Tuesday, February 15, 2011

Gary Gensler on Derivatives and Disclosure

The New York Times' Dealbook ran an interview with Gary Gensler in which he discussed Washington, regulation, Wall Street and lobbying.

Regular readers of this blog know that the gold standard for disclosure is all the useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.  Under the FDR Framework, it is the government's responsibility to achieve and maintain this gold standard for disclosure in the financial markets.

Mr. Gensler specifically asked for the opportunity to develop the disclosure regulations to achieve this gold standard for derivatives. [emphasis added]
As chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, he is leading the charge to overhaul the murky $600 trillion derivatives market, which was at the center of the financial crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act, the financial overhaul law enacted last year, requires Mr. Gensler’s agency to draft dozens of new derivatives rules by July. 
Since taking the helm of the commission in early 2009, Mr. Gensler, 53, has developed a reputation as a consumer-friendly regulator — despite his 18 years on Wall Street, including nine as a Goldman Sachs partner. He has been pushing aggressively to impose the Dodd-Frank rules, although he has had to dial back on a few occasions in order to strike a compromise. 
... His gung-ho approach has drawn the ire of the new Republican Congress, which is threatening to withhold additional money from Mr. Gensler’s agency. Wall Street lobbyists have bombarded him with complaints and requests for exemptions, too. 
... In a recent interview from his Washington office, Mr. Gensler spoke with DealBook about the challenges of Dodd-Frank, his days on Wall Street...
Q.  The C.F.T.C. has taken up much of the implementation of Dodd-Frank. How challenging has it been? 
A.  .... It is also a challenge to integrate all of these public comments, all of the different views and actually end up with a result that benefits the American public. 
Q.  What’s the most absurd complaint you’ve received about the new regulations? 
A.  I’m not bothered by any of this because it’s often motivated by profits. But there are an awful lot of folks in industry who want an exception. And some of those exceptions are appropriate, but some of them you have to be amused and laugh at. As it relates to Wall Street directly, they tend to want less transparency because that helps their profits and their revenues. 
Because Wall Street wants less transparency, it is the government's responsibility to make sure that disclosure always adheres to the gold standard.
Q.  How would you describe the response you’ve received from industry lobbyists? 
A.  It’s professional. It’s active. We’ve had about 475 meetings in five months. And since the lobbyists haven’t found us on the weekends (usually), you can do the arithmetic. It’s quite a bit. 
I will say this: In America, large institutions have a great deal more resources than the investor advocates. If you looked at those 475 meetings — and we’re posting every one of them on our Web site — 90-plus percent are probably larger institutions or corporations. 
Given that the government is responsible for insuring that derivatives meets the gold standard for disclosure, why would investors or their advocates lobby?

Developing disclosure regulations is not a balancing act based on how many meetings take place with advocates of more or less transparency.

It is the fundamental obligation of the government to insure that all useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.  The obligation and standard are not negotiable.
Q.  Can your staff handle the load? 
A.  This agency, just this past year, got back to the size it was in 1999. We think we need about 400 more people — even though we’re taking on markets that are seven times the size of what we currently regulate and far more complicated. So we’re going to continue to make the case. Even though our great nation has a very large deficit, this is the best investment for taxpayer money.
Your humble blogger would like to offer up again the relevant yearly cost/benefit analysis.

The direct cost of providing current data for each derivative might be as high as five basis points (five one hundredths of one percent) times the notional value of the derivative.  For the $600 trillion derivative market, this works out to an annual cost of $300 billion.

The benefit of providing current data for each derivative is that it contributes to the prevention of a repeat of the recent financial crisis.  Preventing a repeat of the recent financial crisis would save a lot of money.

As discussed by the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, the cost of the recent financial crisis, which occurred because there was not the gold standard for disclosure in all areas of the global financial markets, is measured in the trillions.  This cost includes losses on opaque, toxic securities as well as broader costs like unemployment, business failures and reduced government services. [for example, the discussion over the budget in the US at the national and state levels]
Q.  Republicans have said that the C.F.T.C. is moving too fast in developing regulations. Are they right? 
A.  I think we have to remember there was a great financial crisis in 2008. Every American was affected — millions of Americans are out of work, millions of Americans have homes that are worth less than their mortgages. Derivatives played a role in that.

Q.  Does it ever get overwhelming? 
A.... But we have the task that the American public expects us to do: to lower risk and promote transparency....
Q.  Why leave a profitable career to come to Washington? 
A.  I think what government does makes a difference. 
Your humble blogger is hoping that Mr. Gensler and his staff really do believe that Washington does make a difference.  Particularly when it actually recognizes its responsibility for and promulgates regulations insuring that all useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner to all market participants.

How Would You Know If A Bank Has Enough Capital?

In its discussion of bank capital adequacy, the American Banker raised the questions that can only be answered by banks disclosing current asset-level data to all market participants:

  • How much is enough capital; and
  • By what measure.

If current asset-level data was disclosed, credit and equity market analysts and competitors could independently
  • Determine if a financial institution is solvent [where solvency is a measured by asking if the market value of the financial institution's assets exceeds its liabilities] and therefore has enough capital;
  • Adjust the price charged for funds, both debt and equity, so that it is related to the risk of the financial institution.  
If market participants do not know what is currently on the balance sheet of a financial institution they cannot assess its solvency and capital adequacy so long as it uses leverage.

The definitive observation confirming this statement is on page 373 in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report during its discussion of why the credit markets froze up [emphasis added]
The key concern for markets and regulators was that they weren’t sure they understood the extent of toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions—so they couldn’t be sure which banks were really solvent.
As shown in the American Banker article, bankers prefer arguing that they are more than adequately capitalized rather than providing the current asset-level data needed to confirm the fact.  [emphasis added]
An awful lot of capital. Capital on top of capital. 
These were just some of the phrases used last month by Jamie Dimon, the chairman and chief executive of JPMorgan Chase & Co., in describing the company's cushion for absorbing future losses. 
Citigroup Inc. executives sounded equally confident, telling investors on a recent conference call that the company is "one of the best capitalized large banks in the world." 
There is little question that banks are in a better position than they were just a few short years ago. 
But is more capital, or even an awful lot of capital, enough capital? And if so, what basis of measurement would one use to prove it?
The basis of measurement to prove that more capital or even an awful lot of capital is enough capital would be if the banks disclosed their current asset-level data.  Then the market could decide.  Absent disclosure of current asset-level data, there is no way to prove it.

Monday, February 14, 2011

When will current asset-level data be used to restore confidence in the Irish banking system?

The Irish Times reports that the 'run' on the Irish banking system continues and this puts the ECB in a tricky situation.

While investors have reduced their exposure, they have been replaced by a combination of the ECB and the Central Bank of Ireland.

In theory, the ECB and the Central Bank of Ireland are protected from credit losses in two ways.  The ECB is protected since it supposedly only lent money out against 'good' collateral.  The Central Bank of Ireland is protected on the money it borrowed from the ECB and lent out against 'riskier' collateral by a sovereign guarantee by the Irish government.

Now that the funds have been injected into the Irish banking system comes the challenge of getting the funds repaid without destroying the Irish economy or causing a sovereign debt crisis. [emphasis added]
The ECB is on the hook for the €177 billion it lent to the Irish banking system. 
... So far, however, there has been very little said about the one thing – arguably the only thing – that will very quickly bring the EU and the IMF to the negotiating table: what if the current plan does not work? 
And, if you subscribe to the view that one of the prime objectives of the Irish bailout is to get the European Central Bank out of the predicament in which it has found itself with regards to Ireland, then there is good reason to believe talks will be starting sooner rather later. 
The ECB is on the hook for the €177 billion it has lent to the Irish banking system. It has lent €126 billion directly through various liquidity schemes and another €51 billion indirectly via the Central Bank of Ireland. 
What started out as liquidity support for Irish and other European banks post the collapse of Lehmans in 2008 has become a life-saving transfusion for Ireland’s imploding banking system. 
As confidence in the Irish banks and the Irish sovereign deteriorated, deposits left the system and have been replaced by short-term borrowing from the ECB. 
The deal agreed with the EU and the IMF is supposed to stop this spiral and in time reverse it as confidence in Ireland and the banking system is restored. 
The problem with the deal is how it addresses the issue of stopping the old fashion 'bank run' and restoring confidence.  The deal is based on 'trust us'.

In a nut shell, depositors and investors are asked to trust the Irish government, the IMF and the EU that the combination of a 10 - 35 billion euro capital injection and stress tests means the banking system is adequately capitalized.

Maybe it is then adequately capitalized.  But then again, given the recent history of the Irish banking system, maybe it is not.  Given this history, why would depositors and investors want to risk that the banking system and the government are not solvent?
It is far too early to take a view as to whether or not the plan is working in this respect. The most recent figures for the amount of liquidity provided to the Irish banking system directly by the ECB actually show a slight decline from €132 billion to €126 billion. The liquidity provided via the Central Bank remains stuck at €51 billion. 
However there is clearly a mountain to be climbed in terms of restoring confidence in the banks to the point that they can reduce their reliance on the ECB down to levels with which Frankfurt is happy – presumably single-digit billions. Deposits would have to flood back into the Irish system at something in excess of €1 billion a week over the next three years. 
This looks pretty optimistic standing where we stand today, particularly as the first cracks are starting to appear in the plan. 
Brian Lenihan’s decision to call Labour and Fine Gael’s bluff on recapitalising the banks last week may have been a political stroke but it served to highlight a very big flaw in the plan – namely, the requirement to recapitalise the the banks a month ahead of the stress tests that are supposed to establish their capital requirements once and for all. 
It clearly makes no sense to do this and it raises questions about how well thought-out the rest of the plan is. It must be remembered it was hammered out in a couple of frenzied weeks. 
It also has to be borne in mind that the IMF has never attempted anything on a par with the Irish bailout and Europe’s difficulties in framing a response to the crisis is there for all to see. 
Things will become clearer as the various measures aimed at “cleansing” the banks are implemented over the coming months and they are slimmed down and over-capitalised. 
If the banks’ reliance on the ECB does not start to fall rapidly at that point it can really mean only one thing; investors’ concerns about the burden imposed on the State by the plan outweigh any comfort they may be taking from the sorting out of the banking system.
Actually, it more likely means that in the absence of current asset-level data to show that the banks have been cleaned up, depositors and investors are unwilling to take the risk that the banks have not been cleaned up.

As has been repeatedly said on this blog, the only way for the market to determine if the banking system is adequately capitalized is if the current asset-level data throughout the banking system is made available.  That way credit and equity market analysts as well as foreign competitors can independently analyze the data and reach their own conclusion as to solvency.

If the market believes that specific banks in the banking system are solvent, it is a lot easier to stem the outflow and attract new deposits as there are banks to rebuild the banking system around.
It is at that point that the ECB will have to decide whether it is going to fund the Irish banking system indefinitely or accept that something has to be done to reduce the burden on the State in order to return its debt dynamics to some sort of sustainable path. 
In theory, the ECB can call in all the collateral pledged against the liquidity loans. That though would collapse the Irish banks and economy and, given that pretty much all the collateral amounts to Irish Government debt of one sort of another or is guaranteed by the Government, it is not really an option. 
You would have to suspect that the ECB’s plan B in this scenario is to engineer the sale of the restructured Irish banks to other larger European banks. This solves the liquidity problem overnight as the Irish banks would presumably benefit from the credit rating and funding strength of their new parents, allowing them to repay the ECB. This in turn should improve credit flow because of the reduced cost of funds to the banks.
The flaw in this argument is that it will be hard to find buyers for the Irish banks – no matter how well restructured and over-capitalised – if the economy continues to stutter along under an unsustainable debt load. 
Which brings us back to the need for the ECB to realise that there is no painless way for it to get its €176 billion back. Once the penny drops in Frankfurt, then the talking will start.
Disclosure of current asset-level data is at the heart of plan B.  No buyer is going to acquire an Irish bank without looking at the assets and how they are currently performing.  

Bottom line:  The question that the Irish government, Central Bank of Ireland, IMF and ECB face is do they provide the market with current asset-level data under plan A [cleanse, recapitalize and stress test banks] or do they only let potential buyers of the banks see this data under plan B [cleanse and sell banks].

Guide to the FDR Framework

For new readers of this blog, your humble blogger would like to suggest the following posts as they provide the intellectual foundation to the the FDR Framework.

The FDR Framework recognizes that our capital markets reflect a philosophy of disclosure combined with the principle of caveat emptor [buyer beware].  For the capital markets to function properly, each must be present:
  • Governments are responsible for insuring that investors have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner and not endorsing a specific investment.
  • Investors are responsible for doing their own homework prior to investing and so long as they hold the investment.  This is known as trust, but verify.
With the ability to do their own homework, investors accept their losses knowing that investing is not risk-free and do not look to be bailed-out of their losses.


Finally, there is The Brown Paper Bag Challenge.  This challenge uses a physical model to show why disclosure of asset-level data on an observable event basis is needed for both structured finance securities and financial institutions.

Friday, February 11, 2011

Warren Buffett, Too Big to Fail meet Current Asset-Level Disclosure

Bloomberg reported that in his testimony to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Warren Buffett commented,
... taxpayers will always be on the hook for collapses at the biggest U.S. companies. 
True, but that does not mean that steps should not be taken today that would minimize the potential for taxpayer losses.

The critical step is to require financial market participants to provide genuine transparency.  They must disclose all useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  This would include reporting current asset-level data on an observable event basis.

It is this data that market participants need to assess the risk and solvency of an individual firm.

It is this data that allows market participants to properly value any money they lend to or invest in a firm.  This in turn allows the market participants to exert market discipline when a firm's risk profile changes.
“You will always have institutions that are too big to fail, and sometimes they will fail,” Buffett, 80, told the FCIC in a May 26 interview, according to a recording released by the panel yesterday. “We still have them now. We’ll have them after your commission report.” 
The idea of breaking up the Too Big to Fail has been championed in a number of quarters.  It is still being discussed by the Independent Commission on Banking in England.

At best, it is a poor substitute for current asset-level disclosure.

Long Term Capital is an example of why breaking up a firm does not generate nearly the same systemic risk reduction as current asset-level disclosure.  Long Term Capital was not very big and it needed the Fed to organize a bailout to avoid a systemic problem in the credit markets.

If current asset-level disclosure had been required of Long Term Capital, it would not have been able to take anywhere near as much risk.  The other market participants would have been able to see the risk it was taking.  Credit analysts would have been publicly talking about the risk.  As a result, the other market participants would have adjusted the cost of borrowing so that Long Term Capital would have stopped adding to its total positions much sooner.


For the same reason that Long Term Capital would have been smaller and represented much less systemic risk, current asset-level disclosure will have the same impact on today's Too Big to Fail.


This is the data that Jamie Dimon, Gary Cohen and Peter Sands called for at Davos.  


Current asset-level disclosure is a very good thing, because it does not require governments to tell financial institutions how to reduce their risk profile.  Instead, under pressure from other market participants who can now properly assess their risk, each of the Too Big to Fail will have to decide how to reduce their risk profile for themselves.
...“I do think that if you ran into a similar situation today the government would guarantee commercial paper again. They’d have to,” Buffett said. “You have to believe the government, the federal government, will act and they will act promptly and decisively.”
Actually, your humble blogger would like to believe that the government has learned its lesson from the recent financial crisis and will require current asset-level disclosure so that it is never again faced with a similar situation.
Berkshire bought preferred stock in New York-based Goldman Sachs ... 
“It was a bet essentially on the fact that the government would not really shirk its responsibility at a time like that,” Buffett said.
Hopefully, governments around the globe will not shirk on their responsibility now.  As has been laid out repeatedly on this blog under the FDR Framework, governments are responsible for ensuring that market participants have access to all useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

Thursday, February 10, 2011

George Soros and Avoiding the Next Financial Crisis

Bloomberg reported on George Soros' diagnosis of the cause of the financial crisis, [emphasis added]
Billionaire George Soros said the financial crisis was avoidable and was caused by market participants and regulators following flawed market theories. 
“It’s the theories adopted by both the regulators and the market participants that proved to be false,” Soros, 80, said in an October 2010 interview released today by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission on its website. “It’s the efficient- market hypothesis and the rational expectations theory.” 
The efficient-market hypothesis holds that prices reflect all relevant information available to market participants. Under the rational expectations theory, people make decisions based on their rational outlook while influenced by past experiences.
Your humble blogger agrees that the financial crisis was avoidable, but disagrees with Mr. Soros that it was the theories that were flawed and caused the financial crisis.

Why?

The efficient market hypothesis makes an assumption about the ability of market participants to access all the relevant facts to make a fully informed decision. 

The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report documents that market participants did not have access to all the relevant facts before or during the financial crisis.

It was the lack of relevant facts that was the driver behind contagion.  It was the single sufficient and necessary condition for the old fashion 'run on the banks' that the financial system experienced.

First, the financial markets had to guess at Bear Stearns solvency.

Why did they have to guess?

The Brown Paper Bag Challenge demonstrates that investors did [and still do] not have access to all the relevant facts to value a structured finance security or a financial institution.

This was a fact known to investors.  After all,  they referred to structured finance securities as opaque, toxic securities.

The investors also knew that Bear had an exposure to structured finance securities that was well in excess of its capital.  What the investors did not know was whether the value of Bear's assets exceeded the value of its liabilities.  The need for government assistance to take on structured finance securities in JP Morgan's purchase of Bear confirmed that Bear was not solvent.

The fact that market participants acted as rational expectations predicted is what caused the credit markets to freeze.

The financial markets also had to guess at Lehman Brothers solvency.

Why did the markets have to guess?

The investors knew that Lehman had an exposure to structured finance securities and real estate that was well in excess of its capital.  What the investors did not know was whether the value of Lehman's assets exceeded the value of its liabilities.

In addition, the financial market expected that the government would step in and stop Lehman Brothers from going bankrupt. This was exactly as expected by the rational expectation hypothesis given the Bear experience.

After the government did not step in and prevent Lehman Brothers from going bankrupt and the Reserve Fund from breaking the buck, investors and lenders realized their money was at risk.

Since it was not insured in the money market funds which purchased commercial paper, they raced in an old fashion bank run to get it out before they would lose it.

Banks also realized their money was at risk and contributed to the old fashion bank run by behaving as rational expectations would predict.  Banks stopped lending to other financial institutions where they had to guess if the financial institution was solvent or not based on that financial institution's holdings of opaque, toxic assets.

The solution is not to devise new theories.


Rather it is for government to recognize its responsibilities under the FDR Framework and ensure that genuine transparency in the form of all the useful, relevant data in an appropriate, timely manner is made available to all market participants.

To this end, the Economist Magazine and your humble blogger have called for using 21st century information technology to create the 'Mother of All Databases'.  This database will have the current asset-level data on an observable event basis that market participants need to be able to access for all the relevant facts.

Wednesday, February 9, 2011

Irish Bailout Cost Debate Highlights Need for Current Asset-Level Data

As highlighted in an earlier post, the Irish government and its central bank finds itself debating the final cost of the bailout of the Irish banking system with an individual who has had access to current asset-level information at one of the banks nationalized by the government.

The Irish Independent observes, [emphasis added]
When Alan Dukes speaks about the banking crisis, there is every reason to listen. Not only is he a distinguished economist; he is a former minister for finance and, most importantly, he is chairman of Anglo Irish Bank. He has seen that particular can of worms from the inside. 
He said yesterday that there are more worms than in our worst nightmares. There could be a further €20bn to €40bn losses in the banking system, beyond those already covered, while €75bn in loans will be needed to fund a second NAMA for smaller loans. 
... Whether the final figure is the official €45bn forecast, or Mr Dukes' gloomier estimate, all our futures are at stake. Yet not only do we not know what is going on, because of the disgraceful veil of secrecy surrounding the bank rescues, we do not know, among all the posturing and bickering, what the next government is actually going to do about it.
This debate is interesting because it is entirely possible that because of his position as the chairman of Anglo Irish Bank, Mr. Dukes has better information than the Irish government and its central bank.

The possibility cannot be discounted given the fact that the Irish government has tried and claimed to have succeeded on at least a couple of occasions to identify all the 'bad assets' in the banking system and consolidate them in NAMA.

The difference in quality of information would also be consistent with what the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission found in the US as shown on page 308 of its report,
Douglas Roeder, the OCC’s senior deputy comptroller for Large Bank Supervision from 2001 to 2010, said that the regulators were hampered by inadequate information from the banks but acknowledged that regulators did not do a good job of intervening at key points in the run-up to the crisis.
As has been discussed many times on this blog, the only way to get both the informed insider, the regulators and all market participants on the same page is if current asset-level information is disclosed on an observable event basis.  This is the data that Mr. Dukes sees in his position as bank chairman.

The bottom line:  with current asset-level data, everyone would then have the same data and would know what is going on.

How Much Capital Does It Take to Save the Irish Banking System?

The Irish Independent reports that the final cost to bailout the Irish banking system might jump considerably.  In this case, the government-appointed chairman of a nationalized bank says that the Irish Central Bank and the government are dramatically underestimating what it will take.

As regular readers of this blog know, your humble blogger believes that all governments should adhere to the FDR Framework when it comes to their relationship with the financial markets.  Under the FDR Framework, governments

  • Should provide all market participants with access to all useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner
  • Should not endorse a specific investment
In the case of the Irish government and its central bank, they have violated both aspects of the framework.

They are not providing all market participants with access to current asset-level information for the entire banking system.  Therefore, there is no data for market participants to analyze and determine what the cost of recapitalizing the system might be.

Rather, there are guesses thrown out as to the final cost of cleaning up the banking system.  Some, like the one in this article, are presumably based on better information because they have limited access to current asset-level information.

The government is also effectively endorsing investment by providing their estimate of the final cost of cleaning up the banking system. All this does is destroys credibility as the final cost of cleaning up the banking system is not something that the government or the central bank controls.

Your humble blogger is not saying that one party or the other in this debate over the final cost of the bailout is right.  Your humble blogger is focusing on the fact that each party has access to different information.  None of this information is available to the market.  As a result, the market does not know who is right.  [emphasis added]
Ireland will have to go to the IMF/EU for another €15bn -- on top of the €35bn already earmarked -- to save the banking system, the government-appointed chairman of Anglo Irish Bank warned last night. 
In a bombshell revelation, Alan Dukes said we will need 40pc more, or €50bn, to properly clean up the banks. 
The former finance minister also sensationally suggested €75bn would be needed to fund the existing NAMA operation and a so-called 'NAMA 2' to take more bad loans from the banks. 
His claims sparked a furious rejection from the Department of Finance who said that Central Bank Governor Dr Patrick Honohan had pinpointed a much lower figure. 
If Mr Dukes's assessment is true, it would mean taxpayers would have to foot interest on another major loan which would almost inevitably lead to even more stringent Budgets. 
The row ... also came as:
  • The Government ordered the sale of deposits at Anglo and Irish Nationwide by auction, effectively winding down these institutions.
  • Anglo revealed the largest loss in Irish banking -- at €17.6bn for 2010.
  • Job losses were confirmed at both Irish Nationwide and Anglo Irish.
  • Markets grew nervous after Finance Minister Brian Lenihan made remarks about some senior bondholders sharing the burden of the banking crisis.
Mr Dukes spoke bluntly of the grim outlook at a business conference in Cork: "A clean banking core will require somewhere in the region €50bn of new capital. Currently, Irish banks are unable to raise capital at this level from the markets. 
"The necessary capital must therefore come from Government, EU, IMF or other external sources,'' he added. 
He also said it was time for the outgoing government to sit down and discuss the banking crisis with the parties most likely to form the next government. 
... Earlier yesterday the High Court approved an order to sell off the €14bn deposit books of Anglo Irish Bank and Irish Nationwide and wind-down the two institutions. 
The Government has already been sounding out potential buyers for the deposit books, and sent confidential letters to several banks last week.
The Department of Finance is hoping a buyer for the deposits will be secured within the next fortnight. 
Once the deposits have been stripped out of Anglo and Nationwide, the institutions' remaining loan books will be merged into a new bank. 
The Irish Independent has learned the new bank will be able to hold some deposits and carry out some lending, but only on a very "limited" scale.

Consumers Use Information Technology To Over-Come Opacity in Pricing

Bloomberg ran an interesting article on how the consumers' use of information technology is driving retailers to everyday low prices. If a housewife can figure out how to use information technology to properly value a product, clearly financial market participants are capable of doing the same with current asset-level data for both banks and structured finance/covered bond securities!  [emphasis added]
Best Buy Co., the world’s largest consumer electronics retailer, may curtail three decades of tactical discounting and move instead to its own version of the everyday prices pioneered by Wal-Mart Stores Inc. 
With Americans increasingly using their smartphones to comparison shop, consumers are unwilling to wait for sales if they find better deals elsewhere, said Mike Vitelli, executive vice president and co-head of the North America division. 
“We have to move rapidly in recognizing the transparency of pricing,” Vitelli, 55, said in a Feb. 7 interview at Best Buy’s headquarters in Richfield, Minnesota. Internal discussions about making the switch are at an early stage, he said. 
... The retailer has tried new tactics to keep customers from defecting to rivals.  
... Typically everyday pricing is a pledge that a retailer will offer the best price it can get from its suppliers and still make money on each item. Best Buy hasn’t decided how the new pricing model would work, Vitelli said.
... During a staff meeting, Vitelli was willing to say out loud: “Why do we carry inventory when we train consumers only to buy it’” on sale, said Rick Rommel, a senior vice president who helps run a unit that tests new concepts.
  
“If the pricing isn’t everyday, the consumers just wait," Rommel said in an interview. "Our inventory sits and waits for that next promotional moment.”
  
Switching to consistent pricing would “be very powerful,” said Barry Judge, Best Buy’s chief marketing officer. “It makes our pricing much more transparent than it is today.”

FDR and the Reform of Fannie, Freddie and the mortgage-backed securities market

If FDR were president today, how would he reform Fannie, Freddie and the mortgage-backed securities market?

Using his framework, he would start by focusing on what the government should do.  It should make sure that all market participants can access all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner when they invest in mortgages or mortgage-backed securities.

In the 1930s, FDR realized that it was physically impossible to convey all the useful, relevant information on a mortgage in an appropriate, timely manner to each investor.

Why?  21st century information technology including computers and the Internet had not been invented yet!

Instead, he created government entities as a substitute for providing investors with information on each mortgage.
  • These entities purchased the mortgages and collected all the information on them.   This allowed the entities to enforce standards for the types of mortgages that they were willing to buy.  Enforcement occurred because the entities used the data on the underlying mortgages to determine if the mortgages complied with their standards.  If not, the entities would force the originating banks to repurchase the debt.  
  • These entities could also issue debt that was backed by the government to investors. 
A Washington Post article on the recent ASF Conference, confirms the information substitution role of these entities: [emphasis added]
... participants at the conference warned that a government withdrawal from the market might scare off investors, who are the source of funds for banks that make loans to home buyers. Many investors are especially nervous after the financial crisis, when they took major losses on loans that weren't backed by the government. 
... Eliminating the government's role might also undermine the $5 trillion market for mortgage-backed investments ... In this market, investors are willing to trade in mortgage-backed investments regardless of whether they know what loans underlie them and whether those loans are overly risky.
Today, FDR would use 21st century information technology to convey all the useful, relevant information on each mortgage in an appropriate, timely manner to each investor (see here, here and here) and end the information substitution role.

With this data, market participants can analyze and value each mortgage by itself or as part of a pool backing a covered bond or structured finance security.

How can the mortgage market transition from where it is today to a 21st century information technology based market?

Simple.

The government should make current asset-level reporting on an observable event basis mandatory for all mortgage-backed securities (both covered bonds and structured finance securities).  An observable event includes a payment, delinquency, default or borrower filing for insolvency.

For new securities, the cost of providing the data will be built into the deal.  For all existing securities, the government should pick up the expense.