Showing posts with label Opacity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Opacity. Show all posts

Thursday, September 19, 2013

As JP Morgan pays over $1 billion in fines today, it is worth noting bad behavior occurs across banking industry

As JP Morgan pays over $1 billion in fines today (including for lying about London credit default swap trade and for lying about credit card add-on products it charged for but didn't provide), it is worth noting that the fines are a cost of doing business and that this type of behavior cuts across the entire banking sector.

Regular readers know that the only way to change bank behavior for the better is to require transparency.  Specifically, transparency under which the banks disclose the current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Why transparency?

Because sunlight is the best disinfectant.  With exposure detail transparency, sunlight is shown on the banks and all of their activities.

Gone are the days of misleading or politically bullying their regulators as market participants can use this data to independently assess what banks are doing.  Based on this independent assessment, market participants can exert market discipline on the banks; something that has been absent for the last 40 years.

Zoe Williams nicely summarizes the bad behavior of the banking sector and why transparency is needed in her Guardian column.

Putting aside the people who just can't bear for this to be true, it is plain to everyone that the main high street banks are morally bankrupt. If only we could have bailed them out morally instead of financially – I feel sure our moral deficit would have been easier to pay down. 
Two scandals hit Barclays this week within 24 hours of each other – in one it is contesting a £50m fine for reckless Qatari fundraising that it hadn't told its shareholders about. In the other, it may have to repay £100m for mistakes (in its favour) made in personal loans. 
This doesn't tell us much we didn't already know. 
We knew from Liborand the mis-selling of personal protection insurance that cheating people has become peer-normalised among the main banks, and we know this has been going on since at least 2005. 
There has been a moral deficit since then, and the crash didn't make a dent in it. 
We also know, from those epic fines issued by the Financial Services Authority (now the FCA) over Libor, that much of the punishment is as good as meaningless. Money was just taken from one bank and distributed among the others. This only works if just one of them is crooked. When they all are, it's just a kitty....

We spend so much time talking about this titanic clash between the free market and the social state – yet ignore the fact that most of our major "markets" no longer operate as such. 
This is an oligarchy whose only governing authority is the administrator of wrist-slaps, and whose principles begin and end with the preservation of its jointly and severally managed profit. 
Which is to say that they're not competing against each other; they collaborate brilliantly – which would be sweet to watch were it not for the fact that they are working together the better to screw us. 
When you criticise a bank, you are often accused of the crime of "minding profit". I don't mind profit. But the system as it stands has come untethered from all the principles by which profit justifies itself. 
Buyers and sellers are only equal parties working towards mutually beneficial deals when both have all the relevant information. 
Generally we have no information and discover what the banks are up to roughly six years later, if at all....
[RBS] has all the garden variety failures that affect me personally as a customer – you can check them on a scorecard produced by Move Your Money – as well as occupying the hot epicentre of an FT diagram which details the causes of the 2008 financial crash. 
That was a complicated disaster, caused by bad lending, bad investments, risky funding structures, low capital, and mergers and acquisitions. RBS alone had a finger in every pie chart (it is actually a Venn diagram). 
So this institution is at the very heart of an event that has caused misery for millions of people, not to mention lobotomised our political culture...

Saturday, September 14, 2013

Nucleus of our current financial crisis

The Financial Times put together a terrific graphic in which it lists the five main causes of bank and broker failure (bad lending, bad investments/trading, low capital, risky funding structure and M&A) and which combination of these causes brought down each bank or broker during our current financial crisis.

Your humble blogger likes this graphic because it is both very informative and because each of these causes was made possible by opacity.

The latter point bears repeating.  What made each of the causes of bank and broker failure possible was opacity.

Because of opacity, banks and brokers were not subject to market discipline that would have restrained the banks and brokers exposures to each cause of failure.

Let's look at how opacity works to allow bad lending.

When a bank has to disclose its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can assess both how the bank underwrites its loans and equally importantly how it charges for these loans.

Is the bank compensated for the risk it is taking on?  If not, market participants can exert market discipline by reducing their exposure to the bank and charging the bank more for funds.

With opacity, banks were free to engage in bad lending in the run-up to the financial crisis.

Let's look at how opacity works to allow low capital.

When a bank has to disclose its current global exposure details, market participants can assess the risk of the bank.  Market participants can then adjust their exposure to the bank based on this risk assessment to what they can afford to lose.

The result is a link between the risk a bank is taking and its stock price.

For example, banks with less capital will have a lower stock price for the same level of earnings as banks with higher levels of capital.  There is a natural bias for banks to have higher capital levels. In the 1930s, when disclosing a bank's exposure details was the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet, bank capital levels exceeded 20% of their exposures.

With opacity, banks were free to lower their capital levels as there was no link between the risk they were taking and their stock valuations.

The takeaway from the Financial Times' graphic is that the causes of the financial crisis could have been prevented if the banks had been required to provide transparency and disclose their current exposure details.

Sunday, September 1, 2013

Who is holding the risk?

The Economist magazine raised an interesting question in 2003 when it reported on the lack of an answer to the question: who is holding lending risk?

Today, 6 years after the beginning of the global financial crisis, we still cannot answer the question of who is holding lending risk.

Regular readers know that the only way to answer the question of who is holding lending risk is to bring transparency into all the opaque corners of the financial system.

THE world's leading banks decided some years ago that lending is a mugs' game. 
They began to get rid of their loans, repackaging them and selling them off as securities, or getting others to re-insure their risk....
Alan Greenspan, chairman of America's Federal Reserve, said in a speech in May that this spreading of the banks' risks has made the financial sector more resilient, and individual institutions within it less vulnerable to shocks. 
It can indeed be argued that the world's financial system is safer if banks carry less of the overall credit risk. 
Their previous mismanagement of credit has caused so many damaging banking crises in the past; and banks, with their unique role in the payment system and the distribution of liquidity, are prone to systemic risk in a way that is not true of other financial institutions. Better, in that case, that they are strong, and that risks and losses are borne by a wider investment pool. 
Others, though, are less sanguine. They fear that credit losses, buried today, will show up in new places later, causing unpredictable damage deep in the world economy....

But analysts and central bankers do not have a complete picture of where the banks' risks have ended up. 
One thing is certain. Such risk does not neatly disappear into thin air. 
In a weak economy, bad debts increase and banks traditionally take a big hit. If they are not taking the hit in this economic slowdown, then somebody else is. 
Credit risk is like air in a squishy balloon. You can squeeze the balloon into any shape you like, but the air does not disappear.

Deutsche Bank's Monte Dei Paschi derivative shows why banks must disclose current exposure details

As Bloomberg reports, Deutsche Bank designed and sold a derivative to Monte dei Paschi so the large Italian bank could hide losses that it had already incurred.

The very fact that a bank could engage in a trade to hide its losses confirms the need for banks to provide ultra transparency.

By requiring banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, it eliminates the ability of banks to hide their losses.

Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) designed a derivative for Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA at the height of the financial crisis that obscured losses at the world’s oldest lender before it sought a taxpayer bailout. 
Germany’s largest bank loaned Monte Paschi (BMPS) about 1.5 billion euros ($2 billion) in December 2008 through the transaction, dubbed Project Santorini, according to more than 70 pages of documents outlining the deal and obtained by Bloomberg News. 
The trade helped Monte Paschi mitigate a 367 million-euro loss from an older derivative contract with Deutsche Bank. As part of the arrangement, the Italian lender made a losing bet on the value of the country’s government bonds, said six derivatives specialists who reviewed the files. 
“I can’t understand why any financial institution would engage in a trade like this for legitimate objectives,” said Frank Partnoy, a professor of law and finance at the University of San Diego who structured derivatives at Morgan Stanley and has read the files. “They shouldn’t ever be doing that.”...
Which is why banks should not operate behind a veil of opacity, but rather should have their entire business exposed to the best disinfectant of bad behavior: sunlight.
The Santorini transaction shows how investment banks devised opaque products that years later are leaving companies and taxpayers with losses. 
From the Greek government to the Italian town of Cassino, borrowers have lost money on bets that were skewed in banks’ favor. In December, an Italian judge convicted bankers at four firms, including Deutsche Bank, of fraud in arranging an interest-rate swap for the city of Milan....
Under the FDR Framework, government regulators are given responsibility for ensuring transparency.

Had banks been required to disclose the details of these opaque products, they probably wouldn't have sold them and the buyers probably wouldn't have purchased them.
“You have two banks gambling on regulatory action in late 2008, at a time of supposed crisis, and they are using overly complex and opaque derivatives to do it,” said Partnoy, the University of San Diego professor. “Deutsche Bank made a fortune for facilitating the trade. You can’t tell any of this from looking at their financial statements.”...
As your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis, so long as banks are opaque "black boxes", bankers will engage in gambling.

Current disclosure rules for banks are not up to the task of preventing or exposing this gambling.  A point Professor Partnoy makes.

The only way to expose what is happening so that market participants have the information they need to assess each bank is to require ultra transparency and disclosure of each bank's exposure details.
Santorini “exemplifies the complex structuring, questionable internal decisions and lax external supervision rampant in the lead-up to the crisis and beyond,” Dempster said....
The only way to prevent this from recurring in the future is by restoring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  This includes bank balance sheets.
Monte Paschi shareholders haven’t been in a position to know about the bank’s derivative bets because its filings didn’t provide sufficient information on Santorini and its liquidation, according to two accountants in Italy who reviewed the documents....
Please re-read the previous paragraph because if shareholders aren't in a position to know about derivative bets, they aren't in a position to exert market discipline to prevent these bets in the first place.
“This transaction shows the complexity of banks’ balance sheets,” said Mark Williams, a former bank examiner for the Federal Reserve and now a lecturer at Boston University’s School of Management, who also reviewed the documents. “It leaves one wondering what other skeletons are in the closet.”
The only way to know what skeletons are in each bank's closet is to have them provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global exposure details.

Friday, August 2, 2013

Banks rigged rate at retirees' expense

Having felt comfortable manipulating benchmark interest rates like Libor for their personal gain, it comes as no surprise that Bloomberg reports bankers were also manipulating for their personal gain the more obscure swap benchmark rate, the ISDAfix.

This rate was used by pension funds trying to hedge their positions.

Just like Libor, the solution to end manipulation by the bankers is using transparency into both the actual transactions and each bank's current exposure details.  With this information, market participants can determine if the banks entered into trades in an attempt to manipulate this rate.

U.S. investigators have uncovered evidence that banks reaped millions of dollars in trading profits at the expense of companies and pension funds by manipulating a benchmark for interest-rate derivatives. 
Recorded telephone calls and e-mails reviewed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission show that traders at Wall Street banks instructed ICAP Plc brokers in Jersey City, New Jersey, to buy or sell as many interest-rate swaps as necessary to move the benchmark rate, known as ISDAfix, to a predetermined level, according to a person with knowledge of the matter. 
By rigging the measure, the banks stood to profit on separate derivatives trades they had with clients who were seeking to hedge against moves in interest rates. 
Banks sought to change the value of the swaps because the ISDAfix rate sets prices for the other derivatives, which are used by firms from the California Public Employees’ Retirement System to Pacific Investment Management Co....
Bankers had the exact same motive to manipulate this benchmark interest rate as they did to manipulate Libor.
CFTC investigators are piecing together evidence that shows swaption traders at banks worked with rate-swap traders at their own firms to manipulate ISDAfix, the person said. 
The swaption traders told their rate-swap colleagues the level at which they needed ISDAfix to be set that day in order to bolster the value of their derivatives positions before these were settled the next day, the person said. 
The rate-swap trader would then tell a broker at ICAP, the biggest arranger of the contracts between banks, to execute as many trades in interest-rate swaps as necessary to move ISDAfix to the desired level. 
This would be done just before 11 a.m. in New York, the time when current trades are used to create reference points that help determine the final ISDAfix rates, the person said.
Hiding behind a veil of opacity, bankers used a similar technique to manipulate this benchmark interest rate as the technique they used to manipulate Libor.
In manipulating ISDAfix, ICAP brokers profited from the commissions they received from the interest-rate swap trades banks ordered to influence the benchmark, the person said. 
Banks were willing to endure trading costs with the brokers that may have reached hundreds of thousands of dollars because they stood to earn millions on swaptions by manipulating ISDAfix by as little as a quarter of a basis point, or 0.0025 percentage point, the person said....

ICAP manages an electronic screen known as 19901 on which rate-swap prices are displayed throughout the day to about 6,000 corporate treasurers and money managers so they can value positions. 
The trades displayed on the screen are used to create the reference points for ISDAfix rates, according to ISDA’s website. 
ICAP then sends the reference point to banks, which either accept it as their contribution to the benchmark or submit a different value.

Thursday, August 1, 2013

Trader explains why dishonesty rewarded on Wall Street and only transparency can end bad behavior

In his must read Guardian column, Joris Luyendijk interviews a Trader from London's City who explains why dishonesty is rewarded on Wall Street and how only transparency can end misbehavior.

Regular readers know that sunlight is the best disinfectant.  The trader describes what happens when Wall Street and the City are left to operate behind a veil of opacity.

The trader presents petty theft as an every day occurrence.

"Where I worked people seemed obsessed with power structures and keeping on top. For instance when someone was made redundant a remaining trader would do a deal between his book and that person's, creating a profit in his book and a loss in that of the person leaving...."
Left unsaid is that the trader creating a profit in his own book has his compensation based on the profitability of his book.  From the bank's perspective, the position hasn't changed, just the payout.  So effectively, the trader has stolen money from the bank.

The trader explains how they use opacity to take risks knowing that if the bet pays off they are well compensated and if the bet loses they will just move on to the next bank.
"In the end the bank is like a shell. You need a place to trade from, this is how we saw our bank. Sometimes an entire team can be poached and go from one bank to another. There's no loyalty either way. And the top at your bank has no idea what's going on, how could they? Why would anyone tell them what's going on?
The trader explains Wall Street and the City's ethics.
"Of course traders are constantly inquiring across the bank: what's happening? What are our big clients like institutional investors doing? Then they 'front run' those investors; buying ahead of them so when the price rises due the subsequent buying, they pocket the difference. 
"Chinese walls [between deal making, asset managing and trading bankers]? Bullshit. We could simply log on to our system and see what was happening and what they were doing all the time. 
"If there is a lot of money at stake then people will not adhere outside rules and they will evade Chinese walls....
Next, the trader explains who Wall Street and the City use the complexity and resulting opacity of the financial products they sell to benefit at the expense of their customers.
"My advice to people dealing with the financial sector is: never buy anything that's complex. Because the more complexity the more opportunities there are to screw you over. 
Finally, the trader highlights how important the role of caveat emptor (buyer beware) is when dealing with Wall Street and the City.

Traders see the capital markets as a zero-sum game.  If they win, you must lose.

Individuals and small companies see their relationship with the bank as a partnership with the goal of both parties winning.  This makes individuals and small companies susceptible to being mistreated and sold products like interest rate swaps.
I just can't get my mind around how banks can still call clients in the corporate world and say, look we've got this great idea that's going to make you a lot of money. I mean, what are they thinking? 
Nobody in the City can be trusted because they don't work for you, they work for themselves. 
"I do wonder why there seem to be so many somewhat dishonest people in the bank, and why the most dishonest are often the ones to walk away with the most money."

Nuns and analysts alike recognize need for transparency into bank commodity earnings

Reuters ran an article highlighting the need for transparency as "for nuns and analysts alike, bank commodity earnings are a mystery".

The simple fact is that banks are not required to provide transparency.

Remember that under the 1930s Securities Acts, the government is given the responsibility for ensuring that all market participants have access to all useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so the market participants can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Commodities is one, but not the only area where the government is not fulfilling its responsibility of ensuring transparency to all market participants.

When the government does not fulfill its responsibility and ensure transparency, the market does not work properly as market participants are not able to assess and properly value risk.

Our current financial crisis is the result of market participants not having access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that they could independently assess and properly value risk.

When the Reverend Seamus Finn got an email from Goldman Sachs last week, the giant Wall Street bank was addressing an issue that was already on his mind. 
"We were getting ready to go back to them and talk to them about commodities anyway," said Finn, who heads up faith-consistent investing for the Missionary Oblates, a Washington DC-based Catholic group that owns Goldman shares.... 
But it left unanswered many of Finn's questions about what the bank is doing in the sector.... 
The statement sent to Finn and later released widely did not address one of his broader concerns: that no one outside the banks themselves knows for sure how big their commodity trading arms are, how much they trade, or how much money they make. 
"We would like more disclosure on that," Finn said.
He is unlikely to get his wish. 
While the country's largest banks are required to disclose their activities in some consumer-facing businesses such as mortgages, there is no similar requirement for them to do so on the commodities side....
Please re-read the highlighted text as this experience not only applies to commodities, but also to all the other opaque areas of the financial system ranging from the banks themselves to Libor to structured finance.
"I don't think you have any banks that are properly disclosing commodities revenue," said George Kuznetsov, head of research and analytics at Coalition, a British consulting firm that employs more than 100 researchers to scrutinize public disclosures and conduct interviews to estimate trading revenues for investment banks. 
The issue is becoming increasingly important as politicians press the banks for more insight into the risks they are taking by owning metals warehouses or chartering oil tankers, and as some seek buyers for their physical commodities holdings. ...
The lack of clarity over trading operations has long been a vexing issue across other desks as well, such as foreign exchange and equities....
In sum, it's big money: the top ten global banks collectively made about $6 billion trading commodities last year, down 24 percent from in 2011, according to Coalition. 
The banks say that they are providing regulators and investors with all the information they are required to give. 
"Our disclosures are in line with all relevant reporting requirements and provide investors with all material information," said a spokesman for Morgan Stanley. He said the bank provides data on the main drivers of results across its three core business lines but does not break down earnings to a "product" level like commodities. 
Critics say the disclosures still leave much to be desired. 
"They really don't tell us much," said Robert McCullough, an energy economist who spent six years litigating an electricity market manipulation case against Morgan Stanley. 
"If you wanted an estimate of what their position was in electricity in 2001, six years of litigation was not sufficient to get it," he said.
To accurately assess the risk of a bank's commodity business, market participants need the bank's current exposure details.

Clearly, there is a significant gap between what market participants need to accurately assess risk and what the government has decided represents all the material information.
In terms of financial system risks, the Federal Reserve, which regulates banks, has the power to make on-staff visits and request data sets from the banks on their commodities activities. 
The agency also keeps on-site staff at the banks who are dedicated to monitoring commodities. 
So the government's solution is to give the Federal Reserve an information monopoly on all the useful, relevant information.
But that is not enough, according to some former examiners. 
"There's a sophistication gap between the regulator and the bank that they regulate," said Mark Williams, a former Federal Reserve bank examiner and energy executive who now teaches finance at Boston University. 
"The commodities are where the more sophisticated transactions take place," he said....
As Mr. Williams observes, the Federal Reserve is not up to the task of accurately assessing this information.  Even if it were, there is another problem: communicating this assessment to the other market participants.

If the Federal Reserve isn't capable of accurately assessing the information and the market participants who are capable of assessing the information don't have access to the information, then the result is that there is no one overseeing and exerting restraint on the banks risk taking.

This is a prescription for banks to take on excessive risk and engage in bad behavior.

As has been shown numerous times since the start of the financial crisis, bankers were and still are only too willing to fill this prescription by taking on excessive risk and engaging in bad behavior.
Goldman Sachs, for instance, reported only $100 million in "commodity and other" trading revenues to the Fed in 2012. In a separate filing with the SEC, the bank said it made $575 million trading commodities. Industry sources actually pegged Goldman's commodity revenues closer to $1.25 billion for the year. 
Asked about the different figures, a spokesman for Goldman Sachs said: "We disclose figures in the way we are required. That may not correspond to the way we actually measure the performance of certain trading businesses." He declined to provide a figure for the bank's commodity trading revenues....
With so much uncertainty around the headline numbers, attempting to separate banks' paper bets on commodities from physical trading - the segment most at risk from regulators - is all but impossible....
That hasn't stopped some influential groups from calling on banks to step up their reporting. 
Last year, the CFA Institute - which confers the Chartered Financial Analyst credential to investment professionals worldwide - endorsed a report calling for banks to improve their risk disclosures to investors. 
Banks' trading books, in particular, remain "very opaque" to investors, said Vincent Papa, the institute's director of financial reporting policy. 
"In many cases, they give you a figure which they deem to be meaningless from an internal management standpoint," Papa said. "They just give it for compliance reasons. That's not beneficial to investors. It's about giving relevant information, rather than just ticking the boxes."...

Friday, July 26, 2013

Setting the gold standard for judging quality of country's financial regulations

In his Reuter's blog, Felix Salmon establishes the standard for judging the quality of a country's financial regulation.
Here’s a quick and dirty way of judging the quality of your country’s financial regulation: to what extent do you create and impose tougher-than-international standards? 
By their nature, international standards are the lowest-common-denominator. 
Individual countries can and should extend them and create their own rules; when those rules turn out to work well, sometimes the international community will start adopting them more broadly....
Please re-read Mr. Salmon's standard for judging the quality of a country's financial regulation and his observation about how rules that work well are copied.

In the 1930s, the US adopted the FDR Framework as the basis for its financial system.  The FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

US adoption of the FDR Framework was best exemplified by the 1930s Securities Acts that created the SEC and required that all publicly traded securities disclose all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that market participants could independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

As a result of the Securities Acts, the US had the highest regulatory standards and became know for having the most transparent financial markets.

And why wouldn't your want to have the most transparent markets?

Finance is based on the idea that when market participants have all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner they can do a better job of assessing the risk of a security and assign it a higher cost than a similar security that is opaque.  So why would any country want to put itself at a disadvantage by having its participants in the real economy pay more to access funding?

The financial crisis exposed the "myth" that US markets were still transparent.

Rather than continue to set tougher than international standards, over the last 30 years the US regulators decided in areas like derivatives to join the race to the bottom.  As a result, large areas of the financial system became opaque.

While this opacity was very good for bank profitability and banker bonuses, this opacity was very bad for all the other market participants.
Overall, I’d say the US is not doing a great job on the regulatory front. 
Dodd-Frank created a lot of noise, but ultimately was much less important than Basel III; what’s more, the banks are now driving the rule-making process so as to effectively neuter most of it. 
Confirmation of your humble blogger's observation about the true intent of the Dodd-Frank Act.
Meanwhile, in lots of other corners of the regulatory universe, you can see the forces of capture at work: one prime example is the way in which the FHFA — the regulator for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — has hired a prominent insurance-industry lobbyist to help it regulate the very insurers he not only used to represent, but still represents. 
The fact is that regulation is one of those things that doesn’t have a natural political constituency: rich banks are good at lobbying against it, while there are no effective or well-resourced lobbyists on the other side....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Salmon makes a very important point about the lack of a permanent, effective lobby for regulation and transparency.

However, a permanent lobby for regulation should not be needed.

Please recall that under the FDR Framework, it is the government's responsibility for ensuring transparency.  It was well recognized at the time the FDR Framework was adopted that a lack of transparency resulted in a systemic financial crisis, the Great Depression.

Under the Securities Acts, the government must ensure that all the useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner.

Please note the Securities Acts do not say most of the useful, relevant information.  The Acts say "all" the useful, relevant information.  Government is told to error on the side of disclosing too much information.

Please note the Securities Acts do not say useful, relevant information to all market participants.  They say all the useful, relevant information.  This ensures that information that experts could use as part of their assessment of the risk of a security is made available.  Again, government is told to error on the side of disclosing too much information.

Please note the Securities Acts do not say that the government should perform a cost/benefit analysis when it is ensuring that all the useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner.

It was known at the time the Securities Acts were passed and has been shown with the current financial crisis that the cost of a systemic financial crisis is far greater than the cost of providing all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

The benefit of having transparency and not having another systemic financial crisis far outweighs the cost of providing transparency.  This is why there is no need for a permanent lobby to tell the government that it needs to ensure there is transparency.

Monday, July 22, 2013

An example of "Trying to pierce a Wall Street fog"

In her NY Times column, Gretchen Morgenson looks at the credit default swap market and finds that because of opacity the market is not acting in a competitive manner and Wall Street's informational advantage enables it to extract a much higher profit margin.

Regular readers are not surprised by this finding.  As Yves Smith said, nobody on Wall Street is compensated for developing low margin, transparent products.  Credit default swaps are an example of a high margin, opaque product.
BACK in 2009, the Justice Department said it was investigating the large Wall Street banks for possible collusion in the huge and opaque credit default swaps market. The question was whether the big financial institutions had worked to keep transactions in these insurance-like instruments closed to competitors and more profitable for themselves....
On July 1, the antitrust division of the European Commission announced that its investigators had come to a “preliminary conclusion” that the banks and two entities controlled by them had infringed European antitrust rules. These entities colluded, the commission said, “to prevent exchanges from entering the credit derivatives business between 2006 and 2009.” 
Credit default swaps were at the center of the financial crisis. These instruments allow holders of bonds or other debt to hedge their risks in those positions. But the swaps also let speculators bet on a debt issuer’s default. ... 
But the market for these swaps has been conducted in the shadows. Trades were made over-the-counter — between private parties and not on an exchange. This meant that participants’ positions were not disclosed to regulators. 
Wall Street likes the fog of over-the-counter markets because the profits generated by executing customers’ trades in them are far greater than in more transparent arenas. 
Think of the way you might shop for a mortgage: if mortgage rates were not publicly available, it would be hard to know whether the rate one banker offered was competitive. Customers that dealt with only one banker on their credit default swaps almost certainly did not get the best prices. 
The 13 banks under the microscope on credit default swaps include Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, Morgan Stanley and UBS. Two associated entities controlled by the big banks are also being scrutinized — the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, a lobbying organization, and Markit, a data service provider....
“There was no question the banks did not want the C.M.E. to make the market more liquid and transparent,” said one person briefed on the banks’ internal discussions who asked for anonymity because he was not authorized to speak publicly. “This was their cash cow, and they didn’t want to give it up.”...

The banks have pushed to keep the market for credit default swaps in the dark. 
Three years ago, the Dodd-Frank legislation aimed to bring more competition by pushing trading onto exchanges and swap execution facilities. Wall Street tried to beat back regulators’ efforts to write tough rules after the legislation’s lead. They won some and they lost some. For instance, dealers now have to report swap transactions to regulators. 
There was a reason for the banks’ pushback: money. The Deloitte study cited a 2010 analysis by Citigroup showing that the big banks’ trading in over-the-counter derivatives generated revenue of $55 billion, or 37 percent of the total at these institutions. Such profits will fall as more swaps trade on swap execution facilities under the new rules.... 
“When you have markets that are .... opaque and where market players don’t have access to the same information, the markets are not functioning in a competitive fashion. Those that have the information can take advantage of that fact and extract anticompetitive leverage over those that lack the information.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes why transparency needs to be brought back to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Wednesday, July 10, 2013

Ha-Joon Chang: Welcome to the age of irresponsibility

In an excellent column in the Guardian, Ha-Joon Chang talks about our modern era of irresponsibility where there is so much complexity that no one is expected to really know what is going on.

Mr. Chang uses finance as one of his examples where complexity threatens an endless series of crises.

Complexity is one of the methods that Wall Street uses to introduce opacity into the financial system.  Opacity that allows Wall Street to profit from the resulting mis-pricing of risk.  Opacity that allows Wall Street to dodge responsibility for the consequences of this mis-pricing of risk and mis-allocation of capital.
The problem is even more serious in the financial sector, which these days deals in assets that involve households (in the case of mortgages), companies and governments all over the world. On top of that these financial assets are combined, sliced and diced many times over, to produce highly complicated "derivative" products. 
The result is an exponential increase in complexity.
Andy Haldane, executive director of financial stability at the Bank of England, once pointed out that in order to fully understand a CDO2 – one of the more complicated financial derivatives (but not the most complicated) – a prospective investor needs to absorb more than a billion pages of information. 
I have come across bankers who confessed that they had derivative contracts running to a few hundred pages, which they naturally didn't have time to read. 
Given this level of complexity, financial companies have come to rely heavily on countless others – stock analysts, financial journalists, credit-rating agencies, you name it – for information and, more importantly, making judgments. 
This means that when something goes wrong, they can always blame others: poor people in Florida who bought houses they cannot afford; "irresponsible" foreign governments; misleading foreign stock analysts; and, yes, incompetent credit-rating agencies. 
The result is an economic system in which no one in "responsible" positions takes any serious responsibility. Unless radical action is taken, we will see many more financial crises and corporate scandals in the years to come.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Chang makes a very important point about how complexity has reduced, if not eliminated, the sense of responsibility for exposures taken on and the losses incurred if something goes wrong.

Under the FDR Framework, market participants are responsible under the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware) for all losses on their exposures.  This gives them an incentive to independently assess the risk of an investment using all the useful, relevant information disclosed and limiting their investment to what they can afford to lose.

But what if market participants cannot do the assessment themselves?

They hire experts.  For example, individuals hire portfolio managers by investing in mutual funds.

But what if the experts fail to accurately represent their abilities to the market participants?

We end up with the situation that Mr. Chang describes where no-one has responsibility.

Regular readers know that the opaque structured finance market is exactly the type of situation where Wall Street reaps massive profits from opacity while dodging any responsibility for the consequences while the experts failed to represent that they were blindly betting the market participants' money.

But what happens if there is opacity and there is no information to independently assess?

Then we have the situation with the 'black box' banks where at the start of the financial crisis even the banks could not tell which banks are solvent and which are not.  In this case, taxpayers bailout market participants for the regulators failure to ensure transparency.

Thursday, May 23, 2013

Hedge funds blindly gambling on private label RMBS nervous as $8.7B portfolio goes on sale

Hedge funds that have been blindly gambling by buying private label RMBS securities are getting nervous as an $8.7 billion portfolio of these securities is being offered for sale.

The sale of the portfolio could hurt their gamble in two ways.  First, the seller could accept prices that are lower than the hedge funds are currently exchanging these bonds.  Second, if the portfolio clears at close to market prices, it might encourage other holders of similar portfolios to try to sell their holdings.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal,
The riskiest types of residential mortgage bonds that rewarded investors with double-digit gains last year and almost that again in 2013 are about to be tested. 
Investors are atwitter with anticipation over what will be one of the biggest sales of non-government mortgage bonds since the financial crisis knocked them into deeply distressed states. 
Wall Street dealers are circulating an $8.7 billion list of subprime and other risky residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) to investors for a sale next week, demanding that terms be kept quiet until the mission is accomplished, according to Empirasign Strategies, a trade database. 
But the sheer size of the list, whose source isn’t being disclosed, has investors reconsidering the risk-reward equation after the market’s feverish rally over the past year. 
The supply is rivaling multi-billion dollar sales of RMBS by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 2011 and 2012, the earliest of which overwhelmed demand and helped drive the market into a tailspin....
The reason the Fed sales overwhelmed demand is that there is no "market" for private label RMBS securities.

Yes, these securities trade.  But because they are opaque, the trades are typically between one hedge fund and another as they gamble on the value of the contents of the brown paper bag that is the security.
In general, nonagency mortgage bonds have gained almost 10% already this year, after more than 20% last year, said Bryan Whalen, a managing director at TCW Group. 
The market — comprised of subprime and other bonds that aren’t backed by the government — has seen consistent demand for the past year as the U.S. housing market recovers and because of its relatively high yields.
Demand from hedge funds has consistently been on the long side as these gamblers are looking for something to buy.
“As deep as the bid has been, seeing close to $9 billion in a short time period is still a lot to digest,” Whalen said....
The fact that $9 billion is considered a lot to digest is a sure sign that there isn't a market for these securities.

In their heyday before the financial crisis began in 2007, there were $2 trillion of these securities outstanding.  So a sale of $9 billion was a non-event.
What would be worrisome is if other sellers also decide that now is the time to capitalize on today’s higher prices. 
Brad Friedlander, a portfolio at Angel Oak Capital, says he is still bullish on nonagency RMBS, but with the caveat if “we see a real cascade of these sales.”
Translation: the hedge fund gamblers only have so much capacity to buy these opaque, toxic securities.

Sunday, April 28, 2013

The difficulty in buying shares in any bank today

In a column discussing the possibility of the UK government selling its shares in RBS and Lloyds, the Guardian summarized why investors should not buy shares in any bank today.
But there are plenty of reasons to be cautious about buying bank shares – even when, compared with the value of banks' assets, they appear to be cheap. 
The market values banks at around half the value of their assets – and probably quite correctly, given that the regulators themselves are concerned about unexploded bombs on their balance sheets.
The Guardian focuses on the simple fact that investors do not know what exposures a bank has on or off its balance sheet.  

Without knowing what these exposures are, investing in a bank is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a 'black box'.

A not very attractive gamble as the regulators, who are in a position to evaluate the contents of the black box bank, "are concerned about unexploded bombs".

Saturday, April 13, 2013

Deposits are not investments when banks aren't required to provide transparency

In his Telegraph column, Liam Halligan succinctly makes the point that deposits are not investments.

Regular readers know this is particularly true when banks are not required to provide transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

If depositors do not have the information needed to assess the risk of a bank and can reasonably rely on representations made the government (think passing a bank solvency stress test), they simply should never be included in a bail-in.

Investors in unsecured bank bonds or stock on the other hand are choosing to gamble on the solvency of the bank.  They are choosing to gamble because they are buying securities that are designed to place them at risk of losing their money.

The fact that investors in unsecured bank bonds or stock are blindly gambling because of the lack of transparency does not excuse them from the responsibility for losses on their investment exposures.

Rather, it suggests that these investors should instead practice the Wall Street Walk and find investments where there is transparency and they can assess the risk and value of the investment.

Yet as German Chancellor Angela Merkel quakes before her own increasingly outspoken electorate, with parliamentary opposition rising and federal elections looming in September, the screws are now being turned on Cyprus even more. 
How much can this Mediterranean mini-state take? Even before this latest cash demand, the Cypriot economy was officially forecast to shrink by an eye-watering 12pc over the next two years. 
Those with savings above €100,000 at the dominant Bank of Cyprus — including numerous local businesses, educational institutions and charities — are already in line to lose around two thirds of their deposits. 
With growth now likely to be even more negative, that horrendous asset-grab will be more draconian, with large savers at Laiki bank, the second biggest in Cyprus, likely to get nothing at all. 
At the risk of repeating myself, deposits are not investments. If you buy an equity or bond, exposing yourself to risk but also the prospect of a commercial return, then you stand to lose your money. Fair enough. 
If you put money in a bank, though, in a modern society that deposit should be guaranteed.  
To wilfully demonstrate otherwise is to incite deep social unrest, while undermining the very fabric of capitalism and wealth creation itself. 

Tuesday, April 9, 2013

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane takes on combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight

Reuters reports that the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane has escalated his fight to dismantle the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight.  

He advocates simpler rules that are harder to game.  An example of a simple rule would be that banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Regular readers know that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight has been used unsuccessfully as a substitute for the combination of transparency and market discipline.  Examples of where the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight failed include banks and structured finance securities.
Bank regulators need to develop much simpler rules to make it harder for large financial firms to game the supervisory system, Bank of England official Andrew Haldane said on Tuesday. 
"We need to do a radical pruning, simplifying of our regulatory apparatus (that) places much less emphasis on what are unreliable measures of risk," Haldane, the BoE's executive director for financial stability, told a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta....
Examples of unreliable measures of risk include, but are not limited to, bank book capital level and bank risk based capital measures.

Bank book capital levels are an easily manipulated accounting construct.  Since the beginning of the financial crisis, bank book capital levels have been manipulated by the regulators through suspension of mark to market accounting and by the banks through implementation of extend and pretend on nonperforming loans.

Bank risk based capital levels are also easily manipulated as banks simply game their internal models.
"Complex frameworks if anything are easier to arbitrage, easier to game," he said....
Too Big to Fail banks lobby for complex frameworks precisely because these frameworks are easier to arbitrage and game.
The Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. financial reform law that Congress passed in response to the financial crisis, is some 2,300 pages long, and has been criticized for its complexity and opaqueness.
As your humble blogger noted about Dodd-Frank, it was written by the banks' lobbyists for the benefit of the banks.  Not surprisingly, it is long on complexity and short on substance that will actually make the financial system safer.

In fact, it is long on complexity so as to keep opacity in the financial system.  Opacity that allows the banks to place proprietary bets and gamble with the taxpayers' money.  Opacity that allows the bankers to engage in bad behavior (see manipulating Libor).

Monday, April 1, 2013

Olivier Blanchard: 5 lessons for economists from the financial crisis

As reported by the Wall Street Journal's David Wessel, Mr. Blanchard, the chief economist at the IMF, offered 5 lessons that economists should take away from the financial crisis.

Here are 4 of his lessons with a few comments inserted by your humble blogger who publicly predicted the financial crisis, publicly predicted what policy responses would not work to end the financial crisis and, more importantly, publicly predicted what policy response would end the financial crisis.

#1: Humility is in order. 
If there is any characteristic that is in short supply in the economics profession, it is humility.

It is one thing to consistently miss on forecasts of economic growth, it is entirely another for the profession to have effectively missed forecasting the financial crisis.

The Queen of England asked a simple question that the economics profession still has no answer to: how if everything was going so well did no-one see the financial crisis coming.

Yes, there were a handful of economists like William White, Dean Baker and Paul Krugman who argued that subprime mortgages could be a problem.  However, these economists were dismissed by the profession because, while their analysis was correct, it was not linked to any economic theory about how the financial system operates.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger developed the FDR Framework with its combination of the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware) to show the link between a series of predictions based on opacity and the invisible hand of economic theory which only operates properly in the presence of transparency.

Before turning to the second lesson, let me repeat that humility is in short supply in the economics profession.

Given my track record, one would expect the economics profession, including those in a regulatory or academic environment, to pay attention and embrace what I am saying.

Clearly, track records don't matter.  Numerous economists, including many Nobel prize winners and central bankers, continue to pound the table in what appears to be a defense of their PhD dissertations as they push solutions that will not end the financial crisis.
#2: The financial system matters — a lot. 
It’s not the first time that we¹re confronted with [former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld called “unknown unknowns,” things that happened that we hadn’t thought about.
Actually, there is no excuse for the economics profession not to have thought about transparency as it is the necessary condition for the invisible hand and the markets to operate properly.
There is another example in macro-economics: 
The oil shocks of the 1970s during which we were students and we hadn’t thought about it. It took a few years, more than a few years, for economists to understand what was going on....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Blanchard has suggested that it will take years for economists to understand what was going on that led to the financial crisis.  However, this has not stopped them from offering up their solutions to how to end the financial crisis.

What hubris!

If you did not predict the financial crisis, it is highly unlikely that you have any insights into what caused the problem and what it will take to fix.  Doesn't it make sense under this condition not to offer up an uninformed opinion or, at a minimum, to confess a lack of understanding?
This is different. 
What we have learned about the financial system is that the problem is in the plumbing and that we have to understand the plumbing....
The problem is not the plumbing!!!

The problem is opacity which has plugged up the plumbing.

Apparently the entire economics profession suffers from amnesia and has already forgotten the term "opaque toxic securities" or the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane calling banks "black boxes".
In the financial system, a myriad of distortions or small shocks build on each other. When there are enough small shocks, enough distortions, things can go very bad.
When there is enough opacity in the financial system, things can go very bad.
This has fundamental implications for macro-economics. We do macro on the assumption that we can look at aggregates in some way and then just have them interact in simple models. I still think that¹s the way to go, but this shows the limits of that approach. When it comes to the financial system, it¹s very clear that the details of the plumbing matter.
Actually, it is transparency alone that matters.

The only question that economists need to concern themselves with is do market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

If the answer is yes, then the plumbing in the financial system is operating properly.

If the answer is no, then the plumbing is plugged and economists need to call attention to the problem.
#3 Interconnectedness matters.
Interconnectedness does not matter unless you are a banker trying to preserve their bonus!!!

As I have written about numerous times, the global financial system is based on the FDR Framework and this framework makes each market participant responsible for the losses on all their exposures.

This responsibility causes market participants to do two things.

First, market participants have an incentive to use the information disclosed under transparency to independently assess the risk of each of their investments.

Second, investors have an incentive to limit each of their exposures to what they can afford to lose given the risk of the investment.  It is this activity that ends financial contagion and the threat of interconnectedness.
#4 We don’t know if macro-prudential tools work. 
It’s very clear that the traditional monetary and fiscal tools are just not good enough to deal with the very specific problems in the financial system. This has led to the development of macro-prudential tools, which what may or may not become the third leg of macroeconomic policies. 
[Macroprudential tools allow a central bank to restrain lending in specific sectors without raising interest rates for the whole economy, such as increasing the minimum down payment required to get a mortgage, which reduces the loan-to-value ratio.] 
In principle, they can address specific issues in the financial sector. If there is a problem somewhere you can target the tool at the problem and not use the policy interest rate, which basically is kind of an atomic bomb without any precision. 
The big question here is: How reliable are these tools? How much can they be used? The answer — from some experiments before the crisis with loan-to-value ratios and during crisis with variations in cyclical bank capital ratios or loan-to-value ratios or capital controls, such as in Brazil — is this: They work but they don’t work great. 
People and institutions find ways around them. In the process of reducing the problem somewhere you tend to create distortions elsewhere.
Macro-prudential tools are dangerous for another reason.  They represent the substitution of regulators for market discipline.

As Mr. Blanchard observes, macro-prudential tools are suppose to deal with problems in the financial system such as too high loan to value ratios for mortgages.

Since each market participant is responsible for the losses on their investments, it is their choice as to how much exposure they want to mortgages with high loan to value ratios.  Naturally, there is a limit to their appetite.

Macro-prudential regulation suggests that regulators know where to set the limit better than market participants.

Sunday, March 31, 2013

Ernst & Young predicts that banks will have to be more transparent

As reported by the Telegraph's Harry Wilson, based on a survey of corporate executives, Ernst & Young is predicting that banks will have to be more transparent about their risks.

The EU's using deposits to recapitalize the Cyprus banks has reinforced the need corporate executives see for transparency.  It has reinforced the need for transparency as corporate executives don't want to put their working capital at risk by keeping it in a bank that is likely to need to be bailed out using deposits.

Regular readers know that the only way corporate executives and other market participants can have access to the information they really need to evaluate the risk of a bank is if the bank provides ultra transparency.  It is only by disclosing its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that a bank's risk can truly be assessed.
More than half of top executives at some of the world’s largest companies think their banks are still taking too many risks five years on from the financial crisis, according to a survey by Ernst & Young. 
Just 43pc of executives said they were completely confident their banks were taking acceptable risks, while less than a third said their banks shared adequate information on its risk, capital and liquidity.
Among the businesses taking part in the survey were the drinks maker, Diageo, Google, the internet search provider, and the energy company, Total, with executives complaining about a lack of transparency from their banks. [bold added]
Please re-read the bolded text as it nicely summarizes how the lack of transparency prevents banks from being subject to market discipline.  Top executives think, but don't know, that their banks are taking too much risk.  The executives would like to know so they could manage their exposure based on the actual level of risk at each bank.

Banks become subject to market discipline when the risk the banks take is reflected in the amount and cost of their funding.  Clearly, corporate executives would like to exert market discipline on the banks, but are prevented by a lack of transparency.
“The lingering after-effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the ongoing challenges in the eurozone have forced corporations to focus on the stability of their core banking teams. 
Counterparty risk and exposure from banks have become heightened concerns for large corporates and, as a result, we predict that banks will have to be more transparent about their risk profiles and portfolio concentration,” said Steven Lewis, a global banking analyst at Ernst & Young....
It is nice to have Ernst & Young confirming the need for banks to provide more transparency.

Thursday, March 21, 2013

Hedge fund manager says JP Morgan's 'Whale' trade was a bet

The Wall Street Journal reports that a well known hedge fund manager says JP Morgan's 'Whale' trade was "not a hedge, it was a bet".

Regular readers know that it was a bet that would not have been taken had JP Morgan been required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures.

The bet would not have been taken because JP Morgan would have worried about the market trading against it.  This concern was confirmed by Jamie Dimon's actions when he tried to limit who had access to information about the trade out of concern that it was being leaked to the market.

Boaz Weinstein, a hedge-fund manager who traded opposite J.P. Morgan Chase Co.'s "London Whale," said a Senate report clearly indicates that the losing positions were "not a hedge, it was a bet." 
Asked at a hedge-fund conference in New York Thursday about how he formulated his trading position, Mr. Weinstein, founder of Saba Capital Management L.P., told attendees: "There was one index sitting out there [that] looked like a real mispricing" and "didn't make sense." 
It was an "easy and obvious trade to do," he said in a keynote talk at the Absolute Return Symposium, referring to the bank's outsize positions in an opaque corner of the credit markets that came to light last year....
Regulators and lawmakers have been scrutinizing the bank's trading in derivatives indexes that tracked the health of corporate credit, which ultimately saddled J.P. Morgan with more than $6 billion of losses. 
Regulators have focused on whether the bank was hedging its risks or making big bets on the future cost to insure against defaults by companies in the indexes.
Senators at a hearing last week questioned J.P. Morgan executives about whether the bank would be allowed such trades if new rules and regulations were in place, including the Volcker rule, a part of the Dodd-Frank regulatory overhaul that aims to curb banks from placing bets in the markets with their own money. 
The trades that hurt J.P. Morgan became a rallying cry for supporters of a stronger interpretation of the rule. J.P. Morgan proposed Friday to revamp the way it hedges its positions. 
According to quarterly data from the Federal Reserve, J.P. Morgan sold $101.3 billion more long-dated derivatives insuring against defaults by investment-grade companies as of March 31, 2012 than it had purchased. 
"It appears now that the notional [volume] was over $150 billion," Mr. Weinstein said. 
The Senate investigators said the volume was $157 billion. 
Mr. Weinstein said regulators might want to "have a rule that any time anyone wants to make an investment…. greater than $10 billion, the boss has to sign off on it." 
He added that the J.P. Morgan bets he and others traded against were "probably the largest investment ever in an item" and significant because one entity was "the entire other side of the trade." 
Asked why he didn't make as much money on the trade as some others on the winning side, Mr. Weinstein said he didn't want to put his whole fund into it. "We had quite a large trade on and the risk reward was fantastic. But we don't use leverage in that way."

Bankers get one last bonus season before ....

Reuters reports that this is the last season of unlimited bonuses for bankers before the EU regulations that restrict banker pay kick in.

At a minimum, we can expect bankers to make the most of it.

The article would have you believe that next year will be different and banker pay will be dramatically less.  But is there any reason to believe that bankers will not game the pay regulations like they game every other complex regulation?

So the bankers won't report large bonus numbers, is that any reason to believe that their pay will drop?

Regular readers know that your humble blogger does not object to bankers being well compensated when the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

What your humble blogger objects to is yet another example of the substitution of complex rules and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.  Our current financial crisis stands as testament to the simple fact that this substitution never produces the intended results and creates financial instability.

What makes the regulation of banker pay particularly galling is that banker pay is addressing a symptom and not the core problem.   The core problem is opacity.

Banker pay is as high as it is because of opacity.  Bankers are able to profit because investors do not have the information they need to properly assess the risk that the banks are taking.  As a result, investors are funding the banks too cheaply and bankers are pocketing this mis-pricing.

Bankers in Europe will have one final bonus season before they are barred from awarding themselves payouts worth more than their salary, EU lawmakers agreed on Wednesday, paving the way for the first cap of its kind globally. 
The cap is designed to address public anger at a bonus-driven culture many European politicians believe encouraged the risk-taking that led to the near-collapse of some of the region's biggest banks.....

The new rules will make it harder to award large payouts such as the bonus worth more than 17 million pounds ($25.7 million) cashed in this week by Rich Ricci, the head of Barclays' investment bank.... 
The rules, part of a wider capital regime for banks, allow bonuses of twice bankers' salary if shareholders agree. They represent the toughest bonus regime anywhere in the world. 
The cap has been softened to allow banks to pay up to a quarter of a banker's bonus in share options, bonds or other non-cash payments which attract a premium after five years. 
Payments made after more than five years would qualify for a bigger discount when calculating the size of the bonus, to make the total payment slightly more generous than foreseen by the cap....

The rules are also a setback for European banks, which had long argued that the curbs would put them at a disadvantage to U.S. rivals. 
"If you want to restrict bonuses we should do it on a global level," said Christian Clausen, president of the European Banking Federation lobby group told Reuters. 
"We have the risk that customers will do business with American banks that still pay high bonuses."

Friday, March 15, 2013

Senate panel finds JP Morgan hid trading losses from regulators (and market)

Further highlighting the need for banks to be required to provide ultra transparency, MarketWatch reports that a US Senate Subcommittee found that JP Morgan ignored its own risk limits, manipulated risk models to avoid detection of its trades and hid trading losses from regulators (and the market).

Regular readers know that it is impossible for a bank to hide trading losses if it is required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this level of disclosure, market participants can see and track every position so banks cannot hide behind the veil of opacity provided by current disclosure requirements.

With this level of disclosure, market participants can exert discipline on the banks so that they do not exceed their own risk limits or manipulate risk models or hide losses.
A Senate subcommittee report on Thursday charged J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. with ignoring its own limits on risk taking, manipulating risk models to avoid detection and ignoring warnings from traders as the bank’s CEO, Jamie Dimon, intentionally withheld investment bank profit and loss data from federal regulators.
This does not effect just federal regulators.

Under the current disclosure rules where banks are "black boxes", market participants are dependent on the bank regulators to properly assess and communicate the risk of each bank.

If bank regulators communicate that the risk is lower than it really is (this is the result of JP Morgan hiding its losses), market participants do not raise the bank's cost of funds to reflect this risk (i.e., market participants give JP Morgan too much funding at too low a price).  This is a complete breakdown of market discipline.
The report was commissioned to examine a $6.2 billion credit derivatives trading loss last year at J.P. Morgan’s (NYSE:JPM) London investment office. The loss was partly attributed to a trader, Bruno Michel Iksil, dubbed the “London whale” for his large positions in credit derivatives. 
The report notes that the current status of the losses is unclear because J.P. Morgan dismantled the portfolio late last year, moving some funds to its investment banking unit....
The current status of the losses is unclear because JP Morgan is actively hiding it.

This action alone should compel Congress and the bank regulators to push through the requirement that banks provide ultra transparency.

Without ultra transparency, as shown by JP Morgan shuffling its losses neither the regulators nor the market know what the true level of risk is at the banks.
The panel, headed by Sen. Carl Levin, Democrat from Michigan, examined 90,000 documents, conducted over 50 interviews and reviewed over 200 taped telephone conversations and instant messages before issuing the bipartisan 300-page report. 
It includes dozens of examples in which trader warnings were ignored while risk managers at the institution appeared unaware of losses. It adds that the bank’s chief government regulator appeared oblivious in many instances or was denied critical information.
Denial of critical information...

That is the lesson about opacity from the current financial crisis and the JP Morgan trade.
However, the report does have one example showing that Dimon intentionally sought to cut off regulators from critical daily profit and loss trading data at the investment bank....
According to the report, in late January, 2012, as losses in the CIO office were increasing, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the bank’s chief regulator, said Dimon ordered the bank to stop providing a daily investment bank profit and loss report to the agency, because he believed it was too much information to provide to the OCC. 
However, Douglas Braunstein, J.P. Morgan Chase’s chief financial officer at the time, restored the daily report soon afterward at the OCC’s request. 
But, according to the OCC bank examiner, Scott Waterhouse, “Dimon reportedly raised his voice in anger” at Braunstein and disclosed that he had ordered the halt to the reports. Dimon said the OCC didn't need daily profit and loss figures for the investment bank, according to the examiner....
As always, bankers want opacity to hide what is going on.

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Manage

In his Guardian column, Joris Luyendijk does a wonderful job of outlining the issues with the Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Manage global financial institutions.

The Lloyds and RBS press conferences were strikingly similar and, as they wore on it became hard not to think of them as dull, rather sophisticated but above all extremely effective rituals.
Given that these banks do not provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, earnings releases are simply elaborate rituals.

With the information provide by ultra transparency, there is no way to know if anything represented about a bank's financial condition is true.

As the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane says, banks are "black boxes".

Other than the financial regulators, nobody knows what is lurking on and off their balance sheets.
On one side of the table were men (Lloyds had one woman, who said nothing) in suits projecting an image of control. 
Yes, they were presiding over banks with tens of thousands of employees engaged in very different and often wildly complex activities across the globe. Yes, they had been caught out by scandal after scandal somewhere in their vast empires and yes, in the past their books had given a wildly inaccurate picture of the risks they were running. 
Without ultra transparency, there is no way of knowing what risks they are currently running.  So the critical issue is why trust what the bankers have to say?
But all of this was now in the past and firmly under control, they implied, as they fired off endless numbers and percentages and ratios, and said things like "We remain very confident of our capital position," or "Our strategy remains centred on taking into account the interests of all of our stakeholders", or some other cardboard PR phrase CEOs learn to use when they want to deflect a question they know can't be followed up.
Here is one of the dangers of the easily manipulated Basel III capital ratios, because the financial regulators are blessing them it is easy for banks to hide their true condition.
Their vocabulary had been sanitised to a startling degree, with PPI and other schemes that cheated tens of thousands of trusting Britons out of their money becoming "legacy issues" requiring "customer redress". (HSBC referred to its huge fines in the US for massive drug money-laundering as "regulatory and law enforcement matters".)...
The PPI scandal continues to grow.  Last year, the UK's Financial Ombudsman saw its case load of PPI claims grow by almost 300,000.

The ability of the banks to use vocabulary to sanitize their past actions is directly related to how the financial regulators are reaching settlements with the banks.

As regular readers know, financial regulators have adopted the policy of financial failure containment and its corollary the Geithner Doctrine (do nothing that hurts the profitability or reputation of big or politically connected banks).

The pursuit of these policies results in settlements where the banks do not have to admit quilt for their actions.

It is not surprising when banks reach an agreement where they don't have to admit guilt to ripping off their customers that they would choose to try to sanitize and gloss over their activities.


What if bonuses and privatisation are diversions and the real issue is "too big to fail" in combination with too big to manage? 
If you believe that CEOs knew nothing about the scandals taking place under their watch, what reason is there to believe that this time they are on top of things? 
Over the past 18 months I have interviewed more than 150 people working in finance in London, most of them in junior functions. Many of them believe that the top of their organisation has no idea what's really going on. 
They are equally scathing about the regulators.
This is the debate Britain [and the rest of the world] refuses to have.  
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Luyendijk captures the problem presented by Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Manage who operate behind a veil of opacity.

Opacity prevents market participants from knowing what is going on inside these banks.  As a result, the banks are subject to regulatory and not market discipline.

Regulatory discipline that is lacking for a number of reasons.  This includes the ability of the regulators to actually assess what is going on.  The bigger problem with regulators is that even if they do properly assess what is going on, they are designed to make it virtually impossible to communicate this to other market participants or to get the regulator to take action.

The top of the shop for financial regulators are political appointees.  This means they are susceptible to lobbying efforts by the banks.

The upper levels of the financial regulators tend to experience the revolving door between regulator and industry.  As a result, there is a tendency to give the banks the benefit of the doubt.

Your humble blogger has repeatedly said that the only way to truly address the problem presented by Too Big to Fail and Too Big to Manage is to require them to provide ultra transparency.

With this information, market participants can exert discipline on these global financial institutions.  This discipline takes several forms including linking each bank's cost of funds to the risk they are taking.

Naturally, banks that are more complex because of thousands of subsidiaries will be perceived as riskier.

Naturally, banks that engage in proprietary bets will be perceived as riskier.

It is these banks that will face a higher cost of funds and pressure to simplify their organizations and reduce their risk exposure.
The timing and conditions of the privatisation of Lloyds and RBS are vital to the British government's financial health, and it makes for powerful and simple-to-produce stories, especially if these banks continue to pay high salaries and bonuses. 
But Lloyds' and RBS's return to private ownership is ultimately a question of secondary importance when both banks continue to be too big to fail – and so effectively remain a public liability.
Today, the banks are a public liability because they are opaque.  As a result, market participants are dependent on the regulators who have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for properly assessing this information and accurately communicating the risk to the market.

When regulators fail to do this and they will whenever there is concern over the safety and soundness of the financial system, there is a moral obligation to bailout the investors.  After all, the investors relied on the regulators who had better information.

One of the benefits of ultra transparency is that it ends the banks being a public liability and the moral hazard caused by reliance on the financial regulators.

With ultra transparency, investors know they are responsible for all losses on their exposures to these banks as they have the information they need to independently assess the risk and solvency of each bank.

It is this responsibility for losses that will drive investors to exert market discipline.
While this idea persists, Britain remains hostage to the health of banks over which it has only very limited influence. Knowing that your vital interests are affected by factors beyond your control is a recipe for stress. It's not what democracies should be about. 
But it has become the new normal. The big issue today is not whether British taxpayers get their money back. It's whether British citizens get their sovereignty back.
Getting their sovereignty back simply requires the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Any bank that is unwilling to disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is not a bank that the British citizens would want to support in any fashion.

After all, an unwillingness to provide ultra transparency is the equivalent of waving a giant red flag and announcing to the world that the bank has something to hide.

British citizens would be better off asking banks that are unwilling to provide ultra transparency to leave and become some other country's headache.  Why should British citizens be responsible for the losses of a bank that refuses to disclose the risks it is taking?