Showing posts with label Volcker Rule. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Volcker Rule. Show all posts

Friday, May 3, 2013

Another fight over transparency: Banks rally against strict controls over foreign bets

The NY Times has an excellent article on how banks are fighting against bringing transparency to their derivative positions and the proprietary bets they make using these instruments.

Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFTC is trying to require banks disclose the derivative positions held by their off-shore subsidiaries (think disclosure of the credit default swaps that JP Morgan booked through its London subsidiary).

The reason US regulators are interested in knowing what these positions are is that losses on these positions potentially could cost US taxpayers money should a bank fail.

Banks are arguing that this disclosure is unnecessary as the derivative positions are disclosed to the regulators in the foreign countries in which they do business.  Banks are saying that it is the role of these foreign regulators to ensure the safety and soundness of the foreign subsidiaries.

Translation: banks want to continue betting with US taxpayer money by placing their bets in their foreign subsidiaries and saying that US taxpayers should rely on foreign regulators to monitor these bets and make sure US taxpayers don't lose any money.

Those same foreign regulators who did not see the current financial crisis coming and effectively let their banks blow up.

Thank you, but no.

The simple response from the US government should be:

  •  if a bank wants to be able to offer US taxpayer backed deposit insurance on its accounts, then it needs to disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details; or
  • if a bank doesn't want to provide this level of on-going disclosure to all market participants, then it can no longer offer US taxpayer backed deposit insurance on its accounts.

Then, it is up to each bank to decide whether it wants to provide transparency.  Transparency that the Jamie Dimon and the Whale trade shows will limit proprietary betting for fear of the market trading against the bank's position.

Friday, April 26, 2013

Brown-Vitter highlights failure of Dodd-Frank Act

Whether you approve or disapprove of the proposal by Senators Brown and Vitter to require big banks to hold more capital, this proposal offers confirmation that the Dodd-Frank Act has failed.

Dodd-Frank has failed because it is not seen outside of Washington DC and the financial regulatory community as actually making the US financial system safer.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying since Day 1 that there are only two elements of Dodd-Frank worth saving, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule.  The rest should be repealed.

Dodd-Frank is based on the fundamentally flawed premise of "we should give the financial regulators who failed to prevent the current financial crisis another chance to prevent a future financial crisis".

Why?  Especially since the financial regulators have already shown themselves by not preventing the current crisis to be up to the task.

The upside of giving the financial regulators another chance is that they succeed in preventing the next financial crisis.

The downside of giving the financial regulators another chance is that they fail.

If they fail, who pays for their failure?

Are the Senators and Congressmen who drafted and voted for Dodd-Frank first in line with all of their net worth to pay?  Is the President who signed Dodd-Frank into law first in line with all of his net worth to pay?  Are the financial regulators who are suppose to have prevented the financial crisis first in line with all of their net worth to pay?

No.  It is the taxpayers who pay when the financial regulators fail.  I say "when" because the financial regulators have already shown they are prone to failure.  It is only a question of time.

And it is the knowledge that the financial regulators will fail that drives individuals like Senators Brown and Vitter to propose legislation that attempts to protect the taxpayers from the failure of the financial regulators.

The Senators hope by putting more capital into the financial system this capital rather than the taxpayers' money will be used to pay for the losses incurred during the next financial crisis.

Of course, this won't work as financial regulators have already shown they will not use the banking system as it is designed and require banks to recognize upfront their losses on private and public debt that cannot be repaid.

Financial regulators don't require the banks to recognize losses upfront as the regulators perceive that any reduction in the reported level of capital signals a problem that threatens the safety and soundness of the financial system.

As regular readers know, this assumption is false as market participants already know the banks have experienced massive losses and undoubtedly have negative book capital levels if all their losses are realized.  What market participants don't know is just how negative book capital levels really should be.

While I think that the goal of Senators Brown and Vitter to try to protect the taxpayer from the failure of the financial regulators is correct, their effort to put more capital into the financial system won't achieve this outcome.

Taxpayers would be much better off if Senators Brown and Vitter championed enforcement of the Securities Act of 1933 and requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Under the Act, the government is suppose to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision.

The current financial crisis has shown that the banks are "black boxes".  It is only when the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants have the information that they need to make a fully informed investment decision.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

UK's Andrew Tyrie wants banks to publish risk exposure by trader

The Guardian reports that the UK's Andrew Tyrie, the member of Parliament who headed the commission on banking standards, wants banks to publish risk exposure by trader so that the new Prudential Regulatory Authority can monitor proprietary trading.

By making this recommendation, Mr. Tyrie shows that he understands that disclosure of exposure details is more effective at minimizing proprietary trading than legislation or regulation.

However, Mr. Tyrie stops short of asking for disclosure that would be truly effective in ending proprietary trading by the banks.  Truly effective disclosure requires disclosing each bank's exposure details to all market participants.

What makes disclosure to all market participants effective at ending proprietary trading is these market participants could trade against the bank so as to minimize the bank's profits and maximize its losses from proprietary trading.

As shown by JP Morgan's London Whale trade, disclosure to regulators is not going to result in a reduction in proprietary trading.

Furthermore, regulators are trained not to approve or disapprove of any exposure that a bank takes on whether it is a proprietary trade or not.  The reason regulators don't approve or disapprove of individual exposures is that it gets the regulators into making decisions as to how capital is allocated by the financial system.

The Bank of England is under pressure from parliamentarians to crack down on banks that use their own money to take potentially risky bets on the financial markets. 
On only his second day at the helm of the new Prudential Regulation Authority inside the central bank, Andrew Bailey faces questions on how he would monitor proprietary trading. 
In a letter from Andrew Tyrie, the Conservative MP who chairs the parliamentary commission on banking standards, Bailey was reminded of the findings of the commission's report into 'prop trading'. 
The report fell short of calling for a US-style Volcker rule banning some elements of trading, but said that the PRA should ask banks to publish the risk exposures taken by their traders, with the regulator then reporting to parliament each year on the scale of the activities.
Your humble blogger has said repeatedly that the way to enforce the Volcker Rule is to require the banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can exert discipline so that the banks do not engage in proprietary trading.
"We concluded that proprietary trading is not a suitable activity for UK-headquartered banks to engage in, due to both the prudential and cultural risks it carries," Tyrie said in the letter. "However, we also concluded that it would not be appropriate to attempt immediate legislative prohibition of such activity. 
"Instead we recommended that the PRA should monitor indicators of whether banks appear to be engaging in proprietary trading," Tyrie said, although he raised the prospect of a Volcker rule being introduced in the future. 
The PRA should "bear down" on any such trading by demanding banks hold more capital against those activities or be prohibited from conducting such trading through "variations of permission" by the new regulator, Tyrie said.
Capital requirements are a very inefficient way of addressing proprietary trading.  In fact, increasing capital requirements could cause the bank to take bigger risks with its proprietary trading to cover the cost of capital. 
He also asked Bailey whether any legislative changes were needed to enable the PRA to demand that banks report the extent of their trading activities. 
The banks that appeared before the commission said they were not currently involved in proprietary trading. "The PRA must exercise its judgment. It should hold the banks to their word. If the PRA concludes, after a period, that it lacks the authority or the tools to carry out this work, it should make clear to parliament where the current legislation or tools fall short," Tyrie said.
In fact, there is no need for legislative changes to have the banks report their exposure details to all market participants.  Like the US, the UK has disclosure rules that are based on the notion of ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.


Thursday, March 21, 2013

Hedge fund manager says JP Morgan's 'Whale' trade was a bet

The Wall Street Journal reports that a well known hedge fund manager says JP Morgan's 'Whale' trade was "not a hedge, it was a bet".

Regular readers know that it was a bet that would not have been taken had JP Morgan been required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures.

The bet would not have been taken because JP Morgan would have worried about the market trading against it.  This concern was confirmed by Jamie Dimon's actions when he tried to limit who had access to information about the trade out of concern that it was being leaked to the market.

Boaz Weinstein, a hedge-fund manager who traded opposite J.P. Morgan Chase Co.'s "London Whale," said a Senate report clearly indicates that the losing positions were "not a hedge, it was a bet." 
Asked at a hedge-fund conference in New York Thursday about how he formulated his trading position, Mr. Weinstein, founder of Saba Capital Management L.P., told attendees: "There was one index sitting out there [that] looked like a real mispricing" and "didn't make sense." 
It was an "easy and obvious trade to do," he said in a keynote talk at the Absolute Return Symposium, referring to the bank's outsize positions in an opaque corner of the credit markets that came to light last year....
Regulators and lawmakers have been scrutinizing the bank's trading in derivatives indexes that tracked the health of corporate credit, which ultimately saddled J.P. Morgan with more than $6 billion of losses. 
Regulators have focused on whether the bank was hedging its risks or making big bets on the future cost to insure against defaults by companies in the indexes.
Senators at a hearing last week questioned J.P. Morgan executives about whether the bank would be allowed such trades if new rules and regulations were in place, including the Volcker rule, a part of the Dodd-Frank regulatory overhaul that aims to curb banks from placing bets in the markets with their own money. 
The trades that hurt J.P. Morgan became a rallying cry for supporters of a stronger interpretation of the rule. J.P. Morgan proposed Friday to revamp the way it hedges its positions. 
According to quarterly data from the Federal Reserve, J.P. Morgan sold $101.3 billion more long-dated derivatives insuring against defaults by investment-grade companies as of March 31, 2012 than it had purchased. 
"It appears now that the notional [volume] was over $150 billion," Mr. Weinstein said. 
The Senate investigators said the volume was $157 billion. 
Mr. Weinstein said regulators might want to "have a rule that any time anyone wants to make an investment…. greater than $10 billion, the boss has to sign off on it." 
He added that the J.P. Morgan bets he and others traded against were "probably the largest investment ever in an item" and significant because one entity was "the entire other side of the trade." 
Asked why he didn't make as much money on the trade as some others on the winning side, Mr. Weinstein said he didn't want to put his whole fund into it. "We had quite a large trade on and the risk reward was fantastic. But we don't use leverage in that way."

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

JP Morgan's 'Whale Trade' confirms that transparency ends proprietary trading by banks

In his Huffington Post column, Leo Leopold highlights why transparency ends banks gambling by taking bets through proprietary trading.

Why does transparency bring an end to gambling?

Mr. Leopold discusses JP Morgan's frantic activity to prevent anyone from finding out about the Whale trade for the simple reason that with this information the market could trade against JP Morgan and drive up its losses.

This fiasco is a wake-up call to all those who thought that Dodd-Frank might rein in financial gambling. The so-called Volcker rule supposedly prohibits running a casino in a federally insured bank. 
But the moment JP Morgan Chase smelled big winnings, it jumped into the riskiest of all Wall Street casinos -- synthetic credit derivatives.... 
The Chief Investment Office of JP Morgan Chase was set up to invest $350 billion dollars that the bank claims are excess deposits that it can't, or doesn't want to, loan out to businesses and consumers. That fund alone would make it the seventh largest bank in America. 
Within that pot of money, the bank set up the Synthetic Credit Portfolio to play in the hot derivatives market. That's where the Whale and his London trading team swam.... 
In early 2012, the Whale hit the shoals. He and his trading team in London were losing money both when they wrote financial insurance and when the took out financial insurance. 
So what do you do if you're losing in a casino and desperate to get even? You double down, of course. And when that doesn't work, you double down again. 
But, these were not your typical gamblers. They knew they could drive the market up or down by making bigger and bigger bets, hoping to turn their previous losses into gains. In short, the Whale team acted like any other devious hedge fund -- it tired to manipulate the market. 
Unfortunately, the word got out that the Whale was reaching his limit and that his big bets couldn't continue. So the hedge funds began manipulating the market in the other direction. In short, they harpooned the Whale, forcing more and more losses. 
Catch this: The Whale and his traders suspected that some of the traders who bet against them may have come from within JP Morgan Chase's own investment bank. Further, they wondered if the traders at the investment bank also tipped off certain of its client hedge funds so that they all could gang up on the Whale and make a killing. ... 
The text in bold is that reason that transparency ends banks gambling through proprietary trading.

When market participants know a bank's positions, they can trade against it.  This minimizes the profitability of the gambles and maximizes the losses on the gambles.

Sunday, March 17, 2013

JP Morgan's Jamie Dimon confirms that requiring banks to provide ultra transparency would end their taking proprietary bets

Thanks to the US Senate panel investigation lead by Senator Carl Levin we have confirmation that requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures would be more effective than the Volcker Rule and end banks taking proprietary bets.

As discussed by Heidi Moore in her Guardian column,

Senator Levin asked a bank regulator with the OCC what had happened, how the regulator stopped getting information. 
The regulator said JP Morgan had stopped sending daily reports in August 2011. 
The OCC objected, and met with Dimon as well as CFO Doug Braunstein. 
At this meeting, the regulator said, Dimon said the bank was afraid of leaks, and that it was changing how it was distributing its information.
There is a reason that a bank is afraid of leaks.

If the market knows what your position is, it will trade against you to minimize the profitability and maximize the loss of the proprietary bet.

Equally importantly, if the market knows what your position is, it can see how risky your bank really is.  As a result, investors will charge more to provide funds.  This further minimizes the profitability and maximizes the loss from taking a proprietary bet.

The reason that a bank is afraid of leaks of its proprietary bets is precisely the reason that requiring banks to provide ultra transparency ends their taking proprietary bets.

Mr. Dimon confirms this and in doing so confirms that your humble blogger's version of the Volcker Rule should be adopted by the financial regulators.

Regular readers will recall that my version of the Volcker Rule is two paragraphs long.  Paragraph one says that banks are prohibited from taking proprietary bets.  Paragraph two says that to enforce this prohibition banks must provide ultra transparency.
Dimon allegedly hammered the OCC regulator on why he needed the information – which, at that time, was standard and expected information for the regulator to have. 
"As Mr Dimon said: why we weren't going to get it?" the regulator recalled. Braunstein said he had already sent the reports. Dimon turned on Braunstein, the regulator remembered. "Mr Dimon said it was his decision whether to send the reports to the OCC." 
"Did he raise his voice?" Levin asked. 
"He did," the regulator replied. 
This moment was damning, as damning as Ina Drew's moment of truth earlier. It showed the pattern of bullying that JP Morgan showed towards its own regulator, and that Dimon himself had a hand in it. He prevented a bank regulator from getting necessary information, and, according to the testimony, personally kept that information out of the regulator's hands in August 2011.
This moment also confirms for all time why banks must be required to provide ultra transparency.  It simply is not an option to let bankers only disclose the information that they want when they want.
Levin also pointed out that the bank misinformed the OCC on losses – at times, telling the regulator that the bank was losing only $580m on the risky trades when JP Morgan's own internal numbers showed a loss of $1.2bn. 
It was compounded because since last year, Dimon and Braunstein had both said the bank's regulators were fully informed – which, as we now know, they were not.
Regular readers of this blog know that our financial system only works properly when market participants are fully informed.

The only way to insure that market participants are fully informed about banks is to require ultra transparency.

Mr. Dimon will not object to do so.  After all, JP Morgan did it himself as he knew it was the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.

Can the same be said of Mr. Dimon's JP Morgan?

Friday, March 15, 2013

Parliament panel: too difficult for regulators to enforce ban on proprietary trading

Confirming what your humble blogger has been saying about the Volcker Rule, the Parliament Commission on Banking Standards said it would be too difficult for regulators to enforce a ban on proprietary trading.

According to a Reuters article, the Commission proposed a series of one off solutions like raising capital requirements to limit proprietary trading.

Regular readers know that the direct way to effectively ban proprietary trading by banks is to require them to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, market participants will be able to see what "trading positions" the banks have.

Then, as Paul Volcker would say, the market knows a proprietary trade when it see it.

For banks, disclosure of proprietary trading changes the economics of engaging in proprietary trading.  When the market "sees" a proprietary trade, it will trade against the banks in such a way as to minimize the profit of the trade and maximize the downside of the trade.

At the same time, investors who provide funds to the bank will raise their required return for providing funds.  After all, the bank that engages in proprietary trading has higher risk.

With lower profitability from any individual trade and lower profitability from its higher risk profile, bankers have an incentive to exit the proprietary trading business.

A U.S.-style ban on Britain's banks trading with their own money is not needed and would be too difficult to enforce, a group of influential lawmakers said on Friday. 
Instead, Britain should use the threat of capital add-ons or other tools to bear down on any bank that shows signs of proprietary trading, said the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS). 
The PCBS said a U.S. ban on proprietary trading, known as the Volcker rule, has shown it is difficult to define and prohibit such trading, and it would impose an extra burden on UK regulators who already have to enforce a complex separation of banks' retail operations. 
"The Banking Commission does not feel it appropriate to recommend the immediate prohibition of proprietary trading," said Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the PCBS. 
But he did not rule out a ban in the future. 
"Were this approach to prove ineffective, further measures, including prohibition, could be desirable," he said in report released by the PCBS....

UK banks told the PCBS they do not engage in proprietary trading and said they do not want to, but Tyrie said that could change: "At a time when banks are under less intense scrutiny, proprietary trading could re-emerge as a greater risk." 
He said proprietary trading was not a suitable activity for a bank, and could lead to conflicts of interest, have harmful cultural effects and raise pay expectations. 
The Prudential Regulation Authority, which takes over UK financial regulation in April, should pay close attention to big trading units and volatile revenue flows, and if it spots potential proprietary trading it should use capital add-ons or other methods to incentivise the firm to exercise tighter control, Tyrie said.

Thursday, February 7, 2013

Elizabeth Warren: CFPB, Dodd-Frank and a trade with the Republicans

Bloomberg ran an article on how the Republicans are united in their efforts to restrict the independence of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and Senator Warren has the opportunity to forge a compromise.

Your humble blogger would like to suggest that Senator Warren take the Republicans up on their offer and propose the following compromise:
In exchange for ensuring accountability and transparency at the CFPB, the rest of the Dodd-Frank Act is repealed and replaced with a law requiring transparency, specifically valuation transparency, be brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  Under this law,
  • Banks would be required to provide ultra transparency under which they disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
  • Structured finance securities would be required to provide observable event based reporting on all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.
How can the Republicans possibly decline the opportunity to let the market function properly?  After all, it is well known that the necessary condition for the invisible hand of the market to actually work is valuation transparency.  Specifically, that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

How can the Republicans possibly decline the opportunity to get rid of the explosion in complex rules and regulatory oversight like the Volcker Rule that make up Dodd-Frank?  In an era of endless budget deficits, here is an opportunity to save substantial sums of money.

How can the Republicans possibly decline the opportunity to get rid of the Office of Financial Research (aka, the government agency where transparency goes to die)?  The whole point of bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system is not to have agencies like OFR having a monopoly on information that market participants need if they are to have all the useful, relevant information.

How can the Republicans possibly decline the opportunity to end the market's reliance on supervision by bank regulators and the related taxpayer funded bank bailouts when supervision fails? With ultra transparency, the market can exert discipline on each bank to reduce its risk of failure.  If it does fail, market participants can absorb the loss because they could assess what was happening at the bank and have limited their exposure to what they can afford to lose.

Friday, February 1, 2013

'London Whale' demonstrates why transparency ends banks taking proprietary bets

The Wall Street Journal carried an article on how the 'London Whale' sounded the alarm over concerns about the risk of his trading position.

In doing so, he demonstrated why transparency ends banks taking proprietary bets.  Specifically, transparency when banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
The J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. trader known as the "London whale" tried to alert others at the bank to mounting risks months before his bets ballooned into more than $6 billion in losses, according to people familiar with emails reviewed by J.P. Morgan and a U.S. Senate panel..... 
In one instance, Mr. Iksil told another trader that the size of his bets was getting "scary," according to emails in a Jan. 16 report by J.P. Morgan and to the people familiar with the emails.... 
The panel, led by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., also is looking into whether J.P. Morgan failed to disclose crucial information to its primary bank regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and whether the OCC failed to press the bank for details about how it managed its risks. The bank acknowledged previously that its information was wrong early in 2012. 
The OCC prepared an assessment of its performance and shared it with the subcommittee, said people familiar with the OCC report. ...
Like the Bank of Italy with the Monte Paschi derivative scandal, the OCC was in position, but failed to take action.

Your humble blogger is not surprised that the OCC did nothing.  Financial regulators do not see it as their role to question individual positions as this get them into allocating capital across the economy.  Instead, the regulators focus on whether the bank has the ability to absorb the 'expected' losses on the position.

Rather than change the regulatory focus to allocating capital across the economy, your humble blogger has argued that the regulators' information monopoly must be ended and the banks required to provide ultra transparency.  With this data, the markets can exert discipline on the banks by questioning individual positions.
Emails reviewed by the subcommittee and J.P. Morgan show Mr. Iksil was worried about the trades as early as January 2012, according to the people familiar with them. 
Mr. Iksil and another London trader, Javier Martin-Artajo, also suspected in early 2012 that other traders in a different part of J.P. Morgan leaked their positions to outside hedge funds and took opposing positions to those held by Mr. Iksil's group; both later communicated these suspicions to internal investigators, said people familiar with the case....
Please re-read the highlighted text again as it explains exactly why requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency will end the banks taking proprietary bets.

Simply put, if other traders know your positions, they will trade against you.

At a minimum, their involvement minimizes the amount that can be made on the position.  More likely, and this is what Mr. Iksil and his trade experience, their involvement maximizes the size of the loss on the proprietary bet.

I know I have repeated this point endlessly, but the Volcker Rule is simple to write and enforce.  The rule simply states that banks are not permitted to take proprietary bets and the banks are required to provide ultra transparency so that the market can enforce discipline so no proprietary bets are taken.
Messrs. Iksil and Martin-Artajo were key members of the London team that built a complicated, bearish position in an index that tracks the health of a group of investment-grade companies. Last year, the bets morphed into a not-easily-liquidated position on corporate credit. The wagers accumulated losses when the traders added to their positions instead of unwinding them and the market went the other way. 
On Jan. 30, 2012, according to emails in J.P. Morgan's report and the people familiar with the emails, Mr. Iksil said to Mr. Martin-Artajo that the size of the positions was becoming "scary" and suggested that the bank's chief investment office should take losses, or "full pain," immediately. Mr. Iksil then asked for a Feb. 3 meeting with his managers, including Chief Investment Officer Ina Drew. 
Mr. Iksil told Ms. Drew the portfolio could lose an additional $100 million and that it was possible J.P. Morgan didn't have the right positions in place. 
One of the advantages of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency is that the banks are not going to take on a position that they cannot easily explain to market participants.
To Mr. Iksil, Ms. Drew didn't appear overly concerned by this potential $100 million loss....  
One week later, Mr. Iksil told those who attended the Feb. 3 meeting aside from Ms. Drew that he would need to expand his positions. He was told to proceed, while concentrating on managing profits and losses. He and the other traders added to their trades in February. Losses reached $169 million by the end of that month. 
At one point, Mr. Iksil told a trader to stop trading a certain credit index because he wanted to observe its behavior. He told Mr. Martin-Artajo about his plans, but Mr. Martin-Artajo, who was Mr. Iksil's direct superior, told him to keep trading. 
In March, traders overseeing the positions began to discuss whether they should place higher estimates for the values of certain trading positions of the CIO group, a step crucial in how they viewed the positions and reported them to investors and other outsiders.... 
Another advantage of ultra transparency is that this internal debate over how to value the trading positions goes away.  The market is going to value the positions so the bank has an incentive to make sure its values are always conservative (it is better to error on the side of undervaluing than overvaluing a position).
But on April 10, losses mounted again, and traders were at odds over how bad it could get. The estimates for that day ranged from $5 million to $700 million; the final number landed at roughly $400 million.... 
Then, on six trading days between April 23 and April 30, losses went up by nearly $800 million more. 
The losses caused Mr. Dimon and other top executives to question whether the traders "adequately" understood the trading portfolio "or had the ability to properly manage it," J.P. Morgan said in its Jan. 16 report.
Requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency removes the issue of whether the traders adequately understand or have the ability to properly manage a trading portfolio.

It is far better to eliminate proprietary bets upfront by having the market discipline of the market trading against a bank position than it is to have the banks lose money because their traders do not adequately understand or have the ability to properly manage a trading portfolio.

Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Davos: Paul Singer versus the global financial regulators

One of the central themes of this blog is the always harmful substitution of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight for transparency and market discipline.

This theme played out in a Davos panel discussion involving Paul Singer from Elliott Management.

As reported on twitter by @Anthony_Reuben, a journalist on the BBC business desk:
Paul Singer says he sends his staff to find out about financial health of banks and they come back and shrug. Wants more disclosure. 
Mr. Singer's staff confirms the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane's observation that current bank disclosure standards leave them resembling 'black boxes'.

And why does Mr. Singer want more disclosure?  Because as an investor Mr. Singer knows that he should be responsible for all gains and losses on his exposures to banks.

Hence, he is looking for all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so he can independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision.

For banks, the useful, relevant information is their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  What your humble blogger calls ultra transparency.

Why isn't this information available?
Prudential boss: global banking standards difficult because banks in countries where banking system didn't blow up are not interested.
It is not the banks that are uninterested, but it is the global financial regulators clinging to their information monopoly who are uninterested.

Here we are five years after the beginning of the financial crisis and Paul Singer's staff still cannot access all the useful, relevant information for making an investment in a bank nor is there any movement afoot to ever require banks to provide this information.

Everyone knows that ultra transparency is the "gold standard" for bank disclosure.  But it is more than that.  It is also gives banks in countries that adopt ultra transparency a competitive advantage.

The competitive advantage comes from the simple fact that ultra transparency allows market participants to independently assess the risk of each bank.  Since everything is disclosed, market participants can do a better job of assessing the risk and as a result can reward these banks with a lower cost of funds and a higher stock price.

All those banks in countries that don't require ultra transparency are at a competitive disadvantage.  Market participants know from the lack of disclosure that the banks are hiding something.  As a result, market participants punish these banks with a higher cost of funds and a lower stock price.

Ultra transparency is actually an easy global banking standard to adopt as there are no banks who would want to be at a competitive disadvantage.

So what do we have instead of ultra transparency?

We have the pursuit of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

This takes the form of legislation like the Dodd-Frank Act that was written by and for the banks (recently, I discovered that the Volcker Rule is essentially toothless as it was written so it doesn't apply to position held for more than 90 days ... proprietary bets can last months), we have financial regulators pursuing Basel III capital regulations that are too complex to enforce and we have policymakers pursuing ring-fencing.

This pursuit of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight shows that the first lesson of the financial crisis was not learned.  The first lesson is that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight failed.

The combination just didn't fail, it failed in a catastrophic manner as shown by our ongoing financial crisis.

Equally importantly, the financial crisis revealed that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight is prone to catastrophic failure.

Unlike Tim Geithner who believes that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight should be given another chance, your humble blogger does not believe in gambling with the stability of the financial system when it is your humble blogger and the other taxpayers who are going to be called on to bail out the financial system when this combination predictably fails again.

Ultra transparency restores stability to the financial system and does away with gambling financial stability on the success or failure of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

Thursday, January 17, 2013

UK's John Vickers: Volcker Rule too difficult to police

As reported by Bloomberg, John Vickers does not think that the UK should adopt the Volcker Rule because it is too difficult to police.

Regular readers know that there are two components to every regulations:  the rule and how it is enforced.

Regular readers also know that enforcement for the Volcker Rule is simple:  require every bank to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can assess every trading position and see if it is simply there for market making or is there as a proprietary bet.

If it is a proprietary bet, the bet is subject to every trader's worse nightmare.  The market can now trade against the position to minimize its upside while maximizing its downside.  Traders know this and it acts as discipline so that the traders don't engage in proprietary betting.

As for the Vicker's Rule which separates investment (casino banking) from retail banking, it too needs an enforcement mechanism.  Again, the best enforcement mechanism is requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

With this information, market participants, including the financial regulators, can see if the banks are taking risks they are not suppose to inside the ring-fence.

Please note that in the absence of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency so the rules can be enforced, we are left with the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

The combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight is known to increase the risk of future financial crises.  This lesson was learned with our current crisis where the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight failed to prevent a bank solvency led financial crisis.

U.K. banks shouldn’t be restricted from proprietary trading in a way similar to the U.S.’s so- called Volcker rule because it would be too complicated to police, said John Vickers, chairman of Britain’s Independent Commission on Banking. 
The distinction between market making and a bank trading with its own money is ill-understood and would sap too much time from regulators, Vickers, 54, told the U.K.’s Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards today.
With ultra transparency, there is no need to make the Volcker Rule complex nor to sap too much time from regulators.  The Volcker Rule could stay as it currently is:  banks are prohibited from making proprietary trades.

With ultra transparency, market participants can decide what is market making and what is a proprietary trade.
Shielding banks’ consumer units from their investment banking operations as recommended by the ICB is preferable, he said.
Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker, 85, who helped devise the U.S. rules, told Parliament in October that Vickers’s own proposals will be difficult to maintain and financial institutions will seek to unwind separations over time....
The Vicker's Rule also needs ultra transparency for enforcement.  There is no reason to believe that the financial regulators can do a good job of enforcing the separation as Glass-Steagall collapsed in the face of bank lobbying.
“If one had ring fencing and Volcker there would be two boundaries to police,” Vickers said. “Volcker draws the line in a very difficult, almost excruciatingly difficult, place.” 
If proprietary trading is banned from banking, it could “move elsewhere” where there may be fewer rules to govern it, Vickers said. 
Banks holding bonds and shares to sell to clients, so-called market making, is indistinguishable from proprietary trading, where a firm takes its own positions in securities for its own gain, he said. 
It would be “very difficult” for a regulator to tell the difference between market making and proprietary trading, Vickers said. “People at the top of banks themselves have not known what was going on in terms of the kind of trading, and the regulator is at a disadvantage even relative to them.”
Mr. Vickers makes a strong case for ultra transparency.  Market participants like traders at other large global banks and hedge funds don't have trouble distinguishing between market making activities and proprietary bets.

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Despite Blankfein's representation, Goldman team sidesteps Volcker Rule

Bloomberg reports that Goldman's Multi-Strategy group is betting about $1billion of Goldman's capital despite Lloyd Blankfein's public representation that the firm no longer has traders who 'just put on the risks that they wanted'.

Regular readers know that the key to enforcing the Volcker Rule and ending proprietary trading is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, every market participant can see what the banks are doing.

Having to disclose their positions is every proprietary trader's worst nightmare.  With this disclosure, other market participants can now trade against the position in a way that absolutely minimizes the upside to the position while maximizing the potential downside.

Sitting onstage in Washington’s Ronald Reagan Building in July, Lloyd C. Blankfein said Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) had stopped using its own money to make bets on the bank’s behalf. 
“We shut off that activity,” the chief executive officer told more than 400 people at a lunch organized by the Economic Club of Washington, D.C., slicing the air with his hand. The bank no longer had proprietary traders who “just put on risks that they wanted” and didn’t interact with clients, he said. 
That may come as a surprise to people working in a secretive Goldman Sachs group called Multi-Strategy Investing, or MSI. It wagers about $1 billion of the New York-based firm’s own funds on the stocks and bonds of companies, including a mortgage servicer and a cement producer, according to interviews with more than 20 people who worked for and with the group, some as recently as last year. The unit, headed by two 1999 Princeton University classmates, has no clients, the people said.
The team’s survival shows how Goldman Sachs has worked around regulations curbing proprietary bets at banks. 
One of the major lessons of the financial crisis is that complex regulations and regulatory oversight are not a viable substitute for transparency and market discipline.

With ultra transparency, Goldman loses its ability to work around the complex regulations and to influence the mechanism of regulatory oversight.
Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul A. Volcker singled out the company in 2009, saying it shouldn’t get taxpayer support if it focuses on trading. A section of the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act known as the Volcker rule, drafted to prevent banks from taking on excessive risk, limits short-term investments made with firms’ capital. 
The law doesn’t bar longer-term wagers. That leaves room for other risky investments, according to Matthew Richardson, an economics professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. Bets that last months can go awry and belong outside federally backed banks, he said. 
“From a systemic-risk perspective, it’s really the longer- term holdings which are of issue,” said Richardson, who heads NYU’s Salomon Center for the Study of Financial Institutions.
Michael DuVally, a Goldman Sachs spokesman, said in an e- mail that MSI engages in long-term investing and lending. A 2011 proposal for implementing the Volcker rule uses a 60-day cutoff to classify short-term trades. 
“We have made changes to the strategies this business historically has employed to bring them into compliance with our current understanding of the Volcker rule,” said DuVally, who declined to make MSI executives available for interviews. “If the final rule requires additional changes, we’ll make them.”...
The beauty of ultra transparency is it doesn't care whether a position is put on for the short term or the long term.  The position is reported to all market participants.  These participants then use the information to assess the risk of Goldman and to manage their own exposures.
Goldman Sachs, the fifth-biggest U.S. bank by assets, doesn’t report on the holdings or performance of MSI, or of the Special Situations Group in which it’s housed. That parent group, which uses the firm’s funds to profit from distressed and middle-market companies, has been a major profit center at the bank, sometimes the biggest, former executives told Bloomberg in 2011. Its holdings that year included debt of Melville, New York-based pizza chain Sbarro Inc.
With ultra transparency, Goldman would have to report its holdings.
Cajide, who left SSG in 2008, called it a “very hush- hush” division because it wagers the firm’s capital. 
“You don’t talk about what you’re doing,” she said. “It’s Goldman’s money, right?”...
Even so, with banks pushing in Washington to limit the trading rule, not all proprietary bets were banned. Former Fed Chairman Volcker, who graduated from Princeton 50 years before Oneglia and Adamson, pushed to bar long-term investments when Dodd-Frank was written, according to three people with knowledge of the talks. He tried again when regulators drafted rules based on the legislation, they said. 
“There were so many elements of the rule that in order to get it passed had to be softened quite a bit, and that may very well have been one,” Kimberly Krawiec, a law professor at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, said of the focus on short-term trading. “There’s going to be more prop trading than what the general public and perhaps even some experts believe.”...
Not if ultra transparency is used as the enforcement mechanism for the Volcker Rule and all exposure details have to be reported on an ongoing basis.
“The Volcker firewall in Dodd-Frank set up a clear distinction between lending banks and hedge funds,” said Jeff Merkley, an Oregon Democrat and one of two senators who inserted the trading ban into the legislation. “Any way you slice it, the work of the London Whale and similar setups are hedge funds, whether the trades endure days or months. The regulators have full authority and clear direction to prohibit these operations. They have stalled for two years, and it is way past time for them to act.”
Congressman Merkley, to achieve your goals, simply ask that ultra transparency be adopted now.

Thursday, January 3, 2013

The Atlantic: What's inside America's Banks Part III: Volcker Rule

In their lengthy Atlantic piece, Frank Partnoy and Jesse Eisinger look at the impact of transparency on the Volcker Rule.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying that there are two parts to each regulation:  what the regulation says and how it is enforced.  I use the Volcker Rule as an example and have said that it could be written in two paragraphs.

Paragraph one says that banks are not allowed to engage in proprietary trading.  Paragraph two says that banks must provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this data, market participants can assess whether the banks are complying with paragraph one.

Lo and behold, Mr. Partnoy and Eisinger agree with my solution for implementing the Volcker Rule.

What if legislators and regulators gave up trying to adopt detailed rules after the fact and instead set up broad standards of conduct before the fact? 
For example, consider one of the most heated Dodd-Frank battles, over the “Volcker Rule,” named after former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker. The rule is an attempt to ban banks from being able to make speculative bets if they also take in federally insured deposits. The idea is straightforward: the government guarantees deposits, so these banks should not gamble with what is effectively taxpayer money. 
Yet, under constant pressure from banking lobbyists, Congress wrote a complicated rule. Then regulators larded it up with even more complications. They tried to cover any and every contingency. Two and a half years after Dodd-Frank was passed, the Volcker Rule still hasn’t been finalized. By the time it is, only a handful of partners at the world’s biggest law firms will understand it. 
Congress and regulators could have written a simple rule: “Banks are not permitted to engage in proprietary trading.” Period. ... 
Legislators could adopt similarly broad disclosure rules, as Congress originally did in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The idea would be to require banks to disclose all material facts, without specifying how.... 
 As for the details, banks could voluntarily provide information on their Web sites, so that sophisticated investors had enough granular facts to decide whether the banks’ broader statements were true. 
As the 2008 financial crisis was unfolding, Bill Ackman’s Pershing Square obtained the details of complex mortgages and created a publicly available spreadsheet to illustrate the risks of various products and institutions. Banks that wanted to earn back investors’ trust could publish data so that Ackman and others like him could test their more general statements about risk.

Friday, December 28, 2012

Did losses on "London whale" trade succeed in defanging bank lobbying when financial crisis couldn't?

In his Wall Street Journal article, Scott Patterson lays out how the losses sustained by JP Morgan on its "London whale" trade effectively defanged the bank lobbying efforts when it came to implementation of the Volcker Rule.

Regular readers know that there are two elements to each rule:  what the rule says and how it is enforced.

Your humble blogger showed how this would work for the Volcker Rule.  The rule says that banks are not allowed to engage in proprietary trading.  This is enforced by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants could see if the bank were engaged in proprietary trading and exert discipline to stop this proprietary trading.

Compare this with the 200+ pages that is going to emerge from the bank regulatory complex and that bank examiners are suppose to enforce.  Enforcement which will be problematic because one of the cardinal rules of bank examiners is not to approve or disapprove of an exposure taken by a bank because this gets the bank examiners into allocating capital across the financial system.

Which rule and enforcement mechanism looks more likely to be successful in permanently ending proprietary trading by the banks?

The bank lobby already won when they ended up with a 200+ page rule from the bank regulatory complex.  What the "Whale" trade cost the banks is that it will be a little harder for them to engage in proprietary trading.
Wall Street banks entered 2012 confident they could stall a wave of rules that they feared would hurt profits. But they are ending the year largely resigned that their activities will be constrained and monitored more closely by the government. 
One big reason for the change: J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.'s "London whale" losses. 
The bad trades, ultimately resulting in about $6 billion in losses, disrupted the banks' campaign against the Dodd-Frank financial overhaul, according to regulators, lawmakers and close observers of policy debates in Washington. 
I find this a stunning statement for the simple reason that the banks blew up the financial system prior to the beginning of the financial crisis on August 9, 2007.

Apparently, the regulators tasked with writing the Volcker Rule forgot this and needed to be reminded by the losses on the London whale trade.
The trades damaged the reputation of J.P. Morgan, which suffered less than other banks from the financial crisis, and its chief executive, James Dimon, during a crucial period of policy debate in Washington, putting critics of Dodd-Frank on the defensive. 
Before news of the whale losses emerged, banks were arguing, with some success, that too-tight regulations were crimping lending during a time of slow growth....
And what exactly does banning proprietary trading have to do with crimping lending?

Ending the banks proprietary trading would in fact free up capital that could be used to support lending as the banks would be forced to shed the assets they bet on.
Perhaps the most significant fallout was on the "Volcker rule," which bans banks from making bets with their own money. While the final version of the Volcker rule hasn't been released, people with knowledge of the latest version said that it is likely to be more restrictive of bank's trading activities and might not allow broad hedging of bank portfolios.
Hello, it takes two paragraphs to both write the rule and its enforcement mechanism (see above).

Monday, December 24, 2012

France moving forward to separate investment and commercial banking

The Wall Street Journal reports that French bank reform is focusing on separating investment from retail and commercial banking.

France's banks are lobbying against this saying the separation will hurt economic growth.

I can clearly see how it will hurt banker bonuses, but I fail to see the direct connection between separating the two businesses and hurting economic growth.  The reason I don't see a direct connection is that the two businesses still exist after they have been separated.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger sees reform efforts focused on separating investment from retail and commercial banking as a best a distraction and at worst a barrier to real reform of the financial system.

The starting point for real reform of the financial system is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Not only does ultra transparency address the issue of reducing the riskiness of the investment and retail/commercial banks, but it also ushers in cultural change as sunlight is the best disinfectant for bad behavior.

The French government-planned reform of the banking industry, which seeks to separate speculative and highly risky activities from retail and commercial operations, is ill-timed, the head of the French Banking Federation said Saturday. 
Implementing the reform, which was an electoral pledge of socialist president Francois Hollande while the country is facing strong economic headwinds could further limit banks' profitability and ability to help foster growth, Jean-Paul Chifflet said in an interview with France Inter radio. 
In the U.S., banking reforms have been put on the back-burner because of the economic slowdown, Mr. Chifflet said.
Actually, in the US, bank reform was put on the back-burner by the Obama administration and the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act.  The administration didn't want to reform the banks and Dodd-Frank was written by and for the banks by their lobbyists.
The French government last week presented a bill forcing French banks to create specific units to house risky speculative operations, in a bid to address one of the causes of the financial and economic crisis that started in 2007 and to protect retail activities and customers' savings. 
The project, however, has been watered down from Mr. Hollande's original plan to split the banks into two and end the combined model of commercial and investment bank.

Thursday, November 15, 2012

Washington and the financial regulators are not about to crack down on Wall Street

In a Propublica article, Jesse Eisinger looks at the ongoing implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act and concludes that Washington and the financial regulators are not about to crack down on Wall Street.

Regular readers know that with limited exceptions, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule, the Dodd-Frank Act was written by lobbyists for Wall Street's benefit.  The act was never designed to crack down on Wall Street.  It was designed to protect Wall Street and the opacity that Wall Street thrives on.

For example, the act created the Office of Financial Research.  The idea behind OFR is that it will operate like the National Weather Service and collect all the useful, relevant information about the financial system.

Unlike the National Weather Service which makes its data available to anyone who asks, by law, OFR must keep its data confidential.  All it can share is the results of analyses conducted by its in-house analytical team.

Hence, OFR is nothing short of the black hole in the financial system where transparency goes to die as the reason that transparency works is that it lets every market participant independently assess the information and come to their own conclusion.  A conclusion that they then act on when determining both the amount and price of any exposure.
Surely, reformers can now ride in and save the day, right? 
Alas, no. While the rule making will speed up, the core problems with the financial system and its regulators are deeper than personnel and sadly impervious to which party occupies the White House. They are bipartisan and structural.... 
The structural issues go deeper. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission still exist as two separate agencies, a huge missed opportunity for Dodd-Frank and one borne of politics. 
The C.F.T.C. is protected (and bashed) by the Senate Agriculture Committee, the S.E.C. by the Senate Banking Committee. Merging the agencies would mean that one of those committees would lose power, so forget about that. ... And, anyway, these agencies are still run by commissions, not single heads, and they rely on Congress for their financing. It's little surprise that such a structure creates plodding impotence. 
"One of the biggest weaknesses of Dodd Frank is that we failed to look long and hard at true independence of regulators," a frustrated and regretful Senate staff member, who worked on the legislation, told me the other day....
 Did the Senate staff member expect Wall Street and its lobbyists to say this was a problem?
Or take the Volcker Rule, one of the most prominent symbols of the financial overhaul. The rule, which was intended to prevent banks from speculating with money backed by taxpayers, still has not been finalized almost two and a half years after Dodd Frank passed. 
It's the subject of multiple-agency negotiations, which are going about as well as that phrase would suggest. Representative Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, had called on the regulators to finish up by Labor Day. That came and went. Senators Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan, and Jeff Merkley, Democrat of Oregon, the authors of the provision, fired off a letter a few weeks ago, urging the regulators to finish their work. 
Now, it would be good if regulators were assiduously working to radically simplify the rule, which is a bloated monstrosity filled with loopholes and exemptions. But they aren't. Instead, they're squabbling over petty turf issues....
Regular readers will recall that the Volcker Rule could be written in 2 pages.  Page one would repeat the Volcker Rule and its prohibition on proprietary trading.  Page two would require banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As Mr. Volcker said, you know proprietary trading when you see it.  With ultra transparency, all the market participants could see if a bank engaged in proprietary trading.  This would make it easy for regulators to enforce the rule.
Dodd Frank is so sweeping in scope yet so picayune in application that it will be close to impossible for the public to tell whether it's making a difference.
Dodd Frank is designed not to make a difference.

Any effort to truly crack down on Wall Street will start with transparency and providing market participants with access to all the useful, relevant information so they can independently assess the risk and make a fully informed investment decision.

Dodd Frank is designed to protect opacity.  As a result, it calls providing pricing information transparency.

Everyone knows that pricing information is not transparency.

The first step of the investment cycle is for the market participant to independently assess a security.  Transparency is focused on providing all the useful, relevant information for this assessment.

The second step of the investment cycle is to look at the prices shown by Wall Street.

The last step of the investment cycle is to compare the independent assessment of the security against the prices shown by Wall Street in order to make an buy, hold or sell decision.

The lesson that investors relearned at the beginning of the Great Recession is that if you cannot do the first step, stop.  Buying and selling based on price is simply blindly betting.

Saturday, November 10, 2012

Banco Popular selling shares at steep discount as nobody can tell what they are worth

As reported by Bloomberg, Banco Popular is offering a steep discount on its shares in an effort to attract new capital.  The reason for the discount is nobody knows what Banco Popular is worth.

Under current disclosure requirements, banks are 'black boxes'.  Nobody knows what is in them.  As a result, nobody can value them.

Regular readers know that letting market participants know what is in a bank requires having the bank provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Market participants can assess this information and value the bank as they know what the bank's exposures are.

Banco Popular Espanol SA will sell shares at a discount as the Spanish lender seeks to raise as much as 2.5 billion euros ($3.2 billion) to help cover a capital shortfall. 
Popular will issue new shares at 0.585 euros each, excluding the value of subscription rights, Chief Financial Officer Jacobo Gonzalez-Robatto told shareholders in Madrid today. Existing shareholders can pay 0.401 euros and will receive three new shares for each one they own, he said. The bank’s shares closed at 1.118 euros yesterday and 1.701 euros on Sept. 28, the last trading day before the sale was announced. 
“It’s very difficult to say if this is a good price,” said Inigo Lecubarri, who help manage about $400 million at Abaco Financials Fund in London. “But what you can say is the price is good compared to other Spanish banks."
As regular readers know, the investment cycle begins with an independent assessment of the security (in this case, common stock in the bank).  The second step is to compare this valuation with the price being shown for the security.  The third step is to make a buy, hold or sell decision based on the difference between the investor's independent valuation and the price being shown.

Mr. Lecubarri observes that it is very difficult to say if this is a good price.  The reason is that the bank cannot be independently assessed and valued.

Lacking his own assessment, he then compares the price to the prices on other Spanish banks to suggest the maybe the price is 'good'.  This analysis assumes that the prices on the other Spanish banks reflect the value that an independent valuation using each bank's exposure details would set.

In fact, because of the lack of ultra transparency, what he should know is his assumption is false and that the price on all the banks was set by blindly betting.
Popular said on Oct. 1 it would sell shares and suspend its dividend as the Madrid-based lender seeks to avoid tapping state aid to cover a 3.22 billion-euro capital deficit revealed in stress tests that accompanied a European bailout for Spain’s banking system. 
Shares of Popular, the only publicly traded bank with a capital shortfall that hasn’t been nationalized, have declined 68 percent this year.

“It’s a brave step by them because they are raising actual equity,” said Benjie Creelan-Sandford, a banking analyst at Macquarie Bank Ltd. in London, who rates Popular underperform. “In the context of deleveraging and funding costs, it will be tough to grow revenue in absolute terms.”
Excuse me, but after the Bankia preferred securities disaster, other than a gambler, who would buy shares in any Spanish bank in the absence of ultra transparency?
The 15 underwriting banks include Deutsche Bank AG, Banco Santander SA (SAN), UBS AG, Bank of America Corp.’s Merrill Lynch & Co. unit and JPMorgan Chase & Co., which will act as global coordinators, Chairman Angel Ron said. They have guaranteed 2.08 billion euros of the sale with the remainder covered by pledges to buy stock from existing shareholders, he said. 
Deutsche Bank underwrote 400 million euros, Santander 300 million euros with the other global coordinators taking 230 million euros each, Gonzalez-Robatto said in an interview after the event. Commissions were about 2 percent plus a 1 percent success fee, he said....
Who would buy shares in a Spanish bank, why everyone's favorite gamblers:  the large, global financial institutions.

The very same large, global financial institutions that governments unnecessarily bailed out and continue to protect by not requiring them to provide ultra transparency and disclose the losses currently hidden on and off their balance sheets.
Popular is accompanying its pitch for shareholder funds with a new business plan that speeds up recognition of loan losses to produce a 2.3 billion-euro loss this year. The bank is targeting earnings of 1.4 billion euros by 2014, using a predicted operating profit of 7.2 billion euros over the next three years to absorb losses....
In the absence of ultra transparency, why should anyone believe that Popular's new business plan is any more credible than Bankia's plan when it raised preferred shares?
Ron said the stress test process had penalized the bank because its business model focused on small Spanish businesses. 
“Accepting the results of this hypothetical exercise does not mean that we share them,” said Ron, who also highlighted the “torrent” of regulation imposing new capital burdens and provisioning costs on lenders.
Considering how low the bar is to pass the stress tests, recall the number of EU banks that passed a stress test only to be nationalized within 3 months, Banco Popular must be in awful shape.

If Banco Popular was not in such bad shape, it would voluntarily provide ultra transparency and show the world the facts to support its claim it was not in bad shape.

The absence of Banco Popular providing ultra transparency is a very, very large red flag signaling that purchasing its stock is purely blindly betting.

Friday, October 26, 2012

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane calls for 'curbing King Kong banks'

The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane in his speech 'on being the right size'  became the latest regulator to call for cutting the Too Big to Fail banks down to size.

Besides Mr. Haldane's typical insightful analysis, his speech reiterated many of the observations made by Paul Volcker on why the regulations proposed since the beginning of the current financial crisis are not going to be effective at dealing with the Too Big to Fail banks.

Regular readers know that there is only one way to right size these banks:  require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency harnesses the market in shrinking these global financial institutions.

For example, the market shrinks these banks by charging the banks more for their complexity.  It is one thing to say these big banks have 14,000+ subsidiaries, it is another to make these banks disclose the intimate details of each subsidiary so the market participants can assess their risk.

In addition, the market shrinks these banks by restraining proprietary trading.  Management and traders know that disclosing their positions limits how much can be earned from proprietary trading.  At a minimum, market participants can use programs similar to IBM's Watson to identify trades that appear to violate the Volcker Rule and call these trades to the regulators' attention.

More importantly, ultra transparency ends contagion in the financial system.  With ultra transparency, market participants have the information they need to independently assess the risk of each of these banks and adjust the amount of their exposure to what they can afford to lose given the risk assessment.

As reported by the Telegraph,
Andrew Haldane, the Bank’s executive director for financial stability, claimed that current bank reforms – including the Government’s plans to ringfence retail banks – do not go far enough and further measures should be considered. 
To address properly the “too-big-to-fail” problem, he said regulators should consider doubling banks’ loss-absorbing capital buffers to around 20pc, “placing limits on bank size”, or imposing a “full separation of investment and commercial banking” rather than a ring-fence.
Each of these alternatives has problems.

The OECD observed and your humble blogger has fully documented why the accounting construct known as bank capital is meaningless.  It bears repeating that bank capital is meaningless because it is easily manipulated by both banks and their regulators.

Limiting the size of banks sounds nice in theory, however, the question is whether it is size that makes the Too Big to Fail problematic or the risk that if they fail it will cause damage to the rest of the financial system.  The way to mitigate this risk is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Ring-fencing or full separation of investment and commercial banking sounds nice in theory, but the reason that Glass-Steagall fell was banks and their regulators had discovered that banks were bad holders of credit, interest and liquidity risk.  It was far more sensible for banks to originate and service loans and distribute these loans to investors who were better able to hold the loans.

The freezing of the structured finance market is a reflection of the failure to require that each deal provide observable event based reporting so that investors could know what they own.  The fact that the market froze does not say that it is a bad idea to have banks reducing their credit, interest and liquidity risk.
He added that the evidence pointed to the optimal size for a bank to be as small as $100bn (£62bn). ... 
Although banks claim to be more efficient the larger they are, Mr Haldane said the analysis ignored the cost of the implicit taxpayer guarantee that he calculated was worth $70bn a year for the world’s largest banks between 2002 and 2007, and $300bn a year now. 
Without the subsidy, “there is no longer evidence of economies of scale at bank sizes above $100bn. If anything, there is now evidence of dis-economies which rise with bank size, consistent with big banks becoming ‘too big to manage’,” he said. 
“Subtracting this subsidy, removing the state crutch, would suggest a dramatically lower socially-optimal banking scale. Like King Kong and Godzilla, these giants would arguably then be physiological impossibilities ... the weight transfer associated with a single step would have shattered their thigh bones.”
Mr. Haldane does have a wonderful way with words.

I know what his analysis suggests, but it is not clear to me that a bank that provides ultra transparency and operates as a utility doesn't have economies of scale when it gets larger than $100 billion.
Mr Haldane was warning that, despite regulators efforts to build regimes that allow banks to fail without taxpayer support, the risk is that – in the practical event of a giant lender’s imminent collapse – the government would discard the theory and step in. 
“Consider that trade-off when a big, complex bank hits the rocks,” Mr Haldane said. “On the one side is a simple, but certain, option – state bail-out. On the other is a complex, and less certain, option – resolution. If governments are risk-averse ... then bail-out may look attractive on the day. 
“The history of big bank failure is a history of the state blinking before private creditors.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as the point that Mr. Haldane makes is extremely important.

Our modern banking system is designed not to require government bailouts of the banks, however, there is a long tradition of bank regulators urging governments to bailout failing institutions (think Savings & Loans for example).
In his speech at the Institute of Directors, he argued that “one way of lessening that dilemma, and at the same making resolution more credible, is to act on the scale and structure of banking directly”....
The most direct way to act on scale and structure of banking is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It would be amazing how much the banks would change by simply shining the bright light of transparency on them and letting it act as the best disinfectant.
Mr Haldane warned of potential loopholes in the structure. “Today’s ring-fence [can become] tomorrow’s string vest,” he said. He also questioned whether banks would properly separate “cultures and capital” as long as the two operations remained under one roof.
Both of these loopholes were identified by Paul Volcker in his testimony before Parliament prior to Mr. Haldane's speech.

As I learned when working for Mr. Volcker, what he says might not be the word of god when it comes to banking, but it does come from closer to god given his 6'7" height.
Although he welcomed the progress made on bank reforms so far, he added: “Claims that they have solved the too-big-to-fail problem appear to me, however, premature, probably over-optimistic. Worse, they risk sending a false sense of crisis comfort.”
His comments were released shortly after Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, spoke out against the “vested interests” in banking and said that unfinished reforms were hampering economic recovery. 
“There are many vested interests working against change and push-back is intensifying,” she said. “It is interesting how some banks say the new regulations will be too burdensome, but then spend hundreds of millions of dollars lobbying to kill them.”
The leading unfinished reform that is hampering economic recovery and that is being strongly resisted by the banks is requiring them to provide ultra transparency.

The banks know if they provide ultra transparency the market will force them to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This will take the burden of supporting this debt off of the real economy and, as shown by Iceland, result in the economy growing again as capital that was used for debt service is now used to buy goods and services.

The banks know if they provide ultra transparency they will be forced to shrink dramatically.  Gone will be the subsidiaries to arbitrage rules and regulations.  Gone will be proprietary trading.  Gone will be behavior like manipulating Libor.
She added that progress was needed on resolution regimes to allow banks to fail and for regulators to coordinate and align their rules, particularly over new rules on bank structures such as ring-fencing or proprietary trading bans. “We need a global level discussion of the pros and cons of direct restrictions on business models,” she said.
Actually, we need to stop talking and simply implement ultra transparency.

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Time to rethink regulatory reform and replace it with ultra transparency

The American Banker ran an interesting article on all the complex rules that are being implemented as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III and asking if there is a better solution.

Regular readers know that all these complex rules and increases in regulatory oversight are a substitute for the simple solution of transparency and market discipline.

As I have said numerous times, with the exception of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule, Dodd-Frank should be repealed.

It should be replaced with an Act that brings transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  At a minimum, this Act should
  • Require that banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This is the data market participants need to independently assess the risk of the banks and exert discipline to restrain risk taking.
  • Require that structured finance securities provide observable event based reporting on all activities like a payment or default involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.  This is the data that investors need to know what they own.
Utilizing 21st century information technology, all of this disclosure can be centralized in the 'Mother of All Financial Databases' and made available to all market participants.

Market participants have an incentive to use this data because there is money to be made from using it.
  • For example, banks with deposits to lend can use this data to assess the risk of banks looking to borrow.  With this assessment, the interbank lending market can reopen.
  • For example, market participants can calculate Libor because they have access to all of the interbank transactions.
Regular readers know that unlike complex rules and regulatory oversight, transparency and market discipline have pass the test of time.
How ripe is the moment? Even lawmakers who voted for the 2010 reform law are open to improving it. 
"Congress never gets it right, when you're looking at massive reform legislation, the first time through," Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., told The Hill newspaper last week. "You directionally head in an area and then you come back, two years, three years hence to do a corrections legislation."...
Ammunition for anyone seeking change arrived Monday from Karen Shaw Petrou of Federal Financial Analytics.... 
Her stark conclusion: even if regulators did everything called for in Dodd-Frank, and did it perfectly, financial services supervision would still be a mess. Throw Basel III in the mix and it just gets worse. 
The end-result of numerous agencies pumping out massive rules to meet statutory deadlines will be a tangle of contradictory mandates that will be tough to enforce and impossible to comply with....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Petrou makes the case for restarting financial reform with a simple focus on bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

As I have documented on this blog, simply bringing transparency back to the opaque corners of the financial system will go a long way towards fixing all of the problems that financial reform is suppose to address.

Transparency has one more advantage over loophole ridden complicated regulations that the industry will render irrelevant.  Transparency has been shown to prevent a financial crisis in the first place.