Showing posts with label Asset and Liability-level Disclosure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Asset and Liability-level Disclosure. Show all posts

Friday, February 24, 2012

Hedge Fund Manager Paul Singer renews call for transparency

Approximately one year ago, this blog carried a post on hege fund manager Paul Singer, who like your humble blogger was publicly recognized as predicting the financial crisis.

At that time, Mr. Singer was critical of the Dodd-Frank Act for its failure to bring transparency to the financial system and its reliance on regulators to effectively monitor the Too Big to Fail banks.

Mr. Singer is back with a letter to investors in his Elliott Management funds which once again sounds themes that are very familiar to regular readers.

In a NY Times Dealbook article on the letter, Mr. Singer observes:

A great deal of stupidity has chipped away at the massive advantages of Western civilization, which could terminally decline if it remains on the current path. But these problems can be solved — and swiftly ....
This observation confirms the long term economic impact of the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency based financial crisis (preserve bank capital and only recognize losses as banks generate earnings to absorb them).  The US, UK and EU policies since the beginning of the financial crisis reflect this model.

As shown by Japan, the impact of the Japanese model and its supporting fiscal and monetary policies is long term economic decline.  In Japan's case, its economy has shrunk over the last 15 years.

This observation also supports the idea that adopting the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency based financial crisis and requiring banks to recognize all of their losses today will bring a quick end to the global financial crisis.
Mr. Singer is generous with his ire, directing it at the United States,  the European Union and Japan, and offering a critical assessment of the sorry state of affairs in the world marketplace. 
Here is a current snapshot of the U.S., Europe and Japan: the financial sector is overleveraged and opaque. Fiscal, tax, and regulatory policies are unsound and not oriented toward growth and efficiency. On a long-term balance sheet basis, these countries are insolvent, with no hope of paying presently promised benefits regardless of the level of growth achieved or tax rates charges. Monetary policy is extreme and experimental. None of these assertions is refutable...
The financial sector is opaque and, with the blessing of regulators, hiding losses.
He goes a step further, too, arguing that “the epoch of investor confidence in money backed by nothing is coming to an end.” 
As he often has in recent letters, Mr. Singer spends pages railing against the Federal Reserve for buying bonds, printing cash and keeping interest rates at or near zero percent. 
“This policy is arrant idiocy and is likely to ultimately lead to serious inflation, a risk that governments continue to ignore at their peril,” he writes.
Whether it leads to serious inflation or not, Mr. Singer joins Bill Gross, Charles Schwab and Walter Bagehot in thinking that the zero bound for monetary policy is at an interest rate greater than zero and more like Mr. Bagehot 2%.

Mr. Singer spells out a clear casualty of pursuing a zero interest rate monetary policy:  investor confidence in money backed by nothing.
The peril he spells out for Europe, meanwhile, is much more immediate. He points out the circle of codependency between the nations and their banks: the nations support the banks to keep them from falling prey to markets, but the banks support the nations, too, by buying their debt. 
In the next global trading crisis, characterized (as it may well be) by the cascading transmission of losses from one opaque, overleveraged institution to another, the survival of any given commercial or investment bank (or group of such institutions) is likely to depend more on the perception of the creditworthiness of the sovereigns which stand behind them (and the sovereigns’ willingness to actually do so) than on any analysis of the fundamentals of the afflicted institutions....
By adopting the Japanese model, nations have to stand behind their banks to inject capital should a bank's book value fall.  As a result, there is a circle of codependency between banks and sovereign.

Under the Japanese model with its emphasis on protecting the level of capital at the banks, opacity is a policy requirement.  For example, regulators have given RBS's Stephen Hester permission to hide the losses on and off the RBS balance sheet and only recognize them as RBS has earnings to absorb them.

If the Swedish model were adopted, nations would only stand behind the bank depositors.  This breaks the circle of codependency.

Under the Swedish model with its emphasis on protecting Main Street and requiring banks to recognize the losses on and off their balance sheet, transparency is a policy requirement.  If banks disclose their current asset, liability and off balance sheet exposure details, market participants could see that all their losses have been recognized.
Back home, a bevy of regulation in the wake of the financial crisis has done little to shelter the system from risk, address leverage or puncture the veil of secrecy at large financial institutions, he writes. 
The argument is context to his real point, however, about impending  regulation of hedge funds: “It is worse than pointless.”...
“We wonder if the Securities and Exchange Commission, the regulatory body tasked with policing hedge funds in the U.S., has the sophistication and resources to sniff out issues related to the myriad of complicated trades, strategies and securities that these firms manage,” he writes, before throwing some salt on a particularly sensitive wound at the agency. “Hopefully this new crop of regulators will be more astute than those who ignored a 15-page detailed analysis of the Madoff fraud that was handed to them on a platter years before his unmasking.”
If every financial institution over a certain size were required to provide ultra transparency, the regulators could enlist the resources of the market to help them understand each firm and the risks it poses to the system.

For example, JP Morgan could help the regulators in their analysis of Citi and BofA.  Likewise, these firms could help in the analysis of JP Morgan.

Saturday, December 10, 2011

Liam Halligan and the Telegraph call for disclosure rather than more 'sticking plaster' solutions

In his weekly Telegraph column, Liam Halligan once again makes the case for why detailed disclosure is needed to end the solvency crisis that began on August 9, 2007.

He assets that the Eurozone leaders are deluded if they think the most recent 'sticking plaster' treaty can solve the solvency crisis.

This Brussels summit was an unseemly combination of law-bending and posturing. The coup de grace, for me, was the quiet agreement to drop any requirement for private sector holders of dodgy eurozone sovereign debts to incur losses. So much for moral hazard. 
Dropping the requirement to 'incur losses' does not mean that the losses have gone away.  This is the same problem with extend and pretend.  The losses are still there lingering on bank balance sheets.

Since everyone knows that the banks are holding losses, the question then becomes, how big are these hidden losses.  Said another way, who is solvent and who is insolvent.

When no-one knows who is solvent and who is insolvent, the following solvency driven liquidity symptoms emerge.
The fundamental problem remains that Europe’s banks remain locked-out of traditional funding markets, leaving them reliant on the ECB – which, in turn, is now increasingly reliant on covertly printed money and whatever the Chinese and others will ultimately chip-in. 
Faced with a funding freeze, banks are shrinking their balance sheets and strangling growth by refusing to lend, a problem the ECB’s “special measures” will do nothing to address. 
The use of the ECB’s emergency lending facility rose last Wednesday to €9.4bn, the highest daily total since early March, pointing to deep-seated banking sector distress. 
Such distress relates, above all, to a lack of trust. 
Eurozone banks can’t raise cash, and won’t even lend to each other, due to crippling fears of counter-party risk, given that many continue to hide massive liabilities in so-called “special purpose vehicles”. Lawmakers, after all, still lack the courage to force them to fully disclose their losses. 
This lack of disclosure is the nub of the sub-prime problem. Nobody wants to hear it, but it’s true. 
Please re-reading the previous bolded text as your humble blogger has been making this point since the beginning of the credit crisis.
Last week’s “stress tests” suggested Europe’s banks have a deficit of €115bn, up from €106bn in October. But these government-run tests lack credibility. The first round cleared some big Irish banks, which then went bust. A subsequent round gave Belgium’s Dexia a clean bill of health, just weeks before it imploded. And now the European authorities want the markets to believe this latest exercise in high-stakes financial spin. 
No one knows who is solvent. 
The drip-drip of stress test information causes more problems than it solves. 
So stand-behind retail depositors, impose “full disclosure” and let the cards fall, forcing our bombed-out banks to consolidate. 
This really is the only solution – in the US, the UK and the eurozone. But the eurozone’s failure to grasp it will be far more explosive, given the pressures being created by this absurd monetary experiment.
FDR and his administration showed that this solution worked to break the back of the Great Depression (see here).

To date, we have tried everything else.  It is time to require banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Friday, December 9, 2011

Eurozone banking system on edge of collapse over collateral crunch

A Telegraph article reports that the Eurozone banking system is on the edge of collapse as the banks do not have access to funding due to a lack of assets that can be pledged as collateral.

Regular readers know that if Eurozone regulators required the Eurozone banks to provide ultra transparency this would not be a problem.

By disclosing on an on-going basis their current assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can value every exposure.

With market values on all of the assets that a bank has, particularly the loan portfolio, the bank expands the collateral it can pledge to the ECB.  Today, the bank can only pledge loans that have been put into a covered bond or securitization structure.  With ultra transparency, banks will be able to pledge any loan on their balance sheet.

Using the loan portfolio to secure funding from the ECB frees up the other assets, like securities, to be used to fund through the repurchase market.

The other advantage of offering ultra transparency is that market participants can evaluate the riskiness of each bank.  When lenders can see that they are going to be repaid, it makes it easier to access money through the repo and inter-bank funding markets.

Senior analysts and traders warned of impending bank failures as a summit intended to solve the European crisis failed to deliver a solution that eased concerns over bank funding. 
The European Central Bank admitted it had held meetings about providing emergency funding to the region's struggling banks, however City figures said a "collateral crunch" was looming. 
"If anyone thinks things are getting better then they simply don't understand how severe the problems are. I think a major bank could fail within weeks," said one London-based executive at a major global bank. 
Many banks, including some French, Italian and Spanish lenders, have already run out of many of the acceptable forms of collateral such as US Treasuries and other liquid securities used to finance short-term loans and have been forced to resort to lending out their gold reserves to maintain access to dollar funding. 
"The system is creaking. There is a large amount of stress," said Anthony Peters, a strategist at Swissinvest, pointing to soaring interbank lending rates. 
CreditSights' weekly funding report said the ECB had effectively become the central clearer for the region's banks as lenders are increasingly distrustful about funding one another. 
Bank deposits with the ECB now stand at their highest level since June 2010 at €905bn (£772bn) as lenders withdraw deposits held with their peers and put them into the central bank. 
At the same time, banks in major eurozone countries such as France and Italy have become increasingly reliant on central bank funding. This follows the trend seen in smaller countries like Ireland where lenders have effectively becomes taxpayer-funded "zombie" banks. 
Alastair Ryan, a banks analyst at UBS, said there would be "no Lehman moment" – or single catastrophic event – for the European banking sytem, but added that without a full backstop of bank liabilities by governments the system would "struggle to finance itself in the next year in a durable way". 
"The system at the moment hasn't got funding of a duration that allows it to function, so it's failing," he said. 
Others think the eurozone banks are heading for a catastrophe and the worry is growing that a major bank could collapse within weeks.... 
Moody's on Friday downgraded France's three largest banks, BNP Paribas, Credit Agricole and Societe Generale in light of what the US rating agency said were "liquidity and funding constraints". The banks' downgrade came despite Moody's acknowledging the three lenders could depend on a higher level of French taxpayer support in future.... 
The fear is the European authorities do not have the financial firepower to deal with the banks' problems. 
Analysts at BarCap say that even if the European rescue funds were able to raise €1 trillion of funding this would only meet the needs of the Italian and Spanish government and banks.
The European banking sector's problems are being exacerbated by a wave of asset sales as lenders look to dramatically shrink their balance sheets. UBS estimates eurozone banks could sell off between €3.7 trillion and €4.5 trillion of assets in the next three years.
These asset sales of course are the result of a regulatory policy that requires Eurozone banks to achieve the meaningless 9% Tier I capital ratio.  Selling their good assets and keeping their troubled assets so as to show a higher capital ratio does not improve the outlook for Eurozone bank solvency. 

Thursday, December 8, 2011

Donald Kohn explains why regulators have not addressed the global solvency crisis

In a speech, the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee member Donald Kohn explained why regulators have not addressed the global solvency crisis.  He discussed the difficulty with implementing countercyclical macroprudential policy when times are tough.

When the economy is weakening and bad debts are building, easing [capital and liquidity] requirements may reduce the effect of financial sector problems on the real economy.   
There is no 'may' in the effect of these policy actions on the real economy.  It has been well known since the Great Depression that making banks absorb the losses on the excesses in the financial system does reduce the effect of financial sector problems on the real economy.

This blog has referred to this as banks acting as a safety valve between the excesses in the financial system and the real economy.

You don't have to take your humble blogger's word that this works.  The NY Fed has documented that it works.

Contemporary observers consider the [US] Bank Holiday and [FDR's] Fireside Chat a one-two punch that broke the back of the Great Depression....
Roosevelt’s oratory certainly played an important role, but only the financially naive would have believed that the government could examine thousands of banks in one week to identify those that should survive. 
According to Wigmore (1987, p. 752), “The federal review procedure for reopening banks also had too many weaknesses to create much confidence, given the number of banks reopened, the speed with which they opened, and the lack of current information on them. There were no standards for judging which banks should reopen.”...
This article demonstrates that the Bank Holiday that began on March 6, 1933, marked the end of an old regime, and the Fireside Chat a week later inaugurated a new one. 
The Emergency Banking Act of 1933, passed by Congress on March 9—combined with the Federal Reserve’s commitment to supply unlimited amounts of currency to reopened banks—
created de facto 100 percent deposit insurance. 
Moreover, the evidence shows that people recognized this guarantee and, as a result, believed the President on March 12, 1933, when he said that the reopened banks would be safer than the proverbial “money under the mattress.” 
Confirmation of the turnaround in expectations came in two parts: the Dow Jones Industrial
Average rose by a statistically significant 15.34 percent on March 15, 1933 (taking into account the two-week trading halt during the Bank Holiday), and by the end of the month, the
public had returned to the banks two-thirds of the currency hoarded since the onset of the panic.
Breaking the back of the Great Depression sure sounds like making banks absorb the losses on financial excesses unambiguously works.

I can hear the objections already.  The article refers to an implied 100% deposit guarantee.  It does not mention banks taking the losses.

Literally true, but once there is an implied 100% deposit guarantee in place, then there is no reason that a bank cannot recognize all of its losses.  It does not have to fear a run as no-one is looking at its financial statements.

As a practical matter, once the government formally began guaranteeing deposits later that year, regulators had an incentive to make sure the banks cleaned up their bad assets.

Returning to Mr. Kohn's speech...

But how do you know the problems won’t get much worse, perhaps for reasons entirely external to the economy in question and out of control of the authorities.   
If conditions do continue to deteriorate substantially, releasing capital and liquidity buffers – lowering requirements – could come back to haunt the economy and the authorities if it results in widespread failures, unemployment as credit tightens, and if it comes to require fiscal action to stem the downward slide.  
Now there is a prescription for regulators never addressing a solvency crisis.  After all, it is always possible that the situation will get worse.

Even if the situation gets worse, it does not matter so long as three conditions hold true.

First, the central bank continues to be willing to lend against good collateral.  Second, the government continues to guarantee the deposits.  These two conditions assure that an insolvent bank can continue operating indefinitely.

Third, the banks provide ultra transparency by disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This condition means that market discipline will prevent banks from taking unnecessary risks and gambling on redemption.

Regular readers will recall that your humble blogger predicted at the start of the solvency crisis that the global economy was in a downward spiral that could only be stopped if the solvency issue was addressed by requiring ultra transparency for all the opaque areas of the global financial system.

So where are we today more than four years after the start of the solvency crisis on August 9, 2007?

The Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard observed that today all the Eurozone and UK banks are insolvent and policy makers and regulators need to face up to it.


He could also have observed that the global banking regulator review process, including stress tests, has too many weaknesses to create confidence.  The key weakness being the lack of current information available to market participants so that they can independently assess the solvency of each bank.

He could also have observed that the trigger for the Eurozone banks causing a credit crunch was the regulators insistence that banks meet a 9% Tier I capital ratio.

The FPC has faced just such an issue as the situation in the euro area worsened last summer and fall, and its discussion of the conflicting pressures is reflected in the record of our September meeting, already published.   
The committee concluded that lowering buffers would not be appropriate at that time, out of concern about what might be coming next.    
Buffers that the Great Depression showed are meaningless when the government is implicitly guaranteeing 100% of the deposits.

Wait a second, given the stress tests, aren't the governments morally obligated to bailout investors?  Isn't this a 100% deposit guarantee?
The cost of leaning unnecessarily hard against expanding credit and rising asset prices would be growth and innovation foregone – very hard to see. The cost of inadequate capital and liquidity is large and visible – a loss of confidence and an unstable financial system.  

A direct link between high levels of bank book capital/liquidity and confidence and a stable financial system may in theory exist.  Then again, it might not. [Pre-deposit insurance we had high levels of bank book capital and liquidity, but there were frequent periods of instability characterized by bank runs.  Post-deposit insurance, we had low levels of bank book capital/liquidity and long periods of financial stability.]

A direct link between disclosure to market participants of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner and confidence and a stable financial system has been definitively shown to exist.  

There is no clearer example of this linkage than the government's implied guarantee of 100% of deposits in the Great Depression.  With knowledge of the implied deposit guarantee, bank runs ended and deposits flowed back into the banking system.

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

Deloitte confirms Europe's banks insolvent, estimates they have 1.5 trillion pounds of toxic assets

According to a Telegraph article,

Europe's banks must dispose of a pool of toxic assets larger than the entire British economy if they are to return to profitability and meet new capital rules.
The article goes on to say,


Estimates from accountants Deloitte found that European banks currently hold more than £1.5 trillion of non-core and non-performing assets on their balance sheets. 
From the article's headline, it appears that there are 1.5 trillion pounds of non-performing assets.  If so, it is highly likely that all the European banks are insolvent.
Deloitte said that while banks will have to dramatically shrink the size of their asset books they are likely to face major challenge in doing so given the scale of the bad loan problems they face. 
British banks, despite beginning their disposal programmes much earlier than their Continental European peers, still have by far the biggest pile of toxic assets. 
Deloitte estimates the size of the non-core and non-performing assets held on the balance sheets of UK banks at £460bn, more than the combined total for Ireland, Spain and Italy. German banks come a close second with a toxic asset pool of about £447bn. 
It is one thing for bank's to be a 'black box' when they have few non-performing or toxic assets.  It is entirely another issue when banks clearly have so many non-performing or toxic assets that their solvency is highly questionable.

The time has come to require ultra transparency.  Each bank must be required to disclose on an on-going basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this information that the market can determine which banks are solvent and which are not.

It is only with this information that the market can properly assess the risk of the banks and adjust both the amount and price of their exposure to the banks.

It is only with this information that the market can exert discipline on the insolvent banks to keep their risk levels in check while they are retaining earnings to restore their solvency. 

Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard: Eurozone and UK banks are insolvent, face up to it

When dealing with a bank solvency crisis, it is always nice to know how the markets perceive the current state of bank solvency.

The Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard summarized the market's perception of the current state of bank solvency as:

In [Standard & Poor's] view, financial institutions ... face pressure where the quality of ... assets is deteriorating. 
Deleveraging by European banks is intensifying, as they reduce their balance sheets amid worsening funding conditions, look to bolster their capital ratios, and address concerns about deteriorating asset quality among their borrowers. 
By our estimates, a sample of 53 large eurozone banks from 12 countries will face bond market maturities of an historic record of over 205 billion euro in the first quarter of 2012." 
I might add that EMU banks have a loan-to-deposit ratio of almost 1.2 (like Japan before the Nikkei bubble burst), compared to 0.7 in the US. They are much larger in aggregate, much more leveraged, and mostly underwater already on EMU bonds if forced to mark to market. 
In essence, the whole eurozone is already insolvent. Face up to it. 
(Yes, yes, before you all scream over there, Britain is insolvent too by the same yardstick. That is why it is useful to have the magical instrument of a sovereign central bank in such circumstances – and one willing to act – to conjure away the awful truth.) 
Euroland’s crisis is not about Greek pensions or Italian labour laws, but about a vast and catastrophically ill-designed edifice of interlocking bank debt and sovereign debt.
You cannot separate the two. The sovereigns are destroying banks, and the banks in turn are destroying sovereigns. The two disasters are feeding on each other. This will continue until there is a circuit-breaker, both to act as lender of last resort and to end the slump.
Actually, there is a circuit breaker other than the central bank, which really is designed as a circuit breaker for liquidity problems and not solvency issues.  That circuit breaker is regulators also acknowledging that the banks are insolvent.

When that happens, the options available for addressing the solvency crisis expand.  Specifically, they expand to include this blog's blueprint for saving the financial system - have the banks take the losses on the excesses in the financial system and have sovereigns invest in economic policies that restore growth.

Acknowledging that the banks are insolvent immediately raises the question of 'by how much'.  The only way to answer this question is to require banks to disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures.  This is the data that is needed so market participants can assess how much the book value of the bank's liabilities exceeds the market value of its assets.

It is also the data needed to restore confidence in and market discipline of the banking system.

Acknowledging insolvency also means acknowledging that banks can continue to operate for years with a negative book value.  After all, the banks have effectively been doing this since the start of the credit crisis on August 9, 2007.

Thank you Mr. Evans-Pritchard making your comment on bank insolvency and providing the global financial policy makers with the freedom to fix the solvency crisis.

Senator Sherrod Brown calls for greater transparency in oversight of Wall Street

Re-iterating many of the themes of this blog, Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown called for greater transparency in the financial system.

“For too long, Wall Street has been permitted to operate in the dark, putting our economy at risk and leaving taxpayers on the hook,” Brown said. “Transparency makes markets work and helps improve oversight.  We need a financial system that benefits all Americans – not just the companies that want to enjoy private profits and bonuses, and make taxpayers cover their losses.” 
Senator Brown then cited several examples of the Wall Street Opacity Protection Team's handiwork.
Brown’s call follows repeated stonewalling by federal regulators after Brown raised a red flag over a risky new practice employed by Bank of America and five of the six of our nation’s largest bank holding companies. In October, Brown was joined by U.S. Rep. Brad Miller (NC-13) in questioning the decision by the Federal Reserve and other regulators to allow these institutions to transfer their risky derivatives operations into bank affiliates insured by the federal safety net.  Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act restricts transactions between banks and their nonbank affiliates, placing limits on the amount of each transaction relative to a bank’s capital and prohibiting purchases of certain “low-quality” assets. 
Last week, Bloomberg Markets magazine reported that 190 institutions made $13 billion in profits on $1.2 trillion in secret, below-market rate loans.  Previously, Bloomberg reported that the Federal Reserve also relaxed its standards for acceptable collateral, accepting “junk” bonds and stocks against its loans. 
In August, Brown wrote a letter to the Federal Reserve questioning a $5 billion purchase by Berkshire Hathaway of 50,000 shares of preferred stock in Bank of America, with annual dividend payments of $300 million.  
Last week, the Fed responded, refusing to answer whether Bank of America will be required to submit new plans to raise equity as a result of this arrangement, which the Fed would then approve, stating that the answer constitutes “confidential supervisory information.”
This blog has called for making the Fed ultra transparent in all its dealings with the banks.  Ultra transparency would bring an end to the idea of 'confidential supervisory information'.  Anything that is happening at a financial institution that the regulators should know about, all market participants should be informed about at the same time.

Otherwise, we end up with the situation we are in today where market participants do not have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for assessing the risk of or investing in a financial institution.

Instead market participants are reliant on the regulator to accurately assess and communicate the risk.  Clearly, the current financial crisis showed that there was a problem either with the regulator's assessment or communication of risk.

Equally clearly, because market participants are dependent on the regulator there is a moral obligation for the government to bailout any investor in the banks.  After all, the investor relied on the government's declaration that the bank was solvent in assessing the risk of investing in the bank.

It is only with ultra transparency (a bank is required to disclose on an on-going basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details) that investors become responsible for both gains and losses on their investments in banks.  It is the potential for loss that gives an investor the incentive to use the disclosed information to independently assess the risk of the bank.

Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Bernanke letter on Fed lending programs confirms need for Fed to be ultra transparent

The Federal Reserve posted a letter from its Chairman, Ben Bernanke, to Congress attempting to explain the Fed's version of its secret lending programs.

The letter confirms the need to end opacity at the Fed and require that the Fed, like the banks it supervises, be required to provide ultra transparency for all of its dealings with the banks.

How does the letter confirm that the Fed should be required to provide ultra transparency for all of its dealings with the banks?

The letter reflects an argument over what should be indisputable historical facts that market participants needed to have at that time if they were to have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for making investment decisions in the banks.

For simplicity sake, I ask the readers to imagine a simple loan database that any lender must have.  The loan database has all the information on the Fed's loan programs in it.  This database would include on a daily basis the name of any borrower, the amount borrowed under each of the programs, the interest rate paid and the date the loan was repaid.

There is nothing in this database that is disputable.  It is all historical facts.

Since the data is in a database, it is easy to share with all market participants so that they can see how much was outstanding in total, by program or by borrower on a daily basis.  

Furthermore, it is easy to see what a borrower's average cost of funds was.  If the Fed truly lent at a premium it should be easy to verify.

As this blog has discussed previously, market participants knew that the banks were and still are insolvent (it is scary if the Fed examiners did not confirm this fact) as solvency is a function of the relationship between the market value of the bank's assets and the book value of its liabilities.  

The moment the Fed adopted regulatory forbearance (think extend and pretend) and supported suspension of mark to market accounting, the Fed confirmed this insolvency.

Hiding the details of the loan programs did not alter this perception of insolvency.  Market participants are not stupid, they knew the banks were overexposed to opaque toxic securities, second mortgages to sub-prime borrowers and commercial real estate loans.  

All the Fed's secretive activities achieved was to highlight the need for banks to provide ultra transparency so that market participants can assess the risk of an investment in a bank again.

This is a lesson that any scholar of the Great Depression should know!

Former Fed Governor Kevin Warsh adds his support to requiring ultra transparency

In a Wall Street Journal column, Former Fed Governor Kevin Warsh discusses how global policy makers are preventing informed judgments.

His solution is providing market participants with transparency.

Financial markets are in a precarious place, with European banks and sovereign balance sheets in the cross-hairs. Bank regulators are becoming increasingly aggressive, and euro-zone borrowing costs are rising as the debts of years past are coming due. 
In this environment, policy makers are finding their authority, credibility and firepower being tested. In turn, they are finding it tempting to pursue "financial repression"—suppressing market prices that they don't like. But this is bad policy, not least because it signals diminished faith in the market economy itself. 
Markets are not always efficient, but the market-clearing prices for stocks, bonds, currencies and other assets (like housing) are critical to informing judgments, in good times and bad. 
Market-determined asset prices often reveal inconvenient truths. But the sooner the truth is revealed, the sooner judgments can be rendered and action taken. 
By contrast, government-induced prices send false signals to users and providers of capital. This upsets economic activity and harms market functioning. 
Markets that rely on governmental participation will turn out to be less enduring indicators of value. 
In environments of financial repression, businesses are keener to retrench than recommit their time, energy and capital to new projects. Trillions of dollars of private capital remains on the sidelines. And the private-sector engine that drives prosperity sputters. 
Consider a few recent examples of this policy in practice: 
In Europe, share prices are falling among the largest banks, but these prices are little more than a symptom. European banks suffer from a lack of capital to offset future losses, and a lack of transparency that makes it futile to try to judge their financial wherewithal. 
This also applies to banks globally.

Until banks are required to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants will not be able to judge their solvency.
The bank problem is not some unfounded attack by greedy speculators, so a leading proffered solution—extending the ban on short-selling shares in big banks—obfuscates rather than informs. It also delays the necessary private-sector recapitalization....
Financial repression is sometimes the effect of policy even if it is not the intent. It manifests itself, for example, when policy makers react more forcefully to declines in asset prices than to increases. Price increases tend to be treated with benign indifference. But declines often lead policy makers to respond with force, deploying fiscal stimulus and monetary accommodation.... 
Efforts to manage and manipulate asset prices are not new. But history provides little comfort that these practices work. Interfering with market prices occasionally buys time, but rarely do policy makers seize the window of opportunity to enact structural reform. 
Financial repression embeds the wrong incentives—obfuscation begets delay, and a robust recovery becomes unattainable. 
The path to prosperity requires taking the long road. It requires policy reforms that make the economy less reliant on the preferences of government and more responsive to the market. 
That means prioritizing long-term growth over fleeting market stability, and giving precedence to structural reforms over temporary stimulus and market manipulation.
Nothing would be a bigger structural reform than requiring ultra transparency.

Corzine's rebuff of internal warnings on risk shows why ultra transparency is needed

A Wall Street Journal article documented how Jon Corzine rebuffed MF Global's chief risk officer and his concerns over the Eurozone debt trade.

Mr. Corzine's ability to rebuff the chief risk officer and the board of directors shows why ultra transparency should be required of all financial institutions.

If market participants had access on an on-going basis to MF Global's asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, they could have assessed the risk of the Eurozone trade.  As the risk of the trade to the firm increased, they could have exerted market discipline by requiring higher returns on their investments.

Seeing his cost of funds increase would have acted as a break on increasing the Eurozone debt trade.
MF Global Holdings Ltd.'s executive in charge of controlling risks raised serious concerns several times last year to directors at the securities firm about the growing bet on European bonds by his boss, Jon S. Corzine, people familiar with the matter said. 
The board allowed the company's exposure to troubled European sovereign debt to swell from about $1.5 billion in late 2010 to $6.3 billion shortly before MF Global tumbled into bankruptcy Oct. 31, these people said. The executive who challenged Mr. Corzine resigned in March. 
The disagreement shows that concerns about the big bet grew inside the company months before the trade rattled regulators, investors and customers. 
Inside the company, they had access to the information on the trade.  Outside of the company, the information on the trade was limited.
The executive, Michael Roseman, whose title was chief risk officer, also expressed concerns directly to Mr. Corzine in meetings of just the two men and with other people present, people familiar with the situation said. 
Mr. Roseman contended MF Global didn't have enough spare cash to withstand the risks of its position in bonds of Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Belgium. He also presented gloomy hypothetical scenarios of what could happen if MF Global's credit rating was downgraded because of the exposure. 
Mr. Corzine, who started betting on the bonds shortly after arriving as chief executive in March 2010, responded to Mr. Roseman's concerns that some of the scenarios were too extreme and likely impossible, people familiar with the matter said. The former New Jersey governor and Goldman Sachs Group Inc. chairman said MF Global's exposure was limited, adding that the likely profit was worth the risks, these people said. 
Boardroom disagreements in which the CEO's decisions are questioned by a lieutenant are rare. The situation at MF Global is even more unusual because it came just six months after directors hired Mr. Corzine to turn around the struggling brokerage firm.

Is Spain going to be the first European country to implement this blog's blueprint for saving financial system?

A Wall Street Journal article suggests that Spain is going to be the first European country to implement this blog's blueprint for saving its financial system.

Under the blueprint, banks would be required to recognize the losses on their bad assets by taking reserves against losses.  The market already expects these banks to have negative book values.  Formally recognizing the losses removes any guesswork about the exact magnitude.

To restore market confidence and show that they have come clean, banks would also be required to provide ultra transparency.  Market participants can use this disclosure to confirm that all the losses were recognized.

With ultra transparency in place, Spanish banks can continue in operation for several years while they retain their earnings and rebuild their capital.  This saves the Spanish government from having to provide the funds immediately.

By disclosing on an on-going basis their asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures, market participants can also to a better job of assessing the Spanish banks as an investment opportunity.  This makes the Spanish banks more attractive for investment.

Ultra transparency also allows the market participants to exert discipline to ensure that the banks do not try to gamble on redemption by increasing their risk levels.

Finally, by making the banks recognize their losses on their bad assets, Spain's government preserves its own financial capacity to a) credibly back-up its guarantee of bank deposits with an assist from the European Financial Stability Fund and b) invest in programs to spur economic recovery.

Spain's incoming prime minister, intent on curing the country's ailing banking sector, is considering cleanup plans that could dwarf the cost of previous efforts, including ... a move to force banks to dramatically boost loan-loss reserves, people close to the situation say. 
Prime Minister-elect Mariano Rajoy has said he wants to speed up the process of dealing with €176 billion ($236 billion) of impaired real-estate assets from Spain's housing bust, although he played down the potential cost of his plans ahead of last month's elections. 
The bad assets are choking off the flow of credit and making international investors wary of the euro zone's fourth-largest economy.... 
"It makes sense to give restructuring a push by cleaning up balance sheets; it signals things are moving along," said Tano Santos, a finance professor at Columbia University in New York. "That has been one of the most damaging things in the Spanish crisis: the lack of movement." 
A more aggressive response won't come cheap. Analysts estimate a quick fix, such as setting up the bad bank or forcing banks to dramatically boost loan-loss reserves and providing government capital to backstop them, could cost the Spanish state as much as €100 billion. 
That sum raises concerns that the effort could break the government's finances, as happened to the Irish government when it recapitalized its banks and blew out its deficit to 32% of gross domestic product in 2010. 
But a growing chorus of economists and policy makers say the risks of failing to act decisively now are even greater; a new recession could further stress banks, and investor concerns about euro-zone debt problems threaten to scupper the common currency. 
Previous cleanup efforts of the outgoing government of Socialist Prime Minister JosĂ© Luis RodrĂ­guez Zapatero have fallen short, largely because they were designed to spread the cost over time and avoid a big one-time hit to the government's finances. 
Mr. Rajoy isn't expected to publicly disclose his plans for dealing with the collapse of Spain's decade-long housing boom before taking his oath of office sometime around Dec. 19. 
But some people close the situation say the fastest way to deal with the problem would be to create a bad bank that purchases the impaired assets from lenders at discounted prices. This would force the institutions to recognize losses. It also would likely undermine their solvency ratios and require further funds to shore up their capital bases. 
According to analysts at Morgan Stanley, Spain could acquire the entire €176 billion pile of impaired real-estate assets at the 58% discount applied by Ireland's bad bank, or a cost of €73.9 billion. This could be funded by swapping new government debt for the banks' soured real-estate assets. 
However, the state would have to raise sufficient funds from investors to provide the banks with an estimated €28.5 billion in new capital to absorb losses that the banks would take in selling the assets at a steep discount. In all, the cost of the plan to the Spanish state could be €102.4 billion, or around 10% of Spanish GDP. 
Still, if the €28.5 billion proves difficult to raise from private investors, given current market conditions, Mr. Rajoy has said he is open to the idea of requesting funds from the European Financial Stability Facility, the euro zone's bailout fund, to help finance the new capital needs. That is one of the facility's new mandates after it was revamped earlier this year. 
Mr. Rajoy seemed to pour cold water on the bad-bank idea when, in the heat of his pre-election debate with Socialist rival Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, he pledged not to give the banks a "single cent." 
But one person close to the situation said Mr. Rajoy's team is studying the possibility of using Spain's deposit guarantee fund, which holds €6.59 billion and is financed by contributions from the banks, to pay for necessary capital injections. That wouldn't go against his campaign pledge because the bank-financed fund, not the government, would provide the cash. 
Requesting money from the EFSF, however, would because the EFSF is funded by Spain and other euro-zone countries. 
Spain's outgoing government approved new regulations on Friday that will double banks' annual contributions to the deposit guarantee fund to around €1.5 billion. These are paltry sums compared to the banks' likely capital needs, but a system could be devised whereby the deposit guarantee fund repays over time any monies the government injects in the banks now, the person said. 
On the sidelines of a conference last week, Spain's central bank chief said the country's banks need further "restructuring" and urged the government to consider approaches that had previously been ruled out because of their high cost, including the creation of a bad bank. 
"This mechanism should be studied…situations change," said Miguel Angel Fernández Ordóñez, noting that the EFSF was now on hand to provide financing.

Concerned about the freeze in interbank lending, Bank of England introduces new liquidity facility

A Telegraph article reports that the Bank of England has introduced a new facility to make sterling available to the banking system if UK interbank lending freezes further.

Once again, a central bank treats the symptom of a solvency crisis with liquidity.

The reason that banks refuse to lend to each other is that they cannot tell if the borrowing bank is solvent or not.  They cannot assess solvency because banks are not required to provide ultra transparency.

Without on-going disclosure of each bank's asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, banks cannot assess the risk and solvency of their competitors.  When banks cannot make this assessment, they cannot lend to each other because of concern they may not be repaid.

Another way banks show they do not trust in the solvency of other banks is in the repo market.  Here, the bank with cash to lend requires better collateral and higher haircuts - a higher haircut is another way of saying the lending bank requires more collateral to support a given loan amount.

In the repo market, the symptoms of the solvency crisis express themselves as a shortage of collateral.  This particular problem is exacerbated by quantitative easing which sees the central banks purchasing the better collateral and making it unavailable to the repo market.

The move comes just days after the BoE joined the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Banks and other major central banks to boost the global supply of dollar liquidity by making it cheaper to borrow. 
However the Bank stressed today there was no "short term" shortage of sterling for UK banks. 
The Bank said its new Extended Collateral Term Repo (ECTR) Facility would enable it to offer banks 30-day loans of sterling on an ad hoc basis. 
"There is currently no shortage of short-term sterling liquidity in the market. But should that position change, the new facility gives the Bank additional flexibility to offer sterling liquidity in an auction format against the widest range of collateral," the BoE said in a statement. 
The Bank said its new facility came "in light of the continuing exceptional stresses in financial markets" and that its design had been influenced by feedback from market contacts.... 
The new ECTR Facility will have an auction format, with loans available for 30 days against collateral. 
The BoE accepts as collateral sovereign debt, residential mortgage-backed securities, securitised credit card debt, student and consumer loans and some types of asset-backed commercial paper, amongst other assets.

Monday, December 5, 2011

Occupy Wall Street embraces ultra transparency for banks

According to an FT Alphaville post, Occupy Wall Street embraces ultra transparency for banks.
Presented below is a note prepared for the December 4th meeting of the Occupy Wall Street General Assembly by its alternative banking working group. We present it – without comment – as a document for understanding the aims of OWS... 
This note has been prepared by the alternative banking working group of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement. The note is for discussion with the OWS movement and more broadly. 
The purpose of this note is to describe the characteristics of an ideal bank that embodies the values of the OWS movement. 
The current banking system lies at the heart of our current economic crisis of increasing volatility and inequality. To change that system, we need to replace it with a better bank. What would be the characteristics of this bank? 
None of these features is new, and many are already evident in credit unions, community banks and “mutuals”. But our purpose is to imagine something that might have a broader reach and impact – that might transform the banking system, and thus, by its example and through its operations, potentially create an economy that is fairer, more inclusive, democratically managed and stable....
6. Transparent – the opacity and unintelligibility (even to those working in finance) of the financial system have contributed to the “credit crunch” collapse. The operations of this bank would by contrast be wholly transparent, thus again helping minimize any risk caused by its operations.... 
In establishing the bank, the principles embodied in the characteristics outlined above should be followed as much as possible (“the means are the ends”). ... If there is general consensus within OWS and perhaps more broadly on the desirability of such a bank, the Alternative Banking group will set itself to the design and perhaps construction of the bank, drawing on the examples and experience – and perhaps the assistance – of similar such banks around the world. But there is no monopoly here: anyone is free to take inspiration from these ideas and embark upon the same challenge.

Former Chief Accountant of SEC takes on Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team

In her NY Times column, Gretchen Morgenson discusses the Fed's secret bailout of the banks as seen by Lynn E. Turner, a former chief accountant at the SEC.

Mr. Turner takes on Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team and calls for transparency to both prevent a repeat of the secret bailout and, more importantly, to change bankers' mindset so that they do not get in trouble in the first place.

In short, Mr. Turner endorses ultra transparency as proposed by your humble blogger.

The fact is, investors didn’t know how dire the situation was at these institutions. At the same time that these banks were privately thronging the teller windows at the Fed, some of their executives were publicly espousing their firms’ financial solidity. 
During the first three months of 2009, for example, when Citigroup’s Fed borrowing apparently peaked, Vikram Pandit, its chief executive, hailed the company’s performance. 
Calling that first quarter the best over all since 2007, Mr. Pandit said the results showed “the strength of Citi’s franchise.” 
Citi’s earnings release didn’t detail its large Fed borrowings; neither did its filing for the first quarter of 2009 with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Other banks kept silent on these activities or mentioned them in passing with few specifics. 
These disclosure lapses are disturbing to Lynn E. Turner, a former chief accountant at the S.E.C. Since 1989, he said, commission rules have required public companies to disclose details about material federal assistance they receive. The rules grew out of the savings and loan crisis, during which hundreds of banks failed and others received government help.
The rules are found in a section of the S.E.C.’s Codification of Financial Reporting Policies titled “Effects of Federal Financial Assistance Upon Operations.” They state that if any types of federal financial assistance have “materially affected or are reasonably likely to have a future material effect upon financial condition or results of operations, the management discussion and analysis should provide disclosure of the nature, amounts and effects of such assistance.” 
Given these rules, Mr. Turner said: “I would have expected some discussion in the management discussion and analysis of how this has had a positive impact on these banks’ operating results. The borrowings had to have an impact on their liquidity and earnings, but I don’t ever recall anybody saying ‘we borrowed a bunch of money from the Fed at zero percent interest.’ ”... 
Of course, there is stigma associated with a company tapping into federal assistance programs. This is the Fed’s main argument for keeping its operations under wraps. And companies want to avoid frightening investors by disclosing their reliance on this type of emergency cash, even if it is only temporary.
This argument is fundamentally flawed.

Prior to the introduction of deposit insurance in the 1930s, banks would routinely disclose 'all their accounts fit to print'.  This was a sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.

It is only with the arrival of the regulators that less information was made available to deposit holders and investors.

If banks were required to provide ultra transparency, market participants would know if they needed to use a Fed program and if the need was temporary or a reflection of a true solvency problem.
But keeping this information from shareholders is no way to engender their trust. And a lack of investor confidence often translates to depressed valuations among companies’ shares.
Actually, a lack of investor confidence often translates into a run on the bank.  One symptom of this is investors fleeing the bank's stock.
If investors doubt that a company is coming clean about its financial standing — the current worry is how exposed our banks are to European debt woes — its stock price will suffer. This is very likely one of the reasons that big bank stocks trade at such low price-to-earnings multiples today.
Today, investors know that banks are not coming cleaning about their financial standing.  The Fed's secret bailout was just one of the ways that bank financial statements were manipulated.

At the beginning of the financial crisis, regulators adopted a raft of programs to distort bank financial statements.  These include regulatory forbearance (extend and pretend on loans), suspension of mark to market accounting, and adoption of mark to myth accounting (management values securities based on hope rather than prevailing market prices).
It will be interesting to see whether the S.E.C. does anything to enforce its rules that companies disclose federal assistance in financial filings, either in the recent past or in the future.
Highly unlikely as the SEC is a card carrying member of Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team.

This blog has frequently documented how the SEC, despite its mandate to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner, has repeatedly endorsed opacity in the financial system.

For example, disclosure for structured finance securities is covered by SEC Regulation AB.  Under this regulation, investors only have access to the underlying loan performance information once per month.

This contrasts with the centuries old banking industry standard for monitoring a loan portfolio of looking on a daily basis for any observable events with the underlying loans.  An observable event includes a payment, delinquency, default or borrower filing for bankruptcy.

This regulation also legalized for Wall Street what was the equivalent of an insider's trading advantage.  They were able to trade on tomorrow's news today as Wall Street ran the firms that did the billing and collecting of the loans backing the structured finance securities and therefore had access to data on a daily basis.
You could certainly argue that requiring such disclosures is even more important nowadays, given that so many banks are considered too big to fail and that the taxpayer will undoubtedly be asked once again to rescue them from their mistakes.  
 “These banks and the Fed have never believed in transparency,” Mr. Turner said. “I actually think their thought process is sorely flawed. If the banks knew this stuff was going to be made public they’d behave differently. Instead of runs on the bank you’d have bankers doing things intelligently to avoid getting into trouble.” 
What an idea!
Yes, one that your humble blogger has frequently shared with regular readers.

Sunday, December 4, 2011

Bank of England: crackdown on bankers' bonuses

The Telegraph reports that the Bank of England is preparing a regulatory crackdown on the out of control bonus culture that exists in finance.

Regular readers know that rather than try to stop excessive bonuses through a regulatory crackdown, I prefer to reduce them by requiring ultra transparency.

Ultra transparency is a trader's worst nightmare.  Ultra transparency requires disclosing on an on-going basis current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Traders hate it because it lets market participants trade against them.  This includes piling into and out of trades before the trader has a chance to take a meaningful position or can exit their position.

In case there is any doubt about this, Warren Buffett negotiated with the SEC to keep his trades confidential.

Ultra transparency is also a bank CEO's worst nightmare.  Ultra transparency shines a very bright light on a bank's efforts to increase its earnings (the return in Return on Equity or Return on Assets) by increasing its risk.

With ultra transparency, market participants can assess the risk of the bank and adjust both the amount and price of their exposure to reflect this risk assessment.  As risk goes up, so does the cost of funds to the bank.

Finally, with ultra transparency, there is no need for specific regulations on payments to bankers.  If they can deliver high earnings with verifiably low risk, they should be rewarded with high pay.

The Bank has warned lenders it is considering changes to the way bonuses are measured to make it far harder for big-hitting investment bankers to justify their multi-million pound awards. 
The threat follows the central bank's decision last week to force British lenders to "limit" bonuses this year in order to shore up their balance sheets against the looming eurozone crisis....
The threat of a bonus crackdown was made in the Bank's Financial Stability Report. It said the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), which has the power to set new rules, had "noted that performance metrics, such as return on equity targets, that take little account of the risks taken to achieve them could be distorting incentives". 
It added: "Given the importance the committee attaches to this issue, it agreed to consider it in greater depth at a future meeting. It would consider, among other things, the extent to which such performance metrics influence …remuneration." 
The disclosure appears to be an early warning that reform is coming. 
At least two leading members of the FPC have been campaigning for change for some time, endorsed by the Bank. 
Robert Jenkins, an external member, said earlier this month: "Return on equity is the wrong target. Over the last 10 to 15 years it has helped to make many bankers rich and loyal shareholders poor." 
Although technical, the reform would have far-reaching implications. Return on equity, or RoE, rewards bankers for taking risk that in the recent crisis was ultimately borne by taxpayers. 
Instead, both Andy Haldane, the Bank's executive director of financial stability and a member of the FPC, and Mr Jenkins believe that bonuses should be measured against return on assets, or RoA, which adjusts for risk. 
"While the risks have typically been borne by wider society, the returns have been harvested by bank shareholders and managers," Mr Haldane has said. 
According to his analysis, the effect on bonuses from switching targets would potentially be huge. Between 1989 and 2007, in which time there was "increasing focus on RoE as a performance target", the average pay of the top seven US investment bank bosses rose from $2.8m to $26m. If their performance had been linked to RoA, it would have increased to just $3.4m. 
"Rather than rising [from 100 times] to 500 times median US household income, it would have fallen to around 68 times," Mr Haldane said.... 
According to Mr Haldane: "In effect, RoE is skill multiplied by luck."

Can today's meaningless, easily manipulated bank capital ratios be saved?

With its Financial Stability Report, the Bank of England followed in the footsteps of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and showed why today's bank capital ratios are highly manipulated and meaningless.

First, there is the problem with book capital, the numerator in a bank capital ratio.  The amount of reported bank capital is distorted by regulatory forbearance and suspension of mark to market accounting.

In both the Financial Stability Report and a Guardian article, the UK's FSA estimates that bank book capital is overstated by 5 billion pounds based on extend and pretend policies applied to 50 billion pounds of commercial real estate exposures.  This is before we get to similar policies on mortgage loans to individuals.

Suspension of mark to market on sovereign debt and structured finance securities further distorts reported bank book capital.

The bottom line is that today regulatory policy easily manipulates bank book capital and deprives it of any meaning.

Second, there is the problem with how banks calculate their risk-weighted assets, the denominator in the bank capital ratio.  Banks calculated the risk-weights on their assets differently.  The Financial Stability Report suggests that it would not be unusual for a large bank to use over 100 models in calculating its total risk adjusted assets.

In fact, as this blog has previously documented, banks "optimize" their risk-weights to minimize their risk adjusted assets in order to produce the highest capital ratios.

The bottom line is that today banks easily manipulate risk adjusted assets and deprive it of any meaning.

The question is how to restore meaning to bank capital ratios and end the various ways that they can be manipulated?

Regular readers know that the solution is implementing ultra transparency.  By requiring banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, meaning is restored to bank capital ratios.

Ultra transparency directly addresses over-stating bank capital.  Market participants will use the disclosed data to calculate the current market value of the bank's exposures.  They will use the difference between current market value of the bank's exposures and the book value of these exposures to adjust bank book equity.

This adjusted bank book equity is a meaningful number to use in calculating a bank's capital ratio.

Ultra transparency directly addresses under-stating risk adjusted assets.  Market participants will use the disclosed data to independently calculate risk adjusted assets.  Thereby rendering meaningless the bank's efforts to game the risk adjusted asset calculation.

The independently calculated risk adjusted assets is a meaningful number to use in calculating a bank's capital ratio.

Ultra transparency brings meaning back to both the numerator and denominator of the bank's capital ratio and thereby restores meaning to a bank's capital ratio.

Saturday, December 3, 2011

Eliot Spitzer on regulatory discretion and Fed's secret loan program

Slate ran a column by Eliot Spitzer, the former NY attorney general and governor, in which he discussed how the government and big banks deceived the public with their $7 trillion loan program.

In a previous post on the secret loan program, I discussed the idea of and role played by regulatory discretion.  I noted that ultra transparency is necessary as it would end the possibility of a secret loan program in the future as well as provide the information the market needs to assess the banks in the aftermath of the distortions to the bank balance sheets caused by regulatory discretion (think extend and pretend).

Mr. Spitzer focuses on the issue of disclosure.  He leaves no doubt that even if the secret loan program did not violate the law (and there is plenty of reason to think that statements made to the public misrepresented what was going on) they violate the spirit of the law.

During the deepest, darkest period of the financial cataclysm, the CEOs of major banks maintained in statements to the public, to the market at large, and to their own shareholders that the banks were in good financial shape, didn’t want to take TARP funds, and that the regulatory framework governing our banking system should not be altered. Trust us, they said. 
Yet, unknown to the public and the Congress, these same banks had been borrowing massive amounts from the government to remain afloat. 
The total numbers are staggering: $7.7 trillion of credit—one-half of the GDP of the entire nation. $460 billion was lent to J.P. Morgan, Bank of America, Citibank, Wells Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley alone—without anybody other than a few select officials at the Fed and the Treasury knowing. 
This was perhaps the single most massive allocation of capital from public to private hands in our history, and nobody was told. This was not TARP: This was secret Fed lending. And although it has since been repaid, it is clear why the banks didn’t want us to know about it: They didn’t want to admit the magnitude of their financial distress. 
The banks’ claims of financial stability and solvency appear at a minimum to have been misleading—and may have been worse. Misleading statements and deception of this sort would ordinarily put a small-market player or borrower on the wrong end of a criminal investigation. 
So where are the inquiries into the false statements made by the bank CEOs? And where are the inquiries about the Fed and Treasury officials who stood by silently as bank representatives made claims that were false, misleading, or worse?
All of the representations were also being made by the regulators.  Just look at the borrowing being done at the same time the stress tests were conducted.
Only now, because of superb analysis done by Bloomberg reporters—who litigated against the Fed and the banks for years to get the information—are we getting a full picture of the Fed and Treasury lending. 
The reporters also calculated that recipient banks and other borrowers benefited by approximately $13 billion simply by taking advantage of the “spread” between their cost of capital in these almost interest-free loans and their ability to lend the capital. 
In addition to the secrecy, what is appalling is that these loans were made with no strings attached, no conditions, and no negotiation to achieve any broader public purpose. 
Even if one accepts the notion that the stability of the financial system could not be sacrificed, those who dispensed trillions of dollars to private parties made no apparent effort to impose even minimal obligations to condition the loans on the structural reforms needed to prevent another crisis, made no effort to require that those responsible for creating the crisis be relieved of their jobs, took zero steps towards the genuine mortgage-reform that is so necessary to begin a process of economic renewal. 
The dollars lent were simply a free bridge loan so the banks could push onto others the responsibility for the banks’ own risk-taking. 
If ever there was an event to justify the darkest, most conspiratorial view held by many that the alliance of big money on Wall Street and big government produces nothing but secret deals that profit insiders—this is it. 
So what to do?
Mr. Spitzer, at a minimum banks should be required to provide ultra transparency.  They should be required to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, market participants, particularly taxpayers and policymakers, could see if and to what extent the Fed was propping up the financial system.

Thursday, December 1, 2011

Where is extra capital going to come from for UK or European banks?

The Bank of England's financial policy committee thinks that now would be a good time for banks to raise additional capital.

Setting aside my reservations about bank capital, where exactly is this capital going to come from?

As the Bank of England's Andy Haldane has said, banks are 'black boxes'.

Who is going to invest in a black box where they cannot assess the risk of the investment?

Since the beginning of the solvency crisis on August 9, 2007, I have been saying that in order to restore confidence, opacity must be eliminated throughout the financial system.

One place where there is considerable opacity is the black box that represents a bank.  To shine light into this box requires that the bank discloses its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Without this data, it is simply impossible to assess the risk of a bank as the bank's exposures can and do change rapidly in today's financial markets.

Regulators confirm this fact every day by having bank examiners on-site at the largest financial institutions.

Nils Pratley has an interesting article in the Guardian focused on the question of where the capital is going to come from.

Alarm bells are ringing at full blast in Threadneedle Street. The current environment is "exceptionally threatening," says Sir Mervyn King. The spiral of decline - falling confidence, lower asset prices, tighter credit conditions, damage to the economy - is "characteristic of a systemic crisis." 
But what should banks do? On this score, the governor of the Bank of England offered only a broad description. The gist was: whatever it takes. 
The banks actually know that ultra transparency is required.  Notice how SocGen, BNP Paribas and Jefferies turned to it briefly when faced with bank runs.
So banks should raise their capital levels to preserve confidence and maintain lending capacity.
But how much capital is required? "There is no simple answer," said Sir Mervyn. In other words: just keeping jumping and don't stop to ask 'how high?'  
This advice comes with the usual qualification about the dangers of deleveraging: don't make matters worse by stopping lending to the economy. That implies cuts to bonuses and, possibly, straightforward capital-raisings since the Financial Policy Committee thinks bank boards should "give serious consideration to raising external capital in coming months." 
But how is the latter going to work? Take Royal Bank of Scotland, already 83% owned by the state. If wholesale funding markets become fully frozen (and ice has been forming since the spring), where should the bank turn? Are taxpayers meant to subscribe for a rights issue? Are we meant to nationalise RBS all over again? Is that where we are? 
It's not the governor's job to delve into specific mechanics of capital raisings - and, in theory at least, there are many sources of new capital before the buck lands on shareholders' laps. But the problem looks acute since, for three out of four UK banks, capital levels (as opposed to capital ratios, which can be improved by deleveraging) have been going down or sideways over the past year. 
And it gets worse. Hope is fading that a strong recovery in profits could raise capital levels. 
 "The outlook for UK banks' profits has deteriorated since the previous report [in June], particularly since the start of October, which would limit banks' ability to build capital without taking other actions," says the report. ... 
Two other points flow from the above. More capital implies lower returns on capital if other factors remain the same. So bank shareholders should probably prepare to kiss goodbye to the sunny thought that double-digit returns can be earned within a year or two. Most investors had already worked this out for themselves; it's only the bank managements that are clinging to the idea that 13% is in sight. 
But, since the banks may wish to cling to the hope that capital-raisings can be avoided, the Bank and Financial Services Authority may face a big battle to get their way on capital levels. 
Second, remember that the UK is not at the heart of this "exceptionally threatening" environment. The eye of the storm is the eurozone. And if UK banks need more capital, imagine the demands on eurozone lenders.

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

MF Global highlights need for disclosing asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details

A Bloomberg article discusses the role played by the Board of Directors and complicated disclosure in MF Global's demise.

Regular readers know that market participants need financial firms to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures if the market participants are going to be able to assess the risk of the financial firm.

Rather than offer ultra transparency, the article describes how MF Global's disclosure failed to lift any of the opacity surrounding the trades.

MF Global’s regulatory filings don’t give dollar amounts for the gross purchases of European sovereign debt or for the hedges. Instead, the investments are shown as percentages of a bigger base of assets, leaving investors to calculate the numbers themselves. Those assets are reported on a market-value basis. 
The firm in filings and an October investor presentation disclosed the net amount at risk from its European bonds after hedges. Neither the presentation nor regulatory filings explained that the hedges matured before the bonds and thus would have to periodically be renewed....

MF Global disclosed in a May 20 filing that its net holdings among the five European countries consisted of $6.3 billion in debt at the end of March that had an average maturity of April 2012. 
The company said in the Aug. 3 filing that its European sovereign portfolio had risen to $6.4 billion of debt with an average maturity of October 2012. 
In both instances, MF Global said the figures were “net of hedging transactions the company has undertaken to mitigate issuer risk.” 
While reporting its net holdings had increased 2 percent, MF Global had expanded its bets to $11.5 billion as of June 30 from $7.64 billion as of March 31, according to data contained in the SEC filings. The firm didn’t quantify its holdings at the end of 2010. 
The firm’s hedges, known as reverse repurchase agreements, jumped to $4.93 billion at June 30 from $1.08 billion as of March 31, the data show. 
Revenue from the European sovereign trades was about $47 million during the fiscal fourth quarter ended March 31, or 16 percent of net revenue, and $38 million, or 12 percent, in the following quarter, according to an October investor presentation.
This lack of useful disclosure meant that MF Global's management was not constrained by market discipline -- market discipline would have taken the form of investors reducing their exposure to the firm and increasing the cost of funds to the firm as MF Global increased its risk.

Instead, MF Global was dependent on its Board of Directors.
Although the trades didn’t require pre-approval by the board, directors (MF) later questioned Corzine’s investment, according to a person familiar with the discussions. 
After challenging the size of the bets and the concentration on a small number of countries, the board set dollar limits on the amount of sovereign debt its chairman could buy. 
Corzine came back to the board at least once to get the ceiling raised. 
At multiple meetings, Corzine reassured directors that the trades would work out, said the person, who asked not to be identified because the discussions were private. 
Corzine said the European countries he selected wouldn’t default before the bonds matured, and that the market was mis-pricing the debt, according to the person. Underpinning Corzine’s view was the euro zone’s European Financial Stability Facility, which could backstop government short-term debt through June 30, 2013. 
Some risk managers and traders at MF Global shared the directors’ concerns, according to a former employee with knowledge of the matter. The risk-management department began asking for daily prices of credit-default swaps on sovereign debt to keep track of how the market viewed the underlying bonds, a second person said. 
The demise of MF Global, which was spun off from fund manager Man Group Plc in 2007, shows how Corzine’s stature made it hard for the board or underlings to oppose him, even as the crisis in Europe deepened. 
Directors believed that rejecting the trades would have been an affront to the veteran trader and would have been tantamount to firing him, said the person familiar with the board’s deliberations. 
The trades could have been rejected had there been market discipline.  Investors selling the stock as MF Global's risk increased would have been the equivalent of firing Corzine.
“This was a board that could not possibly have been more expert in exposure to risk, a board with at least as much, if not more, expertise than the CEO,” said Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, senior associate dean at the Yale University School of Management in New Haven, Connecticut, and founder of a nonprofit educational and research institute focused on CEO leadership and corporate governance. “This was an example of people not having the courage to stand up to the CEO.”
The failure to stand up to the CEO would not have been a problem if there had been ultra transparency as that would have permitted the market to exert market discipline on the CEO.