Thursday, June 13, 2013

Robert Reich: lack of accountability by Wall Street creating huge problems

On his blog, Robert Reich looks at the problems that are created by not holding Wall Street accountable.

Regular readers know that the only way to hold Wall Street accountable is with transparency.  Sunlight is the best disinfectant because it makes the bankers and their financial regulators responsible for their actions.
The second center of unaccountable power goes by the name of Wall Street and is centered in the largest banks there. 
If we trusted that market forces kept them in check and that they did not exercise inordinate influence over Congress and the executive branch, we would have no basis for concern. 
However, market forces can not keep them in check because market forces do not operate where there is opacity.  Market forces require transparency to exert influence.
We wouldn’t worry that the Street’s financial power would be misused to fix markets, profit from insider information, or make irresponsible bets that imperiled the rest of us. 
Fix markets like the benchmark interest rates (Libor). Profit from insider information like structured finance products (ownership of servicers allows Wall Street to have tomorrow's news today and legally trade on it). Place bets like JP Morgan's London Whale CDS trade.
We could be confident that despite the size and scope of the giant banks, our economy and everyone who depends on it were nonetheless adequately protected.  
But those banks are now so large (much larger than they were when they almost melted down five years ago), have such a monopolistic grip on our financial system, and exercise so much power over Washington, that we have cause for concern. 
The fact that not a single Wall Street executive has been held legally accountable for the excesses that almost brought the economy to its knees five years ago and continues to burden millions of Americans, that even the Attorney General confesses the biggest banks are “too big to jail,” that the big banks continue to make irresponsible bets (such as those resulting in JP Morgan Chase’s $6 billion “London Whale” loss), and that the Street has effectively eviscerated much of the Dodd-Frank legislation intended to rein in its excesses and avoid another meltdown and bailout, all offer evidence that the Street is still dangerously out of control. 
Dodd-Frank was effectively written by and for the Too Big to Fail banks.  The banks were so confident in their writing of the legislation that they even created the Office of Financial Research so that transparency would have a place to go to die.

The only elements not approved of by Wall Street were the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule.
It is rare in these harshly partisan times for the political left and right to agree on much of anything. But the reason, I think, both are worried about the ... depredations of “too big to fail or jail” Wall Street banks on our economy, is ...: It is this toxic combination of inordinate power and lack of accountability that renders ... them dangerous, threatening our basic values and institutions. 
Ultimately policymakers will have to make a choice: bankers or society.

Dani Rodrik on Europe's way out of the financial crisis

In his Project Syndicate column, Harvard Professor Dani Rodrik lays out his plan for how Europe could end its current financial crisis and and restore economic growth.

Regular readers will immediately recognize that Professor Rodrik's plan is essentially your humble blogger's blueprint for economic recovery with one difference.

Professor Rodrik thinks that banks need to be recapitalized immediately by their sovereigns when in fact they are designed so that they can be recapitalized over several years using retained earnings.

Letting the banks recapitalize themselves through retained earnings frees up the sovereigns to use their resources pursuing stimulative economic policies.

The eurozone periphery suffers from both a stock problem and a flow problem. It has too large a debt stock, and too little competitiveness to achieve external balance without significant domestic deflation and unemployment. 
What is required is a two-pronged approach that targets both problems simultaneously. 
The prevailing approach – targeting debt through fiscal austerity and competitiveness through structural reform – has produced unemployment levels that threaten social and political stability.
So, what can be done differently?
The most direct way to address the debt problem is a write-down, coupled with recapitalization of those banks that will suffer large losses as a result. This may seem extreme, but it simply recognizes the reality that much of the existing debt will not be paid back without new flows of official financing. 
As the IMF now acknowledges, it might have been better to restructure Greek debts from the outset than to engage in a “holding operation.” 
Debt reduction by itself clears the way for growth, but does not directly trigger it. 
Policies that directly target expenditure rebalancing within the eurozone and expenditure switching within the peripheral economies are also needed. 
These include: policies to boost eurozone-wide demand and stimulate greater spending in creditor countries, especially Germany; policies that aim to reduce non-tradable prices; income policies to reduce the peripheral economies’ private-sector wages in a coordinated fashion; and a higher ECB inflation target to allow room for movement in the real exchange rate via nominal changes.
These policies would require Germany to accept higher inflation and explicit bank losses, which assumes that Germans can embrace a different narrative about the nature of the crisis. And that means that German leaders must portray the crisis not as a morality play pitting lazy, profligate southerners against hard-working, frugal northerners, but as a crisis of interdependence in an economic (and nascent political) union. Germans must play as big a role in resolving the crisis as they did in instigating it.
France will most likely play a critical role as well. France is big enough that if it threw its support fully behind the peripheral countries, Germany would be isolated and would need to respond. But, so far, France remains eager to separate itself from the southern countries, in order to avoid being dragged down with them in financial markets.

Small problem with Fed policies, it is real wages, not wealth effect, that drive US consumer spending

As Pedro da Costa reports in his Reuters blog, a survey shows that it is real wages and not the wealth effect that drive US consumer spending.

This is important because the Fed's monetary policy, including zero interest rates and quantitative easing, is reliant on the wealth effect to drive growth in demand.

Did this reliance ever make sense in anything other than an economic model?

No.

There is no reason to believe that the wealthy dramatically increase or decrease their spending because of the level of interest rates rather than base their spending on what they earn as income each year.

If your humble blogger had to guess why economists believe in the wealth effect it is that they confuse correlation with causation.

Specifically, they saw consumption pick up over the last 30 years as both stock and house prices increased and said "aha, there must be a wealth effect as an increase in wealth is correlated with higher consumption".

In reality, what was really happening is that Wall Street became quite proficient at letting Main Street tap the equity in their houses and Main Street needed to tap this equity because growth in income was insufficient to support the lifestyle they had from previous years.

Federal Reserve officials have touted the ‘wealth effect’ from higher stock prices and rising home values as a key way in which monetary policy boosts consumer spending and economic activity. 
But according to the results of a recent survey from the Royal Bank of Canada, that ethereal feeling of being richer on paper is no substitute for cold, hard cash.
Here’s how Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke explained the benefits of rising asset prices to the real economy during a press conference in September. 
The tools we have involve affecting financial asset prices and those are the tools of monetary policy. There are a number of different channels – mortgage rates, I mentioned corporate bond rates, but also prices of various assets, like for example the prices of homes.  
To the extent that home prices begin to rise, consumers will feel wealthier, they’ll feel more disposed to spend. If house prices are rising people may be more willing to buy homes because they think that they will make a better return on that purchase. So house prices is one vehicle.... 
The issue here is whether or not improving asset prices generally will make people more willing to spend. 
One of the main concerns that firms have is there is not enough demand, there’s not enough people coming and demanding their products. If people feel that their financial situation is better because their 401(k) looks better for whatever reason, or their house is worth more, they are more willing to go out and provide the demand..... 
RBC survey’s findings, explained by the bank’s chief U.S. economist, Tom Porcelli, in a research note: 
That wages and the jobs backdrop matter for consumption is not only borne out in the hard data, but this also came through loud and clear in our June consumer survey. 
When asked about what would embolden them to increase spending, nearly half of respondents noted wage increases while about 1/5 said a better job backdrop. So 65% of consumers think employment dynamics are what matter most. Contrary to popular belief, there was little “wealth effect” from stocks and housing apparent here. 
The bad news: U.S. wages have been stagnant for quite a while.

Wednesday, June 12, 2013

Paul Krugman: Unproductive finance based on knowing something before other market participants

In his NY Times blog, Professor Paul Krugman finally discovers the role of transparency in the financial markets when he discusses unproductive finance which is based on knowing something before other market participants.
More than half a century ago, in his classic paper on the economics of speculation, Paul Samuelson noted the perverse rewards to knowing stuff just slightly before everyone else. 
He asked readers to imagine someone who, somehow, consistently received crucial information one second before everyone else. 
As he pointed out, the social value of that extra second would be minimal; but the private rewards could be huge.
As regular readers know, with private label structured finance securities including CDOs, Wall Street's informational advantage was not an extra second but rather weeks.  Wall Street had this informational advantage because it owned the firms that were servicing the underlying collateral.

Naturally, when the collateral stopped performing, Wall Street was only too happy to "short" these securities before market participants received this performance information.

Your humble blogger has been saying since the very earliest days of the financial crisis that we need to bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system so as to eliminate Wall Street's informational advantages.

It is these informational advantages that give rise to unproductive finance and our current financial crisis.

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane: Central bank created bond bubble threatens financial system

In his testimony before Parliament, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane made clear that the greatest threat to financial stability was the central bank zero interest rate/quantitative easing induced bond bubble.

Regular readers know that Mr. Haldane is accurate in his assessment and that the pursuit of ZIRP and QE was totally and completely unnecessary as a response to the bank solvency led financial crisis.

As your humble blogger has been saying since before the financial crisis spiraled out of control in 2008, the way to deal with this crisis is to adopt the Swedish Model and require banks to absorb upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

Please note, the only way to end Mr. Haldane's concern about unwinding ZIRP and QE and triggering financial instability is to adopt the Swedish Model with a twist.  The twist being that the banks "pay" for their having been bailed out by "donating" their holdings of government securities to the issuing sovereigns.

Will this make the vast majority of banks have low or even negative book capital levels?

Yes, but modern banks are designed because of the presence of deposit insurance and central banks to be able to continue operating and supporting the real economy when they have low or negative book capital levels.  They can do so because with deposit insurance the taxpayers act as the banks' silent equity partners.

A key Bank of England policymaker has warned of the risks to global financial stability when "the biggest bond bubble in history" bursts. 
In a wide-ranging testimony to MPs, Andy Haldane, Bank of England director of financial stability,... told the Treasury select committee that the bursting of the bond bubble – created by central banks forcing down bond yields by pumping electronic money into the economy – was a risk "I feel acutely right now"....

But he described bond markets as the main risk to financial stability. 
"If I were to single out what for me would be biggest risk to global financial stability right now it would be a disorderly reversion in the yields of government bonds globally." he said. 
There had been "shades of that" in recent weeks as government bond yields have edged higher amid talk that central banks, particularly the US Federal Reserve, will start to reduce its stimulus. 
"Let's be clear. We've intentionally blown the biggest government bond bubble in history," Haldane said. "We need to be vigilant to the consequences of that bubble deflating more quickly than [we] might otherwise have wanted."

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

Sheila Bair asks "Does anyone have a clear vision of the desirable financial system of the future"

Since Sheila Bair asked "does anyone have a clear vision of the desirable financial system of the future" and responded by providing a variant of the financial system that collapsed at the beginning of the current financial crisis, I thought I should answer her question.

Ms. Bair's response fails because it substitutes complex rules and regulatory oversight for transparency and market discipline.

The number one lesson of the financial crisis is that a financial system that is reliant on complex rules and regulatory oversight is prone to failure.

It is a myth that more complex regulation and regulatory oversight would have prevented the financial crisis that started on August 9, 2007.

The reason it is a myth is that a financial system that relies on complex regulations and regulatory oversight is dependent on the regulators to a) do their jobs, b) properly assess what is happening in the financial system and c) accurately communicate their findings to market participants.  Because of concern about the safety and soundness of the financial system, regulators will never accurately communicate their findings.

The financial system of the future is the same financial system that was designed in the 1930s and based on the FDR Framework.  This financial system incorporated the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

It assigns a very specific role to the financial regulators. They are responsible for ensuring that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Fulfilling this responsibility means the financial regulators have to eliminate opacity in all the large areas of the financial system where it currently exists.

For example, regulators need to require that banks adopt that 1930s standard of disclosing all of their current global exposure details.  This includes assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposures.

For example, regulators need to require that structured finance securities disclose when an observable event occurs with the underlying collateral, like a payment or delinquency, before the beginning of the next business day.

The FDR Framework also assigns responsibility to the market participants.  They are responsible under caveat emptor for all gains and losses on their exposures.  Responsibility for losses gives market participants an incentive to independently assess the disclosed information.  Market participants use this independent assessment to limit their exposure to what they can afford to lose given the risk of the exposure.

By limiting their exposures to what they can afford to lose, market participants build robustness and resiliency into the financial system and make it so it is not prone to failures.

Unlike Ms. Bair's, my proposed financial system for the future has 6+ decade track record of successful performance.

Ms. Bair's proposed financial system that allows opacity and relies on complex rules and regulatory oversight  has already shown that it is prone to failure within a decade.

ABC's Alan Kohler on casino banking: banks create risk and gamble on it

ABC's Alan Kohler makes the case for requiring banks to provide transparency when he talks about casino banking and how banks create risk that they subsequently gamble on.

Almost all financial derivatives trading adds nothing but risk to the world and should be banned. It won't be, but that doesn't mean the debate is academic. 
Regulators are attempting to bring derivatives into the light through mandatory exchange execution and clearing and "Legal Entity Identification" rules, but progress is slow and fragile. It can be filed under "B" for believe it when we see it.
Please note that derivatives could easily be brought into the light if banks were required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Disclosing their exposure details would disclose their derivative positions.
But is there any reason to allow financial derivatives at all? 
New York hedge fund manager James Rickards says they should simply be banned because the benefits are illusory and the effect is that risk is created out of thin air and then multiplied....
Most derivatives trading involves swaps or contracts for difference, where two people bet on movements in an underlying asset or income flow without actually trading in it. It's a bit like betting on flies crawling up a wall, without having to buy the flies.... 
Credit default swaps are bets on whether a country or company will go broke; interest rates swaps are bets on movements in interest rates; contracts for difference are bets on movements in a share price or other asset; and so on....

In fact, derivatives caused the 2008 global financial crisis because banks and investment banks vastly multiplied the leverage on their balance sheets by betting through derivatives and then losing control. 
I wouldn't say that derivatives caused the 2008 global financial crisis.  Derivatives clearly contributed to the magnitude of the crisis.
Since then, the amount of derivatives outstanding has actually grown, and now stands at more than $700 trillion....
Requiring the banks to disclose their derivative positions would have an immediate impact on restraining growth in the amount of derivatives outstanding and would give banks an incentive to shrink their derivative exposures.

Disclosure of their derivative books means that banks are subject to having their cost of funds linked to the risk they are taking.  The more risk in their derivative book, the higher their cost of funds.

This form of market discipline restrains growth in derivative exposures and provides an incentive to reduce the risk of the derivative exposures.
Nevertheless, regulators are grinding their way through consultation and report production with a view to eventually dragging OTC derivatives trading into the open, where the players at least have to say who they are.
The US Dodd-Frank legislation, passed in 2010, requires non-US banks to register as swap dealers with US regulators from next year if they want to trade derivatives there. 
Guess what? Reuters reported last week that Asian banks are cutting their relationships with US banks so they don't have to register, and US banks themselves are restructuring so they can keep going. 
Proving that complex rules and regulatory oversight are not a substitute for transparency and market discipline.
Let's be clear: basically, we're talking about a casino where the gamblers are banks. And banks aren't just any old punters: they also take deposits and lend money, underpinning the financial system on which society rests. 
As with all casinos, someone always loses their shirt occasionally - LTCM in 1998 (US$4.6 billion), UBS in 2011 ($2 billion), AIG 2008 ($18 billion), Barings in 1995 ($1.2 billion), Societe Generale in 2008 ($7.2 billion), and so on. 
The losses of shirts don't always cause a general financial crisis, but there's always a wobble, and in 2008, the combination of AIG, Merrill Lynch and Lehman Brothers and a few others did cause a global recession and is still causing widespread misery....
The only way to restrain bankers' desire to gamble is by requiring they disclose their exposure details.

As Jamie Dimon and JP Morgan showed with the London Whale trade, if banks are forced to disclose their positions, fear of the market trading against them will cause them to exit the position as soon as possible.

Monday, June 10, 2013

Telegraph's Jeremy Warner: 6 years into financial crisis, time to consider radical reforms

In his Telegraph column, Jeremy Warner looks at the failure of current reforms to satisfactorily address the problems in the financial system and suggests that it is time to consider more radical reform.

He proposes that we consider adopting 100% reserve banking.

Regular readers were first exposed to this idea a couple of years ago with the discussion of Boston University Professor Kotlikoff's call for limited purpose banking.

As your humble blogger noted at the time, we already have 100% reserve banking/limited purpose banking.  It is known as mutual funds.  A mutual fund operates with no leverage.  All gains and losses on its investments are absorbed by its investors.

Mr. Warner described the advantages and disadvantages of such a mutual fund only financial system.
In a system of 100pc reserve banking, none of these problems arises. As the term implies, all deposits are held on reserve, or in cash. The deposit bank is thereby deprived of its money creating privileges, but there is no risk of a run. Credit is instead provided by intermediaries that compete for these deposits and marry them directly with borrowers. 
Simple. The credit cycle is abolished, and many of the things that so much concern regulators today – capital and liquidity requirements, risk weighting, how to get rid of the too-big-to-fail problem – would cease to be an issue. 
What’s more, there would be no need for deposit insurance or oversight, beyond a framework for simple fraud prevention. Credit banks could be allowed to fail without risk of wider systemic damage. 
Under the original Chicago plan, the transition from the current to the new system would also allow the Government to cancel its debts, though obviously at the current level of spending, these debts could quickly re-accumulate. 
When something looks too good to be true, it generally is. 
One of the most obvious drawbacks is that there would plainly be less credit and less leverage in such a system. Indeed, to the extent that credit existed, it would look much more like high-risk equity. For all the social and economic scarring the credit cycle can inflict, it is also a key part of the creative destruction of capitalism. 
Without it, you might have a more stable economy, but it is not clear that you would have as much innovation, entrepreneurialism, business creation and long-term economic growth. 
The biggest problem of all with 100pc reserve banking is that of transition. Getting from here to there would be a truly revolutionary and potentially highly destabilising process, so much so that it is hard to think of any advanced economy embarking on it. 
Then again, we are not through this present banking crisis yet by any means, and already, many things that were once thought fanciful are now part of our every day language.
I happen to agree with Mr. Warner's motivation for reform as returning the banks to where they were pre-August 9, 2007 is of no benefit to society.
The only thing everyone agrees on – from bankers to bank bashers – is that the reform agenda as it stands is far from satisfactory. 
In the sense that the thrust of banking reform to date has been essentially to return the system to the way it was, with a little more discipline and transparency than before...
I disagree with his solution of 100% reserve banking.  Just like the 1930s, where we need to end up is with transparency so that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

For banks, this level of transparency is ultra transparency.  It existed and was the global standard in the 1930s.  Under ultra transparency, banks disclosed on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The result of ultra transparency would be to radically reform the banking system.  It would subject the banks to market discipline.

With their risk linked to their cost of funds, banks would have an incentive to a) end proprietary trading, b) shrink by eliminating their subsidiaries that engage in regulatory and tax arbitrage, and c) reduction of excess public and private debt in the financial system as banks would absorb their losses on this debt.

Friday, June 7, 2013

FT's Martin Wolf calls for UK to fix it banks, but not its monetary policy

In his Financial Times column, Martin Wolf calls for the UK to fix its banks, but leave its monetary policy unchanged.

Mr. Wolf bases his call on the observation that
The UK is suffering from a combination of the banks’ unwillingness and inability to lend and potential clients’ inability and unwillingness to borrow. 
The BoE’s easing is “pushing on a string”.
This is an interesting observation as it contains a kernel of truth surrounded by a forest of falsehood.

Regular readers know that a bank's lending function is separate from how it funds the loan.  It is separate because banks have many different ways of funding the loan including on-balance sheet, syndicating the loan to other banks or selling the loan to investors.

Banks have the ability to lend, but they are showing an unwillingness to lend.

Why?

Banks are senior secured lenders.  In this role, they require collateral.  When the financial crisis hit, it created doubts about the value of the collateral, particularly the real estate collateral.

These doubts were made worse by the financial regulators adoption of regulatory forbearance.  Under regulatory forbearance, the banks engage in 'extend and pretend' and turn non-performing debt into 'zombie' loans.

The bankers know how much of their portfolio is in 'zombie' loans.  Psychologically, it is difficult to assign a high collateral value to real estate pledged for a new loan when one can see the huge overhang of real estate in the 'zombie' loans.  The result is both the apparent unwillingness to lend and potential clients' inability to borrow (inability reflects a lack of collateral after the bank discounts for 'zombie' loan overhang).

The way to address this problem and restart lending is to have the banks recognize their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.  In recognizing their losses, the banks need to write-down the debt to a level where the borrowers can afford to service the debt.

Debt write-downs should not create equity for the borrower.  Where there is a buyer for the collateral who would pay more than the borrower, the collateral should be sold.

The idea that the BoE's easing, like the other central banks, is "pushing on a string" is totally false.  This policy was known in advance to be good for bankers and bad for the real economy.

It was good for bankers in that it maximized the banks' reported earnings and banker bonuses since the beginning of the financial crisis.  There is nothing like zero cost funds to temporarily boost banks' net interest margin, particularly when the banks are carrying 'zombie' loans.

It was bad for the real economy in that it triggered economic headwinds like the Retirement Plan Death Spiral that crushed current demand.  Under the Retirement Plan Death Spiral, both individuals and companies make up for the shortfall in earnings on their retirement assets by reducing current consumption.

The way to address the problem with monetary policy and support the real economy is to reverse the policy and restore interest rates to a minimum of 2%.

Thursday, June 6, 2013

European Commission cites risk of financial contagion to defend not restructuring Greece debt earlier

The Guardian reports that the European Commission is defending its failure to restructure the Greek (Irish, Portuguese, Spanish, ...) debt at the outset of the financial crisis citing the risk of financial contagion.

And what is financial contagion?

In theory, financial contagion is a domino effect through the banking system where the failure of one banks triggers the failure of other banks.

But does financial contagion exist in our global modern banking system?

No.  Banks have the capacity to absorb significant losses as they are designed to be able to operate with low or even negative book capital levels and still support the real economy.

Banks are able to do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funds.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

But don't banks need to be recapitalized immediately after they have absorbed the losses on the excess public and private debt?

No.  Again, the taxpayers are effectively backstopping the banks, so it is as if the banks had unlimited equity.  As a result, the banks can rebuild their book capital levels over several years by retaining 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

But won't depositors get nervous if the banks have low or negative book capital levels?

No.  There are two types of core depositors.

One type holds deposits that are below the deposit guarantee level and they trust that the government will honor its guarantee.

The second type of depositors is a business that has a reason, like making payroll, for holding deposits with the banks.  They too are insensitive to how much capital the bank has unless policymakers and financial regulators plan on seizing these excess deposit a la Cyprus to bail-in and recapitalize the bank.

So why are policymakers citing the risk of financial contagion to defend themselves against not restructuring excess public and private debt sooner?

Because policymakers were following the advice of the bankers advising them.  As shown by the European Commission, it was easy to succumbed to the irresistible temptation to push the losses onto the taxpayers and "protect" the banks.

In reality, all putting the losses on the taxpayer did was to protect the bankers' bonuses and shift who suffered as a result of the losses from the banks to the taxpayers.

The IMF criticism and the commission's defence of its performance boil down to a dispute over whether Greece's staggering debt level should have been restructured early in 2010 when the troika was fixing the terms for the bailout. 
While the IMF takes the view now that it was a cardinal error not to restructure, the commission argues strongly that there were too many unknowns, the risks were huge, such a move could have unleashed a rollercoaster of panic across the eurozone, and there was not yet any real eurozone firewall or bailout funds in place.
Actually, all the necessary firewalls have been in place for decades.

It would have been armageddon for banker bonuses, but this seems like a reasonable outcome given that the bankers were the ones who took on the risk in the first place.
"Even assuming it was inevitable and the only solution, the risks associated with an early Greek debt restructuring were huge," according to the commission. 
The European Commission is confirming that it knew what the only solution to end the financial crisis was (adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize the losses upfront) and that it instead chose to protect bank balance sheet and banker bonuses at all costs (the Japanese Model).
"The whirlpool in the financial markets in early 2010 was only beginning to subside, the banking system was extremely fragile and it was not possible to estimate financial and psychological effects of the largest bond restructuring in history or its potential ripples to the real economy of the euro area. Against this background, later restructuring allowed for time to build firewall capacity. An earlier restructuring would have also entailed risks of systemic contagion."
By 2010, governments around the world had put the financial system on life support.  Recognizing the losses that everyone knew were on the bank balance sheets would not have triggered panic.  In fact, it would have triggered relief.

Later restructuring allowed the banks time to offload their losses onto the taxpayers while the bankers continued to pocket their bonuses.  Not a good outcome for the taxpayers.