Saturday, February 23, 2013

Head of UK bank regulator: "banks' assets wrongly valued"

The Telegraph reports that the newly appointed head of the Bank of England's bank supervision area says that banks are not valuing their assets correctly.

That banks are not valuing their assets correctly is not news.  Your humble blogger has been talking about this since the beginning of the financial crisis and the adoption of regulatory forbearance (which turns non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans the banks claim are performing) and the suspension of mark to market accounting (which lets bank management mark their securities to mythology).

What is newsworthy about the statement is that the regulator wants to end these deceptive practices and have the assets actually properly valued.

Regular readers know that the only way to properly value the assets is to have the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, the market can an will value the assets.

This has several advantages including:

  1. Markets are designed to price assets so the price of the assets reflects not just the regulators' or bankers' opinions; and
  2. Markets are not influenced by the lobbying of the banks for higher asset valuations;
With this information, the market will also exert discipline on the banks so that any losses that are currently being hidden on or off the banks' balance sheets are recognized.

The new PRA, which will be a division of the Bank of England, will take over the prudential operations of the FSA – ensuring banks hold enough capital and liquidity to withstand shocks unaided. 
It is intended to be the first line of defence in preventing the UK’s largest banks from ever returning to the point they reached four years ago, when their failure threatened to bring down the entire financial system.
The new PRA should use the market as leverage to fulfill its role as the first line of defense in preventing UK banks from threatening to bring down the entire financial system.

PRA can easily do this by championing requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

With this information, the PRA can access the market's ability to analyze data to identify banks that have a higher risk profile.

With this information, the PRA can piggyback on the market's ability to exert discipline on these banks to reduce their risk profile.
Among the body's first tasks will be an assessment of the risks being taken by large banks. 
An assessment that the market and its experts is more qualified to perform than the PRA and its staff.
Mr Bailey told The Times there was a need to "bring this capital debate to a head and ask what is it we are concerned about". 
He added that regulators believed there were still problems with bank balance sheets: 
“Some assets are valued in a way I don’t think is sufficiently prudent. That is not lying. That’s a matter of judgment.”
In matters of judgment like asset valuation, it is better to have an independent third party value the assets than the regulators or the bankers.  That independent third party is the market.
The Cambridge-educated economist cautioned that banks remained too big to fail.
A problem that requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency cures as the market exerts discipline on these banks to reduce their risk profile.
He believed too that the industry faces a small “tail risk” that fines over Libor, mis-sold interest rate hedging products and other wrongdoing could cause institutions to “keel over”.
Banks are not like non-financial firms.  They don't keel over.  They only go out of business when the regulators close them down.

Banks are designed to operate with low or negative book capital levels.  They can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.
Mr Bailey will also become the third deputy governor of the Bank of England. In his role as one of the three deputy governors of the Bank, Mr Bailey will have responsibility for prudential regulation. He will also become a member of the Court of Directors (the governing board of the Bank) and a member of the Financial Policy Committee.

Friday, February 22, 2013

Geithner Doctrine worked as financial crisis just a 'blip' for bankers

Under the leadership of the US Treasury and Federal Reserve, prior to the current financial crisis global financial regulators abandon the policy of financial failure prevention that the global financial system is based on in favor of the policy of financial failure containment.

The policy of financial failure containment is embodies in its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine.  Under the Geithner Doctrine, as Yves Smith says, no action shall be taken that hurts the profitability or reputation of a bank that is too big to fail or politically connected.

Under the policy of financial failure containment and the Geithner Doctrine, at the beginning of financial crisis most western economies adopted the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses were protected at all costs.

The Financial Times reports that it is mission accomplished when it comes to having protected banker bonuses.

At the same time, the cost to the global economy has been significant and is still rising.

As regular readers know, there is an alternative to the policy of financial failure containment, the Geithner Doctrine and the Japanese Model.  The alternative is the policy of financial failure prevention and the Swedish Model.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  By having the banks recognize these losses, the real economy is protected as it does not have to divert capital needed for reinvestment and growth to debt service.

Of course, under the Swedish Model, banker cash bonuses are limited until such time as the bank has rebuilt its book capital level through retain earnings.
The financial crisis has been “little more than a blip” for London bankers who were being paid more three years after it hit than before and were more likely to be employed than other workers, a report has found. 
The financial sector has proved remarkably resilient with wages in the City rising, while other workers saw pay fall between 2008 and 2011, according to research from the London School of Economics. 
Inequality before the crisis was driven by high pay in the financial sector and does not look set to stop, said Brian Bell of the Centre for Economic Performance, a co-author of the report. 
“The sector which in some sense caused the whole crisis is the sector which seems immune to almost any employment effect,” said Mr Bell. “Traders earning millions are in some sense not replaceable . . . so they have remarkable bargaining power within firms.”
Actually, requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details would go a long ways to reducing the leverage of the traders.

Exposing their positions to other market participants would dramatically shrink the profitability of their bets as market participants trading against the bank would limit the upside of the bank's positions and maximize the downside.

With profits lowered and risk raised, banks would reduce the size, if not completely eliminate, the bets taken by traders.  The result is much less compensation for bank traders.
London’s finance workers took home 14.2 per cent more in salary and cash bonuses for 2011 than they did in 2008, compared with a 3.7 per cent rise – a real terms fall – for all other workers.
The top 10 per cent of bankers saw their wages rise by an average 8.6 per cent over the three years, more than the 2.3 per cent rise for the top decile of all workers. 
The report shows that a worker in the finance industry was still 2.2 per cent more likely to be employed than workers in other sectors....
Bottom line:  the policy of financial failure containment, the Geithner Doctrine and the Japanese Model have been wonderful for protecting banker pay.

And what does the real economy and the rest of society have to show for it?

Adoption of austerity policies and a rewriting of the social contract.
Two Labour MPs said the report showed that the financial sector – much of which was bailed out by the state – had not changed its ways. 
Lisa Nandy, MP for Wigan, said it was “business as usual” for parts of the banking industry and the government should “not be letting them get away with it”. 
“It demonstrates that finance executives and investment bankers have learnt nothing from the financial crisis,” she said. 
Paul Flynn, Labour MP for Newport East, said banks were part of a “dependency culture”. “It proves that the wages of sin are handsome,” he said.
Of course, this was the goal of the policy of financial failure containment, the Geithner Doctrine and the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

EU bank regulator to create liquidity ranking for assets

In yet another example of the substitution of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline, EU bank regulators are going to create a liquidity ranking for assets held by a bank.

Bloomberg reports that the European Banking Authority will start ranking assets by their liquidity in an effort to assure that banks have adequate liquidity to protect themselves from a sudden loss of short-term funding.

Regular readers know this whole exercise is not needed if the banks are required to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants, including the bank regulators, can exert discipline on the banks to maintain adequate liquidity.

Europe’s top banking regulator will start ranking financial assets in order of liquidity as it implements international rules to protect banks from a sudden loss of short-term funding. 
The European Banking Authority will create a “scorecard” of asset liquidity, the agency said in an e-mailed statement, as part of requirements that banks hold a buffer of assets, known as the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, they can quickly sell to survive a 30-day credit squeeze. 
The EBA’s analysis will also “identify the features that are of particular importance to market liquidity” and report to the European Union’s executive body, the regulator said....
Regular readers might recall that the EBA was the bank regulatory authority that determined that the disclosures made by opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities were adequate for banks to know what they own.

Given this history, there is zero reason to believe that the EBA is capable of identifying the features that are important for liquidity or creating a useful asset liquidity scorecard.
The LCR is part of an overhaul of global financial rules, known as Basel III, intended to prevent a repeat of the financial crisis that followed the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.
Please note the substitution of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight that failed to prevent the financial crisis for the combination of transparency and market discipline that protected the sectors of the financial system that did not freeze during the financial crisis.

EU Commission turns up pressure on banks over Libor

The Financial Times reports that the EU Commission is turning up pressure on the banks to settle the Libor interest rate rigging scandal by pointing out that it can assess a fine equal to 10% of each bank's annual revenue for every market it was involved in manipulating rates.

At first blush, the idea that a bank could lose 30% of its annual revenue for having manipulated benchmark interest rates on a global basis (Libor, Euribor and Tibor) sounds like a significant penalty.

However, consider that these rates have probably been manipulated for 2+ decades and suddenly a fine of this size might not be large enough to make the banks disgorge all the profits they made from manipulating the benchmark interest rates.

To date, the fines assessed to the banks have been the equivalent of parking tickets and will do absolutely nothing to stop bankers from engaging in manipulating interest rates in the future.  What the fines will do is send a message to the bankers not to leave an electronic trail while they are manipulating interest rates.

The European Commission’s 18-month antitrust investigation, previously known to include yen and euro interbank rates, has been extended to include Swiss franc-denominated swaps and poses a significant regulatory threat to the financial institutions under scrutiny, according to people familiar with the probe. 
The commission can impose a maximum penalty equivalent to 10 per cent of a company’s global turnover for each cartel it is found to be involved with. A bank implicated in all three rate-fixing cases could, for example, face fines of up to 30 per cent of total revenues.... 

Libor scandal expands into Swiss franc denominated swaps

Reuters reports that the Libor interest rate manipulation scandal is now expanding into the market for Swiss franc denominated swaps.

This is not surprising as there is no reason to assume that bad behavior by bankers that was hidden behind a veil of opacity in one market would not occur in other markets.

As everyone knows, sunshine is the best disinfectant for bad banker behavior.  That is why your humble blogger has been advocating requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants could monitor what the banks were doing and exert discipline where the bankers were behaving badly.

The European Commission's 18-month long antitrust probe into yen and euro interbank rates has been broadened to include Swiss franc-denominated swaps, posing a significant regulatory threat to financial institutions under scrutiny, the Financial Times reported on Thursday....
The paper, citing people involved in the probe, said the EU is informally exploring the potential for settlements but some companies are reluctant to open discussions over what they see as unfounded allegations.

Thursday, February 21, 2013

European banks resort to manipulation to make their capital ratios look better

In yet another article on the manipulation of capital ratios by the banks, the Wall Street Journal looks at how European banks are attempting to look better and disguise their true financial condition.

Regular readers know that the Basel capital requirements are an open invitation to the banks to manipulate their reported capital ratios.

By design, Basel capital requirements hide the true leverage and risk of the banks (I say this as an individual who helped to create Basel I and the reason for hiding the true leverage and risk was to allow the banks to earn a higher ROE - the regulators believed this was necessary to attract capital).

The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane notes what a good job the Basel capital requirements do at hiding leverage and risk when he observed that there are literally millions of assumptions that go into calculating Basel III.

Big European banks are boosting a key gauge of their financial health through largely cosmetic maneuvering, even as regulators in some countries try to crack down on the practice. 
The only way to crackdown on the practice is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can calculate capital ratios for each bank themselves.
Banks are recalculating the risks in their loan portfolios and trading books in flattering ways, a move that has the effect of raising their ratio of capital to "risk-weighted" assets—a metric that investors and regulators use to assess banks' abilities to absorb unexpected losses. 
While such maneuvering has been going on for years, analysts say it appears to be accelerating at some major European banks, which are under pressure to raise their capital ratios as new regulations known as Basel III start phasing in this year.

Fitch: mortgage bonds need better transparency

According to a Wall Street Journal article, Fitch asserted that mortgage bonds need better transparency so that investors are protected and originators and issuers have an incentive to do a better job underwriting the mortgages.

Regular readers know that the transparency investors need in order to fully enforce the reps and warranties of each deal is observable event based reporting.  Under observable event based reporting, every activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral are reported to the investors before the beginning of the next business day.

With observable event based reporting, investors can know what they are buying and what they own.

As a result, they can enforce the reps and warranties for each mortgage that violates the terms of these reps and warranties as soon as the violation occurs.

Mortgage bond issuers that are relieving lenders of some potential liabilities may be exposing investors to additional risks of weak underwriting and defective loans, Fitch Ratings said in a report Wednesday. 
Fitch focused on proposals to recast the so-called representations and warranties in private mortgage-backed securities, which are legal testaments to the quality of the assets packaged into a securitization. 
Facing billions of dollars in claims over bubble-era mortgages that have caused investor losses, the issuers are trying to provide some degree of protection to lenders in the future, to the extent that investors will allow. 
Some rep and warrant provisions in recent residential mortgage-backed securities have provisions that Fitch "deems weak," the rating firm said in a statement. 
For example, some of the provisions relieve lenders from demands to repurchase faulty loans after fewer than 36 months, it said. 
"The balance between protecting both lenders and investors in new RMBS deals requires greater clarity and transparency so that investors remain protected and lenders remain incentivized to make sound underwriting decisions," Fitch said.

Thomas Hoenig: bank accounting masks risk of banks

Bloomberg reports that FDIC Vice Chairman Thomas Hoenig wants bank accounting changed so that it properly reflects the risk of the banks.

Specifically, he wants to force the banks to include their off-balance sheet exposures on their balance sheets.  For derivatives, this means showing the gross amount of exposure and not the net amount of exposure.

Regular readers know that accounting for financial institutions actually creates opacity.  It creates opacity because it hides the risk of the individual exposures in summary accounts.

The only way to convey the risk of each bank is to have the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can assess the risk and solvency of each bank.  Without this information, market participants cannot assess the risk and solvency of each bank because accounting turns them into 'black boxes'.

Warning: Banks in the U.S. are bigger than they appear. 
That label, like a similar one on automobile side-view mirrors, might be required of the four largest U.S. lenders if Thomas Hoenig, vice chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., has his way. 
Applying stricter accounting standards for derivatives and off-balance-sheet assets would make the banks twice as big as they say they are -- or about the size of the U.S. economy -- according to data compiled by Bloomberg. 
“Derivatives, like loans, carry risk,” Hoenig said in an interview. “To recognize those bets on the balance sheet would give a better picture of the risk exposures that are there.”

Gary Gensler: 'Setting' Libor still not clean despite scandal

The BBC reports that Gary Gensler, head of the CFTC, sees a lot that much be done before 'setting' of Libor and other benchmark interest rates like Euribor and Tibor is done so that they cannot be manipulated.

Regular readers know that what must be done is that the banks must be required to provide ultra transparency so that these benchmark interest rates can be based off of actual transaction from a deep, liquid unsecured bank debt market.

Ultra transparency is the key to unfreezing and keeping unfrozen the interbank lending market as it provides the data that banks with deposits to lend need to assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.

Specifically, under ultra transparency banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency is also the key to basing benchmark interest rates off of actual transactions.  These transactions are disclosed by each bank.  Market participants can then determine which transactions to include in the benchmark interest rates.

Without ultra transparency, benchmark interest rates will still be subject to manipulation even if there are complex rules and regulatory oversight of setting process.

The way that the key Libor interest rate is set in the UK is still not clean and free of fraud, according to a top US regulator. 
"We have a lot more work to do," Gary Gensler, chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, told the BBC in London. 
He suggested that the rate was often "completely made up".....
Speaking of the scandal, Mr Gensler spoke of "pervasive rigging" and said authorities could not guarantee the rate is fraud-free, but refused to criticise the FSA or suggest that setting the rate should be moved to the US....
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Mr. Gensler has just confirmed what your humble blogger has been saying that the only way to guarantee that the benchmark interest rates are free of fraud is through ultra transparency.

Complex rules and regulatory oversight as suggested in the Wheatley Review will simply not guarantee an absence of fraud nor do they provide a reason for the market to trust the resulting benchmark interest rates.

So why did the Wheatley Review not publish your humble blogger's suggestion of ultra transparency and instead championed a combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight that will not work?
Mr Gensler compared the manipulation of rates to an estate agent trying to sell you a house. 
"They are trying to reference the price of the houses in the neighbourhood [when] there have been no transactions in the neighbourhood and furthermore, the agent is not willing to share the data and is often just making it all up," he said.
A problem that ultra transparency alone solves.
The BBA told the BBC it would not comment on Mr Gensler's comments but said: "The BBA has strongly stated the need for greater regulatory oversight of Libor". It added that it was working closely with the government and regulators to change the system. 
A government-commissioned review suggested taking the responsibility away from the BBA and placing it in the hands of an outside authority, such as a commercial body or an industry group.
This is an example of regulatory capture.

The British Banking Authority asked its regulator to do something that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight cannot accomplish.  Rather than respond by requiring ultra transparency, the regulatory response was to pursue a path that would allow the banks to continue manipulating the benchmark interest rates as before.

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

PIMCO shocked by prices paid to gamble on toxic RMBS

Bloomberg reports that JP Morgan is trying to bring a non-agency backed residential mortgage-backed security to market and PIMCO is shocked by the terms that gamblers are willing to accept to place their wager on these securities.

As everyone knows, residential mortgage-backed securities are opaque.  Therefore, buying these securities is simply blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.

Leading up to the financial crisis, buying these securities was a losing bet for the gamblers and selling these securities was a winning bet for Wall Street.

Since nothing has changed, most notably these securities still do not offer observable event based reporting under which all activities like a payment or default on the underlying assets are reported before the beginning of the next business day so market participants can know what they are buying or know what they own, there is no reason to believe the gamblers won't lose again.

Which is precisely why PIMCO cannot believe the prices paid by the gamblers.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. is seeking to sell securities tied to new U.S. home loans without government backing in its first offering since the financial crisis that the debt helped trigger. 
The deal may close this month, according to a person familiar with the discussions. 
Servicers of the underlying loans may include the New York-based lender, First Republic Bank and Johnson Bank, said the person, who asked not to be identified because terms aren’t set. 
The market for so-called non-agency mortgage securities is reviving as the Federal Reserve’s $85 billion a month of bond purchases help push investors to seek potentially higher returns. 
As deals accelerate, Pacific Investment Management Co. is questioning the prices paid. 
At the same time, a weakening of contract clauses that offer protection to investors if the loans don’t match their promised quality is stoking debate, said Kroll Bond Rating Agency analyst Glenn Costello. 
“There’s a pretty heavy dialogue going on right now between all participants in the market about what makes sense,” Costello, who is based in New York, said last week in a telephone interview....
What makes sense is that the deals provide observable event based reporting.
JPMorgan is telling investors its deal’s terms may allow some of the so-called representations and warranties about the mortgages from originators or itself to expire after 36 months to 60 months, the person said. Such contract clauses, which can be used to force loan repurchases, have led to billions of dollars of costs for banks on debt made during the housing boom. 
After Credit Suisse included so-called sunsets of 36 months on certain buyback promises in a November deal, Standard & Poor’s, the only grader to rate the bonds, said in a statement that the move didn’t affect its view of the debt’s risks. The ratings firm cited the “exceptionally high credit quality” of the loans and that all of them had been reviewed by third-party firms before being packaged into the securities.
Interesting to note the use of third-party firms to review the mortgages and the reluctance of the issuers to provide the data on the mortgages to all market participants so that investors can do their own independent assessment.

As everyone knows, one of the weak spots in securitization is the reliance on third parties making representations about the quality of the underlying collateral and the deal.  A prime example of this was the rating firms.

Yet, here is Wall Street trying to repackage and sell the same snake oil.
Rivals including Fitch Ratings, which publicly called S&P’s grades too high, are taking a more skeptical view. Changes such as sunset provisions and clauses that void loan-quality warranties if borrowers default after events such as job losses or illness generally should require greater so-called credit enhancement, said Rui Pereira, a managing director at Fitch. 
Credit enhancement can include some bonds taking losses before others, cash reserves or payments from the underlying assets that exceed coupons on the securities created. 
“Less investor-friendly provisions are something we need to take into account,” Pereira said last week in a telephone interview.

Issuers are seeking to move past a framework for representations and warranties provided by Redwood that represented a “gold standard,”Kathryn Kelbaugh, a senior analyst at Moody’s Investors Service, said last month during a panel discussion at a securitization conference in Las Vegas. 
In Redwood’s latest deal, it may sell a top-rated class as large as $561.2 million with a 2.5 percent coupon at about 102 cents on the dollar, a person familiar with that offering said today, asking not to be named because terms aren’t set. 
That compares with current prices of about 99 cents on the dollar for Fannie Mae-guaranteed 2.5 percent securities, according to Bloomberg data. 
Bonds issued in recent months by Redwood have been “insanely expensive” by comparison with Fannie Mae debt, Pimco’s Scott Simonsaid in an interview yesterday. 
“I can’t believe someone would pay anywhere near where they have sold them,” said Simon, the mortgage-bond head at Newport Beach, California-based Pimco, manager of the world’s largest mutual fund.
 It is hard to argue with Mr. Simon's observation about the Redwood deal or the prices gamblers are paying for other opaque residential mortgage-backed securities.