Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label IMF. Show all posts

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

IMF confirms solvency problem not fixed by response to financial crisis

According to a Guardian article, the IMF warns that the global economy still faces chronic risk until the excess debt in the global financial system is dealt with.

The International Monetary Fund has warned that the repair job on the world's battered financial system is only partly completed and said failure to finish the job risks propelling the crisis into a chronic new phase....

But with only a modest recovery in the global economy since the deep slump of 2008-09, the report said the improvement in financial market conditions could only be sustained through measures to address issues that posed risks both to financial stability and growth. 
"Continued improvements will require further balance sheet repair in the financial sector and a smooth unwinding of public and private debt overhangs. If progress in addressing these medium-term challenges falters, risks could reappear. The global financial crisis could morph into a more chronic phase marked by a deterioration of financial conditions and recurring bouts of financial stability."
A Bloomberg article gave an explicit example of the excess debt that needs to be dealt with.

As much as 20 percent of non-bank corporate debt in the weakest euro-area economies is unsustainable and may force companies to cut dividends and sell assets, dealing further blows to investor confidence, the International Monetary Fund said. 
Businesses (SXXP) in Italy, Spain and Portugal have the largest “debt overhang,” according to the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report released today, which analyzed 1,500 publicly traded non-financial European firms. 
Strains in the corporate sector may in turn hurt banks’ asset quality, the report showed. 
“Firms in the euro-area periphery have built a sizable debt overhang during the credit boom, on the back of high profit expectations and easy credit conditions,” the IMF said. Now they “face the challenge of reducing the debt overhang in an environment of lower growth and higher interest rates, in part related to financial fragmentation in the euro area.”
The IMF's findings are not a surprise as the global policymakers and financial regulators response to a bank solvency led financial crisis was not to address this excess debt.

Instead, they adopted the Japanese Model under which bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protect at all costs.  By doing this, the burden of the excess debt in the financial system has been placed on the real economy where it is diverting capital needed for growth and reinvestment to debt service.

As predicted by your humble blogger, the result has been a global Japanese-style economic slump.

Fortunately, the excess debt in the global financial system can still be dealt with.  This requires the global policymakers and financial regulators to abandon the failed Japanese Model and adopt the proven Swedish Model.

Under the Swedish Model, banks recognize upfront their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This protects the real economy and allows it to resume growing.  

Adopting the Swedish Model ends the diversion of capital from the real economy to cover the debt service on the excess debt.  Instead, under the Swedish Model, all of the capital that the real economy generates for growth and reinvestment is retained for use by the real economy.

One of the many benefits of adopting the Swedish Model is that it ends the need for austerity and rewriting the social contract.

Update
From the Guardian, the IMF recommended that as part of cleaning up the banks, they adopt enhanced disclosure.
Enhanced disclosure for banks and conducting selective asset quality reviews will help restore confidence in bank balance sheets and improve market discipline

Wednesday, November 7, 2012

Former IMF deputy director: fundamental error at the outset means crisis continues to fester

In her Guardian column, Susan Schadler, former IMF European Department deputy director, observed that pursuing the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis was the wrong choice.  Instead, the Swedish Model should have been pursued.

Regular readers know that under the Japanese Model bank book capital and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.  The burden of the excess debt is placed on the real economy and the result is a Japan-style slump.

Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  As a result, the real economy is protected.

Europe's crisis continues to fester. In large part this is due to a fundamental strategic error at the outset – the failure to restructure the debt of banks and governments.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Schadler is explicitly asking why the Swedish Model was not adopted and saying that had it been adopted the crisis would be over.

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

IMF's epic plan to conjure away debt and dethrone bankers

In his Telegraph column, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard looks at the pros and cons of the IMF's proposal to have central banks turn over their holdings of government debt to the Treasury.

The benefits of doing this include reducing the sovereign debt outstanding, boosting growth and dethroning the bankers.

Regular readers know that prior to the IMF proposal your humble blogger suggested that the way to achieve all of these benefits was to require the banks to provide non-interest bearing excess reserves to the central banks to fund the central banks' government security portfolios.

With these interest free excess reserves, the sovereign debt outstanding is effectively reduced, growth is boosted and the bankers are dethroned.
So there is a magic wand after all. 
A revolutionary paper by the International Monetary Fund claims that one could eliminate the net public debt of the US at a stroke, and by implication do the same for Britain, Germany, Italy, or Japan. 
One could slash private debt by 100pc of GDP, boost growth, stabilize prices, and dethrone bankers all at the same time. It could be done cleanly and painlessly, by legislative command, far more quickly than anybody imagined. 
Yes, simply require the banks to hold the non-interest bearing excess reserves.  Something that the banks should be happy to do to maintain their access to the state deposit guarantee.  Something that is appropriate for banks to do considering how much of the sovereign debt had to be issued as a result of the financial crisis they created.

Instead, the IMF economists recommend
The conjuring trick is to replace our system of private bank-created money -- roughly 97pc of the money supply -- with state-created money. ...
Specifically, it means an assault on "fractional reserve banking". If lenders are forced to put up 100pc reserve backing for deposits, they lose the exorbitant privilege of creating money out of thin air. 
The nation regains sovereign control over the money supply. There are no more banks runs, and fewer boom-bust credit cycles. Accounting legerdemain will do the rest. That at least is the argument. 
Some readers may already have seen the IMF study, by Jaromir Benes and Michael Kumhof, which came out in August and has begun to acquire a cult following around the world. 
Entitled "The Chicago Plan Revisited", it revives the scheme first put forward by professors Henry Simons and Irving Fisher in 1936 during the ferment of creative thinking in the late Depression. 
Irving Fisher thought credit cycles led to an unhealthy concentration of wealth. He saw it with his own eyes in the early 1930s as creditors foreclosed on destitute farmers, seizing their land or buying it for a pittance at the bottom of the cycle. 
The farmers found a way of defending themselves in the end. They muscled together at "one dollar auctions", buying each other's property back for almost nothing. Any carpet-bagger who tried to bid higher was beaten to a pulp.... 
The original authors of the Chicago Plan were responding to the Great Depression. They believed it was possible to prevent the social havoc caused by wild swings from boom to bust, and to do so without crimping economic dynamism. 
The benign side-effect of their proposals would be a switch from national debt to national surplus, as if by magic. "Because under the Chicago Plan banks have to borrow reserves from the treasury to fully back liabilities, the government acquires a very large asset vis-à-vis banks. Our analysis finds that the government is left with a much lower, in fact negative, net debt burden." 
The IMF paper says total liabilities of the US financial system - including shadow banking - are about 200pc of GDP. The new reserve rule would create a windfall. This would be used for a "potentially a very large, buy-back of private debt", perhaps 100pc of GDP. 
While Washington would issue much more fiat money, this would not be redeemable. It would be an equity of the commonwealth, not debt. 
The key of the Chicago Plan was to separate the "monetary and credit functions" of the banking system. "The quantity of money and the quantity of credit would become completely independent of each other." 
Private lenders would no longer be able to create new deposits "ex nihilo". New bank credit would have to be financed by retained earnings. 
"The control of credit growth would become much more straightforward because banks would no longer be able, as they are today, to generate their own funding, deposits, in the act of lending, an extraordinary privilege that is not enjoyed by any other type of business," says the IMF paper. 
"Rather, banks would become what many erroneously believe them to be today, pure intermediaries that depend on obtaining outside funding before being able to lend."
BU Professor Kotlikoff suggested something similar with his idea for limited purpose banks.
The US Federal Reserve would take real control over the money supply for the first time, making it easier to manage inflation. It was precisely for this reason that Milton Friedman called for 100pc reserve backing in 1967. Even the great free marketeer implicitly favoured a clamp-down on private money. 
The switch would engender a 10pc boost to long-arm economic output. "None of these benefits come at the expense of diminishing the core useful functions of a private financial system." 
Simons and Fisher were flying blind in the 1930s. They lacked the modern instruments needed to crunch the numbers, so the IMF team has now done it for them -- using the `DSGE' stochastic model now de rigueur in high economics, loved and hated in equal measure. 
The finding is startling. Simons and Fisher understated their claims. It is perhaps possible to confront the banking plutocracy head without endangering the economy....
Hello, Iceland showed the banking plutocracy can be confronted without endangering the economy when it adopted the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis at the start of our current crisis.
The theory also has strong critics. Tim Congdon from International Monetary Research says banks are in a sense already being forced to increase reserves by EU rules, Basel III rules, and gold-plated variants in the UK. The effect has been to choke lending to the private sector. 
He argues that is the chief reason why the world economy remains stuck in near-slump, and why central banks are having to cushion the shock with QE. 
"If you enacted this plan, it would devastate bank profits and cause a massive deflationary disaster. There would have to do `QE squared' to offset it," he said.... 
One thing is sure. The City of London will have great trouble earning its keep if any variant of the Chicago Plan ever gains wide support.
Which is not a bad thing as the individuals who work for the City of London might instead of trying to make money from money take jobs that real goods and services.

Friday, October 12, 2012

IMF and EU engage in brinkmanship while Greek bailout fails

The IMF upped the ante in its efforts to get the EU to address the fundamental problems underlying the financial crisis.

Specifically, it called for government institutions, like the ECB, that hold Greek debt to grant Greece debt relieve by writing down this debt.

Naturally, the EU refused.

As the Guardian's Ian Traynor discussed,

The eurozone and the International Monetary Fund are engaged in a dangerous game of brinkmanship over how to respond to a Greek bailout that is going off the rails. 
It is now clear that Athens is highly unlikely to achieve the key IMF benchmark on the rescue of getting its national debt down to a "sustainable" 120% of gross domestic product by 2020.
The IMF came to this conclusion when it realized that the impact of adopting austerity in a recession for a country in a currency union resulted in a 3x greater contraction in demand than originally thought.
The word in Brussels, based on assessments from the troika of European commission, European Central Bank and IMF officials scrutinising Greece's compliance with the bailout terms, is that Athens could overshoot the sustainability target by as much as 25% on current trends, begging the question of whether the IMF will remain a party to the rescue. Figures circulating in Brussels estimate Greece's national debt will be between 130-145% of GDP by 2020 on current trends. 
The showdown between the eurozone and the IMF is being described as eyeball-to-eyeball, a shouting match, and a contest to see who will blink first. It is expected to come to a crunch next month. 
The IMF is insisting that the eurozone and the ECB resort to a new policy of Official Sector Involvement (OSI), meaning a writedown or writeoff of Greek debt to its official creditors, a move that the ECB and the German government are resisting fiercely....
Please remember that had the Swedish Model been adopted at the beginning of the financial crisis, there would be no need for the Official Sector to writedown or writeoff Greek debt.  The debt was held by the private sector, with a majority held by the banks.

It is as a result of five years of bailing out the banks that the Official Sector now has a sizable exposure.

This exposure exemplifies the pursuit of the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis which is designed to socialize the losses and privatize the gains.
Greece needs a bailout disbursement of more than €30bn (£24bn) next month, without which it will go bankrupt. It is certain to get the money, it is said in Brussels, since, following chancellor Angela Merkel's fraught visit to Athens this week, no one in the eurozone or in Washington wants to let Greece go bust or exit the common currency....

With a funding gap opening up in the Greek bailout trajectory of up to €30bn, the IMF is said to be arguing that the Europeans should foot the bill by writing down Greece's official debt. Other ideas being mulled over are to "extend" the €130bn bailout (Greece's second) or concoct a third rescue, all deeply unattractive options for Merkel who would need to return to an increasingly recalcitrant parliament in Berlin in an election year. 
The row comes as divisions open up in public between the IMF and eurozone leaders over the merits of austerity, after an IMF study released this week found that it had underestimated the impact that fiscal cutbacks have on economic growth. 
This study has been rebuffed by some eurozone leaders, with commissioner Olli Rehn arguing that it would be a mistake to change course. "The EU cannot be making swift turns, rather it is a convoy and you have to carefully consider which policy turns are best," he said. 
The best policy turn is to adopt the Swedish Model with both ultra transparency and the European Stability Mechanism becoming a backstop for each EU country's deposit guarantee.

Friday, June 22, 2012

IMF says Spanish bank recapitalization plan flawed

A Wall Street Journal article describes how the IMF is saying that the Spanish bank recapitalization is flawed because funds go through the government and not directly to the banks.

Channeling the money through the Spanish government is the least of the flaws in the recapitalization plan.

The more important flaws are

  • In a modern banking system with deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding, banks do not need to have governments bail them out by injecting capital.  Banks are capable of absorbing all the losses on the excesses in the financial system today and rebuilding their book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.  The IIF suggested that this would take 4 years for the Spanish banks to do.
  • Bailing out the banks is never accompanies with the requirement that the banks recognize all their losses.  As a result, the banks continue to support zombie borrowers to the detriment of creditworthy borrowers and the real economy.
  • Governments have scarce resources and these resources should be used to support economic growth.  Bailing out banks is of no value if the economy goes into a depression.
  • In the absence of ultra transparency and the requirement that banks disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants will never believe the banks are adequately capitalized.  The absence of ultra transparency is a guarantee that the banks have something to hide.
From the article,
Spain said its crisis-hit banks will need as much as €62 billion ($78.75 billion) in new capital to absorb losses from a real-estate meltdown, as the International Monetary Fund warned that the euro-zone plan to aid the country may not work. 
Spanish lenders have been pummeled by a dive in property prices that hasn't yet bottomed out, as loans to households are going bad amid record-high unemployment. 
The cost of bailing out the banks will drive up Spain's debt load and threatens to freeze the country out of international markets, which could send shock waves across the euro zone. 
The currency bloc has promised Spain as much as €100 billion in aid, but because it will ultimately add to the government's debt load, investors have been dumping the country's bonds, driving up its funding costs. 
The IMF, which is a contributor to the European rescue programs and is providing technical assistance for the Spanish bank support, on Thursday came out sharply against the euro zone's insistence that any aid be channeled through the government. 
The euro zone needs to quickly set up a mechanism that allows it to directly recapitalize weak banks, "in order to break the negative feedback loop that we have between banks and sovereigns," IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said after a meeting with the bloc's finance ministers in Luxembourg....
A negative feedback loop that only exists because bankers need bailouts if they are to continue receiving their bonuses.
Earlier in the day, Spanish officials presented the results of stress tests by Oliver Wyman, a U.S.-based consulting group, which estimates that under an adverse economic scenario, Spanish banks would need between €51 billion and €62 billion through 2014, and by German consultancy Roland Berger, which estimates they would need €51.8 billion..... 
In an effort to shore up international confidence in its battered banks and to pave the way for euro-zone financial aid, the Spanish government hired the two consultancies to conduct stress tests on the sector's overall loan book to determine potential losses in base and adverse economic scenarios through 2014. The tests analyzed the sector's ability to absorb those losses and provided estimates of possible capital shortfalls in both scenarios. 
"The analyses are accurate, they're credible and they are manageable," said Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy at a meeting with local business leaders in São Paulo, Brazil.....
Just like the analyses there were done in Ireland, Greece,....
The latest plan to clean up the banking sector is Spain's fifth in three years. Some analysts questioned whether the new effort will be sufficient to shore up investor confidence. 
Phoenix Kalen, a macro credit strategist at Royal Bank of Scotland Group, said the €62 billion figure was lower than generally expected for worst-case scenarios. "Investors may have concerns that the stress tests weren't adverse enough," she said. "If investors could see the macro situation deteriorating more than is assumed in the worst-case scenario, they will question the [tests'] credibility."
Regular readers know that the only way to restore credibility is to provide ultra transparency.  With this information, market participants can independently assess the banks.  Confidence flows because market participants trust their own assessment.

IMF unveils its blueprint to save EU

The IMF unveiled its blueprint to save the EU and lo and behold bailouts were in and requiring banks to recognize their losses and proved ultra transparency was out.

Since the bank solvency led financial crisis is not going to end until we stop bailing out the banks and start requiring the banks to recognize their losses and provide ultra transparency, it is safe to say that the IMF blueprint will do more harm than good if implemented.

As reported by the Telegraph,

The International Monetary Fund has directly confronted Germany by urging the eurozone to take a "determined and forceful move" to "complete economic and monetary union" by sharing government debt and underwriting failing banks.
In short, the IMF would reject RBS's Stephen Hester's advice and use up scarce government resources on needlessly bailing out the banks rather than on economic growth.

The IMF would continue with policies that have not worked since the beginning of the financial crisis and that have no chance of working. 
The IMF's intervention is timed to tip the balance against Angela Merkel at a critical summit between Germany, France, Italy and Spain in Rome today where the embattled German Chancellor will be fighting off identical demands. 
Christine Lagarde, the IMF's managing director, last night unveiled the blueprint to save the euro while warning that the EU's single currency was under "acute stress" that threatened "the viability of the monetary union itself". 
"We are clearly seeing additional tension and acute stress applying to both banks and sovereigns in the euro area," she said. 
"With that in mind, the IMF believes that a determined and forceful move towards complete European monetary union should be reaffirmed in order to restore faith in the system, because we see at the moment the viability of the European monetary system is questioned." 
The way to restore faith in the system is to adopt the Swedish model with ultra transparency.

Under the Swedish model, banks are required to recognize all the losses on the excesses in the financial system today.  This protects the real economy from the existing drag of carrying the debt associated with the zombie borrowers.  Subsequently, the banks can rebuild their book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

Ultra transparency is needed so that market participants can confirm all the losses were realized and exert discipline on the banks to keep their risk levels in check.
Germany is opposed to almost every single element of the IMF measures, including "common debt", a European deposit guarantee scheme, a single banking resolution fund, sovereign bond purchases by the European Central Bank and direct aid by euro bail-out funds to struggling financial institutions....

Tuesday, June 5, 2012

Lessons for Spain in how Iceland handled the financial crisis

The Telegraph carried an interesting article on how Iceland handled its bank solvency led financial crisis and the lessons that Spain could learn from this.

Simply, Iceland adopted the Swedish model and required its banks to recognize all the losses on and off their balance sheets.  Four years later, Iceland has an investment grade debt rating and its economy is growing.
Iceland tore up the traditional rulebook.
Actually, there are two traditional rulebooks.

There is the rulebook preferred by bankers who are interested in receiving their bonuses.  This rulebook is called the Japanese model and requires that bank book capital levels be protected at all costs.

There is the rulebook preferred by a country's citizens that says that they come first.  This rulebook is called the Swedish model and requires that banks recognize all of the losses on and off their balance sheets today.

Iceland simply chose the rulebook that put its citizens first.
First, retail depositors were given priority over bondholders. 
Then, alongside the deposits, all domestic assets were transferred to new banks at "fair value" – the shrunken, market price of the debt. The new banks, recapitalised by the state, took over the vital payments system that kept the wheels of the economy turning....
Please note that in a modern financial system with deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding, the banks do not have to be recapitalized by the state.  They can rebuild their book capital levels by retaining future earnings.
Shut out of the international money markets and with the country's economic model broken, Iceland tapped the International Monetary Fund for a $2.1bn emergency loan.... 
The IMF was an immediate stabilising influence. Rather than preach austerity, it backed a state-sponsored stimulus package, agreeing to postpone planned cuts for a year. 
Poul Thomsen, a director of the IMF's European department, said in December 2008: "We think it is wrong, in the face of a deep recession, to embark on fiscal consolidation."
Your humble blogger has been advocating that the state funds that would be used in an unnecessary bailout of the banks instead be used to support an economic stimulus package.
The Icelandic government then took unorthodox measures to alleviate the debt burden on households. Banks were made to accept reductions in mortgage interest payments of up to 40pc, while the most distressed households had some of their debt written off.
Iceland effectively required the banks to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  By doing so, it protected its real economy.

Ireland did not do this prior to bailing out its banks and it is still fighting with its banks to get them to recognize the losses on the mortgages they hold.
The medicine is working.
This is no surprise as the Swedish model has worked everyplace it has been implemented.  This includes the US (during the Great Depression) and Sweden.
The economy contracted 6.8pc in 2009 and another 4pc in 2010, but bounced back to grow 3.1pc last year. The IMF has been repaid and, in February, the country regained its investment grade credit rating after Fitch raised it from the "junk" status of BBB- to BB+....
But compared with Ireland, which has seen national debt soar from 11pc to 96pc of GDP after bailing out bank bondholders rather than cutting them loose, Iceland has been an amazing tale. 
It may have been so small as to be irrelevant to the global financial system, but the IMF has said there are lessons to be learned. Spain, whose banks pose a much greater risk than its public finances, is a case in point. 
As Julie Kozack, IMF mission chief for Iceland, said: "For a country whose entire financial system collapsed, Iceland is doing remarkably well."
It is nice to have the IMF confirm that the Swedish model is the policy of choice for countries that have to deal with a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Wednesday, April 18, 2012

IMF: EU bank capital related cuts in lending drag on growth

Confirming that EU financial regulators created a credit crunch and slower economic growth with their 9% Tier I capital ratio target, the IMF warned that EU banks under pressure to maintain this capital ratio could cut back further on lending and slow the region's growth.

This is the outcome that your humble blogger predicted when the EU financial regulators announced their 9% Tier I capital ratio target.

This target is meaningless when it comes to any information about the solvency of the banks as both risk weighted assets and bank book capital levels are easily manipulated.  For example, regulatory forbearance results in overstating book capital with the regulators' blessing as losses are not recognized.

According to a Telegraph article,

The decline in credit is a big reason Europe's economy is expected to suffer a mild recession this year and barely grow in 2013, the IMF said in a report on the global financial system released today. 
Large banks based in the European Union may reduce their balance sheets - which include outstanding loans, securities and other assets - by as much as $2.6 trillion (£1.6 trillion) through the end of 2013, the IMF said. That's about 7pc of their total assets.... 
Some reduction in credit, or "deleveraging," is necessary, the IMF said. Banks aren't able to borrow as freely as in the past and governments are requiring them to hold more capital. 
"But like Goldilocks, the amount, the pace of deleveraging must be just right," said Jose Vinals, the IMF's financial counselor. "Not too large or too much."...
The IMF notes that the central bank's capital has given European officials more time to push the continent's shaky banks to raise new capital. The EU's European Banking Authority is already pressing to do that. It has pushed banks to increase the size of their financial reserves compared to their risky loans and investments - but it has urged them to do it by finding new capital, not by cutting back on loans. 
Even so, the IMF points out that most responsibility for overseeing banks remains at the national level, where authorities have been slower to make banks take tough measures. 
Raising capital can be a difficult step because it can dilute shareholders holdings.
Or, as is really the case, raising capital is a difficult step because investors do not want to buy bank equity or CoCo bonds so long as bank financial disclosure results in banks resembling 'black boxes'.

Without ultra transparency under which banks disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants do not have the information they need to independently assess the risk of the banks.  As a result, buying bank equity or CoCo bonds is simply blindly betting.
The IMF also warned that national regulators must restrain banks from using money for payouts of dividends to shareholders and bonuses to top bank executives.
This would require the national regulators to abandon the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and adopting the Swedish model.  Under the Japanese model, losses are only recognized after banker bonuses and dividends have been paid.

Under the Swedish model, all the losses hidden on and off the bank balance sheet are recognized today.  Book capital levels are then rebuilt from retained earnings and banker bonuses paid in newly issued stock. 

IMF fears $3.8 trillion forced asset sale by EU banks

Highlighting the hazard of the regulatory fixation with meaningless bank capital levels and capital ratios, the IMF suggested in its Global Financial Stability Report that EU banks face risks that may force them to liquidate $3.8 trillion in assets by the end of 2013.

Readers will recall that the OECD called bank capital levels and capital ratios meaningless.  This reflected the current complete lack of informational content in either bank capital levels or capital ratios and the degree of ease with which both can be manipulated with the blessing of the financial regulators by the banks.

Despite the fact that bank capital levels and capital ratios are meaningless at conveying any information about the solvency of the bank, the focus on them by regulators creates the situation where a fire-sale of high quality, performing assets might occur.

According to a Telegraph article,

An escalation of the eurozone debt crisis could force European banks to sell assets worth up to $3.8 trillion by the end of 2013 with damaging consequences for the global economy, the International Monetary Fund has warned. 
The IMF's spring Global Financial Stability Report said that should markets lose faith in the effectiveness of eurozone policies, rising funding costs and increased stresses within the banking system could force banks to rapidly reduce their balance sheets to raise capital buffers.
The sell-off among 58 of the biggest banks in the European Union included in the IMF's analysis would be equivalent to 10pc of total assets, and the balance sheet adjustment would also involve a significant reduction in bank lending, it said....

Note, the rapid sell-off is a consequence of the need to rapidly raise capital buffers.

This assumption is flat out wrong.  As shown by the US Savings & Loan crisis, banks are fully capable of operating for years with a negative book capital level and making loans to support the real economy.

There is no need to rush to restore bank book capital levels either through asset sales or government provided recapitalization.

"Such a large-scale deleveraging would have consequences well beyond the euro area. The fire sale of bank assets could have a significant impact on asset prices and market liquidity," the IMF said....
Confirmation of these consequences is easily seen by looking at the impact of the EU financial regulators setting a 9% Tier I capital ratio for June 30, 2012.  The EU is currently experiencing a a credit crunch in addition to seeing a negative impact on asset prices and market liquidity.

Wednesday, April 11, 2012

IMF screws Ireland and then adopts Swedish model for handling bank solvency led financial crisis

In an Irish Times column, the author discusses how the IMF committed Ireland to the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and its on-going permanent economic decline and now the IMF endorses the Swedish model and its rapid economic recovery.

“BOLD” HOUSEHOLD debt-restructuring programmes can help prevent recessions becoming deeper and more protracted, according to research by the International Monetary Fund.... 
The study said restructuring household debt “can significantly reduce debt repayment burdens and the number of household defaults and foreclosures. 
Such policies can therefore help avert self-reinforcing cycles of household defaults, further house price declines, and additional contractions in output.”
In short, if you adopt the Japanese model and don't restructure the existing debt to what the borrowers can afford to pay, then the real economy faces a hurdle to growth it cannot overcome.
In a chapter of the World Economic Outlook report entitled “Dealing with household debt”, the IMF economists find that recessions preceded by periods in which households have run up large debts tend to last “at least five years”. 
In the case of Japan, we are talking 2+ decades.
The Irish economy began contracting four years ago....
In the case of Japan, the adoption of the Japanese model and not restructuring the debts has led to 2+ decades of recession (its GNP was actually lower in 2010 than 1995).
A number of the case studies cited in the paper may have relevance for the Irish situation.... 
Case studies that examine what happens when the Swedish model is adopted and debt is restructure based on the borrowers' capacity to pay.
The IMF had a significant input into the design of [the debt restructuring] mechanisms as it was the main source of funding to the north Atlantic state when it was unable to borrow after the collapse of its banking system in 2008. 
Specifically, at the urging of the creditor states in the EU, it pushed for the Japanese model of only recognizing losses to the extent that the banks generate earnings in excess of banker bonuses, dividends and modest book capital increases.
The report notes that the case-by-case approach in Iceland to writing off debts of households which had little or no chance of repaying them proceeded slowly....
The Irish banks are not making much money before loss recognition so they have little ability to absorb losses through their current income stream.
The study concludes that a comprehensive framework and an explicit timeframe are necessary for restructuring programmes to be effective. 
This is how the Swedish model works.  The banks are told to recognize the losses on the portion of the debt that the borrowers cannot afford to pay today.  The banks then subsequently retain future earnings to restore their book capital levels.
Given that the authors’ colleagues are involved in overseeing Ireland’s EU-IMF bailout, the strong endorsement of writing down debts may increase speculation that bigger, Iceland-style restructurings could take place here in the future.
Without these restructurings, Ireland's real economy is condemned to a long term recessionary environment.
Separately, and mirroring the situation in Ireland, the report finds that “strong capital buffers may be insufficient to encourage banks to restructure household debt on a large scale, as is evident in the US today”. 
In fact, under the Japanese model using bank capital to absorb losses is explicitly forbidden.  Losses are only taken as earnings are recognized.

Fundamental to the Japanese model is the idea that depositors equate a healthy bank to a bank with positive  book capital levels.  In reality, government deposit guarantees mean that depositors don't care about a bank's capital level and in most cases do not even know what it is.

Fundamental to the Japanse model is the idea that banks only make loans when they have positive book capital levels.  The US Savings and Loan crisis showed this isn't true as these financial firms knew they had negative book capital levels, they were only positive due to a government sanctioned accounting gimmick, and they continued to make loans.
The report acknowledges that government-supported restructuring schemes do involve one group in society effectively subsidising those who benefit from the scheme, but the case for doing so depends on the net cost/benefit for the economy as a whole.
This is true and is the reason that I proposed that Wall Street rescues Main Street.  It seems perfectly reasonable that that after making money leveraging up Main Street during the years leading up to the financial crisis, that Wall Street should not subsidize Main Street in restructuring the excess debt.

IMF champions Swedish model for handling bank solvency led financial crisis

In the spring edition of its World Economic Outlook, the IMF championed the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Specifically, according to a Guardian article, the IMF found that relieving debt holders of part of their debt speeds the recovery from a financial crisis.

The IMF's conclusion confirms what your humble blogger has said about why the Swedish model for handling a financial crisis (banks recognize losses today on financial excesses) results in a strong recovery and the Japanese model (banks recognize losses only to the extent that they generate earnings in excess of banker bonuses, dividends and de minimus capital retention) results in ongoing economic decline.

The IMF's conclusion also confirms the Wall Street Rescues Main Street blueprint for saving the financial system and protecting the real economy.

Governments should step in to help struggling households write off part of their mortgages in the wake of a financial crisis to avoid the risk of a prolonged economic slump, according to new research by the International Monetary Fund.  
In a chapter of the spring edition of its World Economic Outlook, the rest of which will be published next week, the IMF's economists find that a rapid buildup of household debt during a boom leads to a deeper downturn when the bubble bursts. 
"Housing busts preceded by larger run-ups in gross household debt are associated with deeper slumps, weaker recoveries, and more pronounced household deleveraging," they find. 
From Iceland to the US, Spain to the UK, a rapid increase in debt was a common characteristic across many economies in the years before 2007, as homeowners took advantage of low interest rates to borrow against the rocketing value of their properties. 
When house prices crashed, many borrowers inevitably found themselves in trouble and were forced to cut back sharply, contributing to the deep recessions that followed the financial crisis. 
But when they examined scores of historical property crashes, the IMF found that where consumers were battling with a heavy debt burden spending fell on average four times as fast as could be explained by the decline in house prices alone. 
"The decline in economic activity is too large to be simply a reflection of a greater fall in house prices. And it is not driven by the occurrence of banking crises alone," they say. "Rather, it is the combination of the house price decline and the pre-bust leverage that seems to explain the severity of the contraction." 
Because of this strong relationship between the debt burden before a crisis and consumer behaviour in the years afterwards, the IMF says governments should consider intervening to help households write off or restructure their mortgages.... 
In so doing, these programmes help prevent self-reinforcing cycles of declining house prices and lower aggregate demand."
The question is how should governments step in and facilitate this debt restructuring.

The answer under the Swedish model is rather than provide banks with regulatory forbearance, the regulators should force the recognition by banks of the losses on the excesses in the financial system.

Tuesday, April 10, 2012

IMF urges authorities to adopt debt forgiveness to restore growth

A Telegraph article reports that the IMF is urging authorities to consider 'bold' actions to reduce household debt levels and get economic growth going again.

It is nice to have the IMF embrace one of the core elements of the Wall Street Rescues Main Street blueprint I proposed.

As your humble blogger has said on numerous occasions, the way Wall Street rescues Main Street is by absorbing the losses on the excesses in the financial system today.

Absorbing these losses means that the level of debt for both households and governments shrinks.  Which in turn frees up the scarce resources that were being used for de-leveraging to instead be used for economic growth.

High levels of household debt restrain consumer spending and delay recoveries, the Bretton Woods institution concluded in an analysis of crises over the past century.... 
the IMF said the authorities should consider going further with “targeted household debt reduction policies”.... 
Although the policies might initially be expensive, they would be beneficial by reinvigorating consumer spending and helping the economy, the IMF said.
By having the banks absorb the losses, the debt reduction policies are not expensive.
It cited the actions of the US in 1933 in the midst of the Great Depression and Iceland after its recent banking collapse. 
The Roosevelt administration in the US set up the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation to buy distressed mortgages from banks in exchange for government debt. It then restructured the mortgages “to make them more affordable”. 
The policy cost 8.4pc of GDP, equivalent to £130bn in the UK this year, but saved 800,000 households from repossession. The US government had made a profit, before inflation, by the time the scheme was run off in 1951. 
In Iceland, banks were made to accept reductions in mortgage interest payments of up to 40pc and the most distressed households had a portion of their outstanding debt written off. 
The economy there has now recovered remarkably since its bank-led collapse in 2008. 
The IMF said the lessons showed that “policies can help avert self-reinforcing cycles of household defaults, further house price declines, and additional contractions in output” and made a case “for government involvement to lower the cost of restructuring debt, facilitate the writing down of household debt, and help prevent foreclosures”....
It is remarkable just how well the Swedish model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis works.
The IMF added that the banks need to be strongly recapitalised before debt forgiveness is considered, and that “bold” policies would be easier to implement in countries where there had been some state intervention in the banking system – as in Iceland....
Not a surprising recommendation given the failure of economists to understand the role of deposit guarantees and unlimited liquidity from the central bank in preventing runs on the banks after they have realized the losses.

Keep in mind three items when it comes to government guarantees.

First, when a child opens up a bank account and asks how do they know they are going to get their money back, no parent says it is because the bank has positive book capital levels.  They tell the child the government guarantees they will get their money back.

Second, almost nobody knows what the current level of book capital is for their bank (do you?).  At the same time, everyone knows that with their regulators' blessing, banks are hiding losses.  As a result, even if they knew the reported level of book capital, they don't trust it.

Third, everyone knows that the government extended the deposit guarantee to cover unsecured debt at the start of the financial crisis.  The annual stress tests are the government's way of renewing this guarantee.  It is hard to close a bank that passes the government stress test and inflict losses.
“These programs help prevent self-reinforcing cycles of declining house prices and lower aggregate demand. Such policies are particularly relevant for economies with limited scope for expansionary macroeconomic policies and in which the financial sector has already received government support,” the IMF said. 
However, loading all the burden on the banks and tearing up the law so households could walk away from their debts, as attempted in Colombia in 1997, would only trigger another credit crunch, it added.
Actually, without tearing up the law so households could walk away from their debts, but rather requiring the debts to be written down to levels the borrower can afford to pay has been done successfully in the US, Sweden and Iceland!

As shown by the US Savings & Loan crisis, financial institutions with negative book capital levels are fully capable of supporting significant quantities of new lending.  So there is no reason to be concerned with a credit crunch by loading all the burden on the banks.

Saturday, October 22, 2011

IMF threat to not lend Greece more money is opportunity for Europe

According to an article in the Telegraph, the IMF is telling the European financial ministers that it will not continue to lend to Greece.

If this is true, it is extraordinarily good news as it presents the EU with the opportunity to truly address the sovereign debt and bank solvency issues.

In 2008-2009, like the US and UK, the EU elected to bailout its banking system.  The result was to change a bank solvency issue into a sovereign debt crisis.

Now, in 2011, the EU has the chance to lead the way and break from the failed policies of 2008-2009.

The time has come to force banks to recognize their losses.

Policymakers have to understand that banks recognizing losses is the safety valve in the financial system.  It is not recognizing the losses that is a primary driver of the sovereign debt crisis.  

Recognizing accounting losses will not cause the financial system to collapse.

Depositors will not run - they are covered by deposit insurance.  This deposit insurance can be enhanced by using the European Financial Stability Fund as an additional guarantor.  There is the European Central Bank to insure liquidity.

Banks can continue to originate loans that can be funded either through securities like covered bonds or by selling the loans to investors like pension funds, insurance companies and hedge funds.

Access to credit will actually be enhanced for small businesses.  Policymakers under appreciate the role that real estate plays in these loans.  Banks are senior secured lenders.  For most small businesses, the security they have to pledge is real estate.

When a real estate bubble bursts, the problem for bankers is to estimate the value of the real estate.  Not requiring the banks to write down the real estate related loans on their balance sheets prolongs the period of time in which bankers are uncertain as to the value of the real estate and thus the collateral being pledged.  It is this uncertainty that limits small businesses access to credit.

The EU should recognize the opportunity the IMF threat represents and fully utilize the safety valve that banks recognizing losses represents.

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Germany's Merkel backs plans to recapitalize banks, but how much capital do they need? (updated)

A Telegraph article reports that Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel backs plans to recapitalize the Eurozone banks.

The key questions are:  how much capital do the banks need and will there be disclosure of each bank's current asset and liability-level data so that market participants can confirm the adequacy of this additional capital injection?

Confirmation of the adequacy of the capital injection is critically important to restore market confidence because the mere discussion of another round of capital injections in the Eurozone banks clearly shows that the first round of capital injections was inadequate.

As previously discussed on this blog, potential recapitalization amounts range from the single digit billion euros (based on the EU financial regulators stress tests) to 200 - 300 million euros (based on the IMF's analysis) to maybe as much as 2 trillion euros (based on BlackRock Larry Fink's comment).

Regardless of what number is selected for recapitalizing the banks, market participants and Germany's Merkel are going to want to be able to verify that this recapitalization is sufficient to restore and maintain bank solvency.  The only way to do this is if each bank discloses its current asset and liability-level data.

If regulators do not require banks to make this disclosure, market participants and Germany's Merkel could easily conclude that the regulators are hiding something and that the banks are in fact not adequately capitalized.  After all, there is no reason not to disclose this data unless the banks are hiding something.
The German Chancellor's intervention on Wednesday rallied European markets after fears that EU's determination to prop up banks was wavering after a meeting of finance ministers on Monday failed to take a decision. 
"I think it is important, if there is a general view that the banks are not sufficiently capitalised for the current market situation, that one does it," she said following talks in Brussels.  Chancellor Merkel said that she was ready to support and to decide on a eurozone bank capitalisation plan as early as October 17, at an EU summit. 
"Germany is prepared to move to recapitalise. We need criteria. We are under pressure of time and we need to take a decision quickly," she said. 
Actually, as your humble blogger has repeatedly pointed out, Eurozone policymakers are not under time pressure to inject capital into the Eurozone banks.

Eurozone policymakers are under time pressure to put in place a mechanism for determining how much capital each bank needs.

Only after the size of the capital shortfall has been determined is it appropriate to talk about how and if each bank will be recapitalize - which banks will recapitalize themselves through retained earnings, which banks will be recapitalized by raising equity from the capital markets, which banks will be recapitalized by their host governments, and which banks are so far underwater that they will be closed.

The "how to" roadmap for doing this involves the following steps:

  1. Each bank discloses its current asset and liability-level data to all market participants;
  2. Market participants analyze this data and determine how much capital each bank needs;
  3. Working with market participants, the regulators determine appropriate strategy for recapitalizing each bank; and 
  4. Banks recapitalized.
Please note, these steps will not be completed in 5 weeks.  However, that is not what is needed to restore confidence in the market.

What is needed is that the market sees the Eurozone governments committed to a path that will address and end the solvency crisis.

... Germany is said to support a move by the European Banking Authority to raise minimum capitalisation levels, a change that would lead to a need for financial support for banks with exposure to Greek or other sovereign debt risk.... 
Germany's intervention soothed markets but will intensify pressure on France. 
France, with banks that are among the most exposed, including its stake in Dexia, is opposed to recapitalisation. Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, is concerned that the huge sums he might have to pay out could threaten the French AAA sovereign debt rating ahead of elections next year.
Using my approach, it is not clear that governments will have to inject huge sums of money in their banking systems.  Private investors are likely to put up the money when they can assess the risk of each bank.
"I think it will be a very important signal to the international financial markets," she said.
The key is to send the right message.  My modest proposal is the message that needs to be sent.
"There's just news of discussions about a possible bank recapitalisations, there's no details yet," said Kasper Kirkegaard, currency strategist at Danske in Copenhagen. "There's a high risk of a further sell-off if we don't get details on this soon."
The details that need to be laid out is a credible plan for addressing the need to recapitalize the banks.

Update


A Wall Street Journal article discusses a 'plan' to restore investor confidence in Eurozone banks.  Under the plan, each EU nation and its financial regulators are now suppose to tell how much capital each bank actually needs.

Currently, the plan lacks verifiability by market participants.  Instead, market participants are suppose to simply believe these numbers.

This plan is highly unlikely to restore confidence.  At a minimum, it excludes two key ingredients to restoring confidence.  These ingredients are current asset and liability-level disclosure and investor participation in the determination of how much capital each bank needs.

Germany is putting pressure on other euro-zone governments to declare how they would recapitalize their banks if the need arose, as part of a concerted effort to repair investors' battered confidence in European banks....

German officials hope that a coordinated demonstration by euro-zone governments that they have contingency plans for their banks in place would calm financial-market fears of a banking crisis in the region....
As well as alleviating such funding strains, German officials hope that a system of backstops for banks would give the euro zone more freedom to deal with Greece's teetering debts—including the option of restructuring Greek bonds. 
Investors fear that some European banks would struggle to digest the losses that would follow from a major Greek debt restructuring, unless the banks receive capital injections from national or European authorities....

Banks should seek to raise capital first from private investors, and from national authorities if they can't tap the market, she said. If national authorities don't have the necessary resources, banks should turn to currency bloc's main bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, she said....

Germany has said in recent days that it stands ready, if necessary, to reactivate its national banking bailout fund, which was set up in 2008 but is now closed to new aid requests from banks. Reopening the fund would require approval from Germany's parliament, but Berlin officials believe they could get that authorization quickly.

Germany professes confidence that its own banks, which have so far avoided the worst of the recent funding strains, don't need more capital. But Europe's biggest economy wants the single-currency bloc to send a united, reassuring signal to financial markets about its banks.

German officials have complained that some other governments haven't put in place national contingency plans to support their banks. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble was frustrated at the lack of progress in some countries when European finance ministers discussed the issue in Luxembourg early this week, according to people familiar with the matter....

France's government, however, is reluctant to reactivate its banking bailout measures dating from 2008, according to people familiar with the matter. Paris is deeply worried about losing its triple-A credit rating if the rating agencies decide the country can't afford any costly new bank-support measures, these people say....

French banks are also against announcing a new national banking backstop, for fear that it could spook financial markets already worried about French lenders' exposure to indebted Southern European countries.

Saturday, October 1, 2011

How bad is the situation in Europe? Germany would like to know!

As we come to the end of a work week, I found myself reflecting on three interesting data points concerning the European financial crisis.
  • Less than 3 months ago, the European financial regulators suggested that as a result of the latest round of stress tests, European banks needed to raise less than 10 billion euros in new capital.
  • Less than 2 months ago, the IMF suggested that European banks needed to raise between 200 and 300 billion euros of new capital.
  • Less than 1 month ago, US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner suggested that between European banks and at-risk sovereigns, there was a need to raise 2 trillion euros.
Admittedly, the European financial regulators did not consider a sovereign default in their stress tests, so their estimate of how much capital is needed is probably too small.

However, and this is a big however, their estimate is the closest of the three estimates to being constrained by what is actually happening at the banks.  The stress tests were run on some of the banks' assets and liabilities.

Unless the results of the stress tests are completely fictional, the tests suggest that European banks have the capacity to absorb a significant amount of write-downs without requiring governments or the European Financial Stability Fund to recapitalize them.

The economists at the IMF estimated capital needs based on what they thought were the most likely levels of write-downs as a result of sovereign debt restructuring.  

Admittedly, the IMF economists did not know the extent to which sovereign debt positions might be hedged so capital needs could be lower if banks had hedged their positions.

Again, we have an estimate of capital needs that suggests that Europe can handle the problem with in its current plans.

Finally, we have Mr. Geithner's estimate.

Admittedly, it includes funding for sovereign bailouts.  However, it strains credibility to believe that it includes the European financial regulators' estimate of capital needed by the banks and not the IMF's.

If the IMF and Mr. Geithner's estimate is right, it suggests that European policy makers and financial regulators have seriously misled market participants.  Is that true of all European policy makers and financial regulators?  Is it possible that Germany's policy makers and financial regulators did not mislead market participants?

Given the US experience with stress tests, I am not naive enough to believe that the results of the tests provided to the public did not understate the amount of capital the tests actually found was needed.  I just do not believe that the financial regulators would release numbers that are off by a factor of 10.  It is far too likely that the market will quickly discover the shortfall and the resultant loss in the financial regulators' credibility will fuel the fear of just how bad shape the global financial system is in.

What Germans would like to know is which of these three estimates is right! 

There is only one way to find out and that is disclosure of each bank's current asset and liability-level data.  Market participants can analyze this data and assess how much, if any, capital each bank needs. 

Wednesday, September 28, 2011

Irish lending expertise in looting taxpayers to Greece

According to an article in the Irish Times, the staff of the Irish central bank are advising their counter-parts at the Greek central bank on how to plot a resolution of the Greek banks and restore confidence in the Greek banking system.

At first blush, this seems reasonable.  After all, the Irish banking system has experienced a similar run on its banks as the Greek banking system.

So what can the Irish central bankers advise their Greek counter-parts on?

The Irish central bankers could advise their Greek counter-parts on their experience hiring firms like BlackRock, Barclays and Boston Consulting to run a stress test and reorganize the banks.

Specifically, they could share
  • how 30 million euros was paid to these firms for a solution that your humble blogger stated before the firms started would neither restore confidence nor stop the run on the banks' deposits;  
  • that the run on the Irish banking system has continued months after the results of the stress test and reorganization were announced; and 
  • that the ECB recently committed to paying 4 million euros for a report due in November 2011 on how to restore confidence in the Irish banking system.
Most likely though, the Irish central banker will advise their Greek counter-parts to spend lots of taxpayer money on a similar stress test and reorganization.  

Like Wall Street, the advice will be better for the advisor than for the recipient.  
  • For the advisor, it provides cover lest Irish taxpayers question the wisdom of the stress test and reorganization - the central banker's defense is 'it must be a good idea because someone else did it too'; kind of like lemmings jumping off a cliff.  
  • For the recipient, it provides an opportunity to loot the Greek taxpayer (or the EU taxpayers given that Greece is having difficulty repaying its debt).  After all, it cannot be justified on the grounds that it will restore confidence or stop the run on the banks.
Alternatively, the Irish central bankers could advise their Greek counter-parts that they wished they had pursued the only proven solution for restoring confidence and ending bank runs.  This solution involves implementing the FDR Framework and providing disclosure to all market participants of the current asset and liability-level data for each bank.
SENIOR OFFICIALS from the Central Bank have played a walk-on part in the unfolding Greek tragedy, prompting their counterparts in Athens from the wings on how to plot a resolution for their banks. 
Performing a role close to that of an all-knowing Irish Oracle at Delphi, two officials travelled to Athens in July and again earlier this month to advise the Greeks on how they stress-tested the Irish banks in an attempt to draw a final line under the banking crisis. 
The troika gods of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund have looked favourably on the Irish stress tests as a winning formula for assessing risks in banking sectors in other struggling euro zone states.
Despite all evidence to the contrary that the stress tests were not a winning formula.  So maybe having Greece engage in this activity is to provide cover to the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund too!
The cost of bailing out the Irish banks has not increased since the March 2011 tests, the fifth attempt in more than two years to put a final bill on the banking disaster. 
Apparently success is defined as the Irish government not having to put more equity into the banking system for 6 months.  A measure of success that Warren Buffett would say is very similar to firing an arrow and then drawing a bullseye around where it has landed.

This definition of success has a couple of flaws.  First, it is not clear that the Irish government has access to the financial resources to put additional capital into the banks.  This is a bit of a problem given that the Irish Times reports that house prices continue to fall.  Second, bank equity is an easily manipulated accounting construct.  Simply practicing extend and pretend results in bank equity being higher than it would be if losses were realized.
As a result of the purported success of the Irish tests, the Central Bank was asked to send a delegation to Athens earlier this summer to help the Greek authorities handle their own banking woes.
"We can confirm that following a request from the Bank of Greece a small team from the Central Bank of Ireland travelled twice to the Bank of Greece to share experiences gained," a Central Bank spokesman said...
The officials advised the Greeks on the process followed in the Irish tests and how the test results influenced the reconstruction of the Irish banking system around the two "pillars" of Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Banks. 
Two Greek banks were among eight lenders that failed EU-wide stress tests of 90 banks in July. 
Bank of Ireland and AIB both passed the EU tests the previous year, but the results were undermined when the Government was forced to seek bailout loans from the EU and IMF four months later. 
The subsequent Irish stress tests of the banks in March 2011 were not carried out exclusively by Central Bank officials, however. As part of their scrutiny, they called in consultants, including US asset manager BlackRock Solutions, to assess losses on the loan books of the Irish banks. 
BlackRock has since been recruited by the Greek central bank to evaluate the country's banks, which would be among the losers in a default by Greece. 
The Central Bank spent €30 million on external consultants to verify the tests on Bank of Ireland, AIB, EBS building society and Irish Life and Permanent. The results of the tests raised the cost of bailing out the banks by €24 billion to €70 billion. About €64 billion is being injected by the State.
And still the run on the Irish banking system continues as the failure to disclose current asset and liability-level data means that nobody knows if the banks are solvent or not.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Did the IMF endorse the FDR Framework's roadmap for addressing Europe's solvency crisis?

In his Telegraph column, Jeremy Warner analyzes not only what the IMF said in its twice yearly Global Financial Stability Report but what its message to European policymakers was.

Independent of this report, I posted a roadmap based on the FDR Framework for addressing Europe's solvency crisis.

It is clear from what the IMF said and its message to European policymakers that it would support European policymakers adopting the roadmap and addressing Europe's solvency crisis.

Most International Monetary Fund reports are necessarily the result of compromise and negotiation. Rarely is the IMF allowed by its nation shareholders to tell it exactly as it sees it. 
So the warning in the IMF's latest "Global Financial Stability Report" that European Union banks face a possible capital shortfall of €200bn to €300bn as a result of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis comes as quite an eye opener. 
European governments will have fought this assessment tooth and nail, for not only does it seem to add fuel to what is already a raging panic around the solvency of the European banking system, it also provides some indication of quite how much more public money is going to be required for recapitalisation. 
In the absence of asset and liability-level disclosure as recommended under the FDR Framework, it is necessarily public money that is needed for recapitalization.

After all, what private investors would take on the risk of losing their investment in a financial institution where they do not have the data necessary to evaluate if the financial institution will be solvent after their investment?
Banks were stress tested by European banking regulators against bad debt risk less than three months ago, and with a few notable exceptions, were found to be broadly sound....
But these stress test results did not restore market confidence as, for example, the assumptions used in the test were immediately criticized.  One of the criticisms was that the test did not adequately cover the possibility of one or more sovereign defaults/restructurings.

Regular readers know that by definition stress tests do not restore market confidence.  Stress tests are run by regulators.  The source of market confidence is market participants using granular level data from the banks to run their own stress tests.  It is the results of these stress tests that market participants believe.
The IMF is at pains to stress that the €200-300bn cited is an estimate of the increased sovereign credit risk in the EU banking system, not of the extra capital needed by banks as such. None the less, it is the IMF's best guess at the size of capital at risk. This is, if you like, the IMF's assessment of the unrealised losses in the European banking system as a result of the sovereign debt crisis. 
Of course, some of this risk may already have been written off or provided for. The point is that we just don't know, as there is no transparency in the system or commonly applied method of accounting for such assets.  
Since before the financial crisis began on August 9, 2007, I have been advocating for transparency in the global financial system.  This includes both the regulated banking system and the shadow banking system.

The reason I have done so is with transparency (disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner) we could know.

There is no reason given the availability of 21st century information technology that it should be a mystery if a bank has written off or provided for a sovereign credit.
Small wonder that many European banks can no longer access private funding markets.
Who would want to put funds into a bank if they cannot assess the risk of loss?  This assessment can either be done by the market participant or by using trusted independent third parties.
Small wonder too that European governments are so alarmed at this assessment, statement of the bleedin' obvious though it might be. Another round of bank bailouts so soon after the last one is anathma to most Europeans, worse, in some respects than the idea of bailing out sovereign nations directly. 
Yet if this crisis is ever to be resolved, the IMF is surely right in asserting that recapitalisation of the banks is one of the first things that needs to happen.
But not until after there is transparency so that the market can assess whether the recapitalizations actually restored solvency or not. 
Most people will find the idea that more than four years after the banking crisis began, the banking system continues to require squillions of public money almost beyond belief. 
It was reasonable to assume that the balance sheet problems of most banks had been "cured". Plainly they have not. Indeed the process seems barely to have begun....
Actually, assuming that the bank balance sheet problems had been "cured" is just repeating the assumption that bank balance sheets were not risky prior to the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007.

Just because global financial regulators have been saying the problem has been fixed does not mean it has been fixed.
As the IMF Stability Report warns, "Time is running out to address existing vulnerabilities. The set of policy choices that are both economically viable and politically feasible is shrinking as the crisis shifts into a new, more political phase"....
Which is where the roadmap based on the FDR Framework comes in.  It is economically viable as it limits the amount of government money needed to address solvency in the European banks and sovereigns.  It is politically feasible because it addresses the solvency crisis in a way that will result in a credible solution.

The IMF embraces the FDR Framework disclosure requirements

As reported in a Telegraph article about the IMF's twice yearly Global Financial Stability Report, the IMF embraces the FDR Framework disclosure requirements as what is needed for answering the question which European banks are solvent and which European banks are not.

The FDR Framework requires disclosure of each financial institution's current asset and liability-level data.
It estimated that the eurozone debt crisis has directly cost banks in the European Union €200bn since Greece's debt crisis erupted. Of this, €60bn comes from sovereign debt in Greece, €20bn from Ireland and Portugal, and €120bn from Belgium, Spain and Italy. 
The IMF estimated that there was a further €100bn in additional costs linked to the banks of those six countries. 
"This estimate does not measure the capital needs of banks, which would require a full assessment of bank balance sheets and income positions. Rather, it seeks to approximate the increase in sovereign credit risk experienced by banks over the past two years," the global lender said. 
The fund said that while the numbers are "based on market assessments of credit risk, which may reflect a degree of overshooting, the underlying problems that they highlight are real".

Tuesday, September 13, 2011

Andrew Ross Sorkin and the IMF's Chief change of tune on bank capital

Andrew Ross Sorkin wrote a column in the NY Time's Dealbook on how Christine Lagarde's change in roles from French bank regulator to Chief of the IMF appears to have influenced her position on the adequacy of European bank capital.

He roundly praises her for coming clean about the need for more capital and asks if she can bring the rest of the European financial regulatory community with her.

Regular readers would like to know why he thinks she should stop there.  If Bank of America has shown anything over the last few weeks, it is that the US financial regulators are every bit as guilty when it comes to hiding what is going on.  Is it credible that the 2009 stress tests missed what many analysts today believe is a $200 billion hole in BofA's balance sheet?

If he truly believed in what he wrote, he would become an advocate of the FDR Framework.

Under this framework, 21st century information technology is harnessed to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  For banks, this is their current asset and liability-level dat which the financial regulators currently have a monopoly on.
Over the weekend, Christine Lagarde, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, was desperately trying to back-pedal. A report had surfaced citing an internal I.M.F. document estimating that Europe’s banks were woefully short of capital — by a whopping $273.2 billion....
While Ms. Lagarde acted as if she was surprised by the number — and tried to play it down — she shouldn’t be. And in truth, she wasn’t. 
Changing her tune seems to be a theme for Ms. Lagarde, which may explain her feigned sense of shock. 
Ms. Lagarde sounded alarm bells last month about what she called the need for an “urgent recapitalization” of European banks, and was roundly criticized for it. 
“Developments this summer have indicated we are in a dangerous new phase,” she said then. Her refreshingly honest remarks had been so honest — apparently, too honest — that some bankers blamed her for further undermining confidence in European banks. 
Yes, Ms. Lagarde had broken the secret code of silence among Europe’s top bankers — a silence she herself had kept for far too long when she was a politician. 
It is this code of silence about what is actually going on with the banks that is a major source of financial instability.

As BNP Paribas Chairman Michel Pebereau observed, 'utter transparency' is needed.
Just this summer,... Ms. Lagarde was trying to will the world into believing that the French banks, the ones she oversaw as France’s Minister of Economic Affairs, Finances and Industry, and the ones which are now in the headlines every day — BNP Paribas and Société Générale, among them — were sound....
In an interview even before the results of this summer’s stress tests of European banks, she told The Economist: “As far as my banks are concerned, the French banks, I am very confident about the results; and No. 2 and probably more importantly, from what I have seen of the criteria, and the kind of tests that are applied to the 91 banks in Europe, it’s a very tough standard that is applied. And I’m saying that because I have seen here and there some, you know, allegations, little hints, and, and, various comments, analysts saying ‘Oooh, not so sure about the tests.’ Well, let’s go down to the details, the tests are really, really hard.” 
... Europe’s central bankers continue to defend the fictional stress test. 
Even as late as last week, they somehow argued that “individual disclosures of sovereign exposures were an essential component of the exercise and a great enhancement in terms of transparency” despite disbelief in the markets.
The markets disbelief was in the stress tests themselves which have been subsequently shown as not very credible.

It is an undisputed fact that the individual disclosures of sovereign exposures were a significant enhancement in terms of transparency.
We often blame United States politicians and regulators for not owning up to our economic problems until it is too late. But the Europeans have tried to keep up the fiction of their economic strength for much longer....
While the United States was injecting capital in banks, guaranteeing debt and trying to increase capital requirements, European regulators were fighting behind the scenes to keep capital requirements low.
Perhaps my memory is hazy, but I think that France injected capital into its banks and, following the example set by the US, let the banks repay this capital.

The US policy of guaranteeing financial institution debt was and is a major contributor to moral hazard.

On the other hand, this blog has argued that the US should guarantee the debt if the regulators are going to have a monopoly on the information that market participants need to assess the risk of investing in the debt.

Furthermore, when regulators say that the banks are solvent (see stress tests above), they are explicitly offering investment advice.  Given that the information monopoly makes market participants dependent on the regulators for analysis of the information, if the regulators fail to properly assess the risk, the government should pick up the loss.
Instead, European regulators, including Ms. Lagarde, jumped on the banker compensation bandwagon, which might have won her political points, but appears now to have also kept the public eye off the bigger issue: Europe’s banks were woefully undercapitalized and every regulator knew it. 
Why does anyone not think the same about US banks and what their regulators knew?

Recently, a considerable amount of attention has been focused on Bank of America and analysts' estimates that it is undercapitalized by $200 billion.  Is it believable that US regulators did not know about this capital shortfall when they conducted their 2009 stress tests?  What are we to make of the representation by the regulators that accompanied the 2009 stress tests that BoA would be adequately capitalized if it raised less than a fifth of this estimated shortfall?
... Europe’s economic problems won’t be solved until the banks — and their regulators — accept that they need more capital and a solution is reached about the structure of the European Union. (It probably has to happen in that order.) 
Actually, what has to happen first is that the banks need to disclose their current asset and liability-level data.  Market participants can use this data to determine which banks are solvent and which banks are insolvent and the amount of capital needed to restore each insolvent bank to solvency.

Some of the insolvent banks will be able retain earnings and restore their solvency.  Other banks will need to be recapitalized.  Private investors are likely to participate in this recapitalization because they will know what they are buying.  Other banks will have to be closed.
The question, of course, is now that Ms. Lagarde has broken her code of silence, can she persuade the rest of her European counterparts to come clean too?
Can she persuade the rest of the global financial regulator to come clean too?

Now that the code of silence has been broken, there is no excuse for not implementing 'utter transparency' across all financial institutions.