Thursday, June 6, 2013

Euribor managers mull using real transactions to set benchmark rate

Bloomberg reports that the Euribor managers are considering using real transactions to set the benchmark interest rate and end the ability of banks on the rate panel to manipulate the rate.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger recommended and the Wheatley Review rejected (it wouldn't even publish my submission) that benchmark interest rates be based off of actual transactions made available by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

By disclosing their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, the banks end two major problems with the benchmark interest rates.

First, ultra transparency thaws the unsecured inter-bank lending market.  Banks with deposits to lend can use the disclose data to assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.

Second, ultra transparency ends manipulation because market participants can use all of the transactions in the inter-bank market or a subset.

Of course, this eloquent solution was rejected by both the banks and their guardians, the regulators.

The group that manages the Euro Interbank Offered Rate, or Euribor, is considering setting up a parallel benchmark based on real transactions rather than estimates. 
Euribor-EBF is exploring the move as part of its response to revelations that some lenders tried to rig interbank lending rates, tarnishing credibility of the indexes. The European Central Bank is providing technical assistance for a feasibility study, according to Euribor-EBF’s response to a review by global regulators. 
Any new benchmark would be set up in addition to Euribor, according to the letter, sent to the International Organization of Securities Commissions. It wouldn’t affect any contracts linked to Euribor rates, the group said. 
The move echoes comments made last month by Martin Wheatley, the head of the U.K. markets regulator. He said the London interbank offered rate should eventually be replaced with a transaction-based benchmark using a dual-track system. ... 

Wednesday, June 5, 2013

Bank of England's Sharp on why JP Morgan London Whale shows banks must provide transparency

As reported by Bloomberg, the Bank of England's Richard Sharp observed that information on exposure details is so "distorted" as it is passed through different levels of management at a bank that it is virtually impossible for management or regulators to stay on top of the risks banks are taking.
Richard Sharp, a member of the Bank of England’s Financial Policy Committee, said the so-called London Whale losses at JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) illustrate the financial-stability risks posed by firms “too big to manage.” 
JPMorgan’s report on the losses is “very chilling” in revealing how information “can get distorted” as it passes through management layers, Sharp said in a parliamentary testimony today in London. Money laundering in places such as Mexico at HSBC Holdings Plc and rogue trading at UBS AG are among other examples, he said. 
“Risks aren’t understood where they need to be understood within the organization,” Sharp said. “That obviously begs a question how even the regulator can be on top of that if even the organization itself can’t be on top of that risk?”...
“I worry that the auditors are ill-equipped,” Sharp said. “The JPMorgan experience indicates that even the executives were ill-equipped to see what was in a multi-trillion dollar portfolio.” 

This observation is why banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  

With this level of disclosure, the information on the risks that banks are taking is not distorted.  Instead, it it readily available for all market participants, including rival trading firms, banking competitors and regulators, to assess.

By harnessing the analytical power of the market and the experts within it, ultra transparency fosters a much better understanding of each bank's risk.

An understanding that results in the linkage of a bank's cost of funds to the amount of risk it is taking.  This linkage is important as it is the mechanism by which the market exerts discipline on each bank to restrain its risk taking.

IMF to admit mistakes with Greece, but what about Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain?

The Guardian, following on the initial report in the Wall Street Journal, says that the IMF is going to admit to numerous mistakes that it made and contributed to in the handling of Greece's financial crisis.

The IMF will disclose that its biggest mistake was not requiring the original creditors (also known as the banks) to absorb losses at the beginning of the debt crisis.

The IMF is going to say that the primary beneficiaries of the mistaken strategy pursued in Greece were the creditor banks.

Imagine that.

Who could have guessed that the creditor banks would have been the beneficiary of Greece destroying its social contract?


Regular readers will recall that following the advice of the bankers, global policymakers and financial regulators adopted the Japanese Model under which bank book capital levels and banker bonuses were protected at all costs.  Not having the banks take losses at the beginning of the financial crisis was the direct result of this policy.


As predicted by your humble blogger, the result of protecting the banks and banker bonuses was to put the burden of the excess debt on the real economy with the result being a downward spiraling economy and an end to the social contract.

As the IMF is admitting to mistakes in handling Greece, will it also admit that the same fundamentally flawed strategy was used in Ireland, Portugal and Spain to the detriment of these countries' real economies and social contracts?

The authoritative Kathimerini newspaper said the report identified a number of "mistakes" including the failure of creditors to agree to a restructuring of Greece's debt burden earlier – a failure that had had a disastrous effect on its macro-economic assumptions. 
"From what we understand the IMF singles out the EU for criticism in its handling of the problem more than anything else," said one well-placed official at the Greek finance ministry. 
"But acknowledgement of these mistakes will help us. It has already helped cut some slack and it will help us get what we really need which is a haircut on our debt next year."
Please re-read the highlighted text as it is an explicit statement that the problem of excess debt in the financial system did not go away as a result of pursuing the Japanese Model for the last 5 years.  There are still losses to be taken.

One of the reasons that the IMF is apologizing is it realizes that it will have to absorb the losses and it gets its funding from taxpayers.  Effectively, the IMF oversaw a program that transferred losses from private balance sheets, the banks, to the taxpayers.

Please note that before the IMF engaged in the program it is now apologizing for, individuals, like your humble blogger, were saying that the program would not work and the only beneficiaries would be the banks.

For this reason, a simple apology is not enough.

At a minimum, 100% of the IMF's pension assets should be given to the poor in Greece with recognition by the IMF that giving up its retirement assets and the right to replace them is the least the IMF can do for the pain and suffering it has caused.

ECB pushes ahead with plan to find out what is hidden on and off EU bank balance sheets

As reported by Zeit (hat tip Zero Hedge), prior to taking on responsibility for monitoring the EU's banks, the ECB is planning on finding out what losses are hidden on and off the balance sheets of the top 140 EU banks.

Not only does the ECB want to have the losses discovered realized, but it also wants the banks to be recapitalized either by taxpayers or by bailing in equity holders and unsecured creditors including depositors.

The ECB's plan is positive in that the banks will finally be forced to recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

The ECB's plan is negative in that it insists on an immediate recapitalization of the banks.  The plan would be much better if it allowed the banks to recapitalize themselves over several years through the retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

The timing is already set. From the autumn of the monetary authorities will illuminate along with the national supervisory authorities, the balance sheets of major financial institutions in the euro zone. There is a total of around 140 banks, which together cover about 80 percent of the market.  
The ECB teams are already formed to examine the books as required directly into the banks. Thus, at the end come out reliable figures, is the intention of the central bank also independent consultants - to be on board - Wirtschaftsprüer or investment companies....
Regular readers know that your humble blogger dislikes regulators going into banks with teams of consultants to find bad debts.  As shown by Ireland, Greece and Spain, the combination of regulators and consultants never find and have the banks disclose all of their bad debt.

Your humble blogger prefers requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this disclosure, all market participants can see just how much bad debt a bank is exposed to and that the bank recognizes the losses on this debt.

If the combination of regulators and consultants is really going to force banks to disclose and write-off all their bad debt, then regulators should be happy to have banks provide ultra transparency to confirm this fact.

A failure to require the banks to provide ultra transparency is the equivalent of waving a large red flag and saying the banks are still hiding losses.  The experiences of Ireland, Greece and Spain show that this is true.
Financial institutions that can not even fill possible gaps capital should be recapitalized by the Member States. If they are not able to lift the renovation alone, they can access loans from the ESM bailout fund to fall back. 
The risk should not alone bear the taxpayers: Even shareholders, creditors and customers of the affected banks will be first used to cover the losses.
Once the banks have been forced to recognize their losses on the excess private and public debt, they should be separated into two groups.

Those banks whose interest income is greater than the sum of its interest expense plus operating expense should be allowed to remain in business.  These banks have the capability of generating earnings that can be retained and used to rebuild their book capital levels.

Those banks whose interest income is less than the sum of its interest expense plus operating expense should be resolved.  Simply, they do not have a franchise that allows them to generate earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.

Tuesday, June 4, 2013

WSJ's Jason Zweig looks at how trust in the financial markets is easy lose, hard to restore

In his Wall Street Journal column, Jason Zweig touches on one of the key unaddressed problems created by the financial crisis:  a lost of trust.

Mr. Zweig discusses how important trust is not just to the normal functioning of the financial markets, but to the broader economy at large.

You can summarize the outcome of the financial crisis in one sentence: Good things happened to bad people, and bad things happened to good people. Some people who contributed to the crisis kept hundreds of millions of dollars apiece in compensation and will spend the rest of their lives in luxury. The victims of the crisis—borrowers, taxpayers and investors—have spent the ensuing years trying to regain some of what they lost. 
As I wrote in early 2010, this kind of outcome violates a basic psychological need. 
Humans can’t live normal lives without believing in what psychologists have christened “positive illusions.” Among them are overconfidence, the belief that we know more than we do; the illusion of control, the sense that we have more power over what happens around us than we do; and unrealistic optimism, the tendency to think positive things are more likely to happen to us than to other people. 
If we honestly accepted how little we know, how little we can control and how little advantage we have over other people, we wouldn’t be able to get out of bed in the morning. 
As the Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman has said, “The combination of optimism and overconfidence is one of the main forces that keep capitalism alive.” 
Another positive illusion is known as “belief in a just world.” Although we all know full well that it isn’t true, humans need to believe that we generally get what we deserve, with good things happening to good people and bad things happening to bad ones. The fact that it’s an illusion is beside the point. ... 
A study published in 2009 concluded that when people don’t believe the world is just, they become significantly less willing to wait for a financial gain. After all, if you can’t be sure that you usually will get what you deserve, why would you ever trust a counterparty to honor its contracts or promises?
Please re-read the last paragraph and consider that the global policymakers and financial regulators adopted the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under this model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.  

By protecting the banks and bankers from the losses they should have experienced, global policymakers and financial regulators effectively undermined the both the financial system and the global economy.

That this was known and documented in 2009 and global policymakers and financial regulators continue to pursue the Japanese Model is truly amazing.  In the name of saving the financial system and the global economy, policymakers and financial regulators have aggressively pursued policies known to destroy both the financial system and the global economy.
If ever there was an ideal example of an “unjust world” in the eyes of some people, Wall Street of the past few years is it. 
What, then, would it take to restore trust and to revive belief in a just world?
Restoring trust and reviving belief in a just world require two related steps.

First, the global policymakers and financial regulators must adopt the Swedish Model and require that banks recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system. While it is belated, adopting the Swedish Model means that the losses in the financial system are absorbed by the firms and individuals who created the losses.

In addition, having the banks absorb the losses protects the real economy as capital that is needed for reinvestment, growth and the social contract is no longer diverted to debt service.


Second, banks must be require to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is only with this information that market participants can exert restraint on both risk taking by banks and banker behavior (sunlight is the best disinfectant).

Monday, June 3, 2013

ECB's pressuring banks to stay in interest rate benchmarks highlights failure of Wheatley Review reforms

Reuters reports that the ECB is pressuring banks to stay in the interest rate benchmarks, like Euribor or Libor, so that the benchmarks retain some measure of validity.

The need for the ECB to take this action highlights the failure of the Wheatley Review based reforms.

Regular readers will recall that your humble blogger recommended to the Wheatley Review that banks be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This disclosure addressed the two key problems with the benchmark interest rates.

The first problem is that the unsecured interbank lending market is prone to freezing because banks with deposits to lend cannot assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.  With ultra transparency, this market will unfreeze and remain unfrozen as banks with deposits to lend will always be able to assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.

The second problem is that the benchmark interest rates were not based on actual transactions and therefore they were subject to manipulation by the banks.  With ultra transparency, the benchmark interest rates can be based off of all the actual transactions.

Naturally, the Wheatley Review rejected this simple solution.  They even went so far as to not publish my response.

The European Central Bank put pressure on banks on Friday to stay in interbank lending benchmarks Euribor and Eonia, after a recent spate of high profile withdrawals which have put the future of the gauges in doubt. 
"The ECB strongly encourages banks to remain in, join or re-join the reference rate panels in order to ensure an appropriate level of participation, so that the reference rates serve their purpose of adequately reflecting market developments," the ECB said in a statement. 
Trillions of euros worth of financial products, from home mortgages to complex financial derivatives, are priced using Euribor and Eonia and a complete unravelling of the rates would be a major headache for the banking system....

The exodus has come as the credibility of the benchmarks has been called into question by an inquiry into Libor-style manipulation and the huge drop in lending during the financial crisis as bank-to-bank trust has crumbled....

The Frankfurt-based central bank already helps calculate Eonia and has been working with Euribor-EBF on new rates based on transactions rather than the so-called 'estimates' that gave banks the room to manipulate them for their own advantage.

Sunday, June 2, 2013

Bank of England's Mervyn King explains why banks providing ultra transparency is necessary

As Sir Mervyn King ends his term as Governor of the Bank of England, he has offered up some reflections on the ongoing financial crisis.

Each reflection is further confirmation that banks must be required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with ultra transparency that market participants are no longer reliant on financial regulators and institutions like the Bank of England to both assess the level of risk at the individual banks or financial system as a whole and to accurately communicate this risk to the market.  Note, these guardians of the financial system will never accurately communicate risk to the market for fear about damaging the safety and soundness of the financial system.

As reported by the Telegraph,
Sir Mervyn King confessed on Desert Island Discs on Sunday that he slept soundly during the events that sent the economy spiralling into recession but was surprised it had taken the public so long to react angrily to the way the banks had behaved and were responsible for the crisis....
Perhaps the UK public has taken a long time to react angrily with the banks, but the US public has been reacting angrily since the beginning of the financial crisis.  As President Obama put it, he was standing between the bankers and the lynch mob.

While Sir Mervyn King slept soundly, I wonder if the same could be said of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke.  When he testified before Congress on the need for TARP, he looked pale as a ghost.
Sir Mervyn acknowledged that the Bank had failed to either detect or diagnose the extent of the crisis and were in the dark about the time bombs sitting in bank balance sheets.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Sir Mervyn has just put forward the strongest case possible for requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

As regular readers know, under the FDR Framework, it is the responsibility of government to ensure that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

For banks, this information is only provided when they provide ultra transparency into their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, the Bank of England might still have failed to either detect or diagnose the extent of the crisis, but it would not have subsequently been in the dark about the time bombs still sitting on bank balance sheets.

More importantly, with this disclosure, under the FDR Framework, each market participant under the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware) would be responsible for losses on their exposures to each bank.

Even if the investors failed to detect or diagnose the extent of the crisis, each investor had an incentive to limit their investment exposure to each bank to what they could afford to lose given their independent assessment of the risk of each bank.

By limiting their exposures to what they could afford to lose, the investors would have stopped the policy makers and financial regulators' irresistible urge to use taxpayer money to bail-out the banks.  Instead, the unsecured creditors and equity holders of the banks would have suffered losses.
He rejected interviewer Kirsty Young’s suggestion he was guilty of being “too academic” in his approach to the issues and said the general feeling at the time among informed opinion makers and the press was that “we had a wonderful system.” 
He added: “No-one realised it was going to go wrong so quickly.”
We do have a wonderful system based on the FDR Framework.  It didn't go wrong quickly.  It worked flawlessly for several decades.

When the system failed, it failed because the financial regulators with the responsibility for ensuring transparency allowed massive parts of the financial system to become opaque.  Included in the opaque corners of the financial system were banks (what the BoE's Andrew Haldane calls 'black boxes') and structured finance securities (what the market calls opaque, toxic securities).

Fixing the financial system and ending the financial crisis has always been a straightforward task.  The starting point is bringing transparency back to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Unfortunately, leading the fight to maintain opacity are the very government institutions that are given responsibility for ensuring transparency in the financial system.  Included on this list is the Bank of England.
He took issue with comments from a former member of the Bank’s Monetary Policy Committee, David Blanchflower, that as a highly paid executive he should have been aware of a developing crisis.
Your humble blogger cannot emphasize enough that under the FDR Framework our financial system is designed not to be dependent on any one person or entity being aware of a developing crisis.

Instead, our financial system is built on the combination of the philosophy of disclosure and the principle of caveat emptor.  Everyone is given both the information they need and the incentive to protect themselves.

As Nassim Taleb would say, our financial system is "anti-fragile" by design.

It only became fragile when the government institutions responsible for ensuring transparency failed to do so.
“Anyone who says we know what’s going to happen is a charlatan,” he retorted....
There is a large difference between saying, like your humble blogger did in late 2007, that we are in a downward economic spiral that will only end when transparency is brought to all the opaque parts of the financial system and saying that tomorrow XYZ will happen.

The former is a statement of fact about the current state of our economy and financial system.  The latter is in the realm of tarot card readers.
The Governor accepted that the last five years had not produced the legacy he wanted to leave behind. There were signs of recovery “but not as fast as we thought”.
If Japan has shown anything, it is that pursuing the same flawed economic policies as Japan did when its credit bubble burst nothing beyond lost decades will occur quickly.

Update
More from the Telegraph.
Asked if there had been any moments that had caused him sleepless nights, he said: “I don’t think anything kept me awake at night because my training, my reading of financial history, meant I knew exactly what we had to do.” 
Decisions like rescuing Royal Bank of Scotland were “quite easy” because it was obvious what had to be done, he added.
With this comment, Sir Mervyn completely discredits training as an economist as being fit for the role as head of a central bank.  Clearly, training as an economist does not prepare one to assess the risk of a bank or know how to deal with a bank solvency led financial crisis.

As your humble blogger has repeatedly pointed out, the choice of pursuing the Japanese Model and protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs was wrong at the beginning of the financial crisis and it is still wrong today.

The lesson of history is the way to deal with and end a bank solvency crisis with minimum damage to the real economy or the social contract is to adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to absorb upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

The decision to bailout the banks using taxpayer money is irresistible to policymakers, central bankers and financial regulators.  The only way to take this option off the table is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants know they are responsible for all losses on their exposures as they can independently assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure to what they can afford to lose given the risk of each bank.

What this does is links the risk each bank takes with its cost of funds.  As a result, banks are subject to market discipline and are restrained in their risk taking.
Asked about his comment on August 8, 2007, the day before the credit crunch struck, that “the banking system is much more resilient than it was in the past”, he said: “Clearly it wasn’t... I think we learned that that was not true.”
This comment further confirms that training as an economist means knowing nothing about how a modern banking system is designed.

By design, banks are resilient.

In fact, banks are capable of absorbing all the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system and continuing to operate and support the real economy.

How are banks able to do this when they could have negative book capital levels after absorbing the losses?

The combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding makes this possible.  With deposit insurance, the taxpayers become the banks' silent equity partners when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Please note, banks are designed so that the only time they need to be resolved is when their interest income is no longer greater than their interest expense plus their operating expenses.

So long as interest income is greater than interest expense plus operating expenses, banks are able to generate earnings that can be retained to rebuild their book capital levels.

I realize that rebuilding book capital levels after absorbing losses will be devastating to banker cash bonuses, but they really don't deserve cash bonuses when their banks lose massive amount of capital.

Saturday, June 1, 2013

Andrew Haldane: the Counter-Reformation in Banking has just begun

Leave it to the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane to end the debate about all the success of the "efforts" to reform the banking system since the start of the financial crisis.

In a speech at the Festival of Economics, Mr. Haldane dismissed these efforts as the problem of Too Big to Fail, Too Interconnected to Fail and Too Big to Jail still exist.

As Mr. Haldane observed,
“Too big to fail” banks create three disastrous problems, any one of which should have been sufficient decades ago to convince our politicians to get rid of them. 
  • They make a mockery of the phrase “free markets.”  
  • TBTF bank failures risk causing global financial crises. 
  • TBTF banks create so much economic power that it inherently translates into dominant political power and cripples our democracy by creating crony capitalism and the corresponding problem of “too big to jail.”
  • So the question is, how do we tackle these problems as the existing efforts to write new laws, like the Dodd-Frank Act, have effectively closed this avenue for reforming the financial system?

    Regular readers know that the answer is by enforcing the existing securities laws, particularly the 1930s Securities Act.

    Under the 1930s Securities Act, publicly traded firms must disclose all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that market participants can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

    At the time the 1930s Securities Act was written, the standard for disclosure of all the useful, relevant information for banks was to disclose all of their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

    This disclosure of exposure details was seen as the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet as it invited market participants to independently confirm this fact for themselves.

    Judging by Mr. Haldane's observation that banks are "black boxes", clearly banks are no longer providing the disclosure that was the standard in the 1930s.

    The starting point for the counter-reformation in banking is to formally reinstate the standard of ultra transparency for banks.

    As regular readers know, requiring banks to disclose this information addresses all three of the areas that Mr. Haldane is concerned with.

    It brings "free markets" back to banking as with this disclosure market participants can now independently assess the risk of each bank.  As a result, market participants can link the cost of funds paid by the bank to the level of risk at the bank.

    It ends the risks of the failure of one global financial institution causing a financial crisis.  With ultra transparency, each market participant knows that they are responsible for any losses on their exposures to the banks.  As a result, market participants will limit their exposures to each bank to what they can afford to lose given the risk of the bank.

    By limiting their exposures, market participants end the risk of financial contagion and the possibility of a financial crisis.

    It ends the ability of the banks to control their regulators and the political system.  By disclosing their exposure details, banks are subject to market discipline.  Discipline that is not swayed by donations or lobbying.

    An example of the market discipline banks become subject to is JP Morgan's London Whale trade.  Jamie Dimon and his management team did everything they could to keep the trade confidential.  They knew that as soon as the market knew of the trade, market participants would trade against JP Morgan in such a manner as to maximize any losses and minimize any profits.

    Simply requiring the banks to disclose their exposure details will result in the banks shrinking and become far less politically powerful.

    Not only will the banks end their proprietary trading, but they will also end the practice of using thousands of subsidiaries for tax and regulatory arbitrage.  These subsidiaries add complexity to assessing the banks.  Complexity that market participants will see as risk and for which market participants will require a higher rate of return.

    Finally, ultra transparency has one more benefit that recommends it as the starting point for the counter-reformation in banking.  Ultra transparency ends the markets dependence on the financial regulators to do accurately assess and communicate the risk of each bank.

    Not only does ultra transparency let the market participants independently determine this risk for themselves, but it also lets market participants to exert pressure on the regulators to do their job.

    For example, it ends the irresistible urge by regulators to bail-out banks using taxpayer money.  Well before the banks need to be bailed-out, market participants will be putting pressure on the regulators and bankers to address the bank's losses.

    In addition, everyone knows that when a bank's interest income is less than the combination of its interest and operating expenses, it will be closed and unsecured debt and equity holders will absorb the losses.


    Friday, May 31, 2013

    Noah Smith and what does it mean to have "predicted the crisis"

    In an excellent post, Noah Smith asks the question of what does it mean to have "predicted the crisis" and then challenges anyone who claims to have "predicted the crisis" to examine their track record in light of his analysis.

    Naturally, your humble blogger thought this would be an interesting exercise to apply to oneself because I frequently mention that I "predicted the crisis" and the success or failure of the different responses to the crisis.
    Since 2008, quite a lot of people have boldly claimed that they "predicted the crisis". 
    I confess to having made this claim.
    Usually, the claimants use this "fact" to argue for the superiority of their economic school of thought, modeling approach, investing approach, or personal intuition.
    I confess that I have in fact used not only my prediction of the crisis, but also the accuracy of my predictions of the success or failure of the various policy responses to the crisis to argue for my approach, the FDR Framework.
    But what does it mean to have "predicted the crisis"? 
    First of all, there are different things that get labeled "the crisis". These include: 
    1. The big drop in U.S. housing prices that started in 2007. 
    2. The systemic collapse of the U.S. financial industry that began in 2008. 
    3. The deep recession and the long stagnation that began in late 2008. 
    Predicting one of these is not the same as predicting the others. 
    It is possible, for example, to have missed the housing bubble and the finance industry collapse, but to have successfully predicted, after seeing these events happen, that a deep recession and long stagnation would be the result; this is what Marco Del Negro et al. claim to have done, and a number of pundits and commentators made informal recession predictions after housing peaked in 2006. 
    Alternatively, it is possible to have predicted the bursting of the housing bubble without foreseeing the systemic damage that this would cause to the financial system; many writers, such as Bill McBride, Dean Baker, and Nouriel Roubini, seem to have done this (and of course, Robert Shiller). 
    It is also possible to have predicted the collapse of the big banks and their mortgage-backed bonds - and made money off of this - while staying agnostic about the macroeconomic consequences; this seems to have made a lot of money for investors like Steve Eisman and John Paulson. 
    Of course, in theory it might have been possible to predict all three events.
    For the record, my predictions applied to the collapse of the global financial system and what it would take to avoid the deep recession and long stagnation that has occurred since the crisis began on August 9, 2007.
    Then there's the question of what it means to "predict" something. Here are some alternative definitions: 
    1. You could predict the timing of an event, e.g. when the housing bubble would burst. 
    2. You could predict the size or severity of an event, e.g. how much house prices would decline or how much the economy would contract in 2009. 
    3. You could predict the duration of an event, e.g. how long our economy would stagnate after the recession, or how long it would be before housing prices reached their pre-crash peak. 
    4. You could describe the particular characteristics of an event, e.g. what would cause banks to fail, or whether they would be bailed out, or whether inflation would remain subdued after the recession.
    My predictions fall into Mr. Smith's third and fourth category.

    Caroline Salas and Bloomberg reported on December 4, 2007 that I was saying the solution for moderating the seizure of the credit markets driven by the toxic subprime mortgage bonds was to make them transparent so that market participants could accurately value them.

    For example, Paul Kix and the Boston Magazine reported that I was saying in February 2008 that because of opacity in structured finance securities we faced a downward economic spiral until such time as transparency was brought to these securities.

    Subsequently, but well before September 2008, I expanded the need for transparency to apply to all the opaque corners of the financial system, including banks.

    After the financial crisis hit, my predictions, many of which are on this blog, then shifted to would a policy response or combination of policy responses policy makers and regulators were pursuing work or not work to end our ongoing financial crisis.

    Just to remove any doubt about what policy responses I predicted would work, I have written extensively about the Swedish Model under which banks are required to recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.
    Next, there is the question of with what degree of confidence you make a prediction. Saying "this event is a conceivable possibility" is different than saying "the risk of this event is high," which is different from saying "the risk of this event has increased," which is different from saying "this event will happen."
    Regular readers of my blog know I don't BS when I make a prediction.  My predictions are all of the variety that "this event will happen."

    For example, I predicted that BlackRock assessing individual banks would not restore confidence in the Irish, Greek or Spanish banking system.  In fact, it didn't.
    Also, there is the question of how far in advance a prediction was made. That could be important.
    Each of my predictions was made when there was still time for policy makers and regulators to listen to the prediction and choose a different policy response that would have been successful.
    Finally, there is the question of whether the prediction was made by a model or by a human. 
    If it's a model, then there's the hope that humanity has a tool with which to predict future crisis events.
    Fortunately, my predictions were based on a model:  the FDR Framework.  The Swedish Model, which is the response to a bank solvency led financial crisis, is a component of the FDR Framework.

    I confess, I hope the FDR Framework is not used as a model to predict future crisis events.  Rather, the FDR Framework is a model for how the financial system is suppose to work so that a future crisis can be avoided.

    Simply put, what made our current crisis possible was the financial regulators allowed opacity into large corners of the financial system.  If we don't let this happen in the future, we shouldn't have another opacity driven financial crisis.
    Anyway, how should we evaluate these claims? 
    There are so many different combination of "predictions" and "crises" here that it's very difficult to lay out an explicit taxonomy of who got it "more right," and who got it "less right." 
    As a more humble goal, we can examine a specific individual or model, and identify which events he/she/it predicted, with what degree of confidence, and when.
    When you look at which events I predicted, the degree of confidence of the prediction and the timing of the prediction, the FDR Framework stacks up incredibly well against any of the alternatives.

    Thursday, May 30, 2013

    Why Shareholder Rescue Never Comes to end Too Big to Fail Banks

    In his ProPublica article, Jesse Eisinger looks at why shareholders don't end the problem of Too Big to Fail banks.

    Mr. Eisinger had hoped that shareholders would put pressure on bank management because of low share prices to break up these institutions.

    He considered the possibility that because of opacity, shareholders were worried about how the risk would be distributed if they forced a break-up.  So this restrained the shareholders forcing a break-up.

    Then, leaving opacity behind, he settled on the idea that shareholders actually prefer banks to take on risk as they have capped downside and unlimited upside.

    Mr. Eisinger is on the right track.  However, he failed to see the link between opacity and the type of shareholders that banks attract.

    As regular readers know, under the FDR Framework, there is a three step investment process:

    1. Investor independently assesses all the useful, relevant information to determine the risk of and value of the investment;
    2. Investor solicits bids from Wall Street to buy or sell the investment.
    3. Investor compares the price shown by Wall Street to independent valuation to make buy, hold or sell decision.
    When there is opacity, as is the case with banks, investors do not have access to all the useful, relevant information and therefore they cannot independently assess the risk or value the investment.  As a result, investors cannot go through the investment process.

    So buying or selling shares in a bank is not investing, but rather something else entirely.

    As the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane says, banks are "black boxes".  Nobody other than the bank regulators knows what risks are inside these boxes.  This has important implications for the types of shareholders that banks attract.

    Investors are not attracted to banks because investors cannot go through the investment process.  They recognize that buying or selling bank shares is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a black box.

    Naturally, the shareholders who are attracted to the big banks are not investors who would exert discipline on management, but rather gamblers.  By definition, these gamblers want bank management to take on risk because as Mr. Eisinger noted their downside is capped and their upside is unlimited.