Monday, April 22, 2013

Protecting bankers, Germany says "liability cascade" must prevail in bank bailouts

I keep wondering how many times bankers must be protected from the consequences of their actions until global policymakers realize that this protection does not a) result in banking systems that are fixed or b) economic growth.

In the latest round of protecting the bankers, Germany has called for rescuing the banks by enforcing a liability cascade that starts with shareholders and moves towards and includes depositors.

Regular readers know that based on how modern banks are designed the number one source for rescuing and recapitalizing banks is future bank earnings.

Please note the difference between recapitalizing banks using future earnings versus using deposits.
 
When future earnings are used, banker effectively "pay" for the damage they did to the bank because their cash bonuses are minimized until bank book capital has been rebuilt.

When deposits are used, bankers keep receiving their cash bonuses while the depositors and the real economy suffer the losses.

Plans in the euro area to allow the direct recapitalization of failing banks must stick to a hierarchy of responsibility that starts with the banks’ shareholders, the German Finance Ministry said. 
In its report for April, the ministry said a “liability cascade” must prevail in any attempt to save a bank, allowing the European Stability Mechanism to allocate resources on its main job of averting state insolvencies. 
“From the German government’s point of view, it’s important to limit the volume for direct recapitalization to allow the ESM to focus on its core task,” the ministry in Berlin said today. “It’s also important that the liability hierarchy is followed,” it said, echoing comments made by Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble in Brussels this month.
All of Germany's stated goals are more easily achieved by tapping unlimited amounts of future bank earnings as a source for recapitalizing the banking system.

Sunday, April 21, 2013

Why the hurry to "fix" Slovenia's banking system when doing it right takes time?

A Reuters article on eurozone leaders pushing Slovenia to fix its banking raises an interesting question: why does it have to be done quickly when doing it right takes time?

Common sense says that there are three steps to fixing the banking system the right way:
  1. Require the banks to provide on-going transparency so that market participants can assess their global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
  2. Based on this assessment, the true extent of the problem can be determined and the losses can be realized.
  3. Determine how to rebuild the banks' book capital levels over the next several years.
It is common sense that transparency is needed so that there is no doubt that all of the bad debt hidden on and off the banks' balance sheets is recognized.

As Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Spain have shown, so long as the banks remain "black boxes", market participants will never believe that all the hidden bad debt hidden been recognized.

So long as there is this doubt about what is lurking on or off bank balance sheets, the banking system has not been truly fixed.

Putting ultra transparency in place takes time.

It is common sense that before fixing the banks, the true extent of their bad debt needs to be known.  It is only when the size of the problem is known that the solution for fixing the banks that corresponds to the size of the problem can be chosen.

It will take time for market participants to assess the value of each of the banks' exposures.

Finally, it is common sense that the banks do not need to be recapitalized immediately.  Savers and SMEs, who represent the banks' core depositors, are using the banks today even though they know the banks probably have low or negative book capital levels when adjusted for all the hidden losses on and off their balance sheets.

Recognizing the hidden losses and putting the banks on a path towards recapitalization is not going to make the savers and SMEs stop using the banks.  If anything, it should make them more comfortable using the banks.

Recapitalizing the banks through retention of future bank earnings takes time.

So, why the hurry?

Five years later, policymakers finally searching for new economic rescue plan

As reported by Reuters, global policymakers are searching for a new economic rescue plan as it has become clear to all that the current set of policies isn't working.

What has been shown globally not to work to end a bank solvency led financial crisis can be summarized as either zero interest rates/quantitative easing with fiscal stimulus or zero interest rates/quantitative easing with austerity.

Your humble blogger predicted before these policies were implemented that they would not work.  I have explained in detail why they would not work and why they have not work.

Fortunately, there is a policy that has proven it ends a bank solvency led financial crisis and restores economic growth.  I call that policy the Swedish Model.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on all the excess debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy and allows it to continue to grow.

Why does the Swedish Model work?

The Swedish Model protects the real economy by not diverting capital that is needed for reinvestment and growth to debt service.  Unlike the policies that have been adopted to date, the Swedish Model doesn't place the burden of servicing the excess debt on the real economy and then try to boost demand to offset this loss of capital through monetary and/or fiscal stimulus.

The Swedish Model also uses the banks as they are designed to be used.  Because of deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding, banks are capable of operating and supporting the real economy even when they have low or negative book capital levels.  Banks can do this because the deposit guarantee effectively makes the taxpayers the silent equity partner of the banks when they are in book capital rebuilding mode.

Where has the Swedish Model been used and shown to work?

In the US, the Swedish Model was implemented during the Great Depression beginning with the 1933 bank holiday.  As the NY Fed said, it broke the back of the Great Depression.

In Sweden, it was used during the 1990s.

Finally, it was used by Iceland at the beginning of our current financial crisis.

Given this track record, why hasn't the economic profession endorsed it?

Thanks to Nobel prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz we know the answer.  Prior to the current financial crisis, economic models treated the banking system as simply moving money from one pocket to another.  Therefore, there was limited reason to study banks or include them in models used to predict economic performance.

If you are not studying the key element in the policy that has been shown to end bank solvency led financial crises, you are not very likely to endorse this policy.

Why should policymakers adopt the Swedish Model now?

Because it is clear to everyone that the economic policies adopted to date have failed.  If they had remotely worked, central bank balance sheets would be contracting rather than growing exponentially.

All the alternatives recommended by the economics profession have failed.

On top of this, the economics profession through Reinhart and Rogoff has been discredited as a serious science.  Economists have been revealed as simply biased story tellers whose stories are most likely based in pure fantasy.

As a result, politicians now have to take responsibility for the policies they pursue as economists no longer provide politicians with a fig leaf of intellectual cover.
More than three years after the end of the global recession, sluggish activity across rich and poor economies is confounding policymakers who expected more by now and raising concerns that options for kick-starting growth are increasingly limited. 
They face a sobering checklist: 
The U.S. economy remains shackled by a mountain of household debt and continues to whipsaw between periods of modest growth and next to none at all. 
The euro zone is mired in recession, lurching from crisis to crisis and now dealing with the latest trouble spot in Cyprus. 
And even such star performers as China and Brazil have run low on gas. China in 2012 posted its weakest year of growth since 1999. Brazil's economy slowed to a near standstill; at the same time, it faces a growing threat from inflation. 
Against this backdrop, the exasperation of finance ministers and central bankers attending last week's Group of 20 and International Monetary Fund meetings was palpable. 
The official communiques and sideline discussions reflected their frustration over the failure so far to deliver an effective mix of policies to finally get an upper hand on a long-lasting crisis that shows little sign of ending. 
"We cannot unmistakably declare that the worst is behind us," Brazilian Finance Minister Guido Mantega said on Friday. "There is a risk of a prolonged crisis, despite all our efforts in the G20 and other international forums." 
Central banks across the developed world have held interest rates at rock-bottom levels since 2008 while pumping more than $6 trillion into their banking systems through loans and asset-purchase operations known as quantitative easing, or "QE." The European Central Bank has helped lower borrowing costs for the governments of Spain and Italy. Ireland, Portugal and Greece have been bailed out. 
And yet a return to normalcy appears a distant dream....
Were the Swedish Model now adopted, we could be back to normal in 12 months.
"You're not going to have a perfectly optimal set of policies for everyone in the world," said Tharman Shanmugaratnam, chairman of the International Monetary and Financial Committee, which advises the IMF on the global monetary and financial system. 
Tharman said the trick was to find a mix of policies that would help economies grow without risking future bubbles. "We need a new framework," he said.
The new framework is simple: adopt the Swedish Model and bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Good for the global economy, good for society and bad for banker cash bonuses.

Saturday, April 20, 2013

Paul Krugman: reasons current policies to end financial crisis has failed are obvious

On his NY Times blog, Paul Krugman attempts to explain why it was predictable that the policies applied to end the bank solvency led financial crisis would not succeed and why it is no mystery what must be done to end the crisis.

Regular readers know that the Nobel-prize winning economics professor is on the right track when he says it was predictable before the policies were implemented that they would fail [your humble blogger predicted it] and why it it is no mystery what must be done to end the crisis [your humble blogger has been saying it publicly since the beginning of the crisis].

However, like all economists, he fails to consider, or maybe it is understand, that there is an X-factor that explains why the policies implemented would fail and why his choice of policies to end the financial crisis would have failed also.

The X-factor is the banking system and the excess debt in the financial system it is designed to absorb the losses on.

It is a very bold statement to say economists fail to consider or maybe understand the role of the banks and why they are an X-factor.

Why do I make it?

No less an authority on economics than Nobel-prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz observed that prior to the financial crisis economic models left out the banking system in its entirety.  The banking system was seen as moving money from your left to right pocket and therefore could be ignored.

The conclusion from this statement is if the policies you recommend when the banking system is ignored are the same policies you recommend after we discover that the banking system cannot be ignored, there is little reason to believe your policies are right.

Chris Giles of the FT reports that central bankers are worried that they are “flying blind”; he quotes Lorenzo Bibi-Smaghi, formerly of the ECB governing board, saying “We don’t fully understand what is happening in advanced economies.” 
Um, guys, that’s because you don’t want to understand.
Professor Krugman makes an excellent point about the desire of central bankers, policy makers and economists not wanting to understand what is happening.

I have explored on this blog a number of different reasons they might not want to understand or worse, understand, but chose to adopt policies that don't reflect this understanding.
Nothing about our current situation, except maybe the absence of outright deflation, is at all surprising or mysterious. 
We had a huge financial crisis, and the combination of a housing bust (on both sides of the Atlantic) and an overhang of household debt (also on both sides) has acted as a drag on private demand.
Here is where a discussion of the banks and how they are suppose to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system is suppose to come in.
Monetary policy quickly found itself up against the zero lower bound, while fiscal policy, after providing some stimulus, soon turned strongly contractionary....
Here is where Professor Krugman pushes his solution of more fiscal stimulus needed.

Unfortunately, by not dealing with the excess debt in the financial system, this additional fiscal stimulus would also not solve the problem.  Put simply, the fiscal stimulus would be swallowed by the debt burden that the excess debt places on the real economy.

We saw this with the original fiscal stimulus at the beginning of the Obama administration and we have seen this repeatedly in Japan.
But many central bankers and other officials chose to ignore all that and place their faith in the confidence fairy instead. 
So now that it has all gone wrong, they throw up their hands and say that it’s a mystery — how could this happen? 
No mystery, guys; you messed up.
The same conclusion would hold had Professor Krugman's solution been followed in the absence of requiring the banks to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

However, if the banks were required to fulfill the function that they are designed for, which is absorbing the losses on the excess debt in the financial system, then Professor Krugman's solution would in fact see the results he anticipates.

Kaggle answers the question of "can and will market participants use transparency"

One of economists' and Wall Street lobbyists' favorite objections to requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency is that market participants won't know what to do with this much data and it will confuse them.

After all, your humble blogger is talking about having each bank disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Since these details are tracked by information systems, what we are talking about with this disclosure is what I call the "Mother of All Financial Databases".

Is this database large?  Yes, but not so large that we are talking about orders of magnitude bigger than Walmart's database.

Will market participants use this database?  Of course, there is money to be made.

Can market participants use this database?

Rather than rely on your humble blogger's "yes" response, I will let Kaggle answer "yes" for me.

For those readers who are not familiar with Kaggle, an article in The Atlantic describes it as
an on-line platform for data-mining and predictive-modeling competitions. A company arranges with Kaggle to post a dump of data with a proposed problem, and the site's community of computer scientists and mathematicians -- known these days as data scientists -- take on the task, posting proposed solutions. 
Importantly, competitors don't just get one crack at the problem; they can revise their submissions until a deadline, driving themselves and the community towards better solutions. 
"The level of accuracy increases, and they all tend to converge on the same solution," explains Anthony Goldbloom, Kaggle's co-founder and CEO.
Is there any reason to believe that market participants will use a Kaggle to analyze the Mother of All Financial Databases?
Companies as varied as MasterCard, Pfizer, Allstate, and Facebook (not to mention NASA) have all created competitions. 
GE sponsored a contest to give airline pilots tools to make more efficient flight plans en route. 
Health technology company Practice Fusion funded another challenge to identify patients with Type 2 diabetes based on de-identified medical records. 
Prizes for the winning solution have ranged from $3,000 to $250,000. A $3 million prize, offered by the Heritage Provider Network for the best prediction of which patients will be admitted to a hospital within the next year, based on historical claims data, closed last week, and the winner will be announced in June at the Health Datapalooza.
Do you think a hedge fund would be willing to pay say $10 million to the winner of a Kaggle competition if the hedge fund makes $1 billion?

But how do we know that Kaggle is up to the challenge of assessing the Mother of All Financial Databases?
The key to Kaggle is the community: 85,000 data scientists (who knew there were that many data scientists in the world!) have entered competitions, and each is ranked according to their skill and results in competitions. 
Xavier Conort, a French actuary living in Singapore, holds the Number One spot (he's won 6 prizes and come in the top 10 percent a dozen times). 
As I'm writing this, Joshua Moskowitz, an American who joined 9 minutes ago, is at the other end of the pecking order. Just wait till Joshua starts competing, though; he could be a challenge Xavier in a matter of months. 
That everyone-has-a-chance ethos means that any competitor, no matter how isolated they may be, can judge their talents against the top rank of their field. 
What's more, in the company's forums competitors can swap techniques and hone their skills. Goldbloom says that a good programmer can work their way up the ladder fairly quickly, by scoring well in two or three competitions.
In short, there are no barriers to entry by a data scientist to see if they can win a Kaggle competition and collect the prize money from the hedge fund.

Friday, April 19, 2013

Is the Federal Reserve insane? No. It only has one tool and it uses it to try to solve all problems.

In a must read Bloomberg editorial, Matthew Klein asks if the Federal Reserve is insane because its response to every economic problem it to try to solve it with a bigger economic bubble.

I would not argue that the economists who run the Fed are insane.  I would say they are a product of their training.  In the course of studying for their PhDs, they have learned a particular way of looking at the world.

It is this rigidity in thinking and the desire to defend the PhD theses that resulted that prevents them from implementing alternative responses to solving an economic problem.

My case in point would be our current financial crisis.  It is well known that we are dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Yet, the Fed continues to treat it as if it were a bank liquidity crisis.

Your humble blogger is not the first to make this observation that the Fed is treating a bank solvency problem as a liquidity problem.

The loudest voice on this was Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author and an authority on the Great Depression and monetary policy before Ben Bernanke began his studies.  In a Wall Street Journal interview, she debunked the Fed's response, which is a reflection of what Mr. Bernanke argued should have been done at the time of the Great Depression, to our current crisis.

Ms. Schwartz made the case for bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system, including banks and structured finance securities.

The Fed, as Mr. Klein observes, is not interested in bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  Instead, the Fed is only interested in implementing what Mr. Klein describes as the Fed bubbles only policy:

Back in the 2000s, however, most people just wanted to get out of the funk associated with the aftermath of the tech boom. 
There was also a widespread belief that bubbles aren't dangerous as long as the central bank is around to "clean up" the mess when they burst. This view was best articulated by Ben Bernanke in 1999. 
As a result, many monetary policymakers were untroubled by the prospect of creating a new bubble to replace the old one. 
Transcripts of the Fed's internal meetings make it clear that this was their conscious plan. 
On March 16, 2004, Donald Kohn, a longtime Fed staffer who later became the Fed's vice chairman, said that the credit bubble was "deliberate and a desirable effect of the stance of policy." 
According to Kohn, the Fed's strategy was: "boost asset prices in order to stimulate demand." 
That appeared to work for a short time, but it ended badly. We're still struggling to emerge from the wreckage despite, yet again, incredibly low real interest rates and very large government budget deficits. 
Clearly, cleaning up after bubbles is harder than it's made out to be. 
One might think that the Fed has learned something from this experience.  A recent speech from Nayarana Kocherlakota, the president of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank, suggests otherwise. 
He said that the Fed "will only be able to achieve its congressionally mandated objectives by following policies that result in signs of financial market instability." 
In other words, he wants to repeat the exact same formula that Donald Kohn endorsed in the 2000s.
Please note that there is nothing in the Fed's blow bubbles strategy that directly addresses bank insolvency.  So what are the chances it will be successful in ending a bank solvency led financial crisis?

Rallying to defense of TBTF, Treasury questions existence of big bank subsidy

Confirming its commitment to implementing the Geithner Doctrine (Yves Smith:  don't do anything that will hurt the profits or reputation of a big and/or politically connected bank), the US Treasury questioned the existence of any big bank funding subsidy based on the idea these banks will be bailed out by the government.

By questioning the existence of this funding subsidy for Too Big to Fail banks, the US Treasury is casting doubt on the core argument used to support breaking these banks up.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger sees the argument for breaking up the Too Big to Fail and the argument for banks holding more capital as distractions that crowd out discussion of the most important reform:  transparency.

I say that transparency under which the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is the most important reform because with this level of transparency we get a number of benefits including the TBTF breaking themselves up and banks holding more capital.

This is a bold statement.

Fortunately, it is supported by the facts.

First, transparency has already been shown to shrink a TBTF institution.  All we have to do is look at Jamie Dimon and the JP Morgan London Whale trade.

His first response was to hide the trade so that the market wouldn't find out about it and trade against JPM.  Senator Levin's committee documents cutting off information to regulators for fear of leaks.  His second response was to exit trade as soon as possible.

Please note, simply ending proprietary betting is a step in breaking up the TBTF.

What else might be ended and be a step in breaking up the TBTF as a result of transparency?

How will the market react when it gets to see what is really happening with all of those subsidiaries that are designed to arbitrage regulations and taxes?  Will the market pressure the TBTF to close these subsidiaries?

Second, transparency has already been shown to exert discipline on a bank so it holds more capital.  For confirmation, all we have to do is look at the level of capital that banks held back in the early 1900s when providing exposure detail disclosure was the norm and seen as a sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.

As reported by Reuters,

 A Treasury Department official on Thursday rebuffed recent arguments that giant banks enjoy cheaper borrowing because markets think the government would bail them out in a crisis. 
Mary Miller, Treasury's undersecretary for domestic finance, said in prepared remarks for a speech at an economic conference in New York that it is not necessarily true that the biggest banks borrow more cheaply than smaller competitors can. 
And even if they do enjoy such a subsidy, she said, it may not be because markets believe they are "too big to fail." 
"In the wake of the financial crisis, the largest banks' borrowing costs have not only increased more than those of some regional bank competitors, but have also increased to higher absolute levels," Miller said.... 
Many politicians and some regulators argue some banks are still so big that the government would support them, as was done during the 2007-2009 crisis, rather than let their failure threaten the stability of the financial system. 
Because markets also believe the government would step in, these critics say, the biggest banks have the unfair advantage that they can issue debt more cheaply than smaller banks can.... 
Even if big banks do have lower funding costs, that could be explained by other factors, she said. For example, financial giants may have greater liquidity and a bigger pool of potential investors than smaller competitors. 
"Research shows that large non-financial corporations enjoy a similar funding advantage over their smaller and less-diversified peers," Miller said.

Thursday, April 18, 2013

More on why the Swedish Model works to end a bank solvency led financial crisis

The Washington Post reports on a paper that looks at the impact that underwater mortgages had on the economy.

The paper concludes that the benefit to the economy to be gained from writing down the mortgage debt more than offsets the cost to the creditor from realizing the loss.

Regular readers will recall that under the Swedish Model banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  An example of the loss that could be realized is the difference between the outstanding mortgage balance and the value of the house.

A recently revised paper by Atif Mian of Princeton, Amir Sufi of the University of Chicago Booth School of Business and Kamalesh Rao of MasterCard Advisers suggests that underwater mortgages have played a significant role in holding back the recovery. 
The paper, “Household Balance Sheets, Consumption and the Economic Slump,” was first released several years ago, but it has been revised to include an important new calculation. 
It is widely recognized that the fall in housing prices had a “wealth effect” that led homeowners across the country to cut back on spending. 
In the updated paper, Mian, Sufi and Rao measured how much more underwater borrowers probably cut back on spending compared to borrowers without an overhang of mortgage debt. (More precisely, they measured how much homeowners cut back on auto spending for each dollar loss of housing wealth. But that’s important; the decline in auto sales was a significant part of the economic contraction.) 
The authors found that being underwater makes a big difference. .... 
In an e-mail interview, Sufi says he and his co-authors believe the paper is the first to show that borrowers with very high leverage – which would include people who are underwater – are likely to cut back significantly on spending in a housing decline....

Sufi says the findings underscore the notion that principal reductions – reducing the overhang of mortgage debt left by the financial crisis – should have been more widely embraced as part of the policy response to the housing bust. 
“Facilitating mortgage debt write­-downs would have softened the blow to household spending. A dollar lost by a creditor has less of a negative effect on consumption than the positive effect on consumption from a dollar gained by an underwater homeowner,” he says. 

Risk manager explains why transparency and not complex regulations needed

In a ProPublica article, Jesse Eisinger lets a former Wall Street senior risk manager explain why transparency and not complex regulation is needed.

I've been talking to him periodically over the years about how giant financial institutions should manage the aggressive traders slinging giant sums around the world in ever more complex transactions. 
After the Senate issued a report last month on JPMorgan Chase's multibillion-dollar "London Whale" trading loss, an incident where the mathematical modeling went seriously wrong, I reached out to him again. 
That debacle encapsulates much of what is wrong about how banks manage their risk and how the regulators oversee those efforts. 
At JPMorgan Chase, the risk models hid — and were used to hide — risks from the traders and top executives. 
Too many measures and too many numbers undid the risk managers.....
Please note the reliance on models which can be manipulated to hide the risk of a trade as oppose to actually looking at the trade details.
Early in his career, Mr. Breit figured out that models for markets aren't like those for physics. They don't come from nature. It was necessary to know the math, if only so that he couldn't be intimidated by the quantitative analysts. 
But the numbers more often disguise risk than reveal it. "I went down the statistical path," he said. He built one of the first value-at-risk models, or VaR, a mathematical formula that is supposed to distill how much risk a firm is running at any given point. 
The only thing from capital markets math he came to embrace was this immutable law of nature: Investors make money by taking risk. "If it's profitable and seems riskless, it's a business you don't understand," he told me....
One of the benefits of requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is that it lets competitor banks flag for the regulators the risks that each bank is taking.

It is a lot easier for a regulator to figure out that there is a problem if a bank says a trade is risk-less and its competitors see it as being risky.
All the while, he was on the lookout for bad trades. Most traders who get into trouble, he thinks, aren't bad guys. The bad ones, who try to cover up improper trades, are relatively easy to detect. 
The real threat, he said, comes from the "crazy ones" who really believe they've found ways to spin flax into gold. They can blow up a firm with the best of intentions.
Please note that with transparency, market participants have an incentive to scan for these trades that could blow up a bank and bring everyone's attention to them.
They don't do it suddenly. "I hate the whole Black Swan concept," he said, referring to the notion, popularized by Nassim Nicholas Taleb, that the true risks lie in unforeseeable events that occur with much more frequency than the mathematical models suggest. "It takes years of concerted effort to lose a lot." 
Yes, a big market move might reveal a fatally flawed trade, but that volatility is not the root cause of an oversize loss.
The root cause is misunderstanding the risk or a trade where the risk is hidden for a period of time (think investing in subprime mortgage-backed securities).
The problem, as Mr. Breit sees it, is that this has nothing to do with how risk management is practiced today, or what the regulators encourage. 
Regulators have reduced risk managers to box checkers, making sure they take every measure of risk and report it dutifully on extensive forms. "It just consumes more and more staff, turning them into accountants and rotting brains." 
Take VaR. In Mr. Breit's view, Wall Street firms, encouraged by regulators, are on a fool's mission to enhance their models to more reliably detect risky trades. 
Mr. Breit finds VaR, a commonly used measure, useful only as a contrary indicator. If VaR isn't flashing a warning signal for a profitable trade, that may well mean there is a hidden bomb.
Recall that VaR can be manipulated by manipulating the risk models.  Just ask JP Morgan how this played out in the London Whale trade.
He despises the concept of "risk-weighted assets," where banks put up capital based on the perceived riskiness of the assets. 
Inevitably, he argues, banks will "pile into" the same types of supposedly safe investments, creating bubbles that make the risks far more severe than the initial perceptions. 
Paradoxically, risk-weighting can leave banks setting aside the least capital to cover the biggest dangers.
Say sovereign debt having a zero risk weight.
"I could not be more disappointed," he said. "The cynic in me thinks this is all in the interests of senior management and regulators to avoid blame. They may not think they can prevent the next crisis, but they then can blame the statistics."
It is an exercise in both covering the regulators' backside when the next crisis happens and also preserving opacity so that bankers can continue to bet with taxpayer money.
Instead, Mr. Breit believes that regulators should encourage firms when they reach different conclusions on what is risky and what is safe. That creates a diverse ecosystem, more resilient to any one pestilence.
Please re-read Mr. Breit's comment because he nicely summarizes a major benefit of requiring the banks to provide transparency.  Each bank can reach its own conclusions on what is risky and what is safe and adjust their exposure to the other banks based on its own conclusions.


Reinhart/Rogoff: a symptom of more serious problem with economic profession

In a must read column in the Guardian, Heidi Moore lays out the serious problem with economics: it is unreliable as a policy tool yet central banks and the technocratic parts of government focused on fiscal policy are run by economic PhDs, i.e. true believers in the truth provided by economics.

This point cannot be repeated enough times.

It was not by chance that the global economics profession, with a small handful of exceptions, failed to predict our current financial crisis.

It was not by chance that the policies pushed forth by the global economics profession have failed to end our current financial crisis.
Economics is an inexact science, as any honest economist will tell you. 
It is based on unreliable numbers that measure relatively small swaths of the population. Whatever the number – unemployment, inflation, wages – it is almost always wrong the first time the government publishes them, and then it is revised later: once, twice, three times or more. The errors are usually large.
If it is not an exact science, what is economics?

A nice set of theories by which to express one's political biases without have to disclose these biases.

Reinhart and Rogoff demonstrated this.
Many Americans know that Washington lawmakers have been engaged in a two-year battle to the death over the federal deficit. ... 
This philosophical debate is not actually about philosophy. It has been, to a certain extent, about two activist economists who spent years preaching that high debt would destroy America's economy in the future, pitching us into certain recession. 
Here's how it happened: 
In 2011 Congress was engaged in a bitter battle over the direction of the US economy; a group of them seemed ready to default on the nation's debt and shut down the government, if necessary, to win their point: that the growing federal deficit would endanger America's economy for generations to come. Others were unconvinced. The stalemate brought Washington to a standstill on the issue. 
During this tense period, there was an important meeting. Nearly 40 Senators sat in neat rows to hear a presentation on debt from Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff, two economists with faultless reputations and keen academic credentials. 
They were not just economists that day, however, bolstered by years of research and a 900-pound book full of graphs and complex economic data, Reinhart and Rogoff were also activists against debt. Their goal was to convince the assembled lawmakers to cut the amount of money the government owed....
Reinhart and Rogoff also demonstrated that faultless reputations and keen academic credentials are worthless when talked about in the context of economists.  

Had their article gone through the peer review process that exists for serious academic disciplines like the hard sciences or business operations, it would not have been published as the findings of their research had no statistical significance after fixing their Excel error and omission of relevant data.  

At the end of the day, regardless of their reputation or academic credentials, economists are simply shills for their political biases.
The travails of Rogoff and Reinhart show one thing conclusively: we put too much trust in economics to tell us how to run the country. 
Economics cannot actually bear this burden. It is largely a science of educated guesses. Economics is a useful science, but it is not an infallible one. 
It is, in particular, an unreliable policy tool.
Which brings us to central banks who have been pursuing zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Bernanke and his colleagues have been coming up with new, innovative ways to stimulate the US economy. 
The Federal Reserve did things it had never done before: it lent money directly to certain kinds of banks, it increased access to cheap loans when banks wouldn't lend to each other, and it bought billions of dollars in Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities to take them off the market so banks would buy other kinds of bonds. 
How does the Fed, which has an encyclopedic command of every kind of economic indicator, know all of this is working? 
Spoiler: it doesn't. 
Bernanke has repeatedly said in press conferences that he believes this stimulus – known as quantitative easing – is working, but also implied that is hard to measure whether the Fed's stimulus moves are making enough of a difference in major economic indicators. 
As your humble blogger mentioned at the start of this blog, we have true believers taking action that influences the real economy and society based on their belief in an unreliable policy tool.

Does that sound like a recipe for success in ending the financial crisis?

Sounds to me more like Mr. Bernanke is adopting policies in defense of his PhD thesis and subsequent academic career.

No less an authority on the Great Depression and monetary policy than Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author, said Mr. Bernanke learned the wrong lessons and adopted the wrong policies for our current financial crisis.  She identified our current financial crisis as a bank solvency led financial crisis.

There is one and only one proven way to end a bank solvency led financial crisis: adoption of the Swedish Model.  Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront their losses on the excess private and public debt in the financial system.

It is common sense why the Swedish Model works.  It does not require the real economy to divert capital it needs to support growth, reinvestment and the social contract to making debt service payments on the excess debt.

The drawback to the Swedish Model is it crushes banker cash bonuses for the next several years.

The Swedish Model originated in the US during the Great Depression (FDR implemented during the 1933 bank holiday and, according to the NY Fed, broke the back of the depression), was successfully used by Sweden to handle its 1990s crisis and was most recently successfully used by Iceland at the beginning of our current financial crisis.

I am not an economist.  Hence, I have a bias to adopting policies that have been proven to end a bank solvency led financial crisis.