Sunday, January 27, 2013

Italian bank involved in derivatives scandal seeks outside investor

Reuters reports that the Italian bank involved in the derivatives scandal is looking for an outside investor.

One might ask the question of could someone invest in that bank.  After all, the definition of investing involves being able to complete three steps:

  • Independently assess the risk and value the investment.  To do this, the investor needs access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.
  • Compare the independent valuation to the price being shown by Wall Street.
  • Make a buy, hold or sell decision based on the difference between the independent valuation and the price shown by Wall Street.
In the case of the Italian bank, no investor can complete the first step because the bank does not disclose all of its global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

In fact, it took the bank several days to disclose the existence of $1 billion in losses on three derivative contracts.

Who knows what else is lurking on or off the bank's balance sheet.

This is not to say that someone might not be willing to place a bet on the contents of the 'black box' that is the Italian bank.  This is a gamble and not an investment.

The Italian bank highlights the simple fact that all banks are 'black boxes' and that it is impossible to invest in them.  One might gamble, but that is it.  The only way this will change is when banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
Monte dei Paschi di Siena said on Sunday it was seeking a financial investor as the political storm over a derivatives scandal at the ailing bank intensified ahead of next month's Italian election. 
Italy's third-biggest lender, which needs state loans to stay afloat, this week revealed opaque derivatives trades, conducted between 2006 and 2009, that could cost it some 720 million euros. 
The scandal has turned the spotlight on Monte Paschi's close political ties with the centre left and on possible oversight failings by the Bank of Italy (BOI), then led by current European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi. 
"I would like to have a long-term financial investor," Monte Paschi Chairman Alessandro Profumo told Italian business daily Il Sole 24 Ore on Sunday. "Nationality is not a problem. The important thing is that it believes in our project"....
In fact, placing a bet on the Italian bank is entirely a question of belief as there are no facts available on which to make an informed decision.
Corriere della Sera daily on Sunday published excerpts from the minutes of Monte Paschi meetings in 2011 showing several board members expressing concern about the bank's portfolio, overladen with long-term Italian government bonds. 
"The situation is no longer sustainable, we must take steps to reduce these positions," said former vice chairman Francesco Caltagirone in September 2011 as Italian government bond yields soared during the apex of the euro zone debt crisis.... 
Monte Paschi's new management have said the main loss-making derivatives it uncovered involved Japanese bank Nomura and Deutsche Bank.

Opacity in financial system is boon to study of financial contagion

Bloomberg ran an interesting article on Kristin Forbes and her pursuit of the study of contagion in the financial system even though her MIT economic department colleagues thought it was a dead-end.

Regular readers know that in financial systems that adhere to the FDR Framework, the study of financial contagion is in fact the study of the empty set.

Why?

Because under the FDR Framework, all market participants are held responsible for the losses on their exposures.  As a result, market participants set their exposures at a level where they don't have more exposure than they can afford to lose.

Hence, the idea of contagion doesn't apply.

How can market participants set their exposure at what they can afford to lose?

They are given access to the information they need to independently assess the risk of any exposure.  Based on the results of this assessment and the market participant's capacity to absorb any losses from the exposure, the market participant sets their exposure.

Isn't the global financial system based on the FDR Framework?

Yes.

Then why is there concern over financial contagion?

Because financial regulators failed to ensure that the financial system adhered to the FDR Framework.

Specifically, the financial regulators let large swathes of the financial system become opaque.  Examples of the opaque corners of the financial system include the "black box" banks and the "brown paper bag" structured finance securities.

A financial product or corner of the financial system is opaque if market participants do not have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Beginning in 2007 and continuing to this day, where there is opacity the financial system has effectively frozen.  An example is the inter-bank lending market where banks with deposits to lend cannot assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow and therefore are unwilling to lend.

Bottom line:  bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system would in fact prove her MIT colleagues right that studying financial contagion is a dead-end.


Poll: Will Barclays' new value statement change its culture?

The Guardian ran a poll in which it asked "will Barclays' new value statement change the bank's culture".

72% of the respondents answered No.

This result is not surprising as talk is cheap and, after engaging in a series of unacceptable business practices ranging from mis-selling of insurance to manipulating benchmark interest rates, there is very little trust in what Barclays has to say.

Regular readers know that if Barclays was serious about cleaning up and changing its culture it would voluntarily commit to providing ultra transparence and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Adopting this disclosure allows sunshine to act as the best disinfectant for past, present and future bad banker behavior.

The fact that Barclays doesn't provide ultra transparency is the equivalent of waving a red flag and saying that Barclays has something to hide.

Saturday, January 26, 2013

Is it time to grasp the debt restructuring nettle? Yes!

In his Telegraph column, Philip Aldrick puts the idea of pursuing the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system squarely on the agenda in the UK.

He points out that the UK has pursued the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis for five years and the UK looks like it will match the Japan's experience of a lost decade of economic growth or worse.

The economic stagnation/decline is the direct result of the policies that are pursued as a result of choosing the Japanese Model and protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

These policies place the burden of the excess debt on the real economy.  To service this debt, the real economy has to divert capital that is needed for growth and reinvestment.  The result is at best a Japan-style economic slump.
Vincent Reinhart, Morgan Stanley’s chief economist who was a senior US Federal Reserve official and is the author of seminal papers on post-financial crisis responses, thinks there is an alternative, though. That there is a quicker way back to prosperity. 
Regular readers are familiar with my seminal work on this blog on how to respond to a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Mr. Reinhart confirms that adopting the Swedish Model restores prosperity quicker.  But then, anything is faster that the Japanese Model which as Japan is currently showing, doesn't work.
“A financial crisis is really about an enormous loss of wealth,” he told me at the Word Economic Forum in Davos. “And it’s only when you recognise that loss of wealth that you can set about rebuilding.” 
What he was talking about was writing down private sector debt – that of over-borrowed households, companies and banks.
According to the Bank of England, there may be as much as £60bn of unrecognised losses in the UK. 
Writing down that amount of debt would normally lead to an awful lot of pain – with some families losing their homes and jobs lost as companies go bust. But if the debts aren’t written down, the rest suffer too.
“If you buffer the people who made bad decisions from their wealth loss, then the people who didn’t make bad decisions suffer a wealth loss too,” Mr Reinhart said. 
That manifests itself in a long period of slow growth and - worst of all - youth unemployment.
Effectively, the innocent victims of the recession end up being the ones that also pay for it.
Confirmation that pursuing the Japanese Model makes the situation worse.  At the beginning of the financial crisis this was referred to as socializing the losses.

The politicians and bankers structured the socialization of the losses so well that the bankers didn't even suffer a significant interruption in their stream of bonus payments.
A little bit of honesty here from the political classes would go a long way, Mr Reinhart reckons. 
In the wake of a major financial crisis, he said, the authorities have two options: denial - letting banks, companies and households pretend they can service their debts and sparing them short-term pain. 
Or forcing writedowns upfront. Individuals would suffer and unemployment would almost inevitably rise, but the country would get over the hump quicker. 
“How long would those laid off be out of a job, though,” Mr Reinhart said optimistically.
As shown by Iceland, the recovery is very quick when the Swedish Model is adopted and banks are forced to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.
Effectively, his second option prescription is classic economic “creative destruction”. 
Mr Reinhart is not some misguided hairshirt ideologue, though. He has studied in detail the 15 biggest financial crises since the Second World War, and worked on the issue with the world’s foremost authorities – his wife Carmen and Harvard economist Ken Rogoff. 
According to his research, the “more successful economies were the ones where you recognise losses, take writedowns and get over it early”. 
“The incomplete recognition of losses means a prolonged period of below par growth.  
You never really grow your way out of a debt problem, you limp out. If that’s the case, you have to do QE1, QE2, QE infinity,” he said. 
Not clear that you can ever grow your way out of a debt problem except in an economics paper.

Mr. Reinhart's observation also confirms the prediction that your humble blogger made at the beginning of the financial crisis that the global economy would remain in a downward spiral (despite brief respites when aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus is pursued) until such time as transparency was brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

When transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system, it drives the adoption of the Swedish Model.  Why?  Because market discipline forces the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Of course, this prediction and recommendation about how to handle a bank solvency led financial crisis occurred before Professors Rogoff and Reinhart started talking about financial crises and "This Time Its Different".  Their message was that regardless of what was done, it takes years to recover from a financial crisis.

This was precisely the message that the bankers wanted to hear and they repeated it constantly to the policymakers.  The result was the adoption of the Japanese Model.

Please note, that the work of Professors Rogoff and Reinhart was fundamentally flawed.  It assumes no learning curve in how to deal with bank solvency led financial crises.

In fact there was a significant learning curve.  In the 1870s, Walter Bagehot introduced the concept of a modern central bank.  In the 1930s, the FDR Administration introduced deposit insurance.  The combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank liquidity in fact makes adoption of the Swedish Model possible.

As shown first by the FDR Administration in breaking the back of the Great Depression and later by Sweden, pursuing the Swedish Model works and ends the bank solvency led financial crisis.  Of course, Iceland showed that even with a less than perfect implementation of the Swedish Model an economy can recover quickly from a bank solvency led financial crisis.
QE brings its own problems by distorting market behaviour and perpetuating the problem of “zombie banks, zombie companies, and zombie households”. 
“The attrition can last a really, really long time,” Mr Reinhart said, citing Japan’s two “lost decades”.
Confirmation of all the posts your humble blogger has written about the headwinds generated by zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies exceeding the benefits of pursuing these policies.
So where does that leave the UK? 
First, his argument suggests policymakers are not being entirely honest with the public. Patience is not the only option. Aggressive debt restructuring is another.
Your humble blogger has been pointing out the two options and why aggressive debt restructuring is the preferred choice.
The problem is, as Mr Reinhart pointed out, that the taxpayer would almost certainly have to step in – to recapitalise the banks as they wrote off billions of pounds of bad lending, or to protect households by capping their maximum loss. 
The US stepped into help householders in the 1930s under President Roosevelt, and the idea has been recently endorsed by the International Monetary Fund no less..
This is a classic example of economists not understanding how our financial system is designed.

Yes indeed, the US stepped in to help households in the 1930s.  The FDR Administration did this by creating deposit insurance.

It is the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding that allows banks to operate with low or negative book capital levels.  With deposit insurance, the taxpayers effectively become the banks 'silent equity partners' when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  This allows the banks to both recognize the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to operate and support the real economy.

Since the taxpayers are already the banks' silent equity partners when banks have low or negative book capital levels, there is never a reason to step in and recapitalize the banks.

Instead, the banks with a franchise capable of generating earnings before banker bonuses should retain 100% of their earnings until they have rebuilt their book capital levels.  The banks that do not have a franchise that is capable of generating earnings should be resolved.
According to Mr Reinhart, the instruction for banks to write down their assets would have to come from the financial regulator – in the UK in future, the Bank of England. 
But the decision would need to be made politically....
Mr. Reinhart is right that it is the politicians who have to make the decision to require the banks to recognize their losses.

It is the politicians who have to decide whether they put their country's citizens first or the bankers who fund their elections and retirements first.

To date, every day since the beginning of the financial crisis on August 9, 2007, the politicians have put the bankers ahead of the citizens.
Ideally, this would be when to use quantitative easing. The economy would suffer a brief shock as a result of the hurt households were feeling and as unviable businesses went bust. 
Low rates and cheap money would be the cushion to ease the blow.
It should also be combined with stimulative fiscal policies to be sure that the real economy fully recovers.
Instead, Mr Reinhart reckons, QE is being used because politicians are failing to take the big decisions: “Of the – say - 15 things that need to be done, QE is number 15. It’s just that the other 14 aren’t happening.” 
“I think of it like one of the old service comedies. The commander asks his troops to volunteer for a dangerous but vital mission and they all take a step back except one guy – the hapless hero. That’s the central bank. Because of the failure of politicians to address the real issues, you’re left with the hapless hero trying to do the right thing.” 
There is some evidence the UK is trying to grasp the debt restructuring nettle. 
The Bank of England is currently forcing banks to declare their hidden losses. But, the Treasury has made it crystal clear that the taxpayer will not be forking out a penny more, which will limit the policy’s effectiveness.
As much as £100bn of mortgage debt in the UK is in forbearance, where borrowers are struggling to keep up with their monthly payments even with interest rates at a record low, the Bank has estimated. The writedowns on that may not be huge, but when taken with overvalued commercial property and other hidden losses, it’s easy to get to a figure of £60bn of writedowns, using Bank calculations.
Forcing is too strong a word to describe the request from the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee that banks disclose their hidden losses.

If the UK financial regulators were serious about forcing the declaration of the hidden losses, the financial regulators would enforce existing disclosure laws and require the banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, market discipline would force the banks to recognize the losses on their dud exposures.
If there is a country that needs to address its private and banking sector debts, as well as the public ones, it is the UK. Mr Rogoff told me at Davos that “by and large Britain is having a typical post financial crisis period, exacerbated by the dependence on the financial sector and the eurozone”. 
In other words, we’ll grow anaemically for a decade at least. “Patience” is the authorities’ euphemism for what they used to call “a lost decade”. 
If that’s the choice they have taken, fair enough. But Britons – in particular the younger generation who can not get on the housing ladder and are struggling to find a proper job - deserve at the very least to be told there was another option.
Actually, the elderly who vote need to be told their is another option too.  After all it is their retirements that are being damaged by the pursuit of very low interest rate policies.

Friday, January 25, 2013

Davos: the attempt to market the idea that the financial crisis is over

The pompoms are out and the Davos cheerleaders can be heard chanting:  the financial crisis is over, the financial crisis is over.  There is just one small problem.  The financial crisis isn't over.

If the financial crisis were over, why is the UK economy performing worse than it did during the Great Depression?

If the financial crisis were over, why is youth unemployment in Greece and Spain in excess of 50% and climbing?

If the financial crisis were over, why are central banks around the world pursuing zero interest rate policies and pushing liquidity into the financial system through quantitative easing?

If the financial crisis were over, why are central banks buying up the low risk assets in an attempt to force investors to buy riskier securities?

If the financial crisis were over, why haven't the financial regulators required the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures so that market participants could see they have purge their dud exposures and are keeping their risk down?

If the financial crisis were over, why is Japan, which followed the same policies after its financial crisis, still in an economic slump 2+ decades later and threatening to start a currency war in an attempt to get its economy moving?

If the financial crisis were over, why is there any talk about cutting back on government social programs to reduce the debt as between the natural shrinkage in the economic stabilizer programs and increased tax revenue more should be generated in revenue than is being spent?

Unfortunately, the financial crisis is not over and because of the policies that are currently being pursued there is no end in sight for the financial crisis ever to be over (see Japan's 2+ decades of dealing with its financial crisis).

I know that the 1% that went to Davos would like the financial crisis to be over because there is likely to be a backlash against them and their policies when it becomes apparent that the financial crisis isn't over.  However, that doesn't change the simple facts that the financial crisis hasn't ended.

The chanting the financial crisis is over does effect one group though (from a Bloomberg article):  money managers who are worried about missing a move up in the financial markets.

There is no official declaration, or even a formal survey. But the chatter at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, is about the end of the financial crisis that began in 2008 and dragged on through last summer’s spike in Spanish and Italian government bond yields. 
“There’s a crystallization of thought that the financial crisis is over,” says Scott Minerd, managing partner and chief investment officer of Guggenheim Partners, a Santa Monica (Calif.) firm with about $160 billion under management. 
“I was riding around in a van last night with two guys whose names you’d recognize,” Minerd said. “They were comparing notes and hearing the same thing. The conclusion has sort of gone viral. It’s an interesting social-networking phenomenon.” 
It has real-world consequences, too. “When thought leaders leave an event like this, they take the message with them, and it affects the way they behave.” That is, they’ll buy.
Which will give the 1% a chance to unload their shares.

UK's economic strategy has failed

In a scathing Guardian editorial, Larry Elliott looks at each element of the UK's fiscal and monetary policy and find it unfit for the purpose of getting the UK out of an economic slump that is actually worse than during the Great Depression.

Your humble blogger needs to repeat the point that the economic performance the UK has experienced is actually worse than during the Great Depression.

Why have I repeated this point?

Because how many times have we heard politicians and financial regulators say that their response to the financial crisis that started on August 9, 2007 saved us from a second Great Depression.

The performance of the UK's economy puts to rest the myth that the fiscal and monetary response to the financial crisis saved the UK from a second Great Depression.

I know that a bunch of economists will argue that the UK is not having a second Great Depression because the unemployment rate hasn't reached 25%.  The reason it hasn't reached 25% has to do with the economic stabilizing programs that were put in place by the generation that experienced the Great Depression and has nothing to do with the response to the current financial crisis.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger predicted and explained why the UK's fiscal and monetary policies would be unsuccessful before they were implemented.  I get absolutely zero satisfaction out of having been shown to have been right.

Fortunately, because the UK's economy has performed as I predicted, it strongly suggests that my blueprint for restoring the UK economy to robust health is likely to work.

What is my blueprint?

First, look at Iceland.  What is important to notice about Iceland is that it forced its banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

The starting place for restoring the UK economy is to make the same requirements of UK banks.  I know that the bankers will complain bitterly about this, but their banks are designed to absorb these losses and continue to support the real economy.

Second, understand that austerity is not a policy prescription for restoring growth to an economy.  What is a policy prescription for restoring growth to an economy is to focus spending on items that benefit UK taxpayers like social programs and infrastructure and not on bailing out banks.

Third, understand that monetary policy can contribute to economic headwinds and end those policies like interest rates below 2% and quantitative easing that create these economic headwinds.  Abandoning these policies will actually stimulate demand as savers can spend what they are currently setting aside to offset the lack of earnings on their savings.

Regulators stuck on how to curb banker pay and bonuses

Bloomberg reports that global financial regulators are stuck on how to go about curbing banker pay and bonuses.

Banks are struggling to gauge whether staff are taking excessive risks that should lead to bonus curbs set out in a new wave of international rules, global regulators said. 
Lenders face “practical implementation challenges” including measuring “poor behavior” that merit bonus cuts or clawbacks, the Financial Stability Board said in a report on its website today. Banks also have divergent views “over the legal enforceability of clawbacks,” the FSB said. 
Regulators have sought to rein in banker pay as part of their response to the financial crisis unleashed by the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 
The FSB rules, published in 2009, seek to deter banks from offering bonuses that encourage staff to take excessive risks....
Regular readers know that there is one action that the global financial regulators could and should take that would limit banker pay and bonuses:  require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants could exert discipline that would curb excessive risk taking and other forms of poor behavior, like manipulating benchmark interest rates, that bankers engage in to generate large bonuses.

With this information, the earnings generated by banks would begin to resemble what one would expect of utilities that are there to serve the payment and credit needs of the real economy.

The issue of banker pay is another example where the combination of transparency and market discipline results in a far better outcome for the global financial system than the alternative combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

Regulators begin to think that maybe market should be used to value securities

Bloomberg reports that away from the bank cheerleading at Davos, financial regulators might have suddenly realized that the best way to limit the variation in values banks put on their assets is to require disclosure and let the market value the assets instead.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been calling for regulators to take this step and require banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, the market can value each of the bank's exposures and exert discipline on the banks if the banks' valuation of the exposures for calculation of the riskiness of their assets strays from the market's.

Global regulators may impose restrictions on the way lenders model risk and assign capital after a review of banks’ trading practices found wide differences in their number crunching. 
A probe of banks’ calculation of the riskiness of their assets found “material variation” across the industry, Stefan Ingves, chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, said in a speech in Cape Town. 
Regulators could respond with tougher disclosure rules or “limitations in the modelling choices for banks,” Ingves said in the prepared remarks today. 
“The committee’s work on how banks calculate risk weighted assets also feeds into a broader concern that, in pursuit of risk sensitivity, the Basel III framework has grown too complex.” 

Thursday, January 24, 2013

Deutsche claws back $53 million from trader who manipulated benchmark interest rates

Bloomberg is reporting that Deutsche Bank has clawed back $53 million from a trader it fired for manipulating Euribor (the European version of Libor).

What may be most interesting about this story is that Deutsche Bank claims that there is no link between the manipulation of the benchmark interest rates and the profits made by the trader.
Deutsche Bank AG (DBK)’s Christian Bittar, one of the firm’s best-paid traders, lost about 40 million euros ($53 million) in bonuses after he was fired for trying to rig interest rates, three people with knowledge of the move said. 
The lender dismissed Bittar in December 2011, claiming he colluded with a Barclays Plc (BARC) trader to manipulate rates and boost the value of his trades in 2006 and 2007, said the people, who requested anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak publicly. 
His attempts to rig the euro interbank offered rate and similar efforts by derivatives trader Guillaume Adolph over yen Libor are the focus of the bank’s probe, the people said. Both traders declined to comment for this story. 
“Upon discovering that a limited number of employees acted inappropriately, we sanctioned or dismissed those involved and clawed back all of their unvested compensation,” Deutsche Bank spokesman Michael Golden said in a statement. “To date we have found no link between the inappropriate conduct of a limited number of employees and the profits generated by these trades.”
One might think that a trader who earns a bonus in excess of $50 million would understand how to manipulate a benchmark interest rate to their personal advantage.  One might think that the trader understand which direction to manipulate the interest rate so that it boosts the value of his trades and maximizes his bonus.

Bloomberg provides confirmation of this speculation:
Ex-traders say their firms had no rules governing how Euribor and Libor should be set and that managers were aware that traders, who stood to benefit from where the rate was fixed, were on occasions making submissions to the benchmarks.
Regular readers know that the way to permanently fix and restore confidence in the benchmark interest rates is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This addresses two problems that currently exist with the benchmark interest rates.

First, it addresses the problem that the unsecured interbank lending market is frozen.  It froze at the beginning of the financial crisis and has remained frozen because the banks with deposits to lend do not have access to the information they need to assess the risk and solvency of the banks that are looking to borrow.

With ultra transparency, banks with deposits to lend will always have access to the information they need to assess the risk and solvency of the banks looking to borrow.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the unsecured interbank lending market.

Second, it addresses the problem of benchmark lending rates not being set on actual transactions.  With the unsecured interbank lending market unfrozen, the benchmark lending rates can be based on all or a subset of the transactions in these markets.

The use of actual transactions that market participants can independently confirm restores trust to the benchmark interest rates.

Italian bank derivative scandal highlights need for banks to disclose their exposure details

While the financial industry cheerleaders have gathered at Davos to declare that the financial crisis is over, a derivative scandal involving Italy's oldest bank reminds us that the crisis won't end until the global banking system is fixed and this will not occur until banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As Zero Hedge put it succinctly,
Naturally, the implication is that after 4 years of endless bailouts and "recovery", nobody has any clue still just what is on Europe's bank balance sheets. 
And the further implication is that if [the Italian bank involved in the derivative scandal] was doing it, everyone else was, of course, doing it, and much more dirty laundry is soon set to be uncovered...
As reported by Reuters,

European Central Bank President Mario Draghi is facing criticism over a scandal involving loss-making derivatives trades made by troubled Italian lender Monte dei Paschi di Siena while he was Italy's central bank governor.... 
Former Economy Minister Giulio Tremonti said in a tweet that it was "stupefying" that in his role as supervisor of Italy's banking system Draghi had failed to discover or prevent the trades, which took place between 2006 and 2009....
Current Economy Minister Vittorio Grilli avoided mentioning Draghi directly but stressed that it was not the government but the central bank that was responsible for bank supervision. 
"It wasn't us that did the controlling," he told reporters. "On the checks, all I will say is that it is the responsibility of the Bank of Italy." 
Underlining the gravity of the crisis, Italian President Giorgio Napolitano said Monte Paschi's latest problems were a "serious issue" but that he had "full confidence in the Bank of Italy." 
On Wednesday the central bank tried to deflect any criticism, saying the nature of the trades had been "kept hidden" and were only recently divulged by new management appointed last year to turn the bank around....
Please re-read the highlighted text again as it nicely summarizes why all banks must provide ultra transparency.

Until banks provide ultra transparency, market participants need to assume that the banks are hiding something.  Otherwise, they would disclose everything.
The deals under scrutiny are the so-called "Alexandria" trade with Japanese bank Nomura, the "Santorini" trade with Deutsche Bank and a derivative called "Nota Italia", with an unspecified bank.... 
Analysts fear eventual losses could be higher and have urged Monte Paschi to come clean on any other potential surprises....
Let me repeat that there is no reason to believe the management of Monte Paschi or any other banks when it says it has come clean unless the bank provides ultra transparency.
The effectiveness of the Bank of Italy's supervision is being increasingly questioned, despite the fact the country's lenders complain it is more stringent than other European regulators in its monitoring of the Italian financial industry. 
"One has to wonder what the Bank of Italy was doing given all the visits they've paid to Monte dei Paschi in recent months," said a source close to the situation. 
"If what they came here to look at was only the information publicly available in the bank's financial statements, they could have done that from Rome."
One of the lessons of the financial crisis is that market participants cannot rely on the financial regulators to provide an accurate assessment of the risk of a bank.  Even if the regulators properly assess the risk, they have concerns about the safety and soundness of the financial system that prevent them from communicating how bad the situation might be.

Requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency ends the dependence of market participants on the financial regulators.

There is a significant benefit to doing this.  Market participants become responsible for all gains and losses on their exposures as the have all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess the risk and solvency of each bank and make a fully informed investment decision.

Translation:  no more moral hazard over bailing out investors who relied on the financial regulators' representations about the solvency of a bank in making their investment decision.