Showing posts with label Credit Crisis. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Credit Crisis. Show all posts

Friday, January 25, 2013

Davos: the attempt to market the idea that the financial crisis is over

The pompoms are out and the Davos cheerleaders can be heard chanting:  the financial crisis is over, the financial crisis is over.  There is just one small problem.  The financial crisis isn't over.

If the financial crisis were over, why is the UK economy performing worse than it did during the Great Depression?

If the financial crisis were over, why is youth unemployment in Greece and Spain in excess of 50% and climbing?

If the financial crisis were over, why are central banks around the world pursuing zero interest rate policies and pushing liquidity into the financial system through quantitative easing?

If the financial crisis were over, why are central banks buying up the low risk assets in an attempt to force investors to buy riskier securities?

If the financial crisis were over, why haven't the financial regulators required the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures so that market participants could see they have purge their dud exposures and are keeping their risk down?

If the financial crisis were over, why is Japan, which followed the same policies after its financial crisis, still in an economic slump 2+ decades later and threatening to start a currency war in an attempt to get its economy moving?

If the financial crisis were over, why is there any talk about cutting back on government social programs to reduce the debt as between the natural shrinkage in the economic stabilizer programs and increased tax revenue more should be generated in revenue than is being spent?

Unfortunately, the financial crisis is not over and because of the policies that are currently being pursued there is no end in sight for the financial crisis ever to be over (see Japan's 2+ decades of dealing with its financial crisis).

I know that the 1% that went to Davos would like the financial crisis to be over because there is likely to be a backlash against them and their policies when it becomes apparent that the financial crisis isn't over.  However, that doesn't change the simple facts that the financial crisis hasn't ended.

The chanting the financial crisis is over does effect one group though (from a Bloomberg article):  money managers who are worried about missing a move up in the financial markets.

There is no official declaration, or even a formal survey. But the chatter at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, is about the end of the financial crisis that began in 2008 and dragged on through last summer’s spike in Spanish and Italian government bond yields. 
“There’s a crystallization of thought that the financial crisis is over,” says Scott Minerd, managing partner and chief investment officer of Guggenheim Partners, a Santa Monica (Calif.) firm with about $160 billion under management. 
“I was riding around in a van last night with two guys whose names you’d recognize,” Minerd said. “They were comparing notes and hearing the same thing. The conclusion has sort of gone viral. It’s an interesting social-networking phenomenon.” 
It has real-world consequences, too. “When thought leaders leave an event like this, they take the message with them, and it affects the way they behave.” That is, they’ll buy.
Which will give the 1% a chance to unload their shares.

Thursday, August 9, 2012

Financial crisis reaches fifth anniversary

Thanks to the efforts of the global policymakers and financial regulators, the financial crisis has reached its fifth anniversary.

Regular readers know the financial crisis began on August 9, 2007.  However, as a favor to the academic community, I thought it would be useful to quote the Guardian on just why August 9, 2007 is such an important day.

Five years on from what is considered the start of the credit crunch –dubbed "the day the world changed" by the former boss of Northern Rock – ... 
On 9 August 2007, the final wake-up call to the world's banking system occurred after many early warnings over the toxic nature of high-risk mortgage debt. "Sub-prime" was about to enter the vocabulary. 
France's biggest bank, BNP Paribas, had been forced to suspend three of its funds with major exposure to bonds backed by US sub-prime mortgages – it was unable to value them because the market for these products, or "securities", had dried up completely. 
Default levels among high-risk US borrowers had soared as the US Federal Reserve hiked interest rates to 5.25%. 
This shattered confidence in the bonds, which were used by most banks as collateral for the commercial paper they used as a source of short-term funding. 
There had been early signs of the crisis – notably the first-ever profit warning from HSBC in February and the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds exposed to high-risk mortgage debts in July. 
But BNP caused other banks, concerned at the possibility of more bad debts coming out of the woodwork, to cut back on everyday lending to each other by hiking their own interbank rates – and so began the credit crunch....
In the wake of 9 August 2007, heightened inter-bank lending rates, along with the closure of the mortgage securities market, placed the finances of Northern Rock under intolerable pressure. 
The way the group financed itself, "a reckless business model excessively reliant on wholesale funding", according to MPs, had been caught short by the credit crunch. Panicking customers queued to grab back their savings and the UK's first bank run in 140 years was under way. 
The Rock – the fast-growing banking success story of the previous decade – was on the road to nationalisation, a £27bn taxpayer bailout and huge political embarrassment for the government. 

Sunday, August 5, 2012

Five years ago banks stop lending to each other... they still don't

In his Guardian column, Larry Elliott reviewed the unraveling of the financial system and the interbank lending market at the beginning of our current financial crisis.

This review is timely as the still frozen interbank lending market confirms that all of the policy responses adopted since the beginning of the financial crisis have not fixed the underlying problem.

The summer of 2007 was a run-of-the-mill affair.... 
Then, on 9 August, came reports that central banks had been active in the markets. The Guardian said the action involved pumping billions of pounds into the financial system to calm nerves amid fears of a credit crunch. 
The trigger for the panic was the decision by BNP Paribas to block withdrawals from three hedge funds because of what it called a complete evaporation of liquidity. ... 
Actually, BNP Paribas said it could not value the subprime mortgaged-backed securities in the three funds and that there was inadequate liquidity to get a reliable price from the market.
Five years on, the global economy has yet to recover from the deep trauma caused by the hubris of the bankers. 
Back then, though, there were few who imagined that 9 August 2007 would prove to be such a milestone in financial history....
A milestone that is so carefully hidden that two Yale professors were left pondering what happened in August 2007 that caused the financial markets to freeze [it is a testament to the non-existence of even minimal academic standards at the leading economic and finance journals that their paper pondering the August mystery was published given that Mr. Elliott wrote about it at the time].
Stripped of the jargon, it is now quite easy to see what happened. Banks were taking large gambles with precious little capital in reserve if the bets went wrong. ... 
In August 2007, the air started to escape from this gigantic bubble. It happened in three stages. The financial sector was the first to feel the impact, because while it was evident that almost every bank had been up to its eyeballs in investments linked to the American housing market, nobody knew for sure just how much money each institution stood to lose. The financial system grinds to a halt if banks refuse to lend to each other, as they did in August 2007....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Elliott nicely summarizes why banks stopped lending to each other:  they couldn't tell who was solvent and who was not.

The inability to assess how much each bank stood to lose is the direct result of opacity.  In this case, it is opacity into each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With these details, banks could independently assess each bank's losses.
Governments arrested the slide into a 1930s-style slump by concerted and co-ordinated action, but wrecked their own finances in the process. Bailing out the banks was expensive, particularly since much lower levels of output reduced tax revenues....
Bailing out the banks was expensive and unnecessary.

In a modern financial system, banks are designed to be able to continue to operate and support the real economy even if they have negative book capital levels.  The reason for this is the existence of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, taxpayers are the banks' silent equity partner when banks have negative book capital levels.

Since banks don't need to be bailed out with direct investments by the governments, the governments are freed up to use the funds to promote economic growth.
Central banks tried to help out by making credit cheap and plentiful. They cut interest rates and used unconventional methods – such as buying bonds in exchange for cash – to boost the money supply. The hope was this would stimulate a private sector recovery and so provide a breathing space in which governments could repair their finances.
The attempt to solve a crisis caused by credit with even more credit has, predictably enough, proved a failure....
As your humble blogger has documented, not only was the failure of central bank policies predictable, but the wanton destruction caused by these policies was also predictable.

For example, these policies triggered the pension fund/real economy death spiral.  With interest rates artificially depressed, pension funds are not able to generate a return on their investments.  As a result, companies have to make up the pension fund earnings shortfall by using money that would have been invested to grow the economy.  With a slowdown in the real economy, pension fund earnings shortfall get worse and this requires even more money being diverted from growing the real economy.

Sunday, July 8, 2012

Guardian's Heather Stewart calls for 'proper banking inquiry'

In her Guardian column, Heather Stewart calls for a 'proper banking inquiry', think Pecora Commission, based on the simple fact that the extraordinary hold banks have gained over politicians makes them incapable.

Regular readers know that since the beginning of the financial crisis, there has not been a true, properly funded inquiry into the financial system in either the US or UK.

As a result, without a true understanding of what gave rise to the financial crisis, we have had policymakers and financial regulators covering their backside by proposing all sorts of new regulations approved of by the banking industry that have not addressed the underlying problem.

Your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that it is a crisis caused by opacity and the solution is transparency.  Transparency that provides market participants with all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can make a fully informed investment decision.

Supporting evidence for this diagnosis is abundant.  Examples include, but are not limited to,  opaque, toxic structured finance securities, JP Morgan's credit default swap trade, and now the manipulation of Libor.

Should the UK engage in a 'proper banking inquiry', just like the Pecora Commission in the 1930s, it will find that opacity is the underlying problem and call for the sunshine of transparency, rather than a mountain of new regulations, to act as the best disinfectant of the financial system.
The Treasury select committee's ineffectual clash with the former Barclays boss shows just why MPs might not be best placed to investigate the financial sector. 
Watching Wednesday's gruelling (for viewers) three-hour Treasury select committee hearing, .... We certainly learned more about the state of parliamentary democracy in 21st-century Britain than the inner workings of Barclays. 
For one thing, the links between the mighty financial sector and the men and women who are meant to represent the public are deep and complex.....
The inescapable conclusion to draw .... that a Commons inquiry, even one chaired by the independent-minded Andrew Tyrie, would be too weak, and too hamstrung by private interests and political point-scoring to succeed. 
The extraordinary hold Britain's banking sector has gained over Westminster and the reins of economic power over the past 25 years is a story that transcends political parties and extends before and beyond the financial crisis of 2008-9. 
For Thatcher's Tories, unleashing the City in the Big Bang reforms of 1986 meant building a more go-getting, entrepreneurial economy where capital would flow freely and "wealth creators" could flex their muscles. 
For Labour, which consciously wooed the money men to win their confidence in the early 1990s, a strong City meant bumper tax revenues to be spent on the health service, schools and infrastructure. Both parties enjoyed the swagger that came with attracting some of the world's best-known financial firms – Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, UBS – to the heart of the City and the gleaming towers of Canary Wharf. 
Yet not only did those freewheeling financial capitalists not bring the new, shiny economy and the permanent prop for the public finances the politicians hoped for, they also skewed and corrupted business and society in their image.....
And it wasn't just their double-shot lattes and graph-paper shirts the American bankers brought with them. A big bucks, heads-I-win-tails-you-lose bonus culture, which took root on trading floors in the 1980s (seeLiar's Poker) and was given a sheen of respectability by business school neologisms such as "incentivisation", led to a pay explosion as profits soared. 
Once bankers were raking it in, other bosses who had once held their own with the City boys wanted to get in on the act, and the age of remuneration consultants, "golden parachute" rewards for failure and seven-figure bonuses had well and truly arrived across corporate Britain. 
But out in the real world, meanwhile, little of the money being churned around London's financial markets found its way into productive investments to build up the capacity of the economy for the long term. 
Some went to fuel an unsustainable property boom, convincing hundreds of thousands of people they could be buy-to-let millionaires; but much of it was just lent back and forth between a handful of giant financial players placing ever riskier bets. 
And those tax revenues that were so useful for Gordon Brown in the age of "prudence" and "stability" went up in smoke when taxpayers were forced to spend tens of billions of pounds bailing out the financiers, who were anything but grateful, let alone humble. 
The public deserves a thoroughgoing, independent inquiry into the culture, structure and economic impact of banking, because they know that politicians of all stripes – just like the rest of us – have been taken for a ride.

Saturday, June 16, 2012

Bank of England 'throws kitchen sink' at credit problem knowing it is really a bank solvency problem

Ultimately, despite 'throwing the kitchen sink' at the UK credit problem, the Bank of England's Mervyn King recognizes that this won't work because it is not a credit, but rather bank solvency problem that must be addressed.

Since the adoption of regulatory forbearance and with it regulatory permission for banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' tactics to keep zombie borrowers alive, the credit markets have been in a downward spiral.

The reason for this downward spiral is simple:  it is easier for a zombie borrower to get credit than it is for a creditworthy borrower.

The creditworthy borrower is up against two obstacles.

First, the uncertainty in the value of the collateral they have to pledge for a loan.  The banks know how much in the way of similar collateral is supporting zombie loans.  The bankers have to figure out what the likely value for this collateral is if they are ever required to recognize the losses on the zombie loans and their collateral was sold.

The result is a gap between what the creditworthy borrower wants to borrow against the collateral and what the bank is willing to lend based on collateral value.

Second, the regulators' focus on a 9% Tier I capital ratio makes it unattractive to make the new loan.

As Liam Halligan said in his Telegraph column,

To be sure, making these policies work will be difficult. How can the Bank of England ensure that banks fulfill their lending promises. The “Project Merlin” targets have been all-but abandoned amid enforceability disputes. What is to stop the banks “gaming” the system, by reclassifying loans to themselves as “credit extended”? 
One got the sense, listening to King, that his heart wasn’t really in the measures he was trying to promote. That is because, as the Governor himself admitted, the problem the banks have isn’t one of liquidity but “one of solvency”. 
We should note that King told the Mansion House, referring to Europe’s entire banking sector, that “until losses are recognised, and reflected in balance sheets, the current problems will drag on”. 
The only way to solve Europe’s banking crisis, of course, is root-and-branch recapitalisation, involving closures, restructuring and a full clean-out of the Augean stables.
Please re-read the highlighted text as this is what I have been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis.

This full clean-out and root-and-branch recapitalization takes two steps.

Today, adoption of the Swedish model with ultra transparency.  Under the Swedish model, the banks are required to recognize all the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets.  Under ultra transparency, the banks have to disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details so that market participants can confirm that fact.

Over the next several years, the banks then recapitalize themselves through retention of pre-banker bonus earnings .  Those banks that do not have a franchise that permit them to generate the earnings to recapitalize themselves are closed.

Thursday, January 26, 2012

Eurozone banks hoarding ECB cash spells end to 'zombie companies'

A Bloomberg article reports on the ongoing Eurozone credit crunch as banks continue hoarding the EBC cash while trying to reach the 9% Tier I capital requirement.

Specifically, the article looks at how the credit crunch is increasing Europe's default rate.

In particular, the default rate will increase for firms that have little or no equity value but have enough value so that senior lenders like the banks can be repaid.

At the same time, banks have an incentive to continue using extend and pretend on the loans to zombie companies where they would have to recognize a loss on the loan and the resulting reduction to Tier I capital.

Corporate defaults may almost double in Europe as companies struggle to refinance debt and banks hoard cash borrowed from the European Central Bank or use it to buy government bonds.
Europe’s default rate may soar to 8.4 percent or more, from 4.8 percent at the end of 2011 as the recession bites and company financing dries up, according to Standard & Poor’s. ... 
“It’s very challenging for anyone to raise money from lenders right now,” said Andrew Cleland-Bogle, a Frankfurt- based director at corporate finance specialist DC Advisory Partners. “Combine that with increased bank capital requirements and you can see that although banks are getting money they’re very selective when it comes to lending it. 2012 is going to be a very, very tough year.” 
Speculative-grade companies have to refinance about 230 billion euros ($300 billion) through 2015, according to S&P. At the same time, banks and loan funds that provided the initial funding are scrambling for capital or reaching the end of their reinvestment periods and may be unwilling to extend loans....
Note the use of the word 'may' in the highlighted sentence.
“There are a lot of zombie companies that are trapped by their debts and have no way out,” Bryan said. “The recovery isn’t really happening and there’s a high probability we’re going into a double-dip recession. For all that the banks kicked the can down the road once, the realization is dawning that they can’t just do that again.” 
A very big assumption that banks cannot kick the can down the road again particularly now that they have guaranteed access to funding through the ECB.
Companies bought by leveraged buyout firms during the boom years in the middle of the last decade are particularly vulnerable to the dearth of funding because their debt levels are higher than investors are willing to accept, said Edward Eyerman, head of leveraged finance atFitch Ratings in London. And because banks and collateralized debt obligations are also leveraged, the problem is amplified, he said. 
“For companies that have five times leverage, are in cyclical industries, exposed to anemic economies and have near- term maturities, it’s questionable how much equity value is underneath the debt,” Eyerman said. “When these highly leveraged borrowers get into trouble, the focus on what’s the right capital structure for a company within its industry to perform effectively competes with the demands of banks and CLOs to preserve the senior debt.”...
Lower-rated borrowers that have a large part of their business in the nations hardest hit by the sovereign debt crisis, and which haven’t refinanced loans coming due this year and next, will “face particular difficulties,” he said.

The European Banking Authority, which found a 115 billion- euro capital shortfall in its most recent stress tests on lenders, has given banks until June to find the cash or face nationalization. 
Struggling to raise the money, lenders are choosing to reduce risk-weighted assets instead. European banks, which currently have total assets of about 26.5 trillion euros, will probably reduce their balance sheets by 5.1 trillion euros in the next three to five years, according to Alberto Gallo, a strategist at Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc (RBS) in London. 
“Given the large shortfall in equity capital and persistent sovereign risk, we think it will be difficult for European banks to start transferring their liquidity to the broader economy,” Gallo said.

Wednesday, December 7, 2011

Deloitte confirms Europe's banks insolvent, estimates they have 1.5 trillion pounds of toxic assets

According to a Telegraph article,

Europe's banks must dispose of a pool of toxic assets larger than the entire British economy if they are to return to profitability and meet new capital rules.
The article goes on to say,


Estimates from accountants Deloitte found that European banks currently hold more than £1.5 trillion of non-core and non-performing assets on their balance sheets. 
From the article's headline, it appears that there are 1.5 trillion pounds of non-performing assets.  If so, it is highly likely that all the European banks are insolvent.
Deloitte said that while banks will have to dramatically shrink the size of their asset books they are likely to face major challenge in doing so given the scale of the bad loan problems they face. 
British banks, despite beginning their disposal programmes much earlier than their Continental European peers, still have by far the biggest pile of toxic assets. 
Deloitte estimates the size of the non-core and non-performing assets held on the balance sheets of UK banks at £460bn, more than the combined total for Ireland, Spain and Italy. German banks come a close second with a toxic asset pool of about £447bn. 
It is one thing for bank's to be a 'black box' when they have few non-performing or toxic assets.  It is entirely another issue when banks clearly have so many non-performing or toxic assets that their solvency is highly questionable.

The time has come to require ultra transparency.  Each bank must be required to disclose on an on-going basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this information that the market can determine which banks are solvent and which are not.

It is only with this information that the market can properly assess the risk of the banks and adjust both the amount and price of their exposure to the banks.

It is only with this information that the market can exert discipline on the insolvent banks to keep their risk levels in check while they are retaining earnings to restore their solvency. 

Monday, November 28, 2011

Secret Fed bank loans make definitive case for requiring the financial system be based on ultra transparency

Bob Ivry wrote a must read article for Bloomberg on how secret Fed loans during 2008-2009 gave banks an undisclosed $13 billion boost to income.  As Mr. Ivry observes, 'a fresh narrative of the financial crisis emerges' when actions by the Fed, like the loans, are examined.

In fact, the narrative that emerges is my narrative on an opacity driven solvency crisis where the only way to fix the financial system is to require ultra transparency from all market participants, including banks and the Federal Reserve.

These loans illustrate everything that is wrong with the current financial system including:
  • The opacity of banks.  This blog has frequently cited Bank of England's Andy Haldane referring to banks as 'black boxes'.
    • As documented by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee, the crisis began with banks asking the question of which banks are solvent and which are not.  Clearly, there was inadequate disclosure.  The fact that the Fed could make secret loans confirms this inadequacy and the need for banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
    • The reason that banks were asking about solvency was the exposure of banks to opaque, toxic securities -- CDOs, sub-prime mortgage backed securities.  Clearly, ultra transparency needs to be applied to these securities too.
  • The relationship between banks and their regulators.  
    • In a NY Times article, Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story covered how the Office of Thrift Supervision advised IndyMac to misrepresent its capital to market participants.  How is offering secret loans to the banks any different than advising the banks to misrepresent their capital to market participants?
    • The Nyberg Report on the Irish Financial Crisis showed how even when a member of the regulatory body saw that something was wrong, the regulatory bureaucracy pushed to suppress this finding.  Contributing to this result was both political pressure on the regulator and lobbying from the banks.
  • The dependence of market participants on the regulators because of the regulators' information monopoly.
    • Unlike every other market participant, banks are not a black box to financial regulators as they have access to all the useful, relevant information.  This includes access to the bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  The result of this access is that market participants rely on the regulators to properly assess the risk of the bank and to communicate this risk to the market.
    • The moral obligation to bailout investors after each round of stress tests where the banks are deemed to be solvent.
I could go on, but the more the facts behind what caused the financial crisis and how the crisis was handled come out, the stronger is the case for requiring ultra transparency.
The Federal Reserve and the big banks fought for more than two years to keep details of the largest bailout in U.S. history a secret. Now, the rest of the world can see what it was missing. 
The Fed didn’t tell anyone which banks were in trouble so deep they required a combined $1.2 trillion on Dec. 5, 2008, their single neediest day. 
Bankers didn’t mention that they took tens of billions of dollars in emergency loans at the same time they were assuring investors their firms were healthy. 
And no one calculated until now that banks reaped an estimated $13 billion of income by taking advantage of the Fed’s below-market rates, Bloomberg Markets magazine reports in its January issue. 
Saved by the bailout, bankers lobbied against government regulations, a job made easier by the Fed, which never disclosed the details of the rescue to lawmakers even as Congress doled out more money and debated new rules aimed at preventing the next collapse. 
A fresh narrative of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 emerges from 29,000 pages of Fed documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and central bank records of more than 21,000 transactions 
While Fed officials say that almost all of the loans were repaid and there have been no losses, details suggest taxpayers paid a price beyond dollars as the secret funding helped preserve a broken status quo and enabled the biggest banks to grow even bigger....
The size of the bailout came to light after Bloomberg LP, the parent of Bloomberg News, won a court case against the Fed and a group of the biggest U.S. banks called Clearing House Association LLC to force lending details into the open. 
The Fed, headed by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, argued that revealing borrower details would create a stigma -- investors and counterparties would shun firms that used the central bank as lender of last resort -- and that needy institutions would be reluctant to borrow in the next crisis....
Here we have the major bank regulator in the US arguing for opacity.  Chairman Bernanke takes the position that market participants should not know the true condition of the banks because if they did the market participants might properly assess the risk of the banks and adjust the amount and price of their exposure accordingly.

Think of how absurd a position that is for the Chairman of the Federal Reserve to be arguing.  Particularly one who is a scholar of the Great Depression and the introduction by FDR of a financial system based on transparency.

There is only one way to prevent any Fed Chairman from ever being in a position for making this argument again and that is requiring ultra transparency.

Had ultra transparency existed for the structured finance securities, CDOs like Abacus could never have been sold.

Had ultra transparency existed for banks, market discipline would have restricted casino banking activities to what a bank could have afforded to lose.  If the bank insisted on taking more risk than this, its cost of funds would have gone up and its access to funds down as investors adjusted their exposure to reflect the risk of the bank.

Had ultra transparency existed for the Fed, it would never have violated Walter Bagehot's advice to lend against good collateral at high rates of interest.  There would not have been a $13 billion gift from the Fed to the banks.
Bankers didn’t disclose the extent of their borrowing. 
On Nov. 26, 2008, then-Bank of America (BAC) Corp. Chief Executive Officer Kenneth D. Lewis wrote to shareholders that he headed “one of the strongest and most stable major banks in the world.” He didn’t say that his Charlotte, North Carolina-based firm owed the central bank $86 billion that day....
Is this a fundamental misrepresentation similar to the advice of the Office of Thrift Supervision to IndyMac on its capital?

With ultra transparency, regulators are permanently blocked from inadvertently supporting misrepresentations to the financial markets.  Market participants could have seen that BofA was borrowing from the Fed and that IndyMac did not have adequate capital.
The Fed has been lending money to banks through its so- called discount window since just after its founding in 1913. Starting in August 2007, when confidence in banks began to wane, it created a variety of ways to bolster the financial system with cash or easily traded securities. 
By the end of 2008, the central bank had established or expanded 11 lending facilities catering to banks, securities firms and corporations that couldn’t get short-term loans from their usual sources.

“Supporting financial-market stability in times of extreme market stress is a core function of central banks,” says William B. English, director of the Fed’s Division of Monetary Affairs. “Our lending programs served to prevent a collapse of the financial system and to keep credit flowing to American families and businesses.”...
As regular readers know, restoring and maintaining confidence in banks comes from providing market participants with access to ultra transparency so that the market participants can independently analyze each bank.

None of the lending programs engaged in by the Fed restored confidence.  This is supported by the fact that the Fed announced that its late 2011 round of stress tests is designed to restore confidence.

As previously discussed on this blog, all the Fed's latest stress tests will do is create a moral obligation for the Fed to bailout investors.  After all, investors cannot be expected to incur losses on a bank that is reported as solvent under the Fed's stress tests subsequently blows up ... look at the need to bailout the investors in Dexia after the latest round of European stress tests found it adequately capitalized.
While the emergency response prevented financial collapse, the Fed shouldn’t have allowed conditions to get to that point, says Joshua Rosner, a banking analyst with Graham Fisher & Co. in New York who predicted problems from lax mortgage underwriting as far back as 2001. 
The Fed, the primary supervisor for large financial companies, should have been more vigilant as the housing bubble formed, and the scale of its lending shows the “supervision of the banks prior to the crisis was far worse than we had imagined,” Rosner says.
Ultra transparency is needed so that the failure of bank supervision no longer puts the financial system at risk.

With ultra transparency, market participants are no longer reliant on the regulators to properly assess the risk of the banks.  Market participants can assess the risk for themselves.
“I believe that the Fed should have independence in conducting highly technical monetary policy, but when they are putting taxpayer resources at risk, we need transparency and accountability,” says Alabama Senator Richard Shelby, the top Republican on the Senate Banking Committee....
So Senator Shelby when can I expect a call from your staff to discuss legislation bringing ultra transparency to the financial markets before December 31, 2011?
“Some might claim that the Fed was picking winners and losers, but what the Fed was doing was exercising its professional regulatory discretion,” says John Dearie, a former speechwriter at the New York Fed who’s now executive vice president for policy at the Financial Services Forum, a Washington-based group consisting of the CEOs of 20 of the world’s biggest financial firms. “The Fed clearly felt it had what it needed within the requirements of the law to continue to lend to Bear and Wachovia.”
Ultra transparency ends regulatory discretion of picking winners and losers.  That is the job of the market.
On May 4, 2010, Geithner visited Kaufman in his Capitol Hill office .... At the meeting with Kaufman, Geithner argued that the issue of limiting bank size was too complex for Congress and that people who know the markets should handle these decisions, Kaufman says....
Provide ultra transparency and banks will come under enormous pressure from the market to reduce their risk and shrink their asset base.  It will also be harder for them to run their casino banking business because everyone can see their proprietary positions ... a trader's worse nightmare because of the potential to be front run when buying or selling.
Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, says banks “were either in bad shape or taking advantage of the Fed giving them a good deal. The former contradicts their public statements. The latter -- getting loans at below-market rates during a financial crisis -- is quite a gift.”...
Regardless of which one, requiring ultra transparency eliminates this from occurring again in the future.

Friday, November 18, 2011

The next downward leg of the financial crisis will be worse

According to a Forbes article, the next downward leg of the financial crisis will be worse and it is on its way.

Like the first leg of the financial crisis, the impact of the second downward leg can be moderated.

What it takes is for global policymakers and financial regulators to realize that the actions they have taken since August 9, 2007 have not worked.  Clearly, there would not be second downward leg to the financial crisis if they had.

It is only by acknowledging this fact that the search for a different response is possible.

Regular readers know that the blueprint for rescuing the financial system presented on this blog is a reasonable alternative to the failed strategies.

Under the blueprint, banks are required to perform their function as a safety valve between the financial excesses in the financial system and the real economy.  Banks will absorb the losses on the bad debt in the system.  This seems reasonable because banks benefited initially from creating the financial excesses.

As a result of recognizing the losses on their bad assets, banks will have significant negative book equity.  This is okay.

Banks can continue to function without the payment system collapsing or access to credit for qualified borrowers being diminished.

This blog has explained how depositors will not race to withdraw their deposits from banks with negative book capital so long as the depositors believe that they are covered by deposit insurance.  In the case of some Eurozone sovereigns, their deposit guarantee needs to be supplemented with a guarantee by the European Financial Stability Fund.

This blog has also explained how central banks will have to lend against good collateral (and once the losses are recognized, it is all good collateral) so that banks have access to the funding they need.

Finally, this blog has explained that banks must be required to disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure detail.  It is this data that allows market participants, including competitors and regulators, to assess the risk of the banks and to use market discipline to keep the banks from increasing their risk profile in the future.
"There is definitely going to be another financial crisis around the corner," says hedge fund legend Mark Mobius, "because we haven't solved any of the things that caused the previous crisis."... 
Speaking in Tokyo, he pointed to derivatives, the financial hairball of futures, options, and swaps in which nearly all the world's major banks are tangled up. 
Estimates on the amount of derivatives out there worldwide vary. An oft-heard estimate is $600 trillion. That squares with Mobius' guess of 10 times the world's annual GDP. "Are the derivatives regulated?" asks Mobius. "No. Are you still getting growth in derivatives? Yes." 
In other words, something along the lines of securitized mortgages is lurking out there, ready to trigger another crisis as in 2007-08.... 
The Greek crisis is first and foremost about the German and French banks that were foolish enough to lend money to Greece in the first place. 
What sort of derivative contracts tied to Greek debt are they sitting on? What worldwide mayhem would ensue if Greece didn't pay back 100 centimes on the euro? 
That's a rhetorical question, since the balance sheets of European banks are even more opaque than American ones....
Greece will likely get another bailout — 30 billion euros on top of the 110 billion euro bailout it got a year ago.
It will accomplish nothing. Going deeper into hock is never a good way to get out of debt. And at some point, this exercise in kicking the can has to stop. When it does, you get your next financial crisis. 

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

Tim Geithner calls on Europe to go beyond recapitalizing banks

A Bloomberg article reports that Tim Geithner is calling on Europe to go beyond recapitalizing its banks to addressing its sovereign debt crisis.

There are two interesting observations to make about what he said.

First, in America, the Dodd-Frank Act supposedly did away with bank recapitalizations or, as they are more commonly refer to, bailouts.  Why would Mr. Geithner recommend bailing out the European banks?

Second, isn't the classic way to handle a situation where countries or any other borrower cannot repay their debts to restructure the debts?  Is Mr. Geithner suggesting that the sovereign debt crisis should be handled with a "bailout" too?

Does the exposure of US banks have anything to do with his advice?
U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner said European leaders must go beyond a planned recapitalization of banks to resolve the continent’s sovereign- debt crisis. 
“The most important problem is they have to make sure that the major economies of Europe that are under pressure now are able to borrow at affordable rates,” Geithner said today in an interview with Bloomberg Television. “They recognize the need to do more than they’ve done so far.” 
... “They are moving but they have some ways to go,” Geithner said. “You saw the president of France, the president of Germany make some very promising, very encouraging statements,” he said. “The Europeans recognize they need to put in place a much more substantial, much more powerful response if they are going to achieve their objectives, which is helping countries reform by making sure they have enough oxygen that they can get through this.”

Monday, September 19, 2011

Having exhausted monetary and fiscal policy it is time to turn to regulatory policy to restore confidence

As predicted under the FDR Framework, fiscal and monetary policy have not restored confidence in either the capital markets or the economy.

Since the beginning of the solvency crisis, we have tried both fiscal stimulus and austerity (see Greece and Ireland).  Neither has restored confidence nor should they as they are tools for adjusting aggregate demand in the economy at one point in time and not for addressing solvency.

Since the beginning of the solvency crisis, we have tried policies including zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing.  None of these policies has restored confidence nor should they as they are tools for adjusting aggregate demand and not for addressing solvency.

This failure to restore confidence is not surprising, because it is regulatory policy that is the source of confidence and the tool for addressing solvency.

It is the ongoing failure of regulatory policy that is causing the solvency crisis to continue.  It is the ongoing failure of regulatory policy that undermines confidence and stymies expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.

Why has regulatory policy failed?  It has failed because the key to ending a solvency crisis is answering the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent.  This question is the starting point for determining how to address the insolvent banks and sovereigns.

In their defense, the global financial regulators would say that they have adopted policies to answer the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent.  They have engaged in bank recapitalization and stress tests.

These policies were predestined to fail in the absence of the ability of market participants to Trust but Verify.

Why should market participants trust the regulators given their pre- and post- solvency crisis track record?  Before the solvency crisis, the regulators failed to fulfill their number one responsibility of preventing the crisis from occurring in the first place.  Since the beginning of the solvency crisis, regulators have run stress tests that have been discredited shortly after the results were announced.

As predicted under the FDR Framework, it is only by providing market participants with access to each bank's current asset and liability-level data and each structured finance security's current loan-level performance data that the question of who is solvent and who is insolvent can be answered.
  • It is only when market participants have this data that they can value the structured finance securities.  
  • It is only when market participants can value the structured finance securities and all the assets on each bank's balance sheet that they can determine which banks are solvent and which are not.
The reason that market participants must analyze this granular level data for themselves is that it is the only way for them to trust their valuation.  It is this trust in their own valuations that is the source of confidence in both the capital markets and the economy.
  • It is only after doing this analysis that market participants have assessed the risk of an investment in the banking system and are willing to be responsible for all gains or losses on any new investments they make in bank related securities.  
  • It is only when market participants have the confidence to invest in the banking system that they have confidence to invest in the economy.
Until market participants have access to current asset and liability-level data or are promised that they will get this level of disclosure, confidence will continue to deteriorate as the market participants assume that policy makers and regulators must have something to hide.

If market participants cannot have confidence in their banking system, it is impossible for them to have confidence in their economies.

Sunday, September 18, 2011

FDR Framework 101

A Bloomberg article reports that
European banks are “grossly under- capitalized” and the debt crisis is more serious for the region than the 2008 meltdown as governments are constrained by fiscal pressures, former U.K. Prime Minister Gordon Brown said. 
“In 2008, governments could intervene to sort out the problems of banks,” Brown said at the World Economic Forum in the Chinese port city of Dalian today. “In 2011, banks have problems, but so too do governments.” 
Investor skittishness over Europe’s sovereign debt crisis raised lenders’ funding costs and caused a rout in the region’s banking stocks this month. European Central Bank President Jean- Claude Trichet pressed euro-area governments late yesterday to take decisive action to restore confidence after the ECB extended an emergency lifeline to lenders. 
Brown said that while the ECB is part of the short-term solution, it needs additional assistance. 
The European Financial Stabilization Mechanism, which is run by the European Union’s 27-nation executive arm, is “not enough,” Brown said. “Substantially more resources” are required, including from the International Monetary Fund and lenders including China, he said....
“European banks as a whole are grossly under- capitalized,” Brown said. “We’ve now got the interplay between banks that are not properly capitalized and sovereign debt problems that have arisen partly because we’ve socialized or accepted responsibility for the banks’ liabilities.”
With this background in mind, a quick review of the FDR Framework and how it could restore confidence and help to address the bank and country solvency problems in Europe is useful.

The FDR Framework gets its name from both the President, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, whose administration introduced the philosophy of disclosure to the capital markets and from the framework's focus on financial disclosure requirements.

FDR introduced disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to accomplish two linked goals.  First, to restore confidence in the markets.  Second, to keep the government out of making investment recommendations.  Disclosure achieves both of these goals because it allows market participants to analyze the information disclosed for themselves to assess the risk and reward of any investment.

There was one part of the financial system that disclosure could not be introduced to:  banking.  Simply put, without access to 21st century information technology, it is not possible to disclose to all market participants each bank's current asset and liability-level data (all the useful, relevant information) in an appropriate, timely manner.

Instead, his administration set up a system where the government both regulated and supervised the banks.  Included in bank supervision was the idea of bank examiners having access to and looking at the current asset and liability-level data 24/7/365.

Unfortunately, the lack of disclosure also meant that the market participants were dependent on the bank regulators to properly analyze the risk of each bank and convey it to the market.

Besides the historically opaque banks, there was another source of opacity in the financial system.  That source was Wall Street and the products it developed.  As Yves Smith observed on NakedCapitalism, no one on Wall Street was paid for developing low margin, transparent products.

Examples of opaque products Wall Street developed include structured finance securities and exchange traded funds.  While both are conceptually simple, that was before Wall Street engineered opacity into the information needed to value these products.  Neither of these products provide investors with all the useful, relevant information on the underlying "assets" in an appropriate, timely manner so that investors can value the product.

The FDR Framework is the backbone for a financial system based on using 21st century information technology both to facilitate disclosure and the analysis of the disclosure.

Under this framework, governments are responsible for ensuring that every market participants can access all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  This includes current asset and liability-level data for banks.

Under this framework, market participants have an incentive to assess each investment using the disclosed information because, under the principle of caveat emptor, they are responsible for any gains or losses on the investment.

Previously, this blog discussed how using the FDR Framework, policymakers and regulators in Europe could restore confidence and address the issue of bank and sovereign solvency.  This involves two steps.

Step one is for the policymakers and regulators to issue a statement that describes what the actual condition of each bank is providing as needed the hard facts to back up the analysis (this is something that Societe Generale did recently in a bid to restore confidence).

Step two is for the policymakers and regulators to promise and implement utter transparency (set up a data warehouse where all market participants can access the current asset and liability-level data for each bank).

Setting up this data warehouse is critically important, because market participants will put far more faith in the analysis if they see that the data is going to be released that confirms or debunks the analysis.  The market is likely to give the analysis the benefit of the doubt because not releasing the data suggest there is something to hide.

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

BNP Paribas Chairman Michel Pebereau reaches time for 'utter transparency'

In a great irony, BNP Paribas which fired the Guns of August on August 9, 2007 and signaled the beginning of the financial crisis when it announced that it could no longer value sub-prime structured finance securities now finds the market is unable to value BNP Paribas.

The WSJ ran an article by Nicolas Lecaussin citing an anonymous executive on the condition of BNP Paribas.  Naturally, BNP Paribas issued a statement claiming the executive was wrong.

Why should market participants believe BNP Paribas?  If 'utter transparency', disclosing its current asset and liability-level data would show that it is right, it ought to disclose this information.

The failure to provide 'utter transparency' and disclose its current asset and liability-level data is a public admission BNP Paribas has something to hide and its anonymous executive is right.

If BNP Paribas would like help with the mechanics of offer 'utter transparency', your humber blogger is ready to assist them.
"We can no longer borrow dollars. U.S. money-market funds are not lending to us anymore," a bank executive for BNP Paribas, who declines to be named, told me last week. "Since we don't have access to dollars anymore, we're creating a market in euros. This is a first. . . . we hope it will work, otherwise the downward spiral will be hell. We will no longer be trusted at all and no one will lend to us anymore." 
He's not the only one worried. SociĂ©tĂ© GĂ©nĂ©rale has lost 22.5% of its value since the beginning of the summer. In early September, BNP released a statement—in English, which is highly unusual—explaining that it has abundant dollar liquidity and that BNP has nothing to worry about, unlike other banks. France's three biggest banks have been the subject of whisper campaigns about their solvency throughout the summer. 
On the surface at least, the concerns are hardly groundless. BNP, SociĂ©tĂ© GĂ©nĂ©rale and CrĂ©dit Agricole together hold nearly $57 billion in Greek sovereign and private debt, versus $34 billion held by the largest German banks and $14 billion at British banks. And then there is Spain and Italy. French banks held more than €140 billion in total Spanish debt and almost €400 billion in Italian debt as of December, according to the latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements. If either of these governments were to default on their debts, their banking systems could collapse and take the French system along with them. BNP, SociĂ©tĂ© GĂ©nĂ©rale and Credit Agricole all say that their finances are in order and the market worries are unfounded. 
But it's difficult for the BNP executive to hide his concern. "Look at the French banks' debt holdings versus those of U.S. banks," he continues. "The total debt of the three big U.S. banks (Bank of America, JP Morgan and Citigroup) is $5.86 trillion, or 39% of GDP, while the debts of BNP, CrĂ©dit Agricole and SociĂ©tĂ© GĂ©nĂ©rale come to €4.7 trillion, or 250% of French GDP."... 
Whether the market's worst fears are realized or not, French banks certainly maintain an all too close relationship to the state. This opaque system doesn't offer outsiders much visibility, save for the knowledge that indebted banks and an indebted French state intend to continue to cover each other, no matter the cost and on taxpayers' backs if they must.  If U.S. money-market managers no longer trust the French system, this is a glaring reason why. The fastest way to regain their trust would be to end this system.
This is true of the relationship between the banks, governments and regulators in the US, UK and the rest of Europe too (See the Nyberg Report on Irish Financial Crisis for confirmation of this fact).

The way to end this system would be to provide utter transparency as recommended under the FDR Framework.

Is the global banking system staring into the abyss?

Jeremy Warner wrote an interesting column in the Telegraph in which he asked if Europe's banks are staring into the abyss.

Are US banks also looking into the abyss given the interconnectedness of the global banking system?  The fact that Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner is flying to Europe to put pressure on European governments to bailout their banks and deal with the sovereign debt issue strongly suggests they are.

The fact is since August 9, 2007 when the solvency crisis began market participants have not been able to tell which banks are solvent and which are not.  If they could, do you think that the US money market mutual fund industry would be reducing its exposure to European banks given the limited opportunities to earn money in the US under the Fed's zero interest rate policy?

Regular readers know that markets hate uncertainty and not knowing who is solvent and who is insolvent is a major source of uncertainty.

Markets do not hate insolvent banks as previously documented in the discussion of Security Pacific and its loans to Less Developed Countries in the mid-80s.  Markets understand that solvency is determined by the market value of the assets on the bank's balance sheet exceeding the book value of its liabilities.

Markets understand that some insolvent banks have the capacity to generate the earnings necessary to restore their solvency and some insolvent banks do not.  Insolvent banks in the former category markets are willing to continue funding.  Insolvent banks in the latter category the market would expect would be closed.

Had policy makers in 2008 and 2009 taken this into account, perhaps they would not have transformed a bank solvency crisis into a bank and sovereign solvency crisis.

Now markets not only have the uncertainty concerning which banks are solvent and which are not, but they also have the uncertainty of which countries are going to destroy their own sovereign solvency in an effort to prevent the market from discovering which banks the country hosts are solvent and which are not.

Ireland has become a classic example of why it is important to get the facts on solvency first before putting the sovereign solvency on the line.

Where now for European banks? Sir Howard Davies, former chairman of Britain's Financial Services Authority, said on BBC Radio's Today programme on Tuesday morning that he thought the French government was only days away from having to recapitalise the country's banking system for a second time. It's hard to disagree. 
The panic seems to have been temporarily stemmed by a statement from BNP Paribas to the effect that it wasn't having the problems widely reported of finding dollar funding.
Actually, it was the additional disclosure that accompanied the statement as nobody trusts the claims of the regulators (see widely discredited stress tests) or banks anymore.
There was also an emphatic denial of discussions over state intervention. But no-one is kidding themselves. Italy had to pay the highest spread since joining the euro to sell its bonds on Tuesday. There are growing fears over whether Europe's largest borrower can stay the course. 
The eurozone sovereign debt crisis is meanwhile exacting a devastating toll on the European banking system as a whole, the UK included. With their high exposure to eurozone debt, the problem is particularly acute for the French banking goliaths, BNP Paribas and Societe Generale.... 
Collectively, French banks have €56bn of Greek sovereign bonds alone. They've so far only written down this Greek debt by around 20pc, or in line with the restructuring agreed at the time of the last bailout. 
That's nowhere near mark to market....
Greece is already effectively a cash only economy. Most forms of credit has effectively dried up, the Greek banking system is finished, and capital controls to prevent what little money that remains from leaving the country are surely only a matter of time. European banking must prepare for the worst as far as Greece is concerned. 
As for the remainder of the eurozone sovereign exposure, there's been no write down at all among banks on these bonds. If there's a wider problem of default, the bad debt recognition has yet to come. 
How come European banks have got so much of the stuff? Well ironically, this is one lending decision gone wrong that the banks cannot be blamed for. In response to the original banking crisis, regulators ordered banks substantially to increase their liquidity buffers. Government bonds are generally viewed as the most liquid and least risky assets to hold, so that's where the money went. 
That these regulatory obligations also helped governments fund their ever growing deficits is by the by. In any case, nowhere is the law of unintended consequences more in evidence than in financial regulation. By seeking to address the last crisis with greater liquidity buffers, regulators succeeded only in sowing the seeds for the next one. 
A banking crisis that transmogrified into a sovereign debt crisis now shows every sign of transmogrifying back into another banking crisis....
When the banking crisis first broke, Europeans tended to regard it as wholly an Anglo-Saxon problem. There was some recapitalisation of French and German banks that went on in late 2008, early 2009, but it wasn't nearly as big as in the UK and the US, and within a year, the French banks had in any case largely repaid all their state support. Problem over, it was thought. 
This is what the regulators said at least.
The same refusal to face up to underlying solvency concerns continues to dominate Contintental attitudes to the crisis. There is a collective sense of denial. 
BNP for one insists that it is in nothing like the same poor shape as many UK and US banks back in 2008. Profits are still buoyant, delinquency subdued, and capital more than adequate, BNP insists. Unfortunately, that's not what the markets are saying.
Market participants know that profits, like bank capital, are an easily manipulated accounting construct.  For example, by not setting aside reserves for the Greek debt, profits and therefore book capital are overstated.

Since the banks do not disclose current asset and liability-level data, market participants are forced to guess what the banks' exposures are.  From here they try to determine if the banks are solvent or not.

Both BNP Paribas and Societe Generale recognized that they need to disclose much more information if market participants were to believe their claims (the disclosure allows for market participants to trust, but verify).
Record quantities of European term funding are set to mature in the first quarter of next year. It's not clear that the European Central Bank can cope with the sort of liquidity support that banks will require if markets refuse to refinance it.
Why would the markets refinance this debt without disclosure of current assets and liability-level data.  Without this data, markets would essentially be buying opaque toxic securities.
Europe's financial and monetary system is falling apart. 
Since French banks are widely thought of as essentially arms of the French state, is there actually any point in recapitalising them? ... Why not then just make this implicit support explicit? 
You only need to take one look at what happened to Ireland to see why. In the early days of the crisis, the Irish government promised to stand behind all banking liabilities. By doing so, it ended up pushing the entire country into bankruptcy.
The time has come for disclosure.  Depending on what disclosure shows then a solution can be implemented.

Monday, September 5, 2011

Markets remind Deutsche's Ackermann of 2008 right down to banks needing another bailout

Bloomberg ran an article on a Euroforum speech given by Deutsche Bank AG's Chief Executive Officer Josef Ackermann.  In the speech, he observed that the markets remind him of 2008.  This is not surprising given that the solvency crisis which began in 2007 is still with us and the issue of which banks are solvent and which are not has re-emerged.

Just like 2008, the banks need a bailout because "some" banks cannot afford the losses from restructuring debt.  In 2008, we were talking toxic securities.  In 2011, we are talking sovereign debt.

Having determined that some banks cannot afford the losses on a specific asset type, the next concern is contagion.  If those banks that cannot afford the loss were forced to realize the loss, this would spread problems throughout the European banking system.

This blog has repeatedly observed that there is a big difference between disclosing and realizing losses.  The former involves reporting to all market participants the information they need to assess the risk of investing.  The latter involves accounting.

Since mark-to-market was suspended at the beginning of the solvency crisis, when banks would account for the losses on the sovereign debt is no longer linked to disclosure.

“The ‘new normal’ is characterized by volatility and uncertainty -- not only in respect to market developments, but also in consideration of the future of the financial branch,” Ackermann said today at a conference in Frankfurt organized by Euroforum. “All this reminds one of the fall of 2008, even though the European banking sector is significantly better capitalized and less dependent on short-term liquidity.” 
It is the lack of disclosure that creates uncertainty and volatility in the financial branch.

If the European banking sector is so much better capitalized, then why is disclosing and realizing the losses on sovereign securities a problem?  Either the banks are adequately capitalized or they are not.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September of 2008 froze credit markets and forced taxpayer-funded bailouts of banks from Washington and London to Berlin. 
Concern Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is worsening and global economic growth is slowing wiped about 5 trillion euros ($7 trillion) from stock values since the end of July, with banks leading the slide, Ackermann said.... 
Many European banks “obviously” wouldn’t be able to shoulder writedowns on sovereign debt held in their banking books based on market values, Ackermann said today. Therefore European governments agreed to financial aid measures for countries, and forcing banks to boost their capital would undermine the credibility of existing support measures, he said.... 
Since there are now significant restrictions on the ability of governments to access funds for another bailout, there is a certain logic to requiring banks to pay for their own bailout by boosting capital.

If there were disclosure, market participants would know which banks were adequately capitalized and which were not as well as how much capital the European banking system needs to raise to shoulder the write-downs on sovereign debt.
DZ Bank AG Chief Executive Officer Wolfgang Kirsch, speaking at the same conference, said European politicians need to agree on a solution for the sovereign debt crisis to avoid a repeat of the events of 2008. “Otherwise we will enter a very difficult market situation,” Kirsch said.
Disclosure and not austerity is the simple solution.

It is only after market participants know the facts that a plan for writing-down the sovereign debt and recapitalizing banks can be determined and confidence restored to the financial markets.

Telegraph's Liam Halligan calls for disclosure to end financial crisis begun in 2007

Liam Halligan wrote a column for the Telegraph that called for disclosure to end the financial crisis that began in 2007.

Regular readers will be familiar with his argument.

At last weekend's Jackson Hole summit, though, the new [IMF] Fund boss made a statement that sounded courageous and long overdue. [Christine] Lagarde said the big problem facing the developed world is an excessive overhang of debts that were used to finance spectacularly bad investments – not least those ghastly collateralised debt obligations. 
Oh yes, the CDOs are still out there, levered-up 10-fold or more, those weapons of "financial mass destruction", lurking off-balance-sheet and largely undeclared in the "shadow banking system". They're the reason many Western banks are technically insolvent – and why the interbank market remains moribund, with banks reluctant to lend even to each other, given concerns over counter-party risk. 
Which banks are solvent and which banks are insolvent?
With wholesale credit channels blocked, lending to credit-worthy firms and households remains thin. That's why the wheels of finance are gummed up and the West's economic recovery has been so feeble. Bank claims about "a lack of demand for credit" are propaganda – an attempt to deflect attention from their own bombed-out balance sheets and the sector's singular failure to disclose their massive loses. Those arguing otherwise either doesn't understanding banking or, directly or indirectly, are in the pay of the banks. 
Lagarde's actual words at Jackson Hole – "banks need urgent recapitalisation" – were a statement of the obvious. The so-called "stress tests", an attempt by regulators to secretly assess bank balance sheets, were a bad joke. The Irish banks, for instance, "passed" the first European tests, but were nationalised just a few weeks later. The second eurozone stress tests earlier this summer were also laughable, the results since deeply discredited. 
Under the FDR Framework, regulators are suppose to ensure disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  They are specifically not suppose to weigh in on the merits of an investment.

Stress tests turn the FDR Framework inside out.  They keep all the useful, relevant information secret.  They have the government weighing in with its opinion of financial institutions as an investment.

There are many market participants who understand that their role is to Trust, but Verify.  It is this role that has revealed the short-comings of the stress tests.
So when Lagarde pointed out that without mandatory recapitalisation "we could easily see the further spread of economic weakness to core countries, or even a debilitating liquidity crisis" she was only repeating what we already know.
And what your humble blogger described as a downward spiral with no logical stopping point prior to the credit crisis.
After all, the trouble extends beyond the eurozone's periphery. Spanish banks, for instance, are majorly exposed to dodgy real-estate deals and other non-performing loans. Even Germany's ubiquitous Landesbanken are bankrupt. 
So far, the insolvency of Europe's fragile banking system has generated sovereign debt risks, as eurozone governments have moved to "backstop" the banks. In recent weeks, though, an increasingly large number of European governments have been shown to be financially suspect which has, in turn, reflected investor angst back onto the banks. 
Throughout August, even on slow summer-trading, equity markets were rocked by wild gyrations, wiping out all this year's gains. Such volatility was led by Europe's banks – which are now down 25pc during 2011. 
In belated recognition of undeclared liabilities, many banks are now trading at a deep discount to the value of their assets. European credit default swaps, the cost of insuring against bank failure, have surged to levels beyond those seen even at the height of the subprime storm. 
The danger now is that Europe's bank fragility becomes systemic, sparking another "Lehman-moment" and causing, in turn, a second economically-debilitating credit crunch. Within financial circles, recognition is growing that such an outcome could happen. Even if it doesn't, concerns it might will damage investment and jobs. 
Actually, it already is systemic as the lack of disclosure and resolution of the solvency crisis is destroying  national balance sheets and investor confidence.
Lagarde's statement was welcome – and, as such, attracted praise. So lacklustre are our political leaders these days – and Lagarde, above all, is a politician – that even recognising an uncomfortable truth exists is enough to shine. 
But what about actually doing something about it? What about emphasising that the only way to fix the Western world's banking system, so facilitating a decent economic recovery, is for powerful financial institutions to be forced to disclose their entire portfolio of losses. 
Please re-read as this is the point that I have been making since before the credit crisis began.
I've written this before. I will continue to write it, relentlessly, until it actually happens. Because happen it will. It's for our politicians and regulatory authorities to decide if this "reckoning" takes place in a relatively orderly way – with bad banks being broken-up and restructured, as solvent institutions absorb their depositors. Or maybe they'd prefer if the market just took its chaotic course? 
Lagarde finally acknowledged the problem. But she stopped well short of acknowledging the implication. She said banks should be recapitalised from "funds in the markets first" and only then "seek public money if necessary". Lagarde must know this is nonsense. No commercial investor would invest in Europe's banks at this stage, given that they can't even know if such banks are solvent. Private-sector recapitalisation might have been possible a year ago, after the first round of stress tests, when global markets were awash with QE funny-money and investors had a warm glow. But not now. 
Bank recapitalisation will, of course, have to be state-funded....
I am more optimistic than Mr. Halligan on this point.  I think that private-sector recapitalization is possible if investors know what they are investing in.

Also, there are many banks that might be insolvent (the market value of their assets exceeds the book value of their liabilities), but like Security Pacific, have a franchise that will allow them to generate and retain the earnings necessary to restore their solvency.
If there is to be more public-money spent on propping-up our banks, it absolutely must be used to facilitate restructuring, as loans are written off and investors are forced to take haircuts, rather than to finance the status quo. There really is no other way.
A critical element of the Lagarde comments was the observation that governments have far fewer resources available to them to address the solvency issue.

What Mr. Halligan correctly identifies is the need to use these resources in such a way that solvency is actually restored and not to kick the problem into the future as was done in late 2008 and early 2009.
Far from addressing these realities, Lagarde, like almost every other Western regulator, continued to deny they exist. 
None of this is to say that America's banking sector doesn't have problems. The US stress tests were also pathetic. Washington, too, has pandered to bank vested interest. But America's bank debt overhang is lower and a far higher share of liabilities have been "fessed-up". 
We really do not know who is solvent and who is insolvent in the US either.  This question has been undermining Bank of America's stock price for the last several weeks.