Showing posts with label Trust but Verify. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trust but Verify. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

John Kay: Need to return to markets built on trust, not prescriptive regulation

In his Financial Times column, John Kay looks at the failure of prescriptive regulations to control bad behavior in the financial system and argues for restoring a trust based financial system.

Regular readers know that the key to a trust based financial system is transparency.

Specifically, ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  Under the FDR Framework, ensuring transparency is the responsibility of the government.  


Under the FDR Framework, market participants have the incentive, but not the obligation, to use this information as they are responsible for all gains and losses on their investments.


There are many ways for market participants to use this information.  Some are capable of assessing the information themselves.  Others hire experts to assess the information for them.


Ultimately, the basis for trust in the system is that market participants are able to independently assess each investment and they trust this assessment.

Enron is the classic example of why all the useful, relevant information must be disclosed even if most market participants don't use it.  It only took one money manager to read the footnotes to Enron's financial statements to realize Enron was a house of cards.  

In the 1970s and 1980s, financial market regulation largely abandoned a system structured to limit conflicts of interest, which encouraged businesses to build reputations on their performance of specialist functions. 
The new approach was based on behavioural regulation, designed to combat inappropriate incentives by detailed prescriptive rules. The outcome is regulation that is at once extensive and intrusive, yet ineffective and largely captured by financial sector interests.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Professor Kay makes a very important point about how the current practice of regulations is both ineffective and largely captured by financial sector interests.

Behind the failure of the current practice of regulation is that it substitutes detailed prescriptive rules for transparency.

Everyone knows that sunshine is the best disinfectant.

The detailed prescriptive rules were drafted to perform the same tasks as transparency and not surprisingly are not as effective as transparency.
Such capture is sometimes crudely corrupt, as in the US where politics is in thrall to Wall Street money. 
The European position is better described as intellectual capture. Regulators come to see the industry through the eyes of market participants rather than the end users they exist to serve, because market participants are the only source of the detailed information and expertise this type of regulation requires.
With transparency, everyone would have access to the detailed information.  As a result, Wall Street's purchase of Washington would be neutered.  As a result, regulators could access end user expertise and not just the expertise from the firms being regulated.
This complexity has created a financial regulation industry – an army of compliance officers, regulators, consultants and advisers – with a vested interest in the regulation industry’s expansion.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Professor Kay has just described why the financial regulation industry is also known as Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team.

When there is transparency, most of the extensive detailed prescriptive rules become unnecessary.  As a result, to protect itself, the financial regulation industry protects opacity.
In regulation also we need to go back to a simpler structure, serving the users of equity markets – savers and companies....
We need to go back to a transparent financial system.  To do this requires the creation of the "Mother of All Financial Databases".  At a minimum, this data warehouse should contain:

  • All the current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details for each bank; and
  • Current performance information on the assets backing structured finance securities (this information should be reported on an observable event basis where every activity like a payment involving the underlying collateral is reported before the beginning of the next business day).

This data warehouse should be coordinated and overseen by a firm with no conflicts of interest with existing market participants.
The events of the past few weeks may have been a watershed in British attitudes to financial services. Public opinion finally understands that the sector’s problems are not the byproduct of unpredictable events but arise from a wrong turning in the culture of an industry that has come to prioritise transactions and trading over trust relationships. 

The only way to restore those trust relationships is by restoring transparency to the financial system and creating the 'Mother of All Financial Databases' so that market participants can Trust, but Verify.

New Yorker's James Surowiecki: Bankers gone wild

In his New Yorker article, James Surowiecki looks at the need to restore trust in the financial system.

Regular readers know that trust in the financial system is a result of transparency.  With transparency, market participants can Trust, but Verify.

With transparency, market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess risk.  Market participants trust their own assessment.

Heading into the financial crisis, market participants substituted trust in the financial regulators for transparency as the financial regulators let large areas of the financial system become opaque.

This trust was shown to be misplaced.

The question is why would market participants ever trust the financial regulators again?  The old adage goes:  fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.

Mr. Surowiecki recommends actually enforcing the laws as a first step for financial regulators regaining the trust of market participants.
In order to work well, markets need a basic level of trust. As Alan Greenspan said, in 1999, “In virtually all transactions we rely on the word of those with whom we do business.” 
So what happens to a market in which the most fundamental assumptions turn out to be lies? .... 
The LIBOR (London Inter-bank Offered Rate) index is the most important set of numbers in the global financial system. ....
Yet we now know that for years LIBOR rates were rigged. ....
Rigging LIBOR was shockingly easy. The estimates aren’t audited. They’re not compared with market prices. And LIBOR is put together by a trade group, without any real supervision from government regulators. 
In other words, manipulating LIBOR didn’t require any complicated financial hoodoo. The banks just had to tell some simple lies. 
They had plenty of reasons to do so. At Barclays, for instance, traders were making big bets on derivatives whose value depended on LIBOR; changing rates by even a tiny bit could be exceptionally lucrative....
And, once the crisis hit, banks had a new incentive to distort LIBOR: if their estimates were higher than their peers’ (meaning that it would be expensive for them to borrow money), investors, creditors, and regulators would worry that they were about to go under. So the banks sent LIBOR downward in order to make themselves look stronger than they were. The result was that, instead of reflecting what was real, LIBOR reflected what the banks wanted us to believe was real. 
The most striking thing about this scandal is that it was predictable—the way LIBOR was designed practically invited corruption—yet no one did anything to stop it. 
It is an example of regulators failing to perform their primary task under the FDR Framework of ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.
That’s because, for decades, regulators and people in the financial industry assumed that banks’ desire to protect their reputations would keep them honest. If banks submitted false LIBOR estimates, the argument went, the market would inevitably find out, and people would stop trusting them, with dire consequences for their businesses.  
LIBOR was supposedly a great example of self-regulation, evidence that the market could look after itself better than regulators could. 
But, if recent history has taught us anything, it’s that self-regulation doesn’t work in finance, and that worries about reputation are a weak deterrent to corporate malfeasance. ...
The lesson is that in the absence of transparency self-regulation does not work in finance.  Without transparency, there is no way for market participants to keep the banks honest through Trust, but Verify.
Even in the absence of market discipline, self-regulation could work if institutions had strong internal safeguards against corruption. But while every institution says that it has these norms—that’s why scandals like LIBOR are always blamed on a “few rogue traders”—the track record of the banking industry over the past two decades doesn’t inspire confidence in its devotion to the truth or to the public interest. 
The Barclays traders, for instance, sent e-mails casually thanking their colleagues for lying, and sometimes talked with their supervisors about their plans, revealing a culture in which deception was simply part of how things got done. 
As the behavioral economist Dan Ariely writes in his new book, “The Honest Truth About Dishonesty,” cheating is contagious—when we see others succeed by cheating, it makes us more likely to cheat as well. So when institutions tolerate, and even reward, bad behavior, all that self-regulation gets you is bankers gone wild. 
How do we rein them in?
Simple, by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information,
We could start by making it harder for the banks to game the system—LIBOR, for instance, should be revamped so that it reflects actual market rates, not self-serving guesses....
This new approach would be intrusive and overbearing, and would make it harder for bankers to do what they want. In other words, it’s exactly what the financial industry needs.

Wednesday, May 9, 2012

Prudential RMBS suit with Morgan Stanley reminder of need to address opacity in structured finance

Bloomberg reports that Prudential is suing Morgan Stanley over the purchase of $1 billion in mortgage backed securities.

The case highlights the opacity of these securities and the fact that Wall Street's ownership of the mortgage originators and servicers provided Wall Street with an informational advantage.

Prudential Financial Inc. (PRU), the second- largest U.S. life insurer, sued Morgan Stanley over the purchase of $1 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities. 
Morgan Stanley, the sixth-largest U.S. bank by assets, made untrue statements and omitted material facts before Prudential bought RMBS certificates issued with 41 mortgage-loan securitizations from July 2004 to August 2007, according to the complaint filed in state court in Newark, New Jersey. 
“A high percentage of the mortgage loans backing the certificates have defaulted, been foreclosed upon, or are delinquent,” according to the complaint. Poor loan performance “caused a massive decline in the value of the certificates and Prudential investment losses in excess of $350 million.” 
The bank falsely claimed mortgages met underwriting guidelines, homes securing loans were legitimately appraised, and the bank properly transferred titles, according to the complaint filed April 25. 
Pools of home loans securitized into bonds were a central part of the housing bubble that helped send the U.S. into the biggest recession since the 1930s....
Morgan Stanley faced similar lawsuits in recent months from investors including Asset Management Fund, Bayerische Landesbank and MetLife Inc. (MET)  
On April 3, the Federal Reserve ordered the bank to review foreclosures conducted by its Saxon mortgage servicer before the unit was sold and compensate injured borrowers. 
Prudential claims Morgan Stanley violated the New Jersey Uniform Securities Law, engaged in common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and interfered with the insurer’s contractual rights. It seeks compensatory and punitive damages.


Tuesday, January 10, 2012

Opacity Protection: Vikram Pandit rolls out a 'new way to measure risk'

In a column in the Financial Times, Citigroup CEO Vikram Pandit rolls out a 'new way to measure risk' and strengthen the financial system.

He observes that bank capital ratios are not very informative as there are a number of assumptions that go into calculating the risk-weightings of the assets.  To provide additional information, he suggests using a benchmark portfolio and then drawing inferences to Citigroup and other financial institutions.

The last time the financial markets relied on a benchmark portfolio was for rating structured finance securities.  The rating agencies used a benchmark portfolio of mortgages.  We know how their reliance on this benchmark mortgage portfolio turned out.

The lesson from that debacle is the importance of assessing the actual exposures and not some artificial benchmark.


To do this requires the Citigroup and other financial institutions provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details so market participants could calculate for themselves a much more informative capital ratio.

It is hardly surprising that the financial crisis and ongoing economic turmoil have caused some to question the value of capitalism. But in fact the crisis was not an indictment of capitalism. It should be seen, rather, as a call to improve how we practise it. 
Many remedies have been proposed to shore up the safety of the financial system, including the Dodd-Frank law and the higher capital requirements of the Basel process. I support both. But I also believe a market-driven mechanism would further strengthen the system.
I too believe that we need to improve how we practice capitalism.  My improvement is requiring every opaque area of the financial system (for example 'black box' banks and opaque structured finance securities) to provide ultra transparency.

When market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner, they are in a position where they can assess the risk of any exposure and adjust the amount and price of this exposure to reflect the risk.
Currently, banks are required to hold specified levels of capital relative to their outstanding loans. Regulators set those requirements based on their judgment of market risks and worst-case scenarios. 
There are limits to this approach. As practised ... it presumes a level of clairvoyance that no regulator can possess.... 
[C]apital requirements are not as transparent as many presume. It is not enough to require financial institutions to disclose capital ratios. Without knowing what that institution’s underlying assets are (only insiders and select regulators know that), outsiders, including most investors, cannot properly assess how that institution calibrates risk.
Where Mr. Pandit and I differ is that investors are not primarily interested in how a financial institution calibrates risk.  Investors are primarily interested in the risk being taken by the financial institution.

Please re-read the previous paragraph as it highlights the difference between a red herring argument to protect opacity and implementation of transparency.

Let's look at how Mr. Pandit's observation would read if the focus was where it belongs on investors understanding the risks a financial institution is taking:


Capital requirements are not as transparent as many presume. It is not enough to require financial institutions to disclose capital ratios. Without knowing what that institution’s underlying assets are (only insiders and select regulators know that), outsiders, including most investors, cannot properly assess how much risk that institution is taking.


This is the way the paragraph needs to be written if the goal is to strengthen the financial system.  The obvious conclusion is that if investors don't have the information they need to properly assess how much risk is being taken, they do not have the information for properly pricing their exposure to the financial institution.
What is needed is a way to compare apples with apples. Regulators should create a “benchmark” portfolio and require all financial institutions, not just banks, to measure risk against that. The benchmark portfolio would not actually exist on the balance sheet of any one institution. Rather, it would be a collection of real investments that stand in for the kinds of assets that most financial institutions actually hold at the time. What is more, its contents would be 100 per cent public....
As investors in structured finance securities discovered to their dismay, they had bought securities that bore no resemblance to the benchmark portfolio.

Having learned this lesson once, investors understand that they need to have ultra transparency into all of a bank's exposures.  Investors can use this data to create their own apple to apple comparisons!
Shining a light on the reality behind reported capital ratios would encourage financial institutions to take a more conservative approach to risk. Investors would reward institutions whose approach to risk and capital holdings seem to be sound and punish those who appear to get it wrong. In this case, as in so many others, the crowd can be wiser than individual experts. But the crowd can only be as wise as the information it uses to make its evaluation. Right now, there isn’t enough.
And that is why ultra transparency is needed.  It is the ultimate in shining a light on what is happening in each financial institution.
I well remember what it was like to recapitalise Citigroup at the height of the crisis. I understand the stresses on institutions, and the system, amid financial turmoil. The best solution is not to mitigate panics but to aim to avoid them. One way is to give the market the tools to discipline firms that leverage up too far and take too much risk. 
The financial industry certainly lost trust with the public in the crisis. But that loss of trust arose not from a failure of capitalism but from specific failures by certain participants in the financial system. We could go a long way to regaining that trust by making the system more transparent, by clearing some of the obscurity that causes people to believe the system is a game rigged against their interests.
I couldn't agree with Mr. Pandit's conclusions more about the need for transparency.  I am looking forward to his call asking for my assistance in creating the mother of all financial databases so that Citigroup can lead the financial sector in providing ultra transparency!

Wednesday, January 4, 2012

Bill Gross puts the issue of 'trust' front and center

In his monthly news letter, PIMCO's Bill Gross puts the issue of 'trust' front and center.  Specifically, he observes
But before ringing in the New Year with a rather grim foreboding, let me at least describe what financial markets came to know as the “old normal.” It actually began with early 20th century fractional reserve banking, but came into its adulthood in 1971 when the U.S. and the world departed from gold to a debt-based credit foundation. Some called it a dollar standard but it was really a credit standard based on dollars and unlike gold with its scarcity and hard money character, the new credit-based standard had no anchor – dollar or otherwise. All developed economies from 1971 and beyond learned to use credit and the expansion of debt to drive growth and prosperity. Almost all developed and some emerging economies became hooked on credit as a substitution for investment in tangible real things – plant, equipment and an educated labor force. They made paper, not things, so much of it it seems, that they debased it. Interest rates were lowered and assets securitized to the point where they could go no further and in the aftermath of Lehman 2008 markets substituted sovereign for private credit until it appears that that trend can go no further either. Now we are left with zero-bound yields and creditors that trust no one and very few countries. The financial markets are slowly imploding – delevering – because there’s too much paper and too little trust.
Please re-read his comment about creditors that trust no one and financial markets with too little trust.

Why has trust evaporated from the financial markets?

Opacity.

As this blog has observed many times before, on August 9, 2007, the financial markets effectively shutdown for every type of opaque security.  This list includes mortgage backed securities as well as unsecured bank debt and equity.

Quite simply, buyers went on strike.

Since then, central banks and governments have tried numerous programs to try to get the buyers to end their strike.  Predictably, all these programs have failed.

The cause of their failure is the same.  None of the programs addressed the issue of restoring trust.

There is only one way to restore trust:  provide ultra transparency.

Providing anything less than ultra transparency will not see the buyers end their strike because they have learned from structured finance securities like CDOs that what they cannot see and therefore evaluate can and will cause investment losses.

Thursday, December 8, 2011

Donald Kohn explains why regulators have not addressed the global solvency crisis

In a speech, the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee member Donald Kohn explained why regulators have not addressed the global solvency crisis.  He discussed the difficulty with implementing countercyclical macroprudential policy when times are tough.

When the economy is weakening and bad debts are building, easing [capital and liquidity] requirements may reduce the effect of financial sector problems on the real economy.   
There is no 'may' in the effect of these policy actions on the real economy.  It has been well known since the Great Depression that making banks absorb the losses on the excesses in the financial system does reduce the effect of financial sector problems on the real economy.

This blog has referred to this as banks acting as a safety valve between the excesses in the financial system and the real economy.

You don't have to take your humble blogger's word that this works.  The NY Fed has documented that it works.

Contemporary observers consider the [US] Bank Holiday and [FDR's] Fireside Chat a one-two punch that broke the back of the Great Depression....
Roosevelt’s oratory certainly played an important role, but only the financially naive would have believed that the government could examine thousands of banks in one week to identify those that should survive. 
According to Wigmore (1987, p. 752), “The federal review procedure for reopening banks also had too many weaknesses to create much confidence, given the number of banks reopened, the speed with which they opened, and the lack of current information on them. There were no standards for judging which banks should reopen.”...
This article demonstrates that the Bank Holiday that began on March 6, 1933, marked the end of an old regime, and the Fireside Chat a week later inaugurated a new one. 
The Emergency Banking Act of 1933, passed by Congress on March 9—combined with the Federal Reserve’s commitment to supply unlimited amounts of currency to reopened banks—
created de facto 100 percent deposit insurance. 
Moreover, the evidence shows that people recognized this guarantee and, as a result, believed the President on March 12, 1933, when he said that the reopened banks would be safer than the proverbial “money under the mattress.” 
Confirmation of the turnaround in expectations came in two parts: the Dow Jones Industrial
Average rose by a statistically significant 15.34 percent on March 15, 1933 (taking into account the two-week trading halt during the Bank Holiday), and by the end of the month, the
public had returned to the banks two-thirds of the currency hoarded since the onset of the panic.
Breaking the back of the Great Depression sure sounds like making banks absorb the losses on financial excesses unambiguously works.

I can hear the objections already.  The article refers to an implied 100% deposit guarantee.  It does not mention banks taking the losses.

Literally true, but once there is an implied 100% deposit guarantee in place, then there is no reason that a bank cannot recognize all of its losses.  It does not have to fear a run as no-one is looking at its financial statements.

As a practical matter, once the government formally began guaranteeing deposits later that year, regulators had an incentive to make sure the banks cleaned up their bad assets.

Returning to Mr. Kohn's speech...

But how do you know the problems won’t get much worse, perhaps for reasons entirely external to the economy in question and out of control of the authorities.   
If conditions do continue to deteriorate substantially, releasing capital and liquidity buffers – lowering requirements – could come back to haunt the economy and the authorities if it results in widespread failures, unemployment as credit tightens, and if it comes to require fiscal action to stem the downward slide.  
Now there is a prescription for regulators never addressing a solvency crisis.  After all, it is always possible that the situation will get worse.

Even if the situation gets worse, it does not matter so long as three conditions hold true.

First, the central bank continues to be willing to lend against good collateral.  Second, the government continues to guarantee the deposits.  These two conditions assure that an insolvent bank can continue operating indefinitely.

Third, the banks provide ultra transparency by disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This condition means that market discipline will prevent banks from taking unnecessary risks and gambling on redemption.

Regular readers will recall that your humble blogger predicted at the start of the solvency crisis that the global economy was in a downward spiral that could only be stopped if the solvency issue was addressed by requiring ultra transparency for all the opaque areas of the global financial system.

So where are we today more than four years after the start of the solvency crisis on August 9, 2007?

The Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard observed that today all the Eurozone and UK banks are insolvent and policy makers and regulators need to face up to it.


He could also have observed that the global banking regulator review process, including stress tests, has too many weaknesses to create confidence.  The key weakness being the lack of current information available to market participants so that they can independently assess the solvency of each bank.

He could also have observed that the trigger for the Eurozone banks causing a credit crunch was the regulators insistence that banks meet a 9% Tier I capital ratio.

The FPC has faced just such an issue as the situation in the euro area worsened last summer and fall, and its discussion of the conflicting pressures is reflected in the record of our September meeting, already published.   
The committee concluded that lowering buffers would not be appropriate at that time, out of concern about what might be coming next.    
Buffers that the Great Depression showed are meaningless when the government is implicitly guaranteeing 100% of the deposits.

Wait a second, given the stress tests, aren't the governments morally obligated to bailout investors?  Isn't this a 100% deposit guarantee?
The cost of leaning unnecessarily hard against expanding credit and rising asset prices would be growth and innovation foregone – very hard to see. The cost of inadequate capital and liquidity is large and visible – a loss of confidence and an unstable financial system.  

A direct link between high levels of bank book capital/liquidity and confidence and a stable financial system may in theory exist.  Then again, it might not. [Pre-deposit insurance we had high levels of bank book capital and liquidity, but there were frequent periods of instability characterized by bank runs.  Post-deposit insurance, we had low levels of bank book capital/liquidity and long periods of financial stability.]

A direct link between disclosure to market participants of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner and confidence and a stable financial system has been definitively shown to exist.  

There is no clearer example of this linkage than the government's implied guarantee of 100% of deposits in the Great Depression.  With knowledge of the implied deposit guarantee, bank runs ended and deposits flowed back into the banking system.

Tuesday, October 18, 2011

Mervyn King: Four years into the crisis it is surely time to accept the underlying problem is solvency, not liquidity

Bank of England Governor Mervyn King confirms we are dealing with a solvency crisis and embraces the recommendation under the FDR Framework for disclosure by banks that your humble blogger has been making.

According to an article in the Telegraph, he observed
All of the emergency stimulus measures employed to support European banks and the eurozone had simply “bought time” for world leaders to address that fundamental imbalance, Sir Mervyn said in a speech in Liverpool last night. 
“So far, that time has not been used to deal with the underlying imbalances, or the weaknesses in bank and sovereign balance sheets,” he said. “Time is running out [to prevent the greatest economic crisis since the 1930s or of all time].”
According to another article in the Telegraph,
[F]ar more urgent is how we deal with the crisis of confidence in some banks and sovereigns. 
Here the Bank of England Governor had a clear message for the eurozone. "A transparent recognition of losses and a substantial injection of additional capital are necessary to restore market confidence." 
Four years into the crisis, said Sir Mervyn, it was "surely time to accept that the underlying problem is one of solvency, not liquidity". This goes for banks and countries, added Sir Mervyn. 
A round of recapitalisations in October 2008 was inadequate, he believes, especially on the Continent. And he's right.
As this blog has repeatedly said, the only way to know if a capital injection is adequate is if there is disclosure by each bank of its current asset and liability-level data, including off-balance sheet exposures.  With this data, market participants can verify that all the bank losses have been recognized.  With this data, market participants can assess how much, if any, capital a bank needs.

Where this blog differs from Mr. King is over the timing of recapitalizing the banks.

Your humble blogger believes that so long as banks continue to disclose their current asset and liability-level data, they do not have to recapitalize immediately.  Instead, they can recapitalize over time through retained earnings and stock issuance.  While the banks are recapitalizing, either market discipline or regulatory persuasion will act as a restraint on the banks increasing their risk profile.

Not recapitalizing immediately should have no impact on the ability of banks to make all the loans necessary to support a growing economy.  While it will impact their ability to hold the loans they generate, this is not a problem.  There are plenty of buyers of these loans in the capital markets (insurers, pension funds, hedge funds to mention a few).

Update


From an article in the Guardian,
Four years into the financial crisis, King said it was time to accept that the underlying problem was solvency of banks and countries. "Of course, the provision of additional liquidity support to countries or institutions in trouble can buy time. But that time will prove valuable only if it is used to tackle the underlying problem."
King said that the recapitalisation of banks in continental Europe in October 2008 had been inadequate, noting that the underlying problems of excessive debt had not gone away. "As a result, markets are now posing new questions about the solvency of banks, and indeed of governments themselves."

Monday, October 17, 2011

Without disclosure, no-one knows if Europe's "Grand Plan" lacks firepower

A Telegraph article quotes US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner as saying
A central lesson of financial crises is that success requires the commitment of financial force greater than the foreseeable magnitude of financial pressures.... 
[The European Union has] come to recognise that if you underdo it, it can be more expensive.
Following up on this theme, in his Telegraph column, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard observes
Top officials from the US Treasury and the International Monetary Fund are privately worried that Europe’s `Grand Plan’ to overcome the debt crisis is fundamentally deficient and may fail to restore market confidence.

The lesson from the Great Recession is that governments cannot buy market confidence.  They can spend vast sums of money and purchase a Great Reprieve, but they cannot buy long-term market confidence.

This finding is not surprising given that the lesson from the Great Depression is that success in restoring market confidence comes from disclosure which ensures that market participants have assess to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.


Let me make a few factual observations in support of the need for disclosure ins restoring market confidence.

  • Without detailed disclosure of each bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures, how does anyone know if the European Union does not already have the needed capital with the European Financial Stability Fund or, alternatively, that 4 trillion euros (2 trillion that BlackRock's Larry Fink said the banks need and 2 trillion for sovereign debt under Mr. Geithner's initial recommendation) is enough?
    • Now that Mr. Geithner and the IMF officials have offered their opinion that 2 trillion euros is required, what happens if the EU's proposal is for less?  I realize that Mr. Geithner and the IMF officials are entitled to their opinion, but in theory the EU has much better information as the national financial regulators report to them and not to Mr. Geithner and the IMF officials.
    • Who would buy Greece's debt if the EFSF is only guaranteeing the loss on the first 30% and Greece's debt is trading suggesting write-offs of 50% or more?
  • Without detailed disclosure of each bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures, market participants cannot verify for themselves if the Grand Plan restores solvency to the banking system let alone cures the sovereign debt problem.  If market participants cannot verify solvency for themselves, why should market confidence be restored by a Grand Plan based on recapitalization figures generated by regulators who managed to run stress tests that passed banks which had to be nationalized within 90 days of the announcement of the results?
  • Without detailed disclosure of each bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures, how do market participants know which banks are solvent and which are insolvent?  If they do not know who is solvent or who is insolvent, why would they want to keep their money in these banks?

Sunday, October 16, 2011

Liam Halligan and the Telegraph call for detailed disclosure

The international call for banks to provide detailed disclosure is growing.

In the last week, the Wall Street Journal (see here), the Financial Times (see here), the NY Times (see here and here), and now the Telegraph in Liam Halligan's column have called for banks to provide detailed disclosure and explained why this disclosure is necessary for ending the global financial crisis which began on August 9, 2007.

Why has the international call for detailed disclosure occurred now?

Because global policy makers and financial regulators have tried everything else and these other solutions have failed to restore investor confidence or end the global financial crisis (see current Eurozone sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis or Chinese bank solvency problem).

[The] only chance eurozone banks have of raising serious capital is if they’re forced, under threat of custodial sentences for bank executives, to disclose fully their detailed asset and liability data. Investors could then make accurate assessments and decide which banks to back. 
Stress tests, carried out by the authorities, are merely political damage-limitation exercises. They’re also deeply counter-productive. By forcing investors to rely on regulatory judgments, governments burden themselves with an obligation, possibly even a legal obligation, to provide bail-outs. After all, why should creditors lose, having supported a bank which the government said was solvent? 
That’s why the failure to insist on full disclosure – a failure resulting, of course, from the cosy, nay corrupt, financial links between Western banks and political parties – is so damaging. 
The ongoing lack of transparency gums up the inter-bank market, the wholesale lending channel, so denying firms and households of much-needed capital. It also generates huge and ongoing investor angst, making it impossible for banks to refinance, while complicating efforts to force creditors to face up to their mistakes. 
Markets don’t work without information. 
Instead of insisting such information is widely available, eurozone governments are engaged in a cover-up. Stagnating growth and rising loan defaults are threatening bank failures while, in turn, exacerbating a sovereign debt fiasco. Full disclosure of bank liabilities is essential to break the deadlock. 
Instead of grasping this nettle, euroland’s “leaders” talk of “leveraging” the EFSF, allowing it to borrow. Another wheeze would see the rescue fund being granted a “temporary” banking licence, granting it a direct credit line from the European Central Bank. That is probably what will happen. Unable to get a bigger bail-out fund agreed by various parliaments, the single currency’s architects will raid the ECB instead, attempting to douse the flames with a hydrant of “virtually printed” money, while putting the central bank’s capital at risk. 
Such policy pyrotechnics, though, won’t address the real problem.... Both France and Germany say they want a “durable fix” to the turmoil that has driven several nations to the brink of default, while seriously rattling global markets.
The only durable fix is detailed disclosure of each bank's assets and liabilities.

I look forward to working with the global policy makers, financial regulators and banks and coordinating the creation and on-going operation of a durable fix.  This fix will be a data warehouse that provides market participants access for free to each bank's detailed disclosure of its assets and liabilities.

Monday, October 10, 2011

Surprise! Investors have little faith in numbers provided by banks

As bank earning season approaches, the NY Times ran an article documenting that investors have little faith in the numbers provided by banks.

This is a very big problem.

A loss of faith in the numbers provided by the banks is nothing less than a loss of faith in the ability to independently assess the risk of and value the banks.  Investors learned from the subprime mortgage securities that if you cannot independently assess the risk of and value a security not to buy the security.

Investors also learned from the financial crisis that began on August 9, 2007, that bank regulators should not be relied on for an accurate assessment of the risk of the banks (remember the comments about how the subprime problem is contained).

In short, given what investors have learned, the question is how much longer can the market function without faith in the bank balance sheet numbers and when will the global orderly sell-off in bank stocks become a more frantic activity?

There is only one way to solve this problem of a lack of faith in the numbers provided by a bank.  That is disclosure of each bank's current asset and liability-level data.  With this data, market participants can independently assess the risk of and value each bank.
The protesters who have gathered for weeks near Wall Street and the highly paid investors and analysts in the buildings that surround them don’t agree on much. 
But when it comes to the nation’s biggest banks, they have a lot more in common than you would think. Both are deeply frustrated with financial institutions in general and have little faith in the message coming from bank executives. 
... Senator Richard J. Durbin of Illinois, the No. 2 Senate Democrat, took the unusual step of denouncing Bank of America on the Senate floor [over its monthly charge for debit card use], urging customers to “vote with your feet, get the heck out of that bank.” 
Investors certainly have. Bank stocks are at lows not seen since the wake of the financial crisis, and shares of Bank of America, the nation’s biggest bank, are down more than 50 percent since the start of the year, while Citigroup is down more than 40 percent....
And in a kind of unusual convergence, protesters and bank analysts alike have had it with bank management....
“There is a huge skepticism, that goes way beyond normal healthy doubt, about how reliable their numbers and guidance are,” said Chris Kotowski, an analyst with Oppenheimer. “People who were bullish are frustrated and beaten down.” 
Michael Mayo, a longtime financial services analyst, ... argues there is so much pressure on loans, margins and revenue that even at these depressed levels, American bank stocks are too richly priced. And the political and financial uncertainty in Europe makes the sector even more risky. “Underweight bank stocks and put more of your money elsewhere,” he advises. 
Mr. Mayo is not alone...
Analysts expect that auto, credit card and corporate lending will have inched upward in the third quarter, and lower credit losses could mean the release of several billion dollars’ worth of past reserves that will be counted toward current profits. 
But these days, investors are ... increasingly focused on the consequences of prolonged unemployment of around 9 percent and an almost daily drumbeat of other grim economic data. 
What is more, worries are rising that the debt troubles in Europe could infect the balance sheets of American financial institutions. 
Even though the banks insist their exposures are not a cause for alarm, investors have so little faith in the numbers banks have provided that their first reaction is to sell shares first, and ask questions later. 
The credit default swap market provides one clue of how deep those fears run, as the cost of buying insurance against the default of billions of dollars’ worth of bank debt has surged since mid-July. 
Rates on credit default swaps for Morgan Stanley now stand at 420 basis points, while Bank of America’s rate was 379, and Goldman Sachs was at 351. That is equivalent to the cost of insuring junk bonds issued by companies whose credit rating is below investment grade. 
Among the major banks, only JPMorgan Chase and Wells Fargo fare better, with rates at just above 150 basis points.

Friday, October 7, 2011

Happy 3rd Anniversary Bank Bailouts

According to a Guardian article, it was three years ago this week that the UK engaged in the first bank bailout.  Shortly thereafter the US and Eurozone also bailed out their banks.

With these actions, a terrible precedent was set.  This precedent was even worse than the precedent set by crediting regulatory capital to insolvent US savings and loans in the 1980s.  The clear lesson from crediting regulatory capital was that it resulted in increasing the cost to taxpayers of unwinding the insolvent savings and loans.

What made the actual cash bailouts worse is that now, not only did it increase the cost to taxpayers, but global financial regulators and policymakers felt compelled to lie about the solvency of the banks.

For all its faults, the Office of Thrift Supervision never claimed the savings and loans that received regulatory capital were actually solvent, but rather with the addition of regulatory capital they did not have to be closed.

With the actual cash bailouts, global financial regulators and policymakers undertook a very public campaign to say that the banks were solvent.  Global financial regulators and policymakers have repeatedly made this claim and taken actions as if it were true.

However, given the available evidence, this claim was never believable in the first place nor required (as the savings and loans have shown, insolvent financial institutions can remain open for business for years until they are closed by the financial regulators).

  • In the US, analysts are debating whether Bank of America needs to raise upwards of $200 billion in equity - well over $100 billion more than US financial regulators have ever said was necessary if BofA was to remain solvent;  
  • In Europe, after each year's stress tests, within weeks banks that easily passed the test had to be nationalized - think Irish banks and Dexia.
By itself, this evidence suggests the claim of solvency is highly suspect.

Unfortunately, there is much more evidence.
  • The Eurozone policymakers are meeting to discuss how much more capital to inject into the Eurozone banks - if the banks are solvent, then why do they need capital?
  • Market participants are throwing out suggested capital shortfalls - Christine Lagarde and the IMF are suggesting 200 to 300 billion euros; BlackRock's Larry Fink is suggesting 2 trillion euros - if he is right then the interconnectedness of the global financial system is going to require that US and UK banks are bailed out too if Europe does not go for the full 2 trillion.

Why don't financial regulators and policymakers acknowledge that the banks are insolvent?  Without requiring banks to disclose their current asset and liability-level data, market participants already assume that there is something to hide.

More importantly, market participants know that what is hiding on the bank balance sheets or in the structured finance market will eventually emerge.  First, it was the sub-prime debt (which is still there and marked to make believe).  Now it is the sovereign debt.

Does anyone wonder why confidence is ebbing and market participants are aggressively reducing their risk?  They know that there is too much debt and that borrowers do not have the resources to repay it.  As a result, it is highly likely another problem area will emerge.

They are justifiably worried about the ongoing cycle of debt problems emerging that financial regulators and policymakers apparently did not see coming and the need for on-going bailouts.  Bailouts that the countries putting up the cash cannot afford and that are undermining their social fabric.

Since before the credit crisis began, your humble blogger has been suggesting an alternative policy for global financial regulators and policymakers that would have ended this cycle before it began and moderated the damage from the credit bubble.  This policy is based on bringing disclosure to all the opaque areas of the financial marketplace including structured finance securities and bank balance sheets.

Not just disclosure, but disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that market participants can use this information to assess the risk of and value a security or bank.

With this disclosure, market participants and regulators would already know which banks are solvent and which are insolvent and how the insolvent banks are going to be returned to solvency or closed, debt would have been written down to levels that are affordable to the borrowers and the focus would be on the next great investment.

Thursday, October 6, 2011

Its a solvency crisis, not a liquidity crisis

By treating a solvency crisis as a liquidity crisis, have global financial policymakers set the global economy up for what the Bank of England's Mervyn King fears is "the most serious financial crisis at least since the 1930s if not ever?"

Yes.

This is the unmistakable conclusion when you realize that four years after the solvency crisis began, global market participants still do not know which banks are solvent and which banks are insolvent.

In Europe this month, the questions are:

  • will it take 200 billion or 2 trillion euros to fill the hole in the bank balance sheets; and 
  • will market participants believe that the solvency issue is ended regardless of which number European policymakers choose.

It is the second question that is the more difficult because if market participants do not believe the solvency issue is ended, like the original bank bailouts, all these new bank bailouts will do is buy some time.

Fortunately, there is a way to get market participants to believe in the adequacy of the number.

Regular readers know that

  • requiring banks to disclose their current asset and liability-level data would allow market participants to determine which banks are solvent and which banks are insolvent.  


  • More importantly, it would also allow market participants to determine how much capital is needed by each bank and in total to end the solvency crisis and believe that this amount of capital is sufficient.  


  • Even more importantly, it would restore market participants' confidence so that they could voluntarily be the source of capital rather than government balance sheets.
  • Perhaps most importantly, it would also result in debt being written down to a level where the borrower could service the debt (this occurs as part of the process of assessing a bank's solvency as solvency is defined as the market value of the bank's assets minus the book value of its liabilities).

Yet, here we are four years into the solvency crisis and banks are still not required to disclose this data and work has not begun on a data warehouse so that all market participants can access this information.

Now, we have European policymakers having to make a choice.  Do they require banks to disclose their current assets and liability-level data and involve market participants in ending the solvency crisis or Do they listen to Wall Street and use the taxpayers' money to bailout the banks.

Given the lack of progress on disclosure, the odds heavily favor bailing out the banks and a continuation of the most serious financial crisis since the 1930s if not ever.

Update


Quote from Mervyn King


The situation in 2008/9 around the world was so much easier than it is today. Those measures taken then did not solve the underlying problems.This is undoubtedly the biggest financial crisis the world has ever faced.
This is exactly the point I have been making since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Friday, September 30, 2011

Thanks to European investor lawsuits sheer stupidity of labeling RMBS and ABS deals highlighted

Shortly after the Issuers and Wall Street tried to sell the magic elixir of 'labels' to the European Central Bank and the Bank of England, European investors in residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) reminded everyone why labels on ABS deals are worthless.

According to an article in the Chicago Tribune, JP Morgan and Bank of America were hit with lawsuits from European investors who claimed that they were sold securities where the quality of the underlying mortgages did not meet the representations in the offering document.  If this is true, a label on the front of the offering document would have made no difference.

The only way to prevent this from occurring is by providing all market participants, including the investors, with current performance information on the underlying assets.  That way, market participants can verify that the representations made about the assets in the offering documents match the actual quality of the assets.

It is time for the ECB and the BoE to stop talking with and being misled by Issuers and Wall Street and to give your humble blogger a call so that an ABS data warehouse can be built that will actually restore investor confidence in purchasing ABS deals.
JPMorgan Chase & Co and Bank of America Corp were hit with new lawsuits by investors seeking to recover losses on $4.5 billion of soured mortgage debt, expanding the litigation targeting the two largest U.S. banks. 
Sealink Funding Ltd said between 2005 and 2007 it bought nearly $2.4 billion of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) from JPMorgan and $1.6 billion from Bank of America in reliance on offering materials that were misleading about the quality of the underwriting and underlying loans. ...
Another plaintiff, Landesbank Baden-Wurttemberg, raised similar claims in a separate lawsuit against JPMorgan over $500 million of RMBS that it said it bought.
Update

From a Reuter's article,
The lawsuits accuse the banks of packaging large amounts of high-risk mortgages by such issuers as Countrywide Financial now owned by Bank of America, and Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual, now owned by JPMorgan, in pursuit of higher profit. 
"This misconduct has resulted in astounding rates of default on the loans underlying the defendants' RMBS and massive downgrades of the (investors') certificates, the vast majority of which are now considered 'junk,'" the lawsuits said....
In a separate lawsuit filed on Thursday in the same court, Britain's Barclays Plc was sued by Germany's HSH Nordbank AG, which said it lost $40 million after being misled into buying risky RMBS. A Barclays spokeswoman did not immediately return a call seeking comment. 
Banks face many lawsuits by mortgage securities investors seeking to hold them responsible for losses on debt that once seemed safe but turned toxic once the housing and credit crises began more than four years ago.

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

SEC looks at S&P use of 'dummy' assets in rating CDO

The Wall Street Journal reported that the SEC is looking at S&P and its use of 'dummy' assets in rating CDOs.

Whether or not the SEC pursues this case against S&P, the use of 'dummy' assets makes the case for asset level (loan-level) disclosure for all structured finance securities.  Simply put, the SEC is looking at the issue of how can you value/rate a security when you do not even know what is in the security.

Your humble blogger has been making this point about the need for current asset-level disclosure for structured finance securities since before the credit crisis.  Without this disclosure, market participants do not have all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

It is nice that the US government in the form of the SEC has come out and formally agreed with me on the need for current asset-level disclosure for structured finance securities.
U.S. securities regulators are zeroing in on the use by Standard & Poor's of fictitious "dummy" assets when it assigned a triple-A credit rating to a $1.6 billion mortgage-bond deal that imploded during the financial crisis, according to a person familiar with the matter. 
S&P's parent company, McGraw-Hill Cos., said Monday that it had received a so-called Wells notice from the Securities and Exchange Commission. A Wells notice is the agency's warning to financial institutions that they could face civil charges. McGraw-Hill said the SEC is weighing civil enforcement action against the firm for its ratings on a collateralized debt obligation called Delphinus CDO 2007-1 issued in July 2007 as the housing market was taking a turn for the worse. 
The SEC is alleging violations of federal securities laws, McGraw-Hill said in a news release. The company said S&P has been cooperating with the regulator on its probe into Delphinus. A spokesman for the SEC declined to comment.
Lawmakers, regulators and investors have trained their cross hairs on S&P and its peers for assigning rosy ratings to thousands of complex securities that were later downgraded within the span of a few months, deepening the crisis. 
The S&P investigation is one of a number of probes by the SEC's enforcement division, headed by Robert Khuzami, into the complex mortgage-bond deals known as collateralized debt obligations. 
CDOs, which are pools of subprime mortgages and other assets that were sold in slices to investors, had emerged before the crisis as popular and profitable products on Wall Street. But the housing market's collapse exposed both the banks and their investors to billions of dollars in losses and left in its wake a raft of legal and regulatory headaches. 
S&P originally assigned its highest rating to the deal based on "dummy," or hypothetical, assets, then maintained that triple-A rating even though bankers had replaced them with lower-quality assets that didn't meet the firm's ratings standards, according to emails among S&P analysts that were disclosed in congressional testimony. 
Jack Chen, a former Moody's analyst who now runs his own consulting firm, said it isn't uncommon for credit-rating firms to use "dummy" assets to determine a final rating for a CDO, because some of the deals may have assets traded in later. 
What is problematic with S&P's rating of Delphinus is that the assets that replaced the "dummy" assets were of a lower quality than those hypothetical assets S&P had used to issue the ratings, said Mr. Chen, who has reviewed the S&P emails that were released. 
Frank Raiter, a former S&P managing director who had retired by the time Delphinus was rated, told lawmakers in April 2010 that S&P's dependence on fictitious assets that were later replaced by lower-quality securities "looks like a bait and switch."
Had the investors had current asset-level data, it would not have been possible to do a bait and switch.  Investors would have been easily able to see that the assets did not meet the quality standards that were represented in the offering documents and would not have purchased the deal.

Monday, September 19, 2011

Having exhausted monetary and fiscal policy it is time to turn to regulatory policy to restore confidence

As predicted under the FDR Framework, fiscal and monetary policy have not restored confidence in either the capital markets or the economy.

Since the beginning of the solvency crisis, we have tried both fiscal stimulus and austerity (see Greece and Ireland).  Neither has restored confidence nor should they as they are tools for adjusting aggregate demand in the economy at one point in time and not for addressing solvency.

Since the beginning of the solvency crisis, we have tried policies including zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing.  None of these policies has restored confidence nor should they as they are tools for adjusting aggregate demand and not for addressing solvency.

This failure to restore confidence is not surprising, because it is regulatory policy that is the source of confidence and the tool for addressing solvency.

It is the ongoing failure of regulatory policy that is causing the solvency crisis to continue.  It is the ongoing failure of regulatory policy that undermines confidence and stymies expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.

Why has regulatory policy failed?  It has failed because the key to ending a solvency crisis is answering the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent.  This question is the starting point for determining how to address the insolvent banks and sovereigns.

In their defense, the global financial regulators would say that they have adopted policies to answer the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent.  They have engaged in bank recapitalization and stress tests.

These policies were predestined to fail in the absence of the ability of market participants to Trust but Verify.

Why should market participants trust the regulators given their pre- and post- solvency crisis track record?  Before the solvency crisis, the regulators failed to fulfill their number one responsibility of preventing the crisis from occurring in the first place.  Since the beginning of the solvency crisis, regulators have run stress tests that have been discredited shortly after the results were announced.

As predicted under the FDR Framework, it is only by providing market participants with access to each bank's current asset and liability-level data and each structured finance security's current loan-level performance data that the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent can be answered.
  • It is only when market participants have this data that they can value the structured finance securities.  
  • It is only when market participants can value the structured finance securities and all the assets on each bank's balance sheet that they can determine which banks are solvent and which are not.
The reason that market participants must analyze this granular level data for themselves is that it is the only way for them to trust their valuation.  It is this trust in their own valuations that is the source of confidence in both the capital markets and the economy.
  • It is only after doing this analysis that market participants have assessed the risk of an investment in the banking system and are willing to be responsible for all gains or losses on any new investments they make in bank related securities.  
  • It is only when market participants have the confidence to invest in the banking system that they have confidence to invest in the economy.
Until market participants have access to current asset and liability-level data or are promised that they will get this level of disclosure, confidence will continue to deteriorate as the market participants assume that policy makers and regulators must have something to hide.

If market participants cannot have confidence in their banking system, it is impossible for them to have confidence in their economies.

Thursday, September 15, 2011

Larry Fink: Regulators Broke Europe; TYI: Regulators can fix Europe

A Wall Street Journal blog summarized BlackRock Chairman and CEO Larry Fink's speech on the European financial crisis succinctly as regulators broke Europe.

The finger of blame is pointing all over the globe when it comes to the European sovereign-debt crisis. BlackRock CEO Larry Fink knows exactly who is at fault. 
“You could argue this was created by regulators,” Fink said of the Eurozone crisis at today’s “Delivering Alpha” conference. “This was not an accident. This was a very visible action by banks and regulators are aware of it. And now we’re sitting with some deep exposures to sovereign credits….
Mr. Fink has gone further than say that regulators are a source of financial instability.  He has specifically said that regulators are a cause of financial instability.

How exactly did the regulators cause Europe's current sovereign debt and banking crisis?  He attributes it to the regulators being aware of what the banks were doing and not taking action.

Why is this the regulators' fault and not a failure of market discipline given that buying sovereign credits "was a very visible action by banks"?  Because the regulators had a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information about bank sovereign debt exposures.

It was only with the latest stress tests that banks were required to disclose this information.

Since then, lead by BNP Paribas, the French banks have been moving towards 'utter transparency' and disclosure of the 'hard facts'.
To me it’s going to require similar actions to what we did in ’08 and ’09 to stabilize.” 
Memories are short, Fink said, and investors are uncertain of what the policy response could look like. “Until we have greater comfort that government is going to do the right thing, it’s pretty binary.”
These actions presumably include the European version of TARP and PPIP.

Regular readers know that taking "similar actions to what we did in '08 and '09" is the absolutely wrong strategy and would waste a considerable quantity of taxpayer money.  Rather than address the problem, these actions address the symptoms.

The issue the market is dealing with is trying to answer the question of which banks are solvent and which are not (including the impact of restructuring government debt).  The only way this issue can be addressed directly is with disclosure that provides 'utter transparency'.

It is only with this information that the market can determine which banks are solvent and which are not.  It is only with this information that the market can determine which of the insolvent banks is capable of earning its way back to solvency and which need to be recapitalized or closed.

It is only by going through the steps of disclosure, analysis and then action that the problem of solvency can be addressed.

When I proposed this solution to the US Treasury in 2008, they agreed with me that addressing the issue of solvency required going in order through these steps, but they felt they needed to "buy" time as disclosure and analysis was not going to happen over night.

The rest is history.  The Great Reprieve from the financial crisis that began in 2007 was bought at large cost to the taxpayers.  Unfortunately, the time of the Great Reprieve was not used to bring disclosure and address the global solvency issue.

Today, the global solvency issues have returned and Europe no longer has access to a charge card for buying time.  The German public has sent the clear message that taxpayer money has to be spent on addressing the underlying solvency problem and not on an unending stream of bailouts.

Fortunately, Europe has an alternative for buying time that will allow it to take the steps of disclosure, analysis and then action.

The alternative is a statement by the regulators.  This statement has two parts.

  • The first part includes a reminder that the regulators have access to all the useful, relevant information that other market participants do not have.  The statement then goes on to honestly lay out what the situation really is for the European banks on a bank by bank basis. 
    • This is not a statement of how each bank performed on the stress tests.  The results of the stress test are a combination of a bank's current position and assumptions made by regulators about the future.  
    • This is a statement of each bank's current condition.  It is the starting point off of which all other market participants should and will base their analysis of a bank's solvency.
  • The second part is to implement 'utter transparency' under which banks will disclose their current asset and liability-level data. 
    • The US Treasury is right that this will not happen over night.  A much more realistic time period is 36 - 48 months for implementing disclosure through a data warehouse. [by way of background, I have designed and patented information technology for collecting, standardizing, and disseminating loan-level information through a data warehouse.]
This statement sends a very powerful message.  It asks the market to trust the regulators.  Perhaps more importantly, it tells the market that it is going to receive the information necessary to verify that what the regulators said is the situation is in fact what is happening.

Trust but Verify.

This is a very powerful combination that will provide Europe with the time it needs to implement disclosure.

Trust but Verify: Tracking data from banks takes diligence

The NY Times' Dealbook published an article by Jesse Eisinger in which he makes the point that the numbers being provided by the banks make it hard to for outsiders to understand what is actually happening at the banks.

For individual banks, the numbers change between the call reports, the annual reports and investor presentations.  Not only does this make it very hard to understand the individual bank, it also makes it very difficult to compare between banks.

His conclusion is outsiders should continue to Trust but Verify by exercising diligence in looking at the data.

Under the FDR Framework, governments are responsible for ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  The article highlights many of the ways data is currently disclosed that could be improved.
If you really want to give your brain a workout to stave off the ravages of mental decline, I recommend trying to read bank financial statements.... 
To be fair, banks do file mountain ranges of disclosure documents. They report to the S.E.C. (which protects investors), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (which insures borrowers), the O.C.C. (which regulates banks) and the Federal Reserve (which also regulates banks with slightly different responsibilities). 
Day after day, they push out news releases that run dozens of pages. They prepare reams of special presentations for investors, the most recent of which from Wells ran 51 pages, on top of a 41-page news release. The S.E.C. filing from the quarter was 162 pages. 
The numbers and presentation differ slightly in all of them and often differ from other banks’ presentations, stirring a struggle among outsiders to compare apples and bananas. No professional admits this publicly, but many investors and analysts privately acknowledge that they can’t fully track the data gushing each quarter from the nation’s banks. 
Even if they could somehow reconcile all the numbers, analysts would still be significantly in the dark. In many instances, banks’ financial disclosures are drawn from estimates that only management teams are privy to. Even the simplest of concepts — how much capital a bank has — is a number based on countless calculations that, let’s face it, are not much better than guesswork. 
Why should analysts have to be in the dark?  If banks were required to disclose their current asset and liability-level data, analysts could know what was going on.

As Mr. Eisinger observes, bank capital is an accounting construct based on countless calculations drawn from management estimates that are not much better than guesswork.  This is not a ringing endorsement of capital ratios as being a reliable indicator of the solvency of a bank.
So it is all the more important that we trust bank management and regulators to make sure the numbers we see truly reflect their financial condition....  
A Wells Fargo representative told me that the bank’s disclosure was “best in class” and listed the enormous amount that it provides. 
The bank still falls short of other big banks in disclosure, according to investors and analysts I’ve spoken with. It doesn’t break out the reserves it has made by asset class, unlike Bank of America, making it particularly difficult to understand how much it is reserving for bad residential real estate loans. It doesn’t separate its business lines in the detail that the other banks do. 
Then there are its nonperforming loans. For its residential mortgages, it doesn’t classify them as nonaccrual until they are 120 days past due, instead of the more typical 90 days. The effect is to make the numbers look better. 
The crucial figure, over time, is the loss rate, the bank representative said. And since the Wells portfolio — not counting the bad Wachovia loans — has been performing consistently well for many years now, investors should believe that the bank is doing something right, and better than its competitors with its mortgage portfolio. 
Yet housing prices continue to fall, the economy is weaker than expected, and we are flirting with another financial crisis, as Europe gets its revenge on us for having exported our calamity to their continent in 2008. Wells isn’t likely to remain immune to that. “Trust but verify,” Ronald Reagan used to say of the Soviet Union. Not a bad idea. 

Friday, September 9, 2011

Disclosure restores both confidence in financial system and consumer confidence

A NY Times article by Binyamin Appelbaum highlights how lack of confidence in the financial system feeds directly into consumer confidence.

Regular readers know that as long as current asset and liability-level data is hidden behind the regulators' information monopoly that it is hard for investors and banks to have confidence in the solvency of the other banks and the financial system.

Patrick Honohan, the head of the Irish Central Bank, observed that this lack of confidence was to be expected because the failure to disclose this data says there is something to hide.

It is the fear that there is something to hide that erodes consumer confidence.

It is clear to consumers that regulators are hiding something when the regulators say that they have run stress tests on the banks showing they are adequately capitalized and the tests are discredited within months.  The failure of the stress tests serves as a reminder that it was the job of the regulators to prevent the financial crisis from occurring in the first place.

It is clear to consumers that there is something wrong in the relationship between the government, regulators and the financial industry they are suppose to regulate.  For example, the Dodd-Frank Act was passed before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission could publish its findings.  To consumers who were taught in school that before you try to solve a problem you gather the facts, this suggests that the Act will not fix the problem.

In fact, the Nyberg Report on the Irish financial crisis discussed what is wrong in the relationship between government, regulators and the financial industry in great detail.  It confirms the consumers' suspicion that the Dodd-Frank Act will not fix what is wrong.

When consumers fear that there is something to hide and the problems in the relationship between government, regulators and the financial industry which directly contributed to the financial crisis are not going to be fixed, consumer confidence declines.

Fortunately, showing that there is nothing to hide and fixing what is wrong with the relationship between government, regulators and the financial industry is easily fixed by fully implementing disclosure under the FDR Framework.

As FDR showed when he implemented disclosure during the Great Depression, it works.  As a scholar of the Great Depression, Ben Bernanke should know this.
Ben S. Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, offered a new twist on a familiar subject Thursday, revisiting the question of why growth continues to fall short of hopes and expectations. 
Mr. Bernanke, speaking at a luncheon in Minneapolis, offered ... something new: Consumers are depressed beyond reason or expectation.
Oh, sure, there are reasons to be depressed, and the Fed chairman rattled them off: “The persistently high level of unemployment, slow gains in wages for those who remain employed, falling house prices, and debt burdens that remain high.” 
What happened to the fact that the government is talking about the need to cut back on retirement programs like Social Security and Medicare?  Consumers do not need to be depressed about these cutbacks however it is reasonable to assume they will adjust their spending knowing they are coming.
However, Mr. Bernanke continued, “Even taking into account the many financial pressures that they face, households seem exceptionally cautious.” 
Consumers, in other words, are behaving as if the economy is even worse than it actually is. 
Economic models based on historic patterns of unemployment, wages, debt and housing prices suggest that people should be spending more money. Instead, just as corporations are sitting on their money, households are holding back, too. 
Are these models based on historic patterns in the 1930s or the 1980s to before the credit crisis?
Why? Well, one possibility is that Americans collectively are suffering from what amounts to an economic version of post-traumatic stress disorder. 
“People are on edge waiting for the other shoe to drop,” John Williams, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, told the Seattle Rotary Club on Wednesday. “In fact, the latest consumer sentiment readings are near the all-time lows recorded in late 2008 during the most terrifying moments of the financial crisis.” 
Why is this surprising?  As discussed above, consumers know that the financial system has not been fixed because they have no way to Trust, but Verify the fact.
Moreover, the national mood is souring. Although the economy has grown this year — albeit slowly — surveys of consumer confidence keep finding increasing pessimism about the future. 
Mr. Williams noted a recent survey finding that 62 percent of households expected their income to stay the same or decline over the next year, the bleakest outlook in the last three decades. 
“It’s hard to have a robust recovery,” he said, “when Americans are so dispirited.” 
There is a longstanding debate among economists about the importance of confidence. 
Research has found that consumers are not very good at predicting the future. Optimism often fails to correlate with growth; pessimism doesn’t necessarily foreshadow a recession. 
Still, it seems intuitive that a lack of confidence can drag on the economy. As pessimistic people pull back — deciding that there is no point in looking for work; that this is not the year to go on vacation; that it may make sense to stop eating in restaurants — the economy shrinks.
Actually, people might not be spending because they realize that the retirement programs are going to be slashed.  As a result, people may be acting in a very prudent manner by not spending and instead saving for retirement.
There is a natural instinct to address this problem by trying to cheer people up. Mr. Bernanke in recent speeches has been careful to note that he continues to think that the American economy has a bright future. 
There is also the possibility, however, that the national mood is a more accurate reflection of the economic reality than any of the other, sunnier statistics. 
“Confidence is mostly reflective of fundamentals,” said Eric Sims, a professor of economics at the University of Notre Dame. As a result, he said, the only way to cheer people up is to improve the condition of the economy. “You’ve got to give people a reason to have confidence.”

Thursday, September 8, 2011

The answer to the Queen's Question

According to a Financial Times column, in the fall of 2008, the Queen of England put the economics profession and global financial policy makers and regulators on the spot with a simple question.  At the London School of Economics she asked, "if things were so large, how come everyone missed them?"

Regular readers know the answer lies in the failure to provide market participants with all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner as required under the FDR Framework.

They also know that your humble blogger was among the handful that did not miss what was happening and said before the crisis began that the impact of the crisis could be moderated with disclosure.  Since the solvency crisis began in 2007 and has not ended, just ask the Europeans, the prescription for disclosure is still in effect.

The Queen's Question is not why did no-one predict that Lehman Brothers would collapse in September 2008.  She knows that firms have failed in the past without threatening to bring down the entire global financial system.

She was asking how could the economics profession and global financial policy makers and regulators have missed what was happening that created the conditions under which the global financial system faced the prospects of collapse.

Three years later, the Queen could return to the London School of Economics and point out that the same economics profession and global financial policy makers and regulators that missed it heading into the crisis have had the chance to apply their best ideas without fixing the problem [for those who suggest that the problem has been fixed, please see the issue of solvency swirling around Bank of America and the European banks].

She might ask given the abysmal track record of the economics profession and the global financial policy makers and regulators with regard to this financial crisis, is there anyone with a public track record of predicting the financial crisis, predicting which policy initiatives will or won't work and who is offering a solution that has been shown to work in the capital markets.

At a minimum, I look forward to my conversation with the Queen.
It’s a reasonable question – and one to which you evidently haven’t had a satisfactory answer during your weekly visits from that man who comes to tell you what is going on....
All in all, that’s not surprising. The grumpy one has desperately been trying to give the impression that the crisis suddenly and inexplicably pitched up in Europe from New York, like a confused migrant trying to buck the historical trend. 
If I were you, Ma’am, I’d raise a regal eyebrow in polite scepticism at that one. The truth is that lots of people in lots of different countries simultaneously made the same mistake. The explanation you got from the man from the LSE was a pretty good summary. “At every stage,” Prof Garicano apparently replied, “someone was relying on somebody else and everyone thought they were doing the right thing.” 
Actually, it was not at every stage.  Regulators had access to all the useful, relevant information that they needed and they did not assess the risk properly.  Since regulators have an information monopoly when it comes to financial institutions, market participants have to rely on them.  The regulators' information monopoly is a point of instability in the financial system because when they under-estimate risk, market participants over-allocate capital.

A second point of instability in the financial system is the reliance on regulators to ensure that all useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner.
That is at least half right. House buyers took the view that as long as someone was prepared to lend them money, things would be OK. The mortgage lenders reckoned that as long as they could package up the mortgages as newfangled financial derivatives (it’s a long story, Ma’am) and sell them on, that would be fine.  
This excuse overlooks their economic incentives as their pay was based on creating these derivatives.
The financial institutions surmised that as long as the credit ratings agencies were giving the derivatives their seal of approval, everything would be dandy.
With the lack of transparency into the underlying mortgages, it was impossible to trust, but verify.  So instead, they relied on the credit rating agencies.  The rating agencies were purported to have a business model based on having access to data that was not available to other market participants.

It was not until the fall of 2007 that the credit rating agencies announced that they did not have any different access to information on structured finance securities than the investors.
 The credit ratings agencies thought – actually, it is pretty hard to work out what in God’s name the credit ratings agencies were thinking, except that as long as their rivals were giving these assets the thumbs-up, they had better do so as well.  As for the regulators, Ma’am, the point is that they didn’t really know and too many didn’t want to.
... Warren Buffett, a somewhat well-known investor from one of your revolted colonies, called these exotic derivatives “weapons of mass destruction”.  Actually, the comparison is apter than even Mr Buffett might have thought. The main thing about these derivatives is no one knew how big the stockpiles were, who had them, or what exact form they took. 
Nor did people know enough about how much they were really worth.
Amazingly, three years later and market participants still do not have answer to these questions.
To extend the Iraq war analogy, the smarter economists treated this as a known unknown. They knew that they didn’t know, and they knew that they wanted to know. But the politicians and regulators whose job it was to know, it appears, didn’t want to know, or didn’t want to know badly enough. They are now pretending it was an unknown unknown. Don’t believe them. 
How did they get away with it? Partly because there were always some tame economists on hand to say that everything was fine. Economists are supposed to be scientists, albeit of the social variety. It gets dangerous when you start treating them as court necromancers, selectively listening only to the ones whose views you find congenial. And at each point, it wasn’t in the politicians’ interests to poke around too much. 
Look at it from the perspective of your own dear government .... when you asked that nice smooth man to form a government for you and he politely obliged, the economy was growing merrily. House prices were rising. People were feeling richer and taking out more loans. (God might save, our gracious Queen, but your subjects are better at borrowing.) Banks were creating lots of jobs. The golden eggs, both economic and electoral, kept tumbling into your government’s lap. It would have taken a brave minister to go anywhere near the goose, particularly when it was being fiercely guarded by a dour Scotsman with a giant clunking fist and a truly divine talent for hand-to-hand infighting. As for the banks themselves, they were supposed in essence to take out proper insurance against everything going wrong. But they didn’t, and the taxpayer ended up footing the bill.
So there you have it. Why didn’t people see it coming? Some did, Ma’am. Some did. But it doesn’t mean they were listened to.
Or that they are being listened to today.
And there is a long history of people in authority running up vast debts without public accountability...
This lack of accountability underscores why global financial policy makers, regulators and central bankers have not solved the problem in three years.  The solution is to adopt the FDR Framework, release the information to all market participants and restore public accountability.