Sunday, March 20, 2011

And Then There Was One

With the results of the US stress tests now official, the options for additional reform of the financial system now rest with one solution.  That solution is the embrace of the FDR Framework by the banking regulators.

Why is additional financial reform finished?

It is no longer politically feasible.  All the existing outstanding reform proposals are subject to being crushed by the 'level playing field' argument and its related race to the bottom or are no longer viable under the 'something can not be and be at the same time' principle.  These proposals include:

  • Higher capital requirements.  In the UK, the Bank of England has been pushing higher capital requirements since the beginning of the credit crisis.  Recently, David Miles and Adair Turner have taken turns advocating for capital ratios (equity to assets) in the range of 20%.
  • Separation of retail and investment banking.  In the UK, the Independent Commission on Banking has been looking at separating retail and investment banking in a modern day version of the Glass-Steagall Act.  Sir John Vickers, the chairman of the commission, has asked whether it makes sense to ring-fence and separately capitalize retail and investment banks owned by the same financial institution.  In theory, the retail bank with its access to the government safety net would be insulated from the failure of the investment bank, but, if the retail bank runs into difficulty, could tap the investment bank for capital.
  • Enhanced liquidity requirements.  The Basel Committee has been developing liquidity requirements that would make financial institutions less vulnerable to a 'run on the bank'.  Potential rules included a requirement to hold up to 30 days of funding in highly liquid, marketable securities like government bonds.
  • Breaking up the Too Big to Fail.  Looking at the hazard posed by financial institutions that are too big to fail, a number of politicians, regulators and academics have proposed proposed breaking up these institutions into smaller firms that can fail.
What is the 'level playing field' argument?

The basic 'level playing field' argument goes as follows:  ABC country has enacted reform that does not exist in XYZ country; this puts ABC country's banks at a competitive disadvantage with banks located in XYZ country; ABC country needs to level the playing field and adopt the same same rules as XYZ country.

By definition, XYZ country is always that country with the least binding regulation.  For example, HSBC is already on record as threatening to move from London to Hong Kong if the UK government adopts higher capital standards - either as a percentage of assets or via a ring-fence requirement.

Potential reforms that are subject to the 'level playing field' argument include: higher capital standards, separation of retail and investment banking and breaking up too big to fail.

What is the 'something cannot be and be at the same time' principle?

This principle says there is no halfway house.  For example, banks cannot be adequately capitalized so that they can pay dividends and also be required to hold more capital.  Either they have enough capital to be adequately capitalized or they do not.  Once the US said that several of its largest banks could resume paying dividends, it set the minimum capital ratio for being adequately capitalized globally.  

Potential reforms that are subject to the 'something cannot be and be at the same time' principle include:  higher capital ratios and enhanced liquidity requirements.

The last remaining option for reform of the financial system is the adoption by bank regulators of the FDR Framework.  It does not require any additional legislation.  Since it is a reform in the way banking regulators operate, it results in a race to the top and it is immune to both the 'level playing field' argument and the 'something cannot be and be at the same time' principle.

How can adoption of the FDR Framework be an internal choice by bank regulators?

There are three observations that support this conclusion:
  • A bank examiner is entitled to see any information that a bank has that the examiner would like to see [at least in the US, there are no restrictions].  The examiner does not need to ask "permission" of the bank where the bank has the option of saying no, we will not let you see that data. (I)
  • A bank examiner can see the requested information at the bank or alternatively bring it back to the office for further analysis. (II)
  • If the examiner needs help analyzing the information, the examiner is permitted to hire an expert without consulting with the bank that provided the information. (III)
Together, these observations suggest that bank regulators do not need to talk with the banks and ask their permission in order to make current asset/liability level data available. The bank regulator is collecting the data for supervisory purposes (I and II) and is making the data available to experts, in this case the market, for their help in analysis and supervision (III).

This also suggests that the politics of deciding to create the database are internal to the bank regulators.  While the banks will not be happy with the creation of the database, creating the database is consistent with the bank regulator fulfilling its financial stability and supervision mandates.

Saturday, March 19, 2011

Hedge Fund Manager Paul Singer on Too Big to Fail and the Next Financial Crisis

The Wall Street Journal ran a column on hedge fund manager Paul Singer.  Like your humble blogger, Mr. Singer was publicly recognized in 2007 for warning regulators about the impending crisis.

While I have never spoken or met Mr. Singer, it is amazing how closely his comments track with this blog's discussion of the FDR Framework and the need for disclosure of current asset and liability level data by the Too Big to Fail.
At the height of the housing bubble, hedge-fund manager Paul Singer was shorting subprime mortgages. By the spring of 2007, he was warning regulators on both sides of the Atlantic that the world was facing a major financial crisis. 
They ignored him. 
An experience your humble blogger shared.  I am not sure that he was also proposing an easily implemented solution like the FDR Framework.
Now the founder of Elliott Management says the biggest banks are headed for another credit meltdown. ... Rather, he's once again warning financial regulators.
 ... financial reform did little to reduce risks.
"Dodd-Frank has made the system more brittle and has shaped the next crisis in a very negative way," he warns. "The opacity of financial institution financial statements has not been addressed or changed at all. . . . We have a very large analytical research effort here and we have not found anybody that can parse" the sensitivity of big banks to changes in interest rates, asset prices and the like. "You can't do it." 
Even after the crisis, credit ratings "obviously provide no real clue," he says. "Rumor and feeling is all you have. You don't know the financial condition of [Citigroup], JPMorgan, Bank of America, any of them." Mr. Singer believes the big banks still carry too much leverage, and he doesn't trust regulators to monitor them effectively. 
The largest financial institutions, he says, are "a random collection of survivors. Almost none of the survivors exist because of their perspicacity, risk controls and sound management—even the ones that are vaunted along those lines. . . . How and why do they exist? Mostly an accident, meaning who got bailed out first and who was saved next and how did people feel and what did people say the weekend Merrill was under pressure [in September 2008]." 
Mr. Singer also has an interesting insight into contagion and the management of counter-party risk.
Mr. Singer says he does as little business with big banks as possible. "Aside from a large position in Lehman as part of our bankruptcy investing, we have no significant positions in global banks." 
"We institutionally have tried to—way before the crisis of '08—tried to insulate ourselves in every way we can from the counterparty problem," i.e. getting involved in a trade with a partner that might not be able to make good on its obligations down the line. 
But the nature of his business, he says, means that he can't sever all connections. "We've removed as many assets from the Street as we possibly can, and we think we're pretty well insulated. . . . If we could completely avoid being subject to the financial condition of any large financial institution, we would do so." 
Most investors don't share this view, of course, and big banks are still able to borrow at lower rates than their smaller competitors. The reason, says Mr. Singer, is that right now the system "is underwritten by the United States government and the governments of Europe. And the system is perceived as underwritten or guaranteed." 
But, he warns, "at some point that guarantee, in some way that I can't really visualize today, will go away." 
Will it really? 
He asks the question of what happens if the government guarantee is removed and a Too Big to Fail banks needs to be closed.
The authors of Dodd-Frank claim that the law prevents the government from bailing out any particular firm, but the Fed can still provide emergency loans to a failing giant as long as it offers similar financing to other firms. 
"It's a very important part of this equation that a few survivors exist in this peculiar relationship with government, having to kowtow to government, make relationships with regulators," says Mr. Singer. "Are they puppets of the government? Are they cronies of the government? Will their lending be affected by the perceived whims or beliefs of the particular government regulators existing at a particular time? Yes." 
If the government deems a firm not "systemically important," Mr. Singer forecasts, it could spell its doom. "Small and medium-sized financial institutions may be disadvantaged, may be sacrificed in the next crisis to protect these behemoths," he says. 
It gets even worse, Mr. Singer says, if the government ever deems a financial giant "in danger of default"—a judgment that can be made without the consent of the firm or its investors. The business is then taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, with its Orderly Liquidation Authority. 
Once in charge of the firm, the government can discriminate among similarly situated creditors and transfer assets out of the business at will. Because of this, says Mr. Singer, creditors and trading counterparties might flee even faster than they would from a firm headed toward bankruptcy, where at least there is established law instead of regulator discretion. 
Mr. Singer's fund specializes in distressed debt and bankruptcy situations, so perhaps he has reason to oppose changes to a system he knows so well. But he's also well-qualified to examine the government's reforms. 
"You don't know how you will be treated," he says of financial institutions under the new FDIC regime. "If there are companies that are also counterparties alongside you but they've been designated systemically important, that's a clue. It's like a game of treasure hunt. It's a clue that you're going to get disadvantaged compared to them." 
So maybe FDIC chairman Sheila Bair and the authors of Dodd-Frank were right about one thing: Perhaps their new process for resolving failing giants really will discourage some people from lending to the biggest banks—but only at the worst possible moment. 
The problem, in Mr. Singer's view, will be the jarring shift from one day being an investor in a member of the "systemically important" club, to the next day being a creditor whose claim is determined by bureaucratic whim. This may be welcome news to government pension funds that will want to be bailed out, but certainly not for private investors. 
The speed at which a firm will collapse as word gets around that it might be headed to FDIC resolution could be "amazing," says Mr. Singer. And that "speed will drive the size of the losses." 
This "atmosphere of unpredictability" is harmful to America's place in the financial world, he says, and "it doesn't make the system any safer. . . . This is nuts to be identifying systemically important institutions." 
He views it as a poor "substitute for creating soundness and reasonable levels of leverage throughout the system."
The only way to create soundness and reasonable levels of leverage throughout the system is implementing the FDR Framework.  Once all market participants have access to current asset-level data, their actions will drive the system towards soundness and reasonable levels of leverage.

How?

The market will be able to properly price each firm's risk.  It will both increase the cost of funds and lower the availability of funds to high risk firms.  This provides a strong incentive to reduce risk.

Friday, March 18, 2011

Ireland's Asset Warehouse

According to a Bloomberg article, Ireland is considering setting up an asset warehouse.

The asset warehouse is an idea straight from structured finance.  Each of the banks that the Irish government has decided are viable would sell assets to the warehouse.  The warehouse would be funded with a combination of funds from investors and the ECB.

Just like all structured finance securities, the attractiveness of and cost of funding the asset warehouse will be related to the disclosure surrounding the underlying asset performance.

As has long been advocated for on this blog, the gold standard for asset-level disclosure is to report the performance of the underlying assets on an observable event basis.  Examples of observable events include payments, delinquencies and defaults.

The further the disclosure of the asset warehouse moves from the gold standard the less access to and the higher the cost of funds from investors.

Given the questions surrounding the quality of the assets in the Irish banking system, to maximize the attractiveness of the asset warehouse to investors requires providing the gold standard for disclosure.  Investors need to know that they can access current information on the underlying assets.

Without the gold standard for disclosure, investors have to assume that there is a reason for not disclosing the underlying performance of the assets on a current basis.  This reduces their appetitive for exposure to the asset warehouse and increases their required return.  This increase is ultimately paid for by the Irish taxpayers.

Another reason for offering the gold standard of disclosure is it eliminates the illiquidity premium.  Moving from the gold standard of disclosure to the current industry standard of once per month disclosure, increases the cost of funding by adding an illiquidity premium.  The illiquidity premium exists because investors know from the recent credit crisis that once per month reporting is not adequate to sustain an active secondary market.

The illiquidity premium is a minimum of one quarter of a percent and more likely one half of one percent annually.  For the 60 billion euros asset warehouse being discussed, having once per month disclosure would cost the Irish taxpayer a minimum of 150 million euros and more likely 300 million euros per year.
Irish authorities are considering allowing the country’s debt-laden lenders to set up a company to warehouse more than 60 billion euros ($84.8 billion) of loans that would be wound down or sold over time, according to three people familiar with the matter. 
Some banks have sought to convince the central bank and government officials that this would be preferable to splitting their operations into core and non-core units, which is also being weighed, said the people, who declined to be identified because the talks are private. 
It would need approval from the European Central Bank, which would be the most likely initial provider of funding to a warehouse vehicle, they said. 
.... Ireland agreed as part of its bailout in November to shrink its banks, as deposit outflows last year drove up their reliance on funding from the ECB. While Irish central bank Governor Patrick Honohan said the ECB wanted to accelerate deleveraging, Ireland has “put in the condition of no fire-sale losses because the state cannot afford it,” he said. 
A decision on the approach to shrinking banks’ balance sheets will be made before the results of capital and liquidity stress tests are revealed on March 31. 
So-called viable lenders ... need to cut their loan-to-deposit ratios to 122.5 percent, “which is acceptable to Europe,” Finance Minister Michael Noonan said March 14. The average loan-to-deposit ratio is currently about 170 percent. 
... Still, a single warehouse company, or special purpose vehicle, which can be separate from the banks’ balance sheets is the “preferred and most realistic route” to deleveraging the banks, analysts including Fergal O’Leary and Michael Cummins of Glas Securities, the Dublin-based fixed-income firm, said in a note to clients on March 9. 
It would be “a more robust, transparent and market-friendly vehicle, than individual SPVs set up by each bank,” it said. 
... Banks’ foreign assets and some residential home-loans that are priced to track the ECB’s key rate, would most likely be transferred to any such vehicle, said three of the people. 
Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish and Irish Life have more than 60 billion euros of U.K. loans.
None of the banks would own more than 50 percent of the new company, allowing them to remove it from their balance sheets, according to the people. 
Assets would be transferred at book value, avoiding initial capital losses, they said. Still, they would have to be sufficiently stress-tested and the vehicle properly capitalized to convince investors that future losses will not ultimately end up back with the banks, they said. 
The central bank is stress-testing against a 60 percent drop in house prices from their peak in 2007, an economic contraction and rising unemployment for this year and next. 
Depositors and wholesale markets would have more confidence in funding the core banks as a result, they said, adding that this would lower lenders’ reliance on central banks. 
Irish banks have already sold 72.3 billion euros of risky commercial real-estate loans in the past year to the state-run National Asset Management Agency, the nation’s so-called bad bank. The loans were sold at an average discount of 58 percent, contributing to the country’s need to inject up 46.3 billion euros into absorb soaring losses in the banks.

Did Ireland's Honohan Call for Current Asset-Level Disclosure?

In a March 15, 2011 address at the International Centre for Monetary and Banking Studies, Patrick Honohan, Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, made the case for the Irish banks providing current asset-level disclosure to all market participants.

He observed that the markets were reluctant to lend to Ireland because of concern with the tail risk of the assets in the Irish banking system, including NAMA.

As regular readers of this blog know, it is only by disclosing current asset-level data to all market participants that the market can judge the tail-risk of these assets.

Unfortunately, as Mr. Honohan discusses, the Irish government did not choose to disclose current asset-level data.  Instead, it chose to run stress tests.

As discussed in a previous post, the fundamental problem with stress tests is that the Irish government is an obstacle to markets functioning properly.  In this case, they are blocking the disclosure of the current asset-level data that the market wants from reaching the market.  The Irish government is doing this by running stress tests.

This will be at least the fourth time that the Irish government has tried to find a level of disclosure that restores market confidence without disclosing current asset-level data.  The first couple of times involved buying the "bad" assets.  The last couple of times have involved stress tests.

In an effort to make these stress tests more credible, the Irish government has hired BlackRock, Barclays and Boston Consulting.  However, these firms are constrained by the terms of the Irish bailout to find a maximum of 35 billion euros need to cure the problem.  This constraint immediately discredits the analysis.

What is more important is the fact that the only way to convince investors is to provide them with the current asset-level data and let them analyze it for themselves.  What their analysis shows is what they will believe in.
...As seen from the rest of the world, and in particular from the financial markets, the key risks now facing the Irish economy lie in its financial balance sheet. To oversimplify, Ireland faces two main problems in this respect. First, it has too much debt, public and private. Second, there is a market perception of significant tail risk to the debt, not least that part that relates to the banks. It is these two problems, which are obviously interlinked, and which have both been growing in the course of the past year, that have led to the market’s reluctance to provide continuing funding at reasonable rates of interest. 
... If I am right in saying that the market’s reluctance to finance Ireland is down to the exposure to tail risks that they fear, then restoring Ireland’s access to market funding needs to address those risks. There are three possible routes. First is to improve the quality and transparency of relevant information so that those parts of the perceived risk that are based on inadequate information will be dispelled. Second, to reduce vulnerabilities through mitigants – notably reducing the leverage of banks, reducing the fiscal deficit and thus slowing the accumulation of government debt. All means of restarting growth of output and employment on a sustainable basis fall into this category. That would include sustaining the recovery, under way since 2007, in wage competitiveness in international markets, as well as strengthening other elements of international competitiveness. Most of the key components of the years of “Celtic Tiger” success are still in place: clearly none should be neglected or dismantled at this juncture. 
... If so, we must work with what we have, and that is the policy strategy worked out for the IMF-EU Programme. It has two main elements, which essentially continue and deepen existing policies. 
First, there is phased deficit reduction projected to bring Government debt under control and declining by 2014. After the period of political uncertainty engendered by the run-up to the General Election, the new Government has reaffirmed the fiscal objectives of the Programme and specifically to the 2011 and 2012 budgetary numbers. This is key to reducing risk and restoring confidence, but I will say no more about it here. 
Second, accelerated resolution of the banking crisis for which we would have hoped to turn the corner already, but has proved to be on a scale which has challenged available policy tools. The banking strategy thus involves further recapitalisation and accelerated downsizing. 
The recapitalisation of the banks will take place following the completion of the 2011 stress tests which, in line with the Programme commitments, will be much more granular, more explicitly transparent, and tougher, than those of 2010. 
Last year’s task was not just a question of assessing future losses under a speculative stress scenario; instead we were still trying to evaluate the losses already embedded in the existing portfolio resulting from the property price collapse that had already occurred, especially for development property. 
In normal times, a well-run bank with good loan appraisal procedures will be able to forecast its likely loan losses fairly accurately, especially if the likely macroeconomic prospects can be pinned-down. But when it becomes clear that banks have made substantial underwriting errors across a wide range of their portfolio to the extent that began to become evident in late 2008 and early 2009, the range of uncertainty balloons out. Standard valuation practices that work for properly underwritten loans in normal times are ineffective in such an environment in predicting the enormous systemic losses that can occur. Thus, over the past couple of years, a point estimate – a single number – has been more misleading than helpful in terms of understanding the range of loss possibilities. 
Usually the validity of stress tests is revealed only over a period of time, but in our case, within months of publication, one of the underlying assumptions of the 2010 stress tests was unluckily undermined. We had to go public on them part-way through the big programme of loan purchases by the State property company NAMA. These loan purchases crystallised those embedded bank losses immediately, but the prices at which the purchases would be made were calculated in a very elaborate and time-consuming way mandated by Competition Law. The stress-test’s seemingly aggressive assumption that the seemingly severe haircuts in the first tranche of loan purchases would read through to the lower tranches also proved to be wrong. With hindsight it would have been great to have built in more insulation by providing for even tougher haircuts; but at the time it would have seemed an arbitrary and hard to justify exercise of regulatory powers. 
This year, we are determined to present a stress test that will not only be more convincing to the market, by providing much more granular detail, but also be better insulated against surprises by using aggressive stress assumptions and modelling. 
The emphasis is clearly on determining appropriate capital levels to meet stresses. The higher capital required will be driven by this rather than from any increase in expected losses: to be sure the somewhat weaker economic growth projections now available would imply some increase in expected losses, but it is the stress scenario that is the focus of the present exercise. 
We will seek to largely free the tests of any excessive expectations from Irish exceptionalism in loan-loss recoveries (over the years very few Irish residential mortgages have been foreclosed in downturns by comparison with the experience in the UK and US, for example: with the help of external consultants we are referencing experience in those countries – though not slavishly so – in the analysis that will lead us to choose new tougher capital levels for the banks sufficient to convince the markets. And less reliance will be made on extrapolation from recent experience.

Thursday, March 17, 2011

Stress Tests and Too Big To Fail

The global bank regulatory community is busily engaged in performing stress tests on the largest financial institutions in each country.
  • In the US, the stated goal of the tests is to answer the question which of the 19 too big to fail banks has adequate capital and therefore can begin paying dividends again.  
  • In the European Union, the stated goal of the tests is to restore confidence in the banking system by answering the question which banks need additional capital to either return to or remain solvent and what is the source of this capital.
  • In the UK, the stated goal of the tests is to provide more transparency into the health of the banks.
In the absence of disclosure of current asset-level data, the greatest impact of each stress test is to reinforce the concept of too big to fail banks.

As soon as they are announced, the markets already have a fairly accurate guess at what the results of the stress test will be.

Is there anyone who doubts that JP Morgan will be allowed to start paying dividends after the latest US stress test?  [With the restoration of bank dividend payments in the US, capital adequacy standards will be set on a global basis.  Since a bank cannot be seen as having adequate capital for paying dividends and not be adequately capitalized for regulatory purposes.]

Stress tests are championed by US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner.  He likes to point to the release of the US bank stress tests in 2009 as a turning point in the financial crisis.  What Mr. Geithner conveniently leaves out of the story was that as part of releasing the stress tests he cemented in the idea of too big to fail by pledging the full faith and credit of the US to keep the banks subject to the stress test solvent.

Markets reacted positively to the pledge and not to the stress test.  The pledge, like the FDIC guarantee of bank deposits under $250,000, eliminated the need for the market to do any research into the solvency of the TBTF institutions.

There are a number of problems with the stress test and government guarantee approach.

Ireland discovered one.  The problem the Irish discovered is the size of the hole in the banking system might dwarf a country's ability to fill it and remain solvent.  When this happens, a country's too big to fail banks become too big to save.

Spain discovered another.  The problem the Spanish discovered is that trying to manage perception of the size of the hole in the banking system creates greater financial instability [see Moody's recent downgrade of Spain].

How did we get to this position where regulators are trying to use stress tests to restore confidence in the financial system while substantially weakening their sovereign's ability to handle future crisis?

How did we get to a position where regulators are substituting their ability for the market's, including the bank's competitors and other market participants, at analyzing each bank's current asset-level data?

One part history.  One part the failure to adhere to the FDR Framework.

In discussing the FDR Framework, this blog has highlighted how the absence of 21st century information technology in the 1930s required the government, with its exposure through deposit insurance, to take on the monitoring, analysis and discipline role that the financial markets would otherwise perform.

For US regulators operating in a 1930s world, performing stress tests and announcing the results would have been sensible.  This is what they effectively did when they closed all the banks and selectively reopened some.

The regulators had to do this because they did not have the alternative of financial institutions disclosing all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to market participants.

For regulators operating in the 21st century, performing stress tests and announcing the results is not a requirement or necessity.  They have the option of disclosing all useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to market participants.

As predicted by the FDR Framework, by not disclosing all the useful, relevant information they have access to, regulators have become an obstacle to markets functioning properly.  They are the gatekeepers in maintaining information asymmetry between the current asset-level data on financial institution balance sheets and the markets.

With the stress tests, the regulators are trying to determine is there a middle ground between current financial reporting and the disclosure of all useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

As regular readers of this blog know, there is no middle ground that does not violate the FDR Framework.  As regular readers of this blog know, violating the FDR Framework not only does not promote properly functioning markets, but it contributes to their instability.

We know that current financial reporting is inadequate because the interbank market froze during the financial crisis.  According to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report, banks did not know the exposure of the other banks to toxic securities and would not lend because of repayment concerns related to the other bank's solvency.

We know that partial reporting using stress tests also is inadequate and contributes to the too big to fail problem.  How can investors be asked to accept the risk of loss when a) they do not have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner on which to make an investment decision and b) the government is saying that that the financial institution they invested in passed a stress test?

In short, the too big to fail problem was created by regulators and their failure to adhere to the FDR Framework.  The solution is to adhere to the FDR Framework and provide investors with all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

Wednesday, March 16, 2011

The Debate Over Cost to Bailout Irish Banks Revisited

In a previous post, the debate over how much more capital needed to be injected into the Irish banking system to restore it to solvency was raging between Patrick Honohan, the head of the Central Bank of Ireland, and Alan Dukes, an individual who had been appointed to run one of the nationalized banks.

The Irish Independent observes, [emphasis added]
When Alan Dukes speaks about the banking crisis, there is every reason to listen. Not only is he a distinguished economist; he is a former minister for finance and, most importantly, he is chairman of Anglo Irish Bank. He has seen that particular can of worms from the inside. He said yesterday that there are more worms than in our worst nightmares. There could be a further €20bn to €40bn losses in the banking system, beyond those already covered, while €75bn in loans will be needed to fund a second NAMA for smaller loans. ... Whether the final figure is the official €45bn forecast, or Mr Dukes' gloomier estimate, all our futures are at stake. Yet not only do we not know what is going on, because of the disgraceful veil of secrecy surrounding the bank rescues, we do not know, among all the posturing and bickering, what the next government is actually going to do about it. 
This debate is interesting because it is entirely possible that because of his position as the chairman of Anglo Irish Bank, Mr. Dukes has better information than the Irish government and its central bank.

The possibility cannot be discounted given the fact that the Irish government has tried and claimed to have succeeded on at least a couple of occasions to identify all the 'bad assets' in the banking system and consolidate them in NAMA.

For the record, at the time Mr. Dukes estimated 40 billion euros, Mr. Honohan felt that the banks would require an additional 10 billion euros of capital and stated he would be disappointed if the 25 billion euros available under the Irish bailout was needed.

According to an article in yesterday's Irish Independent, more than 10 billion euros of capital is needed.

How much more?

The Irish government hired BlackRock, Barclays and Boston Consulting to find out.  Given that there is 25 billion euros available under the Irish bailout agreement, investors can expect that the total found by these three will not exceed 25 billion euros.

Since the government has lost all credibility in estimating how much more capital is needed and its consultants are constrained by the bailout, it is unlikely that any number coming from the government and its consultants will restore confidence in the Irish banking system.

Given that the credit situation in Ireland is deteriorating, the upper end of Mr. Dukes range for needed capital might well prove conservative.

Until the current asset-level data is released so the market can determine how much capital is needed, the run on the Irish banking system will continue.
THE banks are increasingly likely to need most of the €35bn bailout fund set aside to keep them afloat, latest estimates indicate. 
Experts hired by the Central Bank are in the final stages of examining the bank's loans, with financial sources putting the final bill at between €25bn and €35bn. This would be the worst case scenario as envisaged in the IMF/EU bailout agreed last November. 
The new Government will have to pump even more money into the banks than the €10bn earmarked by the outgoing administration, Finance Minister Michael Noonan admitted yesterday. 
...  The deterioration in bank mortgages is a key reason for the additional money needed, with rising concerns over loans taken out by small-time property investors and those with second homes. 
According to one source, the Central Bank stress tests also include an "extreme" scenario where there is little economic growth for the next three years, house prices fall another 10pc and commercial prices drop 20pc with unemployment continuing to mount. A Central Bank spokesman declined to comment on the stress tests. 
Central Bank Governor Patrick Honohan had originally said he would be "disappointed" if the banks needed more than the €10bn immediate injection pencilled in under the bailout plan. 
But arriving in Brussels for his first meeting of Europe's finance ministers, Mr Noonan yesterday hinted that the Central Bank's view had worsened, saying he would be "surprised" if the €10bn was "sufficient". 
"The commitment was €10bn," he told reporters. "The view of the authorities around the Central Bank and the governor is that it will exceed that figure. But he (the governor) is not prepared to estimate yet by how much." 
Banking sources stressed that the process was still "ongoing" with data being exchanged and questioned on a daily basis. 
The tests are being carried out on AIB, Bank of Ireland, EBS and Irish Life & Permanent, so the March 31 announcement should only cover those four banks. 
Mr Noonan will be exploring how to fund this extra re-capitalisation, which could involve making the banks' senior bondholders suffer losses. There are senior unsecured, unguaranteed bonds in the Irish banks worth about €16.5bn. 
Mr Noonan admitted yesterday that while the Programme for Government allowed for burden sharing in the future, he was not "actively pursuing burden sharing" at the moment. This is a recognition of the fact that Europe has so far opposed any efforts to impose burden-sharing. Asked if Ireland could afford to put in the extra money, Mr Noonan said that "sustainability" was a bigger issue than affordability. The bailout plan left Ireland a €25bn cushion in case the banks needed more than the original €10bn. 
"As we move to restructure the wider banking system, particularly AIB and Bank of Ireland, the issue of most concern to me now is the pace of deleveraging (selling down the bank's assets so they can repay money they've borrowed)," he said. 
"If you can get agreement on the deleveraging side, obviously then you don't have the same add-on from banking coming across on the sovereign side." 

Tuesday, March 15, 2011

US Covered Bond Act of 2011: A Fundamentally Flawed Proposal

Recently, the United States Covered Bond Act of 2011 was proposed in Congress.  Passage of this Act would be the equivalent of Congress offering large subsidies for building nuclear power plants in areas prone to frequent earthquakes.

Covered bonds are bonds issued by financial institutions.  These bonds are backed by pools of loans.  The performance of these loans and hence the performance of these bonds is guaranteed by the financial institution.  If a loan becomes delinquent by 60 days, it must be replaced with either cash or a new performing loan.

In the event of bankruptcy of the issuing financial institution, these bonds have priority to the cash flow from the loans in the pool.  More importantly, as proposed in the Act, these bonds also have priority over the FDIC claim to the cash flow of the failed financial institution.

The bonds are therefore effectively guaranteed by the US government.

The authors of the Act recognized this.  They also recognized that it would increase the losses incurred by the FDIC in resolving financial institutions that had outstanding covered bonds.  To protect the US taxpayer, they instructed the FDIC to increase its deposit insurance premium to cover any losses incurred as a result of the covered bonds.

Would the US taxpayer be protected?

Imagine that private label residential mortgage backed securities did not exist.  Instead, as allowed under the Act, financial institutions issue $2 trillion of covered bonds backed by sub-prime mortgages.  Unfortunately, as they are prone to do, the sub-prime mortgages stop performing.

As the hundreds of billions of non-performing sub-prime mortgages are taken out of the covered loan pool, the issuing financial institutions are required to recognize the loss in value from the impairment of these mortgages.  Bottom-line, the financial institutions do not have the capital to absorb the losses and the financial institutions themselves require an FDIC resolution.

Is it realistic that the FDIC could increase its deposit insurance premium on the surviving banks enough to cover $1 trillion in covered bond related losses?  No!

The US taxpayer is fully on the hook for the losses under the US Covered Bond Act of 2011.  This design flaw is so obvious that even the Administration commented on it in the following article by Reuters [if this legislation progresses, a subsequent post will address another major design flaw:  the lack of information on the underlying loan performance],
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Tuesday backed efforts by U.S. lawmakers to create a new market for financing mortgages that would help wean the $10.6 trillion U.S. mortgage market from government support. 
Geithner said he backed efforts to create a market for covered bonds, which are securities issued by banks and backed by pools of loans. The loans underlying covered bonds remain on the issuer's balance sheet. 
That is different from the the current U.S. mortgage system, where lenders sell many of the loans they make to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which then repackage them as securities for investors. 
"We would support legislation that would help create better conditions for a covered bond market," Geithner told the Senate Banking Committee in response to a question from Senator Charles Schumer. 
Republican Representative Scott Garrett, a strong proponent of covered bonds, last week called advocates to testify to a House panel heads to push the idea. He thinks a covered bond market could lessen the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
Schumer, a Democrat, said he was considering introducing a Senate version of Garrett's bill. 
... In Europe, covered bonds have long been in use. But they have failed to catch on in the United States. 
In a covered bond system, banks can borrow against the value of the underlying mortgages to obtain fresh capital to extend further loans. The bond investors have the right to those underlying assets in the case of a bank default. 
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation has warned a covered bond system could put its bank deposit insurance fund at increased risk for losses because the investors would have seniority over the agency in the event of default. 
Geithner said the FDIC concerns are legitimate and would have to be worked out. 
"For this to work, you would be putting the taxpayer in some sense behind private investors, and that has its own consequences, but that is something we can work through and I think it can play a greater role in our system," Geithner said. 
The White House and Congress are in the midst of a major policy debate on how to overhaul the finance system for buying U.S. homes, which collapsed in 2008. 
The Obama administration last month announced several steps to make those government-backed mortgages more expensive in a bid to lure private capital back to the mortgage market. 

Monday, March 14, 2011

Highlight of Euro Stress Test II: Disclosure of Data

Reuters carried an article in which analysts said that the major positive they expected from the second round of European bank stress tests is the release of some bank data.  Analysts plan to use this data to run their own independent stress tests.

As regular readers of this blog know, this is exactly what the FDR Framework would predict would be the reaction of the market - give us the data and let us do our own homework.

The only question that is outstanding about the stress tests is how far short of full transparency they will fall.  We know that the regulators are not going to provide full transparency and release each bank's current asset-level data.  The question is will they release enough data so that the stress tests run by investors can actually provide useful information.
Investors hoping for clarity from this year's European stress tests can expect at best to be given enough data to run their own assessment. 
The problem is that the new regulator running the exercise is unable to challenge EU policy that simply will not accept any of its member countries could default, even theoretically. 
"They have to go for the second-best solution, which is giving transparency of banks' sovereign exposures so that investors can calculate the implications of this particular stress factor themselves," said Nicolas Veron, senior fellow at Bruegel, a Brussels-based think-tank. 
The aim of the tests is to restore confidence in the region's banking sector after last year's health check was widely criticised for lack of transparency and credibility. 
Only seven banks failed last year's tests and needed to raise just 3.5 billion euros, far less than expected. All of Ireland's banks passed, yet months later Dublin needed an 85 billion euro bailout and all its lenders had to be rescued. 
Though the 2011 exercise is being run by the new European Banking Authority (EBA), under pressure to prove its own credibility as a regulator, it will still be flawed by the same inability to force banks to show a loss on assets held in their long-term "banking book," where they park sovereign bonds.  
... "Provided you get the disclosures for the market to run its own stress tests I don't think it's a fatal problem that the banking book isn't stress tested," said Mike Harrison, analyst at Barclays Capital. 
...To run your own test, however, you need to know that the capital being tested across countries is of roughly the same quality, not an easy task without full transparency. 
Last year banks had to meet a Tier 1 capital requirement of 6 percent to pass. This refers to a broad measure of a bank's resilience to shocks, but lenders can pad it with lower quality assets which obscure exactly how much cash is available to tap. 
Analysts would have preferred to use a stricter 'core' Tier 1 benchmark comprising shareholders' capital and retained earnings, possibly with a 5 percent pass rate. That is opposed by some countries as it would make the test harder to pass. 
Germany, for example, wants to include the debt-equity hybrids known as "silent participations" commonly held by its banks, sources familiar with the matter have said. This form of capital has been criticised because it cannot absorb losses while the bank is still in business. 
The solution could be to stick with Tier 1 capital, but include a detailed breakdown of what it contains. 
Another proposed improvement is to highlight the banks that nearly miss the stress tests requirements, in order to pressure them to recapitalise. 
The test also looks set to apply higher funding costs and greater losses from a fall in property prices. It should also ensure that economic stress scenarios are consistently applied under similar accounting rules. 
Regulators are also sticking their necks out politically by insisting that governments have a plan in place to top up capital at banks that fail, unlike last year. 
Germany, in particular, needs to show how it would recapitalise its landesbanks, critics say. 
... Regulators say greater transparency means investors and analysts can run their own tests or add elements if they don't think the EBA is being tough enough. 

Sunday, March 13, 2011

Asset-level Disclosure Makes Markets Work Better at Low Cost

In a recent column in the NY Times, Richard Thaler puts to rest the idea that the market would in any way, shape or form not be up to the task of transforming all the data in the 'Mother of all Databases' into useful information.

He looks at what market participants do with non-financial databases where there are limited financial rewards from transforming the data into information.  Now, just imagine what they would do with access to all the financial data in the 'Mother of all Databases' where there are potentially huge financial rewards from transforming the data to information!
GOVERNMENTS have learned a cheap new way to improve people’s lives. Here is the basic recipe: 
Take data that you and I have already paid a government agency to collect, and post it online in a way that computer programmers can easily use. Then wait a few months. VoilĂ ! 
The private sector gets busy, creating Web sites and smartphone apps that reformat the information in ways that are helpful to consumers, workers and companies. 
... Another example involves weather data produced by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration. The forecasts you find on the Weather Channel, or on the evening news or online, use the agency’s information. 
Again, the government produces and releases raw data, and the private sector transforms it into something useful for the public. 
... Now the administration is pushing to use this concept as a tool for regulation, and as a method of avoiding more heavy-handed rule making. The idea is that making things more transparent can immediately turn consumers into better shoppers and make markets work better. 
One might think that such an initiative would receive nearly universal support — after all, who could be against openness and transparency? But it turns out that some people are. 
Two cases... 
First, the Department of Transportation is considering a new rule requiring airlines to make all of their prices public and immediately available online. The postings would include both ticket prices and the fees for “extras” like baggage, movies, food and beverages. The data would then be accessible to travel Web sites, and thus to all shoppers. 
The airlines would retain the right to decide how and where to sell their products and services. But many of them are insisting that they should be able to decide where and how to display these extra fees.
Electronic disclosure of all fees can make it much easier for consumers to figure out what a trip really costs, and thus make markets more efficient, without requiring new rules and regulations.   [every industry that thinks it benefits from a lack of transparency by being able to sell their products at a higher price will be like the airlines and object to openness and transparency]
Another initiative has been proposed by the Consumer Product Safety Commission. In 2008, Congress overwhelmingly passed and President George W. Bush signed legislation mandating an online database of reported safety issues in products, at saferproducts.gov.  
... If we want to reduce the cost of government regulation, this is exactly the kind of effort we should be applauding and expanding. Compared with the tiny costs [$3 million per year], the benefits of this program could be enormous. 
Thirteen years ago, two of my dear friends ... were called at work ... and told that their 18-month-old son had died in a crib accident. Imagine their anguish when they later learned that other children had died in this model of crib, and that still others had died in cribs with similar design. ... If this program could reduce that number even slightly, the cost would seem amply justified. 
Moving the government into the 21st century should be applauded. [see here] 

Saturday, March 12, 2011

Banks Are Still Unable to Assess Competitors' Solvency

The key concern for markets and regulators was that they weren't sure they understood the extent of toxic assets on the balance sheets of financial institutions - so they couldn't be sure which banks were really solvent.  [Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission Report summary of the role of contagion in the credit crisis, page 373 pdf]
The ability to assess the risk and solvency of the large, global financial institutions has still not been addressed.

Until banks are required to disclose current asset-level data so competitors can actually do their own analysis to determine a bank's risk and solvency, competitors are forced to rely on one-off solutions like risk-adjusted capital ratios.

A column in the Wall Street Journal highlights the problem with relying on risk-adjusted capital ratios that are not being consistently calculated across the too big to fail.
Bank strength still is very much in the eye of the beholder. 
... firms can rely on differing definitions of Tier 1 capital, a key measure of bank strength. 
That debate comes as worries rise in the U.S. that varying approaches in the calculation of Tier 1 ratios will put big American institutions at a competitive disadvantage to European rivals. 
Risk weightings of assets measure the threat of loss posed by different holdings. So, a government bond will receive a lower risk weighting than a "junk" bond. A lower risk weighting for a bank's total assets may allow it to hold less capital. That can help boost returns and profit. 
J.P. Morgan Chase CEO James Dimon recently fired a broadside over that issue. He questioned differences in models other banks use to calculate risk-weighted assets that help determine Tier 1 ratios. 
A comparison of J.P. Morgan's risk-weighted assets to peers suggests their approach "can't be accurate," Mr. Dimon said at his bank's investor-day conference last month. "I mean, obviously, someone's using far more aggressive models." Although Mr. Dimon didn't single out particular institutions, it appears he was pointing a finger at Europe. 
Determining risk weightings relies on complex calculations and judgments. In the U.S., banks calculate them based on an older, restrictive version of international capital standards. European banks use an updated version allowing wider discretion through management's use of internally devised risk models. 
... But the danger mightn't be so much that U.S. banks face competitive constraints as it is that European banks, by using higher leverage, or borrowed money, are courting greater risk. 
For investors, the answer is to cast a skeptical eye on regulatory measures of bank strength.