Showing posts with label UK. Show all posts
Showing posts with label UK. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

UK's Andrew Tyrie wants banks to publish risk exposure by trader

The Guardian reports that the UK's Andrew Tyrie, the member of Parliament who headed the commission on banking standards, wants banks to publish risk exposure by trader so that the new Prudential Regulatory Authority can monitor proprietary trading.

By making this recommendation, Mr. Tyrie shows that he understands that disclosure of exposure details is more effective at minimizing proprietary trading than legislation or regulation.

However, Mr. Tyrie stops short of asking for disclosure that would be truly effective in ending proprietary trading by the banks.  Truly effective disclosure requires disclosing each bank's exposure details to all market participants.

What makes disclosure to all market participants effective at ending proprietary trading is these market participants could trade against the bank so as to minimize the bank's profits and maximize its losses from proprietary trading.

As shown by JP Morgan's London Whale trade, disclosure to regulators is not going to result in a reduction in proprietary trading.

Furthermore, regulators are trained not to approve or disapprove of any exposure that a bank takes on whether it is a proprietary trade or not.  The reason regulators don't approve or disapprove of individual exposures is that it gets the regulators into making decisions as to how capital is allocated by the financial system.

The Bank of England is under pressure from parliamentarians to crack down on banks that use their own money to take potentially risky bets on the financial markets. 
On only his second day at the helm of the new Prudential Regulation Authority inside the central bank, Andrew Bailey faces questions on how he would monitor proprietary trading. 
In a letter from Andrew Tyrie, the Conservative MP who chairs the parliamentary commission on banking standards, Bailey was reminded of the findings of the commission's report into 'prop trading'. 
The report fell short of calling for a US-style Volcker rule banning some elements of trading, but said that the PRA should ask banks to publish the risk exposures taken by their traders, with the regulator then reporting to parliament each year on the scale of the activities.
Your humble blogger has said repeatedly that the way to enforce the Volcker Rule is to require the banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can exert discipline so that the banks do not engage in proprietary trading.
"We concluded that proprietary trading is not a suitable activity for UK-headquartered banks to engage in, due to both the prudential and cultural risks it carries," Tyrie said in the letter. "However, we also concluded that it would not be appropriate to attempt immediate legislative prohibition of such activity. 
"Instead we recommended that the PRA should monitor indicators of whether banks appear to be engaging in proprietary trading," Tyrie said, although he raised the prospect of a Volcker rule being introduced in the future. 
The PRA should "bear down" on any such trading by demanding banks hold more capital against those activities or be prohibited from conducting such trading through "variations of permission" by the new regulator, Tyrie said.
Capital requirements are a very inefficient way of addressing proprietary trading.  In fact, increasing capital requirements could cause the bank to take bigger risks with its proprietary trading to cover the cost of capital. 
He also asked Bailey whether any legislative changes were needed to enable the PRA to demand that banks report the extent of their trading activities. 
The banks that appeared before the commission said they were not currently involved in proprietary trading. "The PRA must exercise its judgment. It should hold the banks to their word. If the PRA concludes, after a period, that it lacks the authority or the tools to carry out this work, it should make clear to parliament where the current legislation or tools fall short," Tyrie said.
In fact, there is no need for legislative changes to have the banks report their exposure details to all market participants.  Like the US, the UK has disclosure rules that are based on the notion of ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.


Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Guardian's Seamus Milne calls for change in policy to save real economy

In his Guardian column, Seamus Milne channels what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis and makes the case for adopting the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency crisis to save the EU and UK economies.

Europe's flesheaters are back. The claim that the worst of the eurozone crisis is behind us now looks foolish.
Please recall that your humble blogger predicted at the beginning of the financial crisis that until transparency was brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system that the global economy would spiral downwards (despite the best efforts at economic stimulus by central banks and governments).
The deal forced on Cyprus by the German-led Troika at the weekend isn't a bailout: it will effectively destroy the island's economy. Instead of getting a grip on its grossly inflated banks, it will impose a brutal credit contraction, combined with sweeping cuts and privatisations, wiping out perhaps a quarter of Cyprus's national income. Ordinary Cypriots, not Russian oligarchs, will pay the price. 
Of course Cypriot politicians are to blame for having allowed the country to be turned into an adjunct of a bloated financial sector and a refuge for hot Russian money. 
But what tipped the divided island over wasn't foreign investors' sharp practices, but the impact of Europe's wider crisis on its banks: in particular, their exposure to devastated Greece, currently also in the Troika's tender care. 
Some have hailed the fact the raid was carried out on Cypriot bank deposits over €100,000, rather than the public purse. 
At last the rich and those responsible for private banking failures are being made to cough up, it's been said. Which would have been a good thing. But it's savers, not bankers or shareholders, who are taking the 40% hit.  
And many of the targeted depositors, such as pensioners, are scarcely rich – or are small businesses which will now go bust. 
The Cypriot government should instead have learned from Iceland: taken over the banks, isolated the bad loans, protected deposits, imposed losses on the wealthy, and used a publicly owned banking sector to rebuild the domestic economy. That would have offered its citizens a better future, almost certainly outside the eurozone. 
But it would have also encroached on private capital's privileges and clearly couldn't be tolerated. ...
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Milne has nicely summarized the benefits of the Swedish Model and why bankers are vehemently opposed to its adoption.
As the Greek economist Costas Lapavitsas argues, Cyprus has "reactivated" the European banking crisis. 
Not that it had been resolved. Only last month the Dutch government was forced to nationalise the Netherlands' fourth biggest bank, SNS Reaal, partly because of its over-exposure to losses in Spain.... 
Now the Troika's decision to help itself to Cypriot savings has paved the way for a new contagion. In the short term that may be contained because of the island's minuscule proportion of eurozone output. 
But the move has demolished confidence in bank deposits – a point rammed home by the Dutch finance minister's blundering signal that the deal had set a precedent. That could easily turn into bank runs in states likely to need new bailouts, as investors move cash to safer locations.
Safer locations like German government debt and not Deutsche Bank deposits.  Safer locations like money market mutual funds invested in UK or US government debt and not EU or UK banks.
Given the spectacular failure of austerity across the continent to overcome the crisis, rather than deepen it as output shrinks and debts mount, more such breakdowns are clearly on the cards.
The choice of austerity or stimulus didn't matter for ending the financial crisis.  If stimulus, all that was going to happen is the stimulus would ultimately be swallowed by the burden of debt service on the excess debt in the financial system.

Stimulus could buy a short-term reprieve from the downward spiral, but once the stimulus ended, the real economy would resume its contraction as money needed for growth and reinvestment was diverted to debt service on the excess debt.
The eurozone has now become a zombie zone.... 
Whatever the focus of the meltdown in each country – banking in Cyprus, property in Spain – all flow from the same crisis that erupted in 2007-8 out of a deregulated profit-hunting credit boom across the western world and has delivered a prolonged depression....
In Britain, the power and weight of the City of London are a particular block on sustainable recovery. 
But across Europe, people are being held to ransom by banks, bondholders and corporations determined to ensure that it's not they who bear the costs of the crisis they created – and politicians who regard it as their job to oblige them. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Milne nicely summarizes why we have made no progress to addressing the underlying issues that caused the financial crisis and why the financial crisis continues.

Friday, March 15, 2013

Parliament panel: too difficult for regulators to enforce ban on proprietary trading

Confirming what your humble blogger has been saying about the Volcker Rule, the Parliament Commission on Banking Standards said it would be too difficult for regulators to enforce a ban on proprietary trading.

According to a Reuters article, the Commission proposed a series of one off solutions like raising capital requirements to limit proprietary trading.

Regular readers know that the direct way to effectively ban proprietary trading by banks is to require them to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, market participants will be able to see what "trading positions" the banks have.

Then, as Paul Volcker would say, the market knows a proprietary trade when it see it.

For banks, disclosure of proprietary trading changes the economics of engaging in proprietary trading.  When the market "sees" a proprietary trade, it will trade against the banks in such a way as to minimize the profit of the trade and maximize the downside of the trade.

At the same time, investors who provide funds to the bank will raise their required return for providing funds.  After all, the bank that engages in proprietary trading has higher risk.

With lower profitability from any individual trade and lower profitability from its higher risk profile, bankers have an incentive to exit the proprietary trading business.

A U.S.-style ban on Britain's banks trading with their own money is not needed and would be too difficult to enforce, a group of influential lawmakers said on Friday. 
Instead, Britain should use the threat of capital add-ons or other tools to bear down on any bank that shows signs of proprietary trading, said the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards (PCBS). 
The PCBS said a U.S. ban on proprietary trading, known as the Volcker rule, has shown it is difficult to define and prohibit such trading, and it would impose an extra burden on UK regulators who already have to enforce a complex separation of banks' retail operations. 
"The Banking Commission does not feel it appropriate to recommend the immediate prohibition of proprietary trading," said Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the PCBS. 
But he did not rule out a ban in the future. 
"Were this approach to prove ineffective, further measures, including prohibition, could be desirable," he said in report released by the PCBS....

UK banks told the PCBS they do not engage in proprietary trading and said they do not want to, but Tyrie said that could change: "At a time when banks are under less intense scrutiny, proprietary trading could re-emerge as a greater risk." 
He said proprietary trading was not a suitable activity for a bank, and could lead to conflicts of interest, have harmful cultural effects and raise pay expectations. 
The Prudential Regulation Authority, which takes over UK financial regulation in April, should pay close attention to big trading units and volatile revenue flows, and if it spots potential proprietary trading it should use capital add-ons or other methods to incentivise the firm to exercise tighter control, Tyrie said.

Tuesday, February 5, 2013

UK banking standards commission sees through Barclay's rhetoric and call for real change

As reported by the Guardian, the UK's commission on banking standards saw through the rhetoric about change offered by Barclays new CEO and asked for real proof of change.

To drive home this point, the head of the commission, Andrew Tyrie, waived around a report that Barclays had heavily redacted by blacking out paragraphs.

This was a none to subtle suggestion that Barclays adopt ultra transparency as the cornerstone of its efforts to change its culture and become a 'socially useful' bank.

Antony Jenkins told MPs that he would resign if another scandal on the scale of the Libor rate scam erupted during his tenure, vowing to transform a bank that he described as an aggressive and self-serving institution under its former chief executive. 
In an appearance at the banking standards commission, he said: "We are shredding that legacy and in the value of stewardship, whoever is sitting in front of a committee in a decade's time – I want them to have inherited a fundamentally different culture." 
He added: "We should shred those behaviours of the past, we should shred situations where we're short-termist, too aggressive and too self-centred. It's those things I want to eliminate from our culture."
Ultra transparency is the key for Mr. Jenkins to reach his goal.

With ultra transparency, Barclays will be disclosing on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This will usher in sunlight which is the best disinfectant for bad banker behavior like manipulating a bench mark interest rate.
However, MPs and Lords on the inquiry remained unconvinced and said the company must do more to show it is changing its ways. 
The Committee chairman, Andrew Tyrie MP, said: "It doesn't really matter what the scandal is – Barclays seems to have a finger in every one of those pies."
He was also critical of Barclays' initial refusal to provide unedited information. 
Waving a redacted document covered in blacked-out paragraphs, he said: "We asked for full papers and frankly it has been very hard getting them... Even the page numbers have been redacted."...
Please re-read the highlighted text as it is obvious from Mr. Tyrie's comments that he and the commission know that the only way real change will occur at Barclays is if Barclays starts to provide ultra transparency.

When a bank is committed to providing ultra transparency, it is saying that it can stand on its own two feet.

A bank that can stand on its own two feet has nothing to hide from market participants or a parliamentary commission (a bank providing ultra transparency would never send over a heavily redacted document).
But Tyrie expressed doubts that the cultural change sought by Jenkins can be achieved by the current board. He said: "Doesn't it seem that the time has come to set your remuneration strategy in a new framework led by a new [remuneration committee] chairman?"...
One of the great things about providing ultra transparency is that it naturally leads to the bank linking remuneration to the risk being taken.
Full turnaround plans for the bank under Jenkins will be unveiled next week, including a new five-point plan for determining bonuses, which must take into accountupholding values as well as financial performance. 
However, Tyrie said the commission would reserve judgement on whether Barclays has changed....
After all, what Mr. Jenkins is proposing is long on rhetoric and short on real substance.

In fact, anything less than adopting ultra transparency is short on real substance when it comes to changing the culture and making Barclays a social useful bank.
Tyrie said yesterday: "We don't seem to be getting very far in thinking through how we can have confidence that the non-executives in Barclays are going to be carrying the right culture. What we want is some more concrete evidence that the board is being put in a shape that can help give you a chance of succeeding."
The only way to have confidence that the non-executives in Barclays are going to be carrying the right culture is if Barclays adopts ultra transparency.  This exposes their activities to sunlight and discourages unacceptable behavior.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

The Question the UK's Commission on Banking Standards should ask bankers

The Guardian carried an article in which it suggested a number of questions that the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards should ask the senior banking executives from Barclays, HSBC and Lloyds at the hearing this week.

These questions include:
■ Has the go-for-broke bonus culture on the City's trading floors really changed? What are they doing to enforce different values?
■ How have they shifted incentives, from boardroom to branch, to prevent another major mis-selling scandal on the scale of PPI or interest-rate swaps?
■ Once the Vickers reforms are enacted, will it really be the case, as George Osborne hopes, that banks' investment arms can be allowed to go bust without inflicting huge collateral damage on the rest of the economy?
■ How can they justify the continued existence of a lavish bonus culture, despite the fact that tens of thousands of layoffs mean there should be bankers aplenty to snap up on the cheap?
■ Why was lending to small and medium-sized businesses still falling at the end of 2012, despite cut-price loans from the government's Funding for Lending Scheme?
■ Even if Osborne fixes the problem of banks being too big to fail, aren't they still simply too big to manage?
All of these are excellent questions, but they are follow-on questions to the real question:
What are you hiding that prevents you from adopting ultra transparency and disclosing on an ongoing basis your current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details?
Since at least the 1900s, ultra transparency has been the sign of a bank that can stand on its own two feet as it shows that the bank has nothing to fear because it has nothing to hide.  Clearly, the UK banks are hiding behind a veil of opacity that the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane says makes the banks 'black boxes'.

What are the banks hiding?

Since the 1930s, it has been well known that sunlight is the best disinfectant.  However, the bankers are not using sunlight but rather policy pronouncements to try to change their culture.  Policies that a Guardian poll showed that almost 3 out 4 people do not think will be effective at Barclays.

If the bankers are truly serious about changing their culture, why are they not deploying ultra transparency which is the best means for changing the culture and keeping future bankers from straying into bad behavior?

Please note that by asking about ultra transparency several of the Guardian's questions don't need to be asked.

The issue of whether a bank is too big to manage goes away as a result of subjecting the banks to the type of market discipline that ultra transparency makes possible.  For the first time since the 1930s, market participants will be able to assess the risk of each bank and adjust the amount and price of their exposure to reflect this risk assessment.  Linking risk and cost of funds will an incentive for banks to make themselves manageable (banks perceived to be too big to manage will pay a premium to obtain funds).

Can a bank's investment arm go bankrupt ceases to be a major issue when there is ultra transparency as the investment arm will no longer take proprietary bets.  It won't take proprietary bets because all of the market participants can see their position and can trade in such a way as to minimize the potential profit of the position and maximize the potential loss on the position (please see JP Morgan Whale trade for confirmation).

The existence of a lavish bonus culture doesn't need to be justified as providing ultra transparency allows the Board to link pay to risk adjusted performance.  The Board will do this as market participants will exert discipline on the bank to do so.

Monday, January 28, 2013

Abandon, don't electrify ring-fence

In his Financial Times op-ed, Andrew Tyrie, the chairman of the Parliament's Commission on Banking Standards, argues for 'electrifying the ring-fence' between investment and retail banking because banks will relentlessly lobby until the ring-fence has been effectively torn down.

I agree with Mr. Tyrie's observation about the behavior of bankers and what the final result of adopting a ring-fence will be.

What your humble blogger disagrees with Mr. Tyrie on is substituting the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight (which is what an electrified ring-fence would be) for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

If banks were required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, this would go further to eliminating casino banking and the danger it presents to utility banking than a ring-fence would.

With ultra transparency, market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess the risk of each bank and make a fully informed decision.  The result of this independent assessment will be market discipline on the banks to reduce their risk taking.

Ultra transparency also has the added advantage that risk reduction is enforced by the market and not by regulators and policymakers who are subject to being lobbied over time.  So ultra transparency directly addresses Mr. Tyrie's concerns about long-term enforceability of reforms.

The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which I chair, supports the creation of this ringfence. However, in our report scrutinising the draft legislation, the commission also concluded that without significant changes it may well not achieve its objectives. 
The ringfence must be “electrified” if it is to stand a better chance of success – in other words, if the banks test the ringfence too much, they will get a shock. 
Any reform where there is significant doubt about its long term viability is a reform that shouldn't be pursued.
We therefore recommended a reserve power for full separation, an approach Sir John himself endorsed in evidence to the commission this month. 
The regulators, too, have told the commission they want electrification. And they have come forward with proposals to give it practical effect. 
The banks, on the other hand, do not want electrification. They seem to be the only ones. 
The lobbying campaign against this proposal predictably started the moment our report was published – just as it did when the ICB first suggested introducing a ringfence. 
The strength of the industry’s lobbying, even at this early stage, makes the case eloquently for electrification. Even while chastened by public anger over their role in the financial crisis and subsequent revelations such as Libor rigging , they are lobbying....
Please note that the banks have been lobbying against any proposed reform since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Your humble blogger has documented this lobbying in the area of structured finance reform.  The bottom line is the banks have effectively blocked reform.

Even when the EU passed legislation mandating that banks know what they own and that the issuers provide the data to make this possible, the banks managed to lobby the banking regulators and have these regulators agree that opaque, toxic subprime mortgage backed securities qualify for know what you own.

The other way that banks succeed in their lobbying is by keeping certain reforms off the table.  Banks have successfully blocked bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system by "supporting" through their lobbying the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight as a replacement for transparency and market discipline.
All history tells us that banks will be at the ringfence like foxes to a chicken coop unless they are incentivised not to do so. On past evidence, they will test it nonstop and try to persuade politicians to alter it in their favour. 
Electrification is therefore essential to ensure that the banks comply not just with the rules of the ringfence but also with the spirit. 
We must legislate now for more benign economic circumstances, when banks are under less intense scrutiny. At that time, politicians will be particularly susceptible to lobbying and the integrity of the ringfence will be most at risk.
 Our proposals help protect the ringfence from such pressures in the long term. Banks see it as a starting point for negotiations; we view it as a starting point for a more stable and sustainable banking system.... 
Mr. Tyrie is wrestling with the issue of how to enforce any complex regulation in light of what we know about the banks' ability to relentlessly lobby.

This issue goes directly to the heart of why the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight fail catastrophically and make the financial system far more unstable.  Ultimately the banks will get around the regulation.

This is why your humble blogger has been pounding the table on the issue of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It is a simple regulation that the market can enforce.
Of course, structural reform is by no means the only way to improve banking standards and the commission will now be largely focusing on the second phase of its work. This will involve examining whether changes in areas such as corporate governance, competition, the regulatory and tax framework, and the civil and criminal law could enhance standards and improve behaviour in the banking industry.
Regular readers know that sunshine is the best disinfectant of bad banker behavior and ultra transparency is the gold standard for sunshine.

Regular readers also know that ultra transparency is the key to restoring trust in the banks.  After all, providing ultra transparency use to be the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet because it had nothing to hide.

Your humble blogger hopes that Mr. Tyrie and his commission will consider it.

Saturday, January 26, 2013

Is it time to grasp the debt restructuring nettle? Yes!

In his Telegraph column, Philip Aldrick puts the idea of pursuing the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system squarely on the agenda in the UK.

He points out that the UK has pursued the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis for five years and the UK looks like it will match the Japan's experience of a lost decade of economic growth or worse.

The economic stagnation/decline is the direct result of the policies that are pursued as a result of choosing the Japanese Model and protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

These policies place the burden of the excess debt on the real economy.  To service this debt, the real economy has to divert capital that is needed for growth and reinvestment.  The result is at best a Japan-style economic slump.
Vincent Reinhart, Morgan Stanley’s chief economist who was a senior US Federal Reserve official and is the author of seminal papers on post-financial crisis responses, thinks there is an alternative, though. That there is a quicker way back to prosperity. 
Regular readers are familiar with my seminal work on this blog on how to respond to a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Mr. Reinhart confirms that adopting the Swedish Model restores prosperity quicker.  But then, anything is faster that the Japanese Model which as Japan is currently showing, doesn't work.
“A financial crisis is really about an enormous loss of wealth,” he told me at the Word Economic Forum in Davos. “And it’s only when you recognise that loss of wealth that you can set about rebuilding.” 
What he was talking about was writing down private sector debt – that of over-borrowed households, companies and banks.
According to the Bank of England, there may be as much as £60bn of unrecognised losses in the UK. 
Writing down that amount of debt would normally lead to an awful lot of pain – with some families losing their homes and jobs lost as companies go bust. But if the debts aren’t written down, the rest suffer too.
“If you buffer the people who made bad decisions from their wealth loss, then the people who didn’t make bad decisions suffer a wealth loss too,” Mr Reinhart said. 
That manifests itself in a long period of slow growth and - worst of all - youth unemployment.
Effectively, the innocent victims of the recession end up being the ones that also pay for it.
Confirmation that pursuing the Japanese Model makes the situation worse.  At the beginning of the financial crisis this was referred to as socializing the losses.

The politicians and bankers structured the socialization of the losses so well that the bankers didn't even suffer a significant interruption in their stream of bonus payments.
A little bit of honesty here from the political classes would go a long way, Mr Reinhart reckons. 
In the wake of a major financial crisis, he said, the authorities have two options: denial - letting banks, companies and households pretend they can service their debts and sparing them short-term pain. 
Or forcing writedowns upfront. Individuals would suffer and unemployment would almost inevitably rise, but the country would get over the hump quicker. 
“How long would those laid off be out of a job, though,” Mr Reinhart said optimistically.
As shown by Iceland, the recovery is very quick when the Swedish Model is adopted and banks are forced to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.
Effectively, his second option prescription is classic economic “creative destruction”. 
Mr Reinhart is not some misguided hairshirt ideologue, though. He has studied in detail the 15 biggest financial crises since the Second World War, and worked on the issue with the world’s foremost authorities – his wife Carmen and Harvard economist Ken Rogoff. 
According to his research, the “more successful economies were the ones where you recognise losses, take writedowns and get over it early”. 
“The incomplete recognition of losses means a prolonged period of below par growth.  
You never really grow your way out of a debt problem, you limp out. If that’s the case, you have to do QE1, QE2, QE infinity,” he said. 
Not clear that you can ever grow your way out of a debt problem except in an economics paper.

Mr. Reinhart's observation also confirms the prediction that your humble blogger made at the beginning of the financial crisis that the global economy would remain in a downward spiral (despite brief respites when aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus is pursued) until such time as transparency was brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

When transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system, it drives the adoption of the Swedish Model.  Why?  Because market discipline forces the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Of course, this prediction and recommendation about how to handle a bank solvency led financial crisis occurred before Professors Rogoff and Reinhart started talking about financial crises and "This Time Its Different".  Their message was that regardless of what was done, it takes years to recover from a financial crisis.

This was precisely the message that the bankers wanted to hear and they repeated it constantly to the policymakers.  The result was the adoption of the Japanese Model.

Please note, that the work of Professors Rogoff and Reinhart was fundamentally flawed.  It assumes no learning curve in how to deal with bank solvency led financial crises.

In fact there was a significant learning curve.  In the 1870s, Walter Bagehot introduced the concept of a modern central bank.  In the 1930s, the FDR Administration introduced deposit insurance.  The combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank liquidity in fact makes adoption of the Swedish Model possible.

As shown first by the FDR Administration in breaking the back of the Great Depression and later by Sweden, pursuing the Swedish Model works and ends the bank solvency led financial crisis.  Of course, Iceland showed that even with a less than perfect implementation of the Swedish Model an economy can recover quickly from a bank solvency led financial crisis.
QE brings its own problems by distorting market behaviour and perpetuating the problem of “zombie banks, zombie companies, and zombie households”. 
“The attrition can last a really, really long time,” Mr Reinhart said, citing Japan’s two “lost decades”.
Confirmation of all the posts your humble blogger has written about the headwinds generated by zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies exceeding the benefits of pursuing these policies.
So where does that leave the UK? 
First, his argument suggests policymakers are not being entirely honest with the public. Patience is not the only option. Aggressive debt restructuring is another.
Your humble blogger has been pointing out the two options and why aggressive debt restructuring is the preferred choice.
The problem is, as Mr Reinhart pointed out, that the taxpayer would almost certainly have to step in – to recapitalise the banks as they wrote off billions of pounds of bad lending, or to protect households by capping their maximum loss. 
The US stepped into help householders in the 1930s under President Roosevelt, and the idea has been recently endorsed by the International Monetary Fund no less..
This is a classic example of economists not understanding how our financial system is designed.

Yes indeed, the US stepped in to help households in the 1930s.  The FDR Administration did this by creating deposit insurance.

It is the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding that allows banks to operate with low or negative book capital levels.  With deposit insurance, the taxpayers effectively become the banks 'silent equity partners' when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  This allows the banks to both recognize the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to operate and support the real economy.

Since the taxpayers are already the banks' silent equity partners when banks have low or negative book capital levels, there is never a reason to step in and recapitalize the banks.

Instead, the banks with a franchise capable of generating earnings before banker bonuses should retain 100% of their earnings until they have rebuilt their book capital levels.  The banks that do not have a franchise that is capable of generating earnings should be resolved.
According to Mr Reinhart, the instruction for banks to write down their assets would have to come from the financial regulator – in the UK in future, the Bank of England. 
But the decision would need to be made politically....
Mr. Reinhart is right that it is the politicians who have to make the decision to require the banks to recognize their losses.

It is the politicians who have to decide whether they put their country's citizens first or the bankers who fund their elections and retirements first.

To date, every day since the beginning of the financial crisis on August 9, 2007, the politicians have put the bankers ahead of the citizens.
Ideally, this would be when to use quantitative easing. The economy would suffer a brief shock as a result of the hurt households were feeling and as unviable businesses went bust. 
Low rates and cheap money would be the cushion to ease the blow.
It should also be combined with stimulative fiscal policies to be sure that the real economy fully recovers.
Instead, Mr Reinhart reckons, QE is being used because politicians are failing to take the big decisions: “Of the – say - 15 things that need to be done, QE is number 15. It’s just that the other 14 aren’t happening.” 
“I think of it like one of the old service comedies. The commander asks his troops to volunteer for a dangerous but vital mission and they all take a step back except one guy – the hapless hero. That’s the central bank. Because of the failure of politicians to address the real issues, you’re left with the hapless hero trying to do the right thing.” 
There is some evidence the UK is trying to grasp the debt restructuring nettle. 
The Bank of England is currently forcing banks to declare their hidden losses. But, the Treasury has made it crystal clear that the taxpayer will not be forking out a penny more, which will limit the policy’s effectiveness.
As much as £100bn of mortgage debt in the UK is in forbearance, where borrowers are struggling to keep up with their monthly payments even with interest rates at a record low, the Bank has estimated. The writedowns on that may not be huge, but when taken with overvalued commercial property and other hidden losses, it’s easy to get to a figure of £60bn of writedowns, using Bank calculations.
Forcing is too strong a word to describe the request from the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee that banks disclose their hidden losses.

If the UK financial regulators were serious about forcing the declaration of the hidden losses, the financial regulators would enforce existing disclosure laws and require the banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, market discipline would force the banks to recognize the losses on their dud exposures.
If there is a country that needs to address its private and banking sector debts, as well as the public ones, it is the UK. Mr Rogoff told me at Davos that “by and large Britain is having a typical post financial crisis period, exacerbated by the dependence on the financial sector and the eurozone”. 
In other words, we’ll grow anaemically for a decade at least. “Patience” is the authorities’ euphemism for what they used to call “a lost decade”. 
If that’s the choice they have taken, fair enough. But Britons – in particular the younger generation who can not get on the housing ladder and are struggling to find a proper job - deserve at the very least to be told there was another option.
Actually, the elderly who vote need to be told their is another option too.  After all it is their retirements that are being damaged by the pursuit of very low interest rate policies.

Friday, January 25, 2013

UK's economic strategy has failed

In a scathing Guardian editorial, Larry Elliott looks at each element of the UK's fiscal and monetary policy and find it unfit for the purpose of getting the UK out of an economic slump that is actually worse than during the Great Depression.

Your humble blogger needs to repeat the point that the economic performance the UK has experienced is actually worse than during the Great Depression.

Why have I repeated this point?

Because how many times have we heard politicians and financial regulators say that their response to the financial crisis that started on August 9, 2007 saved us from a second Great Depression.

The performance of the UK's economy puts to rest the myth that the fiscal and monetary response to the financial crisis saved the UK from a second Great Depression.

I know that a bunch of economists will argue that the UK is not having a second Great Depression because the unemployment rate hasn't reached 25%.  The reason it hasn't reached 25% has to do with the economic stabilizing programs that were put in place by the generation that experienced the Great Depression and has nothing to do with the response to the current financial crisis.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger predicted and explained why the UK's fiscal and monetary policies would be unsuccessful before they were implemented.  I get absolutely zero satisfaction out of having been shown to have been right.

Fortunately, because the UK's economy has performed as I predicted, it strongly suggests that my blueprint for restoring the UK economy to robust health is likely to work.

What is my blueprint?

First, look at Iceland.  What is important to notice about Iceland is that it forced its banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

The starting place for restoring the UK economy is to make the same requirements of UK banks.  I know that the bankers will complain bitterly about this, but their banks are designed to absorb these losses and continue to support the real economy.

Second, understand that austerity is not a policy prescription for restoring growth to an economy.  What is a policy prescription for restoring growth to an economy is to focus spending on items that benefit UK taxpayers like social programs and infrastructure and not on bailing out banks.

Third, understand that monetary policy can contribute to economic headwinds and end those policies like interest rates below 2% and quantitative easing that create these economic headwinds.  Abandoning these policies will actually stimulate demand as savers can spend what they are currently setting aside to offset the lack of earnings on their savings.

Saturday, January 12, 2013

Virtue, Vice and Banks

In his Bloomberg editorial, the next Archbishop of Canterbury, Justin Welby, examines the need for recreating the banking system with structures that lean towards virtue rather than vice.

Regular readers know that the foundation for this structure is transparency as sunlight is the best disinfectant for vice and its related bad behaviors.

For banks, transparency takes the form of requiring disclosure on an ongoing basis of their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This degree of disclosure is necessary so bankers cannot engage in bad behavior behind a veil of opacity.

Under pressure, everyone is prone to make bad decisions and that story remains in my mind as I sit on the U.K.’s Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, listening to people talk about banks, bankers and their failures. 
It is blindingly obvious that the banking system we had a few years ago has more or less collapsed. ... Yet it is clear that responsibility needs to be taken and structures created that lean toward virtue rather than vice.

Our commission was set up in July to review the culture and standards of banking in the U.K. Its creation was a government response to the numerous scandals that had erupted, whether around the London interbank offered rate, money laundering or simply the continuing high remuneration of many people in the banking sector.
Please note that ultra transparency fully addresses the issue with Libor and eliminates the possibility of future manipulation.

First, with ultra transparency, banks with deposits to lend can assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the interbank lending market.

Second, Libor and similar benchmark interest rates can be calculated using some or all of the actual transactions in the interbank lending market.  This eliminates manipulation.
The development of the financial-services industry needs to be thought through as part of a significant restructuring of the values within that sector of the economy. The false assumptions that led us into our current predicament must be rejected.
This rejection of false assumptions was also done at the time of the Great Depression as a result of the Pecora Commission.

The result was the creation of the FDR Framework as the basis of the global financial system.  The FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).
Let’s start with some of these false assumptions. 
First, it is clear that rational market theory and its relatives have been undermined by the events of the past five years. Adam Smith’s general cynicism about the tendency of any group of business people, when meeting together, to create a cartel and ensure maximum profitability, has been shown to be justified, both in its own terms and as a general reflection (which he understood well) of the susceptibility of human-made systems to human failings.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Bishop Welby has nicely summarized your humble blogger's point about why the FDR Framework is based on the philosophy of disclosure.

If the buyer does not have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information, they cannot make a fully informed decision.  If they cannot make a fully informed decision, buyers are likely to be taken advantage of.

The FDR Framework recognizes that bankers engage in bad behavior when their actions are shrouded by a veil of opacity.  As a result, the FDR Framework sets out to be sure there are no opaque corners in the financial system.

The last five years have shown that rational expectations and its relatives are based on the simple fact that transparency is the necessary condition for the invisible hand and the financial markets to operate properly.

The last five years have shown that the global financial system collapsed everywhere there was opacity.
A second myth to fall has been the idea that financial services could, by themselves, carry the economy. 
A remarkable 2009 article by Martin Wolf in the Financial Times pointed out that the U.K. had been behaving like a “monocrop” economy. By that he meant that it was heavily dependent upon one sector alone: When the financial-services industry went well, all went well, and when it went badly, everything went badly. The ups and downs would be more severe. 
I believe the jury is now out as to whether, since the reopening of the Eurobond markets by S.G. Warburg & Co. in the early 1960s, financial services have been a net benefit to the U.K. economy as a whole.  
I suggest that much the same might be said about the U.S. market. 
Banking and financial services have created a significant number of jobs, but the amount of money spent in rescuing them since 2008 eliminated a vast proportion of -- if not more than -- the gains in employment and tax revenue that the sector generated over the previous decades....
The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane suggests that the cost of the financial crisis is multiples of the tax revenue generated by the financial sector over the previous decades.
The third major area of inquiry lies in the failure of financial services to enable society to flourish -- what in Catholic social teaching is known as the “common good.” Much of the financial-services industry became essentially self- regarding, and one result was that small and medium-size businesses as well as poor areas were neglected, often unable to obtain credit....
Your humble blogger has argued that it is time for the banks to do something for the "common good".  They need to step up and recognize all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

The result of recognizing these losses will be to remove from the real economy the burden of servicing this excess debt by diverting capital that is needed for reinvestment and growth.

The result of recognizing these losses will be to remove the burden from the sovereigns to socialize these losses and divert tax revenue that is needed for social programs and fiscal stimulus.
So what are the answers?
Restore transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Everything else that is being proposed is simply substituting the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

The financial crisis has shown that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight fails.
Second, I am deeply suspicious of the intensely complex regulatory structures that are emerging out of the crisis. They are well-intentioned, but impossible to operate. 
My own experience of heading a large organization in risky areas (in my case, a hospital) showed me that the more complex one makes the regulation, the less likely it is to be adhered to. 
The head of a major bank whom I interviewed recently told me they had 3,500 compliance staff and 900 lawyers. Good luck with that! 
One of the leading virtues of ultra transparency is that it is simple.  At the same time, it is extraordinarily effective and powerful.
The reason I started out with the story of my own rescue from an ethical slip is that to me it demonstrates that it isn’t regulations, but virtue and leadership embedded within corporate cultures, that stops people from stumbling when under pressure. 
As I said earlier, the sunlight of ultra transparency is the best disinfectant.
There are no simple answers to the current crisis in banking, but there are simple principles. They come down to saying that financial services must serve society, and not rule it. They must be integrated into the economy, not semidetached. They must recognize human fallibility, not assume the effectiveness of human imagination.
Bishop Welby is right that there are no simple answers.  

Transparency is actually incredibly complex.  It was not until your humble blogger defined ultra transparency that there existed a definition for banks of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner that market participants needed to be able to independently assess and make a fully informed investment decision.

Without ultra transparency, banks are in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane 'black boxes.'

Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Former BoE policymaker Adam Posen: New BoE head will have too much power

Adam Posen, a former member of the Bank of England's monetary policy committee, expressed his view that the new governor of the BoE, Mark Carney, will have too much power.

Anyone who studied the Federal Reserve in the lead-up to our current financial crisis knows this is true.

For those of you who didn't study the Federal Reserve, the Fed was lead by Alan Greenspan and it was responsible for both monetary policy and bank supervision.

Mr. Greenspan was a firm believer in the idea that market discipline is superior to bank supervision.  As a result, he had the Fed bank supervision one up the UK's "light-touch" regulation with "no-touch" regulation.

After all, there was no reason for the Fed to do any supervision as the market would do the supervision and do it better than the Fed.  We know how that has worked out with the financial crisis that started in 2007.

What Mr. Greenspan forgot is that where there is opacity there is no market discipline.

Sunshine is the best disinfectant as it allows market discipline to occur, but market discipline doesn't work when there is a veil of opacity instead.  The BoE's Andrew Haldane describes banks as "black boxes".  Black boxes that have not been subject to market discipline for several decades.


Banks are black boxes with this veil of opacity because the financial regulators have a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate timely manner.

The easy way to reduce the power of the governor of the BoE is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this disclosure, markets can exert discipline on the banks and are not subject to how the governor prefers to supervise the banks.

As reported by the Guardian,
George Osborne's reform of the financial system risks putting too much power in the hands of the newly appointed Bank of England governor,Mark Carney, a former Bank policymaker has warned. 
As Osborne attempts to salvage his reputation with a tough autumn statement, Adam Posen said the expansion of the Bank of England's empire to include City regulation, coupled with the fawning response to Carney taking control next summer, could encourage Sir Mervyn King's successor to abuse his influence.....

"You just don't want to put too much power in one person's hands. And the new rules means the UK governor has enormous amounts of power and discretion," Posen said in his first UK newspaper interview since leaving his role on the Bank's monetary policy committee in August.....

"Notwithstanding that he is obviously well qualified, experienced, bright and hard working, sharing many of Mervyn's best qualities. But any individual given that much power … what's going to happen?"... 
The US economist was also critical of King's handling of the financial crisis. He suggested the governor was too slow to react to the credit crunch when it first began with the collapse of Northern Rock and likened him to former US Federal Reserve chief Alan Greenspan, who failed to see the crisis coming. 
"Like Greenspan, he probably stayed too long and was probably too set in his ways when history changed. There was this sense of enormous accomplishment, and of being at the pinnacle, with everyone treating him like the great maestro, just as they did Greenspan, so it was very hard for him to shift gears when times changed."....
On a different topic, namely the existence of the Blob (aka, politicians, financial regulators, treasury, the City of London and its lobbyists) in the UK.
Last year [Posen] put pressure on the government to go further and take control of Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds to expand the amount of credit in the economy. But he met with intense opposition from inside the Treasury to his ideas, he said. 
"The Treasury didn't want anything that supposedly interfered with market functioning, which I found strange when the markets weren't operating very well. They also didn't want anything that might interfere with the sale of Lloyds and RBS, which I find hard to understand when they won't be selling them for quite a while. Officials also argued that taking control of the banks to be more interventionist would fall foul of EU state aid rules, which is not something the French or Germans worry about. 
"None of these reasons make any sense. I think there is just a lack of will inside the Treasury to take control of the banks, whether that is a political decision or based on an economic view I don't know. But the entire British economy is now living with the consequences," he said.
What Mr. Posen ran into was the Blob.  It was clearly not perceived to be in the interest of the City of London to have Lloyds and RBS fully taken over. 

Monday, December 3, 2012

UK financial chicanery creates unenviable reputation

An editorial by the Guardian concludes that the UK has earned its unenviable reputation because it has permitted financial chicanery and that something needs to be done to restore its reputation.

Regular readers know that the way for the UK and the City of London to restore its reputation is by ending its love affair with opacity and setting itself up as the global standard for transparency.

Opacity encourages bad behavior as it hides the activities of the participants.  When opacity is combined with 'light-touch' regulation, the result is a hot bed for financial chicanery and a bad reputation.

Transparency encourages good behavior as sunshine is the best disinfectant.  Transparency is the basis for the best reputation as it permits the strictest form of regulation:  market discipline.

Your humble blogger has advocated bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

For banks, this means providing ultra transparency and disclosing on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

For structured finance securities, this means providing observable event based reporting on all activities like payments or delinquencies involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.

Recently, the BoE Financial Policy Committee highlighted why banks should provide ultra transparency.  It wants banks to clean up their on and off-balance sheet exposures and to provide the data so that market participants can independently confirm that all the losses have been realized.

Britain is at the extremes of the business of financial chicanery.
This is a conclusion growing in acceptance among economists and policymakers. In 2007, a working paper from the International Monetary Fund drew up a list of offshore financial centres that included the Caymans, Switzerland and the UK. The IMF's definition of an offshore centre was "a … jurisdiction that provides financial services to non-residents on a scale that is incommensurate with the size and the financing of its domestic economy" – and thus acknowledged London's position as one of the most advanced places in the world for ingenious tax planning and financial services. 
The other side of this coin is a relaxed attitude to regulation and risk, from officials and some businesses. Think of the financial scandals that have emerged in just the past few months: the Libor-fixing affair; JP Morgan's $9bn (£5.6bn) loss in derivatives trading; the downfall of the rogue trader Kweku Adoboli. These debacles all have one thing in common: they happened in London's financial centre. Other cases come up elsewhere, of course – think JĂ©rĂ´me Kerviel in Paris or Bernie Madoff's Ponzi scheme in Manhattan – but the Square Mile is too often the location for the greatest fiascos. 
As US congresswoman Carolyn Maloney observed this summer: "It seems to be that every big trading disaster happens in London." 
In other words, the offshore, light-touch regime that many have argued gives London a competitive edge is now earning it the kind of black reputation that might make it unviable. Allowing financiers too much freedom may now be doing them more harm than good. The same surely goes for our offshore industry....
And the secretive behaviour of some organisations and individuals risks doing immense harm to the reputations of others – and to the public supervisors. 
It is surely in the interest of advisers and participants and regulators to have a thorough clean-up of the system. Yet the offshore industry is marked by the same combination of sleepy watchdogs who have rings run around them by those gaming the system.... 
It is no good officials and advisers arguing that all such behaviour is perfectly legal; that merely implies the law needs changing.

Tuesday, November 27, 2012

Will Mark Carney champion transparency?

Ultimately, Mark Carney, the Bank of England governor designate, will be remembered by whether or not he champions transparency and market discipline and rejects the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight as a substitute.

As I am using transparency, it refers to the idea of bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system including banks and structured finance.

  • For banks, this takes the form of ultra transparency under which banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.


  • For structured finance securities, this takes the form of requiring them to provide observable event based reporting under which all activities like payments or delinquencies involving the underlying collateral are reported before the beginning of the next business day.

Regular readers know that if he champions transparency and market discipline, the financial crisis in the UK will quickly be brought to an end and long-term financial stability put in place.

Regular readers also know that if he continues to reject transparency and market discipline in favor of the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight there will be no end in sight for the financial crisis.

Based on an interview with Euromoney, it is hard to tell exactly where Mr. Carney will come down.
Carney, who was appointed FSB chairman in November 2011, is tasked with implementing the Basle III accord.
His in-tray is groaning under the weight of the reform agenda and the ostensibly insurmountable challenges: crafting a regulatory system that reduces the prospect of another financial meltdown, but without choking off capital formation in an already depressed global economy. 
Carney is staking his credibility and reputation that Basle III – the third global regulatory effort in around two decades – is the world’s best bet to reduce the risk of another financial Armageddon. 
In his capacity as chairman of the global agenda-setting and co-ordinating body, which works with the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, he is executing changes to the composition and definition of capital, liquidity and counterparty credit risk, capital buffers and the leverage ratio, while crafting a single rule book, enhanced supervisory measures and sanctions for noncompliance....
This suggests he prefers substituting complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight for transparency and market discipline.
"The reform agenda is being pursued with a legitimate effort to increase the resilience of the system in the most efficient way possible. We could build capital to the moon and we would not have to worry about an institution failing but the economy would not be there," he tells Euromoney. "The interests of the private financial community should be absolutely aligned with those of the regulatory community to grow the real economy in a sustainable way. And the more enlightened members of the financial community have that perspective."...
Regular readers know that transparency is the most efficient way to make the financial system resilient without negatively impacting growth in the real economy.

So it sounds like Mr. Carney is open to hearing about transparency and market discipline.
Gordon Nixon, chief executive of Royal Bank of Canada, agrees: "He acknowledges the fact that the complexity and over-reach of regulation inflicts economic damage and he is fighting to achieve a better balance between regulation and growth within a very constrained political context. I would rather have him fighting for that balance than anyone else I have ever met in the regulatory or political world." 
Although recent scandals have reintroduced calls to break up the big banks even as they maintain their argument that the universal banking model benefits from diversification of geographic exposures and earnings by business type, Carney’s assessment is more nuanced. 
He principally cites the failings in operational oversight and culture, rather than the inherent structural risks of scale and complexity, in the most recent scandals. 
"In these [recent] episodes there were fundamental issues of conduct, and troubling issues of oversight, be it risk management or operational oversight," he says "It is not truly accurate to say they prove something systemic. A common aspect in several cases is that the people involved did not appear to take into account wider societal norms or the implications between what they did and their institution’s ultimate relationship with the real economy." 
He cites money-centre and deposit banks in the US and elsewhere as evidence that it is possible to run well-managed large, global institutions, although he refrains from naming specific banks.
The common aspect of these cases was they all occurred in the opaque corners of the financial system where sunshine could not act as the best disinfectant of bad behavior.

As I said earlier, it is hard to tell whether Mr. Carney will champion transparency and market discipline or not.  If he does, I would expect a quick resolution of the financial crisis in the UK.  If he does not, I would expect that the next Governor of the Bank of England will be dealing with an economy in far worse shape and a financial crisis that is exponentially worse.

Saturday, November 24, 2012

King vs Osborne: a tussle over meaningless bank capital requirements

Against the backdrop of EU banks asking for a one year delay in the introduction of Basel III in light of the US not implementing Basel III in 2013, we have the spectacle of the Bank of England's Mervyn King fighting with UK Chancellor George Osborne over leverage on UK bank balance sheets.

Regular readers know that bank capital and any ratio involving bank capital is meaningless.

The OECD observed that bank capital is meaningless given the existence of regulatory forbearance that allows banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' with bad debt and the suspension of mark-to-market accounting.  Both directly manipulate bank book capital levels by overstating exactly how much book capital there is.

Capital ratios are an example of the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight that are substituted for transparency and market discipline.

The financial crisis showed that this substitution contributes to financial instability and makes the financial system prone to failure.

Regular readers know that what is needed is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank and calculate capital ratios if they want to as part of this assessment.
Indeed, the more important clash is King v Osborne on the vital issue of the degree of leverage on UK banks' balance sheets. 
Vickers' panel was crystal clear: leverage should be capped at 25 times capital. But the chancellor has watered down that proposal, saying the government is happy to tolerate 33 times. 
To most outsiders, it looks as if Osborne has been swayed by the lobbying of the likes of Santander UK, which argues that a mortgage-dominated bank would be constricted by Vickers' harder limits. 
Of course the government is swayed by the lobbying of the industry.  There is no surprise here.

What is left unsaid is that both King and Osborne are swayed by the lobbying.  In particular, both of them are spending time arguing about a meaningless capital ratio when what is needed is to restore transparency to the banking system.
Vickers was unhappy about the watering-down and King sounds furious. 
The governor gave a blistering defence of the more conservative approach. International standards for calculating risk-weighted assets are too inflexible; risk weights move over time; and in major crises risks tend to interact. For those reasons, pure leverage ratios have proved the best guide to the strength of a bank in a crisis. 
As King pointed out, Northern Rock, while fully up-to-date with the Basel banking committee's finely tuned risk calculations, was still operating at 80 times leverage before its collapse. 
The argument over the right amount of leverage is nonsense.

The only relevant issue is how much risk the banks are taking so that market participants can adjust their exposure to each bank based on the risk of each bank and the market participant's capacity to absorb losses given this risk.
Setting sensible leverage ratios should therefore be at the top of the reform agenda. It's more important than the detail of which activities should lie, or be required to lie, within a ring-fenced bank.
Actually, what should be at the top of the reform agenda is requiring transparency.
If King, Vickers (and Tucker?) think 25 times is high enough and that Osborne is being too racy, that's a major concern. Let's hope the commission, which seems to be in a mischievous mood, kicks up a storm about leverage.
I am hoping the commission kicks up a storm about transparency which is what truly matters and is the only sensible reform.

UK financial institution calls for full deposit insurance

Nationwide Building Society, a UK financial institution, answered the question of why was there a run on Northern Rock while calling for full deposit insurance.

As reported by the Telegraph, Nationwide would like full deposit insurance for all financial institutions so as to eliminate the confusion that triggered the run on Northern Rock.

The reason for the run was that Northern Rock depositors knew that their deposits were guaranteed up to a certain level, but were confused over what this level was.

Remember, with deposit insurance, depositors don't care about the performance of the bank.  They only care they can get their money back.
Nationwide Building Society has been lobbying for clearer and more comprehensive protection for depositors for over a year now, and is stepping up efforts ahead of publication of the new Financial Services Bill. 
Under current arrangements, savings are only insured up to a maximum of £85,000 per person per bank or building society. Above that, savers would face losses if the company failed. 
However, Graham Beale, Nationwide’s chief executive, told The Daily Telegraph: “[Protection] should apply to all deposits, not just those less than £85,000.” 
In 2007, confusion over the level of protection sparked the run that brought down Northern Rock, as depositors queued to withdraw their money until the Chancellor promised every penny would be backed by the taxpayer. 
Changes are now being made to the law to enshrine “depositor preference”, which will put insured deposits ahead of other bondholders in the creditor hierarchy to guarantee savers get £85,000 back within days of a bank’s collapse. 
However, Nationwide, the UK’s second largest savings provider with £125bn in deposits, wants the law extended to cover all retail savings to avoid confusion. “The consumer message of full depositor preference is much more powerful and comprehensible,” Mr Beale said.
 Full depositor protection is now implicit based on the government's action in 2007.
The mutual is backed by the Building Societies Association but its position sets it against the banking industry, which does not even back “depositor preference” for the first £85,000. 
Banks claim the £85,000 is protected by the industry insurance scheme so there is no need for a complex legal change that puts other creditors more at risk and may consequently push up banks’ costs. 
“Depositor preference gives customers no added protection and increases substantially the losses of other creditors,” the British Bankers’ Association said in its Parliamentary submission.
It is not surprising that UK banks do not want depositors to have preference.  They know that it is really the taxpayer that is guaranteeing the deposits.

For example, in the US, the FDIC has unlimited ability to draw from the US Treasury to cover losses on its deposit guarantee.

The lack of preference increases the potential for loss on the deposits with the benefit accruing to the other creditors and therefore to the bankers in terms of cheaper funding.  That is why in the US deposit insurance scheme the FDIC has preference over other creditors.

Friday, November 23, 2012

Banking can be made honest and fail-safe

In case no one has noticed, everyone who has testified before the Parliament's Commission on Banking Standards has concluded that the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight will neither make banks honest nor fail-safe.

This list of high-powered witnesses includes the UK Chancellor, George Osborne, the Governor of the Bank of England, Sir Mervyn King, a leading contender as next Governor of the BoE, Paul Tucker and former Fed Chairman Paul Volcker.

As an example of why the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight will neither make banks honest nor fail-safe, each of them looked at the flaws in the proposals to separate investment and retail banking using the Volcker Rule, ring-fencing or complete separation.

Your humble blogger was thrilled that all of these distinguished individuals confirmed what I have been saying all along about the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight is not an effective substitute for transparency and market discipline.

Everyone knows that requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details would make the banks honest.

Sunshine is the best disinfectant.

Everyone also knows that transparency makes the banks fail-safe.

With access to the information disclosed through ultra transparency, market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank.  With this risk assessment, market participants can adjust the amount of their exposure to each bank to what they can afford to lose given the risk of each bank.

As a result, a bank is both subject to market discipline to restrain its risk taking and, if it ignores this restraint, can fail without fear of financial contagion.

Hopefully, the commission members will see that substituting the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight for transparency and market discipline doesn't work.  And they will conclude that reform needs to focus on bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Wednesday, November 21, 2012

UK Chancellor urges Parliament not to "tear up" bank approved reforms

The Guardian reports that George Osborne, the UK's Chancellor, asked a parliament committee not to "tear up" the consensus on banking reform.

He asked the committee to support the idea of ring-fencing rather than complete separation of investment and retail banking.

In addition, the Chancellor asked the committee to focus on how banks could adopt something akin to the ethical standards of other professions like medicine.

Regular readers know that the committee can accomplish the goals of ring-fencing and enforcing ethical standards in the banking industry by simply requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  Under ultra transparency, the banks would be required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, banks would stop taking proprietary bets as they would worry about market participants trading against their positions.  This easily achieves a major goal of the Vicker's commission of separating gambling from insured deposits.

With this disclosure, the culture of banks would be radically changed as sunlight is the best disinfectant.  Without the veil of opacity to hide their bad behavior, bankers would not engage in activities like manipulating Libor.  Ethical standards would effectively be forced on bankers and the market would act as a disciplinarian for violating these standards.

George Osborne, the chancellor, has urged the independent commission on banking standards to avoid "tearing up" the consensus on financial reform by pushing for a more radical separation of retail and investment banking. 
Appearing before the cross-party commission, chaired by the Conservative MP Andrew Tyrie, Osborne firmly rejected the idea that the reforms proposed by Sir John Vickers to "ringfence" retail banking will fail to tackle the culture that led to the crisis. 
"We have spent two years getting to this point … We are now on the verge of implementing ground-breaking legislation," he said on Wednesday. "I don't think this is the moment to tear up everything that's been done over the last two years."
Since all that ground-breaking legislation does not involve requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, it is most likely worthless.

The legislation is probably just like the Dodd-Frank Act in that it substitutes a combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight for transparency and market discipline.  A combination that our current financial crisis shows is prone to not working.

Everyone knows that transparency and market discipline works.  All you have to do is look at the financial system and see that the areas that broke down during our current crisis are characterized by opacity, much of it in the form of complex rules/regulations, and regulatory oversight.

The Chancellor is effectively asking Parliament to gamble with UK taxpayer funds and endorse a known failure (the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight) rather than a proven success (transparency and market discipline).
Rather than questioning the Vickers reforms, the chancellor urged the committee instead to examine how bankers could adopt something akin to the ethical standards imposed on other professions. 
"In the medical profession and the teaching profession, we expect certain standards, but which are administered by the profession," he said. 
Barclays, whose conduct in the Libor scandal prompted Downing Street to set up the commission on banking standards, has proposed a new professional body to police the ethics of finance workers....
No surprise that Barclays would recommend a complex rules based solution that protects opacity in the financial system and allows the bankers to continue to engage in misbehavior.

Frankly, no one cares about the ethics of finance workers.  It is easier to put in place a system that removes the need to rely on their ethics.

The system is requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  With this system, the bankers know if they do anything that might be ethically questionable they could find themselves on the front page of the news tomorrow.
Lord Turnbull, a former permanent secretary to the Treasury, warned that the so-called "enabling legislation" tabled by the government to implement the ringfencing of banks' retail operations gave too little detail about how the new regime would work. 
"You're not just asking us to buy a pig in a poke, you're just asking us to buy a poke – because there's not much pig in it at the moment," he said. 
The chancellor said it would be up to individual banks to decide what operations, in addition to customer banking, should sit inside the ringfence, which will enforce much stricter rules on how much capital they must hold....
But he said these specific demands could not be directly enshrined in legislation, because it would be a mistake to create a "Maginot Line", reflecting how banks operate in 2012, which could later be subverted, or become irrelevant, as the operation of the financial sector changed.
Don't you love the idea of banks shuttling pieces inside and outside the ring-fence.

One of the nice features of ultra transparency is that it adjusts to how the banks operate.  Regardless of where they have an exposure it is fully disclosed.  No ifs, no ands, no buts.

Wednesday, November 14, 2012

BoE's Mervyn King warns UK faces triple dip recession

The Bank of England's Mervyn King has warned that the UK faces a triple dip recession.

Regular readers know that this triple dip, soon to be quadruple dip, recession is simply another way to describe the Japan-style economic slump produced by the policies pursued under the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

The real economy of the UK is simply unable to shoulder the burden of the debt service on the excess debt in the financial system and produce enough capital for reinvestment and growth.  The same is true in the EU and Japan and most likely the US.

The only way to end the Japan-style economic slump is to adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt that they would ultimately realize from going through the long process of default and foreclosure.

As reported by the Guardian,

The UK economy risks suffering from a triple-dip recession amid a period of persistently low growth that will last until the next election, the governor of the Bank of England has warned.
Actually, this period of persistently low growth will last until the Japanese Model is abandoned and the Swedish Model is adopted.

Japan has stuck with the Japanese Model for over 2+ decades and they have never exited the period of persistently low growth.
Sir Mervyn King cut Britain's growth forecast to 1% next year and warned that output was more likely than not to remain below pre-crisis levels over the next three years. "There seems a greater risk that the UK economy may be in a period of persistent low growth," he said on Wednesday....
 No surprise here as Japan showed it can take well over a decade to reach pre-crisis levels.
"Continuing the recent zig-zag pattern, output growth is likely to fall back sharply in the fourth quarter as the boost from the Olympics in the summer is reversed – indeed output may shrink a little this quarter," he said. If that period of contraction continues into 2013, the UK could drop into a triple-dip recession....
This zig-zag pattern is a feature of the Japan-style economic slump.
He said there were limits to what monetary policy could do to boost an economy undergoing far-reaching adjustments in the wake of the financial crisis and amid severe headwinds from the eurozone debt crisis...
Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, would agree with Mr. King that there are limits.  Mr. Bagehot would set the limit on monetary policy at maintaining a minimum of a 2% interest rate.  This avoids the economic headwinds he foresaw in the 1870s that zero interest rate policies create.