Showing posts with label Blueprint for saving financial system. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Blueprint for saving financial system. Show all posts

Sunday, August 11, 2013

Italy's banks may be forced to seek capital from government

Reuters reports that Italy's banks may be forced to seek capital from the government if they recognize some (all?) of the losses currently hiding on and off their balance sheets.

Italy is following the same failed strategy as Ireland, Portugal, Greece, Cyprus and Spain.

Step 1:  Have the banks announce modest losses
Step 2:  Hope market participants will be dumb enough to belief the banks when they claim to have cleaned up their balance sheets.
Step 3:  Failing to find enough dumb investors, the government will stand ready to buy any equity that market participants don't want.

There is no reason for investors to buy equity in any Italian bank in the absence of transparency that discloses that bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is only with this information that the investor can confirm that all losses have been realized and an assessment of the remaining risk made.

Under pressure from the Bank of Italy, banks are cleaning up their balance sheets before a health check-up on asset quality by the European Central Bank (ECB) expected in early 2014, before it takes over supervision of euro zone lenders mid-year. 
That may force them to turn to the market or the state for cash. 
"If done properly, the asset quality review should result in loan losses spiking in the second half, dividend cuts and potential capital increases," analysts at Berenberg said in a note to clients. 
Monte dei Paschi, the country's scandal-hit No. 3 lender, and a string of mid-sized banks look particularly vulnerable. 
"Italian mid-tier lenders are among the weakest in Europe," Royal Bank of Scotland chief credit strategist Alberto Gallo said. 
He estimates that Monte dei Paschi, which posted its fifth straight quarterly loss on Wednesday, may need up to 5 billion euros over the next three years, on top of a 4.1-billion-euro state bailout it received in February. 
The bank will find it difficult to lure private investors for such a sizeable amount - more than twice its market capitalisation, potentially requiring more support from Italy's cash-strapped government, Gallo said.

Thursday, June 20, 2013

Surprise, banks are still a danger to the real economy

In his Financial Times column, Chris Giles looks at the reasons that banks are still a danger to the real economy.

Unfortunately, he leaves off his list the number one reason banks are a danger to the real economy: politicians and financial regulators who do not use a modern banking system as it is designed to protect the real economy by requiring banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

This failure to use banks as they are designed shifts the burden of the financial crisis from the banks onto the real economy.

This burden hurts the real economy in several ways.

For example, it diverts capital needed for reinvestment, growth and supporting the social contract to debt service payments on the excess debt.

For example, it makes it virtually impossible to get a loan as valuing the collateral being offered becomes extremely difficult.  This is particularly true of real estate collateral where the price of real estate is being artificially propped up through banks not foreclosing, banks engaging in 'extend and pretend' and turning non-performing loans into 'zombie loans', and central banks pursuing zero interest rate policies.

When the authorities intervene in banking, their aim is to protect the economy from the banks rather than the banks from the economy.
Please note that authorities intervening in banking was done based on advice from the bankers.

The banking system is designed so that authorities do not need to intervene, particularly to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses, as they did and still do.
This turn of phrase, borrowed from Sir Mervyn King, the outgoing Bank of England governor, should be the yardstick for progress. 
On the morning after the annual Mansion House speeches by the BoE governor and the chancellor, the question is whether George Osborne is correct to say that the UK has reached a turning point from “rescue to recovery”? Is the economy now protected from banks?... 
The simple answer is No. 
The move from rescue to recovery is a question of degree and there is quite some way still to go. Sir Mervyn talked about “the work of a generation”....
Well Sir Mervyn should talk about the "work of a generation" as the EU, UK and US borrowed their policy response from Japan which had a similar banking crisis and is still trying to work its way out of that crisis a generation later.
Much progress has nevertheless been made since 2007. 
The crisis at Co-operative Bank demonstrates that parts of the new regulatory mechanisms are working in the way ultimately intended. ....That new arm of the BoE stood its ground and insisted the Co-op plug a £1.5bn hole in its capital buffers. With the authorities demanding action and no taxpayer money on the table, the wider Co-op group has been forced to inject money from other parts of the business and extract a significant, but still to be determined, contribution from bondholders. 
There was no knock-on distress to other banks’ funding costs or lending. This was banking recovery in action, a regulatory intervention much preferable to the resolution of a dying bank or a taxpayer bailout.
This is the way that a modern banking system has been designed to operate since the 1930s.  This is simply an example of the regulators using the bank as it was designed.
But what is true for the Co-op or for other small financial entities still would not apply to the big boys. If RBS, Lloyds, Barclays, HSBC, Nationwide or Santander UK got into difficulties, the authorities could not stand back. 
Authorities could stand back.  Authorities will not stand back.  After all, they have to consider their post political or regulatory careers.
Nor will we know, ultimately, how healthy Britain’s banks are until monetary policy returns to something approaching normality. The eventual return to interest rates near 4 or 5 per cent contains many hidden dangers for banks if their customers cannot cope with higher borrowing costs. 
Before a new world of normality can be achieved, action is still needed on many fronts to make banks and bankers a more normal part of the British economy.
There is no reason to ever expect monetary policy to escape the ZIRP/QE trap.  These policies are designed to artificially inflate asset prices and hope that the wealth effect will spur economic growth to support the inflated prices.

The problem is that the wealth effect has been shown to be virtually non-existent.
Four “Cs” are especially relevant in removing the special tag from banking and bankers. 
As the parliamentary commission makes clear, the first is the conduct of the industry. Perverse incentives with enormous rewards for success and insufficient sanction for failure must be addressed, especially when the distinction between both depends so much on luck. Deferred bonuses, clawbacks and the mere hint of criminal penalties will help, but can be successful only if banks and bankers embrace a new culture. Success is far from guaranteed....
As regular readers know, conduct of the industry is easily addressed by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is well known that sunlight is the best disinfectant of bad banker behavior. Effectively, sunlight introduces a new culture into banking based on providing services society needs rather than betting with taxpayer money.
Third comes the more difficult area of capital. While banks are far better capitalised than in 2007 and in the long run the BoE is right to argue that higher capital levels do not impede lending, the transition is difficult and gives banks the incentive to reduce lending in the process of becoming safer.
Capital is another area that is easily handled by ultra transparency.

First, with this level of disclosure, banks are subject to market discipline to recognize all the losses currently hidden on and off their balance sheets.

Second, with this level of disclosure, market discipline is exerted on banks to rebuild their book capital levels while restraining their risk taking.  In the 1930s when ultra transparency was seen as the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet, banks carried much higher levels of book capital.

Wednesday, June 12, 2013

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane: Central bank created bond bubble threatens financial system

In his testimony before Parliament, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane made clear that the greatest threat to financial stability was the central bank zero interest rate/quantitative easing induced bond bubble.

Regular readers know that Mr. Haldane is accurate in his assessment and that the pursuit of ZIRP and QE was totally and completely unnecessary as a response to the bank solvency led financial crisis.

As your humble blogger has been saying since before the financial crisis spiraled out of control in 2008, the way to deal with this crisis is to adopt the Swedish Model and require banks to absorb upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

Please note, the only way to end Mr. Haldane's concern about unwinding ZIRP and QE and triggering financial instability is to adopt the Swedish Model with a twist.  The twist being that the banks "pay" for their having been bailed out by "donating" their holdings of government securities to the issuing sovereigns.

Will this make the vast majority of banks have low or even negative book capital levels?

Yes, but modern banks are designed because of the presence of deposit insurance and central banks to be able to continue operating and supporting the real economy when they have low or negative book capital levels.  They can do so because with deposit insurance the taxpayers act as the banks' silent equity partners.

A key Bank of England policymaker has warned of the risks to global financial stability when "the biggest bond bubble in history" bursts. 
In a wide-ranging testimony to MPs, Andy Haldane, Bank of England director of financial stability,... told the Treasury select committee that the bursting of the bond bubble – created by central banks forcing down bond yields by pumping electronic money into the economy – was a risk "I feel acutely right now"....

But he described bond markets as the main risk to financial stability. 
"If I were to single out what for me would be biggest risk to global financial stability right now it would be a disorderly reversion in the yields of government bonds globally." he said. 
There had been "shades of that" in recent weeks as government bond yields have edged higher amid talk that central banks, particularly the US Federal Reserve, will start to reduce its stimulus. 
"Let's be clear. We've intentionally blown the biggest government bond bubble in history," Haldane said. "We need to be vigilant to the consequences of that bubble deflating more quickly than [we] might otherwise have wanted."

Friday, May 24, 2013

Martin Wolf and Ken Rogoff agree: "it is not too late to change course"

The Financial Times' Martin Wolf and Harvard professor Ken Rogoff have taken different paths, but they both agree that the current approach to handling the bank solvency led global financial crisis that began on August 9, 2007 is not working and that "it is not too late to change course".

Mr. Wolf sets out in his column what would be included in this change of course.
The right approach to a crisis of this kind is to use everything: policies that strengthen the banking system; policies that increase private sector incentives to invest; expansionary monetary policies; and, last but not least, the government’s capacity to borrow and spend.
Professor Rogoff lays out in his Guardian column what he thinks is wrong with the current approach and therefore what should be included in this change of course.
No one seems to have the power to impose a sensible resolution of its peripheral countries' debt crisis. Instead of restructuring the manifestly unsustainable debt burdens of Portugal, Ireland, and Greece (the PIGs), politicians and policymakers are pushing for ever-larger bailout packages with ever-less realistic austerity conditions.
Interestingly, both Mr. Wolf and Professor Rogoff have come to champion your humble blogger's blueprint for fixing the financial crisis.

For both individuals, the starting point is dealing with the excess debt in the global financial system.  As Professor Rogoff points out:
In a debt restructuring, the northern eurozone countries (including France) will see hundreds of billions of euros go up in smoke.... These hundreds of billions of euros are already lost, and the game of pretending otherwise cannot continue indefinitely....

But the sooner the underlying reality is made transparent and becomes widely recognised, the lower the long-run cost will be.

The way to deal with this excess public and private debt is by adopting the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to absorb upfront the losses on this debt.

By having the banks absorb the losses on the excess debt, the burden of servicing this debt is lifted from the real economy.  Currently, capital that is needed for reinvestment, growth and supporting the social contract is being diverted to servicing this debt.  Ending this diversion will boost the growth rate of the real economy.

Regular readers know that a modern banking system is designed so that the banks can absorb these losses and still continue to operate and support the real economy.

Banks can do this as a result of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, when banks have low or negative book capital levels, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner.

After absorbing the losses, the banks then rebuild their book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

To make sure the bankers don't gamble on redemption while the banks are rebuilding their book capital levels, banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can exert discipline on the bankers to restrain risk taking.

Once the losses have been recognized, to jumpstart the economy, governments need to adopt fiscal stimulus.

At the same time, central banks need to remove the economic headwinds caused by zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing.  They need to restore short term interest rates to Walter Bagehot's lower bound of 2%.

Increasing interest rates from zero to two percent is actually good for economic growth as it ends the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Zero interest rates triggered this death spiral as savers, both individuals and companies, reduced their current consumption to offset the lack of earnings on their retirement savings.

Tuesday, May 7, 2013

As EU heads towards common deposit insurance, it looks at question of how quickly to recapitalize banks

Bloomberg reports that as the EU heads towards common deposit insurance for its banks, it is now looking at the question of how quickly does a bank need to be recapitalized after it recognizes its losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Regular readers know that the answer is banks don't have to be recapitalized immediately, but rather can rebuild their book capital levels over several years by retaining 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

The reason that banks don't need to be recapitalized immediately is the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

To prevent banks from gambling on redemption after they have recognized their losses, banks must be required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants in combination with the bank regulators can exert restraint on risk taking by management.

The myth that banks need to be recapitalized immediately is solely a function of bankers attempting to protect their ongoing bonuses and shirk any responsibility for the losses that they incurred.  After all, a bank that is rebuilding its book capital level is highly unlikely to pay any cash bonuses.

Common deposit guarantees will be necessary to complete the European banking union project, Dutch Finance Minister Jeroen Dijsselbloem said. 
“That will be the final building block of the banking union, a necessary block,” Dijsselbloem, who heads the group of euro-area finance ministers, said at a conference in Brussels today. 
Precursors include new rules on bank resolution, common standards for national deposit guarantees and a European bank resolution scheme that is due to be proposed in June, he said. 
The euro area needs to press ahead with creating new tools to recapitalize banks, such as rules for when the European Stability Mechanism can provide direct aid, Dijsselbloem said. “We need to have the instruments to deal with the problems, because just exposing problems in banks and not having an answer” for recapitalizing them “would be very dangerous.”...
Actually, the only danger is to banker bonuses.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, everyone knows that the banks have been hiding losses.  The only question is the true size of these losses.

The first step to exposing the problems in the banks is to require them to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current exposure details.

With this information, market participants can determine how large the losses are at each bank.

Then, the question becomes, which banks are still capable of generating enough income from their performing assets to cover their interest and operating expenses.  These banks stay in business and rebuild their capital levels.

Banks that cannot cover their expenses even after recognizing their losses and returning their bad debt into performing debt again should be resolved.
Dijsselbloem said today that the ECB will need to review asset quality as soon as it takes up its new duties, noting that there is “still the risk of contamination between banks.”
The ECB has said if depositors are protected consistently across the euro zone, including guarantees for small accounts and preference for uninsured depositors over other types of unsecured creditors, further measures aren’t needed for now. 
The current EU deposit-guarantee proposal “provides a harmonized framework and should help shore up confidence in national schemes,” said ECB Vice President Vitor Constancio in a March speech. “This means that a single European scheme is not an essential component of banking union in the short term.”

Wednesday, April 24, 2013

Archbishop of Canterbury Justin Welby on long-term solution to financial crisis: "ancient virtue of transparency"

The Telegraph reports when asked what the long-term solution to the financial crisis is, the Archbishop of Canterbury and member of Parliament's commission on banking standards, Justin Welby, replied: the "ancient virtue of transparency".

Regular readers know your humble blogger strongly agrees.

He told the audience of Lords, MPs, bankers and businessmen that Britain was in the grip of a “failure of confidence” - rebuilding, he said, is “essentially an ethically based activity”....  
Having been asked by the Bible Society to come up with “long-term solutions to the financial crisis”, the Archbishop was practical. Sir Mervyn King told the Commission that a high proportion of bad loans in some of our major banks have not yet been recognised. 
The answer, said Archbishop Welby, was “the obvious and ancient virtue of transparency”: if banks are forced to recognise their losses, they will also have to recapitalise.... 
“Balance sheets that are not transparent, that do not recognise the full potential of loan losses, are not only bad in themselves but create a sense of fear and overhang in the markets.”
Please re-read Archbishop Welby's comments as he nicely summarizes why we need transparency to restore confidence and remove the sense of fear and overhang in the markets.

Like your humble blogger, the Archbishop calls for banks to recognize their losses today and then recapitalize over the next several years (the long-term) by rebuilding their book capital levels.  Book capital can be rebuilt through a combination of retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings and stock issuance.

Saturday, April 20, 2013

Paul Krugman: reasons current policies to end financial crisis has failed are obvious

On his NY Times blog, Paul Krugman attempts to explain why it was predictable that the policies applied to end the bank solvency led financial crisis would not succeed and why it is no mystery what must be done to end the crisis.

Regular readers know that the Nobel-prize winning economics professor is on the right track when he says it was predictable before the policies were implemented that they would fail [your humble blogger predicted it] and why it it is no mystery what must be done to end the crisis [your humble blogger has been saying it publicly since the beginning of the crisis].

However, like all economists, he fails to consider, or maybe it is understand, that there is an X-factor that explains why the policies implemented would fail and why his choice of policies to end the financial crisis would have failed also.

The X-factor is the banking system and the excess debt in the financial system it is designed to absorb the losses on.

It is a very bold statement to say economists fail to consider or maybe understand the role of the banks and why they are an X-factor.

Why do I make it?

No less an authority on economics than Nobel-prize winning economist Joseph Stiglitz observed that prior to the financial crisis economic models left out the banking system in its entirety.  The banking system was seen as moving money from your left to right pocket and therefore could be ignored.

The conclusion from this statement is if the policies you recommend when the banking system is ignored are the same policies you recommend after we discover that the banking system cannot be ignored, there is little reason to believe your policies are right.

Chris Giles of the FT reports that central bankers are worried that they are “flying blind”; he quotes Lorenzo Bibi-Smaghi, formerly of the ECB governing board, saying “We don’t fully understand what is happening in advanced economies.” 
Um, guys, that’s because you don’t want to understand.
Professor Krugman makes an excellent point about the desire of central bankers, policy makers and economists not wanting to understand what is happening.

I have explored on this blog a number of different reasons they might not want to understand or worse, understand, but chose to adopt policies that don't reflect this understanding.
Nothing about our current situation, except maybe the absence of outright deflation, is at all surprising or mysterious. 
We had a huge financial crisis, and the combination of a housing bust (on both sides of the Atlantic) and an overhang of household debt (also on both sides) has acted as a drag on private demand.
Here is where a discussion of the banks and how they are suppose to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system is suppose to come in.
Monetary policy quickly found itself up against the zero lower bound, while fiscal policy, after providing some stimulus, soon turned strongly contractionary....
Here is where Professor Krugman pushes his solution of more fiscal stimulus needed.

Unfortunately, by not dealing with the excess debt in the financial system, this additional fiscal stimulus would also not solve the problem.  Put simply, the fiscal stimulus would be swallowed by the debt burden that the excess debt places on the real economy.

We saw this with the original fiscal stimulus at the beginning of the Obama administration and we have seen this repeatedly in Japan.
But many central bankers and other officials chose to ignore all that and place their faith in the confidence fairy instead. 
So now that it has all gone wrong, they throw up their hands and say that it’s a mystery — how could this happen? 
No mystery, guys; you messed up.
The same conclusion would hold had Professor Krugman's solution been followed in the absence of requiring the banks to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

However, if the banks were required to fulfill the function that they are designed for, which is absorbing the losses on the excess debt in the financial system, then Professor Krugman's solution would in fact see the results he anticipates.

Tuesday, April 9, 2013

Slovenia must act on banks

As discussed in his Wall Street Journal Heard on the Street column, Richard Barley notes that Slovenia is fast approaching the time where the pattern that leads to a taxpayer or depositor funded bank bailout becomes inescapable.

Regular readers know that Slovenia could still escape this fate by taking a more proactive approach and requiring its banks to provide ultra transparency.

By requiring its banks to disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, Slovenia accomplishes two objectives.

First, it postpones for several months the time when a bailout might become inescapable.

Second, it and the market discover just how big the holes are in the bank balance sheets and whether the banks are capable of generating interest income in excess of their interest expense and pre-banker bonus cost of doing business.

If banks can generate income in excess of their cost of doing business, then no bailout is necessary as the banks can recapitalize themselves out of retention of future earnings.

Those banks that cannot generate an excess need to be closed.

Thursday, March 28, 2013

Slovenia to make banks pay for existing losses out of their future earnings

Reuters reports that Slovenia has rejected the EU model of confiscating deposits to pay for losses currently on its bank balance sheets and has decided instead to make the banks pay for these losses out of their future earnings stream.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been arguing that in a modern banking system, banks are designed to absorb existing losses in the financial system and recapitalize themselves through retention of future earnings.  It is nice to see my ideas are gaining international attention and acceptance.

Clearly, the Slovenia government accepts my premise.

As for the implementation...

Slovenia has been thrown into the spotlight as the next eurozone country likely to seek an international bailout, given the fragile state of its banking sector.... 
Part of the uncertainty still surrounding the country is due to adjustments that the new governing coalition - led by Prime Minister Alenka Bratusek - has pledged to make to the original 'bad bank' proposal put forward by the previous Janez Jansa administration. 
One of the key tweaks now under consideration, according to RBS, is the creation of internal bad banks within each of the country's largest financial lenders, postponing any transfer of toxic assets to an external bank asset management company to a later date. 
"Initially, bad assets would be transferred to the internal bad banks and backed simply by government guarantees," said Abbas Ameli-Renani, an emerging market strategist at RBS.
By keeping the bad assets on the bank balance sheets, the source for paying off the losses on the bad assets is future bank earnings and not the taxpayer.
Under the original proposal, assets would have been transferred immediately to the BAMC in exchange for newly-issued government bonds.
This would have taken the banks and bankers off the hook for paying for the losses on the bad debt and instead socialized the losses and made the taxpayers pay for the losses on the bad debt.
While there will be a simultaneous recapitalisation of banks under both arrangements, the new version would not result in an immediate spike in the government's debt level, because the authorities would initially provide banks with guarantees rather than newly issued securities. 
One of the downsides, however, is that the plan will keep bad assets on banks' balance sheets and under the same management.
Keeping the bad assets on banks' balance sheets is not a 'bug', but a feature.  By making the banks absorb the losses on all the excess debt in the financial system, the government is establishing how much in the way of future earnings must be retained to recapitalize the banks.

Going forward, the banks will retain 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings until they have rebuilt their book capital levels.

As for the new guarantees, because of deposit insurance, the guarantees are effectively already in place.


Please note, market participants already know a) that the banks are hiding significant losses and b) that the Slovenia government is standing behind its deposit guarantees.  This is why the banks are still operating despite the fact that they would have a low or negative book capital level if the losses were recognized.

To avoid the bankers gambling on redemption or trying to hide the losses on the bad assets, going forward the Slovenia government should require that the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can exert restraint on bank management behavior and ensure that the banks rebuild their book capital levels without excessive risk taking.

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Savers will be raided to pay for hidden bank losses

As reported by the Telegraph, the EU has decided that the way to break the bank-sovereign link is to have savers pay for the losses still hidden on the EU bank balance sheets.

This is a very important change in policy because savers have no way to assess the risk of the banks and therefore how much of their money will be seized to pay for the hidden losses.  A point that the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane made abundantly clear when he referred to banks as 'black boxes'.

EU policy makers would like savers to trust some combination of high capital ratios and the stress tests run by financial regulators.  However, there is absolutely no reason for savers to trust either the book capital reported by the banks or the results of the stress tests.

The history of book capital is that it is easily manipulated by both the financial regulators and the bankers.  As the OECD pointed out, regulators manipulate it by suspending mark-to-market accounting.  They also manipulate it by engaging in regulatory forbearance which allows the bankers to engage in 'extend and pretend' with their non-performing loans and turn them into 'zombie' loans.

The history of the stress tests is that passing the test with high capital ratios is not a good predictor that the bank will not subsequently be nationalize/closed due to insolvency.  This was shown first with the Irish banks, subsequently with Dexia and most recently with the Cyprus banks (July 2011 Cyprus banks pass stress tests).

What made the US stress tests "successful" was former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner pledging the full faith and credit of the US to provide all the capital necessary to support the insolvent banks.  Previously, the EU made the same representation about its stress tests.

Regular readers know since the beginning of the financial crisis your humble blogger has been saying that if the policy makers and financial regulators want the unsecured creditors of the banks to be responsible for absorbing losses, the banks must first provide ultra transparency.

It is only when the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants have the information they need to assess the risk of the banks.

Under the FDR Framework, it is only when market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner, which is what ultra transparency is, that market participants become bound by the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware) and responsible for losses.

Without ultra transparency, savers, including large depositors and other unsecured creditors, are being asked by EU policy makers to blindly gamble on the contents of a black box.  Why should they?

I understand the reluctance of the EU policy makers and financial regulators to require the banks to provide ultra transparency before they seize the savers' money.  Ultra transparency will show just have negative the book capital level is for each bank.

Fortunately, it is not a problem if market participants know how negative the book capital level is for banks as banks are designed to operate with low or negative book capital levels.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.  As a result, banks can continue to lend and support the real economy.

Your humble blogger has proposed on numerous occasions how to transition so that investors are responsible for losses:

  1. Require banks provide ultra transparency.
  2. Continue to protect large depositors and unsecured debt holders on all investment made at each bank until 6 months after the bank has begun providing ultra transparency.  This gives market participants a chance to assess the risk of the bank.
  3. All new large deposits or unsecured debt purchased after the 6 month period has elapsed is subject to being bailed-in.
At the same time that investors become responsible for losses, the banks become subject to market discipline.

Thursday, March 21, 2013

Rather than tax deposits and threaten stability of financial system, use deposit guarantee as basis for ending financial crisis

A Reuters poll reveals that 20 out of 22 economists and bond strategists see the Cyprus deposit tax as undermining both the deposit guarantee and the stability of the EU financial system.

This poll confirms what your humble blogger has been saying about how a modern banking system is designed so that banks can operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Why does this poll confirm this statement?

Because everyone in Cyprus already knows that the banks are insolvent (the book value of their liabilities exceeds the market value of their assets) even if the bank regulators have taken steps so that banks do not show this reality in their financial statements.

What is going to cause the run on the banks not only in Cyprus but across the EU is not the banks being insolvent or having a negative book capital level, rather it is the tax on the deposits to cover the losses that the banks' incurred.  This tax effectively ends the deposit guarantee which is suppose to protect depositors from bank losses.

So long as the deposit guarantee is in place, depositors are completely insensitive to the solvency/insolvency or book value of the bank.

This is behavior that was learned from the depositor's parents when they first opened up a bank account and asked how do they know they will be able to get their money back and were told that the government guarantees they can get their money back.

This behavior shows up when you ask people do they know what the total amount of shareholder equity at their bank was at the end of last quarter.  Virtually no one knows including the economists, regulators and central bankers who are campaigning for banks to hold more capital.

Why don't they know?  Because if you keep your deposits below the government guarantee, there is no reason to know or care.

This observation has important implications for how policymakers should respond to a financial crisis where there is a significant amount of excess debt in the financial system.

Your humble blogger was the first person in the world to talk about how deposit insurance makes it possible for the banks to protect the real economy by absorbing all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Yes, the banks will have negative book capital levels.  But absolutely no one cares (except the bankers as it restricts their cash bonuses).

Ending this financial crisis is easy.  Rather than destroying the deposit guarantee, use the deposit guarantee and have the banks absorb the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

A proposed levy on deposits in Cyprus would pose a threat to the financial stability of other vulnerable euro zone countries, according to a near-unanimous sample of analysts polled by Reuters. 
Twenty out of 22 economists and bond strategists surveyed since Monday said a tax on deposits risks undermining the banking systems of other countries threatened by the euro zone debt crisis....

In theory, euro zone deposits up to 100,000 euros are guaranteed, but analysts warned the proposal of a levy risked debasing that principle, literally overnight. 
"The risk is that ... bank customers no longer trust the guarantee for private deposits in all member states of the European Union," said Gernot Griebling, head of bond research at German bank LBBW. 
"In the case that rumors on solvency problems of another bank come up, this might lead to a bank run." 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who chairs meetings of euro zone finance ministers, said any bailout of Cyprus, one of the currency union's smallest economies, will have to involve some kind of levy on depositors.... 


Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Germany's policy: banking sector must contribute to recapitalizing banks

As the search for a solution on how to recapitalize Cyprus' banks continues, one thing has become clear.  Germany has adopted a new policy under which it will no longer contribute substantial funds to bailout another EU country's banking sector.

The new German policy can be summarized as:  the banking sector must contribute to recapitalizing the banks.

Regular readers know that this is what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis.

There is no legitimate reason why a government should issue debt to bailout the banks and Germany has correctly recognized this.

The question is how to get the banks to contribute 100% of the bailout funds.

What distinguishes my answer to this question from the approach initially proposed by Germany to Cyprus is how I handle the issue of how quickly the banks need to be recapitalized.

My approach recognizes that a modern banking system is designed so that banks do not have to be recapitalized immediately.  This is a very important point as it is the reason that banks can provide 100% of the bailout funds through retention of future earnings.

Banks are designed so that they can continue operating and supporting the real economy even when they have low or negative book capital levels.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  This permits the banks to continue to make loans and handle payments.

Germany's approach of requiring the depositors to take a haircut is driven by their assuming that banks have to be recapitalized immediately.  Something that is not true, but has been obscured by Japan, the UK and the US pursuing policies of protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

Monday, March 18, 2013

Thanks to Cyprus, issue of who pays for bank losses re-emerges

By proposing to violate the sanctity of deposit guarantees to help fund its bailout of its banks, Cyprus has put the issue of who pays for bank losses back onto the agenda.

Thank you Cyprus and by extension Germany, Finland and the IMF.

Regular readers know that a modern banking system is designed so that the banks can pay for their losses, but that since the beginning of the current financial crisis, politicians have prevented this from occurring and instead have made savers and/or taxpayers pay for the banks' losses.

Let me unpack the bolded statement.

A modern banking system is designed so that banks can absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to operate and support the real economy even if the banks have low or negative book capital levels.

Why?

Because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.  With this "silent equity partner", banks can continue to extend the credit that the real economy needs for growth.

The idea that banks can continue to operate with low or negative book capital levels doesn't appear in any textbook or article in a scholarly journal.  What proof is there that the modern banking system is designed to act this way?

Let me provide you three examples that confirm the banking system is designed to act this way.

First, in the mid-1980s, the write-down of loans to Less Developed Countries meant that Security Pacific effectively had negative book capital.  This fact was well known to market participants as they knew the size of Security Pacific's exposures, the size of write-downs other banks were taking on similar exposures and how much book capital Security Pacific had before the LDC write-downs began.

Not only was Security Pacific not closed, but it was allowed to engage in a large acquisition (Rainier) to help it rebuild its book capital levels (pooling accounting).

Second, in the late-1980s, the US Savings and Loans saw their book capital disappear as a result of losses incurred in a rising interest rate environment by the mismatch in pricing between their assets and their liabilities.

The savings and loans didn't go away.  Rather they continued in operation, some would say gambling on redemption by making loans to real estate developers, until closed by the financial regulators several years later.

Third, in 2008, Citigroup's book capital level dropped to what can only be described as a low level.  Citigroup was not closed.

In each of these examples, despite low or negative book capital levels, the financial institutions continued to operate and provide credit to support the real economy.

In each of these examples, the ultimate authority that made the decision to close or not close the financial institutions was the financial regulator responsible for protecting the deposit insurance fund and the taxpayers and not the debt or equity markets.

What ultimately caused the savings and loans to be shutdown is that their franchise was unable to generate earnings that could be retained to rebuild their book capital levels and reduce the risk of loss to the deposit insurance fund and taxpayers.

Please note, that while the examples were drawn from the US, just from the latest financial crisis there are numerous international examples too.

The fact that a modern banking system is designed to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system is inconvenient for policymakers and bankers.  

It is inconvenient because it provides an alternative to savers and/or taxpayers as the answer to the question of who pays for bank losses.  The alternative being the banks and bankers themselves by applying as much of their future earnings as is needed to absorb the losses.

Since the beginning of our current financial crisis, global policymakers have been pursuing a strategy of protecting bank book capital levels and, with it, banker bonuses at all costs.

They have done so under what I have called the Japanese Model (named after the failed policy response that Japan has been pursuing for the last 2+ decades to its financial crisis).  The Japanese Model always fails as a policy response because it is fundamentally flawed.

In protecting bank book capital levels, the Japanese Model allows the banks to kick the can down the road on recognizing losses.  This is not a costless exercise.  In fact, the cost of carrying those losses is very high.

The cost of carrying the losses includes zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies (which hit savers), fiscal stimulus (which hits taxpayers through the additional debt governments take on) and austerity (which hits the poor through a reduction in social programs).

What Cyprus did by "taxing" bank depositors was to simply speed up the process by which financial repression under the Japanese Model takes money from the savers and gives it to the banks (notice that no bankers in Cyprus were going to lose their jobs despite losing billions).

This confiscation of saver funds put the issue of who pays for bank losses back on the agenda.

Why?

Because the savers and taxpayers now know that their governments could also confiscate their deposits without warning to absorb the bank losses.  The lack of warning highlights the simple fact that savers and taxpayers were never consulted about who should pay for the bank losses at any time since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Having been fooled once into paying for the banks' losses, savers and taxpayers are now unlikely to be fooled again.

Germany provides confirmation of this as the current German government is facing defeat because the German citizens are tired of paying for bank losses that could and should be paid for by the banks themselves (even if this means that bankers' cash bonuses will be reduced).

Saturday, March 16, 2013

Rather than confiscate insured deposits, could we please fix the global financial system

EU policy makers have crossed the rubicon and decided that insured deposit holders should no longer be protected from the financial performance of the banks, but rather are a source of funds to recapitalize the banks.

With this single action, EU policy makers have undermined the global financial system and dramatically increased its instability.

Why?

Because depositors trusted that their governments would honor their deposit guarantees.  They have repeatedly demonstrated this across countries like Greece and Spain where no matter how insolvent their banks looked, the depositors kept their money in the banks out of a belief it was safe.

This is simply no longer true no matter how EU policy makers try to spin it.

The burden is now on depositors to determine if their bank is sitting on losses that the depositor will now have to absorb.

We are about to experience the same response as happened with structured finance securities when investors suddenly discovered that they did not know what they owned.  Banks are "black boxes" and structured finance securities are "brown paper bags" when it comes to looking to find out what their underlying exposures are.

Depositors, like structured finance security investors, are going to look for the door.

Why stay and risk the possibility of loss for no return?

As part of confiscating insured deposits in Cyprus, the ECB is standing ready to provide the banks with funds to offset the run that is going to start next Tuesday.  So in fairly short order, the ECB will be the primary funding source for the Cyprus banks.

Please note that all of this is avoidable if policy makers stop listening to bankers (who got us into the financial crisis and truly only care about protecting their bonuses) and PhD economists (who frankly don't understand how a bank actually works so they excluded it from their models).

Policy makers have to start listening to individuals like your humble blogger who has a track record that shows they understand what is wrong with the global financial system and what it will take to fix it.

I am on record for "predicting" the financial crisis and with this blog have consistently been accurate when stating what policies will work and what policies will not work as soon as they are mentioned, let alone adopted.

My blueprint for saving the global economy is pretty simple.

First, use the banks as they are designed to be used.  Banks are designed to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to support the real economy.

It is a myth that banks need to be recapitalized immediately after absorbing these losses.  Banks are designed to operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.  With taxpayers as a silent equity partner, banks have virtually unlimited "equity" so they can continue to extend credit to support the real economy.

Then, over time, banks can rebuild their book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

Call step one:  freely spend as much as it takes in future bank earnings to absorb all of the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

Two, bring transparency back to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

For banks, this means requiring them to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can confirm that the banks have absorbed all the losses on their exposures.  With this information, market participants can exert discipline and restrain risk taking by bankers and gambling on redemption.

For structured finance securities, this means requiring observable event based reporting under which all activities like a payment or delinquency on the underlying collateral are reported to market participants before the next business day.  Observable event based reporting allows market participants to know what they are buying and know what they own.

Three, use expansionary fiscal policies to kickstart the global economy.

Four, raise interest rates back to the 2% minimum set by Walter Baghot in the 1870s by ending zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

This is critical because it ends the ongoing Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Under this spiral, current demand is reduced as savers, both individuals and companies, try to offset the drop in earnings on their investments.  Raising rates allows savers to make some money which in turn shows up as current demand.

No matter what the economic models say, raising rates will not discourage business investment.  What discourages business investment is lack of demand.  This has been proven since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Saturday, March 2, 2013

Is slow growth America's and western economies' new normal?

In his very interesting Washington Post blog post, Jim Tankersley asks the question of whether slow growth is the new normal?

Your humble blogger has said since the beginning of the financial crisis that based on the policies pursued by the global policymakers the answer is "yes".

In fact, I predicted in 2007 that the policies being pursued would leave the global economy at best in a Japan-style economic slump, more likely in a downward spiral and at worse in a depression.

Perhaps more importantly, your humble blogger has discussed at length what policies have to be adopted to end this period of slow growth and restore a higher level of growth across the global economy.
Good economists are great storytellers. They sculpt narratives .... Like a novel, a good economic forecast has action and characters and, in the end, helps you make a little better sense of the world. 
Unless it turns out to be wrong.
Fortunately for my regular readers, I have been right about both what is happening to the global economy and why it is happening.
Consider the dominant story that economic forecasters have been telling you for years now: The U.S. economy just can’t catch a break. 
It has been poised time and again to rocket back to a growth rate that would recapture all the ground lost in the Great Recession, while delivering big job gains. But every time, some outside event scuttles things. 
The euro crisis flares up. A Japanese tsunami scrambles global supply chains. Lawmakers play chicken with the federal debt limit....
This is the dominant story of economic forecasters who failed to predict our current financial crisis and/or have a vested interest in promoting the current mix of policies.
Now consider the possibility that the can’t-catch-a-break story gets it backward. What if the economy isn’t particularly unlucky? 
Actually, the real economy is horribly unlucky.

It is horribly unlucky in that it has economists who failed to predict the financial crisis offering opinions on what it will take to recover from the financial crisis.  Opinions that policymakers for better or worse appear to rely on in setting policy.

Having a Nobel Prize in Economics does not convey the right to open one's mouth in absolute ignorance.

In fact, having a Nobel Prize in Economics conveys the responsibility for truthfully answering the Queen of England when she asked the economics profession if everything was going so wonderfully, how did the economics profession miss seeing the crisis coming.

The answer is that the economics is known as the dismal science because of its track record in forecasting financial crises.

As a result, any suggestion that an economist makes based on a model that missed the financial crisis is highly unlikely to actually positively address the problem that caused the financial crisis in the first place.
What if it’s basically doing what we should expect it to?
It is performing as I predicted.
What if something has changed, thanks to fallout from the recession, or a string of bad policy choices, or both, and growth has shifted into a lower gear?
It is a string of bad policy choices that has caused growth to shift into a lower gear.

You don't need to be an economist to predict that if the burden of the excess debt in the financial system was placed on the real economy it would negatively impact growth.

Placing the burden on the real economy means that capital that is needed for growth, reinvestment and support of the social programs is diverted to debt service payments.

This diversion of how capital generated by the real economy is used guarantees a negative impact on economic growth.
What if this slow and fragile expansion is as good as we’re likely to get for a while? 
Until policymakers abandon the current policies that are damaging the real economy (think zero interest rate policies and austerity for example), this slow growth is as good as it will get.
This is an alternative story that economists across the ideological spectrum have begun to explore. If it’s correct, the implications for economic policy are big....
It has taken five years to realize that maybe we should examine the policies that were adopted in response to the financial crisis to see if maybe they were fundamentally flawed.

Your humble blogger could save economists a great deal of time.  They can simply read my earlier posts and see why the policies were fundamentally flawed.

More importantly, by reading the earlier posts, they can see what policies need to be adopted.
Where our stories diverge is on the reasons those forecasts were wrong.
Please note, your humble blogger's forecasts weren't wrong and I got the financial crisis.
Here’s the standard explanation, from a sharp economist named David E. Altig, the executive vice president and director of research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
Altig says the economy would have grown faster if a bunch of unanticipated problems — most notably the European financial crisis, in all its iterations, and the now-frequent instances of fiscal brinkmanship in Washington — hadn’t popped up to rattle consumers and business executives. 
This is how many Fed and CBO economists view the past few years, and why they remain so optimistic that faster growth is just around the corner..... 
History explains their thinking: In past recessions, the economy has lost ground, only to roar ahead in later years to return to its historical growth trends. ...
“It’s still the story of the unlucky shocks” and of growth eventually bouncing back to make up its lost output, Altig says. He adds: “We’re keeping hope alive with our forecast.”
Even though the models didn't predict the financial crisis, the Fed is following policies that the models say should work.  And the reason that the models are still not predicting what is going on is a series of unlucky breaks.

Excuse me, but maybe the Fed's models don't work because the assumptions that go into the models are fatally flawed.  Oops.
For the gloomy story, meet Kevin Warsh, a former Fed governor .... 
It goes like this: U.S. policymakers have tried for several years to splash gasoline on the flames of growth in hopes of stoking a bonfire. They’ve thrown in the $800 billion of tax cuts and spending increases contained in the 2009 economic stimulus bill, as well as the extraordinary measures the Fed has taken in an attempt to boost employment: holding short-term interest rates near zero for years and buying an unprecedented amount of long-term securities such as Treasury bonds in order to push down long-term interest rates. 
Warsh’s story is that those efforts didn’t work, and to make matters worse, they dampened the economy’s longer-run growth prospects.... 
The reason the economy has been underperforming, Warsh says, is that policymakers responded poorly to the financial crisis.
Yes they did and Mr. Warsh was one of the policymakers involved in the response.
They focused on short-term growth boosts and neglected what you might call basic economic infrastructure investments. 
They didn’t open big new markets for international trade in order to expand exports, and they didn’t streamline the tax code to promote investment.
I guess Mr. Warsh needs to publicly reaffirm that he is a card carrying Republican and confirm that economists truly bring little to the table when it comes to discussing policies for recovering from a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Mr. Warsh would like to expand exports so that the real economy could generate more capital to be used to pay off the existing debts.  However, this policy choice assumes that paying off the existing debts is the right choice.

There is another better choice that was made by Iceland.  Rather than try to pay off the existing debts, Iceland made its banks recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  As a result, its real economy was protected and has continued to grow.

Meanwhile, Mr. Warsh's policy has burdened the US real economy with the debt service payments on the excess debt in the financial system.  In addition, his policy has the US chasing after exports when every other country, like the UK and EU, that adopted similar policies is chasing after exports.  It is simply not likely that the US will prevail in the chase for exports.

So let's see, we could make the banks recognize losses and the real economy could return to its normal growth path or we could put the debt service burden of the excess debt on the real economy and hope we can win the chase for exports.
Meanwhile, Warsh said, lawmakers added new regulations to the financial system that solidified an oligopoly at the top of the banking industry, one that has served to restrict the flow of credit to small businesses and entrepreneurs....
I agree with Mr. Warsh's summary of what the policymakers have achieved in "reforming" the financial system.

Regular readers know that I would repeal all of the Dodd-Frank Act except for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule.  In place of all those complex rules and regulatory oversight contained in Dodd-Frank, I would put transparency and market discipline.

Specifically, I would require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This information allows market participants to independently assess each bank, link a bank's cost of funds to the risk it takes and to exert discipline on the banks.

I would require all structured finance securities provide observable event based reporting on all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral and report these activities to all market participants before the beginning of the next business day.  This lets market participants know what they are buying and know what they own.
Slow growth is the consequence of those policies, Warsh says. 
He fears the consequence of prolonged slow growth is a drop in the economy’s potential to grow. ... Executives have lost confidence in the economy’s ability to expand and willingness to invest in it. 
“We’ve been in this period of the new malaise for so long that workers and companies have lowered their expectations for what the U.S. economy can do,” Warsh says. 
If that’s the case, it’s as if our fireball pitcher has undergone arm surgery, and instead of throwing 95-mph fastballs, he’s stuck at 85 mph. Warsh says an infusion of better, long-run-focused policies is the only way to bring that velocity back — a second surgery of sorts. 
Warsh concedes that there isn’t a lot of data to back up his case. ... To this, Warsh likes to quote one of his mentors, the great free-market economist Milton Friedman: “Milton used to say, ‘everything we know in economics we teach in Econ 1, and everything else is made up.’ ”...
Great quote.

I have written a number of posts on how the economics profession doesn't understand the most basic principle of Econ 1:  the necessary condition for the invisible hand to operate properly is that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

It was the opacity in the financial system that lead to the financial crisis and it is the opacity in the financial system that prevents a recovery.

Until this opacity is addressed, we are going to continue muddling along.
This brings us to a third story... Two ideas are central to this story. 
First is that the recession didn’t just dig a big hole for the economy to climb out of, it also messed with the ladder. This is the basic theory set forth by the economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff in their book “This Time is Different”: Financial crises weaken the financial system, slowing growth for years until the system heals....
I realize this post is overly long, but it is necessary to once again debunk the work of Reinhart and Rogoff.

Their work ignores what I call the learning curve.  Specifically, there is a chance that we have learned over the centuries how to deal with a bank solvency led financial crisis.  So in fact, this time could be different.

This bank solvency led financial crisis has two elements present that allow for a quick recovery (see Iceland).

First is the notion of deposit insurance.  With deposit insurance, depositors no longer care about a bank's book capital level (depositors are taught this as kids when they open up an account and are reassured that the government guarantees they will get their money back).

As a result, banks are fully capable of operating with low or even negative book capital levels.  At these levels, the taxpayers are effectively their silent equity partners.

Second is the notion of central banks providing access to funds as a lender of last resort.  This assures that the banks have liquidity even when they have low or even negative book capital levels.

Together, deposit insurance and lender of last resort, position the banks to protect the real economy from the burden of the excess debt in the financial system.  Specifically, the banks can recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt.

Then, over the next several years, the banks can retain their earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.

I realize that this might be bad for banker bonuses, but it is very good for the real economy as it keeps the real economy on a higher growth path (diverting capital from the real economy to debt service on the excess debt is what puts the real economy on a lower growth path).
This has prompted some wondering aloud, and it has given rise to perhaps the most interesting new story you hear from economists: Um, there’s a lot we don’t know about the economy. ... 
When you miss so regularly on your forecasts, Altig says, “it’s easy to think we have to rethink everything we think we know.” But, he adds, “You can be wrong for a very long period of time and still have the underlying structure and story about the economy correct. That’s not crazy. I guess that’s where I would be right now. It’s not like you have to throw out how you think about these things. You just have to have the same humility you always have.”
Economists and humility are not two words that go together.

Humility would imply that economists state clearly that they don't know what is going on and missing regularly on their forecasts confirms this.  Humility would further imply that economists then say that they will refrain from offering any policy recommendations until such time as they can demonstrate through their forecasts that they do have some insight into what is going on.

Monday, December 31, 2012

Banking industry's year of shame ends

A Guardian column by Heather Stewart and Jill Treanor highlights all the shameful activities that banks engaged in that came to light during 2012.

Included on the list is manipulating a benchmark interest rate, Libor, money laundering and mis-selling financial products like insurance and interest rate swaps.

By themselves, each of these activities is bad.  Together, these activities highlight the need for a radical cultural change not only at the banks, but at their regulators too.

The last time there was a need for such a radical cultural change was during the Great Depression.  What emerged to change the culture was the FDR Framework and a focus on ensuring that market participants had access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they could independently assess and make a fully informed investment decision.

The reason for this focus is that it brings about a radical cultural change as sunlight is the best disinfectant.

What allowed the bank culture to slide back to where numerous parts of the banks were engaged in shameful activities was the re-emergence of opacity in the financial system.  Opacity re-emerged because regulators both failed to ensure transparency and encouraged its re-emergence.

For example, bank regulators jealously guard their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for each bank.  Regulators have access to each bank's exposures 24/7/365.

This is the data that market participants, including competitor banks, need if they are going to assess the risk and solvency of each bank and properly price their exposures to each bank.

In the 1930's, banks routinely disclosed this data as it was the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.  By the 1980s, banks no longer made this disclosure.

The SEC failed in its responsibility to ensure that bank exposure data was made available to all market participants.  It did so with the blessing of the bank regulators.

By protecting their information monopoly, bank regulators enhanced their importance to a properly functioning financial system.  With the monopoly, bank regulators were relied on for analysis of the risk of each bank, communicating the risk of each bank to other market participants and disciplining the banks.

The financial crisis that began in 2007 revealed the wide path of destruction created by regulator driven opacity.  It is this opacity that let banks engage in manipulating Libor for example.

It is this regulatory driven opacity that also prevents the financial system from recovering.  Without transparency into each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants cannot assess the risk of each bank and whether it is solvent or not.


Friday, October 19, 2012

Filling the vacuum and offering a clear proposal to fix the Spanish economy and banking system

Now that the EU policy makers have left Brussels having agreed to do nothing for as long as possible, somebody needs to step up with a clear proposal to fix the Spanish economy and financial system.

So here is the clear proposal that Iceland shows produces a healthy growing economy in under 4 years.

Step 1:  Spain needs to adopt the Swedish Model for handling its bank solvency led financial crisis.
It must require that its banks absorb upfront all of the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets.  These losses include both real estate and consumer debt. 
Like Iceland, the size of these losses should equal what the banks would expect to lose if they went through a long debt workout process. 
There are numerous benefits to Step 1 including protecting the real economy and the social programs as well as keeping people in their homes.  In addition, it frees up money now being used for debt service to buy goods and services.  This stimulates the economy.
Step 2:  Banks need to be separated into two categories.
Banks in Category I are capable of generating earnings and rebuilding their book capital levels after recognition of all their losses.  Banks in Category II are not capable of generating earnings and rebuilding their book capital levels after recognition of all their losses. 
Banks in Category I are left alone and required to retain 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings until they have rebuilt their book capital levels. 
Banks in Category II are resolved.  Losses in the resolution process should fall on equity and unsecured debt holders with one exception.  Because of the moral hazard the government created by saying that the banks were solvent since the beginning of the credit crisis, retail investors should be made whole by the taxpayers. 
No exception needs to be made for institutional investors in equity or unsecured debt as they have had several years to adjust their exposure to what they can afford to lose.
Step 3:  The Spanish government should engage in a fiscal stimulus program to give its economy a boost.

Step 4:  Banks in Category I should be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
This disclosure shows market participants that the banks have cleaned up their balance sheets. 
This disclosure allows market participants to independently assess the risk of investing in each bank and reopens access to both unsecured debt and equity for the banks. 
This disclosure makes the banks subject to market discipline and restrains their future risk taking.
My 4 step proposal is clear and has been shown to fix exactly what ails Spain.

I look forward to working with the Spanish government as they pursue this 4 step proposal.

Friday, October 12, 2012

IMF and EU engage in brinkmanship while Greek bailout fails

The IMF upped the ante in its efforts to get the EU to address the fundamental problems underlying the financial crisis.

Specifically, it called for government institutions, like the ECB, that hold Greek debt to grant Greece debt relieve by writing down this debt.

Naturally, the EU refused.

As the Guardian's Ian Traynor discussed,

The eurozone and the International Monetary Fund are engaged in a dangerous game of brinkmanship over how to respond to a Greek bailout that is going off the rails. 
It is now clear that Athens is highly unlikely to achieve the key IMF benchmark on the rescue of getting its national debt down to a "sustainable" 120% of gross domestic product by 2020.
The IMF came to this conclusion when it realized that the impact of adopting austerity in a recession for a country in a currency union resulted in a 3x greater contraction in demand than originally thought.
The word in Brussels, based on assessments from the troika of European commission, European Central Bank and IMF officials scrutinising Greece's compliance with the bailout terms, is that Athens could overshoot the sustainability target by as much as 25% on current trends, begging the question of whether the IMF will remain a party to the rescue. Figures circulating in Brussels estimate Greece's national debt will be between 130-145% of GDP by 2020 on current trends. 
The showdown between the eurozone and the IMF is being described as eyeball-to-eyeball, a shouting match, and a contest to see who will blink first. It is expected to come to a crunch next month. 
The IMF is insisting that the eurozone and the ECB resort to a new policy of Official Sector Involvement (OSI), meaning a writedown or writeoff of Greek debt to its official creditors, a move that the ECB and the German government are resisting fiercely....
Please remember that had the Swedish Model been adopted at the beginning of the financial crisis, there would be no need for the Official Sector to writedown or writeoff Greek debt.  The debt was held by the private sector, with a majority held by the banks.

It is as a result of five years of bailing out the banks that the Official Sector now has a sizable exposure.

This exposure exemplifies the pursuit of the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis which is designed to socialize the losses and privatize the gains.
Greece needs a bailout disbursement of more than €30bn (£24bn) next month, without which it will go bankrupt. It is certain to get the money, it is said in Brussels, since, following chancellor Angela Merkel's fraught visit to Athens this week, no one in the eurozone or in Washington wants to let Greece go bust or exit the common currency....

With a funding gap opening up in the Greek bailout trajectory of up to €30bn, the IMF is said to be arguing that the Europeans should foot the bill by writing down Greece's official debt. Other ideas being mulled over are to "extend" the €130bn bailout (Greece's second) or concoct a third rescue, all deeply unattractive options for Merkel who would need to return to an increasingly recalcitrant parliament in Berlin in an election year. 
The row comes as divisions open up in public between the IMF and eurozone leaders over the merits of austerity, after an IMF study released this week found that it had underestimated the impact that fiscal cutbacks have on economic growth. 
This study has been rebuffed by some eurozone leaders, with commissioner Olli Rehn arguing that it would be a mistake to change course. "The EU cannot be making swift turns, rather it is a convoy and you have to carefully consider which policy turns are best," he said. 
The best policy turn is to adopt the Swedish Model with both ultra transparency and the European Stability Mechanism becoming a backstop for each EU country's deposit guarantee.

Wednesday, September 26, 2012

Germany, Netherlands and Finland seek to limit use of European Stability Mechanism funds for bank bailouts

In what might prove to be the defining moment in the adoption of the Swedish model to address the ongoing EU bank solvency led financial crisis, Germany, the Netherlands and Finland announced that they would like to limit the use of funds from the European Stability Mechanism for bank bailouts.

By limiting the use of funds for bank bailouts, they are forcing policymakers in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy to use their modern banking systems as they are designed.

Specifically, they are forcing these policymakers to follow the example set by Iceland and requiring the banks to recognize today all of the losses on the excess debt in the financial system that the banks would otherwise recognize by going through the long process of default, bankruptcy and foreclosure.

Having recognized the losses, those banks that can generate earnings to rebuild their book capital levels will do so.  Those banks that cannot generate earnings will be resolved.

Naturally as part of the resolution process, depositors will be protected and bank debt holders will absorb losses to the extent they exceed the capital in the bank.

Spain’s government bonds fell, with 10-year yields rising the most in almost eight weeks, after top- rated European countries said national authorities should bear the cost of earlier losses in their banking industry. 
Italian and Irish securities also declined as Germany, the Netherlands and Finland said late yesterday the region’s bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism, should assume only a limited burden in bank recapitalizations.... 
“There’s an ongoing drip feed of negative news,” said Richard McGuire, a fixed-income strategist at Rabobank International in London. The ESM announcement “appears to cast some doubt as to whether Spain will be able to disburden itself of the liabilities it will assume via its banking bailout.”...
Of course, under the Swedish Model, there will not be a banking bailout.
Bank recapitalization “should take place based on an approach that adheres to the basic order of first using private capital, then national public capital and only as a last resort the ESM,” Finance Ministers Wolfgang Schaeuble, Jan Kees de Jager and Jutta Urpilainen said in a statement distributed by the Finnish Finance Ministry. That may rule out the bailout fund from being used to deal with the 100 billion euros in aid Spain sought for its banks in June....
This statement implies that Germany, the Netherlands and Finland want Spain to bailout its banks.

Why?

Because when it comes to resolution of the banks under the Swedish Model, banks in Germany, the Netherlands and Finland are going to recognize losses.

However, this is not a problem that Greece, Portugal, Spain or Italy should worry about.  Those banks are responsible for not having more exposure than they can afford to lose.  If they exceeded this exposure level, then it is up to the governments of Germany, the Netherlands and Finland to step up and apply the Swedish Model to these banks.
The statement by the German, Dutch and Finnish Finance Ministers “will come as a disappointment to the Irish government, who have been hoping for a significant element of ‘relief’ to their overall debt sustainability,” said Owen Callan, an analyst at Danske Bank A/S (DANSKE) in Dublin. 

Sunday, September 23, 2012

Europe's bank recap strategy has hit its limit

In his Breakingviews column, Peter Thal Larsen makes the argument that Europe's bank recap strategy has hit its limit and that until Europe's banks clean up all of the bad debt hidden on and off their balance sheets no one will trust them regardless of the book capital ratios they show.

This is true and the only way that anyone will believe the banks have cleaned up all the bad debt is if they banks provide ultra transparency to prove it.  Under ultra transparency, the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can independently confirm that the banks have addressed all their bad debt.

Without this information, market participants have to assume that banks have something to hide or otherwise they would provide ultra transparency.

Europe’s bank recapitalisation strategy has reached its limits. The continent’s lenders have added 94 billion euros to their capital buffers since the end of September, comfortably exceeding demands set by the European Banking Authority. Yet they are not yet in the clear. To restore trust, banks will have to clean up their loan books – and hope the euro zone can solve its sovereign woes....
Moreover, banks used relatively few tricks to hit their targets. Most of the improvements to capital came from banks issuing equity and convertible bonds; buying back hybrid debt at a discount; retaining earnings; or offloading assets. True, some banks tweaked risk models to reduce their risk-weighted assets, but this sleight of hand accounted for just 10 percent of the total capital raised. Concerns that banks would respond to the EBA’s demands by shrinking their balance sheets proved wide of the mark. Total loans contracted by just 0.62 percent. 
But anyone who expects faith in Europe’s banks to be magically restored will be disappointed. Not only are funding markets largely closed to the continent’s lenders, many are dangerously dependent on the European Central Bank for liquidity. 
Regular readers know that until banks provide ultra transparency they are 'black boxes'.

As 'black boxes', banks with deposits to lend cannot evaluate the risk of the banks looking to borrow.  The result is that interbank lending market remains frozen.

If banks cannot evaluate the risk of an investment in another bank, how can any other source of funding be expected to evaluate the risk of an investment in a bank?  They cannot and as a result, funding markets remain largely closed.
Rebuilding confidence will require banks to clear out the bad assets still clogging up their balance sheets. And Spain’s bank bailout illustrates the extent to which domestic regulators have allowed lenders to keep their problem loans hidden from view. 
Without ultra transparency, how can investors tell if the banks have cleared out the bad assets still clogging up their balance sheets?

As Spain shows, the regulators are not forcing the banks to address the bad assets.
Such a clean-up would clear the way for the creation of a pan-European banking union, backed by joint deposit insurance. That would help to break the toxic embrace between euro zone banks and governments.
Please re-read the highlighted text as your humble blogger has made exactly this argument in my blueprint for fixing the financial system.

Our financial system is designed so that banks can protect the real economy by acting as a shock absorber and absorbing the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Banks can do this because of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  Deposit insurance and access to central bank funding allow banks to continue to operate and support the real economy even if the banks have low or negative book capital levels.

Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Hence, it is important to insure that depositors 'trust' the guarantee.  In Europe, this trust has been shaken by the threat to a) boot Greece from the EU ... this has created redenomination risk and b) the possibility of sovereign bankruptcy ... this has created doubts as to whether the deposit guarantee will be honored.

To insure that depositors 'trust' the guarantee, I have argued that the European Financial Stability Fund and the European Stability Mechanism should backstop the sovereign's deposit guarantee.  This should be the only use for these funds.

Please recall that the funds are not needed to bailout the banks.  Banks that are capable of generating earnings can rebuild their book capital levels over time.  Banks that are not capable of generating earnings can be merged into healthier banks or closed.

This completely severs the toxic link between bailing out the banks and their host government's access to funds.