Wednesday, May 8, 2013

Health of Spain's banking system in doubt as banks restructure $274 billion in loans

Bloomberg reports that in addition to the $50+ billion of bad debt Spanish banks sold to the taxpayer backed bad bank, Spain's banks restructured an additional $274 billion in non-performing loans.

Naturally, the question is "did this address all the bad debt in the banking system?"

Of course, in the absence of ultra transparency under which the banks disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, there is no way to know.

Spanish banks had 208.2 billion euros ($272.4 billion) of refinanced or restructured loans at the end of last year, a figure that analysts said could translate into further losses. 
Twenty-four percent, or about 51 billion euros, of that relates to mortgages, 36 percent to non-real estate companies and 33 percent to property and construction, the Bank of Spain said in its financial stability report published today. The balance was in loans to households and government. 
An economic slump in its sixth year is generating mounting defaults for Spanish lenders that in some cases refinanced or restructured more loans to avoid booking losses....
So the Spanish lenders have in fact hidden more problems.  The question is how much have they hidden.
“In theory, there’s nothing necessarily wrong with refinancing,” said Daragh Quinn, a banks analyst at Nomura International in Madrid. “What matters is the quality of the refinancing and what is the level of re-default say 12 months down the line.” 
The refinanced or restructured loans amount to about 14 percent of credit in Spain, the regulator said. Of the 208.2 billion euros, 42 percent are classed as normal by the banks, 37 percent as “doubtful” and 21 percent as “substandard,” or having some risk of turning bad. 
“A number like this almost raises more questions than it answers in an economic situation like Spain’s,” said Nick Anderson, an analyst at Berenberg Bank in London. “It’s a big number, and I don’t think it’s going to let people sleep easier at night about the health of the banking system.”... 
Even so, the situation is different than in 2012 because of the loan-loss charges taken by banks and transfers of soured assets to a so-called bad bank, the regulator said.

Willem Buiter: Eurozone crisis demands swift debt restructuring

In his Financial Times column, Willem Buiter, chief economist for Citigroup, observes that the eurozone crisis demands swift private and public debt restructuring.

Why does he think that the debt must be restructured?

Because until the deleveraging process is complete and the financial system is purged of the excess debt, it holds back demand and the potential for economic growth.

Regular readers are familiar with this argument as it is simply a restatement of why the Swedish Model works to end a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to absorb up front their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy as capital that is needed for growth, reinvestment and supporting the social contract is not diverted to making debt service payments on the excess debt.

Modern banks are designed to absorb these excess losses as they have the unique ability to continue to operate and support the real economy even when they have negative book capital levels.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partners while the banks are retaining 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.

Balance sheet obstacles to sustained demand growth mean the European Union faces two or three more years of recession and tepid cyclical recovery, even if EU policy makers enact the right measures as fast as their glacial decision-making process allows. 
The balance sheet recession is caused by excessive leverage: zombie banks throughout the EU, excessive sovereign debt and deficits in the periphery, and excessive household indebtedness in many countries.... 
The deleveraging will not come through growth, as growth will not return until deleveraging is completed. 
It will not come through inflation because the European Central Bank will not inflate. 
The debate between Spendarians and Austerians has little relevance as only Germany is in a position to provide a significant discretionary fiscal stimulus.... 
The main instruments of deleveraging will be debt mutualisation and restructuring.... 
Instead, there will be some limited ex-post mutualisation, as the outstanding debt of troika programme countries to their sovereign creditors is gradually converted into a zero-coupon perpetuity, promising to pay nothing forever. 
There will also be some more mutualisation of sovereign debt and of bank losses when the ECB takes losses on its exposure to likely insolvent sovereigns and to likely insolvent banks that have offered substandard collateral. But this will not suffice to deleverage quickly. 
In line with the agreement reached to manage the Cyprus crisis, the new template for bank resolution bails in the existing shareholders followed by all unsecured creditors, including if necessary the non-insured depositors. Domestic taxpayers are no longer subordinated to senior unsecured bank creditors.
I happen to disagree with the new template for bank resolution bail ins.  The first source of repayment for the losses should be future bank earnings.

Only banks that after recognition of all their losses have interest income greater than interest and operating expenses should be allow to continue in operation.  Other banks should be resolved with depositors protected.
Once the single supervisory mechanism for eurozone banks comes into force, the European Stability Mechanism will be able to directly recapitalise banks. ...
The European Stability Mechanism should not be used to recapitalize banks.  If banks cannot recapitalize themselves through future retained earnings, they should be resolved.

ESM should instead be used to stand behind each EU country's deposit guarantee.
The ECB will soon start a euro-area Asset Quality Review that is likely to be conducted by independent experts, without excessive interference by captured national supervisors. 
By the end of this year, the informational and institutional toolkit to dezombify the euro area banking system could be in place....
The only way to do an asset quality review that the market will believe is to have the banks disclose their exposure details to the market.

The market has the expertise to assess the assets.  The market also has the ability to exert discipline so that the losses each bank is exposed to are realized.

Without transparency, market participants will see a big red flag waving saying that not only did captured national supervisors hide the truth about EU banks, but so too is the ECB.

After all, if the banks are coming clean about all their bad debt then they should have nothing to hide and transparency is a way to demonstrate this fact.
Early resolution is preferable to economically costly and politically unsustainable additional austerity and pointless concessional funding. 
The inherent disruption is minimised through early, co-ordinated and simultaneous debt restructuring of banks, households and sovereigns, of sufficient size to convince markets there will not be an early repeat of the exercise. 
It is not size that convinces the market that there won't be a repeat, but transparency into each bank's exposure details.  With this information, the market can assess what is going on and knows that there won't be a repeat.
Losses would be less than those created by further delay.
As your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis, the losses from not adopting the Swedish Model have been incredibly large and are only continuing to grow as policymakers delay adopting the Swedish Model and ending the financial crisis.
Easy, really.
I have been saying all along how easy this crisis is to end.  It is nice that Mr. Buiter agrees.

Tuesday, May 7, 2013

Before taking on responsibility for supervising EU banks, ECB wants to know if there are losses being hidden by banks

The Telegraph reports that before it takes on responsibility for supervising the EU's banks, the ECB wants to do a review of their on and off-balance sheet exposures to be sure that there are no losses being hidden by the banks.

The frozen interbank unsecured lending market has been the canary in the coal mine signaling that banks are hiding losses and the issue of solvency has not been addressed.  The interbank unsecured lending market acts as the canary because banks with deposits to lend won't lend to banks looking to borrow unless the bank looking to lend can figure out the borrowing bank will repay the loan.

It is astonishing that we could be 5+ years into a bank solvency led financial crisis and the answer to the question of which banks are solvent (market value of assets greater than book value of liabilities) and which are insolvent is still not known.

So why hasn't bank solvency been addressed given that banks are designed to continue operating even when they are insolvent?

The primary reason why is banker cash bonuses.  If each bank had to disclose the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets, there would be no banker cash bonuses for the foreseeable future as all earnings would be retained to rebuild bank book capital levels.

It is also astonishing that by saying that it wants to review each bank's exposures for hidden losses, the ECB is effectively saying the financial regulator run bank solvency stress tests are a total sham.
“The first thing that the ECB will have to do when they take on their supervisory task is to have an asset-quality review of the main banks that will be under their supervision and I think very soon after that all the other banks in Europe as well because there is still the risk of contamination between banks,” Mr Dijsselbloem said. 
“The outcome of that asset quality review we don't know yet, but it might be worrying. It might be worrying for some banks in some countries. We don’t exactly know. What I do know is that when we do have an outcome that is worrying, we need to have the instruments to deal with the problems.”...

Yves Mersch, an ECB executive board member, confirmed that the new supervisor would check bank balance sheets to reveal any concealed dangers in the quality of assets before taking charge. 
“Before we start working, we need to know what is on the balance sheet of these banks,” he said.
Not only the ECB, but every market participants needs to know what is on and off the balance sheet of the EU banks.

As EU heads towards common deposit insurance, it looks at question of how quickly to recapitalize banks

Bloomberg reports that as the EU heads towards common deposit insurance for its banks, it is now looking at the question of how quickly does a bank need to be recapitalized after it recognizes its losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Regular readers know that the answer is banks don't have to be recapitalized immediately, but rather can rebuild their book capital levels over several years by retaining 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

The reason that banks don't need to be recapitalized immediately is the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

To prevent banks from gambling on redemption after they have recognized their losses, banks must be required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants in combination with the bank regulators can exert restraint on risk taking by management.

The myth that banks need to be recapitalized immediately is solely a function of bankers attempting to protect their ongoing bonuses and shirk any responsibility for the losses that they incurred.  After all, a bank that is rebuilding its book capital level is highly unlikely to pay any cash bonuses.

Common deposit guarantees will be necessary to complete the European banking union project, Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem said. 
“That will be the final building block of the banking union, a necessary block,” Dijsselbloem, who heads the group of euro-area finance ministers, said at a conference in Brussels today. 
Precursors include new rules on bank resolution, common standards for national deposit guarantees and a European bank resolution scheme that is due to be proposed in June, he said. 
The euro area needs to press ahead with creating new tools to recapitalize banks, such as rules for when the European Stability Mechanism can provide direct aid, Dijsselbloem said. “We need to have the instruments to deal with the problems, because just exposing problems in banks and not having an answer” for recapitalizing them “would be very dangerous.”...
Actually, the only danger is to banker bonuses.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, everyone knows that the banks have been hiding losses.  The only question is the true size of these losses.

The first step to exposing the problems in the banks is to require them to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current exposure details.

With this information, market participants can determine how large the losses are at each bank.

Then, the question becomes, which banks are still capable of generating enough income from their performing assets to cover their interest and operating expenses.  These banks stay in business and rebuild their capital levels.

Banks that cannot cover their expenses even after recognizing their losses and returning their bad debt into performing debt again should be resolved.
Dijsselbloem said today that the ECB will need to review asset quality as soon as it takes up its new duties, noting that there is “still the risk of contamination between banks.”
The ECB has said if depositors are protected consistently across the euro zone, including guarantees for small accounts and preference for uninsured depositors over other types of unsecured creditors, further measures aren’t needed for now. 
The current EU deposit-guarantee proposal “provides a harmonized framework and should help shore up confidence in national schemes,” said ECB Vice President Vitor Constancio in a March speech. “This means that a single European scheme is not an essential component of banking union in the short term.”

Monday, May 6, 2013

Stevenson & Wolfers offer their lessons for economists from Reinhart & Rogoff debacle

In a very interesting Bloomberg editorial, Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers look at the Reinhart & Rogoff debacle and conclude that the economics profession must master the basics of reviewing an article from fact checking to asking if the idea presented makes any sense.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has consistently observed that the only barrier to publication in the premier economic journals is the ability to write a sentence (plus, I assume that the author has a PhD in economics or finance).

It is clear that there is zero effort put in by any reviewers of the articles to a) ask if the idea presented makes any sense or b) check the accuracy of any data analysis.

To prove these points, I offered up the works of Gary Gorton and Reinhart & Rogoff.

The former developed the idea of "informationally insensitive" debt and gave as an example of this type of debt bank demand deposits.

I don't know about you, but when I helped my children open up a bank account when they were 6-year olds I had to answer the question: how do I know I can get my money back?  My answer, which is the answer virtually every parent I have talked to gave too, was "the government guarantees you will get your money back".

Last time I checked, the existence of a government deposit guarantee was information.

The idea of informationally insensitive debt confuses how hard it is to independently assess an investment with the notion of insensitivity.  All investments are informationally sensitive.  Some, like demand deposits with government insurance, are just easier to assess than others, like structured finance securities.

Professor Gorton also developed the idea of a "safe" asset.  Excuse me, but there is no such thing as a safe asset.  All assets have risk.  Some assets have less risk than others, but they are all risky.  Don't believe me, just look at the Capital Asset Pricing Model that underlies modern finance.

Please note that the ideas for informationally insensitive debt and a safe asset were borne from the necessity to explain the "run on the banks" that occurred at the beginning of the current financial crisis.

A run that the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission explained was the result of the simple fact that no bank could figure out if a borrowing bank was solvent or not.  The "run on the banks" was nothing more than banks reducing their lending because they could no longer determine if the borrowing bank could repay.

As your humble blogger pointed out leading up to the financial crisis and after the crisis began, the reason that it was impossible to determine if a bank was solvent or not was because of opacity.  A point the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane drove home when he called banks "black boxes".

With a modest amount of attention, papers that embodied ideas like these should never have been published.
What lesson can economists draw from the ruckus over a flaw found in an influential study by two Harvard University scholars?
The fact that an economics professor works for an Ivy league school or an MIT, a Berkeley or a Stanford doesn't mean that a) their idea isn't stupid and b) they haven' made a mistake in their analysis.
Our suggestion: Do a better job of checking one another’s work. 
Empirical research has enjoyed an unaccustomed level of public attention since April 16, when a group of researchers published a critique of work by the economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. The critique pointed out a spreadsheet error -- now famous thanks to the blogosphere and “The Colbert Report” -- in a 2010 study on the relationship between government debt and economic growth. ...
There’s only one reliable way to verify empirical findings: Try to replicate them. ...
Replication rarely leads to career success. 
“Ideas” people -- those exciting scholars generating new insights into how society functions -- are the stars of the profession.
By this definition, with the FDR Framework, I should be a star (if only I had a PhD in economics; but then, neither did Adam Smith who invented the invisible hand of the market or Walter Bagehot who invented the modern central bank).

After all, I only explain the basis for how the global financial system operates and why it failed in the run-up to our current financial crisis.

And yes, the FDR Framework has shown that it works for predicting a financial crisis and what policies will and won't work to end the financial crisis.  I used it to predict our current financial crisis and the lack of success at ending the crisis from our existing policy responses.
Those who do the grindingly difficult work of checking whether the stars’ insights are actually true rarely get recognized. Who can name an economist who achieved fame through replication?
Milton Friedman who replicated Anna Schwartz's work or was it the other way around in their collaboration?
Editors of academic journals prefer to give what scarce space they have to exciting new ideas, rather than rehashing old debates....
The preference for giving space to new ideas doesn't mean that the ideas shouldn't first be vetted to see if they make any sense.

The editors seems to have forgotten this admittedly low barrier to publication.
For a scholar, replication offers an unappealing bet. ... Tails, you find a serious flaw, but your results still probably won’t be published and you’ve earned enemies who may try to land some reputational punches against you....
In other areas of academics, the author does not know who reviews their article.  This way, when serious flaws are uncovered, it is done BEFORE the article is published and enemies aren't created.

LIke Ireland, Spain's bad bank good for bankers and disaster for taxpayers

As predicted by your humble blogger when Spain first began talking about setting up a bad bank to hold the bad loans in its banking system, the result has been good for bankers and a disaster for taxpayers.

The prediction was easy to make because Spain didn't require that the banks provide transparency before taking on the bad debts.

With disclosure of the individual exposures, markets could have valued these exposures and the taxpayer supported bad bank could have acquired them at market prices.  The banks that originated the loans would have been forced to take the losses on these loans.

Instead, the bad bank acquired the toxic debt at prices that were favorable to the selling banks.  One can only imagine the size of the bonuses that have been paid out to the bankers that should instead have been used to pay for the losses on the bad debt.

As reported by Reuters,

Spain's bill to bail out its banks may yet rise, some bankers and analysts fear, as a worsening economy hampers the government's early attempts to sell off nationalized lenders and threatens the "bad bank" housing their rotten property deals. 
Spanish banks say the worst is behind them after steep losses last year and they are now recovering - a view broadly shared by authorities such as the European Commission, backer of a 41 billion euro ($54 billion) rescue of ailing lenders. 
But while Madrid is on schedule with demanded industry reforms and banks are better protected against losses from a sunken real estate market, a growing number of bankers argue in private that more state funds may still be needed to help sell rescued lenders and keep "bad bank" Sareb ticking over. 
Sareb was used to clean the balance sheets of state-rescued banks by taking on 50.7 billion euros worth of foreclosed properties and troubled loans to real estate developers. 
The assets are matched by 50.7 billion euros in senior debt and backed by 4.8 billion euros in capital, more than half of which was contributed by Spain's healthy lenders to reduce the burden on state books. 
The 8 percent capital cushion may however be too thin to withstand losses without a top-up, which could be hard to source from the private sector, said several senior Spanish bankers and investment bankers who have worked with the government. 
"It was a big mistake. The government is going to have to take over the entire vehicle sooner or later," said a Spanish banking executive, on condition of anonymity, echoing a view from three other senior bankers.
Ireland went through the same exercise where it purchased bad debt from its banks at inflated prices.  All this does is transfers losses to the taxpayers and lets the bankers off the hook for paying for the losses.
Spain took 41 billion euros of a 100-billion-euro European credit line to bail out its banks last year. The bill added the equivalent of 3.5 percent of gross domestic product to a deficit that was already higher than allowed under EU rules. 
The bailout came after several failed government efforts to clean up the financial sector, crippled by more than 300 billion euros in bad loans after a housing bubble burst in 2008....
The starting point for cleaning up the financial sector is transparency.  Specifically, disclosure on an ongoing basis of all current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, markets can assess the losses at each bank.

With this information, markets can exert discipline so that the losses are recognized upfront.

Fortunately, Spanish banks are designed to absorb these losses as they have both deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  As a result, the Spanish banks can continue to support the real economy during the years it takes to rebuild their book capital levels.
The real estate parked with Sareb was already written down by an average of 63.1 percent and the loans by 45.6 when the assets were transferred to the bad bank, but four bankers argued that further losses could still deplete its capital. 
Of its loans, only 22 percent are considered "normal"; 34 percent are rated "substandard" and 45 percent "doubtful". 
Most of the loans are linked to finished properties, for which it might be easier to find a buyer, but 4.3 percent are for unfinished developments and nearly 10 percent are for empty lots, for which there is little or no demand. 
Nearly all of the foreclosed properties in its portfolio are empty, including apartment blocks far outside big cities. Only 6,000 of nearly 83,000 housing units have tenants...
The real estate probably should have been written down by at least 78% and this assumes that "normal" means the borrower is performing out of current income and not drawing down on savings.
Meanwhile, Sareb is just beginning to comb through its assets. 
"This (structure) could be a problem if the vehicle starts making losses and needs more equity, something very likely to happen in our view once it reappraises its assets," JPMorgan analyst Jaime Becerril said in a recent note. 
One source familiar with Sareb said it was aware of the risk it might need more capital, but believed "that would only happen under an extremely distressed economic scenario." 
A stress test of Spanish banks last year by consultant Oliver Wyman, which served as the basis for some of Sareb's calculations, defined a worst case scenario as a 2.1 percent economic drop in 2013 and a 0.3 percent contraction in 2014.
JPMorgan's analyst will be shown as correct as so far no consultant has run a credible stress (hint: to be credible, the banks would disclose their exposure details so that market participants could confirm the results for themselves).

ECB continues to do everything it can, except require transparency, to restart structured finance

The Wall Street Journal reports that the ECB is continuing to do everything it can, except require transparency, to restart structured finance as it sees structured finance as crucial to reviving lending to small and medium size eurozone companies.

Regular readers know that in the absence of observable event based reporting on the performance of the underlying collateral, buying or selling structured finance securities is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag.

Leading up to the financial crisis, this gamble did not work out to well for buyers.

The realization that Europe’s troubled economies are faced with long and protracted weakness has encouraged European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to suggest a long-term solution to unlock credit to their cash-starved businesses.... 
Mr. Draghi on Thursday said the ECB was working to promote a funding market for asset-backed securities, which allow banks to pool together shorter-term debt they have sold–such as auto loans, credit cards, and residential or commercial mortgages–and sell those pools as a single package to investors.
The ECB wants ABS to be a sizeable source of bank financing that will encourage lending to small-to-medium sized companies, or SMEs....
Your humble blogger thinks that there is a significant role for structured finance to play in supporting the lending to small-to-medium sized companies not just in the eurozone, but globally.

The issue is what does it take to restart the structured finance market?

I have been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that what it takes to restart the structured finance market is disclosure that allows investors to know what they own or know what they are buying.

The only way to achieve this level of disclosure is by having observable event based reporting on all activities like payments or delinquencies involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.

With this reporting, investors have access to current collateral performance so they know what they own or know what they are buying.

Without this reporting, investors are simply guessing at what is a readily knowable fact.  A knowable fact that the sell-side knows and uses when it trades against the buy-side (see WSJ article on Goldman and Senderra Funding).

Your humble blogger predicted at the beginning of the financial crisis that the buy-side, except for hedge funds who charter is to gamble with their investors' money, would stay away from structured finance until this informational advantage was eliminated.

To date, despite 5+ years of zero interest rate and quantitative easing monetary policies, this prediction has been accurate.
At the moment, banks aren’t lending to SMEs. Without financing, these companies can’t grow: can’t hire employees, can’t invest in new projects. This is a serious problem in Europe, especially in the southern countries facing multi-year recessions and unemployment at depression levels. 
The ECB cut its main interest rate to a record low 0.5% Thursday, with the idea that cheaper money will help encourage a greater flow of money, eventually boosting the economy. 
But getting this extra cash to the real growth engines, i.e. companies, is not as easy as cutting rates. This is where ABS comes in. 
“Securitization can play a key role in funding Europe’s growth since it provides funding which matches the cash flows of the securitized assets and carries little or no refinancing risk, which is an important component of Basel III capital requirements,” said Rick Watson, head of capital markets at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe. 
But at the moment, these products still suffer from an association with bad deals sold before the financial crisis, like U.S. subprime mortgages, a type of ABS that catalyzed fears across the banking system. 
Since then, investors, especially those in Europe, have yet to regain confidence in the product....
Investors staying away from structured finance securities isn't a question of confidence, but rather the result of a costly lesson.  Investors know that while the product retains its information asymmetry it is good for Wall Street and bad for them.
“We’re seeing a market that is slowly grinding to a halt. The market isn’t going to disappear, but the risk is that it becomes small, bespoke, and reverse-inquiry driven. That is, not a real solid market for funding the European economy,” said Ian Bell, head of the Prime Collateralized Securities Initiative.
PCS was launched in November with the aim of labeling ABS deals that comply with a set of standards relating to quality, transparency and simplicity. Mr. Bell noted the good news was PCS labels have been granted to 12 of all qualifying ABS transactions. The bad news was this is 75%-80% of what has been sold to investors.
As noted earlier, a PCS label is nothing more than sticking lipstick on a pig.  The label is awarded to structured finance securities with the same transparency as opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities.
The first step for ABS is restoring confidence....
Confidence in the financial system has always been associated with transparency.

Confidence is the result of investors having access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Confidence results because investors trust their own assessment.
The ECB said did not say how close it was to activating any program. If they do launch one, it wouldn’t be the first crisis-era plan to buy collaterized bank bonds. ... 
“The experience with the first covered bond purchase program can be useful. It was the announcement there that produced the most effect. The implementation was indispensable; without it, the effect would have been undone. But if the ECB were to announce something similar for ABS, it could also have a positive short-term impact,” said Francesco Papadia, former director general for market operations at the ECB....
General expectations are that this will not happen soon. Rabobank analysts summed up the gist of opinions: “We would still view such action as some way off if it does indeed take place at all.” 
But Mr. Draghi’s publically sounded what other officials have been stating for four months. Something needs to happen, and this is a realistic path. 
“It would be a big disappointment if nothing comes of this… I’d be surprised if nothing material develops,” Mr. Papadia said.
What is likely to result is the ECB becomes the gambler of last resort and takes onto its balance sheet more opaque, toxic securities.

Sunday, May 5, 2013

RBS' Stephen Hester ends myth that monetary policies pursued by central banks will end financial crisis

The Telegraph reports that the head of RBS, Stephen Hester, has said his bank is swamped with funds to make loans, but businesses don't want the loans as they don't see an increase in demand to generate cash flow to repay the loans.

Regular readers will recognize Mr. Hester's observation as exactly why your humble blogger predicted the central banks' monetary policies of zero interest rate and quantitative easing would fail when they were first announced.

When business looks to make an investment, its first consideration is whether there is going to be an increase in its top line from demand.  It doesn't look at how cheaply it can fund the investment until after it has determined there is demand.

The problem with low interest rate policies is that once interest rates drop below 2%, both consumers and companies don't respond to a drop in interest rates the way they did when rates were lowered from say 9% to 8%.

This change in behavior has been known since at least the 1870s when Walter Bagehot, who invented the modern central bank, observed this change and said that interest rates should never be lowered below 2%.

This change in behavior has been confirmed with the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Under the Retirement Plan Death Spiral current demand is lowered as both individuals and corporations are forced to save more to offset the lack of earnings on the money in their retirement plans.

In the case of businesses, money that could be used for reinvestment and growth is instead put into pension plans.  In the case of individuals, money that could be spent today is instead saved.  This includes paying down debt as well as putting money into savings.

This change in behavior from interest rates being below 2% has been shown in Japan for 2+ decades.  Deflation has set in as Japanese save rather than spend despite 2+ decades of zero interest rate and quantitative easing monetary policies.
Stephen Hester has waded into the controversy about an apparent lack of lending for smaller businesses, saying Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) £20bn of cash it was “desperate” to lend out, but companies were not prepared to borrow as they lacked faith in the economic recovery.

“We are lending as much as we can,” Hester said. “We are not constrained by either capital or funding, Mr Hester told The Sunday Times. “The only way I could see for us to lend more would be for someone to say we did not have to operate by any commercial standard – that we could undercut everyone because we did not have to make a profit.” 
He also said that RBS had “deposits coming out our ears”, an apparent shot across the bow of Sir Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, who has called for RBS to raise more capital or be broken up. 
Banks have been accused to stifling the recovery in the UK by failing to lend to businesses. However, Mr Hester’s statement imply it is lack of progress in improving business confidence that is stopping companies from investing for growth, rather than banks constraining lending criteria. 
Mr Hester said he could not “force companies to borrow”.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Hester has has confirmed why low interest rate monetary policies are doomed to failure before they are even enacted.

Saturday, May 4, 2013

Elliott's Paul Singer debunks myth of Fed as knowing what it is doing

The economics profession has been having a hard time with our current financial crisis.

First, it failed to predict the crisis.  Those handful of professionals who pointed out there was a problem with subprime mortgages were dismissed by the mainstream as cranks to be ignored.

Second, it has failed to produce a policy, whether fiscal, monetary or some combination of the two that has brought an end to the crisis.  This failure to produce a policy for ending the crisis is not surprising as the economists' models exclude the banking system and we have a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Third, as demonstrated by the Reinhart and Rogoff debacle, economics is an academic discipline completely lacking any minimum standards that its practitioners have to meet in order to get their articles published in even its top peer reviewed journal.  This has lead Paul Krugman to issue yet another defense of economics and observed that
 the reputation of the intellectual enterprise as a whole has clearly suffered.
In a letter to his investors posted on Zero Hedge, Elliott's Paul Singer unloads on the myth of the Fed knowing what it is doing.

By way of background, Mr. Singer, like your humble blogger, predicted the financial crisis.  What Mr. Singer and I both see in the Fed's response to our current crisis is panic and not insight into the actual mechanism that is continuing to cause a problem with the financial system and global economy.

Panic that was first shown by Ben Bernanke as he sat white as a ghost next to Hank Paulson as Mr. Paulson asked Congress for a $750 billion blank check to deal with the financial crisis.  Panic that was revealed when Mr. Bernanke said a blank check was needed in order to avoid a second Great Depression.
[T]he financial system (including the institutions themselves, products traded, and risks taken) has “gotten away from” the Fed’s ability to comprehend. The Fed is primarily responsible for that state of affairs, and it is out of its depth.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Singer has succinctly put the simple fact that an institution that relies on models that ignore the financial system and assume that the financial system will always work is highly unlikely to understand how to fix the financial system.
Former Chairman Greenspan created – and reveled in – a cult of personality centered on himself, and in the process created a tremendous and growing moral hazard. By successive bailouts and purporting to understand (to a higher and higher level of expressed confidence) a quickly changing financial system of growing complexity and leverage, he cultivated an ever-increasing (but unjustified) faith in the Fed’s apparent ability to fine-tune the American (and, by extension, the world’s) economy. 
Ironically, this development was occurring at the very time that financial innovations and leverage were making the system more brittle and less safe. 
He extolled the virtues of derivatives and minimized the danger of leverage and risky securities and dot-com stocks, all while he should have been putting on the brakes. 
It was not just the disappearance of vast swaths of the American financial system into unregulated subsidiaries of financial institutions, nor was it just government policies that encouraged the creation and syndication of “no-documentation” mortgages to people who could not afford them. It was also the low interest rates from 2002 to 2005, the failure to see the expanding real estate bubble caused by an unprecedented increase in leverage and risk, and the general failure to understand the financial conditions of the world’s major institutions.
Greenspan put his faith in the market without understanding that the necessary condition for the invisible hand of the market to function properly was transparency (buyers and sellers have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision).

Financial innovation was all about introducing opacity into the financial system.  As Yves Smith so memorably put it: nobody on Wall Street was compensated for creating low margin, transparent products.
Under Chairman Bernanke, the combination of ZIRP and QE completed the passage of the Fed from sober protector of a fiat currency to ineffective collection of frantically-flailing, over-educated, posturing bureaucrats engaged in ever more-astounding experiments in monetary extremism. 
Again, please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Singer has just described what I refer to as PhD defense syndrome.  No policy is too extreme to be undertaken in defense of what an economist wrote and defended on their way to getting a PhD.

Recall that Chairman Bernanke refers to himself as an expert in the Great Depression.  An expert who Ann Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author and an individual who lived during the Great Depression, said learned all the wrong lessons.
If you look at the history of Fed policy from Greenspan to Bernanke, you see two broad and destructive paths quite clearly.  
One path is the cult of central banking, in which the central bank gradually acquired the mantle of all-knowing guru and maestro, capable of  fine-tuning the global economy and financial system, despite their infinite complexity. 
On this path traveled arrogance, carelessness and a rigid and narrow orthodoxy substituting for an open-minded quest to understand exactly what the modern financial system actually is and how it really works.
I am not sure that this "arrogance, carelessness and a rigid and narrow orthodoxy" applies only to central bankers.  My experience is that it applies across the vast majority of participants in the economics profession.

I have had economists tell me that it is easier for a bank to manipulate its historic cost numbers on its individual exposures than it is for a bank to manipulate an accounting construct called bank capital.  Not true.  In their audits, accounting firms looks to see if historic cost numbers are manipulated.

Meanwhile, both banks and regulators manipulate bank capital.  Banks manipulate by how they value their assets.  Regulators manipulate by engaging in regulatory forbearance and letting banks engage in 'extend and pretend' to turn nonperforming loans into 'zombie' loans.

I have had economists tell me that transparency is less effective at constraining bank risk taking than is bank capital.  Not true.  Jamie Dimon showed in his desperation to hide JP Morgan's London Whale trade that the last thing a bank wants is to disclose its proprietary bets for fear that the market will trade against them.

Meanwhile, bank capital is all about using opacity to hide just how much risk banks are taking.  The whole idea behind Basel I was to use complexity to hide the leverage the banks were taking on in an effort to allow banks to generate a return on equity that would attract capital to the banking system.  Naturally, this trend continued with Basel II and III.

I have had economists tell me that once per month data is adequate for setting monetary policy and therefore it is adequate for valuing opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities.  Not true.  In the absence of observable event based reporting, buying or selling these securities is simply betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.

It is only with observable event based reporting that investors know how the loans underlying these securities are currently performing.  It is only with this information that investors can assess the risk of the loans and value the securities.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger created the FDR Framework to explain "exactly what the modern financial system actually is and how it really works".

It is the FDR Framework that underlies the financial systems in Europe, Japan, the UK and US.  This is not surprising as the US exported this framework after World War II.
The second path is one .... In its acute and later stages, it can destroy the social cohesion of a society as wealth is stolen and/or created not by ideas, effort and leadership, but rather by the wild swings of asset prices engendered by the loss of any anchor to enduring value.  
In that phase, wealth and credit assets (debt) are confiscated or devalued by various means, including inflation and taxation, or by changes to laws relating to the rights of asset holders. Speculators win, savers are destroyed, and the ties that bind either fray or rip. We see no signs that our leaders possess the understanding, courage or discipline to avoid this.

Regular readers know I have used the FDR Framework to show how a modern banking system is designed to absorb the excesses losses in the financial system under the Swedish Model and protect the real economy and society.

It is true that the CEOs of the world’s major financial institutions lost their bearings and were mostly oblivious to their own risks in the years leading up to the crash. 
However, as the 2007 minutes make clear, the Fed was clueless about how vulnerable, interconnected and subject to contagion the system was.
The Fed had no clue about what opacity was doing to undermine the soundness of the financial system.
It is not the case that the Fed completely ignored risk; indeed, several Fed folks made “fig leaf” statements about the risks of the mortgage securitization markets, as well as other indications that they appreciated the possibility of multiple outcomes. 
But nobody at the Fed understood the big picture or had the courage to shift into emergency mode and make hard decisions. 
In the run-up to the crisis the Fed was a group of highly educated folks who lacked an understanding of modern finance. After convincing the nation for decades of their exquisite grasp of complexities and their wise stewardship of the financial system, they didn’t understand what was actually going on when it really counted.
Please re-read the highlighted text again and recall that both Mr. Singer and I were trying to get the attention of the Fed and explain what was happening so that the impact of the financial crisis could be moderated.
Ultimately, of course, as the system was collapsing and on the verge of freezing up completely, the Fed shifted into the (more comfortable and much less difficult) role of emergency provider of liquidity and guarantees.
A more comfortable role and one under which it can continue to deny that we are dealing with a bank solvency and not liquidity led financial crisis.
All this background presents an interesting framework in which to think about what the Fed is doing now. 
QE is a very high-risk policy, seemingly devoid of immediate negative consequences but ripe with real chances of causing severe inflation, sharp drops in stock and bond prices, the collapse of financial institutions and/or abrupt changes in currency rates and economic conditions at some point in the unpredictable future. 
However, the lack of large increases in consumer price inflation so far, plus the demonstrable “benefits” of rising stock and bond markets, have reinforced the merits of money-printing, which is now in full swing across the world. 
In the absence of meaningful reforms to tax, labor, regulatory, trade, educational and other policies that could generate sustainable growth, “money-printing growth” is unsound.  
We believe that the global central bankers, led by the Fed as “thought leader,” have no idea how much pain the world’s economy may endure when they begin the still-undetermined and never-before attempted process of ending this gigantic experimental policy. 
If they follow the paths of the worst central banks in history, they will adopt the “tiger by the tail” approach (keep printing even as inflation accelerates) and ultimately destroy the value of money and savings while uprooting the basic stability of their societies. 
I agree with Mr. Singer that the Fed's response to the financial crisis has the potential to cause very high levels of pain to the world's economy and society.
Read the 2007 Fed minutes and you will understand how disquieting is the possibility of such outcomes and how prosaic and limited are the people in whom we have all put our trust regarding the management of the financial system and the plumbing of the world’s economy. 
Printing money by the trillions of dollars has had the predictable effect of raising the prices of stocks and bonds and thus reducing the cost of servicing government debt. It also has produced second-order effects, such as inflating the prices of commodities, art and other high-end assets purchased by financiers and investors. 
But it is like an addictive drug, and we have a hard time imagining the slowing or stopping of QE without large adverse impacts on the prices of stocks and bonds and the performance of the economy. 
If the economy does not shift into sustainable high-growth mode as a result of QE, then the exit from QE is somewhere on the continuum between problematic and impossible. 
Central banks facing high inflation and/or sluggish growth after sustained money-printing frequently are paralyzed by the enormity of their mistake, or they are deranged by the thought that the difficult and complicated conditions in a more advanced stage of a period of monetary debasement are due to just not printing enough.  
At some stage, central banks inevitably realize, regardless of whether they admit the catastrophic nature of their own failings, that the cessation of money-printing will cause an instant depression. 
Even though at that point the cessation of money-printing may be the only action capable of saving society, that becomes a secondary consideration compared to the desire to avoid immediate pain and blame. 
The world’s central banks are in very deep with QE at present, and the risks continue to build with every new purchase of stocks and bonds with newly-printed money.
Mr. Singer has been far more blunt about the consequences of what I call the Fed's needless policy actions.

As regular readers know, there is a simple alternative to what the Fed is doing.  That alternative is to use the modern banking system as it is designed to be used.

By making the banks absorb the losses on all the excess public and private debt in the financial system, the need for the Fed's pursuing its current monetary policies is ended.

Lifting the debt service burden from the real economy will restart growth as capital that is needed for growth, reinvestment and to support the social contract is no longer diverted to debt service.

At the beginning of this financial crisis, Iceland showed that this solution works.  It is time that it is adopted in Europe, Japan, the UK and the US.

Friday, May 3, 2013

Another fight over transparency: Banks rally against strict controls over foreign bets

The NY Times has an excellent article on how banks are fighting against bringing transparency to their derivative positions and the proprietary bets they make using these instruments.

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC is trying to require banks disclose the derivative positions held by their off-shore subsidiaries (think disclosure of the credit default swaps that JP Morgan booked through its London subsidiary).

The reason US regulators are interested in knowing what these positions are is that losses on these positions potentially could cost US taxpayers money should a bank fail.

Banks are arguing that this disclosure is unnecessary as the derivative positions are disclosed to the regulators in the foreign countries in which they do business.  Banks are saying that it is the role of these foreign regulators to ensure the safety and soundness of the foreign subsidiaries.

Translation: banks want to continue betting with US taxpayer money by placing their bets in their foreign subsidiaries and saying that US taxpayers should rely on foreign regulators to monitor these bets and make sure US taxpayers don't lose any money.

Those same foreign regulators who did not see the current financial crisis coming and effectively let their banks blow up.

Thank you, but no.

The simple response from the US government should be:

  •  if a bank wants to be able to offer US taxpayer backed deposit insurance on its accounts, then it needs to disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details; or
  • if a bank doesn't want to provide this level of on-going disclosure to all market participants, then it can no longer offer US taxpayer backed deposit insurance on its accounts.

Then, it is up to each bank to decide whether it wants to provide transparency.  Transparency that the Jamie Dimon and the Whale trade shows will limit proprietary betting for fear of the market trading against the bank's position.