Showing posts with label Capital Requirements. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Capital Requirements. Show all posts

Thursday, October 4, 2012

Top UK regulator warns that banks must act in 'public interest'

According to a Telegraph article, a top UK regulator has warned that in the future banks must act in the 'public interest' and not necessarily the interest of the shareholders.

Andrew Bailey, head of the Prudential Business Unit at the Financial Services Authority, has said new rules that come into force next year will put “the emphasis on economic well-being as an ultimate goal” of bank regulation....
Mr Bailey’s comments will unsettle bank executives who already fear that the regulators are being too interventionist. 
Earlier this year, Peter Sands, chief executive of Standard Chartered, said the notion that regulators could “anticipate all risks and micro-manage such an important part of the economy is dated and wrong”, adding that the policy “reeks of 1970s-style quasi-nationalisation of the industry”. 
The UK is having the same experience as the US.  It is in the process of adding complex rules and regulations in combination with regulatory supervision as a substitute for transparency.  With transparency, market participants can exert discipline on bank risk taking and promote the public interest.

What everyone other than the regulators learned from the financial crisis is that regulators and complex rules and regulations do not result in economic well-being when substituted for transparency.
In his speech to the Edinburgh Business School, Mr Bailey risked antagonising the industry further by reiterating that banks need to raise more capital, despite applauding the “substantial progress” they have made in the last four years....
Your humble blogger has repeatedly discussed how bank capital is an accounting construct that is easily manipulated by both the banks and regulators.

As a result of this ease of manipulation, which was confirmed by the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane observation that banks are 'prevaricating' on the value of their legacy assets, the OECD declare bank capital meaningless.

So it is hard to see how regulators pushing for more of something that is meaningless will be helpful. 
Outlining the regulator’s priorities, Mr Bailey said there were “two important objectives: seeking to increase the resilience of the UK banking system, including the threats emanating from the euro areas; and supporting the creation of credit in the UK economy”. 
The first objective could be achieved ASAP if the regulator required the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With their euro area exposures disclosed, it is amazing how fast the banks would rein in their risk to what they could afford to lose.
Separately, he confirmed that regulators have relaxed capital requirements on new lending to help stimulate growth. “We have allowed banks to reduce the capital buffers they hold over the minimum requirements in line with new lending to the UK economy,” he said. 
“Our view here is that a reduction in the risk arising from this new lending caused by an improvement in credit conditions should offset the risk from lowering capital buffers.” 
This shows a complete lack of understanding about how lending works.  Lending and the financing of the resulting loans are completely separate.

Banks make loans on an opportunistic basis.  If they don't hold the loan for their own balance sheet, they can always pass the loan on to another bank, a syndicate of banks, insurers or pension funds just to name a few. 

Saturday, June 2, 2012

Regulatory failure: banks offered incentive to buy government debt

CNBC carried an interesting article on how financial regulators are offering an incentive banks to buy government securities.  Regulators do this by waiving the need for banks to hold capital against these securities.

Of course, government debt is not risk free.  Not only is there interest rate risk, but as Iceland, Ireland and Greece have shown, there is also default risk.

Requiring banks to hold zero capital against assets with this type of risk profile is a fairly clear example of regulatory failure.

US and European regulators are essentially forcing banks to buy up their own government's debt—a move that could end up making the debt crisis even worse, a Citigroup analysis says. 
Regulators are allowing banks to escape counting their country's debt against capital requirements and loosening other rules to create a steady market for government bonds, the study says. 
While that helps governments issue more and more debt, the strategy could ultimately explode if the governments are unable to make the bond payments, leaving the banks with billions of toxic debt, says Citigroup strategist Hans Lorenzen. 
"Captive bank demand can buy time and can help keep domestic yields low," Lorenzen wrote in an analysis for clients. "However, the distortions that build up over time can sow the seeds of an even bigger crisis, if the time bought isn't used very prudently." 
"Specifically," Lorenzen adds, "having banks loaded up with domestic sovereign debt will only increase the domestic fallout if the sovereign ultimately reneges on its obligations." 
The banks, though, are caught in a "great repression" trap from which they cannot escape.
"When subjected to the mix of carrot and stick by policymakers...then everything else equal, we believe banks will keep buying," Lorenzen said....
"Ask the simple question: Why are banks buying sovereign debt when yields are either near record lows, or perhaps more interestingly, when foreign investors are pulling out?" Lorenzen wrote. 
He thinks he has the answer. 
For one, the European Central Bank's Long-Term Refinance Operations provided guarantees for the debt, which Lorenzen deems a "heavily sweetened form of financial repression given the pressure banks were under" to buy. 
"Banks have ended up buying bonds at yields where they would happily have sold them only a few months prior," he said. 
Moreover, banks are allowed to not count the sovereign debt against their Basel capital requirements. Also, Lorenzen argued, European banks have escaped the onus of stress tests this year, a less-than-subtle hint that authorities are willing to tolerate a bit of looseness in banks so long as they are helping to stave off a full-blown debt crisis. 
"One doesn’t have to be too cynical to hypothesize that all the disclosures on sovereign exposure have become a bit of a political liability at a point in time where the only buyers in size of periphery sovereign debt are periphery banks funded by the ECB," he said. 
"As long as funding for sovereigns in markets remains in jeopardy, and as long as there is no clear move towards proper fiscal solidarity in Europe, we reckon there will be a strong political incentive to make banks captive buyers. That implies a move away from marking sovereign debt to market, away from raising risk weights, away from capital ratios that don't risk weight assets and away from stress tests incorporating government bonds."

Monday, March 12, 2012

BIS confirms that financial regulators create instability

In a Financial Times article, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) observed that financial regulators created instability in the Eurozone with their requirement that banks achieve a meaningless 9% Tier I capital ratio by the end of June 2012.

Regular readers know that financial regulators are a source of financial instability and your humble regulators described the capital ratio target as an example of this when the regulators announced it.
Calls by European regulators for banks to hold more capital exacerbated concerns over the health of the eurozone’s financial sector and led to fears of a squeeze in lending to businesses and households, the Bank for International Settlements said on Sunday. 
The BIS, often referred to as the central bankers’ bank, said the requirement, announced last October, for the region’s largest banks to buttress their capital buffers and raise their tier one capital ratios to 9 per cent by June of this year had destabilised the system by bringing fears of a drop-off in lending and a rise in asset sales “to the forefront of financial market concerns”.
It is nice to have confirmation that the regulators' action destabilized the system.

The 9% Tier I capital target did not just bring fears of a drop-off in lending and a rise in asset sales, it caused both of these to occur.
The funding strains that emerged in the second half of last year had “fuelled fears that European banks would be forced to sell assets and reduce lending, thereby weakening real economic activity”, the BIS said. 
The new regulatory measures had “added to those fears”. 
Eurozone banks sold assets and cut some types of lending, notably those denominated in dollars and those that attracted higher risk weights, in late 2011 and early 2012....
The BIS, which houses the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the body responsible for the far more stringent Basel III supervisory framework, has led calls for banks to hold more capital in the wake of the global financial crisis. However, under Basel III, banks would have been given more time to meet the additional requirements in full. 
The BIS praised the EBA’s statement in December that explicitly discouraged banks from shedding assets to meet the 9 per cent capital target. It also applauded the European Central Bank’s move to provide additional liquidity to the financial system through its two three-year longer term refinancing operations, which took place in December and at the end of last month and have provided more than €1trn of loans to banks in the region. 
I wonder what, if any, impact the 9% Tier I capital ratio requirement had on the ECB's decision to implement the Long-Term Refinancing Operation.  Was the banks shedding assets, including loans and sovereign debt, to shrink their balance sheets a factor?
The LTROs were, according to the BIS, behind the recent recovery in asset prices, bank funding conditions and the revival of activity in credit markets....
“The EBA explicitly stated that actions by banks to meet the capital requirements that impact lending to the real economy would not be allowed before the end-of-June deadline. Plans submitted by banks to meet the requirements are still being assessed. The process is ongoing,” a spokesperson for the EBA said.
Naturally, the banks have paid no attention to the notion of not cutting back on lending to the real economy as part of reaching the 9% Tier I capital ratio.
Lending cuts by European banks focused primarily on new syndicated and large bilateral leveraged and project finance loans. 
Lending for project financing and loans for trade, aircraft and ships declined more sharply for banks with less capital than for stronger lenders. 
European banks also cut lending to emerging markets, with consolidated foreign claims on emerging Europe, Latin America and Asia falling in the third quarter of last year.

Thursday, February 2, 2012

Senior Italian Regulator says that higher bank capital requirements risk making situation worse

According to a Reuters' article, the head of Italy's bourse regulator voice his concern over higher bank capital requirements and observed that they risk damaging investor confidence.

So now damaging investor confidence can be added to igniting a credit crunch on the list of reasons why higher bank capital requirements in the absence of ultra transparency is a bad policy.

Further bank capital increase requested by the European Banking Authority (EBA) risk denting investor confidence, Giuseppe Vegas, head of Italy's bourse regulator Consob said on Thursday. 
"At the moment, the prospect of further, strongly dilutive capital increases risks not only making raising new capital difficult but creating a climate of mistrust among investors which, in the last analysis, could compromise the attractiveness of our shareholder system," he told a Senate hearing. 
He said there was a need to consider extending the deadlines for EBA's capital requirements, which force banks to strongly bolster their capital reserves.

Monday, December 26, 2011

Looting of the Irish expands to looting of the Eurozone

This blog has frequently looked at the issue of regulators requiring insolvent financial institutions to increase their book capital ratios.  A subset of this policy is the requirement that insolvent financial institutions shrink their balance sheets at the same time as these institutions are required to maintain high capital ratios.

One hundred percent of the time this capital ratio policy results in the financial institution selling its bests assets at a discount.  It also does absolutely nothing to address the bad debt that is on the financial institution's balance sheet and that is causing them to be insolvent in the first place.

Why does this regulatory capital ratio policy always end up with the best assets being sold at a discount?

The buyers know several facts that reduce the selling bank's leverage in the negotiation.
  • The selling financial institutions cannot raise capital from the equity markets because no one can assess their risk or solvency;
  • The selling financial institutions have a limited time in which to achieve the target capital ratio -- frequently, the regulators publish a deadline; 
  • The amount of assets that the financial institutions must sell is large relative to the capacity of the buyers to acquire - in Europe, banks are trying to shed 3 trillion euros of assets; and
  • The selling financial institutions must sell their best assets because recognizing the losses on their bad assets would decrease their book capital levels and move them away from the regulators' targeted capital ratios.

The end result is that the regulators effectively required their banks to sell their best assets at a discount.

I call this "looting" because the taxpayer has been called on to bailout these financial institutions in the past and, unless ultra transparency is adopted, be required to bailout these financial institutions in the future.  When the taxpayer needs to step up for the future bailout, the size of this bailout is increased by the discount the banks realized when selling their best assets.

The NY Times ran an article that gives some idea of how attractive looting the Eurozone financial system is.
As Europe struggles with its debt crisis, American businesses and financial firms are swooping in amid the distress, making loans and snapping up assets owned by banks there — from the mortgage on a luxury hotel in Miami Beach to the tallest office building in Dublin.
The sales are being spurred on because European banks are scrambling to raise capital and shrink their balance sheets, often under orders from regulators. European financial institutions will unload up to $3 trillion in assets over the next 18 months, according to an estimate from Huw van Steenis, an analyst with Morgan Stanley....
At Kohlberg Kravis, Nathaniel M. Zilkha, co-head of the special situations group, is expanding his London team to eight, from two, and hoping to take advantage of opportunities in Europe. The firm is even considering potential investments in the country where the crisis began, Greece, despite headlines warning of a default by Athens or the possibility that Greece may withdraw from the euro zone. 
“If no one is willing to turn over the rocks, that’s when you can make extraordinary investments,” Mr. Zilkha said. “The market dislocation in Greece is creating significant opportunities that wouldn’t be otherwise available.” 
Besides Greece, Kohlberg Kravis bankers have also been looking for deals in Spain and Portugal, where private companies are having a similarly hard time winning new credit or extending existing loans.... 
Experts expect these kinds of sales to jump as European banks race to meet the June deadline imposed by the European Banking Authority to raise more than 114 billion euros in fresh capital. Financial institutions also have to increase their Tier 1 capital ratio — the strictest yardstick of a bank’s ability to absorb financial blows — to 9 percent of assets. 
Banks get a twofold benefit from unloading assets like real estate loans and other holdings; not only do they have more cash, but there are fewer assets they must hold capital against in case of losses, thereby quickly bolstering Tier 1 levels...
Inside his firm, Stephen A. Schwarzman, the chief executive of the Blackstone Group, recently cited the $3 trillion estimate of how much European banks will have to unload, and this summer he told investors that Europe was back on Blackstone’s radar after being absent for several years. 
“As people become increasingly negative on the environment there, we think we are buying good companies at very good values,” he said.

Monday, December 19, 2011

Regulators show that bank capital requirements are pro-cyclical

In case there was any doubt over whether the management of bank capital requirements by regulators has been pro-cyclical and increased the economic downturn brought on by the solvency crisis, Larry Elliott ended it with his Guardian column.

Banking has become, rather like the chapter on the fall of the rupee in Oscar Wilde's The Importance of Being Earnest, "somewhat too sensational". 
We shall see on Monday what the government has in mind to make the industry less racy when it gives its response to the report headed by Sir John Vickers. There are unlikely to be many surprises: the plan will be to ringfence the retail operations of financial institutions from their investment banking arms but no break-up. 
Just as importantly, in the short term at least, will be whether ministers accept the recommendation by Vickers that banks should hold far more capital so that they can more easily ride out financial storms. The minimum suggested under the internationally agreed Basel III accord is for a 7% capital cushion but Vickers says it should be 10% for UK banks. 
It's not hard to see why regulators have demanded tougher rules. Banks were over-extended in the good times and operating with far too little capital.... 
What has happened subsequently is a classic case of slamming stable doors after the horse has bolted. Banks had too little capital in the good times and the danger is that they will be holding too much capital in bad times.... 
The argument is that bigger capital buffers are needed to deflect the unwelcome attentions of the credit-rating agencies, who, somewhat belatedly, are now adopting a rather more forensic approach. Banks with high capital ratios will be seen as safe, and will therefore be able to attract funds from other banks should they need to do so. 
Raising capital requirements today does not fool market participants into believing the banks are safer.  Market participants know that banks have significant exposures to troubled credits.

What the regulators achieve by setting a meaningless 9% Tier I capital ratio target is the opportunity to make misleading disclosures to the market,to run up a flag that confirms the financial system is still completely broken and remove any doubt that they are not up to the task of promoting financial stability.
What policymakers at the European Banking Authority (EBA), the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Bank of England want is a financial system that is strong enough and stable enough to fulfil its basic function of lending to the private sector. What they fear is that the less well-capitalised banks will fail, bringing the better-run banks down with them. 
What regulators want is what ultra transparency would provide.  A strong, stable financial system that fulfills its basic function of lending to the private and public sectors.
This all sounds fine in theory, but it is working out less well in practice. How do we know? 
One clue was the special swap arrangements announced by central banks last month, which allowed banks to access money cheaply. Another was the European Central Bank's announcement that it would provide unlimited three-year loans to commercial banks and significantly relax collateral rules. This is not, to put it mildly, a sector in rude health. 
In the UK at least, questions are now being asked about the wisdom of ratcheting up capital requirements on the grounds that they threaten to become dangerously pro-cyclical. At this stage of the economic cycle, when demand is low and credit hard to obtain, banks should be reducing their capital ratios so they can lend more. Insisting that they hold more capital means they call in loans, sell assets and lend less. In monetary policy terms, it is the equivalent of seeking to balance the budget in a slump. 
The position in the eurozone is worse than it is in Britain for three reasons. First, they are already operating in an environment where budgetary policy is pro-cyclical (and likely to remain so permanently as a result of Angela Merkel's fiscal stability pact). Second, the new rules for capital have been buttressed by tougher regulations governing the proportion of a bank's assets deemed to be liquid, normally defined as something that can be converted into cash without significant loss. One of the assets that has been designated highly liquid is European sovereign debt, and UK banks have less of this toxic waste on their books than their continental rivals. 
Finally, European banks do not have the benefit of a full-scale quantitative easing programme to assist them, and – because it is hard to raise money by selling new shares in the currentenvironment – are now involved in a fire sale of assets to raise the €115bn (£137bn) of additional capital that the EBA has said they need to make themselves secure. 
Louise Cooper, of BGC partners, said last week that in total European banks had pledged to cut assets by more than €950bn in the next two years. "That is a huge amount of deleveraging. In the current environment, these sales will have to be of profitable businesses and quality, performing loans."... 
"The banks will have to sit on the rubbish as it is unsellable," Cooper says. "Expect to see more and more evidence of banks deleveraging, selling assets, shrinking their businesses to raise capital. This does not bode well for the health of the European banking industry, or the prospects for a damaging credit crunch."
A point this blog has made repeatedly since the regulators decided that the market could be fooled by compliance with a meaningless bank capital ratio.
The UK is not immune from what is happening across the Channel and banks face the same sort of pressures to deleverage, albeit not so severe. 
This is now becoming a live issue for the Bank of England's financial policy committee (FPC), which is supposed to enhance financial stability by "identifying, monitoring and taking action to remove or reduce systemic risks".... 
Instead, the big question for the FPC is whether capital requirements on UK banks are too tight, too loose or just about right. The correct answer to that question is that they are too tight and need to be loosened in the short term even if they are to be tightened over the medium and long term.
What about the question of whether bank capital requirements should be dropped all together.

If banks are required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, capital and liquidity requirements don't add much value.  Market discipline will force banks to hold capital that reflects the risk of the bank.
More important, though, would be how such a message would go down in the financial markets. Would such a step be seen as a prudent response to changing circumstances or would it be seen as an admission that UK banks have big structural problems, thus creating the panic the authorities are seeking to avoid?
Actually, judging by the buyers' strike that is evident in bank stocks, it is clear that the market already thinks the UK banks have big structural problems whether they are required to hold more or less capital.

The fact is that market participants cannot tell if they are solvent because the banks' current level of disclosure leaves them, as the Bank of England's Andy Haldane observed, looking like 'black boxes'.

Until banks are required to provide ultra transparency, capital is meaningless.  Given this fact, regulators should quit demanding more of it and providing banks with an excuse to create a regulatory induced credit crunch.

Monday, October 31, 2011

Surprise! Europe's banks to raise little new capital from investors as a result of 9% Tier 1 mandate

According to a Bloomberg article, the analysts have crunched the numbers on the European regulators requiring Eurozone banks to hit a 9% Tier 1 capital ratio and discovered the Eurozone banks will require little in the way of new capital from investors.

The analysts reached two conclusions.

First, the 9% Tier 1 capital ratio will not restore investor confidence as the issue is what are the banks' current exposures and the lack of credibility of their risk models.  In addition, it is the peripheral banks and not the core "systemic" banks that need to raise capital.

This conclusion is not a surprise to regular readers as they know that it will take disclosure by each bank of its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet detail data to restore investor confidence.

Second, the 9% Tier 1 capital ratio mandate is just another exercise in "extend and pretend" by the Eurozone policymakers and financial regulators designed to buy time.
Europe’s largest banks may raise just a tenth of the total capital shortfall estimated by regulators, fueling concern policy makers’ plans to bolster the region’s lenders could fail.... 
Rather than tapping investors or governments, firms are trying to hit the 9 percent core capital target by adjusting risk-weightings, limiting dividends, retaining earnings, reducing loans and selling assets. Banks had threatened to curb lending, risking a recession, to meet the goal rather than take government aid that would bring limits on bonuses and dividends...
“The issue is how much fresh capital will be brought in,” Philippe Bodereau, head of credit research at Pacific Investment Management Co. in London, said in a telephone interview. “It would be positive if we saw banks launching rights issues, but they won’t. This is hardly shock and awe.” 
Lenders may sell as little as 6 billion euros of new stock to investors to plug the shortfall, according to Alastair Ryan, an analyst at UBS AGin London. That’s seven times less than the amount banks will raise from retaining earnings and adjusting risk-weightings, he said. 
Before last week’s summit, analysts at JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Credit Suisse Group AG had estimated banks might need as much as 250 billion euros more capital. 
Now, only Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA of Spain, Germany’s Commerzbank AG, France’s BPCE SA, Austria’s Raiffeisen Bank International AG and four Italian banks -- UniCredit SpA, Banco Popolare SC, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA and Unione di Banche Italiane ScpA -- need to raise money, according to [Morgan Stanley analyst] Van Steenis. 
“Surely, no one thinks that by allowing banks to avoid raising capital in all these various ways it’s going to give investors more confidence,” said Peter Hahn, a professor of finance at London’s Cass Business School and a former managing director at New York-based Citigroup Inc. “Part of the issue for a long time has been the lack of credibility of bank balance sheets and their risk models. This isn’t going to help.” ...
Greece’s six banks will need to raise about 30 billion euros, more than any other EU member state, the EBA said. That shortfall is covered by existing backstop arrangements with the EU and International Monetary Fund, so Greek lenders wouldn’t have to tap investors, according to the EBA. 
Spanish banks have the next-biggest deficit, according to the regulator. Yet Banco Santander SA and BBVA SA, the country’s two biggest lenders, have said they won’t raise capital. 
They will instead rely on profit and changes to the way they calculate risk-weighted assets to meet the target.
Under the Basel rules, firms use internal models to decide how much capital to assign to assets based on their own assessment of a default. The models aren’t disclosed and banks can reach different risk-weightings for the same assets, regulators and analysts say....
Italian banks have a 15 billion-euro shortfall, according to the EBA. UniCredit, which has a 7.4 billion-euro deficit, said it may be able to reduce that to 4.4 billion euros by counting 3.3 billion euros of hybrid securities as core capital. The Milan-based lender, the country’s biggest, said it’s working to identify “capital management actions to be put in place,” without adding further details.... 
France’s BNP Paribas SA and Societe Generale SA, which in September began programs to trim a combined 300 billion euros in assets, said last week they can meet the new capital targets without tapping shareholders or the government. 
President Nicolas Sarkozy said on Oct. 27 he has asked the banks to shift “almost all” of their dividend payments into strengthening their balance sheets and make their bonus practices “normal.” 
Deutsche Bank AG and Commerzbank AG, Germany’s biggest lenders, also are cutting assets and selling businesses to meet the threshold. 
The method used to determine how much capital banks need to raise “puts the onus on peripheral banks and limits the impact on core banks,” said Pimco’s Bodereau. “The big weakness is that banks that are truly systemic are headquartered in London, Paris and Frankfurt and not in Athens.” 
Southern European banks that can’t raise capital may still need to shrink their balance sheets by as much as 40 percent to meet the new requirements and run the risk of having to rely on state injections, Mediobanca analysts including Alain Tchibozo wrote in a note to clients on Oct. 28. 
“They’ve cobbled together a sticking-plaster solution,” said Jonathan Newman, an analyst at London-based Brewin Dolphin Holdings Plc, which manages about 25 billion pounds ($40 billion). “While it’s desirable for them to have been tougher, the reality was they couldn’t afford to be tougher. Banks wouldn’t have been able to raise the money privately, so they would have had to go to governments, which then puts the sovereign at risk.”

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Banks have capital for a reason - In Europe, it is time to use it

The Guardian ran an interesting article asking the question:  how much capital should Eurozone banks hold.

Under the current circumstances, the FDR Framework would suggest none.  In fact, banks should have a negative equity balance if that is what is required to recognize all the losses they hold on the asset side of their balance sheet.


The whole reason banks have capital is to absorb losses so that the losses do not damage the real economy.


There are three facts about bank capital that are critical for reaching this conclusion.
  • First, bank capital is an easily manipulated accounting construct. It is not some sort of rainy day fund that has been set aside just waiting to be used.
  • Second, bank solvency is independent of bank capital.  It is a function of the relationship between the market value of the bank's assets and the book value of the bank's liabilities.  When the market value of the assets exceeds the book value of the liabilities, the bank is solvent.  When the reverse is true, the bank is insolvent.
  • Third, banks can be insolvent and continue to make loans until they are closed by the financial regulators.  For example, the US regulators let the insolvent savings and loans operate for several years after the market realized they were insolvent.

In short, banks can operate without capital in the form of positive book equity.

Capital for banks is always an accounting construct.  If it is reduced to a negative number, it does not mean that the bank has to go out of business or that it has to stop making loans (it probably does mean that all bonuses and dividend payments will have to be in shares while book capital is a negative number though).

Unlike a non-financial company, a bank with negative capital can stay open as long as regulators permit it.


In Europe, the time has come to put the bank capital to use absorbing losses on sovereign and private debt.  If necessary, all of the capital plus more should be used?  After all, what is it being 'saved' for?

Is it better to not use the capital to absorb the losses and allow the global economy to sink into another recession or perhaps the Great Depression II?

The capital would be used to reset debt at a level the borrowers can afford.

Why would market participants trust that the banks with their deposits and other investments if they have a negative book value?

Because, under the FDR Framework, going forward the banks are going to be required to disclose their current asset and liability-level data to all market participants.  With this data, market participants are going to be able to assess the risk of the banks and adjust the price and amount of their exposure according to the results of the assessment.
The point of this capital - largely made up of share capital - is that it should be dense enough to absorb losses so that banks can keep the deposits for their customers safe. 
Banks argue that the larger amount of capital they hold, the less they have available to lend out. It is this point that was addressed by Bank of England executive director Andy Haldane in the summer when he pointed out that one of the ways Franklin Roosevelt helped the US out of its Great Depression was to actually reduce the amount of capital banks needed to hold to get more money flowing around the financial system. 
Haldane argued it was an "early example of macro-prudential regulation" - one of the buzz words that has emerged from the 2008 crisis. The idea is that banks build up capital during the good times - even though they do not need it - so that the cushion can be eaten through in the bad times. 
The most recent meeting of the financial policy committee, which is run under the auspices of the Bank of England and on which Haldane sits, discussed whether to copy the plan implemented by Roosevelt 60 years ago. They decided the time was not right to advocate such a move. 
It it worth repeating what the FPC said:
A number of members also placed particular weight on the argument that it would be premature for banks to run down their ratios now, and deplete resilience, in light of shocks that had occurred in the recent past, given the risk that larger shocks could lie ahead. But in the event that conditions did deteriorate sharply, the Committee agreed that it was important that capital and liquidity buffers were useable: it would make no sense for banks to constrain lending, thereby aggravating the adverse consequences for financial stability, because they believed that they would not be allowed to run down their buffers even temporarily to cushion the shock.
... The record of the meeting shows that there was a long discussion about whether banks should hold less capital. It was only a month ago. Now, regulatory sand appears to be shifting, with the need for more capital being debated.

Thursday, July 21, 2011

EU highlights why only disclosure can be global standard (update)

As the negotiations over restructuring the debt of Greece heat up, Michel Barnier, the EU internal markets commissioner, laid out the rules for bank capital requirements.  While the required level of capital is important, what was more significant was the limit placed on national bank regulators preventing them from adopting and enforcing even higher capital requirements.

A Telegraph article by Harry Wilson suggests that the reason for this limit is that not all countries would be able to implement a higher capital standard.

One of the strengths of current asset and liability-level disclosure for banks is that it can be uniformly enforced regardless of the financial condition of the country the bank is headquartered in.
Banks will be forced to hold more capital of a higher quality as part of the package of reforms that will hand the EU sweeping powers to intervene in the financial system to prevent a future crisis....
Michel Barnier, EU internal markets commissioner, said regulations were a "tremendously important step forward in learning the lessons from the crisis"....
In line with the Basel III capital agreements, European banks will be required to maintain a core tier one capital ratio of 8pc, of which common equity will have to make up 4.5 percentage points of the total, up from two percentage points. In addition, banks will in good years be expected to set aside an undetermined additional store of capital as a "countercyclical buffer" and the largest banks will also face an additional surcharge. 
In what could prove to be contentious, national regulators are limited in their ability to impose extra capital requirements on their domestic banks, with the EU saying it wanted to prevent countries from "distorting" the market. 
"Financial stability can only be achieved by the EU acting together; not by each member state on its own," said the EU. 
"The apparent aim of the Commission is that, by creating uniform prudential standards, those jurisdictions that would struggle to impose higher standards will not be perceived as less safe, and capital requirements will not become a basis for inter-state competition," said Jeremy Jennings-Mares, a capital markets partner at law firm Morrison & Foerster. 
"It is frankly extraordinary that the UK has to fight in Europe to retain this discretion for national supervisors," said Ash Saluja, at law firm CMS Cameron McKenna. 
Senior British regulators, including Lord Turner, the chairman of the Financial Services Authority, have argued that higher capital requirements could be imposed in future. 
David Miles, a member of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committe, has said a capital ratio of 20pc could be appropriate.
Update

Subsequent to the original post, Michel Barnier reversed course on not allowing national regulators to set higher capital standards.  According to a Reuters' article,
The UK will still be able to ring-fence its retail banks and impose extra capital limits on them under the European Union's proposed capital and liquidity rules, the bloc's financial services chief said. 
Michel Barnier, the EU's internal market commissioner, told the Financial Times on Friday he had split his proposal into two to give governments such as the UK and Spain more flexibility to impose additional demands on parts of their banking sector. 
The draft laws, unveiled on Wednesday, would make the EU the first jurisdiction to begin implementing the new global Basel III accord, which aims to make banks safer by making them hold more and better quality capital against unexpected losses.

The UK and other countries such as Sweden previously raised concerns that the draft EU laws would make it difficult for countries like Britain to tighten capital controls on banks beyond the levels which had been agreed internationally.

Some investors had also believed that Barnier's Capital Requirements Directive 4 would bar the UK's Independent Commission on Banking, chaired by John Vickers, from pursuing its bid to force banks to ring-fence their retail operations. 
"It seems (the Vickers Commission) may be proposing 10 percent for retail banks. That would be possible in my proposal. We think we have the flexibility we need," he told the FT. "We do think the (Vickers) proposals can be integrated into our framework." 
He also said that his proposal "foresees a much expanded use of the countercyclical buffers" that would allow countries like the UK to pile extra capital requirements on top of the 7 percent for "financial stability" reasons. 
"In the directive are all the issues relating to supervision where national flexibility is needed. There is flexibility for supervisors on the buffers," he said. 
Barnier added that he was confident that his proposal would eventually win the full support of the UK. "It becomes more credible if we have the UK on board, given the support of its financial sector," he said.

Monday, July 4, 2011

Basel III capital requirements, Dodd-Frank ban on using credit ratings in regulations and disclosure by banks

A Reuter's article highlighted how the Dodd-Frank Act impacts the adoption of Basel III capital requirements in the US.

The Act bans the use of credit ratings in US bank regulations.  However, these same banned credit ratings are used to in determining the risk-weighting of an asset for compliance with the Basel III capital requirements.

The question is what can be used as a substitute for relying on the credit ratings for three or four firms?

Under the FDR Framework, the substitute is to replace the opinion of three or four firms with the opinion of the market.  This is easily achieved by requiring disclosure of each bank's current asset and liability-level data.  Market participants including competitors, credit and equity market analysts, and valuation experts will use this data to perform their own risk assessments of the assets on the individual bank's balance sheet.

Rather than having to rely on three or four firms, regulators can now rely on the assessment of risk by the market participants.
The United States' ability to implement global capital rules is being made more difficult by a provision in the Dodd-Frank financial reform law, JPMorgan Securities said in a research note released on Friday. 
The 2010 law bans the use of credit agency ratings, such as those provided by Moody's Corp and McGraw-Hill Cos' Standard & Poor's, in U.S. banking regulations. 
That is a problem for bank regulators, who currently have no good alternative to the credit ratings they use to help judge the risk on banks' books when determining capital requirements. 
... The ban on credit ratings in U.S. regulations will also likely make it more difficult to implement the latest sweeping global capital accord reached as part of the Basel III agreement, the note said. 
That agreement does not have to be fully in place until 2019, but U.S. regulators hope to begin issuing draft rules by the end of this year. 
... Last summer U.S. regulators sought comment on what could be done to replace credit ratings in their rules. They say good alternatives have yet to materialize. 
The Dodd-Frank change has been a burr in their saddle. 
"The Dodd-Frank Act's prohibition against the use of credit ratings also will impede our efforts to achieve international consistency in the implementation of Basel III," acting Comptroller of the Currency John Walsh told the House Financial Services Committee on June 16. 
The Basel III agreement is a response to the financial crisis and aims to force banks to meet tougher capital standards so they can better withstand a financial shock. 
Regulators have asked the U.S. Congress to amend the law to deal with the credit rating problem, but that seems unlikely for the foreseeable future. 
One possible outcome is that regulators will require banks to perform their own risk assessments to replace the work of credit rating agencies, and the banks' assessments would be reviewed by a third party, said Karen Petrou, managing partner at Federal Financial Analytics, a regulatory policy consulting firm. 
That third party could wind up being the credit raters, she said. 
"This is a sort of halfway house," she said.

Thursday, June 30, 2011

Even the Wall Street Journal is beginning to embrace bank asset-level disclosure

A recent Wall Street Journal editorial marks another milestone in the mainstream media's embrace of bank asset-level disclosure.
In the sociology of "The Life of Brian," a world in despair is a world casting about for messiahs. Despair over the problem of big banks has some now reaching for the messiah of higher capital standards. 
If banks had more capital, goes the argument, they wouldn't have needed bailouts. This is true—if you make an unwarranted assumption that the riskiness of bank assets would have been unaffected, or even improved, under higher capital requirements. 
As we discussed in previous posts, under higher capital requirements, both Merrill and Citi could have substituted super senior tranches of CDOs for Treasury securities and improved their return on equity without significantly changing their risk adjusted capital ratios.
... So the equation more capital = safer is not as straightforward as it seems. 
Happily, the complexities are not lost on the gnomes of Basel ... Their latest solution, Basel III, would seriously hike the amount of capital banks must hold, but otherwise persists with the basic strategy of setting different levels of capital against different assets precisely to preserve the incentive of banks to invest in assets perceived as safe. 
The fatal conceit, of course, is "perceived." Triple-A mortgage securities once were seen as safe. Greek bonds were safe. Under TBTF, when banks receive no discipline from their own creditors who expect to be bailed out, it falls on regulators not only to guess which assets are safe but to lean against the incentive of banks to categorize risky assets as safe in order to hold less capital against them. 
How well regulators have performed this function can be guessed from a succession of global financial crises...  
Nor is it pound-foolish to avoid banking panics at the cost of increasing moral hazard. But the fact remains: Everything we do ends up increasing moral hazard. 
Actually, everything that the regulators have tried so far increases moral hazard.
... Lacking, meanwhile, has been any willingness to grasp the nettle of moral hazard directly. We want a messiah, but apparently not one who asks anything radical of us or challenges us to relinquish any sacred cows. 
All but dismissed, for instance, has been the idea of contingent capital—requiring banks to sell a bond that would convert to equity if the bank gets in trouble. 
Forget the trifling argument over whether such convertibles should count as "capital." What matters is the creation of a class of tradable debt exempt from bailout, giving speculators an incentive to scour for early signs of trouble. 
The issue with contingent capital is that there is no readily apparent market for it.  Without asset and liability-level disclosure, investors have no way of assessing the riskiness of what they are buying.

It is one thing to make an investment when you know what the bank's exposures are, but quite another to make an investment on what may or may not be there.
Or how about requiring government-insured deposits to be 100% backed by Treasury bills? 
We already have this.  Since the beginning of the credit crisis, it is called a money market mutual fund.
Don't underestimate the importance of FDIC deposit insurance to the edifice of TBTF. If government were seen acting in advance to protect its own claims in a bank failure, and devil take the hindmost, it would have a powerful effect on the thinking of the hindmost. 
Bank creditors might begin to doubt their own rescue and demand more transparency and less complexity from bank CEOs. 
Following the messiah of transparency comes market discipline and the government acting in advance to protect is own claims in a bank failure.

As this blog has discussed at length, market participants need to have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  For banks, this information is current asset and liability-level data.

With this data, market participants can determine if a bank is solvent or not.  With this data, market participants can determine how much risk a bank is taking and adjust the pricing and amount of their exposure to the bank accordingly.  

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

Checking how banks measure riskiness of their assets requires disclosure of asset-level data

A Bloomberg article reports that now that the battle over risk-adjusted capital requirements is over, regulators are turning to examine how banks' measure the riskiness of their assets.

The best way to ensure 1) that the risk adjustments are not manipulated and 2) that banks converge on the same risk adjustments for the same assets is disclosure of the asset-level data.  The market will force a common risk-adjustment across all financial institutions.
Global banking regulators are moving their attention to disparities in the way firms measure the riskiness of their assets on concern lenders may be using their internal models to mitigate rules aimed at making them boost capital. 
... Now regulators are preparing to assess how banks set risk weightings amid criticism firms’ calculations are inconsistent, said a person with direct knowledge of the matter who declined to be identified because the talks are private. 
“There is no question that the weightings can be manipulated,” said Charles Goodhart, a former Bank of England policy maker and professor at the London School of Economics. “They are light years away from being scientific. The idea that risk can be captured and then not adjusted to reflect dynamic markets is absolutely flawed.” 
The internal ratings rules determine how much capital banks should set aside to cover assets such as mortgages, derivatives as well as consumer and corporate loans. The riskier the asset, the higher weighting it attracts and the more capital a bank is required to allocate. That affects the profitability of trading and investing in those assets for the lender. 
Firms use their own internal models to decide how much capital to assign based on their own view of those assets defaulting. The models aren’t disclosed and banks can reach different risk weightings for the same assets, regulators and analysts say. 
“The basic problem with all this data is can you trust the banks to tell you the bad news?” said Prem Sikka, an accounting professor at the University of Essex. “Regulators won’t have the resources to scrutinize things in detail, but if things are publicly available, ordinary people, academics, lenders, depositors -- anyone who’s interested -- can look and help with the regulation of these banks by pointing out anomalies.” 
A clear statement of the benefits of asset-level disclosure as it applies to risk-weighting assets.
... Regulators are considering a peer-review process, setting up a sub-committee of the Basel Committee to ask a sample of banks to calculate risk weightings on a group of comparable assets to assess whether they are being calculated consistently, the person with knowledge of the plans said. A spokesman for the committee declined to comment. 
However, in a world where regulators are protecting their information monopoly, regulators would rather consider a one-off solution like a peer-review assessment of comparable assets.  The problem with a peer-review is that neither the regulators nor the market knows if the responses a bank gives to the peer-review are consistent with how it actually risk-weights the assets.
“The definition of risk weights is incredibly important,” Adair Turner, chairman of Britain’s Financial Services Authority and a member of the Basel Committee, said in a June 24 speech. “There is a major project for the Basel Committee and the international authorities to really focus on the commonality of risk weights,” he said. “The integrity of this whole system depends on us really being confident” that banks are using the same risk-ratings. 
Given that the numerator in the capital ratio, namely capital, is an accounting construct that at best is a lagging indicator and at worst is subject to substantial manipulation, the integrity of the whole system is already compromised.
... Lloyds Banking Group Plc (LLOY), the U.K.’s biggest mortgage lender, reduced the estimated risk of default on its mortgages to 12 percent in 2010 from 17 percent in 2009, according to a May filing. By contrast, Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc, owner of NatWest, raised its estimate for defaults to 13 percent over the same period from 12 percent, according to Morgan Stanley analysts. Officials at the two banks declined to comment on their calculations. 
HSBC Holdings Plc (HSBA)’s Finance Director, Iain Mackay, said last month at an investor meeting that Europe’s biggest bank had been able to make “significant risk weight asset savings” in the past years through a process of “data cleansing.” 
“It’s not transparent to anybody outside whether the model is as good as it could be and, therefore, the capital weighting is right,” Chairman Douglas Flint told the meeting on May 11.

Tuesday, June 28, 2011

Bethany McLean and "Capital Punishment" [updated]

Slate carried an article by Bethany McLean on why stricter capital requirements would not have prevented our most recent financial crisis.  I made this point in two posts that pre-date her article: bank capital's moment of truth, and debunking the myth of bank capital.

What caught my eye in this article was her solution in an ideal world for preventing financial crisis.  She championed asset-level disclosure as required under the FDR Framework.
Pretty much everyone—everyone, that is, except bankers and a handful of their supporters—agrees that there's one surefire way to make the global financial system safer: Require banks to increase capital reserves. 
But there's a risk in seeing stricter capital requirements as a catchall solution. Think about the past (the financial meltdown in 2008) and the present (the fear that a default by Greece will ignite another financial crisis ). If banks had held more capital, would we have avoided either mess? I'm afraid the answer is no. 
... A curious paradox of capitalism is its aversion to capital. When you think about it, capital is money (classically in the form of common stock) that isn't owed to anyone, so it can protect those who are owed money, like bondholders, by absorbing losses first. It's expensive, because the providers of capital want to be paid for putting their necks on the line. 
Bankers, whom we think of as the ultimate capitalists, can't stand the stuff. Indeed, the new capital standards being contemplated in Basel have bankers up in arms. 
At a House Financial Services Committee meeting last week, industry representatives argued, among other things, that large capital requirements will raise the cost of the loans they make. Prominent economists, including Simon Johnson, former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, andAnat R. Admati of Stanford, say this is bunk. 
Regardless of who's right about that, what seems to get lost in the public debate is what capital isn't. It isn't a literal pile of cash or stock certificates, but rather an accounting construct based on the difference between what the bank says its assets are worth, and what its liabilities are. 
If the bankers are wrong about how much their assets (i.e., their loans), are worth, then they're wrong about how much capital they have.
Her description of what capital is needs to be re-read.  She is very explicit in telling you that capital is an accounting construct.  As a result, it is a number that is subject to being gamed by the banks and their regulators - think suspension of mark-to-market accounting at the start of the credit crisis.

The reason this blog has been down on capital is because it is an accounting construct.  It may or may not reflect reality.

This blog has favored solvency (a bank is solvent if the market value of its assets is greater than the book value of its liabilities) instead because it does reflect current reality.
... Historically, most, if not all, bank failures have resulted from a run on the bank, meaning that short-term lenders or depositors yank their money because they doubt the value of the bank's assets. Once that fear sets in, it doesn't matter whether the bank is well-capitalized or not: It runs out of cash anyway.  
The long form of this point was made in the posts on bank runs found in the guide to FDR Framework.
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers could plausibly argue, at the time of their demise, that they were well capitalized, but they still suffered a run because investors no longer trusted the value of the assets. The very situation in which a bank most needs a lot of capital is when investors start to suspect that the bank might be lying about the value of its assets. At that point, no amount of capital is enough.
... More broadly, think about how the crisis was finally averted. The common perception is that the Troubled Asset Relief Fund, or TARP, which put billions of dollars of capital into the biggest banks, did the trick. But that's not quite right. TARP showed that the government wasn't going to let the banks fail, and it was that demonstration which averted the crisis of confidence. What really made a difference was the other things the government did, most notably the FDIC's blanket guarantee of all the banking sector's debts.
This blog has repeatedly made the point that it was the US government putting its credit on the line, not programs like stress tests, that stopped the crisis of confidence.
... Not only would higher capital requirements have failed to prevent these crises; conceivably they might have made them worse. 
The risk weighting that the regulators apply to assets encourages banks to hold more of the assets that are supposed to be low-risk. That's why banks all owned a lot of mortgage-backed securities—they were purportedly low-risk, and banks didn't have to hold much capital against them. Sovereign debt like Greece's was also purportedly low-risk; that why banks owned a lot of it. 
Subsequent events showed that the risk weightings left something to be desired. 
... If banks had more capital, wouldn't they take less risk, because the bankers would have more to lose? I'm not sure the answer is yes, because the capital is still other people's money.
Previously, using Merrill Lynch as an example, it was shown that more capital could in fact lead to more risk taking.  By simply substituting low risk mortgage-backed securities for low risk sovereign debt, Merrill would have improved its return on equity without having changed the risk weightings under the capital requirements.  As a result, Merrill could have lost far more money.
A better argument in favor of stricter capital requirements is that if there were more capital and less debt in the system, then the likelihood would diminish that short-term lenders and depositors would get scared enough to create a run. 
But in the gigantic, murky, interconnected world of global finance, I'm not sure there's any amount of capital—any amount that still allows the system to function, that is—that would provide enough comfort under all circumstances. 
In an ideal world, we would do a lot more than require banks to hold more capital. We'd mandate transparency in the valuation of their assets, so that outsiders had a prayer of knowing what the stuff on banks balance sheets was actually worth.
With transparency in the valuation of their assets, we would also get each of their individual positions.  This would allow outsiders the ability to value these assets for themselves and determine what they are actually worth.
We'd force banks not to rely on short-term funding, so they couldn't have a liquidity crisis. And we'd make sure that regulators understood all the unique risks in each institution that they were regulating.
As discussed at length in the post on the new model for bank supervision, it is the disclosure of the asset and liability-level data that allows the regulators to understand all the unique risks in each institution.  This disclosure allows the regulators to harness the analytical capabilities of the market to understanding each institution.
But none of that is going to happen. So maybe requiring more capital is the best we can do. But we should be aware that it's an imperfect solution, and that getting the details wrong risks creating catastrophic problems down the road.
Do not be so pessimistic Bethany!

When politicians (see UK Prime Minister David Cameron), central bankers (see Bank of England's Mervyn King and the Financial Policy Committee), regulators (see the Bank for International Settlements, otherwise known as the central bankers' bank) and the mainstream media (see the Economist magazine) call for asset-level disclosure, it is a clear signal that they too know that disclosure is needed.

To paraphrase Winston Churchill, the overseers of the financial system always get it right with disclosure, they just have to try everything else first.

Update
The U.S. General Accounting Office issued a report that weighed in on the short-comings of bank capital that result from it being an accounting construct.
More than 300 insured depository institutions have failed since the current financial crisis began in 2007, at an estimated cost of almost $60 billion to the deposit insurance fund (DIF), which covers losses to insured depositors. Since 1991, Congress has required federal banking regulators to take prompt corrective action (PCA) to identify and promptly address capital deficiencies at institutions to minimize losses to the DIF. 
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act requires GAO to study federal regulators' use of PCA. This report examines (1) the outcomes of regulators' use of PCA on the DIF; (2) the extent to which regulatory actions, PCA thresholds, and other financial indicators help regulators address likely bank trouble or failure; and (3) options available to make PCA a more effective tool. 
... Although the PCA framework has provided a mechanism to address financial deterioration in banks, GAO's analysis suggests it did not prevent widespread losses to the DIF--a key goal of PCA. 
Since 2008, the financial condition of banks has declined rapidly and use of PCA has grown tenfold. However, every bank that underwent PCA because of capital deficiencies and failed in this period produced a loss to the DIF. Moreover, these losses were comparable as a percentage of assets to the losses of failed banks that did not undergo PCA. 
... Since the 1990s, GAO and others have noted that the effectiveness of PCA, as currently constructed, is limited because of its reliance on capital, which can lag behind other indicators of bank health. That is, problems with the bank's assets, earnings, or management typically manifest before these problems affect bank capital. 
... GAO tested other financial indicators, including measures of asset quality and liquidity, and found that they were important predictors of future bank failure. These indicators also better identified those institutions that failed and did not undergo the PCA process during the recent crisis.
An unbiased observer like the GAO realizes that looking at a bank's assets and their quality is of more predictive value in measuring the solvency of a bank than looking at a bank's capital position.  This is not surprising, because deterioration in the assets shows up before accounting losses are recognized.

The FDR Framework and its requirement to disclose the asset-level data incorporates this practical reality.