a salesman was incentivized to peel as much as they could of a given trade, they would at best pocket some 10-15% of the total spread. The rest went to the bank, and thus to management in the form a massive bonuses: comp at banks is not 40% of revenue for nothing, with some money left over for "retained earnings."
Please note, ZeroHedge has laid out why Wall Street is fighting to protect opacity.

But there is no reason to worry about Wall Street's profitability as it has shown itself to being equally adept at making money where there is valuation transparency (see the end of fixed commissions on stock trades for example).

With opacity, Wall Street makes a lot of money on each transaction, but there are very few transactions.  With valuation transparency, Wall Street makes a little money on each transaction, but the volume of trades is significantly higher.  As a result, Wall Street firms actually ends up making more money when there is valuation transparency.  They just have to work harder to make their money.

Monday, January 28, 2013

Ex-compliance officer makes case for banks providing transparency

In a must read interview on the Guardian, an ex-compliance officer talks about regulators, high-frequency trading and transparency.

His view of the impact of transparency on banks is
What's more, you cannot have a banking environment that is risk free, gives high returns while being highly transparent. That's logically impossible. If you're transparent in what you're doing then others will see it and get in on the action driving down returns.
And why is it necessary that banks generate high returns?  Isn't a low risk banking environment that is highly transparent preferable from the perspective of society?

His view on the fundamental reason that regulators are ineffective

My impression was that regulators were not always alive to how things work in practice. 
The ones I dealt with were often economists, essentially philosophers who had learned to build models. 
Why understand how things actually work in practice when you can just make assumptions to plug into models?  A classic example of this is the bank stress tests.  Is there any surprise that the banks can pass stress tests for capital adequacy and then need to be nationalized shortly thereafter.

Finally, he offers his perspective on high frequency trading
The effect of HFT on the trading floor is fascinating. You can't see the HFT programme, as it is embedded in the computers. So you notice it negatively, when traders complain because something isn't working. And you notice it when you're watching the order book on a screen, and you see movement when the programme buys or sells.
It's when there's a panic that you really realise just how strange and evanescent these programmes are. How do we access them? In the last resort people can actually rip out the cable from the computer. I've seen that happen, but it seems ridiculously primitive in such technological environments. 
No human being could ever do what computers now do with high frequency trading. No human being can see what HFT does. We can only see it afterwards, when it already has made its impact. 
This raises important questions for regulators. HFT is very difficult to corset, to manage. Regulators will probably never have the manpower to monitor all the data, to follow all transactions. So a significant portion is delegated to innovative technology. Many people I have interviewed are genuinely concerned over this.
Perhaps rather than trying to monitor high frequency trading, the regulators should ban it until such time as they are actually capable of monitoring it and making sure that its impact on the financial markets is positive.

By letting high frequency trading continue right now, the financial regulators are effectively gambling with the stability of the capital markets and the financial system.  A gamble that doesn't appear prudent to your humble blogger.

Transparency: to stop firms from gaming tax system, make them admit what they are doing

A Guardian article provides yet another example of requiring transparency and letting the benefits of sunshine clean up bad behavior.  In this case, the behavior being cleaned-up is the exercise in tax deferral.

Lloyd Blankfein, the boss of Goldman Sachs, is unrepentant about plans – now dropped – to help the bank's already highly paid traders avoid paying the top rate of income tax. 
To recap, Goldman had been thinking about deferring part-payment of bonuses from 2009, 2010 and 2011 into the new tax year to help recipients benefit from a fall in the top rate of tax from 50% to 45%. 
The firm surrendered only after Sir Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, said he found the idea "depressing" and Treasury minister Sajid Javid quietly intervened. 
There is, of course, nothing illegal about moving payments beyond 6 April, when the new tax year begins, but there is a question about whether it can be justified morally.... 
tax specialists at the likes of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Deloitte – all of whom have been called before the public accounts committee this week – should be forced to think about the advice they give to companies when it comes to "tax planning". The advice should comply not just with the letter of the law but the spirit too. ...
the government should seize upon an idea raised by the corporate governance body Pirc last week when it wrote to remuneration consultants to ask them what advice they have been giving about deferring bonuses. Crucially, Pirc suggested the consultants should advise clients to disclose any such wheezes in annual voluntary reports.... 
Embarrassment forced Goldman to reconsider its deferral plan. Being forced to admit to tax schemes for staff in annual reports may well prove to be an effective deterrent for others.

Iceland and deposit guarantees

Your humble blogger has written extensively about deposit guarantees and the role they play in allowing policymakers to adopt the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Specifically, I have asserted that deposit guarantees make the taxpayers the 'silent equity partner' of the banks when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.

Why?

Because the government is both explicitly and implicitly on the hook for making the depositors whole.

More importantly, depositors assume that governments will honor their deposit guarantee.  From the time they open their first bank account they are told not to worry about bank book capital levels (please recall, when a 6-year old opens a bank account, their parents answer their question of how do they know they can get their money back by saying the government guarantees the 6-year old will get their back and not "look at a bank's financial statements and if the book capital level is positive....).

The case of Iceland and its handling of deposit guarantees confirms the expectation that government's will honor their deposit guarantees.

However, the case of Iceland reminds everyone that foreign depositors who only have an account at a bank to earn a higher rate of interest should recognize that they are "investors" and as investors they should not assume that they will be repaid under the country's deposit guarantee program.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal,
Iceland won a sweeping victory in a court fight over its responsibilities to foreign depositors in the Icelandic bank Landsbanki, which failed in 2008. 
The court of the European Free Trade Association on Monday said Iceland didn't breach European Economic Area directives on deposit guarantees by not compensating U.K. and Dutch depositors in Landsbanki's online savings accounts, known as Icesave accounts.... 
The EFTA Court sets up a vexing question: If deposit-guarantee programs don't protect everyone, are they really effective?  
That issue was raised by the European Commission, the EU's executive arm, which joined the case against Iceland.... 
Yes, deposit-guarantee programs are still effective even if they don't protect everyone.

They are effective even with a distinction between "depositors", individuals and firms that have a reason other than interest earned for having money at a bank, and "foreign investors", who have money at the bank solely for the purpose of receiving a higher interest rate.

Foreign investors recognize that under the FDR Framework the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware) applies and they are responsible for all losses on their exposures.  Hence, they have an incentive to independently assess the risk of investing money in a bank of a small country.
Because its banks opened Internet arms seeking deposits from foreigners, Iceland had an unusually high proportion of foreign depositors in the system..... 
These foreign depositors were investors.
Iceland didn't force losses on domestic depositors. In the windup of the banks, the authorities put domestic deposits and assets into new "good" banks and left foreign deposits in the old, insolvent banks. 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority argued that Iceland violated nondiscrimination rules by treating domestic depositors differently. 
The court agreed with Iceland that the transfer didn't break the rules. 
The EU's common-market rules require that every country establish a deposit-guarantee program that provides a minimum level of compensation to savers in case of a bank failure.  
Iceland's banking collapse took down all the island's major banks, and the Icelandic deposit-guarantee fund didn't have nearly enough money to pay out insurance. 
At the core of the Icesave case is exactly what a country must do in such a total failure. 
Iceland said its obligation was simply to make sure that a reasonable guarantee plan existed. The U.K. said a country is obliged to make sure that insured depositors are actually paid. 
The Icelandic government expressed "considerable satisfaction" that the country's stance had prevailed in the Icesave case....
By compensating their depositors, the U.K. and the Netherlands received priority claims on the assets of the failed Landsbanki. The ministry said it expects those assets will be enough to pay all the British and Dutch claims. 
A spokesman for the European Commission, Stefaan De Rynck, said the commission would "maintain its interpretation" of the deposit-guarantee requirements in the 27 member states of the EU, where Mr. De Rynck says the guarantees must "also apply in the event of a systemic crisis." ...
The message from the EU being that both "domestic" depositors and "foreign investors" can expect an EU member states deposit guarantee to cover their bank deposits.
The Icesave affair has been an acrimonious backdrop to Iceland's relatively successful attempt to recover its economic footing in the aftermath of 2008.... 
Iceland adopted the Swedish Model and required its banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  By sparing its real economy the burden of servicing this excess debt, Iceland has seen its real economy bounce back quickly.
The British shelled out £2.35 billion ($3.7 billion), and the Dutch €1.32 billion, to repay their depositors in Landsbanki shortly after it collapsed....
As it became clearer that Landsbanki's assets would cover most, if not all, of the balance, the impact of the dispute faded.....

Opacity: why its hard to make sense of Wall Street's trading revenue

In his NY Times Dealbook article, Peter Eavis examines how opacity makes it hard to make sense of Wall Street's trading revenues.  He sees how Wall Street reports its trading revenues as part of the broader debate on opacity.

Under the FDR Framework, there is not suppose to be a debate about opacity in which the Wall Street firms have a voice.

It is the government's responsibility under the FDR Framework to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

The government was given this responsibility because the firms providing the disclosure are going to want to disclose as little as possible.

This responsibility puts the burden on the government to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information.

Please note the use of the word "all".  It is there so that government regulators error on the side of requiring disclosure of too much information rather than error on the side of too little information.

Please note the use of the words "useful, relevant information".  These words are there so the government regulators error on the side of requiring disclosure of too much information rather than error on the side of too little information.  So long as one market participant thinks that the information is useful and relevant it must be disclosed.
Traders at the top Wall Street firms racked up nearly $80 billion of revenue last year. But understanding how they produced all that money is far from simple. 
The financial crisis revealed the dangers of banks having murky balance sheets. And some investors think banks’ disclosures are still inadequate. 
One of the primary causes of the financial crisis was opacity across wide swathes of the financial system including 'black box' banks and 'brown paper bag' structured finance securities.

The fact that any investor thinks banks' disclosure is still inadequate says that the government, through the SEC, is not doing its job and fulfilling its responsibility to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.
“The major financial institutions in the U.S. and around the globe are utterly opaque,” Paul Singer, the founder of a large hedge fund called Elliott Management, said last year.
At a conference this week, Mr. Singer clashed with Jamie Dimon, chief executive of JPMorgan Chase, over the subject of bank transparency. In the exchange, Mr. Dimon said hedge funds were hardly transparent and added that JPMorgan’s annual report was 400 pages long.
In an earlier post, I noted that Mr. Dimon observing that hedge funds were hardly transparent was a red herring irrelevant argument.  The issue is not whether an investor does or does not provide transparency.  The issue is whether the firm that is making the disclosures is transparent.

Mr. Dimon makes that assertion that because JP Morgan's annual report is 400 pages long, his firm is providing all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

Clearly this is not the case as Mr. Singer observes that JP Morgan is opaque and his analyst cannot understand the risk of JP Morgan's derivative portfolio.

At the start of the financial crisis, your humble blogger defined what constitutes all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for banks.  This is ultra transparency under which the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

If JP Morgan provided this amount of disclosure, Mr. Singer's analysts would be able to independently assess the risk of JP Morgan and he could then adjust his exposure to JP Morgan to reflect this risk and his capacity to absorb losses.
Trading results are good place to start when assessing whether banks release sufficient information...
Shareholders benefit from good disclosures because they can better assess what value to place on a bank’s business. Trading revenue is not only large – it can also be extremely volatile, bolstering profits one quarter, then hurting them the next. With the right data, investors can do a better job of identifying what drives revenue up and down....
When it comes to sales and trading, Wall Street firms have differing levels of disclosure.
All Wall Street firms should be brought to the gold standard for disclosure:  ultra transparency.

Abandon, don't electrify ring-fence

In his Financial Times op-ed, Andrew Tyrie, the chairman of the Parliament's Commission on Banking Standards, argues for 'electrifying the ring-fence' between investment and retail banking because banks will relentlessly lobby until the ring-fence has been effectively torn down.

I agree with Mr. Tyrie's observation about the behavior of bankers and what the final result of adopting a ring-fence will be.

What your humble blogger disagrees with Mr. Tyrie on is substituting the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight (which is what an electrified ring-fence would be) for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

If banks were required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, this would go further to eliminating casino banking and the danger it presents to utility banking than a ring-fence would.

With ultra transparency, market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess the risk of each bank and make a fully informed decision.  The result of this independent assessment will be market discipline on the banks to reduce their risk taking.

Ultra transparency also has the added advantage that risk reduction is enforced by the market and not by regulators and policymakers who are subject to being lobbied over time.  So ultra transparency directly addresses Mr. Tyrie's concerns about long-term enforceability of reforms.

The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which I chair, supports the creation of this ringfence. However, in our report scrutinising the draft legislation, the commission also concluded that without significant changes it may well not achieve its objectives. 
The ringfence must be “electrified” if it is to stand a better chance of success – in other words, if the banks test the ringfence too much, they will get a shock. 
Any reform where there is significant doubt about its long term viability is a reform that shouldn't be pursued.
We therefore recommended a reserve power for full separation, an approach Sir John himself endorsed in evidence to the commission this month. 
The regulators, too, have told the commission they want electrification. And they have come forward with proposals to give it practical effect. 
The banks, on the other hand, do not want electrification. They seem to be the only ones. 
The lobbying campaign against this proposal predictably started the moment our report was published – just as it did when the ICB first suggested introducing a ringfence. 
The strength of the industry’s lobbying, even at this early stage, makes the case eloquently for electrification. Even while chastened by public anger over their role in the financial crisis and subsequent revelations such as Libor rigging , they are lobbying....
Please note that the banks have been lobbying against any proposed reform since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Your humble blogger has documented this lobbying in the area of structured finance reform.  The bottom line is the banks have effectively blocked reform.

Even when the EU passed legislation mandating that banks know what they own and that the issuers provide the data to make this possible, the banks managed to lobby the banking regulators and have these regulators agree that opaque, toxic subprime mortgage backed securities qualify for know what you own.

The other way that banks succeed in their lobbying is by keeping certain reforms off the table.  Banks have successfully blocked bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system by "supporting" through their lobbying the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight as a replacement for transparency and market discipline.
All history tells us that banks will be at the ringfence like foxes to a chicken coop unless they are incentivised not to do so. On past evidence, they will test it nonstop and try to persuade politicians to alter it in their favour. 
Electrification is therefore essential to ensure that the banks comply not just with the rules of the ringfence but also with the spirit. 
We must legislate now for more benign economic circumstances, when banks are under less intense scrutiny. At that time, politicians will be particularly susceptible to lobbying and the integrity of the ringfence will be most at risk.
 Our proposals help protect the ringfence from such pressures in the long term. Banks see it as a starting point for negotiations; we view it as a starting point for a more stable and sustainable banking system.... 
Mr. Tyrie is wrestling with the issue of how to enforce any complex regulation in light of what we know about the banks' ability to relentlessly lobby.

This issue goes directly to the heart of why the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight fail catastrophically and make the financial system far more unstable.  Ultimately the banks will get around the regulation.

This is why your humble blogger has been pounding the table on the issue of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It is a simple regulation that the market can enforce.
Of course, structural reform is by no means the only way to improve banking standards and the commission will now be largely focusing on the second phase of its work. This will involve examining whether changes in areas such as corporate governance, competition, the regulatory and tax framework, and the civil and criminal law could enhance standards and improve behaviour in the banking industry.
Regular readers know that sunshine is the best disinfectant of bad banker behavior and ultra transparency is the gold standard for sunshine.

Regular readers also know that ultra transparency is the key to restoring trust in the banks.  After all, providing ultra transparency use to be the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet because it had nothing to hide.

Your humble blogger hopes that Mr. Tyrie and his commission will consider it.