Showing posts with label Structured Finance Securities. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Structured Finance Securities. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 6, 2013

Fannie and Freddie look to run out the clock on reform

The International Financing Review had an interesting article on how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are trying to run out the clock on reform of the US mortgage finance system.

It came out shortly before President Obama announced his support for reform along the lines of the Corker/Warner bill in the Senate.

President Obama supports, according to a Bloomberg article,
A reformed system must have a limited government role, encourage a return of private capital and put the risk and rewards associated with mortgage lending in the hands of private actors, not the taxpayers.
Regular readers know that the only way to achieve President Obama's goal for a reformed system is by setting up an independent securitization platform that provides observable event based reporting on the performance of the mortgages underlying each security whether the security is a covered bond, securitization or something else that Wall Street creates.

Naturally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not want to see this type of reform occur.

One way that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are running out the clock on reform is by developing their own securitization platform.  Based on documents released by their regulator, the FHFA, this platform will disclose mortgage performance data once per month.

As we learned in the run-up to our current financial crisis, once-per-month or less frequent performance reporting is useless.  Subprime mortgage-backed securities provided this frequency of disclosure and they were called "opaque" by market participants.

The only reporting frequency that lets all market participants know the current status of each mortgage is observable event based reporting.  Under observable event based reporting, every activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying mortgages is reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

It is only with observable event based reporting that investors know what they are buying and know what they own.

When investors know what they are buying and know what they own, there is little or no need for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

This is understood by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and that is why they are taking action to make sure it doesn't occur.

Key to GSE reform: disclosure


The key to success for any GSE reform and getting private investors to absorb more of the risk of default on mortgages is information.  Specifically, disclosure of information so that investors can "know what they are buying" and "know what they own".

In the run-up to the financial crisis, we learned that once-per-month or less frequent disclosure was inadequate to know what you were buying or know what you own.  We know this because sub-prime mortgage-backed securities disclosed on a once-per-month basis and they were referred to as "opaque".

It is only disclosure on an observable event basis that allows investors to know what they own or know what they are buying.  

This can be easily shown with a clear plastic bag, which represents observable event based reporting, and a brown paper bag, which represents once-per-month or less frequent disclosure.  Which is easier to value the contents of: paper or plastic?

Under observable event based disclosure, any activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral is reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the only non-conflicted buy-side regulator, thinks highly enough of the need for observable event based reporting that it included it in its future of mortgage financing white paper.

This information is best collected and distributed through a securitization platform.

Please note that both the Senate (Corker, Warner) and House bills call for the creation of this securitization platform.

Based on this, you would expect that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would, rather than delay and create their own platform, simply use the exiting securitization platform operating in Europe, the EU Data Warehouse.  

This is particularly true because the EU Data Warehouse's pricing model is to charge enough to break-even.  This pricing model caps what a Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitization platform could charge and effectively means that there would be no return on, let alone return of, US taxpayer funds used to build the platform.

The case for not using the EU Data Warehouse is it doesn't provide observable event based reporting.  However, based on disclosures by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac they are not intending to provide observable event based reporting either.

Thursday, August 1, 2013

Transparency needed to end Wall Street's ratings game

Reuters ran an article describing how rating firms, in a replay of the run-up to the financial crisis, are once again using more favorable ratings to win business.

Regular readers know that the way to end this ratings game is to require transparency.  Specifically, valuation transparency so that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

With equal access to the useful, relevant information, market participants can choose to independently assess this information for themselves or hire a third party expert to do the assessment for them.

Regardless of whether market participants do the assessment themselves or hire a third party the result is the dependence of the financial system on the rating firms is ended.

They become nothing more than a third party expert competing for business.
Five years after inflated credit ratings helped touch off the financial crisis, the nation’s largest ratings agency, Standard & Poor’s, is winning business again by offering more favorable ratings. 
S.& P. has been giving higher grades than its big rivals to certain mortgage-backed securities just as Wall Street is eagerly trying to revive the market for these investments, according to an analysis conducted for The New York Times by Commercial Mortgage Alert, which collects data on the industry. 
S.& P.’s chase for business is notable because it is fighting a government lawsuit accusing it of similar action before the financial crisis. 
As the company battles those accusations, industry participants say it has once again been moving to capture business by offering Wall Street underwriters higher ratings than other agencies will offer. 
And it has apparently worked. Banks have shown a new willingness to hire S.& P. to rate their bonds, tripling its market share in the first half of 2013. ... 
“The general consensus was that these changes have let them get their market share back,” said Darrell Wheeler, a bond analyst at Amherst Securities....
But David Jacob, who ran the S.& P. division that rated mortgage-backed bonds until 2011, said that in his time at the company, after the financial crisis, he saw employees adjusting criteria in response to business pressure. 
“It’s silly to say that the market share doesn’t matter,” said Mr. Jacob, who is now retired. “This is not God’s holy work. It’s a business.”...

But Mr. Shugrue said that the little things being allowed could turn into steps toward much bigger problems. 
“You can see that we are slipping our way back to 2007,” he said.

Thursday, May 23, 2013

Hedge funds blindly gambling on private label RMBS nervous as $8.7B portfolio goes on sale

Hedge funds that have been blindly gambling by buying private label RMBS securities are getting nervous as an $8.7 billion portfolio of these securities is being offered for sale.

The sale of the portfolio could hurt their gamble in two ways.  First, the seller could accept prices that are lower than the hedge funds are currently exchanging these bonds.  Second, if the portfolio clears at close to market prices, it might encourage other holders of similar portfolios to try to sell their holdings.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal,
The riskiest types of residential mortgage bonds that rewarded investors with double-digit gains last year and almost that again in 2013 are about to be tested. 
Investors are atwitter with anticipation over what will be one of the biggest sales of non-government mortgage bonds since the financial crisis knocked them into deeply distressed states. 
Wall Street dealers are circulating an $8.7 billion list of subprime and other risky residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) to investors for a sale next week, demanding that terms be kept quiet until the mission is accomplished, according to Empirasign Strategies, a trade database. 
But the sheer size of the list, whose source isn’t being disclosed, has investors reconsidering the risk-reward equation after the market’s feverish rally over the past year. 
The supply is rivaling multi-billion dollar sales of RMBS by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 2011 and 2012, the earliest of which overwhelmed demand and helped drive the market into a tailspin....
The reason the Fed sales overwhelmed demand is that there is no "market" for private label RMBS securities.

Yes, these securities trade.  But because they are opaque, the trades are typically between one hedge fund and another as they gamble on the value of the contents of the brown paper bag that is the security.
In general, nonagency mortgage bonds have gained almost 10% already this year, after more than 20% last year, said Bryan Whalen, a managing director at TCW Group. 
The market — comprised of subprime and other bonds that aren’t backed by the government — has seen consistent demand for the past year as the U.S. housing market recovers and because of its relatively high yields.
Demand from hedge funds has consistently been on the long side as these gamblers are looking for something to buy.
“As deep as the bid has been, seeing close to $9 billion in a short time period is still a lot to digest,” Whalen said....
The fact that $9 billion is considered a lot to digest is a sure sign that there isn't a market for these securities.

In their heyday before the financial crisis began in 2007, there were $2 trillion of these securities outstanding.  So a sale of $9 billion was a non-event.
What would be worrisome is if other sellers also decide that now is the time to capitalize on today’s higher prices. 
Brad Friedlander, a portfolio at Angel Oak Capital, says he is still bullish on nonagency RMBS, but with the caveat if “we see a real cascade of these sales.”
Translation: the hedge fund gamblers only have so much capacity to buy these opaque, toxic securities.

Wednesday, May 15, 2013

Bank of France turns to "super" transparency to restart securitization in EU

Bloomberg reports that the Bank of France is rolling out what it believes is the model for restarting securitization in the EU.

The distinguishing feature of the Bank of France's model is the reliance on making these deals "super transparent" so that market participants can know what they are buying and know what they own.

This is precisely what your humble blogger has been calling for since the earliest days of the financial crisis.

Why would the Bank of France feel the need to roll out deals that are "super transparent" when the ECB has already endorsed the level of transparency provided by the EU DataWarehouse?

Because the Bank of France sees that the EU DataWarehouse doesn't bring transparency that would allow an investor to know what they own or a buyer to know what they are buying.  Rather, the EU DataWarehouse is the industry's effort to retain opacity at the levels associated with opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities.

Please note, that the Bank of France recognizes that the only way to reduce, if not totally eliminate, the rating firms' role in securitization is to make the deal "super transparent".  When a deal is "super transparent", reliance on rating firms is greatly reduced as investors can do the analysis for themselves or hire a third party expert.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has defined what it takes for a structured finance deal to be "super transparent".

First, the deal must provide observable event based reporting under which all activities, like a payment or delinquency, involving the underlying collateral are reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

Second, the deal must make available all data fields tracked by the originator of the underlying collateral and the servicer of this collateral.  These firms are experts and would only track data fields that are relevant for valuing or monitoring the underlying collateral.  There is no legitimate business reason for depriving market participants of the right to piggy-back off this expertise.

The Bank of France wants to help banks package loans to businesses into tradable securities with the creation of a special-purpose vehicles, in what could become a template for the euro area. 
As the European Central Bank looks for ways to improve the flow of credit to small and medium-sized enterprises, or SMEs, the project started by the French central bank in July last year could provide one possible solution, the head of its markets division, Alexandre Gautier, said in a telephone interview. 
He’s in talks with the Frankfurt-based ECB and other national central banks on the initiative, which would ideally create securities that qualify as collateral in ECB refinancing operations. While banks can currently securitize SME loans and use them as collateral at the ECB, the process is complicated and not centralized. 
“We want a vehicle that is super simple and super transparent,” Gautier said. “We’d very much like these securities to be eligible in the euro system, but it’s not a condition. We’ll go ahead on our own if we have to to show that it’s doable.”... 
The aim is to make it easier for banks to re-finance existing loans and incentivize them to extend credit to small businesses. That would especially be the case if the new securities were eligible as collateral with the ECB, said Gautier. 
“The banks were very interested but they said that to make it really attractive, any securities should be eligible as collateral for refinancing within the euro system so that they would be liquid in the event of a crisis,” he said. “That’s now what we’re aiming for.” 
ECB President Mario Draghi said on May 2 that policy makers will start consultations with other European institutions on initiatives to promote lending to SMEs in the euro area using asset-backed securities.

Tuesday, May 14, 2013

As market for asset-backed securities rebounds, ratings shopping resumes

In yet another sign that zero genuine financial reform has occurred since the beginning of the financial crisis, Bloomberg reports that as the market for asset-backed securities rebounds, credit ratings shopping has returned.

Regular readers will recall that in the run-up to the financial crisis, rating firms were willing to put a AAA-rating on securities that the firms admitted they did not have adequate information monitor prior to issuance of the securities and after the securities traded in the secondary market.

In fact, structured finance securities developed a nickname: opaque, toxic.  Where the opacity of the security hid its toxicity.

Here we are almost 6 years after the financial crisis began and policymakers and financial regulators have done nothing to bring transparency to the structured finance market.

As regular readers know, the only way to bring transparency to structured finance securities is to require that they disclose on an observable event basis all activities like payments or delinquencies that occur with the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.

It is only with observable event based reporting that investors know what they own and potential buyers can know what they are buying.

Here we are almost 6 years later and policymakers and financial regulators have not brought observable event based reporting to structured finance.

In fact, policymakers and financial regulators have gone out of their way to keep these securities opaque.  For example, the ECB puts its blessing on a data warehouse that provides disclosure on the same frequency as opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities.

Almost six years after the start of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, bond issuers are again exploiting credit ratings by seeking firms that will provide high grades on debt backed by assets from auto loans to office buildings considered inappropriate by rivals. 
Fitch Ratings isn’t grading a deal linked to a Manhattan skyscraper after saying investors needed more protection. The securities won top grades from Moody’s Investors Service and Kroll Bond Rating Agency Inc. 
Blackstone Group LP’s Exeter Finance Corp. got top-tier ratings from Standard & Poor’s and DBRS Ltd. in the past 15 months on $629 million of bonds backed by car loans to people with bad credit histories, even as Moody’s and Fitch said they wouldn’t grant such rankings.
Borrowers are finding more options than ever to get the top ratings that many investors require after U.S. regulators doubled the number of companies sanctioned to assess securities to 10 since 2006.... 
Issuance of bonds linked to loans and leases are staging a comeback as the Federal Reserve (FDTR)’s unprecedented stimulus, including a pledge to keep benchmark interest rates close to zero into a fifth year, pushes investors into riskier assets. 
Banks have arranged $31.5 billion of commercial mortgage-backed securities this year with issuance poised to climb 50 percent from 2012 to $70 billion, according to Credit Suisse Group AG. Issuance of bonds tied to subprime auto debt of $7.7 billion this year compares with $5.7 billion in the first four months of 2012, according to Wells Fargo & Co.... 
“Nothing’s really changed” in the ratings business, David Jacob, former head of structured finance at S&P, said in a telephone interview. Regulation “changed some of the processes that they do, but what led to a lot to this bad behavior hasn’t really changed.”
The only way to bring about true change is to require the structured finance securities to provide observable event based reporting.

With this information, market participants can assess for themselves the risk and value of these securities.  Market participants can either do the due diligence themselves or hire third party experts to do the due diligence for them.

This ends any reliance on the rating firms.  With transparency, rating firms become just another third party expert offering an opinion.
Debt graders led by S&P and Moody’s helped ignite the credit seizure that began in August 2007 by lowering their standards to win business before defaults soared on home loans to subprime borrowers, the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission said in a January 2011 report. 
“My plea today is that you take action,” Franken, a Democrat from Minnesota elected to the Senate in 2008, told participants at the SEC roundtable today. “If we maintain the status quo we are leaving ourselves far too vulnerable to another catastrophe.”...
Where the status quo is opacity.  Bringing transparency to opaque securities like structured finance reduces our vulnerability to another catastrophe.

Monday, May 6, 2013

ECB continues to do everything it can, except require transparency, to restart structured finance

The Wall Street Journal reports that the ECB is continuing to do everything it can, except require transparency, to restart structured finance as it sees structured finance as crucial to reviving lending to small and medium size eurozone companies.

Regular readers know that in the absence of observable event based reporting on the performance of the underlying collateral, buying or selling structured finance securities is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag.

Leading up to the financial crisis, this gamble did not work out to well for buyers.

The realization that Europe’s troubled economies are faced with long and protracted weakness has encouraged European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to suggest a long-term solution to unlock credit to their cash-starved businesses.... 
Mr. Draghi on Thursday said the ECB was working to promote a funding market for asset-backed securities, which allow banks to pool together shorter-term debt they have sold–such as auto loans, credit cards, and residential or commercial mortgages–and sell those pools as a single package to investors.
The ECB wants ABS to be a sizeable source of bank financing that will encourage lending to small-to-medium sized companies, or SMEs....
Your humble blogger thinks that there is a significant role for structured finance to play in supporting the lending to small-to-medium sized companies not just in the eurozone, but globally.

The issue is what does it take to restart the structured finance market?

I have been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that what it takes to restart the structured finance market is disclosure that allows investors to know what they own or know what they are buying.

The only way to achieve this level of disclosure is by having observable event based reporting on all activities like payments or delinquencies involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.

With this reporting, investors have access to current collateral performance so they know what they own or know what they are buying.

Without this reporting, investors are simply guessing at what is a readily knowable fact.  A knowable fact that the sell-side knows and uses when it trades against the buy-side (see WSJ article on Goldman and Senderra Funding).

Your humble blogger predicted at the beginning of the financial crisis that the buy-side, except for hedge funds who charter is to gamble with their investors' money, would stay away from structured finance until this informational advantage was eliminated.

To date, despite 5+ years of zero interest rate and quantitative easing monetary policies, this prediction has been accurate.
At the moment, banks aren’t lending to SMEs. Without financing, these companies can’t grow: can’t hire employees, can’t invest in new projects. This is a serious problem in Europe, especially in the southern countries facing multi-year recessions and unemployment at depression levels. 
The ECB cut its main interest rate to a record low 0.5% Thursday, with the idea that cheaper money will help encourage a greater flow of money, eventually boosting the economy. 
But getting this extra cash to the real growth engines, i.e. companies, is not as easy as cutting rates. This is where ABS comes in. 
“Securitization can play a key role in funding Europe’s growth since it provides funding which matches the cash flows of the securitized assets and carries little or no refinancing risk, which is an important component of Basel III capital requirements,” said Rick Watson, head of capital markets at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe. 
But at the moment, these products still suffer from an association with bad deals sold before the financial crisis, like U.S. subprime mortgages, a type of ABS that catalyzed fears across the banking system. 
Since then, investors, especially those in Europe, have yet to regain confidence in the product....
Investors staying away from structured finance securities isn't a question of confidence, but rather the result of a costly lesson.  Investors know that while the product retains its information asymmetry it is good for Wall Street and bad for them.
“We’re seeing a market that is slowly grinding to a halt. The market isn’t going to disappear, but the risk is that it becomes small, bespoke, and reverse-inquiry driven. That is, not a real solid market for funding the European economy,” said Ian Bell, head of the Prime Collateralized Securities Initiative.
PCS was launched in November with the aim of labeling ABS deals that comply with a set of standards relating to quality, transparency and simplicity. Mr. Bell noted the good news was PCS labels have been granted to 12 of all qualifying ABS transactions. The bad news was this is 75%-80% of what has been sold to investors.
As noted earlier, a PCS label is nothing more than sticking lipstick on a pig.  The label is awarded to structured finance securities with the same transparency as opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities.
The first step for ABS is restoring confidence....
Confidence in the financial system has always been associated with transparency.

Confidence is the result of investors having access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Confidence results because investors trust their own assessment.
The ECB said did not say how close it was to activating any program. If they do launch one, it wouldn’t be the first crisis-era plan to buy collaterized bank bonds. ... 
“The experience with the first covered bond purchase program can be useful. It was the announcement there that produced the most effect. The implementation was indispensable; without it, the effect would have been undone. But if the ECB were to announce something similar for ABS, it could also have a positive short-term impact,” said Francesco Papadia, former director general for market operations at the ECB....
General expectations are that this will not happen soon. Rabobank analysts summed up the gist of opinions: “We would still view such action as some way off if it does indeed take place at all.” 
But Mr. Draghi’s publically sounded what other officials have been stating for four months. Something needs to happen, and this is a realistic path. 
“It would be a big disappointment if nothing comes of this… I’d be surprised if nothing material develops,” Mr. Papadia said.
What is likely to result is the ECB becomes the gambler of last resort and takes onto its balance sheet more opaque, toxic securities.

Monday, April 8, 2013

Did Cyprus uninsured depositor bail-in kill market for bank contingent convertible debt?

At a minimum, one of the unintended consequences of the uninsured depositor bail-in in Cyprus should have been a reminder to all potential investors just how dangerous bank contingent convertible securities are.

In the absence of banks providing ultra transparency, CoCos are nothing more than a blind gamble on the solvency of the issuing bank or that the host government will bail an insolvent bank out.

After all, if uninsured depositors are going to take a hit, it is clear that holders of CoCos, who are lower down in the bank's capital structure, should be wiped out.

Without ongoing access to a bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, there is no way for an investor to assess the solvency of a bank.

Trust in the results of stress tests?

No.  There have been numerous banks that passed the solvency focused stress tests that were subsequently nationalized.  Dexia for example.

Trust in the bank's ratings provided by the rating firms?

No.  Recall that the rating firms couldn't accurately rate structured finance securities either.

Trust in the bank's book capital level?

No.  Sheila Bair claims it is deceptive and she would know given that the financial regulators have been manipulating bank capital to make the banks look stronger since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Bernanke gets his wish, comeback of financial system's most toxic securities

The Retirement Plan Death Spiral has been overtaken as the most toxic side effect of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's zero interest rate policies by the comeback of the financial system's most toxic securities: synthetic collateralized debt obligations.

Regular readers will recall that these synthetic CDOs were at the heart of the financial crisis.  These were the securities that let Wall Street ,which knew that subprime mortgages were going bust faster than was assumed in the investors' pricing models, successfully "bet" on this knowledge.

The fact that these opaque, toxic securities which the regulators and market cannot value have re-emerged is the direct result of 5 years of zero interest rate policies.

Surely, investors and the financial system will have a better experience gambling on these securities this time around.

As reported by Bloomberg,

Derivatives that pool credit- default swaps to make magnified bets on corporate debt, popularized in the last credit bubble, are making a comeback as investors search farther afield for alternatives to bonds at record-low yields....
Synthetic credit, which amplified the financial crisis five years ago, is enticing investors after corporate-bond yields dropped to less than half the 20-year average. 
By betting on the degree to which a group of companies will default, a CDO may pay relative yields of more than 5 percentage points, four times that of a typical credit-swaps transaction on similar debt.
Please note the use of the word "betting".  An opaque security cannot be valued.  Therefore, buying it is simply an exercise in betting.
“That’s a valid strategy for this part of the credit cycle: Don’t stretch on credit quality, but rather leverage your exposure to better-quality credit,” Ashish Shah, the head of global credit investment at New York-based AllianceBernstein LP, which oversees $256 billion in fixed-income assets, said ....
Betting is not a valid investment strategy.  Betting is gambling.

The distinction between gambling and betting is subtle.

Gambling involves buying opaque, toxic securities and guessing what the value of their contents is.  Investing involves have transparency into all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so as to independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.
“Investors are in a desperate search for yield,” said David Knutson, a credit analyst at Legal & General Investment Management America. “CDO products offer incremental yield to plain-vanilla transactions.”...
Bernanke's zero interest rate policies deliberately make investors desperate when it comes to yield.  They are designed to be coercive and force investors to take more risk.

However, there is a real difference between taking more risk while investing and simply taking risk by gambling.
Sales of bespoke synthetic CDOs are climbing after the market all but shut down during the financial crisis in 2008.
Bernanke's legacy is the revival of the synthetic CDO market that produced the following spectacular results:
After the amount of credit protection sold through CDOs in that period climbed to about $1 trillion, investors took losses of up to 90 percent on deals that bet heavily on financial firms that failed during the crisis, including Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Icelandic banks. 
In the mortgage market, CDOs that packaged home-loan securities and were given top AAA ratings by S&P wiped out investors in a matter of months, according to a lawsuit by the Justice Department filed Feb. 4 in Los Angeles. 
Synthetic CDOs “enabled securitization to continue and expand even as the mortgage market dried up and provided speculators with a means of betting on the housing market,” the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee wrote in a 2012 report. “By layering on correlated risk, they spread and amplified exposure to losses when the housing market collapsed.”
And thanks to Fed Chairman Bernanke's policies, this particularly toxic security has, like Dracula, come back to life to suck the lifeblood out of the real economy.
As the Federal Reserve holds its benchmark interest rate near zero for a fifth year, investors including pension funds and hedge funds are again seeking out more structured debt or derivatives that offer greater yields than the bonds or loans underlying them....
Your humble blogger doesn't mind if hedge funds gamble on these opaque, toxic securities.  This is what investors in hedge funds expect.

However, pension funds and insurance companies should never be allowed to invest in opaque, toxic securities.  Regulators for pension funds and insurance companies have had 5 years to adopt regulations that would prevent this from occurring.
Trading in synthetic CDOs will continue to rebound even after global bank capital rules and the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act make derivatives more expensive to trade and hold, Peter Tchir, founder of New York-based TF Market Advisors, said in a March 15 e-mail to clients. 
“There’s going to be this bigger search for yield and spread, and tranches are a natural way to do it,” he said.
As previously pointed out by your humble blogger, global capital rules do not stop gambling on opaque securities.  

As previously pointed out by your humble blogger, Dodd-Frank also did nothing to restore transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  

As a result, investors have been coerced by the Fed to return to opaque areas where Wall Street can handsomely profit off of the investors inability to price the securities. 

Monday, March 4, 2013

Did the US securitization lobby just collapse?

Bloomberg reports that the American Securitization Forum is in disarray and on the brink of collapse after most of its Board of Directors quit.

Regular readers know that ASF is a sell-side dominated lobbying firm (it use to be a "subsidiary" of the sell-side's leading lobbying firm the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)).  This is confirmed when one reads the list of members that quit the Board.

The fact that these members quit is a sign that ASF has outlived its usefulness and is now seen even by the financial regulators like the SEC as speaking only for the sell-side.

It is not surprising that the sell-side no longer feels the need to control this lobbying firm.

The few recent structured finance securities that have been sold have been done on terms that make them even more toxic to investors than the opaque, toxic sub-prime mortgage-backed securities at the heart of the financial crisis.

At the same time, a number of sell-side dominated data warehouse initiatives have come on line.  As a result, the sell-side can maintain opacity across the structured finance securities while wrapping themselves in the mantle of providing transparency.

The American Securitization Forum, the leading trade association for the securitization industry, fell into turmoil last week when most of the board resigned ....
The exodus puts the future of the trade group in question, said the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the dispute isn’t public. 
Members that quit include Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Deutsche Bank AG, Citigroup Inc. (C) and law firm Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, the people said....
Note: not a buy-side firm or firm beholden to the buy-side on the list.

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

SEC shines light on derivative backed notes

Bloomberg reports that the SEC is pushing the large banks to disclose to investors just how much money they are making on derivative backed notes.

Specifically, the large banks will be required to say how they value the securities.

Lenders from JPMorgan Chase & Co. to Bank of America Corp. that sold $51 billion of securities backed by equity derivatives the past two years are being pushed by regulators to disclose that the banks valued the debt as much as 10 percent less than customers paid. 
Banks are being given 10 days to tell the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission whether they will comply with rules intended to increase transparency in the structured-notes market, the SEC said in a letter sent to some banks this month.  
Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Bank of America, and Royal Bank of Canada began disclosures as early as May on securities sold at prices that were typically 2 to 4 cents on the dollar more than where the banks valued them, data compiled by Bloomberg show. 
Regulators are increasing oversight of equity-linked note sales that have soared 39 percent the past two years as investors buy them as an alternative to traditional bonds with record-low yields. 
The securities generally are sold to individuals who lack pricing models employed by banks to value the securities, which use derivatives to boost yields. 
“These are complex and opaque products, and the more sunshine and disclosure, the better,” said Jacob Zamansky, a lawyer at Zamansky & Associates in New York representing investors in lawsuits over structured notes. “It’s important that the SEC focus on the disclosure of structured products because they’re exploding in sales to ordinary retail investors.”
Please re-read the highlighted text again and recall Yves Smith's dictum:  nobody on Wall Street is compensated for creating low margin, transparent products.

These securities are just another example of Wall Street profiting behind a veil of opacity.
The five-page letter sent to banks Feb. 21 doesn’t set a date for when all structured-note issuers must include market valuations in offering documents. The SEC will require banks to provide a “narrative disclosure” of how it valued the securities.

They also will be required to explain why the value they place on the note may be higher than the price at which an investor could sell the security on secondary markets immediately after being issued, according to the letter. 
Regulators “believe that investors should be able to understand the difference between the issuer’s valuation and the original issue price that they are paying for the structured note,” the SEC said in the letter, signed by Amy Starr, head of the agency’s capital markets trends office in Washington.

Chasing yields, hedge funds look to riskier piece of CMBS deals

Bloomberg reports that in their search for higher yielding securities hedge funds are looking at the riskier B-piece of commercial mortgage backed securities.

Hedge funds are preparing to muscle in on the riskiest part of the $550 billion commercial mortgage bond market, where a handful of firms control the fate of deals. 
Ellington Management Group LLC, Saba Capital Management LP and a fund of MatlinPatterson are among investors considering purchases of so-called B-pieces of newly issued commercial property bonds, according to people familiar with the three firms’ plans who asked not to be identified because the information is private. 
Buyers of the securities are the first to lose money when buyers default; in exchange they earn higher returns and control over which mortgages are included in new deals created by Wall Street. 
The investments, which can yield as much as 24 percent, are dominated by loan specialists -- Rialto Investments and Eightfold Real Estate Capital bought 16 of the 27 B-pieces sold last year -- when about $35 billion of mortgage bonds were issued, according to Deutsche Bank AG. 
The pool of buyers is poised to widen as new issuance soars and investors try to ferret out ways to get high-yielding returns as the Federal Reserve holds interest rates close to zero into a fifth year. 
“Funds are increasingly getting more creative in terms of complexity and illiquidity,” said Rael Gorelick, co-founder and principal of Charlotte, North Carolina-based Gorelick Brothers Capital LLC, which invests in mortgage funds. “This is a rates- are-low story. Where else are you going to go?”
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes the 'interest rate' bubble that the Fed is creating as a result of its pursuit of zero interest rates and quantitative easing.

Investors are chasing yield just like they did in the run-up to the financial crisis.  There is no reason to believe that the end result will be any better.

China looking to expand its asset-backed securities market

Bloomberg reports that China is looking to expand its asset-backed securities market.  The big question is how will it do this?

Will it require that asset-backed securities provide observable event based reporting  so investors can know what they are buying and know what they own or will it allow the securities to provide out of date information that leaves buyers and sellers blindly gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag?

China may allow more firms to develop asset-backed securities businesses with the goal of boosting liquidity, the nation’s market regulator said. 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission will lower its threshold for securities companies to undertake such businesses, the CSRC said today on its website. Asset-backed securities could be based on accounts receivable, credit assets, bonds, stocks and commercial properties, it said. 
The CSRC issued draft rules for the asset-backed securities business today and asked for public feedback, according to the statement. 
China Development Bank Corp., the nation’s largest policy bank, sold 9.27 billion yuan ($1.5 billion) of asset-backed securities, the bank said Sept. 7, in the country’s first such sale since 2008. 
The difficulty of assessing risk in bonds that are backed by loans was a major contributor to the 2008 global financial crisis.

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Fitch: mortgage bonds need better transparency

According to a Wall Street Journal article, Fitch asserted that mortgage bonds need better transparency so that investors are protected and originators and issuers have an incentive to do a better job underwriting the mortgages.

Regular readers know that the transparency investors need in order to fully enforce the reps and warranties of each deal is observable event based reporting.  Under observable event based reporting, every activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral are reported to the investors before the beginning of the next business day.

With observable event based reporting, investors can know what they are buying and what they own.

As a result, they can enforce the reps and warranties for each mortgage that violates the terms of these reps and warranties as soon as the violation occurs.

Mortgage bond issuers that are relieving lenders of some potential liabilities may be exposing investors to additional risks of weak underwriting and defective loans, Fitch Ratings said in a report Wednesday. 
Fitch focused on proposals to recast the so-called representations and warranties in private mortgage-backed securities, which are legal testaments to the quality of the assets packaged into a securitization. 
Facing billions of dollars in claims over bubble-era mortgages that have caused investor losses, the issuers are trying to provide some degree of protection to lenders in the future, to the extent that investors will allow. 
Some rep and warrant provisions in recent residential mortgage-backed securities have provisions that Fitch "deems weak," the rating firm said in a statement. 
For example, some of the provisions relieve lenders from demands to repurchase faulty loans after fewer than 36 months, it said. 
"The balance between protecting both lenders and investors in new RMBS deals requires greater clarity and transparency so that investors remain protected and lenders remain incentivized to make sound underwriting decisions," Fitch said.

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

PIMCO shocked by prices paid to gamble on toxic RMBS

Bloomberg reports that JP Morgan is trying to bring a non-agency backed residential mortgage-backed security to market and PIMCO is shocked by the terms that gamblers are willing to accept to place their wager on these securities.

As everyone knows, residential mortgage-backed securities are opaque.  Therefore, buying these securities is simply blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.

Leading up to the financial crisis, buying these securities was a losing bet for the gamblers and selling these securities was a winning bet for Wall Street.

Since nothing has changed, most notably these securities still do not offer observable event based reporting under which all activities like a payment or default on the underlying assets are reported before the beginning of the next business day so market participants can know what they are buying or know what they own, there is no reason to believe the gamblers won't lose again.

Which is precisely why PIMCO cannot believe the prices paid by the gamblers.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. is seeking to sell securities tied to new U.S. home loans without government backing in its first offering since the financial crisis that the debt helped trigger. 
The deal may close this month, according to a person familiar with the discussions. 
Servicers of the underlying loans may include the New York-based lender, First Republic Bank and Johnson Bank, said the person, who asked not to be identified because terms aren’t set. 
The market for so-called non-agency mortgage securities is reviving as the Federal Reserve’s $85 billion a month of bond purchases help push investors to seek potentially higher returns. 
As deals accelerate, Pacific Investment Management Co. is questioning the prices paid. 
At the same time, a weakening of contract clauses that offer protection to investors if the loans don’t match their promised quality is stoking debate, said Kroll Bond Rating Agency analyst Glenn Costello. 
“There’s a pretty heavy dialogue going on right now between all participants in the market about what makes sense,” Costello, who is based in New York, said last week in a telephone interview....
What makes sense is that the deals provide observable event based reporting.
JPMorgan is telling investors its deal’s terms may allow some of the so-called representations and warranties about the mortgages from originators or itself to expire after 36 months to 60 months, the person said. Such contract clauses, which can be used to force loan repurchases, have led to billions of dollars of costs for banks on debt made during the housing boom. 
After Credit Suisse included so-called sunsets of 36 months on certain buyback promises in a November deal, Standard & Poor’s, the only grader to rate the bonds, said in a statement that the move didn’t affect its view of the debt’s risks. The ratings firm cited the “exceptionally high credit quality” of the loans and that all of them had been reviewed by third-party firms before being packaged into the securities.
Interesting to note the use of third-party firms to review the mortgages and the reluctance of the issuers to provide the data on the mortgages to all market participants so that investors can do their own independent assessment.

As everyone knows, one of the weak spots in securitization is the reliance on third parties making representations about the quality of the underlying collateral and the deal.  A prime example of this was the rating firms.

Yet, here is Wall Street trying to repackage and sell the same snake oil.
Rivals including Fitch Ratings, which publicly called S&P’s grades too high, are taking a more skeptical view. Changes such as sunset provisions and clauses that void loan-quality warranties if borrowers default after events such as job losses or illness generally should require greater so-called credit enhancement, said Rui Pereira, a managing director at Fitch. 
Credit enhancement can include some bonds taking losses before others, cash reserves or payments from the underlying assets that exceed coupons on the securities created. 
“Less investor-friendly provisions are something we need to take into account,” Pereira said last week in a telephone interview.

Issuers are seeking to move past a framework for representations and warranties provided by Redwood that represented a “gold standard,”Kathryn Kelbaugh, a senior analyst at Moody’s Investors Service, said last month during a panel discussion at a securitization conference in Las Vegas. 
In Redwood’s latest deal, it may sell a top-rated class as large as $561.2 million with a 2.5 percent coupon at about 102 cents on the dollar, a person familiar with that offering said today, asking not to be named because terms aren’t set. 
That compares with current prices of about 99 cents on the dollar for Fannie Mae-guaranteed 2.5 percent securities, according to Bloomberg data. 
Bonds issued in recent months by Redwood have been “insanely expensive” by comparison with Fannie Mae debt, Pimco’s Scott Simonsaid in an interview yesterday. 
“I can’t believe someone would pay anywhere near where they have sold them,” said Simon, the mortgage-bond head at Newport Beach, California-based Pimco, manager of the world’s largest mutual fund.
 It is hard to argue with Mr. Simon's observation about the Redwood deal or the prices gamblers are paying for other opaque residential mortgage-backed securities.

Thursday, February 14, 2013

Robert Shiller: Capitalism and Financial Innovation

At the 2012 CFA Institute Financial Analysts Seminar, Yale professor Robert Shiller laid out his views on capitalism and financial innovation.

Professor Shiller channeled his inner Gary Gorton, another Yale Professor whose work on informationally insensitive debt and safe assets your humble blogger has previously debunked, and talked about the benefits of financial innovation, in particular securitization.

According to Professor Shiller,
The ideas I posit are basically an appreciation of financial innovation. Today, cynicism and skepticism regarding financial innovation abound.
Your humble blogger is neither a cynic or a skeptic.  I simply subscribe to Yves Smith's maxim:  nobody on Wall Street is compensated for creating low margin, transparent products.

Financial innovation is primarily about how to create opacity so that the bankers can extract excess rent from investors who are gambling on the value of the opaque innovation rather than investing in a transparent investment.
Even former Fed chairman Paul Volcker contributes to these views. A couple years ago, he famously said that he couldn’t think of any useful financial innovation within recent memory besides ATMs. 
What Volcker says gets a big audience, but I couldn’t disagree with him more.
Which puts the burden on Professor Shiller to show a financial innovation that is actually useful for something other than extracting excess rent from investors (we'll get to that when he talks about securitization).
Our civilization is built on financial innovation. Finance begets and supports almost all activities; it makes the world turn in a modern and civilized way. 
Innovation is necessary if finance is to remain relevant as a means of achieving society’s goals. Perhaps what I have to say will help the finance community defend itself better and encourage finance professionals to assume personal responsibility for their role in making markets more efficient....
This is quite a statement as most people would think that it is the real economy and its inventions that built our civilization.

Finance certainly has a role in supporting the real economy, but it is not at all clear that it is financial innovation that lead the real economy and its inventions and built our civilization.
Securitization was an innovation that blew up in the latest crisis because the process was fraught with errors. 
The most notable error in securitization was in real estate—the subprime loan securitization, which blew up because people didn’t appreciate the risk that home prices would fall. 
It is misleading to say that people didn't appreciate the risk that home prices would fall as a drop in home prices is not what caused the losses on these securities.

What caused the losses was that the borrowers were not making payments on their mortgages.

Since the value of these securities is based on the ongoing payments on the mortgages, so long as the borrowers are paying on their mortgages, the security is performing regardless of what is happening to the price of the house the mortgage is secured against.

Perhaps Professor Shiller never heard the expression "opaque, toxic sub-prime mortgage-backed securities".


What made these securities so dangerous to investors' wealth was that opacity hid their true toxicity.

Specifically, the lack of observable event based reporting on all activities like a payment or delinquency on the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day made it impossible for market participants to know what they were buying or know what they owned.

Your humble blogger has demonstrated this numerous times using a Brown Paper Bag to represent a security using current industry disclosure practices and a Clear Plastic Bag to represent a security using observable event based reporting.

As a concept, however, securitization will survive because it is a means through which a large number of people benefit.
I happen to agree with Professor Shiller that securitization will survive.  The question is whether it will survive in its current opaque form that allows bankers to extract excess rent from investors or in a transparent form where it supports society.
Securitization is an innovation designed to solve an asymmetric information problem.
Actually, as Wall Street uses securitization, it is an innovation designed to create an asymmetric information problem.

The asymmetry is that Wall Street has the information on the current performance of the underlying collateral (they see these securities as if they are Clear Plastic Bags) and the rest of the market place has out of date performance information (they see these securities as they truly are, Brown Paper Bags).

This information asymmetry effectively lets Wall Street trade on tomorrow's news today.

As the financial crisis showed, Wall Street is more than willing to take advantage of this information asymmetry at the expense of the investors.
In the case of the mortgage market, mortgages and thus mortgage-backed bonds require a lot of analysis that many investors are unable to do, so without securitization, those investors would forgo investing in this market.
By securitizing mortgages, tranches of similar credit quality are created, allowing a large swath of the general investing population to buy mortgage-backed bonds that they otherwise would not buy. 
Professor Shiller's observation about the need for analysis reminds me of Professor Gorton's theory on informationally insensitive debt.

Professor Gorton cited bank deposits as an example of informationally insensitive debt.  There is one small problem with this example.  Bank deposits are insured and depositors are very sensitive to this fact.  Confirmation of this can be seen in Greece and Spain where doubts have arisen about whether deposit insurance will be honored and depositors have pulled their money.

Regular readers know that our financial system is based on the FDR Framework under which the government is responsible for ensuring that all useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner and investors are given the incentive to use this information as they are responsible for all losses on their investments.

Investors know this.  As a result, if investors cannot assess the information on the mortgages themselves, rather than forgo making an investment they simply engage third party experts who can assess the information.

Individuals hire portfolio managers.  Portfolio managers, if they or their organization cannot do the analysis themselves, hire third party experts.

The simple point is that if there is transparency and all the useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner, it is used by investors so they can make a fully informed investment decision for any type of investment.

Unfortunately, current securitizations are opaque and there is no information for investors to analyze.  As a result, buying or selling these securities is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a Brown Paper Bag.
Thus, mortgage securitization creates a financial market that allows many people to buy homes that they otherwise might not be able to buy, and it also lowers mortgage rates. 
Isn't one of the problems we have is that people bought houses that they couldn't afford?
The theory of finance involves asymmetric information as one of the elements that financial professionals have to engineer and design around. 
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Professor Shiller has effectively praised Wall Street for creating high margin, opaque products where Wall Street has an asymmetric information advantage.

What is good for society is when financial products are designed to eliminate asymmetric information.

Thursday, February 7, 2013

JP Morgan e-mails show with current loan-level performance information investors could have known how bad deals were

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, your humble blogger has been saying that if structured finance securities offer observable event based reporting on all activities like payments and delinquencies involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day, investors could know what they own or what they are buying.

The New York Times' Dealbook ran an article on JP Morgan where a series of e-mails confirms that observable event based reporting would allow investors to know what they own or what they are buying.

Equally importantly, the article establishes that observable event based reporting is necessary if the information advantage currently enjoyed by Wall Street is going to be eliminated.  Without this information advantage being eliminated, investors will be reluctant to return to this market as they recall how much money they lost due to Wall Street's use of this informational advantage.

When an outside analysis uncovered serious flaws with thousands of home loans, JPMorgan Chase executives found an easy fix. 
Rather than disclosing the full extent of problems like fraudulent home appraisals and overextended borrowers, the bank adjusted the critical reviews, according to documents filed early Tuesday in federal court in Manhattan. 
As a result, the mortgages, which JPMorgan bundled into complex securities, appeared healthier, making the deals more appealing to investors.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes why observable event based reporting must be a requirement for all structured finance deals.
The trove of internal e-mails and employee interviews, filed as part of a lawsuit by one of the investors in the securities, offers a fresh glimpse into Wall Street’s mortgage machine, which churned out billions of dollars of securities that later imploded. 
The documents reveal that JPMorgan, as well as two firms the bank acquired during the credit crisis, Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns, flouted quality controls and ignored problems, sometimes hiding them entirely, in a quest for profit.
Let me repeat, the profits from Wall Street's information advantage comes from having tomorrow's news today.  Wall Street had access to observable event based reporting on the underlying mortgages and the investors did not.

When it comes to rewriting disclosure regulations for structured finance securities, Wall Street is protecting its access to tomorrow's news today.  It does this through the sell-side dominated industry trade groups, the American Securitization Forum (ASF) and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), that keep lobbying the global financial regulators to focus on data templates and NOT when the data is disclosed.
The lawsuit, which was filed by Dexia, a Belgian-French bank, is being closely watched on Wall Street. 
After suffering significant losses, Dexia sued JPMorgan and its affiliates in 2012, claiming it had been duped into buying $1.6 billion of troubled mortgage-backed securities. 
The latest documents could provide a window into a $200 billion case that looms over the entire industry. In that lawsuit, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has accused 17 banks of selling dubious mortgage securities to the two housing giants. At least 20 of the securities are also highlighted in the Dexia case, according to an analysis of court records....
The Dexia lawsuit centers on complex securities created by JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual during the housing boom. As profits soared, the Wall Street firms scrambled to pump out more investments, even as questions emerged about their quality.... 
JPMorgan routinely hired Clayton Holdings and other third-party firms to examine home loans before they were packed into investments. Combing through the mortgages, the firms searched for problems like borrowers who had vastly overstated their incomes or appraisals that inflated property values. 
According to the court documents, an analysis for JPMorgan in September 2006 found that “nearly half of the sample pool” — or 214 loans — were “defective,” meaning they did not meet the underwriting standards. The borrowers’ incomes, the firms found, were dangerously low relative to the size of their mortgages. 
Another troubling report in 2006 discovered that thousands of borrowers had already fallen behind on their payments....
Please re-read the highlighted text as it shows that if the investors had access to the underlying mortgages on an observable event based reporting basis, they too could have known that the mortgages were bad.

Investors could have done the analysis for themselves or hired an expert like Clayton Holdings.

What is important here is that if there had been observable event based disclosure, these deals would never have been done on the terms they were done on.

Saturday, February 2, 2013

Mathbabe: Bill Gates is naive, data is not objective

In a terrific post with direct application to the ability to bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system like banks and structured finance securities, Mathbabe observes
rather than focusing on how individual models improve with more data, we need to worry more about which models and which data have been chosen in the first place, why that process is successful when it is, and – most importantly – who gets to decide what data is collected and what models are trained.... 
Bill Gates seems genuinely interested in tackling some big problems in the world, and I wish more people thought long and hard about how they could contribute like that. But the process he describes so lovingly is in fact highly fraught and dangerous. 
Don’t be fooled by the mathematical imprimatur: behind every model and every data set is a political process that chose that data and built that model and defined success for that model.
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Mathbabe has nicely summarized why letting the banks and the sell-side hijack the political process prevents transparency from ever being brought to the opaque 'black box' banks or the 'brown paper bag' structured finance securities.

In the case of structured finance securities, the sell-side through the industry trade lobbying organizations it controls set the agenda for bringing transparency to structured finance securities by trotting out the idea of 'data templates'.

By focusing attention on the data templates, the sell-side has been able to control the political process for bringing transparency to structured finance securities by taking many issues off the table.  These issues include 'when' data is disclosed and why not disclose all the data fields tracked by originators and servicers that are not protected by borrower privacy regulations.

The result as shown by a recent poll of investors conducted by Principia is that 59% of investors think that what is currently disclosed and what will be disclosed as a result of the efforts of the global regulatory community will not be sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.

Please re-read the previous paragraph in light of Mathbabe's observation: behind every model and every data set is a political process that chose that data and built that model and defined success for that model.

For the sell-side, success is defined as perpetuating opacity so that investors do not have the data they need to adequately perform due diligence.

The result is that anyone buying or selling structured finance securities is blindly gambling.

Of course, the exception to this is Wall Street which through its subsidiaries has access to all the data it needs on an observable event basis.

Thursday, January 31, 2013

Structured finance investors: current proposed disclosure standards inadequate

A 2012 Q4 survey of investors in asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities and structured credit securities by Principia reveals that 59% of these investors think that the proposed loan level disclosure standards will not be sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.

We asked investors whether the current standards for disclosure of loan level data, for example via the European DataWarehouse, Project RESTART, EDGAR or the BoE and ECB templates, will provide sufficient data to adequately perform due diligence on ABS/MBS/CDO investments.... 
59% remain unsure as to whether the new market standards will be sufficient. This is a general finding across all asset classes...
Please re-read the highlighted text and as you are doing so ask yourself what percentage of portfolio managers would say that IBM's disclosures are sufficient to adequately perform due diligence (your humble blogger would expect 90+% as no one refers to IBM as a 'black box').

Regular readers are not surprised by this survey result.  It confirms what your humble blogger has been saying about the sell-side and its lobbyists like ASF, AFME (formerly ESF) derailing efforts to bring greater transparency to structured finance securities.

Regular readers know that there are two aspects to disclosure:  what is disclosed and when it is disclosed.

To date, the sell-side has managed to prevent adequate loan level disclosure standards by focusing the discussion on what is disclosed in the specific data fields in the templates proposed by ESF, Project Restart, EDGAR, the BoE and the ECB.

While very time consuming, this whole discussion of specific data fields to include in the templates ignores a simple relevant fact: the data fields that should be disclosed are all the data fields tracked by the loan originator and servicer that are not borrower privacy protected.

The originator and servicer are experts and as such every field that they track is a field that they feel is important for monitoring and valuing the individual loan.  These experts wouldn't track a data field they didn't think was important because it costs them money.

However, even if the disclosure templates were thrown away and all the data fields tracked by the originators and servicers were provided to investors, this would not be a big enough change in disclosure to get remotely close to 90+% thinking the disclosure was sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.

The simple fact is that investors recognize that 'when' data is disclose is a critical factor in determining if the disclosure is adequate for performing due diligence.

Structured finance securities are created by setting aside specific assets for the benefit of the investors.  The physical equivalent of this would be to put these assets in a bag.

'When' addresses the question of is the bag paper or plastic.

It is a brown paper bag if 'when' is the same reporting frequency as exists for opaque subprime mortgage-backed securities.  This is the frequency that has been adopted by the sell-side and shows up in the European Data Warehouse and Project Restart.

The bag is plastic if 'when' is observable event based reporting under which all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying assets are reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

It is only be adopting observable event based reporting with all the non-borrow privacy protected data fields tracked by the originators and servicers that 90+% of structured finance investors will think the disclosure was sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.

Other Interesting Observations

1) The investors have confessed that when it comes to buying ABS/MBS/CDO securities they are blindly gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag.

59% of investors are saying that the proposed standards are not sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.  If the proposed standards are not sufficient, what does that say about existing disclosure standards?

2) The proposed disclosure standards are unlikely to encourage former or new investors to buy ABS/MBS/CDO securities.

If 59% of existing investors see themselves as blindly gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag because of disclosure is not sufficient to adequately perform due diligence, why would former or new investors want to gamble too?


Tuesday, January 29, 2013

SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes: Sophisticated investors better at valuing contents of brown paper bag

In an astonishing report by Securitization Intelligence, in his keynote address at the ASF 2013 conference, SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes offered
his views on Regulation AB II’s requirement that private 144a offerings include elements of disclosure usually limited to publicly registered transactions, saying that he has previously expressed concern “that we were going too far in treating the private market just like the public market, and that, as a consequence of that, we may compromise the value that the private market brings to bear.” 
He added that the thought that the relative lack of legal protections for investors in the private-label market makes such disclosure requirements important is obviated in part by the sophistication of the investors in the space. 
“I remain unpersuaded that the fundamental reason that the securitization market has been struggling in the last few years is because we don’t have a piling on of regulatory demands,” he said. 
“That’s not to say there is not some room for improvement” in disclosure enhancements, but that the SEC could “end up undercutting the objective of trying to move the ball forward when it comes to the securitization market being conditioned to take off again.” 
To which Deutsch replied, on behalf of attendees who received less resolute answers from some regulatory panelists yesterday, “Hallelujah, brother.” [confirming that ASF is a sell-side dominated group and doesn't represent the buy-side's interests.]
As long as Commissioner Paredes brought up the issue, I thought I might describe exactly what disclosure requirements are needed for both publicly registered and private 144a offerings.

From my post, Turning lemon mortgage-backed securities into lemonade
Disclosure has two components:  what is disclosed and when it is disclosed.  I would like to focus on “when” it is disclosed. 
Everyone knows that structured finance securities involve taking specific assets, like mortgages, and setting them aside for the benefit of the investor.  The physical equivalent of this would be to put them into a bag.

Once the mortgages are in the bag, it is important to know what is in the bag currently. 
 Why? 
If an investor does not know what is in the bag currently, they cannot take the first step in the investment cycle.  
The first step is to independently assess the risk and value the underlying collateral so the investor can know what the investor is buying and, after buying, know what they own. 
The second step is to compare this independent assessment to the prices shown by Wall Street. 
The third and final step is to make a buy, hold or sell decision based on the difference between the investor’s independent valuation of the security and the price shown by Wall Street. 
Please note that without the ability to know what is in the bag currently, it is impossible to accurately assess what is going to come out of the bag eventually. The lack of knowing what is in the bag currently prevents investors from performing their own independent assessment and makes meaningless hiring an expert third party to do the assessment for them.  
Simply put, without current information of what is in the bag, investors cannot go through the investment cycle. 
Buying securities in the absence of an independent assessment is not investing.  Buying securities that cannot be independently assessed is the equivalent of blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.  And, once the securities are purchased, the investor has no ability to know what they own. 
In case you doubt this, let me show it to you using a brown paper bag to hold the underlying collateral. 
On the first business day of last month, $100 went into the bag.  On the third business day of this month, a trustee report with granular level data was issued that showed the bag contained $75 at the end of the last month.  This was made up of 3 $20 bills and 3 $5 bills. 
So the question is:  what is in the bag currently? 
Based on the fact that $25 came out of the bag last month, there are a number of ways of guessing what is in the brown paper bag? First, we could guess that nothing has been taken out of the bag and it still holds $75. Or a $5 bill has been removed and left $70 in the bag.  Or a $20 bill has been removed and left $55 in the bag?  Or both a $5 bill and a $20 bill have been removed and left $50 in the bag? 
By simply asking what is in the brown paper bag currently, I have already created a $25 spread between the $75 a seller might reasonably value the contents of the brown paper bag at and the $50 a buyer might be willing to offer. 
Let me assure you that with this wide a spread, the contents of the brown paper bag are not going to sell. 
This valuation problem has been shown to be particularly acute for mortgage-backed securities since the beginning of the financial crisis.  At that time, buyers came to doubt the ability of the borrowers to make their future payments.  The more doubt, the more likely the market is to freeze as it is impossible to get buyers, who think that the bag is more likely to have $50, and sellers, who look at last month's performance and think the bag has $75, to agree on price. 
Another way we can approach asking what is currently in this brown paper bag is to use a sophisticated model.  We recognize that last month $25 came out of the bag.  This is roughly $0.85 per day.  So we can value the contents of the brown paper bag by multiplying the day of the month it is today by .85 and subtracting the resulting value from the end of the month value shown in the last trustee report. 
Today is the 6th, so the model suggests a value of $69.90 ($75 minus $5.10).  The price suggested by the model doesn't seem unreasonable if a $5 bill is removed from the bag. 
However, a buyer is significantly overpaying if there has been a sharper decline in the value of collateral in the bag and a $20 bill has been removed.  This is analogous to what happened with sub-prime mortgage-backed securities where there was a rapid decline in the value of the collateral. 
This problem of guessing what is in the bag would go away if we were talking about a clear plastic bag.  The investor would know what is in the bag currently as the contents of the bag can be seen and are a knowable fact. 
This is true whether the investor is Commissioner Paredes' sophisticated investor or not.
As a result, investors could independently assess the risk and value the collateral.  With this assessment, the investor “knows what they are buying” and "knows what they own". With this assessment, the investor can make an investment decision to buy, hold or sell based on the prices being shown by Wall Street. 
So turning the mortgage market from lemons to lemonade simply requires recognizing that it is a choice between “Paper or Plastic”.  With “Paper”, you get lemons.  With “Plastic”, you get lemonade. 
So how can each of the structured finance securities be put into the equivalent of a clear plastic bag? 
This can be easily done as the servicer information systems are designed to track and report on the underlying collateral on an observable event basis. 
With observable event based disclosure where all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral are reported before the beginning of the next business day, the investor knows what is in the bag currently. 
Observable event based disclosure is associated with a clear plastic bag.  All other frequencies of disclosure are associated with a brown paper bag and lemons.