Showing posts with label Walter Bagehot. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Walter Bagehot. Show all posts

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Roger Lowenstein: Obama should name banker, not economist, to Fed

In a Bloomberg column that sent fear through macro economists everywhere, Roger Lowenstein laid out the case for why Obama should appoint someone other than a macro economist as the next chairman of the Fed.

Mr. Lowenstein looked at the task at hand and identified what he felt were the credentials the next Fed chairman should have.

Rather remarkably, your humble blogger possesses these credentials.

Mr. Lowenstein left out the two most important credentials for the next Fed chairman.

First, did they predict the financial crisis.  This is important because it strongly suggests that they had an insight into why the crisis occurred.

Second, do they have a plan for ending the financial crisis and restoring the economy and financial markets to normal functioning based on this insight.

I have written extensively on this blog about how I would end our bank solvency led financial crisis.  Virtually every aspect of my plan can be implemented by the Fed chairman.

As the head of bank regulation, the chairman has the power to bring transparency to the banking system and require banks to disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As the head of monetary policy, the chairman has the ability to raise short-term interest rates above 2% and eliminate the economic headwinds caused by ultra-low rate monetary policy.

Mr. Lowenstein observed:

But the next chairman will have to decide when to trim the Fed’s portfolio, swollen with its extraordinary program of bond purchases. And it will have to raise short-term interest rates, which are currently near zero. It may be sooner, it may be later -- the moment will come. 
Money cannot be free forever. 
To make this decision, the Fed should be led by a fresh pair of eyes -- one not compromised by its current policies....
And what will these fresh pair of eyes see?
ultra-low interest rates are punishing savers and discouraging thrift, not a healthy condition. 
Investors are responding to razor-thin yields by “looking for yield” in suspect places. (Rwanda offered $400 million of debt this year, and the issue was wildly oversubscribed.) 
As we’ll recall from the mortgage crisis, chasing yield can lead to big trouble....
If ultra-low interest rates worked as a monetary policy for ending a bank solvency led financial crisis, then Japan's crisis should have been over years ago.  Instead, Japan has had ultra-low interest rates for 2+ decades.

In addition, there was no reason to believe ultra-low interest rates would work as Walter Bagehot, the founder of modern central banks, set the minimum interest rate at 2%.  He observed that there are changes in economic behavior that occur below 2%.
History suggests that moving away from zero rates will be unpopular and difficult -- especially for a Fed on cozy terms with the White House....
Actually, moving away from zero rates would be incredibly popular with individuals who save and invest.

Moving away from zero rates would be unpopular with the banks.

For those of us who are concerned with fixing the financial system and restarting the economy, winning popularity contests is not a consideration.
If the next chairman isn’t a Washington hand, who should it be? 
It is too soon after 2008 to tap an executive from Wall Street, which bundled the toxic mortgages at the heart of the crisis. That rules out William Dudley, president of the New York Fed and a former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. economist. 
There is no head-hunting recipe for a Fed chairman, but knowing a little institutional background helps....
I got this credential covered.
In recent times, the Fed has been dominated by policy makers. Bernanke was an academic and then a government official (Yellen has a similar background, though she also ran the San Francisco Fed). Greenspan was a consultant and adviser to President Gerald Ford. Geithner was a Treasury official before taking over the New York Fed. 
But Paul Volcker, the most independent Fed chairman in history, was a banker -- president of the New York Fed and an economist at Chase Manhattan Bank when Chase was a lender to corporations....
I got the banking credential covered.
Rather than look for a consultant, an academic or a regulator, Obama should nominate a chairman with an institutional grasp of the banking system.
I have the required institutional grasp of the banking system.

Regular readers have read literally hundreds of posts that I have written on how a modern banking system is designed and how it can be used to end our financial crisis.

Thursday, July 18, 2013

Bernanke's epitaph: "We had to do something"

In his testimony before the US House of Representatives, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke provided his own epitaph when he observe "we had to do something" in response to the financial crisis.

Remarkably, since the moment he appeared in panic before Congress to testify on the need for TARP, the self-described Great Depression expert hasn't been unable to come up with a better thought through strategy for ending the financial crisis than "we had to do something".

Actually, as Mark Twain would say, you only have to pay taxes and die.  Everything else you do is optional.

Mr. Bernanke's testimony confirmed that either he a) didn't understand that he was dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis and the solution is adoption of the Swedish Model or b) he understood that pursuing the Japanese Model would not work and he is trying to defend his legacy.

Bernanke's defensiveness can probably be chalked up to the one thing he could plausibly be afraid of: watching his legacy go the same way as that of former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who left while excoriated for his seeming friendliness toward big banks.
The Geithner Doctrine doesn't "seem" friendly to big banks.  It is designed to be friendly to big banks.

The Geithner Doctrine is don't do anything that will harm the profitability or reputation of big and/or politically connected banks (hat tip Yves Smith).
Bernanke has done more than Geithner did, and took on the economic job left undone by a dysfunctional Congress and a distracted president as well. He became a one-man economic Mr Fix-it, not by choice but by necessity.
Mr. Bernanke told everyone who would listen that he is an expert on the Great Depression.  Hence, he was a logical person to lead the response to our current financial crisis.

The one problem as pointed out by Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author and a noted expert on the Great Depression too, is that Mr. Bernanke learned the wrong lessons (see here and here) about the Great Depression.

When faced with a bank solvency led financial crisis, ending the crisis requires having the banks recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

Until banks recognize the losses, monetary policy is not going to end the crisis.

A fact that should be apparent to all as we approach the six year mark on August 9, 2013 of the beginning of the financial crisis.
Now, facing the end of his term, he is fighting an uphill battle to get the credit for the work laid at his door. 
He wasn't often right – in fact, in forecasting, often wrong – but his Fed did more than any other government or private entity to tackle the country's economic problems. 
That's something.
Your humble blogger would give Mr. Bernanke a significant amount of credit for trying and doing something were it not for one small fact: he didn't use all the tools at the Fed's disposal from the beginning of the financial crisis.

As he testified before Congress, he talked about not being successful at ending the crisis and the need for the Fed to have additional tools if it were to successfully end the crisis.  However, he completely ignores the fact that the Fed has an entire toolkit from its role as lender of last resort and responsibility for bank supervision that he chose not to use.

The Fed could have used both of these tools to end the financial crisis by requiring the banks to recognize their losses upfront on the excess public and private debt in the financial system and protect the real economy and the social contract.

Mr. Bernanke elected not to do so.

He chose to pursue zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies that Walter Bagehot, who invented the modern central bank in the 1870s, said would create economic headwinds that render these policies ineffective.  Turns out Bagehot was right. The economic headwinds existed in the form of the Retirement Plan Death Spiral as both individuals and companies cut back current consumption to fund the shortfall in earnings on retirement assets.

He chose to allow bankers to continue to pay themselves large cash bonuses at the same time the Fed engaged in regulatory forbearance and let the banks transform their non-performing loans through 'extend and pretend' into 'zombie' loans.

He chose to put the real economy into a downward spiral by placing the burden of the excess debt on the real economy where it diverted capital needed for reinvestment, growth and supporting the social contract to debt service.

Update:
In his testimony, Bernanke also observed that
Fed didn't have a way to oversee the shadow banking system.
As regular readers know, the inability to see what is going on in shadow banking should have been a less than subtle hint that there was a need for transparency.

Friday, May 24, 2013

Martin Wolf and Ken Rogoff agree: "it is not too late to change course"

The Financial Times' Martin Wolf and Harvard professor Ken Rogoff have taken different paths, but they both agree that the current approach to handling the bank solvency led global financial crisis that began on August 9, 2007 is not working and that "it is not too late to change course".

Mr. Wolf sets out in his column what would be included in this change of course.
The right approach to a crisis of this kind is to use everything: policies that strengthen the banking system; policies that increase private sector incentives to invest; expansionary monetary policies; and, last but not least, the government’s capacity to borrow and spend.
Professor Rogoff lays out in his Guardian column what he thinks is wrong with the current approach and therefore what should be included in this change of course.
No one seems to have the power to impose a sensible resolution of its peripheral countries' debt crisis. Instead of restructuring the manifestly unsustainable debt burdens of Portugal, Ireland, and Greece (the PIGs), politicians and policymakers are pushing for ever-larger bailout packages with ever-less realistic austerity conditions.
Interestingly, both Mr. Wolf and Professor Rogoff have come to champion your humble blogger's blueprint for fixing the financial crisis.

For both individuals, the starting point is dealing with the excess debt in the global financial system.  As Professor Rogoff points out:
In a debt restructuring, the northern eurozone countries (including France) will see hundreds of billions of euros go up in smoke.... These hundreds of billions of euros are already lost, and the game of pretending otherwise cannot continue indefinitely....

But the sooner the underlying reality is made transparent and becomes widely recognised, the lower the long-run cost will be.

The way to deal with this excess public and private debt is by adopting the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to absorb upfront the losses on this debt.

By having the banks absorb the losses on the excess debt, the burden of servicing this debt is lifted from the real economy.  Currently, capital that is needed for reinvestment, growth and supporting the social contract is being diverted to servicing this debt.  Ending this diversion will boost the growth rate of the real economy.

Regular readers know that a modern banking system is designed so that the banks can absorb these losses and still continue to operate and support the real economy.

Banks can do this as a result of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, when banks have low or negative book capital levels, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner.

After absorbing the losses, the banks then rebuild their book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

To make sure the bankers don't gamble on redemption while the banks are rebuilding their book capital levels, banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can exert discipline on the bankers to restrain risk taking.

Once the losses have been recognized, to jumpstart the economy, governments need to adopt fiscal stimulus.

At the same time, central banks need to remove the economic headwinds caused by zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing.  They need to restore short term interest rates to Walter Bagehot's lower bound of 2%.

Increasing interest rates from zero to two percent is actually good for economic growth as it ends the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Zero interest rates triggered this death spiral as savers, both individuals and companies, reduced their current consumption to offset the lack of earnings on their retirement savings.

Sunday, May 12, 2013

Spanish prelate sides with Elliott's Paul Singer to tell Paul Krugman that response to financial crisis destroying society

As reported by the Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, the Spanish prelate has weighed in on the side of Elliott's Paul Singer against Paul Krugman and called for a change in the policies adopted to deal with the bank solvency led financial crisis so that society does not collapse.

Professor Krugman wrote a post in his NY Times blog in which he defended the policies run by Ben Bernanke, the Fed and other central banks as
just what the textbook says you should be doing.
As regular readers know, the economic textbooks are wrong.

This fact is not surprising because leading up to our current financial crisis the models used by economists did not include the banking sector.

This fact is not surprising because even though the global central bankers claim to have read Walter Bagehot's Lombard Street, in which he "invented" the modern central bank, their response to the financial crisis has broken a number of the rules he laid out.  For example,

  • Central banks are suppose to lend freely at high rates of interest against good collateral; or
  • Central banks are suppose to keep interest rates at or above 2% as rates below 2% bring about a change in the behavior of savers.
Regular readers know that there is one response that works every time when dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis.  That response is to adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize upfront their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

The Swedish Model protects society as the banks absorbing the losses spares the real economy from diverting capital needed for reinvestment, growth and the social contract to debt service on the excess debt.

Regular readers know that under the FDR Framework, banks are designed to absorb these losses and continue to support the real economy.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

Unfortunately, the Swedish Model has not yet been adopted to deal with our current financial crisis.  Instead, policymakers and central bankers have adopted the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs and the burden of servicing the excess debt in the financial system is placed on the real economy.

The results have been predictable (I know, I predicted them).  The global economy is in a Japan-style economic slump and the social contract is being rewritten to the benefit of the rich at the expense of the poor.

As the Spanish prelate said,
"We have to change direction, otherwise this is going to bring down whole political systems," said Braulio Rodriguez, the Archbishop of Toledo. 
"It is very dangerous. Unemployment has reached tremendous levels and austerity cuts don't seem to be producing results," he told The Telegraph.
Austerity will never produce a positive result when facing a bank solvency led financial crisis.  I have been making this point since the beginning of the crisis.
"There is deep unease across the whole society, and it is not just in Spain. We have to give people some hope or this is going to foment conflict and mutual hatred." 
Europe's Catholic bishops have been careful not to stray into the political debate or criticise EU economic strategy but the Archbishop said the current course is untenable.
There are two reasons that the current course is untenable.

First, it is not fixing the underlying problems.

Second, it is causing untold damage to society.
"The Vatican has always been an enthusiast for Europe, but a Europe of solidarity where we help each other, not a Europe of coal and steel. Whether this is possible depends on Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel," he said. 
Unemployment in Spain has reached 6.2m, or 27pc, despite a growing diaspora of young Spaniards seeking work in Britain, Germany, Brazil, or the Gulf, and an exodus of immigrants returning home. Spain's population fell by 0.7pc last year. 
The jobless rate in the Toledo region of Castilla-La Mancha is 31pc. The rate for youth has jumped to 64pc from 14pc at the peak of the credit bubble. 
Spain has largely avoided the sort of street clashes seen in Greece. People have coped with stoicism, drawing on the deep strengths of Spanish family support. Yet the authority of the state is eroding. A new Metroscopia poll shows that 87pc of voters have lost confidence in premier Mariano Rajoy.
Confidence in the state should erode because it is being run for the benefit of the bankers and not for the benefit of its citizens.
El Mundo fears a slow-fermenting 'crisis of the regime', with almost every institution -- including the monarchy -- in disrepute. It likens the mood to "pre-revolutionary" France in the late 1780s. 
The Archbishop, speaking in the austere episcopal palace of Spain's ancient capital, said the current crisis is doing far more damage than the recession in the mid-1990s when unemployment briefly spiked above 24pc. On that occasion peseta devaluations let Spain regain competitiveness and recover gradually despite austerity cuts. 
This time the country seems trapped in slump. The long-term jobless rate is much higher. 
Unemployment benefits taper off after six months, and stop after two years. There are almost two million households where no family member has a job. 
Europe's Catholic bishops know first-hand from their Cor Unum charitable network just how desperate it has become. "We can try to mitigate the effects by giving basic help to people left totally unprotected, but we can't create jobs," said the Archbishop. 
"We are seeing families who used to middle class needing help. This is totally new. As a matter of honour, they won't come to us until they have exhausted everything,"
As we approach the sixth anniversary of the beginning of our current financial crisis, it is time to acknowledge that the response to the financial crisis has been a failure.  If it were a success, policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing would no longer be pursued.

The time has come to adopt the Swedish Model.  

History shows that within a year of adopting the Swedish Model the bank solvency led financial crisis is over and growth has returned to the real economy.

Sunday, May 5, 2013

RBS' Stephen Hester ends myth that monetary policies pursued by central banks will end financial crisis

The Telegraph reports that the head of RBS, Stephen Hester, has said his bank is swamped with funds to make loans, but businesses don't want the loans as they don't see an increase in demand to generate cash flow to repay the loans.

Regular readers will recognize Mr. Hester's observation as exactly why your humble blogger predicted the central banks' monetary policies of zero interest rate and quantitative easing would fail when they were first announced.

When business looks to make an investment, its first consideration is whether there is going to be an increase in its top line from demand.  It doesn't look at how cheaply it can fund the investment until after it has determined there is demand.

The problem with low interest rate policies is that once interest rates drop below 2%, both consumers and companies don't respond to a drop in interest rates the way they did when rates were lowered from say 9% to 8%.

This change in behavior has been known since at least the 1870s when Walter Bagehot, who invented the modern central bank, observed this change and said that interest rates should never be lowered below 2%.

This change in behavior has been confirmed with the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Under the Retirement Plan Death Spiral current demand is lowered as both individuals and corporations are forced to save more to offset the lack of earnings on the money in their retirement plans.

In the case of businesses, money that could be used for reinvestment and growth is instead put into pension plans.  In the case of individuals, money that could be spent today is instead saved.  This includes paying down debt as well as putting money into savings.

This change in behavior from interest rates being below 2% has been shown in Japan for 2+ decades.  Deflation has set in as Japanese save rather than spend despite 2+ decades of zero interest rate and quantitative easing monetary policies.
Stephen Hester has waded into the controversy about an apparent lack of lending for smaller businesses, saying Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) £20bn of cash it was “desperate” to lend out, but companies were not prepared to borrow as they lacked faith in the economic recovery.

“We are lending as much as we can,” Hester said. “We are not constrained by either capital or funding, Mr Hester told The Sunday Times. “The only way I could see for us to lend more would be for someone to say we did not have to operate by any commercial standard – that we could undercut everyone because we did not have to make a profit.” 
He also said that RBS had “deposits coming out our ears”, an apparent shot across the bow of Sir Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, who has called for RBS to raise more capital or be broken up. 
Banks have been accused to stifling the recovery in the UK by failing to lend to businesses. However, Mr Hester’s statement imply it is lack of progress in improving business confidence that is stopping companies from investing for growth, rather than banks constraining lending criteria. 
Mr Hester said he could not “force companies to borrow”.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Hester has has confirmed why low interest rate monetary policies are doomed to failure before they are even enacted.

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Rogoff & Reinhart and the crowding out of solutions that would end the financial crisis

Whether it is accurate or not, a paper was published that says the 90% debt threshold found by Rogoff & Reinhart was the result of an Excel spreadsheet error.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger previously debunked the implications of their study for how to handle a bank solvency led financial crisis by simply observing that it ignores the creation of a) the modern central bank and b) the adoption of deposit guarantees.

The combination of a modern central bank and deposit insurance makes it easy to handle a bank solvency crisis as the combination makes it possible for banks to operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Simply, banks can both absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system to protect the real economy from the burden of servicing this debt and continue to provide the loans needed to support the real economy.

This means that the correct policy response to a bank solvency crisis is the Swedish Model under which banks recognize upfront all their losses on the excess public and private debt.

So why hasn't this policy been adopted anywhere besides Iceland (where it has been highly successful) to address the current bank solvency led financial crisis?

One of the reasons your humble blogger has discovered is that, even when fundamentally flawed, books written by economists from Harvard (This time its different) or Stanford (the Bankers' New Clothes) receive excessive amounts of attention in the mainstream media and from policymakers.

This attention crowds out consideration of alternative solutions, like adopting the Swedish Model, for ending our current financial crisis.

Monday, April 15, 2013

European banks need to be recapitalized when?

In his Financial Times column, Jean Pisani-Ferry asserts that European banks need to be recapitalized now.

Why recapitalize now?
Europe also made two mistakes in responding to the crisis. First, it failed to recognise the true extent of its banking problem. It believed – or pretended to believe – that the guarantees and recapitalisations of 2008-2009 had addressed the issue whereas weaknesses were in fact much more widespread. Second, it failed to appreciate that excessive private-sector debt was not just an American problem. In Europe too many households and companies needed to deleverage....

The first priority is financial repair. Banks with weak balance sheets lend on too expensive terms or lend to insolvent borrowers to keep them afloat and do not grant credit to new firms. This prevents profitable investment and the growth of new, more efficient firms.
A comprehensive bank balance sheet assessment is needed....
The first priority should be a comprehensive bank balance sheet assessment and this can only by accomplished by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  With on-going disclosure of their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can assess each of the exposures.

Market participants can then exert discipline so that banks recognize their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This market discipline ends the practice of lending to insolvent borrowers to keep them afloat.

This market discipline also rewards banks for making new loans to borrowers who can afford to repay the loans.
The ECB should not and will not accept undercapitalised – let alone insolvent – banks to fall under the common supervision. 
With this statement, Mr. Pisani-Ferry moves into the world of theory.  He assumes there are solvent banks in Europe.

In the real world, there is no such thing as a European bank that is not insolvent under the traditional definition of insolvency (the market value of its assets is less than the book value of its liabilities).  Supporting evidence for my statement comes from the need to nationalize several European banks that had passed the stress tests (for example, Dexia).

Mr. Pisani-Ferry also asserts that the ECB should not accept undercapitalized or insolvent banks.

As I discussed in a previous blog, were Walter Bagehot, who wrote the book on modern central banking, alive today he would recognize the existence of deposit insurance. This recognition would change his definition of bank solvency and result in the central bank acting as lender of last resort to banks with substantial negative book capital levels.

Mr. Bagehot would recognize that a bank that does not qualify for access to central bank funds is a bank where its interest income is not greater than its interest expense plus pre-banker bonus operating costs.
National authorities therefore have to initiate a recapitalisation of undercapitalised banks and a resolution of the insolvent ones. The moment is now. 
I agree that the moment for cleaning up the banking system is now.

Using the income driven approach to bank solvency, clearly those banks that are insolvent need to be resolved.

Using the income driven approach to bank solvency, those banks that are solvent should be required to retain 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings until such time as they have rebuilt their book capital levels to regulatory standards.

While this may take years, it is not a problem as banks can continue to make loans to support the real economy.

Thursday, March 28, 2013

Walter Bagehot and the math behind why banks designed to absorb losses without needing bailouts

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying that a modern banking system is designed to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system without requiring a sovereign bailout of the banks.

Today, one of the pre-eminent financial columnists in the world said to me:  prove it using numbers my readers can understand.  So here goes.

The following shows the current condition of a bank if it were not hiding its non-performing loans through 'extend and pretend' or its underwater securities.

                                                       Bank with Bailout                   Bank absorbs losses
 Assets before losses recognized
         Cash                                                         0                                                 0
         Performing Assets                                  60                                               60
         Non-performing Assets                          40                                               40
                 Total assets                                   100                                             100

 Liabilities plus Equity
        Borrowing from Central Bank                   0                                                 0
        Insured Deposits                                      75                                               75
        Purchased funds                                      20                                               20
        Equity                                                        5                                                 5
                Total Liabilities and Equity           100                                             100

Under both scenarios, the losses on the non-performing assets need to be realized.  These losses equal the amount the non-performing assets need to be written down by so that the borrower can afford to service the remaining debt.  For simplicity, we will assume a 50% write-down [40 of non-performing assets becomes 20 of performing assets].

In the bailout scenario, the taxpayer absorbs the loss by injecting enough capital into the bank to cover the losses on the non-performing assets [the injected capital is added to both cash (20) and equity (beginning balance of 5 minus 20 for loss on non-performing assets plus 20 for taxpayer capital injection)].

The following shows the condition of the bank after loss recognition and, in the bailout scenario, the injection of funds by the taxpayer.


                                                       Bank with Bailout                   Bank absorbs losses
 Assets after losses recognized
         Cash                                                       20                                                0
         Performing Assets                                  80                                               80
         Non-performing Assets                            0                                                0
                 Total assets                                   100                                              80

 Liabilities plus Equity
        Borrowing from Central Bank                   0                                                 0
        Insured Deposits                                      75                                               75
        Purchased funds                                      20                                                20
        Equity                                                       5                                              (15)
                Total Liabilities and Equity           100                                               80


Let me make a couple of observations.

First, whether the bank is bailed out or it absorbs the losses, the bank has the same amount of assets that are performing and generating income.

Second, under either scenario, the bank has the same liabilities and the interest expense on these liabilities is unchanged.

Conclusions:

  • We can determine before a sovereign bailout whether the bank has a viable franchise or not.  After restructuring the non-performing assets, either the bank's interest income on all its performing assets (including loans and investment securities) exceeds its interest expense or it does not.  If it does, then the bank is viable as it can generate earnings to rebuild its book capital level.  If it does not, then the bank is not viable and should be closed.
  • If a bank has a viable franchise after restructuring its non-performing assets and its interest income exceeds its interest expense, it does not need a sovereign bailout.  Why inject funds into a bank that is capable of rebuilding its book capital without assistance?

Given that we have the same interest income and interest expense under both scenarios, why do bankers prefer a bailout over recognizing their losses?

Because with a bailout, the losses are socialized and it is the taxpayer who pays.  When banks absorb the losses, it is the banks and the bankers that pay.

Bankers understand this and therefore will try to paint a picture of why a bailout is necessary.

For examples, bankers assert that banks need a bailout otherwise they won't be profitable.  With or without a bailout, banks have the same interest income and interest expense.

Another reason that bankers give for needing a bailout is to stop a potential run on the bank.

By definition, the insured depositors don't care about the bank's book capital level because their money is guaranteed by the government.  Depositors learned to trust the government guarantee from their parents.  When they opened up their first bank account as a child and were worried about getting their money back, their parents assured them the government would get their money back for them.  So the depositors aren't going to run.

This leaves the purchased funds from the wholesale funding markets.  With a bailout, the purchased money can run and take the bank's cash with it (see below).

With the bank absorbing losses, the purchased money can also run.  This is where Walter Bagehot and his concept of the central bank as the lender of last resort comes in.  The central bank lends the bank the money so it can pay out the departing purchased funds.  The central bank borrowing and repayment of the purchased funds is shown below.


                                                      Bank with Bailout                   Bank absorbs losses
 Assets after losses recognized
         Cash                                                   0                                                 0
         Performing Assets                            80                                               80
         Non-performing Assets                      0                                                0
                 Total assets                               80                                              80

 Liabilities plus Equity
        Borrowing from Central Bank           0                                                20
        Insured Deposits                               75                                               75
        Purchased funds                                 0                                                 0
        Equity                                                5                                              (15)
                Total Liabilities and Equity      80                                               80


In this example, the central bank has access to performing collateral worth 4 times what it lends to the bank.  So the central bank's loan is very safe.  In fact, there is plenty of capacity for additional central bank loans to satisfy any demand from the insured depositors.

Exchanging the central bank loan for purchased funds only has a negative impact on banks if the central bank follows Mr. Bagehot's advice and lends at high rates of interest that exceed the cost of the purchased funds.

Yet another reason that bankers give as to why banks need to be bailed out is that without a bailout they would have to stop lending and supporting the real economy.

Clearly, with the bailout, assuming that the purchased funds don't run, bankers have cash on their balance sheet that they can lend.

However, not having cash available on its balance sheet, doesn't stop the bank that absorbed the losses from lending.  What it stops is the bank from holding the loan on its balance sheet.

In this case, the bank with no capacity to hold the loan on its balance sheet has to sell the loan on to someone who would like to hold the loan like a pension fund, insurance company, hedge fund or a bank with capacity on its balance sheet.  This is something that goes on everyday for decades even when a bank has capacity to hold a loan on its balance sheet.

I could go on and debunk the rest of the bankers' reasons for needing a bailout.  However, that is unnecessary as the real reason that bankers prefer bailouts over having the banks absorb losses is that with a bailout there is no interruption in the bonuses that the bankers receive.

What we have witnessed since the beginning of the financial crisis is that bankers have paid themselves at or close to record levels.  They could not have done so if the banks had absorb their losses and had to rebuild their book capital levels.

Saturday, March 16, 2013

Rather than confiscate insured deposits, could we please fix the global financial system

EU policy makers have crossed the rubicon and decided that insured deposit holders should no longer be protected from the financial performance of the banks, but rather are a source of funds to recapitalize the banks.

With this single action, EU policy makers have undermined the global financial system and dramatically increased its instability.

Why?

Because depositors trusted that their governments would honor their deposit guarantees.  They have repeatedly demonstrated this across countries like Greece and Spain where no matter how insolvent their banks looked, the depositors kept their money in the banks out of a belief it was safe.

This is simply no longer true no matter how EU policy makers try to spin it.

The burden is now on depositors to determine if their bank is sitting on losses that the depositor will now have to absorb.

We are about to experience the same response as happened with structured finance securities when investors suddenly discovered that they did not know what they owned.  Banks are "black boxes" and structured finance securities are "brown paper bags" when it comes to looking to find out what their underlying exposures are.

Depositors, like structured finance security investors, are going to look for the door.

Why stay and risk the possibility of loss for no return?

As part of confiscating insured deposits in Cyprus, the ECB is standing ready to provide the banks with funds to offset the run that is going to start next Tuesday.  So in fairly short order, the ECB will be the primary funding source for the Cyprus banks.

Please note that all of this is avoidable if policy makers stop listening to bankers (who got us into the financial crisis and truly only care about protecting their bonuses) and PhD economists (who frankly don't understand how a bank actually works so they excluded it from their models).

Policy makers have to start listening to individuals like your humble blogger who has a track record that shows they understand what is wrong with the global financial system and what it will take to fix it.

I am on record for "predicting" the financial crisis and with this blog have consistently been accurate when stating what policies will work and what policies will not work as soon as they are mentioned, let alone adopted.

My blueprint for saving the global economy is pretty simple.

First, use the banks as they are designed to be used.  Banks are designed to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to support the real economy.

It is a myth that banks need to be recapitalized immediately after absorbing these losses.  Banks are designed to operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.  With taxpayers as a silent equity partner, banks have virtually unlimited "equity" so they can continue to extend credit to support the real economy.

Then, over time, banks can rebuild their book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

Call step one:  freely spend as much as it takes in future bank earnings to absorb all of the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

Two, bring transparency back to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

For banks, this means requiring them to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can confirm that the banks have absorbed all the losses on their exposures.  With this information, market participants can exert discipline and restrain risk taking by bankers and gambling on redemption.

For structured finance securities, this means requiring observable event based reporting under which all activities like a payment or delinquency on the underlying collateral are reported to market participants before the next business day.  Observable event based reporting allows market participants to know what they are buying and know what they own.

Three, use expansionary fiscal policies to kickstart the global economy.

Four, raise interest rates back to the 2% minimum set by Walter Baghot in the 1870s by ending zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

This is critical because it ends the ongoing Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Under this spiral, current demand is reduced as savers, both individuals and companies, try to offset the drop in earnings on their investments.  Raising rates allows savers to make some money which in turn shows up as current demand.

No matter what the economic models say, raising rates will not discourage business investment.  What discourages business investment is lack of demand.  This has been proven since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Why low interest rates policies are not the answer

In her Guardian column, Ros Altmann explains why the the low interest policies being pursued in the EU, Japan, UK and US are not the answer to a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Her column is interesting for a number of reasons.

First, it comes out on the day after the Bank of England's Mervyn King said the Swedish Model under which banks recognize the losses on the excess debt in the financial system is the answer.  This comes from an individual who has tried low interest rate policies and seen that they do not work.

Second, she confirms what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis about why low interest rate policies don't work.
It is four years since the Bank of England cut the base rate to 0.5% and started its £375bn money-creation programme, quantitative easing.... monetary measures pushing lending rates lower in order to revive the economy have failed, merely resulting in stagflation. 
Yet, still the Bank believes the problem is that rates are not low enough, even floating the astonishing possibility of "negative" interest rates.
Good doctors, whose patient is not recovering, would not just continue prescribing more of the same medicine, they would look for a different cure....
To his credit, Sir Mervyn King suggested exactly what is needed.  If policymakers were to follow his advice, the Bank of England could immediately raise interest rates back up to the 2% minimum level set by Walter Bagehot and end the distortions going on in the real economy.
I believe the damaging side-effects of the monetary medicine may actually be undermining recovery. 
Yes, those with large mortgages have had a bonanza, and banks have benefited hugely, but ultra-low interest rates are hurting important sections of the economy. 
Savers' and pensioners' nominal and real incomes have fallen sharply, while companies providing pension schemes have had to pour billions into their funds rather than their businesses, as low rates push up deficits.
Your humble blogger has referred to what has happened to savers, pensioners and companies as the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.

The death spiral refers to the simple fact that savers, pensioners and companies make up for the lack of earnings on their retirement plans/pensions by cutting back current demand and saving more.  This creates an economic headwind that more than offsets any stimulative benefits from lower interest rates.
Since 2008, Bank of England policy has focussed entirely on bringing down interest rates in order to boost growth. 
Academic models predict lowering rates will boost bank lending and increase access to credit for purchases of homes or other goods and services, ensuring economic recovery. However, this hasn't happened here.
That is because the academic models are wrong!!!

Regular readers know that these academic models did not predict the financial crisis either.  So there is absolutely no reason to believe they should predict what is happening now.
Rather than rushing to spend their extra money, over-extended mortgage borrowers have taken advantage of lower rates to accelerate repayments and clear their debts. 
Meanwhile, older savers' and pensioners' incomes have been squeezed by falling rates and soaring pension costs, leaving them poorer. 
Savings rates have lagged behind inflation, reducing real incomes, eroding the real value of savings and lowering consumer confidence. Fearing for their financial future as their current or prospective income plummets, many have cut spending.
Nice description of the retirement plan death spiral that is left out of the academic models.
Of course, no one wants to see home repossessions, but artificially propping up house prices locks future generations out of the housing market, distorts rental costs and delays the banks and building societies recognising their losses. 
Around four in 10 mortgages are interest-only – with many having no strategy for capital repayment – so low rates are just a politically expedient short-term sticking plaster, not a solution....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Altmann has succinctly summarized how banks are the primary beneficiary of a politically expedient policy that is not a long-term solution.
Low interest rates act like a tax increase on savers and pensioners, by reducing their income. 
This quasi-tightening of fiscal policy has transferred national income from older savers, to younger borrowers and banks. For example, since 2008, borrowers with a £100,000 mortgage are over £2,400 better off every year. However, savers with £100,000 in Cash Isas or fixed-rate bonds are over £2,750 a year worse off.
If the Chancellor were to announce a huge tax increase on older workers and pensioners, particularly to help people who had borrowed or lent too much, there would be uproar. 
But, by doing this via monetary policy rather than fiscal policy, there has been no democratic debate....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Altmann has highlighted why the current policy responses to the bank solvency led financial crisis are undermining democracy around the world.

The policy response has benefitted the bankers at the expense of the voting taxpayers.  The voting taxpayers sense that something is wrong with how elected officials are behaving and Ms. Altmann has just spelled out what it is.

Sunday, February 10, 2013

Bank of Italy's secret loan to Monte Paschi was classic central banking

The Wall Street Journal reports that the Bank of Italy made a secret loan to Monte Paschi in 2011 and claims it did nothing wrong as the Bank of Italy was simply performing a classic central bank role of providing liquidity.

The €2 billion ($2.7 billion) emergency liquidity loan the Bank of Italy extended to troubled lender Monte dei Paschi di Siena in 2011 was a "classic" central-bank move, although it didn't appear on the European Central Bank's balance sheet and no other Italian bank entered a similar deal, a senior Bank of Italy official said Saturday. 
"The Bank of Italy acted on its own" said Fabrizio Saccomanni, the deputy governor of Italy's central bank, when asked about the at-the-time undisclosed securities lending transaction with MPS. 
The deal, in the fall of 2011, represented "the classic type of operation central banks engage in since the times of Bagehot," Mr. Saccomanni said, when asked about the loan on the sidelines of a banking conference here. 
Walter Bagehot wrote "Lombard Street," a 19th-century treatise on how central banks should act as lender of last resort.
Walter Bagehot did not argue that central banks should make secret loans in their lender of last resort role.

In fact, the banks of his day can be characterized by their willingness to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Why were banks willing to do this?

Because it was a sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.

A bank that was unwilling to provide ultra transparency was seen as waving a red flag and declaring that they had something to hide.

Regular readers recall that Mr. Bagehot's dictum was that central bankers were suppose to lend freely against good assets at high rates.  When banks provide ultra transparency, the loan from a central bank was suppose to be a signal to the depositors so that would stop engaging in a run on the bank.

Mr. Bagehot would not have favored either banks hiding their exposure details behind a veil of opacity or central banks hiding loans that they make to the banks.
Italy's central bank arranged the loan in October 2011 because MPS was running short of liquidity and had largely exhausted its ability to keep borrowing from the ECB. The loan was aimed at staving off a liquidity crisis at a key Italian bank at a delicate moment in the country's economic history. 
The loan wasn't disclosed at the time by either the Italian central bank of MPS. In a conference call shortly after receiving the emergency loan, MPS executives described the bank's liquidity position as sound.
Please re-read the highlighted text because the stated rational for the loan is to assist MPS executives in misrepresenting the financial condition of the bank.

Regular readers are familiar with the FDR Framework which is the basis of our global financial system.  The FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware) to achieve financial stability.

Under the framework, governments and their financial regulators are given the responsibility for ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information on each bank in an appropriate, timely manner so the market participants can independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision.

Clearly, the secret loan means that investors did not have access to all the useful, relevant information.

Why is it important that investors have this information?

Because under the framework, investors are responsible for all losses on their investments under the principle of caveat emptor.  As a result, investors have an incentive to use this information to assess the risk of an investment and make sure that they do not have a greater exposure than they can afford to lose given the risk.

By letting Monte Paschi hide the loan, the Bank of Italy undermined the ability of market participants to assess the risk of the bank.

In turn, this action by the Bank of Italy created a moral obligation on the part of the Italian taxpayers to bailout the investors in Monte Paschi.
Mr. Saccomanni said that, with its loan to MPS, the Bank of Italy—which was led at the time of the loan by current ECB President Mario Draghi—didn't violate any rules. The loan was "utterly normal central bank behavior," he said.
It is not clear that no rules were violated since neither the central bank nor Monte Paschi reported the loan.
Under the deal, MPS swapped loans and mortgages for some €2 billion of mainly Italian government bonds. 
In discussing the transaction, Mr. Saccomanni said that Italy essentially has two central banks that are both lenders of last resort. One is the European Central Bank, which, via the Eurosystem, includes national central banks of member countries. The other is the Bank of Italy, which can conduct lender-of-last-resort operations on its own account. 
"Anyone can do it," Mr. Saccomanni said, adding that similar transactions have been carried out by other national central banks in the euro area. 
Some central banks, such as those of Greece and Ireland, have used their own balance sheets for such lending to domestic banks, under the Emergency Liquidity Assistance, a special dispensation from ECB protocols.
I wonder how many other Eurozone countries are providing their banks with secret loans?

Monday, February 4, 2013

Low rates force companies to pour cash into pensions

The Wall Street Journal reported that low interest rates are forcing companies to pour cash into their pensions rather than invest in their core business.

This report confirms the Retirement Plan Death Spiral that your humble blogger first discussed many months ago when I first looked at the headwinds created by the central banks' low interest rate policies.  

Under the Retirement Plan Death Spiral, the low interest rate policies being pursued by central banks trigger a self-reinforcing downward spiral in the economy.  

Companies offset the lack of earnings on pension fund assets by diverting funds needed for growth and reinvestment to their pension funds.  This depresses demand in the economy which results in further downward pressure on pension fund earnings.  

Downward pressure that companies then have to offset by diverting more capital needed for reinvestment and growth to their pension plans.

Of course, the Retirement Plan Death Spiral could be stopped, but this would require that the central banks acknowledge that their low interest rate policies aren't working and raising interest rates to at least the 2% level recommended as an absolute minimum by Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking.
Ford Motor Co. expects to spend $5 billion this year shoring up its pension funds, almost as much as the auto maker spent last year building plants, buying equipment and developing new cars. 
The nation's second-largest auto maker is one of a who's who of U.S. companies pouring cash into pension plans now being battered by record low interest rates. 
 Verizon Communications Inc.contributed $1.7 billion to its pension plan in the fourth quarter and—highlighting companies' sensitivity to this issue—Boeing Co. now reports "core earnings" to separate out pension expenses. 
"It is one of the top issues that companies are dealing with now," said Michael Moran, pension strategist at investment adviser Goldman Sachs Asset Management. 
The drain on corporate cash is a side effect of the U.S. monetary policy aimed at encouraging borrowing to stimulate the economy. Companies are required to calculate the present value of the future pension liabilities by using a so-called discount rate, based on corporate bond yields. As those rates fall, the liabilities rise.... 
Today, many of the companies contributing to the pensions are struggling with the costs but don't offer defined benefit plans to new workers....
Andrew Liveris, chief executive of Dow Chemical Co., which posted a loss of $716 million for the fourth quarter, said the company faces a "massive pension headwind" because of the change in the discount rate that added $2.2 billion to its pension liability. 
Pension expense this year is going to rise between $250 million and $300 million. 
"Other companies have got it, and so we're not alone, but clearly those are big numbers for us," Mr. Liveris said. 

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Pension experts: QE is a 'monumental' mistake

The Guardian reports that pension experts have gone before a Parliament committee and explained why the Bank of England's pursuit of quantitative easing (QE) has been a 'monumental' mistake and how the economy would recover if the BoE stopped pursuing all the related low interest rate policies.

Regular readers of this blog will be familiar with the arguments that the pension experts put forward on why QE should be abandoned as they were presented here first.

The Bank of England's policy of pumping money into the economy has been a "monumental mistake", pensions experts have warned . 
A committee of MPs heard that measures taken by the Bank to drive the economy had backfired by squeezing individuals' incomes – both pensioners and those in work – and forcing companies to divert cash into pension funds rather than investing.
I referred to these two economic headwinds as the retirement fund death spiral.  The trigger for the death spiral is the adoption of zero interest rate and related policies like QE.

Both individuals and companies move to offset the loss of earnings on their savings and reinforce the negative feedback loop.  Individuals do this by cutting back current consumption and saving more.  Companies offset the decline in earnings on pension funds by diverting cash rather than investing.

The actions by both individuals and companies reduce aggregate demand.  Since the BoE wants to boost aggregate demand, it pursues the low interest rate policies even more aggressively.  The result is a further drop in aggregate demand as both individuals and corporations move to offset the loss income.

That individuals change their spending and saving habits in the face of low interest rates has been known since the 1870s.  Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, even stated that interest rates should never be less than 2%.
Ros Altmann, pensions expert and director general of Saga, said current policies devalued pensioners' incomes, making them less willing to spend: "Quantitative easing and ultra-low interest rates have hampered the spending power of those in the economy who were not over-indebted and who would otherwise have spent money." ...
Altmann said ending the QE programme was much more likely to herald a period of growth than its introduction had done. "History will judge this as a monumental mistake," she said. "If we do not have any more quantitative easing, the economy will be freer to grow than if we do."
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ros Altmann has nicely summarized what your humble blogger has been saying about why zero interest rate policies never work to boost demand and why abandoning these policies would actually produce the growth in the economy that central bankers want.
Under the QE programme, the Bank of England has bought £375bn of UK government bonds, or gilts, with newly created electronic money. It now owns almost a third of all gilts in the market. This huge influx of demand has driven gilt prices higher and means yields, or the effective interest rates on them – which represent government borrowing costs – are at record low levels. 
That has the unintended consequence of pummelling pension funds, which use gilt yields to calculate their future liabilities. When gilt yields plummet, pension fund deficits effectively balloon. 
The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) estimated last year that QE had increased pension deficits by at least £90bn over the past three years. 
Current regulations mean companies must plug those holes. Mark Hyde Harrison, the chairman of NAPF, said businesses are now having to contribute to their pension schemes instead of investing for the future, which negates any positive impact of QE....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Harrison has described the retirement fund death spiral triggered by zero interest rate policies.
QE has also reduced the incomes of recent retirees using their pension pot to buy an annuity, which sets the size of their income for life, as annuities are also linked to gilt yields. 
Altmann said monetary easing had acted like a "tax increase" on older people. She said the economy is in "unprecedented territory" and the gilt market had never been distorted in such a way. 
The Bank of England had not properly considered whether carrying out a policy which penalises certain sections of society is acceptable, because it has assumed that the path it has taken was the only option. 
QE is not creating growth and is hampering the spending of people who are not particularly burdened with debt because they are "worried about what's coming next," she said.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Altmann has made a very important point.  Specifically, the pursuit of zero interest rate policies including QE sends a message that undermines consumer confidence as these policies reflect the simple fact that central banks are still in crisis management mode.

Saturday, January 19, 2013

What did I know and When did I know it?

In a self-congratulatory blog posting, Paul Krugman asserts that he would probably have been the most alarmist person in the room for the 2007 FOMC meetings about the potential for a really big financial crisis.  But then this isn't saying much as he says the FOMC was complacent.

He then goes on to explain what he saw that made him alarmist and why he has "had a pretty good stretch" since then.

For the record, my stretch over the same period has been vastly superior to Professor Krugman's.

People have been poring over the just-released 2007 Fed transcripts, and the main surprise seems to be how complacent the institution was. 
Some members of the open market committee, including Janet Yellen and, let’s give credit where due, Tim Geithner, seem to have had a sense of dread; but the overall consensus was that nothing really bad would happen. 
The obvious question if you’re a pundit, then, is “How did I do?” And the answer is, not too badly. Yes, I hedged — it was a statement of possibilities, not a straight prediction. But I clearly would have been in the camp of Fed alarmists, and probably the most alarmist of them all. 
It is a matter of public record that I wasn't hedging about the problems in the credit markets.  I was featured in a Bloomberg article on December 4, 2007 on how to actually moderate the impact of and deal with the problems in the financial system.
It seems to me that the really big determinant of whether you were intellectually ready for this crisis was how much attention you paid to events in the late 1990s — the crisis in emerging Asia, LTCM here, and the Japanese liquidity trap. I paid a lot of attention back then (as did Nouriel Roubini), taking the lead in resurrecting the theory of the liquidity trap (pdf) and writing a book, The Return of Depression Economics. 
And the result is that I’ve had a pretty good stretch; the only big thing I got wrong, I think, was in underestimating the stickiness of wages, and hence inflation, and therefore overestimating the risks of actual deflation. 
Professor Krugman and I differ on what it took to be intellectually ready for this crisis.  I think it took an understanding of Economics 101.

Specifically, it took an understanding that the necessary condition for the invisible hand and therefore capital markets to operate properly is that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make an informed decision.

It took an understanding that since the Great Depression our financial system has been based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principal of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

As I was reading the Fed meeting transcripts, what was clear was that nobody in the room understood this necessary condition or the role it plays in our FDR Framework based financial system even though they were well aware that both structured finance securities and bank balance sheets were opaque.

Confirmation of this assertion comes from the Fed's adopting the policy of injecting liquidity into the financial system with the idea that the market would figure out how to value or price the opaque structured finance securities and bank balance sheets.

Hello, the market couldn't figure out how to value or price either structured finance securities or bank balance sheets because they are opaque.

Recognizing that the markets were going to be on life support until transparency was brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system, I have had a much better performance than Professor Krugman since the beginning of the financial crisis.

For example, I knew that the burden of supporting the excess debt in the financial system would swallow both fiscal and monetary stimulus efforts and leave the US economy in a Japan-style economic slump (our economy "grows" only while there is fiscal stimulus and will immediately go back into recession when austerity policies are adopted).
That said... it’s not clear how much difference it would have made if the Fed had grasped the scale of the danger back in 2007.
It makes all the difference in the world because it drives their policy responses.
The big errors came later, after the depth of the crisis was apparent to all, and they came mainly in fiscal and housing policy, not monetary policy.
Actually, there were and still are too many monetary policy errors to mention.

This started with disobeying the father of modern central banking Walter Bagehot's directive that at times of crisis  a central bank lend freely at penalty rates against good collateral.  In 2007, the Fed choose to lend freely at rates they knew the banks would find attractive against bad collateral (I think the term that was used was "dreck").

Friday, November 23, 2012

Two Columbia University economists think that raising rates is cure for economic slump

As reported by Bloomberg, two Columbia University economists have adopted your humble blogger's suggestion that raising interest rates will help to cure the economic slump.

Regular readers have seen numerous posts over the last couple of years discussing Walter Bagehot and his rule that central banks never lower rates below 2%.

Mr. Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, laid out this rule in the 1870s.  He did this in full knowledge of Mark Twain's famous observation about being more concerned about the return of his capital than the return on his capital.

Mr. Bagehot understood that as rates drop below 2% they create their own economic headwinds including that savers start pursuing Mark Twain's observation.

The solution to weak economic growth may be higher interest rates. 
That seemingly paradoxical remedy can apply if the cause of the slump is a confidence shock that cheap borrowing costs are failing to reverse, two Columbia University economists said in a report published this week. 
In such a situation, ultra-easy monetary policy risks making fears of deflation a self- fulfilling prophecy as spenders sit tight. 
If low interest rates can’t motivate jittery consumers, then the answer may be the opposite: an increase in borrowing costs. Such a shift “can boost inflationary expectations and therefore foster employment,” said Stephanie Schmitt-Grohe and Martin Uribe in the study published Nov. 19 by the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Mass.
“By its effect on real wages, future inflation stimulates employment, thereby lifting the economy out of the slump,” they said. 
The academics said sagging confidence among households and companies has played a part in the recent economic slowdown. Evidence from the U.S. as well as Japan during the last two decades “seems to suggest that zero nominal interest rates are not doing much to push inflation higher.”
At the moment, the Federal Reserve pledges to keep its benchmark interest rate near zero through mid-2015.
While I am not an economist, I suspect that the transmission mechanism for economic improvement from higher interest rates is that savers no longer have to offset the lack of return on their savings through more savings, but can instead use this money for consumption.

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

BoE's Mervyn King warns UK faces triple dip recession

The Bank of England's Mervyn King has warned that the UK faces a triple dip recession.

Regular readers know that this triple dip, soon to be quadruple dip, recession is simply another way to describe the Japan-style economic slump produced by the policies pursued under the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

The real economy of the UK is simply unable to shoulder the burden of the debt service on the excess debt in the financial system and produce enough capital for reinvestment and growth.  The same is true in the EU and Japan and most likely the US.

The only way to end the Japan-style economic slump is to adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt that they would ultimately realize from going through the long process of default and foreclosure.

As reported by the Guardian,

The UK economy risks suffering from a triple-dip recession amid a period of persistently low growth that will last until the next election, the governor of the Bank of England has warned.
Actually, this period of persistently low growth will last until the Japanese Model is abandoned and the Swedish Model is adopted.

Japan has stuck with the Japanese Model for over 2+ decades and they have never exited the period of persistently low growth.
Sir Mervyn King cut Britain's growth forecast to 1% next year and warned that output was more likely than not to remain below pre-crisis levels over the next three years. "There seems a greater risk that the UK economy may be in a period of persistent low growth," he said on Wednesday....
 No surprise here as Japan showed it can take well over a decade to reach pre-crisis levels.
"Continuing the recent zig-zag pattern, output growth is likely to fall back sharply in the fourth quarter as the boost from the Olympics in the summer is reversed – indeed output may shrink a little this quarter," he said. If that period of contraction continues into 2013, the UK could drop into a triple-dip recession....
This zig-zag pattern is a feature of the Japan-style economic slump.
He said there were limits to what monetary policy could do to boost an economy undergoing far-reaching adjustments in the wake of the financial crisis and amid severe headwinds from the eurozone debt crisis...
Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, would agree with Mr. King that there are limits.  Mr. Bagehot would set the limit on monetary policy at maintaining a minimum of a 2% interest rate.  This avoids the economic headwinds he foresaw in the 1870s that zero interest rate policies create.

Saturday, November 10, 2012

Former central banker calls for normalizing interest rates

The Telegraph reports that former Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee member Andrew Sentance has called for interest rates to be normalized.  Specifically, he says that rates should be raised to the range of 2-3% to eliminate distortions that close to zero interest rates are causing.

Regular readers know that Walter Bagehot, the man who wrote the bookin the 1870s on modern central banking, said that interest rates should never be less than 2% because savers cannot stand it.  Clearly, Mr. Bagehot understood the economic headwinds that would follow pursuit of sub-2% interest rates.
Andrew Sentance, PricewaterhouseCoopers’ senior economic adviser and a member of the MPC until earlier this year, set out his opposition to another round of quantitative easing and said rates needed to rise to 3pc by 2015 to reduce the risk of “distorting” the economy.... 
While acknowledging the role QE played “in stabilising the UK economy in 2009 and helping bring about a return to growth”... 
“QE is running into diminishing returns and should not be further extended ... Indeed, persistent very low interest rates risk creating distortions in the economy and prolonging a period of persistent above target inflation,” he said....
To avoid future problems, Mr Sentance said “the MPC should consider a gradual increase in [rates] to 2pc-3pc over the next two to three years to return monetary policy settings to a more appropriate level. By setting out its strategy in advance, the MPC would help businesses and consumers plan for higher borrowing costs. And it would still be possible to move away from this path if the economy faced unexpected shocks.”... 
His proposal would benefit savers as well as businesses but would fly in the face of the policy of the US central bank, which has pledged to keep rates low until unemployment starts to get back to acceptable levels.
The fact that the US central bank would pursue policies that distort the US economy while hurting savers and businesses is no reason that the Bank of England should pursue the similar policies in the UK. 

Monday, November 5, 2012

In defending Japanese Model, Nomura's Richard Koo highlights why the Swedish Model is better choice

In his Financial Times column, Nomura economist Richard Koo tries to defend the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  His defense illustrates why the Swedish Model is the proper response.

Regular readers know that under the Japanese Model bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.  This includes socializing the losses and shifting the burden of the excess debt in the financial system onto the real economy.  The result is a permanent Japan-style slump or as your humble blogger predicted at the beginning of the financial crisis a downward economic spiral.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt.  This saves the real economy and avoids any socialization of the losses.  The result is rapid recovery for everything except banker bonuses.

In 2008, Barack Obama told the US people the nation’s economic crisis would take a long time to overcome. In 2012, many of those voters are losing patience, because they have not been told why this recession has lasted so long or why his polices were the correct response. 
Here is the missing explanation – based on not only the US experience, but also that of Japan and Europe.
As Mr. Koo will show, in fact, choosing the Japanese Model is the wrong policy response to a bank solvency led financial crisis.

In 2008, Iceland also faced a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Iceland chose the Swedish Model.  Four years later, Iceland has put its financial crisis in the rearview mirror.

Meanwhile, where the Japanese Model was implemented, the US, Japan and Europe, the financial crisis continues.
Today, the US private sector is saving a staggering 8 per cent of gross domestic product – at zero interest rates, when households and businesses would ordinarily be borrowing and spending money. But the US is not alone: in Ireland and Japan, the private sector is saving 9 per cent of GDP; in Spain it is saving 7 per cent of GDP; and in the UK, 5 per cent. Interest rates are at record lows in all these countries. 
This is the result of the bursting of debt-financed housing bubbles, which left the private sector with huge debt overhangs – notably the underwater mortgages – giving it no choice but to pay down debt or increase savings, even at zero interest rates.
Actually, there is one more choice:  requiring the banks to recognize their losses on the excess debt.  Specifically, writing down the debt to the level that the borrower can afford the debt service payments, but not so far as to create "equity" for the borrower.

If this choice had been made, with all the fiscal stimulus, the real economy would be surging.
However, if someone is saving money or paying down debt, someone else must be borrowing and spending that money to keep the economy going....
Actually, banks writing down debt doesn't shrink the real economy.

What shrinks the real  economy is when banks do not have to write down the bad debt under the Japanese Model and instead 'collect' payments on this debt that could otherwise have been used to reinvest or grow the real economy.

A form of 'collecting' payment on the excess debt is when the central banks pursue a zero interest rate policy.  This policy results in savers losing out on interest income and the banks benefitting from the decline in their cost of funds.

Naturally, without the interest income, savers spend less, demand for goods and services in the real economy declines and the real economy shrinks.
But when the private sector as a whole is saving money or paying down debt at zero interest rates, the banks cannot lend the repaid debt or newly deposited savings because interest rates cannot go any lower. This means that, if left unattended, the economy will continuously lose aggregate demand equivalent to the unborrowed savings. 
In other words, even though repairing balance sheets is the right and responsible thing to do, if everyone tries to do it at the same time a deflationary spiral will result. It was such a deflationary spiral that cost the US 46 per cent of its GDP from 1929 to 1933.
Please note Mr. Koo's reference to 1933.

Regular readers know that in 1933, the FDR Administration was the first to adopt the Swedish Model and force the banks to recognize upfront their losses on the excess debt.  The FDR Administration did this by declaring a bank holiday and only letting some banks reopen.

Naturally, those that didn't reopen absorbed their losses.  Everyone knew that deposits in the banks that reopened were implicitly guaranteed by the government, later explicitly, and therefore these banks could also realize their losses.

According to the NY Fed, this broke the back of the Great Depression.
Those with a debt overhang will not increase their borrowing at any interest rate; nor will there be many lenders, when the lenders themselves have financial problems.
The Swedish Model attacks the debt overhang by eliminating it.

Regular readers also know that it is in bankers' DNA to make loans regardless of the financial condition of their institution.  This is easily shown by the lending binge that went on during the 1980's US Saving and Loan Crisis.

There is a fundamental reason that bankers make loans.  Originating loans is separate from funding the loans.  Bankers know that there are many financial market participants who will "fund" the loans including insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds...
This shift from maximising profit to minimising debt explains why near-zero interest rates in the US and EU since 2008 and in Japan since 1995 have failed to produce the expected recoveries in these economies....
There are several reasons excluding deleveraging that explain why near-zero interest rates have failed to produce the expected recoveries in these economies.

As Walter Bagehot observed in the 1870s, savers cannot stand rates of less than 2%.  This observation translated Mark Twain's statement of being more concerned about the return of his money than the return on his money into an interest rate rule for central banks.

When interest rates drop below 2%, they create economic headwinds.  One headwind they trigger is the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Under this death spiral, a drop in earnings on retirement plan assets is offset by additional savings by individuals and by diverting capital that was used for reinvestment and growth as contributions to pension plans by companies.

Both of these actions to offset the decline in earnings on retirement plan assets reduce demand in the real economy which further decreases earnings on retirement plan assets... a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop.
Japan, which also struggled with this form of balance sheet recession, managed to keep its GDP above the bubble peak of 1990 despite plunging commercial property values and rapid private sector deleveraging, because its government borrowed and spent private sector savings....
Japan is still dealing with its financial crisis.  Iceland is not.
Recovery from this type of recession takes time because the flow of current savings must be used to reduce the stock of debt overhang, necessarily a long process when everyone is doing it at the same time. Since one person’s debt is another person’s asset, there is no quick fix: shifting the problem from one part of society to another will solve nothing.
Actually, requiring the banks to absorb their losses on the excess debt turns out to be a very quick fix.  This has been shown in the US during the Great Depression, Sweden during its banking crisis and more recently Iceland.
The challenge now is to maintain fiscal stimuli until private sector deleveraging is completed.
As shown by Japan, this private sector deleveraging is never completed.  Japan has been experiencing deleveraging for 2+ decades.
Any premature attempt to withdraw that stimulus will result in a deflationary implosion – as in the US in 1937, Japan in 1997, and Spain and the UK most recently. 
Japan’s attempt in 1997 to reduce its deficit by 3 per cent of GDP – the same size as the “fiscal cliff” now facing the US – led to a horrendous 3 per cent drop in GDP and a 68 per cent increase in the deficit. At that time, Japan’s private sector was saving 6 per cent of GDP at near zero interest rates, just like the US private sector today. It took Japan 10 years to climb out of the hole.
What all this data points to is how important it is that the policy makers stop pursuing the Japanese Model and adopt the Swedish Model for addressing the ongoing financial crisis.

A change in policy that could be made in Europe, Japan, the UK or the US today.