Saturday, April 21, 2012

Pursuit of Obamacare doomed financial reform

In a Bloomberg column, Jonathan Alter argues that pursuing Obamacare in 2009 did not ultimately have a material effect on financial reform.

Underlying his argument is the critical assumption that the banks' lobbyists would have been as effective in completely neutering financial reform in 2009 as they were in 2010.

Compare pursuing financial reform beginning February 1, 2009 versus February 1, 2010.

On February 1, 2009, all of the major banks were still recipients of an explicit bailout from the US taxpayers in the form of TARP funds.  By February 1, 2010, most of the major banks had repaid these funds (see SigTARP report).

On February 1, 2009, none of the major banks had passed a stressed test and received the explicit backing of the US Treasury to add as much capital as was necessary to keep them solvent.  By February 1, 2010, all of the major banks had received the US Treasury's explicit backing.

I realize that politics is the art of the possible, but what was possible on February 1, 2009 was dramatically different that what was possible on February 1, 2010.

What was possible on February 1, 2009 was true financial reform.   What was possible on February 1, 2010 was the Dodd-Frank Act, which with the exception of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule was an act written by and for the banks.

The Democratic Party “paid a terrible price for health care,” [Representative Barney] Frank said.... What’s surprising is how many Democrats, with the benefit of hindsight and speaking sotto voce, agree with Frank. 
Although they support the substance of the law, they are appalled by its political fallout and wish they had a do-over. 
Their thinking was summarized this week in the National Journal by Michael Hirsh, who wrote that by embracing health care reform amid the economic crisis, Obama confused his priorities and took his eye off the ball, much as President George W. Bush did when he invaded Iraq instead of worrying more about al-Qaeda.... 
Hirsh argues that Obama should have stayed focused on the economy not for appearances’ sake but because it was worse off than he and his closest advisers recognized. This wrongly assumes that he could have done substantively more to spur a rebound or keep the benefits of recovery from skewing toward the top 1 percent.
Hirsh and the Democrats correctly assume that it would have been dramatically easier to effect true financial reform.
Liberal critics rightly say that Obama should have had a broader circle that included liberal economists. But their remedy -- restructuring of the banks -- turned out to be unnecessary for reviving the economy and would have cost, by some estimates, several hundred billion dollars on top of the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
Requiring the banks to absorb all the losses on the excesses in the financial system would not have required a penny of taxpayer money.

All it required to adopt this policy is that anyone in the Obama administration understood the simple fact that with deposit insurance and unlimited liquidity from the central bank our modern banking system is designed so that banks do not have to be bailed out.

As shown during the Less Developed Country Loan Crisis and the Savings & Loan Crisis, banks can continue in operation and support the real economy while they are insolvent.

By continuing with the policies of the Bush administration, the Obama administration managed to transfer to the real economy the losses that the banks could and should have absorbed.

The Obama administration managed to compound this mistake by not pursuing financial reform in February 2009, but instead pivoting to health care reform.

Excuse me, but what happened to the Presidential candidate who chided Senator McCain  about being able to do two things at once?  Didn't he think that Congress was capable of passing both financial and health care reform in the same year?
It’s important to remember that Obama began his presidency with economic recovery, not health care. In his first month in office, he pushed through a mammoth stimulus package that, contrary to the analysis of Drew Westen and others, was as big as Congress would allow. 
There was no political appetite for a second stimulus before the first had even kicked in -- the period when health care was on the table. In other words, the opportunity costs of health-care reform were zero.
Actually, the opportunity cost of health-care reform was true financial reform.  For example, would the Too big to Fail banks still exist had financial reform occurred in 2009?  Would sunlight have been shown on the opaque, toxic structured finance securities?
But let’s not pretend health-care reform was a fatal Iraq- style distraction from the main event. 
Instead of costing thousands of lives, it will potentially save many more with its incentives for preventive care, among other historic provisions.
By not focusing on reforming the financial system, President Obama has set up a situation where we are now talking about the need for austerity, changing the social contract and reforming retirement programs like Medicare and Social Security.

There is no doubt that even if the Supreme Court does not rule it unconstitutional, Obamacare will also be included for cutbacks.  As a result, it is not clear that any of the benefits of Obamacare will be recognized.

What is clear is that by continuing the policies of President Bush, the Obama administration policies put the banks ahead of society.  By comparison, Iceland pursued policies that put society ahead of the banks.

Friday, April 20, 2012

The Guardian says it is time to recognize we have a 'banking crisis'

In a very important column, the Guardian says its it time to recognize what we have is a banking crisis.  The Guardian also says that a banking crisis requires adopting policies that focus on the banks and not remodeling the social contract.

Regular readers know that the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency crisis that has been adopted by the EU, UK and US policy-makers puts preserving meaningless bank book capital levels ahead of the citizens of each area.

The implication of putting the meaningless bank book capital levels ahead of the citizens is that policies are adopted which transfer the losses on the excesses in the financial system onto the real economy and the citizens.  An example of these policies is calling for austerity and reducing the social safety net.

Regular readers also know that the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency crisis uses the banks to protect the citizens.  Wall Street protects Main Street because the banks absorb all of the losses on the excesses in the financial system today.

The Guardian column frames the choice between the Japanese and Swedish model as an issue of morality and how this applies to bankers.

According to Moody's, borrowing costs above 5.7% "significantly raise the chance of default" for Mariano Rajoy's government. If that's right, then Europe's fifth-largest economy – and the rest of the eurozone – is teetering on the brink of disaster. 
That's the trouble with this crisis: even the comparatively good news turns out to be deeply worrying. And the anxiety is hardly quelled by the responses from policy-makers. 
On the upside, this week's IMF meeting has seen nations slowly but surely giving cash to boost the eurozone rescue fund. On the downside, very few serious investors have much confidence that the rescue fund will be especially effective in the event of Madrid needing a bailout. 
European officials point to Mr Rajoy's resolve to make painful budget cuts; but all the evidence is that the spending squeeze is ruining the outlook for Spain's economy and its unemployed (especially the 50% of under-25s out of work) – without convincing financiers that the country is a decent credit risk. 
This is the problem with the Japanese model.  It locks each country adopting it into a long term downward economic trajectory.  Just look at what has happened in Japan where GNP was less in 2010 than 1995.

The reason for this is that the real economy is carrying the cost of the excess debt in the financial system.

Rather than income being channeled to consumption or investment in productive assets, it is funneled to debt service on the excess debt.  The more income that goes to this debt service and away from consumption and investment, the bigger the headwind to economic growth.
Speaking during this week's London Book Fair, the Toulouse-based economist Paul Seabright deftly summed up why such huge, painful efforts simply aren't paying off. Politicians, he said, remain hellbent on painting the euro crisis as a morality tale – a saga of profligate southern Europeans and virtuous northern Europeans – when it is anything but. 
Until the eve of the banking crisis, Spain had sounder public finances than Germany. Similarly, the idea that Athens was covering up the level of its debt only gets you so far. 
Anyone who cared to inspect the figures could see that by 2008 Greece had become the fifth-largest importer of arms in the world – behind China, India, the United Arab Emirates and South Korea, despite having a far smaller economy than any of those countries. 
As Mr Seabright put it, such information, denoting just how wildly Greece was spending on the wrong things, was "in plain view" of any supposedly cautious German banker who cared to look on the internet – the implication being that they couldn't be bothered. 
Arms dealers obviously do well out of such a relaxed approach to lending – but so do banks, at least during the good times. 
Which brings us to one of the most important yet under-remarked aspects of the euro meltdown. What has been painted as a battle between the virtuous, hardworking north and the lazy, feckless south should instead be depicted as a banking crisis. 
This is the crucial point made in a new paper published by Manchester's centre for research on socio-cultural change. Called Deep Stall, it compares the eurozone collapse with a plane crash and finds one big difference: whereas everyone in the aviation industry – from passengers to planemakers to airlines – has a vested interest in keeping planes up in the air, the banks have no such commitment to keeping the rest of the financial system afloat as long as they get paid out. 
The implication is clear: rather than devote efforts to ruining the lives of southern Europeans, a far more effective way to deal with the continent's crisis would be to restructure the banks, then rein them in for good. 
Please re-read this implication as this is what your humble blogger has been proposing with his Swedish model-based blueprint for saving the financial system.

Forcing the banks to recognize the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets, results in restructuring the banks.

Requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details reins them in for good.  It is the necessary condition for market participants to exert discipline on the banks so the banks do not take on too much risk.
The alternative is to trust in austerity for the public and generously allow the banks to "deleverage" and shrink their balance sheets at their own pace. This is exactly the policy that has turned a Greek tragedy into an existential threat to the entire euro.

So long as regulators focus on bank capital levels, no avoiding credit squeeze in EU

So long as regulators focus on meaningless bank capital levels, there is no avoiding the credit squeeze in the EU and the resulting damage to the real economy.

This is exactly what your humble blogger predicted and current experience in the EU confirms.  It is also why your humble blogger keeps pointing out that policy-makers and regulators could choose not to damage the real economy and instead could allow Wall Street to rescue Main Street.

Modern banking systems are designed so that banks can absorb the losses on the excesses in the financial system without effecting their capacity to support the real economy.  Specifically, the combination of deposit guarantees and central bank liquidity protects banks ongoing operation and makes them capable of supporting the real economy even when they have substantial negative book capital levels.

A Reuters' article describes how the focus on bank capital levels is hurting the real economy.

Europe's banks are aggravating the region's economic woes by rapidly adopting tough new rules for capital, raising the risk they will have no money left to lend to companies and support economic recovery. 
Bloated with risky loans and bad debts, banks are slashing their assets, but this has so far failed to convince investors, hurting the banks' ability to source the capital they need to lend to credit-starved customers.
First, as the OECD observed, current bank book capital levels are meaningless.  Given the suspension of mark-to-market accounting and regulatory forbearance, bank book capital is overstated.  So it is not surprising that higher capital levels are failing to convince investors.

Second, banks do not need capital to lend.
"The genie is out of the bottle. Banks are hellbent on shrinking balance sheets so that they can then start to focus on running their businesses rather than spending time dealing with regulatory matters," said Chris Wheeler, analyst at Mediobanca. 
The unintended consequences of the regulatory clampdown were flagged this week by the International Monetary Fund, which warned that deleveraging will squeeze credit availability in the euro area by 1.7 percent over the next two years. 
If economic conditions worsen, credit availability could contract by a further 4.4 percent, the IMF said.
Unintended, but as your humble blogger has shown, completely predictable consequence.
Italy, Spain and other weak economies in the euro zone - already grappling with slowdowns and huge budget deficits - will be hit hardest, while companies in stronger countries like Germany enjoy a surplus of willing lenders. 
Stringent new capital rules known as Basel III to be phased in from next year are hitting banks even harder than many in the industry had first feared. 
Lenders across the region have curbed new lending to focus on offloading toxic or non-core assets - reducing the denominator of the capital over assets ratio - in the hope of maintaining the confidence of fickle capital markets.
Non-core assets yes, toxic assets no.  It is only performing non-core assets for which there is a market.  No one wants the toxic assets at the price the banks would be willing to sell at.  At the price the buyers are willing to pay, the loss of capital by the banks more than offsets the benefit to the capital ratio from selling the asset.
But the banks still have to reduce assets by 30 percent if they cannot raise new capital - or a staggering 13 trillion euros - according to Ruediger Filbry, head of banking practice in Germany at Boston Consulting. 
Most analysts predict a more modest, but still painful, reduction of assets - a process known as deleveraging - of around 3 trillion euros of loans, or 5 to 7 percent of assets. 
Adding to their woes, Europe's banks don't have time on their side. By June, the European Banking Authority has demanded that they boost their capital by 115 billion euros. 
"(Regulators) are asking banks to do contradictory things. They are asking them to reduce their assets, rebuild capital and increase lending all at the same time. It's just an impossible cocktail," said John McNeill, investment manager at Kames Capital. 
"The combination of Basel-type regulation, with that of domestic regulation, has exacerbated the credit crunch."...

The IMF and the EBA have said they would prefer banks to raise fresh capital to recapitalise. But that's unlikely in the current environment, with sluggish returns for investors offering no incentive....
Actually, it is unlikely that investors will have any significant interest in buying new bank capital securities until the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  Market participants need this information if they are to independently assess the risk of each bank.

In the absence of ultra transparency, banks are 'black boxes'.  So investing in new bank capital securities is just blindly betting.
Another problem is that the assets the banks are managing to off-load are typically the higher-quality ones. That leaves them stuck with more troubled assets that they need to sort out later, potentially increasing the "tail risk" of the crisis.
As predicted, it is the higher quality assets that the banks can sell.  This leaves the banks with the more troubled assets and increases the riskiness of the gamble to invest in them.

This cycle is self reinforcing.  The higher the capital levels the regulators require, the more high quality assets the banks sell.  The more high quality assets the banks sell, the riskier the banks become.  The riskier the banks become, the harder it is for them to raise capital from investors.  The harder it is to raise capital from investors, the more high quality assets the banks have to sell.

Not only is the cycle self reinforcing, but it is also damaging to the real economy.  When banks are busily selling their high quality assets, they are not busy making new loans or dealing with the bad assets on their balance sheet.

It is the latter two activities that benefit the real economy.  New loans is self explanatory.  Working through the bad assets ends any price distortion that is caused by not previously recognizing the losses.
"What is good and rational for the few may be disastrous for the many - deleveraging an over-extended institution or country works when there are those able to take up the slack but doesn't if everyone does it at once," Douglas Flint, Chairman of HSBC told a conference this week.
The bottom line:  so long as global financial regulators focus on bank capital levels, there is no avoiding the credit crunch and the resulting damage to the real economy.

If Greece government cared about its citizens, it wouldn't bailout banks

A Bloomberg article reports that supporting business and the real economy is a top priority for the Greek government.  If so, it would not waste scarce resources by bailing out its banks.  Rather, it would use the resources to support economic growth and social benefit programs.

Regular readers know that a modern banking system is designed so that banks can function and support the real economy for years with negative book capital levels.  This design makes banks capable of absorbing losses on the excesses in the financial system and protecting the real economy.

Governments bailing out banks ends the ability of a modern banking system to protect the real economy.  It interferes with banks recognizing all of their bad debt exposures today.  This occurs because the actual losses on the bad debt exposures could easily exceed the capacity of the government to inject funds into the banking system.

If the Greek government really wants to help the real economy, it would not bailout its banks.  Rather, it would require the banks to recognize the losses on their bad debt exposures today and provide ultra transparency to prove it.

Regular readers know that ultra transparency and not bank book capital levels is the necessary condition for restoring trust in the banking system.

Finally, if the Greek government cared about its citizens, the Greek government would use the funds that would have been invested in the banks to support economic growth and social benefit programs.
Supporting businesses after five years of recession is a top priority for Greece, Prime Minister Lucas Papademos said. 
“The government is trying to do everything possible to make sure that financial resources reach the real economy,” Papademos said at a conference in Athens today. 
The country’s banks need to play an active role and take responsibility for making the economy move, he said. 
The recapitalization of Greece’s banks is a “prerequisite” for this to happen.
Recapitalizing banks is not a "prerequisite" for banks to play an active role in supporting the real economy.

Management of the US Savings & Loans during their crisis definitively ended the notion that positive book capital levels are necessary as a "prerequisite" for making loans.  They made lots of loans to the real economy.

Thursday, April 19, 2012

Jesse Eisinger nails why ultra transparency is needed as replacement for regulators' information monopoly and their interpretation of Volcker Rule

In a NY Times Dealbook article, Jesse Eisinger lays out why ultra transparency is needed as a replacement for regulators' information monopoly and their interpretation of the Volcker Rule.

The path to gaming the Volcker Rule has always been clear: Banks will shut down anything with the word “proprietary” on the door and simply move the activities down the hall.... 
But the suspicious-minded among us wonder whether it was all that simple. 
This is the specter raised by the news that a JPMorgan Chase trader in London ... was amassing such huge positions in indexes related to corporate defaults that he was distorting the market....
Bloomberg followed up with a powerful article about how Jamie Dimon, the chief executive of JPMorgan, has transformed the sleepy chief investment office ... into a unit that hires former hedge fund portfolio managers and slings around giant sums of money in what walks and quacks like prop trading. The chief investment office seems not to just be risk-mitigating, but profit-maximizing. 
The Congressional authors of the Volcker Rule worried about this very thing ... So Congress tightened the language. It wrote that the hedges had to be specific. 
When the Dodd-Frank financial reform law came out, the Volcker Rule provision defined “risk mitigating activities” as trades that were “designed to reduce the specific risks to the banking entity in connection with and related to such positions, contracts, or other holdings.” No macro-hedging, only micro-hedging. That is the will of Congress.
The only way for a bank to demonstrate compliance with this provision to market participants is if the bank provides ultra transparency and discloses its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can see the specific positions, contracts or other holdings that the bank is suppose to be hedging.

It is for this reason that your humble blogger suggested that the financial regulators adopt requiring ultra transparency as the simple, straightforward method for implementing the Volcker Rule.
But then federal regulators got their hands on Volcker and set about interpreting the meaning of Dodd Frank. This has been a Talmudic exercise in reverse: It has taken the clear and simple intent and made it muddy and complicated.
Of course, the regulators had some help from the banks and their army of lobbyists (also known as, the Opacity Protection Team).
Regulators decided that banks could say that they were hedging for an overall portfolio. And the banks could argue that a hedge was legitimate if it merely had a “reasonable correlation” with the security or position being hedged.... 
“One of the great fears was that banks could avoid the rule by simply pretending that their prop trading was somehow their market-making or hedging,” a Congressional aide told me. “Congress tightened the language to prevent this, and yet banks still may get away with this under the proposed rules.”...
The problem of allowing a broad “portfolio hedging” exception is obvious .... And lo, JPMorgan says exactly what we might expect a bank that knows how the regulators are interpreting Volcker would say: that the trading of its chief investment office is merely hedging. 
But the bank is unabashed: “The purpose of this is to hedge the macro risk of the company,” a JPMorgan executive explained to me. “It’s what we are supposed to be doing; we do it well, we write about it in the annual report and we show it to every regulator,” he added. 
Alas, it wasn’t the regulators who brought this to light. 
Instead, it took hedge funds on the other side of trades....
And it matters what the banks’ trading partners think because the banks invoke them constantly in order to protect themselves from the Volcker Rule. The big banks wrap themselves in the mantle of market-making. Without them, they warn, liquidity — the ease of entering and exiting trades — will dry up. 
By definition, without the trading partners, liquidity will dry up for the big banks too.
In the case of these JPMorgan trades, however, we can see how a huge position can undermine liquidity. A big bank can become the market. JPMorgan’s big position now makes trading in these credit indexes less likely, not more, which could lead to more volatile markets. 
So is this legitimate trading? 
The hedge funds don’t really know what’s going on at JPMorgan’s chief investment office. Nor can the public tell from the bank’s disclosures. The only ones who have a chance to get a true picture are the dozens of regulators who are sitting in the bank’s office. 
Here is another example of the regulators' information monopoly having a negative effect on the financial markets.

In this case, the information monopoly prevents market participants from knowing if JP Morgan is complying with the intent of the Volcker Rule and legitimately hedging its exposure or whether it is violating the rule and taking a proprietary bet.
But given how bent the regulators are to subvert the will of Congress, it would take an act of extraordinary naivetĂ© to believe they will actually get to the bottom of it. 

WSJ's David Reilly lays out why ultra transparency is needed when looking at bank trading performance

In his Heard on the Street column, the Wall Street Journal's David Reilly looks at how the current level of disclosure is inadequate for investors to determine how Wall Street makes its money.

Based on the current level of disclosure by Wall Street firms,
No matter how much sun shines on Wall Street, it isn't bright enough for investors to see what really goes on in investment banks.
Trading performance in the first quarter bounced back from a dismal period late last year as fears over a European meltdown receded. 
But divergent performances underscore how little insight investors really have into how banks make their money. 
This lack of insight confirms the fact that the current level of required and voluntary disclosure leave Wall Street firms as transparent as black boxes.
Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs illustrate the point. The two compete in many of the same markets and are fairly comparable. 
In reporting upbeat results Thursday, Morgan Stanley said revenue of about $2.6 billion in its fixed income, commodities and currency business was up 34% year over year, excluding the impact of changes in the value of its own debt. Goldman, meanwhile, reported earlier this week that revenue for its same operation, at about $3.4 billion, was down 20% from a year earlier. 
What gives? Some of it may be down to differences in firms' risk appetite. There may be varying levels of activity by clients. A portion may be due to business mix—currency products were particularly strong last quarter—or how different firms report results. Mark-ups of inventory in rising markets may also play a role. Additionally, Morgan, which has been rebuilding its trading operation for the past year, is likely gaining back market share lost coming out of the financial crisis. 
While all are possible factors, investors can't really say for sure what drives trading results....
With the right level of disclosure it would be possible for investors to know for sure what drives trading results.

This level of disclosure is ultra transparency where the banks disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants could determine exactly how these banks generated their trading results.
As Morgan chief James Gorman said, the quarter showed the firm is headed in the right direction. It still needs, though, to string together a series of similarly strong quarters and show that it can consistently post returns in excess of its cost of capital, estimated at about 10%.... 
But as good as they were, especially compared with Goldman's, investors are still left scratching their heads when gauging how trading businesses will perform next time around.
The bottom-line is until the banks provide ultra transparency, investors do not have the information they need to accurately gauge how the trading business will perform.

Bankers cutting credit is another unintended consequence of stress tests

The Irish Independent carried an article on how an Irish bank is adopting its lending to regulatory stress tests.  It is making smaller loans so it can be assured that the loans will pass the stress tests.

While this might be prudent from the perspective of the individual bank, it works against policymakers efforts to make adequate credit available to support areas of the real economy like real estate.
STATE-owned AIB insisted it is being prudent after it emerged yesterday that it has reduced by around 10pc the amount of money it will lend to first-time buyers for mortgages. 
The bank has changed its lending criteria, which means it will now offer new buyers less than it had been up to now, the Irish Independent has learned. 
The move comes in spite of the State pumping €20bn into the bank to rescue it....
Now the lender has changed its rules and will only approve mortgages for those who can cope with interest rates going as high as 6pc. This "stress test rate" was as low as 5pc earlier this month.

The move has the effect of lowering the amount of money home buyers are now approved for by AIB. 
Broker Karl Deeter, of Irish Mortgage Brokers, said that a couple with two incomes of €35,000 each, taking out a 30-year mortgage, would have been approved for €348,000 under the old rules. 
But the new stress-test rules mean that the couple would now be approved for €36,000 less, or €312,000 in total. 
The same couple would end up with more from other lenders....
A spokeswoman for AIB said the rule change was introduced to ensure all lending by the bank was prudent. 
It was required to stress test borrowers to see if they could cope with lending rates of at least 2pc above current rates, she said. 

Issues delaying Greek bank recapitalization plan easily solved under Swedish model

A Wall Street Journal article highlights the key issues that must be resolved before a plan to recapitalize the Greek banking system can be put in place.

These issues are easily handled under the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Confirming yet another advantage of the Swedish model over the Japanese model.

"The issue of the bank recap is moving slowly. The trick with the plan is to incentivize private investors," one senior government said. "We have to design the right incentive structure…I expect a decision to come after the elections."...
Under the Swedish model, the government does not invest in bank capital securities.  This includes contingent convertible bonds, preferred shares or common stock.

The government does not invest because the investment is not needed.  Banks are fully capable of retaining future earnings and paying banker bonuses in newly issued shares until such time as bank book capital levels have been rebuilt.

Private investors like this solution as it does not dilute their ownership or set up a situation where the government is involved in lending or operating decisions.  Even though the earnings are retained while the level of bank book capital is being rebuilt, their shares are not valueless.  There are plenty of example of non-dividend paying firms with stock that trades based on a discounted cash flow analysis.

By comparison, under the Japanese model, governments invest in bank capital securities to protect the level of capital at the bank.  This raises the issues of dilution and interference.
Last month, Greece completed much of a planned €206 billion ($270.4 billion) debt restructuring .... According to estimates, Greece's banks are facing a combined €40 billion in losses—equal to a fifth of the country's gross domestic product—from the debt restructuring as well as rising nonperforming loans. 
To restore their solvency, the four biggest lenders—National Bank of Greece SA, EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA, Alpha Bank AS and Piraeus Bank SA—will have fresh capital needs of €10 billion to €15 billion combined....
But with a combined market value of just under €3.3 billion, the lion's share of that capital will come from the Greek government, not from private investors....
Only under the Japanese model of protecting bank book capital levels today does the capital have to come from the Greek government.

Under the Swedish model, bank book capital levels can be rebuilt over time and effectively 100% of the capital would come from private investors.

The history of banks shows that modern banks do not need to rebuild their book capital levels today.

The largest banks in the US operated for years with negative book capital level if their loans to less developed countries were marked to market and continued to make loans.  The US Savings & Loans operated for years with negative book capital levels and continued to make loans.
According to the terms of Greece's latest bailout, the banks will have until September to raise the capital they need, as well as detail other plans to boost their capital, such as asset sales, cost-cutting or restructuring their loan books.
While these terms make sense to adherents to the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency crisis, they make no sense under the Swedish model or reality.

Consistent with the regulator induced credit crunch that has gripped the EU since the announcement of the 9% Tier I capital ratio target, these terms are also biased towards inducing a credit crunch.  The terms are concerned with a meaningless level of bank capital and not supporting economic growth in the real economy.

Under the Swedish model, the focus is shifted from bank book capital levels to continuing to make loans to support the real economy and cleaning up the bad assets.
But the key issue is how to reduce government meddling in the banks that the state will majority own—and what to do with those state-controlled shares in the future.... 
The solution is to adopt the Swedish model and don't have the government invest in the first place.
To minimize state control, Greece's troika of international inspectors—from the European Commission, the ECB and the IMF—have insisted that the banks remain under private management and have given the government between two and five years to unload their shares in the banks. 
If the holding period is only two to five years, why bother with the government making an investment at all?

Given Greece's limited access to the sovereign debt market, wouldn't the proceeds be better spent on stimulating the Greek economy?

Doesn't it make more sense to adopt the Swedish model and require the banks to provide ultra transparency?

By requiring the banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can assess the risk of each bank and see that it is addressing all of its bad assets.  This restores confidence in the Greek banking system without any investment from the government.

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

Greece working on how to save its banks

A Bloomberg article described the on-going efforts by Greece to use its scarce financial resources to 'save' its banks with a bailout.

Regular readers know that using government resources to 'save' the banks in a modern banking system via a bailout is unnecessary.  By design, these banks can operate with negative book capital levels.  As a result, these banks have access to unlimited funding through retention of future earnings that can be used to rebuild their book capital level.


As Greeks prepare for an election that’s unlikely to produce a clear winner, interim Prime Minister Lucas Papademos is struggling to complete his final major task: stopping banks from falling into state hands.
The government approved a law last week setting the framework for the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, the state’s recapitalization fund. It included the authorization to give banks capital upfront and a possible plan to enable them to book smaller losses on the bonds issued in last month’s debt swap. 
“The state will do what they can to keep the banks operating as living entities and avoid nationalizations where possible,” said Alex Tsirigotis, an analyst at Mediobanca SpA (MB) in London. “Functioning banks will be important to support any domestic economic revival.”...
Keeping the banks functioning and operating as living entities requires that three conditions are satisfied.

First, that the banks' deposits are implicitly or explicitly guaranteed in a credible manner.  With the Greek sovereign teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, it is not a credible guarantor.  It needs to be backstopped by the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM).

Second, that ECB continues to be willing to lend against good collateral.  This prevents any risk of a bank collapsing because of a run on its funding.

Third, that the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can independently assess the risk of the banks and exert discipline to prevent the banks from increasing their risk profile in order to gamble on redemption.
“Many issues can’t wait until after the elections to be addressed,” Papademos told his cabinet on April 11 when he announced the date of the vote. “We have to specify the conditions for the bank recapitalization, which is essential for enhancing the economy’s liquidity.” 
The IMF, which is helping finance Greece’s second rescue package, estimates the debt restructuring will mean impairments of about 22 billion euros for the country’s banks. That compares with the industry’s tier 1 capital, a key measure of a bank’s strength, of 23.8 billion euros as of September. In addition, banks had non-performing loans equal to 14.7 percent of total lending at the end of September, the IMF said. 
“Bank solvency has become an acute problem” in Greece, the IMF said in a report released March 16. “Regulatory capital will be wiped out for four banks representing 44 percent of system assets, while the remaining banks would end up significantly undercapitalized.”
Actually, bank solvency is not an acute problem.  Bank solvency varies over time.  A bank can be insolvent (the book value of its liabilities exceeds the market value of its assets) and continue to operate.

It is bank funding liquidity that is a potentially acute problem.  A lack of access to funds is what ends bank operation, not a lack of capital.

The presence of the three conditions discussed above (deposit guarantee, central bank liquidity, ultra disclosure) keeps the liquidity problem from becoming acute.
The IMF, EU and European Central Bank, the troika of agencies overseeing the Greek financing, plan to help capitalize banks with incentives for private investors. The goal is to bring core tier 1 capital to 9 percent of assets by the end of September....
Inspectors from the so-called troika have to sign off on the recapitalization plans before they can be implemented. 
Greece is due to receive a 25 billion-euro first tranche of funds from the European Financial Stability Facility for the recapitalization, half of the total public funds earmarked.... 
The plan includes incentives for private investment in the banks such as rights for shareholders to purchase the government’s stake and safeguards for buyers of convertible bonds, according to the IMF report. 
The Greek stability fund will continue to have voting rights in the event of strategic decisions related to the banks to avert the risk of asset stripping by investment funds, it said. 
Outstanding issues include the price at which the state and private investors will buy the shares and the mix of equity and contingent convertible bonds, known as CoCos, according to a note this week from HSBC Pantelakis Securities SA. 
Failure to persuade private investors to shore up the banks will mean they will be controlled by the Greek state, which sparked the sovereign debt crisis when the government of then- Prime Minister George Papandreou revealed that the country’s deficit was twice what was previously disclosed.
Without ultra transparency, why would any private investor invest in the Greek banks when they cannot independently assess the risk of the banks?

Clearly, the private investors are looking for the Greek government to 'guarantee' their investment -- the Greek government will take the risk of loss and the private investors will pocket most of the gains.
Pumping funds into the banks may become a campaign issue as parties vie to win votes from an electorate that partly blames banks for tax increases and also for spending cuts the nation is having to endure to keep Greece in the euro.
Pumping funds into the banks should be a huge campaign issue given that the banks do not need the funds today and can retain future earnings to rebuild their book capital.

Given this basic fact about modern banks, voters have to wonder why politicians are keen on giving private investors and current bank shareholders a deal.

Experts wrong in saying 'not if, but when' for Spanish bank bailout

If Spain adopts the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis, the experts are wrong when they say it is 'not if, but when' for Spain asking for a bailout for its banks.

Regular readers know that under the Swedish model, banks absorb all the losses hiding on and off their balance sheets today -- and provide ultra transparency to prove the fact.  Then, banks rebuild their book capital levels through retained earnings and banker bonuses in the form of newly issued equity.

By adopting the Swedish model, the Spanish government is explicitly recognizing that its resources are limited and better utilized elsewhere.  It is also explicitly recognizing the banking system has access to unlimited resources to fill the hole left by the bad assets.

Why does the banking system have access to unlimited resources to rebuild bank book capital levels?

Because the banks do not have to rebuild their capital today.  They can retain earnings for the next several years (decades?) until such time as they have rebuilt their book capital level.

In a modern banking system, by design, banks can absorb the losses today and rebuild their capital over time.  Remember, banks can continue to operate and support the real economy so long as their deposits are guaranteed and the central bank is willing to provide them with access to liquidity (it is the run on funding that forces financial firms to close ... they can remain open while insolvent if the regulators allow it).

According to a Reuter's article,
Economic experts watching Spain don't know how much money will be needed or precisely when, but some are near certain that Madrid will eventually seek a multi-billion euro bailout for its banks, and perhaps even for the state itself.
Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy has repeatedly said Spain doesn't need or want an international bailout, and the European Union, which along with the IMF has already rescued Greece, Ireland and Portugal, also dismisses such talk.
Does Mr. Rajoy understand that a bailout is not necessary under the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis?
But economists believe that Spanish banks will have to turn to the euro zone's rescue fund, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), for help in covering losses caused by a property market crash which has yet to end....
Actually, Spain would be better off turning to the EFSF and its successor, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) as a backstop to its deposit guarantees.
"They're going to need EFSF money to recapitalize the banking sector," said Carsten Brzeski, a senior economist at ING in Brussels. "I think we'll only see a real end to the Spanish misery if the real estate market stabilizes."...
Let the banks recapitalize the banking sector through retention of future earnings.

Meanwhile, by adopting the Swedish model, force the banks to recognize their losses.  By requiring ultra transparency where banks disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can confirm this.

By disclosing the losses, the real estate market can adjust and stabilize.
One of the critical "unknowables' for Spain is just how bad a situation its banks are in.
There is absolutely no reason that just how bad a situation Spain's banks are in should not be known.

It could be easily determined by the market if the banks were required to provide ultra transparency.
The Spanish housing market, once a driver of the economy, has been in turmoil for more than four years, but prices still haven't fallen as much as economists think is needed to squeeze the air out of the bubble.
Only when prices have bottomed will assessors be able to calculate how just much bad mortgage debt is sitting on the banks' balance sheets, and therefore how much extra capital the sector requires to return it to health. 
"Prices have dropped by about 15-20 percent from peak to now and they will probably have to drop another 15-20 percent before they reach bottom," said Brzeski. He estimates Spanish banks may need as much as 80 billion euros of extra capital once all bad mortgage debt is accounted for....

As a result, economists expect Spain's banking sector will have no choice but to recapitalize.
Where is the capital going to come from?
The government is unlikely to fund such an operation while it is trying to slash the budget deficit, and private investors are reluctant to invest in such a troubled sector. 
That leaves the European Financial Stability Facility as the most likely option for the banks - and possibly also for the government eventually.
It also leaves future bank earnings.  Better to use the future bank earnings which are unlimited.