Thursday, September 27, 2012

Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee embraces transparency

As reported by the Telegraph, the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee is recommending that
To give investors the confidence to put their money in the banks, lenders need to be more honest about the scale of bad debts they are carrying, the FPC said. 
“The task of attracting fresh external capital [could be] facilitated if steps were taken to reduce uncertainty about valuations of on-balance sheet assets,”
Please re-read the highlighted text as the FPC has effectively called for banks to provide ultra transparency as your humble blogger has been advocating and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this level of granular information that uncertainty about valuations is reduced and investor confidence is restored.

Uncertainty is reduced because market participants can independently confirm the valuations.

Europe's betrayal of Spain sets stage for adoption of Swedish model to end financial crisis

As Ambrose Evans-Pritchard so eloquently says it in his Telegraph blog, Europe has betrayed Spain.

Spain’s premier Mariano Rajoy has been betrayed. Nobody should be entirely surprised if he and the Spanish arch-nationalists in his circle offer a condign riposte, and bring down the entire temple on the heads of the creditor powers. 
He bit the bullet and agreed to the highly intrusive terms of a €100bn eurozone rescue for the Spanish banking system on a specific understanding: that the ESM bail-out fund would ultimately take over the burden by recapitalising Spain’s banks directly. 
This deal has been breached. Can we believe anything that the Chancellor of Germany, the prime minister of Holland, and the prime minister of Finland say from now on? The EMU rescue edifice is built on sand.
So the question now is how will Spain respond.

Regular readers know that, just like Iceland, Spain's only choice is to adopt the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

The adoption of the Swedish Model preserves the real economy in Spain and sets the stage for a recovery.

Like Iceland, Spain needs to require its banks to absorb losses today that are the equivalent of what they would absorb if the banks go through the long drawn out process of default, bankruptcy and foreclosure.

This protects the real economy and reduces the debt in the financial system to a level that the borrowers can afford.

To insure that the banks recognize all of their losses, Spain also needs to require its banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can determine which banks are capable of generating earnings and rebuilding their book capital levels and which banks need to be closed.

Bank of England's Robert Jenkins takes on the Blob

In a forward to an interesting book, The Making of Good Financial Regulation, the Bank of England Financial Policy Committee member Robert Jenkins takes on the Blob (aka, politicians, the regulators, Wall Street and its lobbyists).

Specifically, he looks at the problem of regulatory capture by the financial industry.
Driven by hubris, greed and stupidity bankers led the charge off the cliff. But where were the regulators? Why did they not see it coming? Why did they not prevent it? Why did they trust bankers to know what was best for banking?  In short, how could regulators have been so dumb as to believe that bankers were so smart? ....
Excellent questions.
Industry influence operates at all levels of the rule making ranks – from the peak of politics to the substrata of supervision.
This was first confirmed by the Nyberg Report on the Irish Banking Crisis.

The report concluded that industry influence at the peak of politics undermined and would always undermine the regulatory process.  When everything appears to be going well, no politician wants to hear from a regulator that a potential problem is brewing.

The report also conclude that industry influence with the regulator at the substrata of supervision undermined the supervisory process.  Even if the examiners uncover problems at a bank, they have to convince politically appointed superiors who talk to the banks that they are right.

Regular readers know that the only way around this industry influence is to require banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis all of their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can independently assess each bank and not rely on the regulators.

With this assessment, market participants can exert discipline on the banks and not rely on the regulators.
It need not be unhealthy. Indeed, interaction between regulators and the regulated is natural and normal. Yes, industry seeks to shape the rules under which it will operate. But rule-makers need industry input in order to craft sensible policy. Some degree of influence is therefore inevitable.
Based on the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane's argument for simplicity, there should be a lot less rule making.

One of the benefits of requiring ultra transparency is that it limits both the number of and complexity of rules needed to shape industry behavior and restrain risk taking.
Unfortunately, there are times and industries where special interest groups are able to bring disproportionate influence to bear – a condition called “regulatory capture.” The financial sector is one such industry and the run-up to the crisis one such time. The obvious question which arises: is such influence still excessive and thus unduly shaping the needed regulatory response? 
My first encounter with “capture” came at a moment of meltdown in 2008. At the time I chaired both a London-based investment firm and the trade association representing the UK investment industry. 
As financial panic spread I watched in disbelief as bankers trooped through the doors of Downing Street to advise Government on how best to address a problem which bankers themselves had largely created. 
Far from being discredited, the guidance of these “experts” was eagerly sought – and with virtually no counterbalancing input from other stakeholder groups. ... But at that key moment in time - capture was complete.
“Political capture” can be fueled by campaign contributions but in the case above, it resulted from the pervasive beliefs of the day. 
The theology of the time maintained that: markets were efficient and would provide the necessary discipline to participants; the financial sector could be left largely to police itself; global banking and their host centers were engaged in fierce global competition; regulation should facilitate that competition and not get in its way; and therefore, when it came to regulation, less was more. 
This set of beliefs permeated the body politic, shaped the regulatory approach of “light touch” and, believe it or not, established a mindset amongst some supervisors that the regulated banks were to be seen as “clients.” The technical term here is “cognitive or intellectual” capture. The non-technical term is brainwashed.
Please re-read the highlighted text as I shared Mr. Jenkins' disbelief when watching the bankers who created the mess advising governments on how they should respond.

My disbelief has only grown over time as I have watched a parade of economists who did not predict the financial crisis offering their advice to governments on how they should respond.

It is not surprising that neither the bankers or the economists have managed to end the financial crisis.  Nor is it surprising that
Four years on, one might imagine that bankers’ ability to bewitch and bamboozle would have ebbed. Alas not. 
Their formidable lobby has led and continues to lead an effective campaign to persuade pundits, public and politicians that calls for higher capital requirements are impeding the economic recovery. It is an argument framed so as to force the gullible and well intentioned to choose between public safety and economic growth. It is a false argument and a false choice....
Their formidable lobby has done a lot more than that.  For example, it wrote the bulk of the Dodd-Frank Act with the exception of the Volcker Rule and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.
The objective of the author, as indeed that of its sponsoring publisher, is the making of better regulation. What therefore, could be more timely than an analysis of a key impediment to effective rule making and supervision?... 
The recommendations in this volume are presented as actionable “low hanging fruit” – which they are, provided excessive industry influence does not prevent their adoption. 
As Duke Law School Professor Lawrence Baxter observed on page 37
Various tools and techniques exist or have been proposed for promoting a proper balance [between banking and regulators]. Sunlight through transparency – that Brandeisian ‘best of disinfectants’- remains as sound as ever. 
Bankers resist transparency for various reasons.  They are practised in strictly protecting client confidentiality and they do not want to share information that might be useful to competitors. Together with central bankers they also fear that disclosure would reveal financial institution dependence on liquidity supports, and that this knowledge would be misunderstood by the markets and lead to runs on institutions and perhaps even to general financial instability. 
These arguments against transparency are dubious.  
Mythological actually.
The first – protecting client confidentiality – is usually not endangered when detailed but anonymized bank information is disclosed, and if a client position is so large that it would be recognized this information is usually known to the market anyway. 
The second – protecting information from competitors – is no more important than in any other industry,so it is unclear why banks should enjoy a special privilege in this regard. 
And the third – protecting the market from misunderstanding the liquidity needs of banks – seems really to have ended up protecting the central bank and financial institutions from political and shareholder accountability more than preserving financial stability. 
Please re-read the highlighted counters to the arguments against transparency.
For example, the Fed fought tooth and nail to resist Freedom of Information Act demands by two news media for disclosures relating to its emergency lending during and soon after the Crisis. 
When disclosure was finally forced, the information proved very embarrassing for both domestic and foreign financial institutions and the Fed itself.   
Had the Fed’s actions been known during the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, different policy choices might well have been made, both regarding the support powers of the Fed and the permissible scale and operations of financial institutions.
Professor Baxter shows just how low hanging the fruit of transparency is and how the influence of the Blob prevents its being adopted.

Bank of England's Robert Jenkins: A debate framed by fallacies

In a must read speech, Bank of England Financial Policy Committee member Robert Jenkins looks at how the financial industry framed the debate on regulation after the financial crisis on three myths.

Specifically, the myths were

we must choose between safety and growth. The banking lobby would have us believe that higher capital requirements and lower leverage will damage economic growth and retard the recovery. “Increase our capital requirements and we will reduce our lending!”... 
To the exposure of myth number one, bankers retort: “How dumb can you be?” “Equity is expensive. Make us double our equity and you will lower our Return on Equity, damage shareholder value and discourage the supply of bank capital.” Here we have myth number two.... 
The third myth follows from the second – to wit: governments must choose between domestic financial stability and the competitiveness of their domestic financial centers. Clearly, if you believe that higher capital requirements damage bank profitability and shareholder returns then you must also fear for the competitiveness of your domestic banking champions, the attractiveness of your country as a global finanz platz and the tax take for your treasury. 
Let me go on record as saying that I agree with Mr. Jenkins that each of these is a myth.

However, the first two of these myths obscure a more important myth.  The myth that the level of the accounting construct known as the bank capital is important in a modern banking system.

Regular readers know that in a modern banking system, banks are designed to protect the real economy by absorbing the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and still continue operating.  They can continue operating because of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, taxpayers become the silent 'equity' partner for any bank with low or negative book capital levels as a result of absorbing the losses.  With taxpayers as a silent 'equity' partner, there is no reason to bail out a bank that is capable of generating earnings and rebuilding its book capital.  As for the banks that cannot generate earnings, they need to be closed.

All three of Mr. Jenkins myths obscure a second important myth.  The myth that the level of the accounting construct known as bank capital is synonymous with financial stability.

Regular readers know that financial stability is a function of transparency.

Financial systems that are characterized by complex regulations and regulatory oversight as a substitute for transparency are prone to crash.  Our ongoing financial crisis demonstrates this on a daily basis.

Financial systems that are characterized by transparency are not only stable, but have a competitive advantage.  How many times have you heard that investors are drawn to the US financial markets because they are the most transparent?

Regular readers know that I have advocated bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

For banks, this means requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

For structured finance securities, this means that all activities like a payment or default involving the underlying collateral are reported on an observable event basis before the next business day to all market participants.

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

Germany, Netherlands and Finland seek to limit use of European Stability Mechanism funds for bank bailouts

In what might prove to be the defining moment in the adoption of the Swedish model to address the ongoing EU bank solvency led financial crisis, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland announced that they would like to limit the use of funds from the European Stability Mechanism for bank bailouts.

By limiting the use of funds for bank bailouts, they are forcing policymakers in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy to use their modern banking systems as they are designed.

Specifically, they are forcing these policymakers to follow the example set by Iceland and requiring the banks to recognize today all of the losses on the excess debt in the financial system that the banks would otherwise recognize by going through the long process of default, bankruptcy and foreclosure.

Having recognized the losses, those banks that can generate earnings to rebuild their book capital levels will do so.  Those banks that cannot generate earnings will be resolved.

Naturally as part of the resolution process, depositors will be protected and bank debt holders will absorb losses to the extent they exceed the capital in the bank.

Spain’s government bonds fell, with 10-year yields rising the most in almost eight weeks, after top- rated European countries said national authorities should bear the cost of earlier losses in their banking industry. 
Italian and Irish securities also declined as Germany, the Netherlands and Finland said late yesterday the region’s bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, should assume only a limited burden in bank recapitalizations.... 
“There’s an ongoing drip feed of negative news,” said Richard McGuire, a fixed-income strategist at Rabobank International in London. The ESM announcement “appears to cast some doubt as to whether Spain will be able to disburden itself of the liabilities it will assume via its banking bailout.”...
Of course, under the Swedish Model, there will not be a banking bailout.
Bank recapitalization “should take place based on an approach that adheres to the basic order of first using private capital, then national public capital and only as a last resort the ESM,” Finance Ministers Wolfgang Schaeuble, Jan Kees de Jager and Jutta Urpilainen said in a statement distributed by the Finnish Finance Ministry. That may rule out the bailout fund from being used to deal with the 100 billion euros in aid Spain sought for its banks in June....
This statement implies that Germany, the Netherlands and Finland want Spain to bailout its banks.

Why?

Because when it comes to resolution of the banks under the Swedish Model, banks in Germany, the Netherlands and Finland are going to recognize losses.

However, this is not a problem that Greece, Portugal, Spain or Italy should worry about.  Those banks are responsible for not having more exposure than they can afford to lose.  If they exceeded this exposure level, then it is up to the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland to step up and apply the Swedish Model to these banks.
The statement by the German, Dutch and Finnish Finance Ministers “will come as a disappointment to the Irish government, who have been hoping for a significant element of ‘relief’ to their overall debt sustainability,” said Owen Callan, an analyst at Danske Bank A/S (DANSKE) in Dublin. 

RBS traders boasted of Libor 'cartel'

The Telegraph picked up where Bloomberg's report on the involvement of RBS managers in rigging Libor left off.  The Telegraph discussed not only how pervasive manipulating Libor was, but how much money there was to be made from the manipulation.

Regular readers know that opacity in setting the Libor rates allowed bankers to engage in bad behavior.  What is now coming out is how pervasive this bad behavior was.

Since there are $300+ trillion of securities tied to Libor, it cannot simply go away.  Instead, a solution is needed that not only prevents future manipulation, but cleans up the culture of the banks that would allow manipulation to occur in the first place.

Your humble blogger has stated repeatedly that the only solution that does this is requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Only ultra transparency uses the bright light of sunshine to disinfect both the Libor rate setting mechanism and the banks that are involved in providing the actual transaction data on which Libor should be based.

The Telegraph's article on the behavior of the Libor 'cartel' highlights why nothing less than ultra transparency is an appropriate response by the financial regulators.

Senior traders working for RBS’s investment banking arm openly discussed fixing the world’s key borrowing rate in the months running up to the bank's collapse, according to legal documents cited by Bloomberg. 
In one exchange in April 2008, Neil Danziger, a former London-based trader at RBS, messaged Tan Chi Min, a Singapore-based trader for the bank, saying “Our six-month fixing moved the entire fixing, hahahah”.... 
The court documents purport to show that even as late as August 2008, less than six weeks before RBS collapsed, some of the bank's traders were attempting to manipulate borrowing rates to make money. 
The revelations in the legal documents obtained by Bloomberg, show that the actions of the traders could have cost British savers millions and potentially even billions of pounds in lost interest on their deposits. 
The cost of providing ultra transparency is less what the British savers lost in interest on their deposits.
In one instant message dated August 21 2007, Jezri Mohideen, RBS’s former head of yen products in Singapore, asked Mr Danziger, who was sacked along with three other colleagues last year, “What’s the call on Libor”. Mr Danziger replied, “Where would you like it, Libor that is.” 
Another trader unnamed trader replied: “Mixed feelings, but mostly I’d like it all lower so the world starts to make sense.” 
“The whole HF [hedge fund] world will be kissing you instead of calling me if Libor move lower,” said Tan. 
The Singapore court filings are part of a wrongful dismissal claim being brought by Mr Tan against RBS. Mr Tan has alleged that senior staff at RBS where aware of Libor fixing and condoned it. 
“It’s just amazing how Libor fixing can make you that much money or lose if opposite,” wrote Mr Tan in a message to traders at other banks dated August 19 2007. “It’s a cartel now in London.”
So if depositors lost from the manipulation of Libor, who won?

Why the banks!

Given how much the banks 'earned' from manipulating Libor, a fine similar to what Barclays paid is simply not going to change the culture of the banks or behavior.

This fact simply reinforces the need for the financial regulators to require ultra transparency not just for the bank on the Libor panels, but across the entire industry.

Libor reform should not be a 'tricky balancing act'

Only in a world where complicated regulations and regulatory supervision are routinely substituted for transparency is reforming Libor by basing it on actual transaction viewed as a 'tricky balancing act'.

The Telegraph ran an article suggesting that substituting transparency for either the current opaque, manipulated manner in which Libor is set or the combination of complicated regulation and regulatory supervision could disrupt the market.

Under the FDR Framework, governments and their regulators are given the responsibility for ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information they need in an appropriate, timely manner so they can make a fully informed investment decision.

Given this responsibility, the only thing that the regulators need to do to reform Libor is to require that the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, the interbank lending market unfreezes and remains unfrozen as banks with deposits to lend can assess the risk on a continuous basis of banks looking to borrow.

With this information, market participants can calculate Libor rates using all or some subset of the actual transactions.  As a result, Libor truly reflects what it costs banks to borrow money.

With this information, market participants can chose if and how they want to handle setting a Libor rate for maturities which have few transactions.
Derivatives, banking and asset management industry sources say the UK's financial watchdog has a tricky balancing act to win back confidence in the London Interbank Offered Rate, that was rigged by Barclays and other banks. 
Martin Wheatley, the Financial Services Authority's managing director who has warned banks to clean up their act, faces global calls for speedy reform of the Libor rate as well as pressure from cautious users who are resisting radical change. 
Mr Wheatley is expected to recommend on Friday the use of actual market trades rather than quotes to compile Libor and to formally end the role of the British Bankers' Association (BBA) in overseeing it in favour of more formal regulation....
Hopefully this is done using a formal regulation that requires banks on the Libor panels to provide ultra transparency.
His biggest challenge will be how fast and far to change Libor's composition by including actual market transactions....
Gary Gensler, chairman of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), which fined Barclays in June, is pressing for swift changes, saying Libor should simply be based on actual market transactions. 
"If benchmark rates don't have transactions to rely on, the credibility and reliability of the benchmark is limited," Gensler told the European Parliament on Monday.
So the solution to the challenge is to include actual market transactions as quickly as possible.
Users of Libor fear market disruption. 
"It's critical that we restore market confidence in Libor by evolution rather than revolution. We don't believe a single alternative benchmark can replace Libor," said Joanna Cound, European head of government affairs at BlackRock, the world's biggest asset manager.
There is nothing revolutionary about basing Libor off of actual market transactions.  Libor was originally intended to reflect the actual price at which banks could borrow.
Supervision is another sensitive area as Mr Wheatley will scrap the BBA's sole oversight role for Libor so that it is directly supervised by regulators. What is unclear is which supervisor will end up with this role....
Mr Wheatley has warned that while regulators can impose conditions on how benchmarks are put together, they cannot force markets to use them.
Mr. Wheatley's comment that regulators can impose conditions on how benchmarks are put together, but cannot force markets to use them supports my observation that regulators should not directly supervise Libor.  Their focus should be on requiring ultra transparency.

With ultra transparency, market participants can determine who they want to put the benchmarks together and every market participant can independently confirm the Libor interest rate by reviewing the actual transactions on which it is based.

Tuesday, September 25, 2012

British Bankers' Association to stop overseeing Libor, my firm will take on responsibility if banks provide ultra transparency

According to a Wall Street Journal article, the British Bankers' Association is preparing to give up responsibility for overseeing Libor.

Recognizing the need for an independent third party to oversee Libor, my firm is willing to assume the responsibility if, and only if, the banks that are on the Libor panel provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As I have explained numerous times, ultra transparency is needed for two reasons.

First, it provides banks with deposits to lend the information they need to continually assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.  As a result, the interbank lending market unfreezes and remains unfrozen.

Second, it provides the actual observable transactions that can be used in calculating Libor.  These transactions are audited and can be independently confirmed by market participants.

In my private market solution, I proposed setting up a data warehouse to collect, standardize and disseminate the data the banks disclose under ultra transparency.

The day to day operation of the data warehouse will be performed by a global information technology firm.

My firm will oversee and coordinate the data warehouse so that it provides the most accurate data possible, the easiest access to the data possible and the most easily usable data possible.

All that it takes to get the data warehouse off the ground is for Martin Wheatley to recommend it.  I have some confidence he will do so as any other solution he might recommend is likely to substitute the opacity of complex rules and regulatory supervision for transparency.  Without transparency, there is no reason to trust the solution.
The British Bankers' Association is preparing to give up responsibility for the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, the scandal-plagued benchmark interest rate that the group created 26 years ago. 
The council of the BBA, a private trade association that represents more than 200 banks that do business in the U.K., voted earlier this month to relinquish control of overseeing Libor, according to a person familiar with the matter. 
The council's vote came in anticipation of a top British regulator's expected recommendation later this week that the BBA no longer be in charge of the rate, which serves as the basis for trillions of dollars worth of financial contracts, this person said.

RBS managers said to condone Libor rate manipulation

Bloomberg reports that the manipulation of Libor at RBS was not confined to a handful of individuals, but rather was condoned by management.  In addition, Bloomberg reports that condoning manipulation was embraced by the industry and not just a rogue firm or two.

Based on this report, there can no longer be an excuse for any bank not to be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only when banks are subject to this level of transparency that sunlight can act as a disinfectant and clean up the bad behavior at each of the banks.

Clearly there is a need to change from an industry-wide culture of bad behavior that is supported by opacity to a culture of don't do anything today you wouldn't want on the front page of the paper tomorrow that is supported by a level of transparency that makes appearing on the front page of tomorrow's paper possible.

Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc managers condoned and participated in the manipulation of global interest rates, indicating that wrongdoing extended beyond the four traders the bank has fired. 
In an instant-message conversation in late 2007, Jezri Mohideen, then the bank’s head of yen products in Singapore, instructed colleagues in the U.K. to lower RBS’s submission to the London interbank offered rate that day, according to two people with knowledge of the discussion. No reason was given in the message as to why he wanted a lower figure. The rate-setter agreed, submitting the number Mohideen sought, the people said. 
Mohideen wasn’t alone. RBS traders and their managers routinely sought to influence the firm’s Libor submissions between 2007 and 2010 to profit from derivatives bets, according to employees, regulators and lawyers interviewed by Bloomberg News. 
Traders also communicated with counterparts at other firms to discuss where rates should be set, one person said. 
“This kind of activity was widespread in the industry,” said David Greene, a senior partner at law firm Edwin Coe LLP in London. “A lot of the traders didn’t consider this behavior to be wrong. They took it as the practice of the trade. This is how things operated, and it seemed harmless.”

Nordic banks gain new status as safe haven

Nordic banks are experiencing the halo effect from having adopted the Swedish Model to handle a previous bank solvency led financial crisis.

First, knowing they would not be bailed out, the Nordic banks restrained themselves in the buildup to the current financial crisis.  As a result, the losses at most of the banks were within the bank's capacity to absorb.

Second, since they are viewed as solvent, they have become a safe haven for individuals looking to escape the risk of having deposits in Greece, Portugal, Spain or the EU more generally.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal,

Two decades after a devastating banking crisis, Nordic banks are playing a new role: a safe haven for scared euro-zone depositors and investors....
"It's a totally new situation for us," Torsten Ostensen, Nordea's head of Norwegian private banking, said in an interview. "We have received so many requests [to open accounts] that we have had to introduce completely new routines." 
Winning international clients comes with a new set of tasks, including being able to speak in more languages, applying more scrutiny to depositors to prevent fraud and money laundering, and establishing national identification numbers for foreigners, Mr. Ostensen said. 
Thus far, the trouble has been worth it: The growth in deposits has shrunk Nordic banks' reliance on flighty capital markets as a source of funding, reducing their risks at a time of heightened uncertainty in Europe....
Scandinavian currencies are particularly strong against the euro, making Nordic banks solid candidates for clients wanting to pull cash out of troubled banks in Southern Europe. 
As a result, Norwegian and Swedish bankers are profiting from the continued outflows in Greece and Spain, and the nervous posture many investors are taking toward the common-currency bloc as whole.... 
"Sweden and Norway are like safe islands while the rest of the world is to a large extent drowning in debt," said Constantin Bolz, a currency analyst with UBS Wealth Management in Zurich. His group offers products and advice to customers ranging from private pension savers to ultrahigh-net-worth family offices and institutional funds, and he said many have turned to Scandinavia because they want to diversify away from the dollar and euro. Sweden and Norway are both outside of the euro zone, and Norway isn't even a member of the European Union. 
"Clients were afraid of what would happen if the euro would break apart and the U.S. [Federal Reserve] continues to print vast amount of U.S. dollars," he said....