Showing posts with label Swedish model. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Swedish model. Show all posts

Thursday, September 19, 2013

We need a fair system for restructuring debt

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, your humble blogger has predicted that the global economy will not recover until creditors recognize their losses on the debt in the financial system that will never be repaid.

Embedded in this prediction is the notion that a fair system can be developed for rapidly restructuring this debt.

The closest we have come to a fair system for rapidly restructuring debt is Iceland.

Iceland adopted the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and required its banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt.

Specifically, the banks had to write down the value of their loans to a level where the borrower could afford the repayment.  Affordability was based on standards like limiting debt payments to 35% of gross income.

However, there were limits placed on this write down.

Specifically, if an independent third party would pay more for the asset collateralizing the loan than the supportable loan amount, the banks only had to write down the loans to this level.  This meant the write down was limited so that it would not create any equity for the borrower.

On the surface, this system for restructuring appears fair.

The creditor takes responsibility for the portion of the loan that exceeds the borrower's capacity to repay.  This is as it should be as the creditor is suppose to evaluate the borrower's repayment capacity and not extend debt in excess of this level.

The borrower takes responsibility for paying what they can afford.  They cannot simply walk away from the debt.

Please note that this system for restructuring debt could be applied to sovereigns as well as to individuals and companies.

In an interesting column, Joseph Stiglitz argues that a fair system for restructuring sovereign debt is needed.
In debt crises, blame tends to fall on the debtors. They borrowed too much. 
But the creditors are equally to blame – they lent too much and imprudently. 
Indeed, lenders are supposed to be experts on risk management and assessment, and in that sense, the onus should be on them. 
The risk of default or debt restructuring induces creditors to be more careful in their lending decisions.

Wednesday, September 4, 2013

Der Spiegel: Bank reform still needed 5 years after crisis began

A must read Der Spiegel article makes the important point that five years after the beginning of the efforts to reform the international banking system the addition of complex rules and regulatory oversight has achieved nothing.

Regular readers know that the only way to fix the financial system is to require the banks to provide transparency.  Specifically, they need to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can assess the risk of each bank and limit their exposure to each bank to what the market participant can afford to lose given the risk of each bank.

When market participants limit their exposure based on the risk of each bank, contagion or the domino effect is ended.  Contagion is ended because each market participant has set their level of exposure to each bank to what they can afford to lose.  This means there is no reason to ever bailout a bank for fear of contagion.

At the same time, the bank's management becomes subject to market discipline.

Management knows if it increases the bank's risk passed a certain level, it will increase the cost of funds to the bank at the same time as it reduces the bank's access to funds.  This is bad for the bank's net income and share price.

Management also knows that if it reduces the bank's risk it will be rewarded.  Lower risk leads to a lower cost of funds.  A lower cost of funds tends to be good for a bank's net income and its share price.

This is how market discipline works.

Market discipline is something that the banks have not been subjected to for over forty years.  Instead, banks have been subjected to complex rules and regulatory oversight replacing transparency and market discipline.

The results have been predictable.  The banks have gamed the system and taken on far greater levels of risk than the markets would have permitted.

Banks were able to do this because regulators do not approve or disapprove of any exposure a bank takes on (they don't do this as it would mean the regulator was allocating capital across the economy).

Instead, the regulators try to estimate the probability of loss if there is a problem with an exposure and the amount of loss should the problem occur.  Regulators then compare this loss to the bank's book capital level to see if it can absorb the loss.

It is not surprising that Der Spiegel sees a need for bank reform.  Adding more complex rules and regulatory oversight does nothing to change the fundamental reason regulators were incapable of preventing the current financial crisis.

It is only when there is transparency that the next financial crisis can be prevented.

When asked whether he believes that the industry and lawmakers learned the right lessons from that tumultuous weekend in September 2008, he concludes soberly: "We would hardly be more effectively protected against a chain reaction today than we were five years ago.".... 
While it is certainly true that bank bailouts no longer have to be ironed out in hectic, nighttime crisis meetings, it is also true that large banks, especially in the United States, are raking in billions once again. 
But the new sheen is deceptive, because banks owe much of their comeback to ongoing support from governments and central banks. Instead of having to launch bailout operations worth billions, they have simply turned to a policy of slowly feeding the financial industry with cheap money.
Please re-read the previous paragraph as it confirms the adoption of the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under this model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.

As a result, governments feed money into the banks.  Some of this money is used to absorb losses and some is used to pay bonuses.
"In the euro zone, many banks would have trouble refinancing themselves without the help of the European Central Bank (ECB)," says Christoph Kaserer, a financial expert at the Technical University of Munich. 
According to Kaserer, a number of institutions are not sufficiently profitable to survive on their own in the long term.
Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Banks which are capable of generating earnings after recognition of their losses are allowed to continue operating.  Earnings are used to rebuild book capital levels.

Banks which are not able to generate earnings after recognition of their losses are closed.
The euro-zone countries, fearing the potentially uncontrollable consequences of liquidating ailing financial groups, have helped create so-called zombie banks. 
European banks are still burdened with massive bad loans left over from the financial crisis -- amounting to €136 billion ($180 billion) at Germany's Commerzbank alone. 
Analysts with the Royal Bank of Scotland estimate that the banks need to shed about €3.2 trillion in assets in the next three to five years, while at the same time generating €47 billion in fresh capital to be considered stable.
Please note that financial authorities cite fear of uncontrollable consequences, i.e. contagion, as the reason for adopting the Japanese Model and creating zombie banks.

This fear is entirely misplaced as market participants already have some idea of the size of the losses at each bank and which banks do and don't have the ability to generate earnings.

Rather than continue to feed money into banker bonuses, governments should be requiring each bank to provide transparency into their exposure details.  As discussed above, market participants could then assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposures accordingly.

With the risk of financial contagion removed, regulators could then require the banks to take their losses and clean up the banking system.
If one of these shaky financial giants were to fall, it would likely spell the end of the banking sector's tentative recovery.... 
The banking sector's recovery is all smoke and mirrors.
In the last five years, there have in fact been a significant number of new guidelines, laws, drafts and recommendations. 
The banks were forced to increase the size of their financial cushions, for example, but they still aren't large enough. 
Regulators devised split banking systems designed to shield customer deposits from risky trading activities, but the concepts are half-baked and have yet to be fully implemented.... 
Bankers' bonuses were capped, but then their fixed salaries were increased dramatically. 
Regulators had vowed to rein in the rampant trade in derivatives among banks by requiring it to be conducted on supervised exchanges. Instead, the over-the-counter derivatives market has grown by 20 percent since 2009.
In short, complex regulations and regulatory oversight don't work.
Over the years, lawmakers have lost sight of the most important objectives of regulation. 
Secure savings deposits, a continuous supply of credit and a functioning payment transaction system are as important to an economy as intact water pipes or power grids. 
The point is to ensure that this supply functions properly. 
At the same time, governments and taxpayers cannot allow themselves to be held hostage by the banks, merely because they can guarantee a basic supply of capital. 
"What is needed is fundamental structural change, which, as in other industries, costs money. Lawmakers shy away from that," says Clemens Fuest, President of the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW).
The fundamental structural change needed is to bring transparency to the banks and the rest of the opaque corners of the financial system.

With transparency, banks are subject to market discipline and governments and taxpayers are no longer held hostage by the banks.
Financial industry executives take every opportunity to warn that if regulators take aim at financial groups, then businesses, savers and investors will ultimately suffer.... 
The beauty of requiring banks to provide transparency is it doesn't reduce their ability to provide loans, take deposits or support a functioning payment system.

Transparency addresses the issue of how much risk banks take by using market discipline to restrain risk taking.
At the same time, Jain sends out a warning to lawmakers not to overdo it with new legislation. "If all measures are implemented as planned, it could spell the end of 100 years of universal banking in Europe," Jain said in Frankfurt. His message seems to strike a chord.

Capital rules are a case in point. "Contrary to their political rhetoric, Germany, France and even Japan have blocked the acceptance of tougher requirements in international negotiations," says financial expert Harald Hau of the University of Geneva. Their goal, he adds, is to avoid putting their own, undercapitalized banks under pressure....
Please note that after 2+ decades, Japan is blocking capital rules because of its zombie banks.

This is a clear indicator that the Japanese Model is the wrong policy for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  It is also a clear indicator that the EU, UK and US that also adopted the Japanese Model will not do any better.
"So far, this central problem has been neglected in the reform plans," says Jan-Pieter Krahnen of Frankfurt's Goethe University....
The bigger and less transparent the banks, the more reliable their guarantee that the government will bail them out if necessary. "The banks know that if they're complex enough, they'll be bailed out," says ZEW President Fuest.

That is why the solution is to require the banks to provide transparency.



Sunday, August 4, 2013

BIS blames creditors and bank regulators for current eternal financial crisis

As reported by the Telegraph, the BIS laid the blame for the current ongoing global financial crisis on the creditors (banks) and their regulators.

Specifically, the BIS said the mechanism for dealing with the excess debt in the global financial system is jammed because bank regulators refuse to require banks to recognize upfront the losses on their debt.

By design, banks are suppose to absorb upfront the losses on the excess debt so as to protect the real economy.  If they do not do so, the burden of the excess debt is place on the real economy.

This burden takes two forms: debt service and misallocation of capital.  Together these forms of burden result in the real economy not having the capital it needs for reinvestment and growth as well as not properly allocating the capital it does have.

A clear recipe for economic stagnation.

Your humble blogger predicted this economic outcome at the beginning of the financial crisis when global policymakers and bank regulators adopted the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under this model, the mechanism for dealing with losses on excess debt is intentionally jammed as bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger also pointed out that with adoption of the Swedish Model under which banks recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt the real economy is protected.

It is nice to have the BIS agree with my analysis.
The Switzerland-based watchdog said unprecedented imbalances have built up in the global system and these are failing to self-correct because the mechanism is jammed.... 
The BIS said European banks played a huge role in stoking the pre-Lehman credit bubble. They rotated $1.25 trillion into US debt alone between 2003 and 2007, greater than the combined purchases of Asia and OPEC. It said banks funnelled money into southern Europe regardless of risk in "expectations of a bail-out" if any country got into trouble. 
"European banks were negligent in assuming – and their regulators in allowing – such exposures. Overlending was as responsible for the ensuing crisis as over-borrowing."... 
The watchdog called for "symmetry in adjustment between creditors and debtors" to avoid repeating the 1930s, warning that global recovery will remain stunted until the creditors chip in.

Thursday, July 25, 2013

Swallowing the bankers' line

Earlier this month, Robert Jenkins, former external member of the Bank of England's financial policy committee, observed:
I fear that the banks have bamboozled government into believing that society must choose between safety and growth, between safer banks and bank shareholder value, and between a safer financial framework and a competitive City of London. These are all false choices.
Please re-read the highlighted text and ask the question of how could this have come to pass.

In his Project Syndicate commentary, Professor Simon Johnson offers a series of potential explanations for how banks have bamboozled government.

There are three possible explanations for what has gone wrong. 
One is that financial reform is inherently complicated. But, though many technical details need to be fleshed out, some of the world’s smartest people work in the relevant regulatory agencies. They are more than capable of writing and enforcing rules – that is, when this is what they are really asked to do. 
Your humble blogger wonders when the regulators within the SEC decided that they were not really being asked to ensure transparency in the financial system?

Regular readers know the SEC was ground zero for the financial crisis and it was the failure of the SEC to ensure transparency that created the conditions for the financial crisis.  Specifically, the SEC allowed opacity for both banks and structured finance securities.

For banks to be transparent, they must disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This was the law in the UK since the 1870s and the standard in the US in the 1930s when the SEC was created.  Clearly, by the start of the financial crisis in 2007, this was no longer true.

For structured finance securities to be transparent, they must disclose on an observable event based basis.  Every observable event like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying assets must be reported to all market participants before the beginning of the next business day.  Clearly by the start of the financial crisis in 2007, this was not true as opaque, toxic sub-prime RMBS deals report on a once per month basis.
The second explanation focuses on conflict among agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, both within and across countries. Again, there is an element of truth to this; but we have also seen a great deal of coordination even on the most complex topics – such as how much equity big banks should have, or how the potential failure of such a firm should be handled. 
Another source of conflict is the regulatory race to the bottom.
That leaves the final explanation: those in charge of financial reform really did not want to make rapid progress.  
In both the US and Europe, government leaders are gripped by one overriding fear: that their economies will slip back into recession – or worse.  
The big banks play on this fear, arguing that financial reform will cause them to become unprofitable and make them unable to lend, or that there will be some other dire unintended consequence. There has been a veritable avalanche of lobbying on this point, which has resulted in top officials moving slowly, for fear of damaging the economy.
Professor Johnson has nicely explained that fear is why the banks were successful in bamboozling government leaders.

But did the government leaders actually have anything to fear?  After all, the first response to the financial crisis was to put the banking system on life support.

Regular readers know that the answer has always been no  There was nothing to fear, but fear itself.

Our financial system was designed to survive even the failure of the SEC to ensure transparency.  Our financial system was designed to survive a massive credit bubble with the creation of excess debt that was well beyond the borrowers' capacity to repay.

Our financial system was designed to survive because it has a safety valve to release its excesses while protecting the real economy.

This safety valve is the ability of banks to absorb upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to operate and service the real economy.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partners when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Of course, because government leaders swallowed the bankers' line, we have never used the safety valve.

Instead, we have protected bank book capital levels and banker bonuses while at the same time burdening the real economy with servicing the excess debt.  The result has been economic stagnation, an unwinding of the social contract and an increase in inequality.

Thursday, July 18, 2013

Bernanke's epitaph: "We had to do something"

In his testimony before the US House of Representatives, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke provided his own epitaph when he observe "we had to do something" in response to the financial crisis.

Remarkably, since the moment he appeared in panic before Congress to testify on the need for TARP, the self-described Great Depression expert hasn't been unable to come up with a better thought through strategy for ending the financial crisis than "we had to do something".

Actually, as Mark Twain would say, you only have to pay taxes and die.  Everything else you do is optional.

Mr. Bernanke's testimony confirmed that either he a) didn't understand that he was dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis and the solution is adoption of the Swedish Model or b) he understood that pursuing the Japanese Model would not work and he is trying to defend his legacy.

Bernanke's defensiveness can probably be chalked up to the one thing he could plausibly be afraid of: watching his legacy go the same way as that of former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who left while excoriated for his seeming friendliness toward big banks.
The Geithner Doctrine doesn't "seem" friendly to big banks.  It is designed to be friendly to big banks.

The Geithner Doctrine is don't do anything that will harm the profitability or reputation of big and/or politically connected banks (hat tip Yves Smith).
Bernanke has done more than Geithner did, and took on the economic job left undone by a dysfunctional Congress and a distracted president as well. He became a one-man economic Mr Fix-it, not by choice but by necessity.
Mr. Bernanke told everyone who would listen that he is an expert on the Great Depression.  Hence, he was a logical person to lead the response to our current financial crisis.

The one problem as pointed out by Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author and a noted expert on the Great Depression too, is that Mr. Bernanke learned the wrong lessons (see here and here) about the Great Depression.

When faced with a bank solvency led financial crisis, ending the crisis requires having the banks recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

Until banks recognize the losses, monetary policy is not going to end the crisis.

A fact that should be apparent to all as we approach the six year mark on August 9, 2013 of the beginning of the financial crisis.
Now, facing the end of his term, he is fighting an uphill battle to get the credit for the work laid at his door. 
He wasn't often right – in fact, in forecasting, often wrong – but his Fed did more than any other government or private entity to tackle the country's economic problems. 
That's something.
Your humble blogger would give Mr. Bernanke a significant amount of credit for trying and doing something were it not for one small fact: he didn't use all the tools at the Fed's disposal from the beginning of the financial crisis.

As he testified before Congress, he talked about not being successful at ending the crisis and the need for the Fed to have additional tools if it were to successfully end the crisis.  However, he completely ignores the fact that the Fed has an entire toolkit from its role as lender of last resort and responsibility for bank supervision that he chose not to use.

The Fed could have used both of these tools to end the financial crisis by requiring the banks to recognize their losses upfront on the excess public and private debt in the financial system and protect the real economy and the social contract.

Mr. Bernanke elected not to do so.

He chose to pursue zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies that Walter Bagehot, who invented the modern central bank in the 1870s, said would create economic headwinds that render these policies ineffective.  Turns out Bagehot was right. The economic headwinds existed in the form of the Retirement Plan Death Spiral as both individuals and companies cut back current consumption to fund the shortfall in earnings on retirement assets.

He chose to allow bankers to continue to pay themselves large cash bonuses at the same time the Fed engaged in regulatory forbearance and let the banks transform their non-performing loans through 'extend and pretend' into 'zombie' loans.

He chose to put the real economy into a downward spiral by placing the burden of the excess debt on the real economy where it diverted capital needed for reinvestment, growth and supporting the social contract to debt service.

Update:
In his testimony, Bernanke also observed that
Fed didn't have a way to oversee the shadow banking system.
As regular readers know, the inability to see what is going on in shadow banking should have been a less than subtle hint that there was a need for transparency.

Wednesday, July 17, 2013

Economist magazine discovers we still have zombie banks throughout global financial system

The Economist magazine captures the state of the global financial system when it observed
[it] is in a terrible state, and nothing much is being done about it.
But the problem doesn't end with the global financial system.  It extends to the global economy.

Regular readers know that policymakers and financial regulators chose to pursue the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under this model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.

The costs of this protection include transferring the burden of the excess debt in the financial system onto the real economy where it diverts capital needed for reinvestment, growth and supporting the social programs to debt service.

The result is economic malaise and re-writing the social contract.

Regular readers also know that there is a proven solution for handling and ending a bank solvency led financial crisis:  the Swedish Model.  Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy and the social contract.

Our modern banking system is designed to support adoption of the Swedish Models.  Specifically, banks are capable of continuing to support the real economy even when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Banks are able to continue in operation because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

The zombie banks and economic destruction caused by these banks that the Economist finds are the result of pursuing the Japanese Model.

Banks are central to Europe’s prospects.
Since banks are central to Europe's prospects, it is important to understand how they are designed and to realize that the designers understood that there would be a time when excess debt once again existed in the financial system.

So the choice to have zombie banks is entirely the policymakers and financial regulators.
The fear, especially in peripheral economies, is a repeat of Japan’s experience in the 1990s, when “zombie” banks staggered along for years, neither healthy enough to lend to firms nor weak enough to collapse.
Given that global policymakers and financial regulators chose to pursue the Japanese Model, it is guaranteed that Japan's experience with zombie banks would occur in the EU, UK and US.
There are the same unvital signs in Europe. The average price-to-book ratio for European banks remains below one, suggesting that investors think lenders are worth more dead than alive.... 
Weren’t the Europeans supposed to be cleaning up their balance-sheets?...
Regulators worry that banks, rather than writing off or selling bad loans, have been fiddling with the models that dictate how much capital they need to hold. Danske Bank, a big Danish lender, was abruptly ordered by its supervisor to change its calculations last month, lowering its capital ratio. Denmark is outside the euro, but even German politicians joke about the nasty surprises in their banks’ balance-sheets.
None of this presages a full-scale collapse: European banks have more capital than they did before the start of the crisis. But lending is being throttled....
All of this applies in the UK. In the US, price to book is slightly higher, but these banks aren't lending either.

Please note that while lending is being throttled, banker pay has not been.
The second cure involves lifting the cloud of suspicion over European banks. 
The ECB will undertake an “asset-quality review” before it takes up the role of euro-zone banking supervisor next year. 
Previous stress tests by national supervisors were not tough enough—and convinced nobody. 
The asset-quality review is the ECB’s first and best chance to establish its credibility. 
Banks that fall short must be recapitalised—by raising fresh equity from private investors, by bailing in creditors and, in some cases, by bringing in public money. 
An asset-quality review suffers from the same problem as a stress-test.  Nobody believes the results.

Ireland did both with its banks and nobody believes the banks are solvent.  Greece and Spain have also done asset-quality reviews and stress-tests.

The reason that asset-quality reviews and stress-tests are not believable is that they are not accompanied by the requirement that banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency is needed so that market participants can independently confirm the results of the asset-quality review and stress-test.

Without the ability to independently review the results, a big red flag is waved in front of the market participants that says don't trust the results.

Saturday, July 6, 2013

ECB's Coeure: 'Zombie-banks' pose Japan-like threat

After almost six years of pretending that banks are not insolvent, the ECB executive board member Benoit Coeure tears down the facade and observes that the 'zombie-banks' pose a Japan-like threat to the real economy.

Specifically, Coeure focuses on the economic distortions that are brought about by these banks continuing to lend against and transform non-performing loans to 'zombie-loans'.

Policymakers and financial regulators in the EU, UK and US adopted the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis at the beginning of the crisis.  So it is not at all surprising to see these economies going through Japan's experience.

Under this model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.

The major cost of protecting bank book capital levels is that it transfers the burden of the excess debt onto the real economy.  Not only does this divert capital needed for reinvestment, growth and supporting the real economy to debt service, but it creates economic distortions in market competition (aka, pricing).

Regular readers know that there is only one way to end 'zombie banks' and the distortions they create.  Adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

The Swedish Model puts the burden of the excess debt on the banks where it belongs and frees the real economy to return to normal functioning.

Your humble blogger says the burden of the excess debt belongs on banks because they are designed to absorb the losses on this debt and protect the real economy.  Banks can absorb losses because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, when banks have low or negative book capital levels, taxpayers effectively become their silent equity partners.

European Central Bank Executive Board member Benoit Coeure warned Friday that the region's "Zombie Banks" could pose a danger to the Eurozone recovery and said lessons needed to be learned from Japan's so-called "lost decade" in order to prevent it from happening here. 
In prepared remarks for a speech at an investment conference in Paris, Coeure said banks that are reluctant to call in bad loans for fear of writing off existing capital were a real threat to the region's banking system if left unchecked. 
He also noted the regulatory capital requirements could give some banks the "perverse incentive" to extend credit to insolvent borrowers. 
"[Zombie bank] are a problem for regulators, because they have an incentive to take excessive risks, for example, by extending loans to ex-ante risky new customers," Coeure said. "A deeper concern, however, is that zombie banks may pose risks for medium to long-term growth if they engage in so-called "evergreening" of loans, which is often discussed with reference to Japan."... 
the Japanese government's strategy of guaranteeing the liabilities of struggling lenders "effectively kept wages high and prices low, reducing the profits that new productive firms generated and distorting market competition. As a result, even solvent banks had very few good lending opportunities and the economy remained stagnant throughout the 1990s."...
A major issue for Coeure, however, is the reliance many euro area banks have on the purchase of government debt. 
"Banks in countries under stress have, in particular, been investing in relatively risky government bonds, using cheap short-term funding, hoping to pocket the spread between the bond return and the cost of funding on the upside," he said. "This phenomenon shares unsavoury features with the behaviour of banks during Japan's lost decade."...

"This sovereign-bank nexus, whereby domestic banks become the main creditor to national governments, in return increasing the government's incentive to intervene in its banking sector, can become a threat to long-term economic recovery in the euro area. 
Unless both bank balance sheets and public finances are sanitised, and the link between the banks and sovereigns is broken, the euro area may indeed have a long recovery ahead of it, with insufficient loan supply to creditworthy enterprises, depressed productivity and high unemployment rates."

Sunday, June 23, 2013

BIS: Monetary stimulus is not answer

Four plus years after Anna Schwartz said that the policies being pursued by the Fed were wrong, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has come out with its conclusion that monetary stimulus is not the answer to fix the financial system and restore growth in the global economy.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying that monetary stimulus won't work since the beginning of the financial crisis (several months before Anna Schwartz, the pre-eminent economist on the Great Depression and Milton Friedman's co-author, made her observation in an interview with the Wall Street Journal).

The problem we face is bank solvency.  Specifically, the unwillingness of policymakers and financial regulators like the Fed to admit that the banks are insolvent and that they need to absorb upfront the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

As I predicted in late 2007, the underlying path for the real economy is a downward spiral until such time as the banks perform the function for which they are designed and absorb the losses on the excess debt.

The failure to use the banks as they are designed hurts both the real economy and the social contract.

The real economy is hurt because capital that is needed for growth and reinvestment is diverted to debt service on the excess debt.  In addition, capital is misallocated due to the distortion in prices caused by regulatory forbearance that lets assets continue to be tied up in 'zombie' loans.

The social contract is hurt because governments cut back on benefit programs to offset their increasing debt service burdens.

Fortunately, there is an answer to the bank solvency problem we face.  The answer is the Swedish Model.  Implementing this model was built into the global financial system during the Great Depression.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt.  This protects the real economy and the social programs.

Banks are able to absorb these losses and continue operating because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  When banks have low or negative book capital levels, deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner.

The Guardian's summary of the BIS report,

Central banks have done as much as they safely can to rebuild the world economy, and the onus is now on politicians to create the conditions for a stronger recovery, according to the Bank for International Settlements, the central bankers' club. 
In its annual report, published on Sunday, the bank, based in Basle, Switzerland, warns that with unprecedented stimulus already in place, fresh action from central banks to kick-start growth may do more harm than good, by distorting financial markets and jeopardising stability. 
"Unfortunately, central banks cannot do more without compounding the risks they have already created. Monetary stimulus alone cannot put economies on a path to robust, self-sustaining growth, because the roots of the problem preventing such growth are not monetary," said Stephen Cecchetti, head of the bank's monetary and economic department, presenting the report. 
The bank's intervention comes at a critical time, as the Federal Reserveis preparing the US public for the end of the quantitative easingprogramme under which it bought $85bn (£55bn) of bonds every month. In total, central banks in the world's major economies, including the US, UK and Japan, now own assets worth 25% of those countries' GDP. 
Stock and bond prices plunged across the world last week after Ben Bernanke, chairman of the Federal Reserve, announced that he planned to begin "tapering" quantitative easing by the end of the year. 
The regulating bank in Basle believes it is the right time for central banks to reconsider their role. "We are past the height of the crisis, and the goal of policy has changed – to return still sluggish economies to strong and sustainable growth. Can central banks now really do 'whatever it takes' to achieve that goal? As each day goes by, it seems less and less likely." 
Instead of more central bank stimulus, the bank would like to see governments take immediate action to repair public finances, finish the job of re-regulating the fragile banking sector and make markets work better. 
It warns that record low interest rates and quantitative easing on a huge scale have dulled the imperative for politicians to act. "After all, cheap money makes it easier to borrow than to save, easier to spend than to tax, easier to remain the same than to change," the report says. 
However, the bank does express concern about the knock-on effects of central banks withdrawing their emergency measures, including on emerging market economies, many of which have seen their currencies appreciate and their stock markets boom as investors have used the cheap money to invest in riskier assets. 
As the stimulus is withdrawn, and bond prices start to fall, interest rates – which move in the opposite direction – could jump. "An outsize increase in interest rates could lead to volatile capital flows and exchange rates, with corresponding adverse implications for global macroeconomic and financial stability," the report warns. 
The International Monetary Fund also expressed fears in a recent paper that interest rates could rocket as quantitative easing comes to an end if investors "run for the door". 

Wednesday, June 12, 2013

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane: Central bank created bond bubble threatens financial system

In his testimony before Parliament, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane made clear that the greatest threat to financial stability was the central bank zero interest rate/quantitative easing induced bond bubble.

Regular readers know that Mr. Haldane is accurate in his assessment and that the pursuit of ZIRP and QE was totally and completely unnecessary as a response to the bank solvency led financial crisis.

As your humble blogger has been saying since before the financial crisis spiraled out of control in 2008, the way to deal with this crisis is to adopt the Swedish Model and require banks to absorb upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

Please note, the only way to end Mr. Haldane's concern about unwinding ZIRP and QE and triggering financial instability is to adopt the Swedish Model with a twist.  The twist being that the banks "pay" for their having been bailed out by "donating" their holdings of government securities to the issuing sovereigns.

Will this make the vast majority of banks have low or even negative book capital levels?

Yes, but modern banks are designed because of the presence of deposit insurance and central banks to be able to continue operating and supporting the real economy when they have low or negative book capital levels.  They can do so because with deposit insurance the taxpayers act as the banks' silent equity partners.

A key Bank of England policymaker has warned of the risks to global financial stability when "the biggest bond bubble in history" bursts. 
In a wide-ranging testimony to MPs, Andy Haldane, Bank of England director of financial stability,... told the Treasury select committee that the bursting of the bond bubble – created by central banks forcing down bond yields by pumping electronic money into the economy – was a risk "I feel acutely right now"....

But he described bond markets as the main risk to financial stability. 
"If I were to single out what for me would be biggest risk to global financial stability right now it would be a disorderly reversion in the yields of government bonds globally." he said. 
There had been "shades of that" in recent weeks as government bond yields have edged higher amid talk that central banks, particularly the US Federal Reserve, will start to reduce its stimulus. 
"Let's be clear. We've intentionally blown the biggest government bond bubble in history," Haldane said. "We need to be vigilant to the consequences of that bubble deflating more quickly than [we] might otherwise have wanted."

Thursday, June 6, 2013

European Commission cites risk of financial contagion to defend not restructuring Greece debt earlier

The Guardian reports that the European Commission is defending its failure to restructure the Greek (Irish, Portuguese, Spanish, ...) debt at the outset of the financial crisis citing the risk of financial contagion.

And what is financial contagion?

In theory, financial contagion is a domino effect through the banking system where the failure of one banks triggers the failure of other banks.

But does financial contagion exist in our global modern banking system?

No.  Banks have the capacity to absorb significant losses as they are designed to be able to operate with low or even negative book capital levels and still support the real economy.

Banks are able to do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funds.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

But don't banks need to be recapitalized immediately after they have absorbed the losses on the excess public and private debt?

No.  Again, the taxpayers are effectively backstopping the banks, so it is as if the banks had unlimited equity.  As a result, the banks can rebuild their book capital levels over several years by retaining 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

But won't depositors get nervous if the banks have low or negative book capital levels?

No.  There are two types of core depositors.

One type holds deposits that are below the deposit guarantee level and they trust that the government will honor its guarantee.

The second type of depositors is a business that has a reason, like making payroll, for holding deposits with the banks.  They too are insensitive to how much capital the bank has unless policymakers and financial regulators plan on seizing these excess deposit a la Cyprus to bail-in and recapitalize the bank.

So why are policymakers citing the risk of financial contagion to defend themselves against not restructuring excess public and private debt sooner?

Because policymakers were following the advice of the bankers advising them.  As shown by the European Commission, it was easy to succumbed to the irresistible temptation to push the losses onto the taxpayers and "protect" the banks.

In reality, all putting the losses on the taxpayer did was to protect the bankers' bonuses and shift who suffered as a result of the losses from the banks to the taxpayers.

The IMF criticism and the commission's defence of its performance boil down to a dispute over whether Greece's staggering debt level should have been restructured early in 2010 when the troika was fixing the terms for the bailout. 
While the IMF takes the view now that it was a cardinal error not to restructure, the commission argues strongly that there were too many unknowns, the risks were huge, such a move could have unleashed a rollercoaster of panic across the eurozone, and there was not yet any real eurozone firewall or bailout funds in place.
Actually, all the necessary firewalls have been in place for decades.

It would have been armageddon for banker bonuses, but this seems like a reasonable outcome given that the bankers were the ones who took on the risk in the first place.
"Even assuming it was inevitable and the only solution, the risks associated with an early Greek debt restructuring were huge," according to the commission. 
The European Commission is confirming that it knew what the only solution to end the financial crisis was (adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize the losses upfront) and that it instead chose to protect bank balance sheet and banker bonuses at all costs (the Japanese Model).
"The whirlpool in the financial markets in early 2010 was only beginning to subside, the banking system was extremely fragile and it was not possible to estimate financial and psychological effects of the largest bond restructuring in history or its potential ripples to the real economy of the euro area. Against this background, later restructuring allowed for time to build firewall capacity. An earlier restructuring would have also entailed risks of systemic contagion."
By 2010, governments around the world had put the financial system on life support.  Recognizing the losses that everyone knew were on the bank balance sheets would not have triggered panic.  In fact, it would have triggered relief.

Later restructuring allowed the banks time to offload their losses onto the taxpayers while the bankers continued to pocket their bonuses.  Not a good outcome for the taxpayers.

Tuesday, June 4, 2013

WSJ's Jason Zweig looks at how trust in the financial markets is easy lose, hard to restore

In his Wall Street Journal column, Jason Zweig touches on one of the key unaddressed problems created by the financial crisis:  a lost of trust.

Mr. Zweig discusses how important trust is not just to the normal functioning of the financial markets, but to the broader economy at large.

You can summarize the outcome of the financial crisis in one sentence: Good things happened to bad people, and bad things happened to good people. Some people who contributed to the crisis kept hundreds of millions of dollars apiece in compensation and will spend the rest of their lives in luxury. The victims of the crisis—borrowers, taxpayers and investors—have spent the ensuing years trying to regain some of what they lost. 
As I wrote in early 2010, this kind of outcome violates a basic psychological need. 
Humans can’t live normal lives without believing in what psychologists have christened “positive illusions.” Among them are overconfidence, the belief that we know more than we do; the illusion of control, the sense that we have more power over what happens around us than we do; and unrealistic optimism, the tendency to think positive things are more likely to happen to us than to other people. 
If we honestly accepted how little we know, how little we can control and how little advantage we have over other people, we wouldn’t be able to get out of bed in the morning. 
As the Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman has said, “The combination of optimism and overconfidence is one of the main forces that keep capitalism alive.” 
Another positive illusion is known as “belief in a just world.” Although we all know full well that it isn’t true, humans need to believe that we generally get what we deserve, with good things happening to good people and bad things happening to bad ones. The fact that it’s an illusion is beside the point. ... 
A study published in 2009 concluded that when people don’t believe the world is just, they become significantly less willing to wait for a financial gain. After all, if you can’t be sure that you usually will get what you deserve, why would you ever trust a counterparty to honor its contracts or promises?
Please re-read the last paragraph and consider that the global policymakers and financial regulators adopted the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under this model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.  

By protecting the banks and bankers from the losses they should have experienced, global policymakers and financial regulators effectively undermined the both the financial system and the global economy.

That this was known and documented in 2009 and global policymakers and financial regulators continue to pursue the Japanese Model is truly amazing.  In the name of saving the financial system and the global economy, policymakers and financial regulators have aggressively pursued policies known to destroy both the financial system and the global economy.
If ever there was an ideal example of an “unjust world” in the eyes of some people, Wall Street of the past few years is it. 
What, then, would it take to restore trust and to revive belief in a just world?
Restoring trust and reviving belief in a just world require two related steps.

First, the global policymakers and financial regulators must adopt the Swedish Model and require that banks recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system. While it is belated, adopting the Swedish Model means that the losses in the financial system are absorbed by the firms and individuals who created the losses.

In addition, having the banks absorb the losses protects the real economy as capital that is needed for reinvestment, growth and the social contract is no longer diverted to debt service.


Second, banks must be require to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is only with this information that market participants can exert restraint on both risk taking by banks and banker behavior (sunlight is the best disinfectant).

Friday, May 31, 2013

Noah Smith and what does it mean to have "predicted the crisis"

In an excellent post, Noah Smith asks the question of what does it mean to have "predicted the crisis" and then challenges anyone who claims to have "predicted the crisis" to examine their track record in light of his analysis.

Naturally, your humble blogger thought this would be an interesting exercise to apply to oneself because I frequently mention that I "predicted the crisis" and the success or failure of the different responses to the crisis.
Since 2008, quite a lot of people have boldly claimed that they "predicted the crisis". 
I confess to having made this claim.
Usually, the claimants use this "fact" to argue for the superiority of their economic school of thought, modeling approach, investing approach, or personal intuition.
I confess that I have in fact used not only my prediction of the crisis, but also the accuracy of my predictions of the success or failure of the various policy responses to the crisis to argue for my approach, the FDR Framework.
But what does it mean to have "predicted the crisis"? 
First of all, there are different things that get labeled "the crisis". These include: 
1. The big drop in U.S. housing prices that started in 2007. 
2. The systemic collapse of the U.S. financial industry that began in 2008. 
3. The deep recession and the long stagnation that began in late 2008. 
Predicting one of these is not the same as predicting the others. 
It is possible, for example, to have missed the housing bubble and the finance industry collapse, but to have successfully predicted, after seeing these events happen, that a deep recession and long stagnation would be the result; this is what Marco Del Negro et al. claim to have done, and a number of pundits and commentators made informal recession predictions after housing peaked in 2006. 
Alternatively, it is possible to have predicted the bursting of the housing bubble without foreseeing the systemic damage that this would cause to the financial system; many writers, such as Bill McBride, Dean Baker, and Nouriel Roubini, seem to have done this (and of course, Robert Shiller). 
It is also possible to have predicted the collapse of the big banks and their mortgage-backed bonds - and made money off of this - while staying agnostic about the macroeconomic consequences; this seems to have made a lot of money for investors like Steve Eisman and John Paulson. 
Of course, in theory it might have been possible to predict all three events.
For the record, my predictions applied to the collapse of the global financial system and what it would take to avoid the deep recession and long stagnation that has occurred since the crisis began on August 9, 2007.
Then there's the question of what it means to "predict" something. Here are some alternative definitions: 
1. You could predict the timing of an event, e.g. when the housing bubble would burst. 
2. You could predict the size or severity of an event, e.g. how much house prices would decline or how much the economy would contract in 2009. 
3. You could predict the duration of an event, e.g. how long our economy would stagnate after the recession, or how long it would be before housing prices reached their pre-crash peak. 
4. You could describe the particular characteristics of an event, e.g. what would cause banks to fail, or whether they would be bailed out, or whether inflation would remain subdued after the recession.
My predictions fall into Mr. Smith's third and fourth category.

Caroline Salas and Bloomberg reported on December 4, 2007 that I was saying the solution for moderating the seizure of the credit markets driven by the toxic subprime mortgage bonds was to make them transparent so that market participants could accurately value them.

For example, Paul Kix and the Boston Magazine reported that I was saying in February 2008 that because of opacity in structured finance securities we faced a downward economic spiral until such time as transparency was brought to these securities.

Subsequently, but well before September 2008, I expanded the need for transparency to apply to all the opaque corners of the financial system, including banks.

After the financial crisis hit, my predictions, many of which are on this blog, then shifted to would a policy response or combination of policy responses policy makers and regulators were pursuing work or not work to end our ongoing financial crisis.

Just to remove any doubt about what policy responses I predicted would work, I have written extensively about the Swedish Model under which banks are required to recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.
Next, there is the question of with what degree of confidence you make a prediction. Saying "this event is a conceivable possibility" is different than saying "the risk of this event is high," which is different from saying "the risk of this event has increased," which is different from saying "this event will happen."
Regular readers of my blog know I don't BS when I make a prediction.  My predictions are all of the variety that "this event will happen."

For example, I predicted that BlackRock assessing individual banks would not restore confidence in the Irish, Greek or Spanish banking system.  In fact, it didn't.
Also, there is the question of how far in advance a prediction was made. That could be important.
Each of my predictions was made when there was still time for policy makers and regulators to listen to the prediction and choose a different policy response that would have been successful.
Finally, there is the question of whether the prediction was made by a model or by a human. 
If it's a model, then there's the hope that humanity has a tool with which to predict future crisis events.
Fortunately, my predictions were based on a model:  the FDR Framework.  The Swedish Model, which is the response to a bank solvency led financial crisis, is a component of the FDR Framework.

I confess, I hope the FDR Framework is not used as a model to predict future crisis events.  Rather, the FDR Framework is a model for how the financial system is suppose to work so that a future crisis can be avoided.

Simply put, what made our current crisis possible was the financial regulators allowed opacity into large corners of the financial system.  If we don't let this happen in the future, we shouldn't have another opacity driven financial crisis.
Anyway, how should we evaluate these claims? 
There are so many different combination of "predictions" and "crises" here that it's very difficult to lay out an explicit taxonomy of who got it "more right," and who got it "less right." 
As a more humble goal, we can examine a specific individual or model, and identify which events he/she/it predicted, with what degree of confidence, and when.
When you look at which events I predicted, the degree of confidence of the prediction and the timing of the prediction, the FDR Framework stacks up incredibly well against any of the alternatives.

Monday, May 27, 2013

Paul Krugman on "Japan the Model"

In his New York Times' column, Professor Paul Krugman looks at Japan's pursuit of aggressive monetary policy combined with a dose of fiscal stimulus as the model for ending what he sees as the lack of effort by policymakers to fix the global economy.
So the overall verdict on Japan’s effort to turn its economy around is so far, so good. And let’s hope that this verdict both stands and strengthens over time. 
For if Abenomics works, it will serve a dual purpose, giving Japan itself a much-needed boost and the rest of us an even more-needed antidote to policy lethargy. 
As I said at the beginning, at this point the Western world has seemingly succumbed to a severe case of economic defeatism; we’re not even trying to solve our problems. That needs to change — and maybe, just maybe, Japan can be the instrument of that change.
Please re-read Professor Krugman's comments as he has identified a critical problem:  "we're not even trying to solve our problems."

The reason that we are no longer trying to solve our problems is that it means acknowledging what has been done so far did not fix the economic problems.

And this opens up Pandora's Box for policymakers who have adopted the Japanese Model and chosen to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

It opens up Pandora's Box because it is clear that the combinations of austerity/monetary stimulus and fiscal stimulus/monetary stimulus have both failed.  As Professor Joseph Stiglitz said in a Bloomberg article,
“Clearly the economy is not back to normal, and to accept this as the new normal would be really wrong.”
Regular readers know that there is a proven solution for ending a bank solvency led financial crisis like the crisis we are currently experiencing.  That solution is the Swedish Model.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.  This removes from the real economy the burden of servicing the excess debt and ends the diversion of capital that is needed for reinvestment, growth and to support the social programs.

Since the 1930s when the US first implemented the Swedish Model, banks have been designed to absorb the losses on the excess debt and continue to operate and support the real economy.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, taxpayers are effectively the banks silent equity partner when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  Capital levels that can be rebuilt over several years through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

As Professor Krugman rightly points out, we are not trying to solve our economic problem.  In fact, this is a choice of the policymakers under advice from the bankers.

After all, the bankers stand to lose their cash bonuses if we fix the excess debt problem with the economy.

So long as policymakers don't try to solve our economic problems, the bankers benefit and it is society that bears the costs.

As your humble blogger has said since the beginning of the financial crisis, the question is "When" will policymakers put their countrymen ahead of the bankers?

Friday, May 24, 2013

Martin Wolf and Ken Rogoff agree: "it is not too late to change course"

The Financial Times' Martin Wolf and Harvard professor Ken Rogoff have taken different paths, but they both agree that the current approach to handling the bank solvency led global financial crisis that began on August 9, 2007 is not working and that "it is not too late to change course".

Mr. Wolf sets out in his column what would be included in this change of course.
The right approach to a crisis of this kind is to use everything: policies that strengthen the banking system; policies that increase private sector incentives to invest; expansionary monetary policies; and, last but not least, the government’s capacity to borrow and spend.
Professor Rogoff lays out in his Guardian column what he thinks is wrong with the current approach and therefore what should be included in this change of course.
No one seems to have the power to impose a sensible resolution of its peripheral countries' debt crisis. Instead of restructuring the manifestly unsustainable debt burdens of Portugal, Ireland, and Greece (the PIGs), politicians and policymakers are pushing for ever-larger bailout packages with ever-less realistic austerity conditions.
Interestingly, both Mr. Wolf and Professor Rogoff have come to champion your humble blogger's blueprint for fixing the financial crisis.

For both individuals, the starting point is dealing with the excess debt in the global financial system.  As Professor Rogoff points out:
In a debt restructuring, the northern eurozone countries (including France) will see hundreds of billions of euros go up in smoke.... These hundreds of billions of euros are already lost, and the game of pretending otherwise cannot continue indefinitely....

But the sooner the underlying reality is made transparent and becomes widely recognised, the lower the long-run cost will be.

The way to deal with this excess public and private debt is by adopting the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to absorb upfront the losses on this debt.

By having the banks absorb the losses on the excess debt, the burden of servicing this debt is lifted from the real economy.  Currently, capital that is needed for reinvestment, growth and supporting the social contract is being diverted to servicing this debt.  Ending this diversion will boost the growth rate of the real economy.

Regular readers know that a modern banking system is designed so that the banks can absorb these losses and still continue to operate and support the real economy.

Banks can do this as a result of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, when banks have low or negative book capital levels, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner.

After absorbing the losses, the banks then rebuild their book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

To make sure the bankers don't gamble on redemption while the banks are rebuilding their book capital levels, banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can exert discipline on the bankers to restrain risk taking.

Once the losses have been recognized, to jumpstart the economy, governments need to adopt fiscal stimulus.

At the same time, central banks need to remove the economic headwinds caused by zero interest rate policies and quantitative easing.  They need to restore short term interest rates to Walter Bagehot's lower bound of 2%.

Increasing interest rates from zero to two percent is actually good for economic growth as it ends the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Zero interest rates triggered this death spiral as savers, both individuals and companies, reduced their current consumption to offset the lack of earnings on their retirement savings.

Wednesday, May 22, 2013

Who prevented the second Great Depression?

Since the beginning of our current financial crisis, policy makers and central bankers have continually used as justification for their policies the claim that no matter how distasteful their policies are necessary to prevent a second Great Depression.

This raises an interesting question.  In response to the Great Depression, did the policy makers in the 1930s put in place a financial system to prevent another Great Depression or not?

Current policy makers would like to claim that the Dodd-Frank Act is all about preventing another Great Depression.  If current policy makers were focused on preventing another Great Depression, there is no reason to assume that policy makers in the 1930s did not have the same agenda.  Particularly because the policy makers in the 1930s were living through and had first hand experience with the Great Depression.

Furthermore, if policy maker in the 1930s did have the agenda of preventing another Great Depression, is it possible that their policy prescriptions alone were adequate to have prevented our current financial crisis from becoming the second Great Depression?

Regular readers know that the 1930s policy makers did in fact put in place all the elements that were necessary for dealing with our current financial crisis and avoiding a second Great Depression.  These policy makers assumed that the lessons of the Great Depression would be forgotten (after all, bankers are very good salespeople) and that another period of excess credit creation could occur.

The 1930s policy makers put in place the elements necessary for dealing with the excess credit in the financial system.  Specifically, they understood that the Swedish Model is the way to deal with a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and protect the real economy and the social contract.

The 1930s policy makers designed banks to be able to absorb losses should there ever be a credit bubble and still continue to support the real economy.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partners during the years the banks are retaining pre-banker bonus earnings and rebuilding their book capital levels after absorbing the losses on the excess debt.

The 1930s policy makers also put in place the concept of automatic economic stabilizer programs.

So what did our current policy makers contribute to handling our current financial crisis and preventing a second Great Depression?

First, they adopted of the Japanese Model.  Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.  As a result, the burden of the excess debt is put on the real economy where it diverts capital needed for reinvestment, growth and the social contract to debt service.

So rather than use the financial system as it is designed and bringing an end to our current financial crisis, our current policy makers chose to maximize both the length of our financial crisis and the damage the financial crisis does to the real economy and the social contract.

Of course, the choices made by our current policy makers haven't hurt everyone.  For bankers and their bonuses, it is close to if not the best of times.

Second, despite our current policy makers' claim to have prevented a second Great Depression, this claim is premature until such time as the excess debt has been purged from the financial system and all programs adopted to deal with our current financial crisis are ended.

An example of the programs that must be ended are monetary policies like zero interest rate and quantitative easing.  What will happen to the real economy and the financial markets when central banks try to unwind these policies?  Will unwinding these policies precipitate the second Great Depression our current policy makers claim to have prevented?

Monday, May 20, 2013

Who you gonna bet on to end the financial crisis & fix global financial system?

In his NY Times blog, Professor Paul Krugman once again rises to the defense of the economics profession.  This time, he makes the case for why track record is important when deciding who to listen to for advice on how to end the financial crisis and fix the global financial system.

Peter Radford in his blog, Real-world Economics Review, who examines Professor Krugman's response and makes the case for why the response fails:

In his discussion this morning he is critical of a defense of the hedge fund managers made by Jesse Eisinger. That defense rests on the notion that economists have no clue about the economy as demonstrated by their inability to predict the bubble and subsequent collapse. 
There were, of course, many economists who did predict the bubble, but they were not influential enough to have an impact. They remain mostly without influence due to their being outside the profession’s orthodox traditions.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Radford has nicely summarized that it was the non-mainstream economists who predicted the bubble and that they lack the ability to influence the profession.
Krugman, however, defends the profession against Eisinger’s criticism, and this is where he goes wrong. 
It does not matter that some economists were correct. 
The central orthodoxy of the profession, the source of most advice to policy makers and business people, and the basis of most commonly taught textbooks, totally missed both the possibility and then the existence of  the bubble. Economics was horribly wrong.
Please re-read the highlighted text as your humble blogger has been saying and ironically Professor Krugman agrees with the notion that policy makers should not listen to economists or business people who totally missed both the possibility and then the existence of the bubble.

As the Bank of England's Robert Jenkins observed, it was amazing to watch policy makers turn for advice to the very bankers who created the bubble.

As I added, it was even more amazing to watch policy makers also turn for advice to economists who rely on models that exclude the financial sector.

In their search for advice, the only individuals the policy makers were unwilling to turn to for advice were individuals like myself who predicted the financial crisis and offered before the crisis began a solution for how to moderate the impact of the bubble's bursting.
It hasn’t recovered since. 
Instead it is stuck in an unproductive self-examination that has yet to have much impact. 
Those who were wrong still pronounce and influence policy. They continue unabashedly to teach and perpetuate their errors. 
The profession, such as it is, is splintered into ideological warring camps making no progress towards a newer or more complete understanding of actual economies where things like asset price bubbles can, and evidently do, exist. 
In short economics is a mess and is completely deserving of the skepticism Eisinger attributes to the hedge fund managers.
After all many of them made fortunes by ignoring economic theory, recognizing the bubble, and shorting sub-prime assets. People who have made fortunes by thinking about the real economy and then risking their assets based upon that thinking [or by predicting the financial crisis], have a right to look down on a bunch of academics who opine about theories whose proof only ever resides in carefully constructed and highly constrained alternative worlds known as models. 
To win the respect of hedge fund managers, and anyone else out there in the real world for that matter, academic economists need to demonstrate a commitment to learning from their errors and toss aside erroneous theories. They need to stop regurgitating the same old stuff – some of which dates back to bygone eras and thus predates the development of our modern economy.
A modern economy that regular readers know is based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).
This is not to say, naturally, that old ideas are necessarily wrong. But a social science like economics has to recognize that societies change and that the ‘social’ part of a social science provides the relevant context for the ‘science’ part. 
Ideas may, therefore, not be timeless. If economists want us to believe they are, then they need to prove that point, and not simply assume it. 
Economists still are stuck within an anachronistic vision of what they do. They may have stellar reputations as responsible professionals within academia,
Reinhart and Rogoff showed that a stellar reputation as an academic economist is worthless from the standpoint of anyone turning to them for policy recommendations.

Unlike most other academic disciplines, economics has no minimum standard for its peer review articles.  So being published should not be taken as a sign that the authors know what they are talking about.
but, by and large, their relationship with society at large seems amateurish and somewhat naive. Indeed they oftentimes deny its existence, preferring instead to remain engaged in scholarly debate within their respective academic bastions....
Fed Chairman Bernanke best exemplified the economic profession's relationship with society when he became visibly upset with consumers for not spending more when the Fed adopted zero interest rate policies (after all, that's what the Fed's model that failed to predict the financial crisis said should happen) and with investors for not rebalancing their investment portfolios to riskier securities.
Krugman wants us to believe that economics is still deserving of respect. But what about the current mess within the profession is so deserving? 
More to the point, and I have argued this before, given the great fractures and ideological splinters within economics, and given the often totally contradictory nature of different economist’s views, on what basis, exactly, does an outsider rest his or her trust? Who do they turn to for reliable advice? 
And how do they identify an economist’s credentials at all? ...
Please note that economics is one of the few fields of academic study where many of its leading thinkers were not trained economists (see: Adam Smith and the invisible hand; Walter Bagehot and the modern central bank).
Put it this way: in light of the evident failure of economic orthodoxy in recent years, were you in need of advice regarding the real economy would you turn to an academic economist? 
Or would you trust your own experience?  Clearly many hedge fund managers and business people choose their own experience. 
And that says a lot about the state of economics, doesn’t it?
Had policy makers turned to individuals like myself for advice regarding the real economy, they would have been told to adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize upfront their losses on all the excess debt in the financial system.

The Swedish Model is the only known solution for a bank solvency led financial crisis.  It has numerous advantages including it protects the real economy and the social contract.

Furthermore, the Swedish Model is supported by the design of a modern banking system.

However, the Swedish Model is not an economic model.  It is simply the solution for what ails us.

Wednesday, May 15, 2013

Almost 6 years after financial crisis began, consensus emerging there is no sovereign debt crisis in EU

In his Reuters Macroscope post, Pedro da Costa explains how a consensus is emerging that the EU is not facing a sovereign debt crisis, but rather a bank solvency led financial crisis.

This is very important because the cure for a bank solvency led financial crisis is well known: adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize upfront all their losses on the excess private and public debt in the financial system.

Modern banks are designed to absorb these losses and continue operating and supporting the real economy.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  When banks have low or negative book capital levels, deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner.
Instead, argues Blyth, it is merely a sequel to the U.S. financial meltdown that started, like its American counterpart, with dangerously-indebted risk-taking on the part of a super-sized banking sector.
In a new book entitled “Austerity: The history of a dangerous idea,” Blythe writes that sovereign budgets have come under strain primarily because taxpayers of various nations have been forced to shoulder the burden of failed banking systems.
Taxpayers have been forced to shoulder the burden because they are being called on to bailout the banks when the banks are perfectly capable of rebuilding their book capital levels through retention of future earnings.

Taxpayers have also been forced to shoulder the burden because the banks have not been required to recognize the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  As a result, the taxpayers and the real economy are called on to make the debt service payments on this excess debt.  This diverts capital that is needed for reinvestment, growth and support of the social contract.
"The way austerity is being represented by both politicians and the media – as the payback for something called the ‘sovereign debt crisis,’ supposedly brought on by states that apparently ‘spent too much’ – is a quite fundamental misrepresentation of the facts.  
These problems, including the crisis in the bond markets, started with the banks and will end with the banks. 
The current mess is not a sovereign debt crisis generated by excessive spending for anyone except the Greeks. For everyone else, the problem is the banks that sovereigns have to take responsibility for, especially in the euro zone. That we call it a ‘sovereign debt crisis’ suggests a very interesting politics of ’bait and switch’ at play."
No surprise that bankers and politicians would engage in 'bait and switch'.  After all, the policies that have been adopted were designed to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

This has meant putting the bankers ahead of honoring the social contract or serving the best interests of the taxpayers.
So why all the misunderstanding? Why has the crisis become conflated with a government debt problem in the public imagination? 
According to Blythe, this is a convenient way for Wall Street to again saddle the state with massive banking sector losses.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Blythe it is simply marketing by Wall Street to avoid the consequences of its losses and to keep its bonuses flowing in an uninterrupted fashion.
The cost of bailing, recapitalizing, and otherwise saving the global banking system has been, depending on how you count it, between 3 and 13 trillion dollars. 
Most of that ended up on the balance sheets of governments as they absorb the costs of the bust, which is why we mistakenly call this a sovereign debt crisis when in fact it is a transmuted and well-camouflaged banking crisis.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Blythe provides an estimate of how much money the bankers should be reimbursing governments and taxpayers for as a result of their management of the banking system.

Sunday, May 12, 2013

Spanish prelate sides with Elliott's Paul Singer to tell Paul Krugman that response to financial crisis destroying society

As reported by the Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, the Spanish prelate has weighed in on the side of Elliott's Paul Singer against Paul Krugman and called for a change in the policies adopted to deal with the bank solvency led financial crisis so that society does not collapse.

Professor Krugman wrote a post in his NY Times blog in which he defended the policies run by Ben Bernanke, the Fed and other central banks as
just what the textbook says you should be doing.
As regular readers know, the economic textbooks are wrong.

This fact is not surprising because leading up to our current financial crisis the models used by economists did not include the banking sector.

This fact is not surprising because even though the global central bankers claim to have read Walter Bagehot's Lombard Street, in which he "invented" the modern central bank, their response to the financial crisis has broken a number of the rules he laid out.  For example,

  • Central banks are suppose to lend freely at high rates of interest against good collateral; or
  • Central banks are suppose to keep interest rates at or above 2% as rates below 2% bring about a change in the behavior of savers.
Regular readers know that there is one response that works every time when dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis.  That response is to adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize upfront their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

The Swedish Model protects society as the banks absorbing the losses spares the real economy from diverting capital needed for reinvestment, growth and the social contract to debt service on the excess debt.

Regular readers know that under the FDR Framework, banks are designed to absorb these losses and continue to support the real economy.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

Unfortunately, the Swedish Model has not yet been adopted to deal with our current financial crisis.  Instead, policymakers and central bankers have adopted the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs and the burden of servicing the excess debt in the financial system is placed on the real economy.

The results have been predictable (I know, I predicted them).  The global economy is in a Japan-style economic slump and the social contract is being rewritten to the benefit of the rich at the expense of the poor.

As the Spanish prelate said,
"We have to change direction, otherwise this is going to bring down whole political systems," said Braulio Rodriguez, the Archbishop of Toledo. 
"It is very dangerous. Unemployment has reached tremendous levels and austerity cuts don't seem to be producing results," he told The Telegraph.
Austerity will never produce a positive result when facing a bank solvency led financial crisis.  I have been making this point since the beginning of the crisis.
"There is deep unease across the whole society, and it is not just in Spain. We have to give people some hope or this is going to foment conflict and mutual hatred." 
Europe's Catholic bishops have been careful not to stray into the political debate or criticise EU economic strategy but the Archbishop said the current course is untenable.
There are two reasons that the current course is untenable.

First, it is not fixing the underlying problems.

Second, it is causing untold damage to society.
"The Vatican has always been an enthusiast for Europe, but a Europe of solidarity where we help each other, not a Europe of coal and steel. Whether this is possible depends on Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel," he said. 
Unemployment in Spain has reached 6.2m, or 27pc, despite a growing diaspora of young Spaniards seeking work in Britain, Germany, Brazil, or the Gulf, and an exodus of immigrants returning home. Spain's population fell by 0.7pc last year. 
The jobless rate in the Toledo region of Castilla-La Mancha is 31pc. The rate for youth has jumped to 64pc from 14pc at the peak of the credit bubble. 
Spain has largely avoided the sort of street clashes seen in Greece. People have coped with stoicism, drawing on the deep strengths of Spanish family support. Yet the authority of the state is eroding. A new Metroscopia poll shows that 87pc of voters have lost confidence in premier Mariano Rajoy.
Confidence in the state should erode because it is being run for the benefit of the bankers and not for the benefit of its citizens.
El Mundo fears a slow-fermenting 'crisis of the regime', with almost every institution -- including the monarchy -- in disrepute. It likens the mood to "pre-revolutionary" France in the late 1780s. 
The Archbishop, speaking in the austere episcopal palace of Spain's ancient capital, said the current crisis is doing far more damage than the recession in the mid-1990s when unemployment briefly spiked above 24pc. On that occasion peseta devaluations let Spain regain competitiveness and recover gradually despite austerity cuts. 
This time the country seems trapped in slump. The long-term jobless rate is much higher. 
Unemployment benefits taper off after six months, and stop after two years. There are almost two million households where no family member has a job. 
Europe's Catholic bishops know first-hand from their Cor Unum charitable network just how desperate it has become. "We can try to mitigate the effects by giving basic help to people left totally unprotected, but we can't create jobs," said the Archbishop. 
"We are seeing families who used to middle class needing help. This is totally new. As a matter of honour, they won't come to us until they have exhausted everything,"
As we approach the sixth anniversary of the beginning of our current financial crisis, it is time to acknowledge that the response to the financial crisis has been a failure.  If it were a success, policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing would no longer be pursued.

The time has come to adopt the Swedish Model.  

History shows that within a year of adopting the Swedish Model the bank solvency led financial crisis is over and growth has returned to the real economy.