Showing posts with label Libor. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Libor. Show all posts

Friday, August 2, 2013

Banks rigged rate at retirees' expense

Having felt comfortable manipulating benchmark interest rates like Libor for their personal gain, it comes as no surprise that Bloomberg reports bankers were also manipulating for their personal gain the more obscure swap benchmark rate, the ISDAfix.

This rate was used by pension funds trying to hedge their positions.

Just like Libor, the solution to end manipulation by the bankers is using transparency into both the actual transactions and each bank's current exposure details.  With this information, market participants can determine if the banks entered into trades in an attempt to manipulate this rate.

U.S. investigators have uncovered evidence that banks reaped millions of dollars in trading profits at the expense of companies and pension funds by manipulating a benchmark for interest-rate derivatives. 
Recorded telephone calls and e-mails reviewed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission show that traders at Wall Street banks instructed ICAP Plc brokers in Jersey City, New Jersey, to buy or sell as many interest-rate swaps as necessary to move the benchmark rate, known as ISDAfix, to a predetermined level, according to a person with knowledge of the matter. 
By rigging the measure, the banks stood to profit on separate derivatives trades they had with clients who were seeking to hedge against moves in interest rates. 
Banks sought to change the value of the swaps because the ISDAfix rate sets prices for the other derivatives, which are used by firms from the California Public Employees’ Retirement System to Pacific Investment Management Co....
Bankers had the exact same motive to manipulate this benchmark interest rate as they did to manipulate Libor.
CFTC investigators are piecing together evidence that shows swaption traders at banks worked with rate-swap traders at their own firms to manipulate ISDAfix, the person said. 
The swaption traders told their rate-swap colleagues the level at which they needed ISDAfix to be set that day in order to bolster the value of their derivatives positions before these were settled the next day, the person said. 
The rate-swap trader would then tell a broker at ICAP, the biggest arranger of the contracts between banks, to execute as many trades in interest-rate swaps as necessary to move ISDAfix to the desired level. 
This would be done just before 11 a.m. in New York, the time when current trades are used to create reference points that help determine the final ISDAfix rates, the person said.
Hiding behind a veil of opacity, bankers used a similar technique to manipulate this benchmark interest rate as the technique they used to manipulate Libor.
In manipulating ISDAfix, ICAP brokers profited from the commissions they received from the interest-rate swap trades banks ordered to influence the benchmark, the person said. 
Banks were willing to endure trading costs with the brokers that may have reached hundreds of thousands of dollars because they stood to earn millions on swaptions by manipulating ISDAfix by as little as a quarter of a basis point, or 0.0025 percentage point, the person said....

ICAP manages an electronic screen known as 19901 on which rate-swap prices are displayed throughout the day to about 6,000 corporate treasurers and money managers so they can value positions. 
The trades displayed on the screen are used to create the reference points for ISDAfix rates, according to ISDA’s website. 
ICAP then sends the reference point to banks, which either accept it as their contribution to the benchmark or submit a different value.

Thursday, June 6, 2013

Euribor managers mull using real transactions to set benchmark rate

Bloomberg reports that the Euribor managers are considering using real transactions to set the benchmark interest rate and end the ability of banks on the rate panel to manipulate the rate.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger recommended and the Wheatley Review rejected (it wouldn't even publish my submission) that benchmark interest rates be based off of actual transactions made available by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

By disclosing their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, the banks end two major problems with the benchmark interest rates.

First, ultra transparency thaws the unsecured inter-bank lending market.  Banks with deposits to lend can use the disclose data to assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.

Second, ultra transparency ends manipulation because market participants can use all of the transactions in the inter-bank market or a subset.

Of course, this eloquent solution was rejected by both the banks and their guardians, the regulators.

The group that manages the Euro Interbank Offered Rate, or Euribor, is considering setting up a parallel benchmark based on real transactions rather than estimates. 
Euribor-EBF is exploring the move as part of its response to revelations that some lenders tried to rig interbank lending rates, tarnishing credibility of the indexes. The European Central Bank is providing technical assistance for a feasibility study, according to Euribor-EBF’s response to a review by global regulators. 
Any new benchmark would be set up in addition to Euribor, according to the letter, sent to the International Organization of Securities Commissions. It wouldn’t affect any contracts linked to Euribor rates, the group said. 
The move echoes comments made last month by Martin Wheatley, the head of the U.K. markets regulator. He said the London interbank offered rate should eventually be replaced with a transaction-based benchmark using a dual-track system. ... 

Monday, June 3, 2013

ECB's pressuring banks to stay in interest rate benchmarks highlights failure of Wheatley Review reforms

Reuters reports that the ECB is pressuring banks to stay in the interest rate benchmarks, like Euribor or Libor, so that the benchmarks retain some measure of validity.

The need for the ECB to take this action highlights the failure of the Wheatley Review based reforms.

Regular readers will recall that your humble blogger recommended to the Wheatley Review that banks be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This disclosure addressed the two key problems with the benchmark interest rates.

The first problem is that the unsecured interbank lending market is prone to freezing because banks with deposits to lend cannot assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.  With ultra transparency, this market will unfreeze and remain unfrozen as banks with deposits to lend will always be able to assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.

The second problem is that the benchmark interest rates were not based on actual transactions and therefore they were subject to manipulation by the banks.  With ultra transparency, the benchmark interest rates can be based off of all the actual transactions.

Naturally, the Wheatley Review rejected this simple solution.  They even went so far as to not publish my response.

The European Central Bank put pressure on banks on Friday to stay in interbank lending benchmarks Euribor and Eonia, after a recent spate of high profile withdrawals which have put the future of the gauges in doubt. 
"The ECB strongly encourages banks to remain in, join or re-join the reference rate panels in order to ensure an appropriate level of participation, so that the reference rates serve their purpose of adequately reflecting market developments," the ECB said in a statement. 
Trillions of euros worth of financial products, from home mortgages to complex financial derivatives, are priced using Euribor and Eonia and a complete unravelling of the rates would be a major headache for the banking system....

The exodus has come as the credibility of the benchmarks has been called into question by an inquiry into Libor-style manipulation and the huge drop in lending during the financial crisis as bank-to-bank trust has crumbled....

The Frankfurt-based central bank already helps calculate Eonia and has been working with Euribor-EBF on new rates based on transactions rather than the so-called 'estimates' that gave banks the room to manipulate them for their own advantage.

Tuesday, April 23, 2013

CFTC's Gary Gensler repeats call to base Libor on observable transactions

The CFTC's Gary Gensler keeps hammering home the point that the only way benchmark interest rates like Libor are both credible and not subject to manipulation is to base them on observable transactions.

Your humble blogger's question is when will regulators realize that the simple and only way to achieve this is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details?

Ultra transparency both unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the unsecured interbank lending market.  It does this because it provides the banks with deposits to lend the information they need to assess the risk and solvency of the banks looking to borrow.

Ultra transparency also provides the data needed for calculating the benchmark interest rates.  Market participants can use all of the transactions in the unsecured interbank lending market or a subset of these transactions.

As reported by Reuters,

Two interest rate benchmarks that banks were fined for rigging should be scrapped and replaced by indicators based on market transactions, a top U.S. regulator said on Monday. 
The changes should also include benchmarks linked to gold, oil and other commodities, said Gary Gensler, chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission said. 
Regulators from across the world are fleshing out changes to how two key interest rate benchmarks in particular, the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor) and its continental European counterpart Euribor, are compiled.... 
"I believe Libor and Euribor are unsustainable in the long run. They threaten financial stability," Gensler said. 
Gensler co-chairs the group of regulators setting out principles on how benchmarks can be run and compiled to make them harder to manipulate....
What is so difficult about the principle that banks need to provide ultra transparency so the benchmarks can be based on actual transactions?
"The principles that we laid out are equally relevant to energy, metals, agriculture and financials - for any benchmark to be reliable and robust (it should) be anchored in observable transactions," Gensler later told reporters.
Users of contracts linked to all types of benchmarks should also have a "Plan B" if the transactions to compile them dry up, Gensler added.
Fortunately, with banks providing ultra transparency, transactions won't dry up as the banks with deposits to lend can continue to assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.

The interest rate paid by the borrowing bank might change, but that is what is suppose to happen in a functioning market.
He said Libor and Euribor fail to reflect wider market activity, noting how the cost of insuring one bank's bonds rose sharply during the Cyprus crisis while that bank's Libor submissions barely changed. 
"One might have thought the two would have had some relation to one another," Gensler said....
Transparency re-establishes this relationship.
The financial sector fears mayhem from a rapid switch to a new system for compiling benchmarks but Wheatley said changes would have to be phased in.
There should be absolutely no mayhem in the financial sector as ultra transparency is phased in.  Benchmark interest rates like Libor and Euribor will simply reflect the reality of what it costs the banks to borrow and not some bankers' bonus driven imagination of what it costs the banks to borrow.

Wednesday, April 17, 2013

IOSCO: Benchmark interest rates should be based on real trades

Led by the CFTC's Gary Gensler, IOSCO is calling for benchmark interest rates like Libor to be based on observable transactions.

Regular readers will recall that this is precisely what your humble blogger recommended.

And what should be the source for these observable transactions?

The source should be the banks through their disclosing on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency is needed for two reasons:

  • It allows banks with deposits to lend or market participants looking to fund banks with the information they need to assess the risk and solvency of each bank looking to borrow.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen bank funding markets like the interbank lending market.
  • It allows market participants to use all of the observable transactions or a subset of the transactions as the basis for the benchmark interest rates.  It allows market participants to use all of the banks or a subset of the banks as the panel for the benchmark interest rates and not worry about a change in composition of the panel.
As reported by Bloomberg,
Global regulators said interbank lending rates and other so-called market benchmarks should be based on data from actual trades in a bid to restore credibility of indexes tarnished by price-fixing scandals. 
A panel led by U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chairman Gary Gensler and U.K. Financial Conduct Authority Chief Executive Officer Martin Wheatley is also pushing for banks involved in benchmark setting to sign up to a code of conduct as part of a drive to make the process more robust. 
“To promote market integrity, it is critical that benchmark interest rates be anchored in observable transactions and supported by appropriate governance structures,” Gensler said in a statement on the International Organization of Securities Commissions’ website.....
Iosco, which brings together markets regulators for more than 100 nations to coordinate their rule-making, will seek industry feedback on the proposals through May 16, 2013. 
Benchmark setting is a process with “opportunities for abusive conduct,” through submission of “false and misleading data” or attempts to influence personnel charged with compiling data and publishing the rate, according to the Iosco report. 
The data used for rate-setting should be based on “observable transactions entered into at arm’s length between buyers and sellers,” according to the report, as the use of such “bona fide observable transactions” builds confidence, it said.

Wednesday, April 3, 2013

Salz Review: bankers tried to 'win at all costs'

As reported by the Guardian, the Salz Review, an independent review of Barclays, found that its bankers tried to 'win at all costs' even if this meant violating the spirit of the law.

For regular readers, there is nothing surprising in the report.  It simply reflects the behavior that bankers will engage in when their actions are shrouded behind a veil of opacity.

There is only one way to end this behavior and that is to bring in sunlight as the best disinfectant.  At a minimum, what is required is that banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This will minimize, if not end entirely, behavior like manipulating benchmark interest rates, Libor for example, for profit or taking proprietary bets.
Barclays bankers were engulfed in a culture of "edginess" and a "winning at all costs" attitude, according to the top lawyer appointed to lead a review into the ethics of the embattled bank. 
In a 244-page report (pdf) – which cost £17m – compiled after interviews with 600 individuals in the wake of the Libor-rigging scandal, Anthony Salz calls on Barclays to strengthen its board, bolster its human resources function and link its pay to the "long-term success of the organisation". 
"Based on our interviews, we could not avoid concluding that pay contributed significantly to a sense among a few that they were somehow unaffected by the rules," the report said. 
"A few investment bankers seemed to lose a sense of proportion and humility." 
The strongest culture was inside the investment bank, which Salz said was focused on success. But, he noted: "Winning at all costs comes at a price; collateral issues of rivalry, arrogance, selfishness and a lack of humility and generosity"...
Divisions previously run by Diamond's successor and current chief executive, Antony Jenkins, are also highlighted. Barclaycard had a culture of making money ahead of customer satisfaction while the retail bank had a focus on sales where loans sold with payment protection insurance generated two-and-a-half times more commission for staff than loans sold without the discredited insurance. 
Salz found that the board should have "set the tone" of culture from the top but "with the benefit of hindsight we believe that the Barclays board did not give sufficient attentions to this area", the report found, and was not able to penetrate the structure of the bank....
Opacity even blocked the board's ability to see what was going on.
Barclays had an "edginess and strong desire to win", said Salz. "Barclays was sometimes perceived as being within the letter of the law but not within its spirit. 
Actually, Barclays was frequently outside the letter of the law ... see manipulating Libor for example.

The only way to restrain the actions of the bankers is to subject their actions to transparency at all times.  This is what requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency does.

Saturday, March 30, 2013

Perhaps the Department of Justice knew something when it didn't prosecute the banks; judge dismisses Libor case

For those of us who are not lawyers, it certainly appeared after the Too Big to Fail banks confessed to and paid fines for manipulating the benchmark interest rates, Libor in particular, that investors who suffered losses as a result of the manipulation would be able to recoup their losses.

Turns out that we were wrong.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the judge presiding over the case decided that because the banks agreed to cooperate in manipulating the rate the investors shouldn't be reimbursed.

With this ruling, the judge single-handedly validated the US Department of Justice's decision not to pursue any of the bankers for their misbehavior.

It turns out that the DoJ understood that no matter how strong the fact set, and the banks saying they are guilty of manipulating the benchmark interest rates for their benefit and paying a fine is a pretty strong fact set, judges would let the banks off.

This ruling appears to confirm that the Too Big to Fail truly are Too Big to Jail and they are in a position to engage in any illegal conduct that they would like.
A federal-court judge on Friday agreed to dismiss claims that the 16 banks targeted by the suits broke federal antitrust laws through alleged suppression of the London interbank offered rate, or Libor. 
In a 161-page ruling on the banks' motions to dismiss the leading suits seeking class-action status, U.S. District Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald allowed some of the claims to proceed, including allegations the banks breached commodities laws. 
But if her ruling stands, it would take out a central plank of the litigation. The federal antitrust claims that the judge threw out can pay up to triple damages.... 
Judge Buchwald said her ruling was based on the conflicting legal arguments affecting the suits, rather than whether the underlying allegations of rate-rigging were true.... 
Judge Buchwald ruled that the banks' alleged conduct didn't breach federal antitrust laws, partly because the Libor-setting process was a "cooperative endeavor" and "never intended to be competitive."
That means even if the banks did subvert the Libor process by putting in fake estimates, any losses suffered by investors and other plaintiffs would have resulted from the banks' "misrepresentation, not from harm to competition," the judge wrote.
Just wondering, but could any bank have become a participant in the Libor-setting process or was there a restriction, say based on size, on who could participate?

Thursday, March 21, 2013

German regulator finds flaws in how Deutsche Bank supervised Libor manipulation

Reuters reports that Bafin, the German market regulator, disapproved of Deutsche Bank's see no evil approach to supervising the manipulation of Libor.

It is standard operating practice at banks for senior managers to supervise in such a way that they can avoid taking responsibility by maximizing their use of the claim of plausible deniability.  As in, "we didn't know that the trader was telling the individual who made our Libor submission to submit false information".

The fact that Bafin is going to give Deutsche Bank a slap on the wrist for its involvement in manipulating Libor simply confirms that regulatory oversight is inadequate to prevent this type of behavior in the future.  The same is true for fines that are the equivalent of paying for a parking ticket.

Regular readers know that the manipulation of Libor highlights the need to bring transparency back to the financial system.

The only way to prevent Libor or similar benchmark interest rates from being manipulated in the future is for the banks to provide ultra transparency.

By disclosing their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures on an ongoing basis, banks that are looking to borrow make it possible for banks with deposits to lend to evaluate their risk and solvency.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the unsecured interbank lending market.

With ultra transparency, it is also possible to based Libor and similar benchmark interest rates off of actual transactions.  Market participants can use all the transaction of a subset.

With ultra transparency, there is no need for complex rules or regulatory oversight of Libor or similar benchmark interest rates.

German markets watchdog Bafin is set to rebuke Deutsche Bank (DBKGn.DE: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) over how it supervised its contribution to the setting of inter-bank lending rates at the heart of the international rate-rigging scandal, several sources familiar with Bafin's investigation said. 
However, the watchdog's report will focus on "organizational flaws" at Germany's biggest lender rather than placing blame on Deutsche's co-chief executives Anshu Jain and Juergen Fitschen, or their predecessor Josef Ackermann, one of the sources said....

"It won't be much more than finger-wagging," the person said of the report, whose preliminary conclusions are due to be passed on to Berlin by the end of the month....

German financial daily Handelsblatt also said on Thursday, citing "insiders", that Bafin was focusing in on organizational issues at Deutsche and that there would be no consequences for current or former board members.

Tuesday, March 12, 2013

Barclays backs Libor based on actual transactions

Dealing a death blow to the Wheatley Review and its recommendations, Barclays backs basing Libor on actual transactions rather than estimates.

As reported by Bloomberg,

Overseers of financial benchmarks should have limited or no discretion to set levels, Barclays said in a letter released yesterday by the International Organization of Securities Commissions. 
The letter, dated Feb. 11, was a response to IOSCO’s January request for comments on possible measures to overhaul the setting and governance of such benchmarks. 
“Reporting transactions or tradeable prices available to the market would serve to reduce conflicts, especially as trades are already subject to a clear and robust regulatory framework,” Francois Jourdain, a Barclays managing director, wrote on behalf of the U.K.’s second-biggest bank by value.
And how should market participants be able to access and verify unsecured interbank trades?

By requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants have access to the trade data and every bank can be part of the panel on which benchmark interest rates like Libor are based.

With this information, banks with deposits to lend can assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the interbank lending market.

Friday, March 8, 2013

Anat Admati: "The Bankers' New Clothes", right fairy tale, wrong conclusion

In an American Banker column, Professor Anat Admati makes a very important observation about the gutting of financial regulation.  It tends to be good for bankers and bad for society.

The column is an excerpt from a book she co-authored with Martin Hellwig, "The Bankers' New Clothes: What's Wrong With Banking and What to Do About It."

Regular readers know that your humble blogger differs with Professor Admati on both the diagnosis of what is wrong with banking and what to do about it.

I see the problem with banking being opacity.

Opacity that let's bankers engage in bad behavior knowing that they are Too Big to Jail.

Opacity that makes the financial system unstable because market participants are dependent on financial regulators both correctly assessing and communicating the risk of each bank (something the regulators cannot do because of concerns about the safety and soundness of the financial system).

Opacity that prevents the market from exerting discipline on the banks and restraining their risk taking.

Opacity that creates moral hazards like bailouts because investors relied on the Fed's stress tests when making an investment decision.

Opacity that makes the banks such "black boxes" that banks with deposits to lend cannot assess the risk and solvency of the banks looking to borrow.

Opacity that has been made even worse by the response of policymakers and financial regulators.  They have decide we need more of what failed to prevent the financial crisis in the first place.  Namely, the combination complex rules and regulatory oversight.

Professor Admati has championed the notion that banks were holding too little capital going into the financial crisis and by simply upping capital standards all will be well.

This is knowably untrue.

The OECD has written extensively how due to the suspension of mark-to-market accounting and creation of 'zombie' loans under regulatory forbearance bank financial reporting and bank book capital is meaningless.

Opacity hides the true condition of the banks.  Who knows just how distorted each bank's financial statement is from reflecting its true financial condition?  After all, Dexia reported very high capital levels shortly before it needed to be nationalized.

Until there is ultra transparency and banks have to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, bank financial reporting and book capital will remain meaningless.

Ultra transparency is the necessary condition for Professor Admati's capital standards to be relevant.
Do we have to resign ourselves to having a fragile and dangerous banking system, one that harms the economy and requires government support when the risks turn out badly?
No.
As we have seen, there is not much prospect of dealing with failures of large and interconnected banks, particularly those that are active internationally, without imposing large costs on the economy.
Actually, there is a simple solution for dealing with these banks without imposing large costs on the economy.  Require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Like all market participants, banks know that when they have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner they become responsible for all losses on their exposures.

In practical terms what this means is that the banks will independently assess each of the other banks that they have dealings with and they will adjust their exposure to what they can afford to lose should the other bank fail.

With ultra transparency, the cost of failure of a bank is absorbed by investors (including other banks) and not the real economy or society.

Ultra transparency is very important as it also ends the mechanism of financial contagion.  Each bank manages its exposures so that it can survive the failure of the other banks.
The economy is also harmed when many banks are distressed at the same time and do not make sufficient loans because of their overhanging debts.
There is a common misconception that a distressed bank stops making loans.  This is untrue.  I must be too old, but I distinctly remember that in the US Savings & Loan crisis, the management of these institutions gambled on redemption by making large real estate development loans.

As a practical matter, bank lending and the funding of these loans has been separate for at least 40 years.  The reason that they are separate is that holding a loan on a bank balance sheet is not the only option for the bank.  It can sell the loan to a bank syndicate, a hedge fund, an insurance company or a pension fund for example.
It is therefore important to focus on preventing banks and other financial institutions from running into distress or insolvency....
Please re-read the highlight text as Professor Admati has nicely summarized a point that your humble blogger has been making since the beginning of the financial crisis.  We need to take actions that prevent a financial institution from running into distress or insolvency in the first place.

This is why banks must be required to provide ultra transparency.

Investors know that with access to the information they need to independently assess the risk of each bank comes the responsibility for absorbing the losses on their investment exposures.  As a result, investors have an incentive to exert discipline on management so that management does not let the bank become distressed or insolvent.
For this purpose, we need better regulation and supervision.
True, but better regulation does not necessarily mean more regulation and better supervision does not necessarily mean more regulatory oversight.
If the banks' own incentives with respect to the risks they take and the extent of their reliance on borrowing were aligned with those of society, banking regulation would be less important. 
As it turns out, however, the incentives of banks with respect to the risks they take and to their borrowing are perversely conflicted with those of society.
This is only true because of the opacity of the banks.

If banks were required to provide ultra transparency, there would be much more alignment with the incentives of society.  This alignment would occur because investors would no longer be in a position where gains are privatized and losses are socialized.

With ultra transparency, investors know they will get hit for losses should a bank fail.  As a result, investors have an incentive to restrain the risk taking of the banks.  Restraining the risk taking results in banks focusing on supplying the credit the real economy needs and not on taking proprietary bets.
In the last few years, many proposals have been made to address the risks that the banking system imposes on society. Very few, however, have been implemented. 
Most proposals have been rejected, diluted, or delayed, some of them endlessly it appears, because the banks have convinced policymakers, regulators, and sometimes the courts that the regulations might be too expensive.... 
Please re-read the highlight text again as Professor Admati makes a very important point.

Regular readers might recall that before the financial crisis the SEC ran a cost/benefit analysis on bringing observable event based reporting to structured finance securities and concluded that the cost of transparency could not be justified.

Today, a cost/benefit analysis easily justifies bringing observable event based reporting to structured finance securities and ensuring that they are transparent.

Better Markets would argue that our financial system is based on the philosophy of disclosure and therefore transparency should never be subjected to a cost/benefit analysis.
From the bankers' perspective, any regulation that constrains their activities or might reduce their profits is expensive. 
What is expensive for the banks, however, need not be expensive for the economy. 
The costs to the banks are important, but other costs must be considered as well, particularly the costs to everyone else resulting from financial crises or bank bailouts....
When bankers complain that banking regulation is expensive, they typically do not take into account the costs of their harming the rest of the financial system and the overall economy with the risks that they take. 
Public policy, however, must consider all the costs and not simply those to the bankers. 
The point of public intervention is precisely to induce banks, or dye producers, to take account of costs they impose on others. 
For society, such intervention can be very beneficial. 
Appropriate banking regulation is available that would reduce the potential for harm to the financial system without imposing any costs on banks other than the loss of subsidies from taxpayers....
Actually, ultra transparency would cost the banks much more than the loss of their subsidies from taxpayers.

It would end their ability to profit from engaging in illegal activities like manipulating benchmark interest rates like Libor.

It would significantly reduce the profitability of their proprietary trading as market participants could trade against them to minimize their gains while maximizing their downside.

It would reduce their ability to profit from the mismatch between what regulators lead investors to think is the risk profile of the bank and what is actually the true risk profile of the bank.

It would reduce their ability to profit from engaging in regulatory or tax arbitrage.
The fact that this is beneficial and not costly for society is all too often obscured by flawed and misleading claims, what we refer to as the bankers' new clothes.
The bankers' new clothes are simply opacity.

Like the fairy tale Emperor, banks should not be hiding anything.

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

Regulating financial benchmarks: creating the right balance

A Bloomberg blog discussed creating the right balance in regulating financial benchmarks.

Regular readers are probably surprised to learn that there is any debate on this topic.  As your humble blogger suggested in the immediate aftermath of the Libor manipulation coming to light, the solution is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Requiring banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details achieves a number of import outcomes.

First, it unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the unsecured interbank lending market.  It does this because banks with deposits to lend now have access to the information they need to assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.

Second, it makes actual transactions the basis for all benchmark interest rates.  Market participants can use all or some subset of the transactions reported by the banks as the basis for constructing the benchmark interest rates.

Ultra transparency is such a simple, effective solution that it is surprising there is any debate on finding the right balance in regulating financial benchmarks.

Financial benchmarks determine payments on and set prices for at least $750 trillion worth of financial products, including mortgages, student loans, and credit derivatives. 
Achieving the appropriate balance to regulate financial benchmarks is crucial, as it will have a significant impact on the markets globally. It’s vital that they are developed with a strong, consistent, and transparent design that creates a level playing field for all. 
There are three key areas that we feel should be addressed: (1) Creating non-discriminatory access; (2) Avoiding monopolies via exclusive licenses; and (3) Ensuring that constituent and weighting information is available to all key participants....
Ultra transparency addresses all three of these areas. 
Finally, we are disappointed by one aspect of the framework proposed by Martin Wheatley of the UK’s Financial Services Authority which permitted access to individual Libor constituent bank contributions to be publicly delayed three months. This would represent a major step backward in transparency.
Regular readers are aware that the Wheatley Review refused to publish your humble blogger's suggestion of using ultra transparency to solve the problem with benchmark interest rates.
Benchmarks do not exist in a vacuum. In transparent markets, there is more likely to be the raw materials necessary to provide a verifier or a deeper understanding of existing benchmarks. In non-transparent markets, that opportunity doesn’t exist.
Thank you Bloomberg for explaining why ultra transparency is needed as the basis for the benchmark interest rates and not some combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

UK regulator admits negligence on Libor, but says it wasn't it job to spot manipulation

The Guardian reports that the UK's Financial Service Authority admits that there was widespread knowledge of Libor manipulation among its employees, but says it wasn't a major regulatory failure because it wasn't its job to intervene.

Please re-read the highlighted text as it summarizes why financial regulators by themselves are not up to the task of exerting adequate discipline to control banker behavior or bank risk taking.

Financial regulators are not up to the task because of the way their job is defined.

Regular readers know that financial regulators do not express an opinion over any of the bank's security or loan exposures.

They do not do this because this would involve them in the allocation of capital across the financial markets.  It would also make them responsible for the performance of the banks.

Regular readers know that this definition of what is not the regulators' responsibility is not bad.  The reason it is not bad is there is a financial market participant who is suppose to care about the risk that a bank is taking with its various exposures.

The financial market participant responsible for exerting discipline on the banks over the risks they take and discouraging bad banker behavior are the investors.

However, investors cannot do this job so long as the banks remain opaque "black boxes" where only the financial regulators have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

As your humble blogger has said repeatedly since the beginning of the financial crisis, banks are currently not subjected to any market discipline because they operate behind a veil of opacity.

By requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, banks become subject to market discipline.

They become subject to market discipline because investors can independently assess the risk the banks are taking and adjust the amount and pricing of their investments in the banks to reflect this risk.  In addition, investors can catch bad behavior like the manipulation of Libor and other benchmark interest rates.

Staff at the chief City regulator should be cleared of negligence despite failing to spot clues that banks were manipulating interest rates to generate millions of pounds in bonuses and profits, an internal report into the Libor rigging scandal has ruled. 
The Financial Services Authority said staff did not have responsibility for monitoring Libor submissions, which were collected and published by a separate regulator, the British Banking Authority. 
An internal audit of 97,000 documents also found that 26 items related to Libor fixing and only two phone calls with Barclays gave a clear indication that the practice was widespread across the industry. 
The documents referred to artificially lowering the key interbank lending rate, a practice that made banks appear more secure during the financial crisis but also suggested that Libor was being manipulated by traders for profit at other times....

Andrew Tyrie, the Tory MP who heads the Treasury select committee, said the report showed the FSA was slow to act. 
"The FSA has admitted it had 26 warnings that this appalling practice was taking place. It also had other information that, taken cumulatively, ought to have set alarm bells ringing.
"It is concerning that no action was taken; that it wasn't tells us something may have been amiss at the FSA."...
Actually, what it says is that the veil of opacity hiding the banks' activities prevented interested market participants from having access to the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.
The London interbank rate (Libor) was collated by the British Bankers Association from submissions by UK banks. Unknown to most people outside a small group in the City, traders would set the rate according to their own requirements. 
In the three years before the financial crash it became commonplace for them to lift rates to increase profits and bonuses. Following the collapse of Northern Rock and the onset of the credit crunch, when banks were fearful of lending to each other and Libor was soaring as a result, bank rate setters came under pressure from traders and senior executives to depress rates supplied to the BBA. 
Between January 2005 and June 2009, Barclays derivatives traders made 257 requests to fix Libor and Euribor, the eurozone's equivalent. ... 
Turner said: "There are important lessons to be learnt about effective handling of information. A particularly important lesson is the need to have staff focused on conduct issues even when the world rightly assumes that the biggest immediate concerns are prudential; and vice versa. The new 'twin peaks' model of regulation will deliver this."
The important lesson is that regulators should not have a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner when it comes to banks.

Banks should be required to provide ultra transparency.

The new 'twin peaks' model of regulation will not solve the problem as regulators are not responsible for approving or disapproving the individual exposures on and off a bank's balance sheet.


Thursday, February 28, 2013

Despite Lord Turner's claim, it was not impossible to spot Libor manipulation

Reuters reports that in his testimony before the Parliament Commission on Banking Standards, Lord Turner, the head of the UK's Financial Services Authority, asserted that it was impossible to have had a police force big enough to spot the manipulation of Libor.

This statement is false and underscores why bank regulators by themselves will never be up to the task of policing the financial system.

Had the banks been required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, there would have been a police force big enough and motivated enough to spot manipulation of Libor and other benchmark interest rates.

Even if Libor and the other benchmark interest rates had been compiled in an opaque manner, market participants could still have double checked what the interest rates against the actual transactions entered into by the banks.

A discrepancy between the benchmark interest rates and what was actually occurring would have been noticed.

Why would market participants have been looking to see if there was a discrepancy between the benchmark interest rates and the transactions the banks actually engaged in?

Because the market participants who had an exposure to Libor and the other benchmark interest rates had a financial incentive to do so.

Regular readers know that the global financial system is based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

This framework provides a much bigger police force than just the financial regulators as every market participant has an incentive to look out for themselves.

One of the causes of our current ongoing financial crisis is the regulators' information monopoly when it comes to financial institution.  It was and still is only the financial regulators who have access to all the useful, relevant information for assessing the banks.

What the manipulation of the benchmark interest rates and the financial crisis have shown is that the financial regulators are not up to the task of replacing the market and all of its participants when it comes to policing the banks.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, I have repeatedly said that the financial regulators should give up their information monopoly, require the banks to provide ultra transparency and then piggyback off of the market's ability to both analyze the banks and to enforce discipline on the banks.

There is a role for financial regulators.  It is just not as a replacement for the market.  It is as a second line of defense should market participants fall prey to some popular delusion.

Regulators could not have spotted the "lowballing" of Libor interest rates during the financial crisis even if they had looked, Britain's Financial Services Authority said.
But financial market participants could and more importantly would have if they had access to each bank's exposure details.
The watchdog's chairman, Adair Turner, told a parliamentary commission on banking standards on Wednesday it was much easier to see abuses in share trading by using computers.
Same computers could have spotted Libor manipulation.  What is required is that the computers have the actual transaction data.
Manipulation of the London interbank offered rate (Libor) during the 2008 crisis, for which three banks - Barclays BARC.L, Royal Bank of Scotland and UBS - have been fined so far was far harder to see, he said. 
"There was no information on the trader manipulation," Turner told the commission....
There was no information disclosed to the market that would allow it to discover that traders were manipulating the benchmark interest rates.

The regulators had and still have a monopoly on the information that would have shown that the rates were being manipulated.  It is only the regulators who have access to each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The fact that the regulators were not up to the task of discovering the interest rate manipulation even after they had been told about it (see NY Fed and Tim Geithner), does not mean that the market would not have discovered it.
Neither the FSA, the CFTC - two of the regulators that have fined the three banks - or other regulators had ways to see the trader manipulation, Turner said. "We could not have got at it by intensive supervision. You just cannot have a police force big enough to spot all these problems."
When the banks are required to provide ultra transparency, there is a plenty big enough police force as every participant in the market has an incentive to police the banks.
While whistleblowing was one of the few ways to report illegal activity, Turner said trading room mentality was detached from the real economy as some traders see their job in front of a screen as being like playing a computer game, asking "Why shouldn't I cheat?".
With banks being required to provide ultra transparency, the answer to why shouldn't I cheat is because I will be caught! 

There is a reason that sunlight is the best disinfectant!

Tuesday, February 26, 2013

Banks seek to maintain ability to manipulate Libor and similar rates

A Bloomberg article shows how a major bank lobbying organization defends the banks' ability to manipulate Libor and similar benchmark interest rates.

The reason that banks are trying to defend their ability to manipulate Libor and similar benchmark interest rates is that this manipulation is immensely profitable for the banks.

Regular readers know that the only solution for restoring trust in Libor and similar benchmark interest rates and ending the ability of the banks to manipulate these interest rates is to base these interest rates off of actual transactions that are reported by the banks under ultra transparency.

Under ultra transparency, banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, the market for unsecured interbank lending unfreezes and remains unfrozen as the banks with deposits to lend can assess the risk and solvency of the banks looking to borrow.

Libor and similar benchmark interest rates can then be based off of all or a subset of the transactions that result in the interbank lending market.
The London interbank offered rate will face a prominent U.S. critic today as financial regulators look to improve oversight after three banks paid more than $2.5 billion in fines to settle interest-rate rigging charges...
The gold standard for oversight of Libor and similar benchmark interest rates is requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.
CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has questioned the long-term viability of Libor and other benchmark rates, saying the underlying markets must be based on transactions and not estimates from banks. 
“One of the really challenging things is how systemic this is,” Gensler said in a Feb. 21 interview. “This is like a reference rate that is too big to replace.... 
“Anchoring to real transactions is essential to have confidence in these benchmarks,” Gensler said in the interview. “The banks are right now estimating something that isn’t an active market.”
Requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency results in a twofer:  an active unsecured interbank lending market so banks don't have to estimate anything and the ability to anchor these benchmark interest rates to real, verifiable transactions.
The Global Financial Markets Association, a trade association representing securities advocacy groups in Europe, the U.S. and Asia, said benchmarks don’t need to be based on actual transaction data.
Please re-read the highlighted text as here is the big bank lobbying firm defending the banks' ability to manipulate Libor and similar benchmark interest rates.
Some markets have little transaction volume and still benefit from having a benchmark, the groups said.
The reason that some markets have little transaction volume is that banks are 'black boxes' and the banks with deposits to lend are uncomfortable lending to banks looking to borrow because they cannot assess the risk or solvency of the borrowing banks.

By curing the 'black box' problem with ultra transparency, the market unfreezes and has lots of transaction volume.
“GFMA believes that it is unnecessarily limiting to mandate that a benchmark be based solely on actual transaction data,” the organization said in a Feb. 11 letter to the task force.
Please re-read the highlighted text as the big bank lobbying firm is defending the banks' ability to manipulate Libor and similar benchmark interest rates by claiming it is a good thing.

At the same time, the big bank lobbying firm is arguing against requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency so that Libor and similar benchmark interest rates could be based off of actual transactions.
“Provided that a sufficiently robust governance and control framework is in place and there is clear transparency, benchmarks determined under a variety of methods can be of great value to users.”
Translation:  financial regulators please substitute a combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

With the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight, the banks can continue to manipulate for profit Libor and similar benchmark interest rates.

With transparency and market discipline, banks lose their ability to manipulate Libor and similar benchmark interest rates. 

Friday, February 22, 2013

EU Commission turns up pressure on banks over Libor

The Financial Times reports that the EU Commission is turning up pressure on the banks to settle the Libor interest rate rigging scandal by pointing out that it can assess a fine equal to 10% of each bank's annual revenue for every market it was involved in manipulating rates.

At first blush, the idea that a bank could lose 30% of its annual revenue for having manipulated benchmark interest rates on a global basis (Libor, Euribor and Tibor) sounds like a significant penalty.

However, consider that these rates have probably been manipulated for 2+ decades and suddenly a fine of this size might not be large enough to make the banks disgorge all the profits they made from manipulating the benchmark interest rates.

To date, the fines assessed to the banks have been the equivalent of parking tickets and will do absolutely nothing to stop bankers from engaging in manipulating interest rates in the future.  What the fines will do is send a message to the bankers not to leave an electronic trail while they are manipulating interest rates.

The European Commission’s 18-month antitrust investigation, previously known to include yen and euro interbank rates, has been extended to include Swiss franc-denominated swaps and poses a significant regulatory threat to the financial institutions under scrutiny, according to people familiar with the probe. 
The commission can impose a maximum penalty equivalent to 10 per cent of a company’s global turnover for each cartel it is found to be involved with. A bank implicated in all three rate-fixing cases could, for example, face fines of up to 30 per cent of total revenues.... 

Libor scandal expands into Swiss franc denominated swaps

Reuters reports that the Libor interest rate manipulation scandal is now expanding into the market for Swiss franc denominated swaps.

This is not surprising as there is no reason to assume that bad behavior by bankers that was hidden behind a veil of opacity in one market would not occur in other markets.

As everyone knows, sunshine is the best disinfectant for bad banker behavior.  That is why your humble blogger has been advocating requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants could monitor what the banks were doing and exert discipline where the bankers were behaving badly.

The European Commission's 18-month long antitrust probe into yen and euro interbank rates has been broadened to include Swiss franc-denominated swaps, posing a significant regulatory threat to financial institutions under scrutiny, the Financial Times reported on Thursday....
The paper, citing people involved in the probe, said the EU is informally exploring the potential for settlements but some companies are reluctant to open discussions over what they see as unfounded allegations.

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Gary Gensler: 'Setting' Libor still not clean despite scandal

The BBC reports that Gary Gensler, head of the CFTC, sees a lot that much be done before 'setting' of Libor and other benchmark interest rates like Euribor and Tibor is done so that they cannot be manipulated.

Regular readers know that what must be done is that the banks must be required to provide ultra transparency so that these benchmark interest rates can be based off of actual transaction from a deep, liquid unsecured bank debt market.

Ultra transparency is the key to unfreezing and keeping unfrozen the interbank lending market as it provides the data that banks with deposits to lend need to assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.

Specifically, under ultra transparency banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency is also the key to basing benchmark interest rates off of actual transactions.  These transactions are disclosed by each bank.  Market participants can then determine which transactions to include in the benchmark interest rates.

Without ultra transparency, benchmark interest rates will still be subject to manipulation even if there are complex rules and regulatory oversight of setting process.

The way that the key Libor interest rate is set in the UK is still not clean and free of fraud, according to a top US regulator. 
"We have a lot more work to do," Gary Gensler, chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, told the BBC in London. 
He suggested that the rate was often "completely made up".....
Speaking of the scandal, Mr Gensler spoke of "pervasive rigging" and said authorities could not guarantee the rate is fraud-free, but refused to criticise the FSA or suggest that setting the rate should be moved to the US....
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Mr. Gensler has just confirmed what your humble blogger has been saying that the only way to guarantee that the benchmark interest rates are free of fraud is through ultra transparency.

Complex rules and regulatory oversight as suggested in the Wheatley Review will simply not guarantee an absence of fraud nor do they provide a reason for the market to trust the resulting benchmark interest rates.

So why did the Wheatley Review not publish your humble blogger's suggestion of ultra transparency and instead championed a combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight that will not work?
Mr Gensler compared the manipulation of rates to an estate agent trying to sell you a house. 
"They are trying to reference the price of the houses in the neighbourhood [when] there have been no transactions in the neighbourhood and furthermore, the agent is not willing to share the data and is often just making it all up," he said.
A problem that ultra transparency alone solves.
The BBA told the BBC it would not comment on Mr Gensler's comments but said: "The BBA has strongly stated the need for greater regulatory oversight of Libor". It added that it was working closely with the government and regulators to change the system. 
A government-commissioned review suggested taking the responsibility away from the BBA and placing it in the hands of an outside authority, such as a commercial body or an industry group.
This is an example of regulatory capture.

The British Banking Authority asked its regulator to do something that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight cannot accomplish.  Rather than respond by requiring ultra transparency, the regulatory response was to pursue a path that would allow the banks to continue manipulating the benchmark interest rates as before.

Thursday, February 14, 2013

UK regulator warns banks not to leave Libor panel

The Wall Street Journal reports that the UK's Financial Service Authority as part of overhauling Libor in the wake of the manipulation scandal is telling banks not to leave the Libor interest rate setting panel.

As a practical matter, the fact that a regulator has to twist arms to keep banks on the interest rate setting panel is a clear signal that how benchmark interest rates like Libor, Euribor and Tibor are calculated is fundamentally flawed.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger suggested and the Wheatley Review refused to publish that Libor be based on actual transactions that were disclosed as part of each bank disclosing its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, banks with deposits to lend can assess the risk and solvency of banks looking to borrow.  The result is that the unsecured inter-bank lending market unfreezes and remains unfrozen.

With this information and a flow of transactions in the unsecured inter-bank lending market, there is no need to worry about banks being on a panel.  Market participants can chose to base Libor off of all the transactions disclosed by the banks or a subset.

Several banks planned to withdraw from the panel that sets a key benchmark interest rate but scrapped the idea after the U.K.'s financial regulator strongly warned them against doing so, according to people familiar with the matter. 
The Financial Services Authority recently sent letters to a handful of major banks—including France's BNP Paribas and the Netherlands' Rabobank Group—warning them not to pull out of the panel that sets the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, these people said. 
The letters came after executives at those banks privately informed the British Bankers' Association, the trade organization that oversees Libor, that they planned to exit the rate-setting panel. 
The letters show the British regulator going to unusual lengths to try to salvage Libor.
The reputation of the ubiquitous benchmark, which underpins interest rates on trillions of dollars of financial products world-wide, has been marred by banks' efforts to manipulate it. Regulators and policy makers worry that if a parade of banks leaves the panels that set Libor, it will further damage the benchmark's credibility. 
Actually, everyone assumes that these benchmark interest rates are being manipulated today.  As a result, banks leaving the panel has no impact on the benchmark interest rates' credibility.
But banks are increasingly wary of being involved in setting Libor and other benchmarks, which generally are based on estimates of how much it would cost one bank to borrow from its peers. 
A dearth of lending between banks in the current tumultuous environment makes it difficult for banks to come up with accurate estimates of their borrowing costs, industry executives say. 
The dearth of lending is the direct result of the fact that banks are, in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, "black boxes".  Banks with deposits to lend cannot assess the risk and solvency of the banks looking to borrow and therefore are unwilling to lend.
And the scandal surrounding banks' attempted rate manipulation means some lenders perceive their continued participation in setting the benchmarks as a potential liability....
Actually, every bank that engaged in manipulating the benchmark interest rate is exposed to a potential liability that would render them insolvent.
The FSA letters have ruffled feathers, with some industry officials perceiving them as strong-arm tactics. 
In one letter, the FSA left the impression among one bank's executives that pulling out of Libor would damage its relationship with the FSA and could negatively influence the bank's standing in the agency's ongoing investigation into rate manipulation, according to a senior bank executive who read the letter. 
The executive said the letter's blunt tone caused the bank to drop its plans to withdraw, at least for now....

Monday, February 11, 2013

RBS investment banker explains why platitudes do not change banker behavior

Testifying before the Parliament Commission on Banking Standards, former RBS investment banker Johnny Cameron explained why banker behavior is never going to be changed by rhetoric:

Cameron said while the bank had tried to impose ethical values on its traders, it could not control their behaviour. 
"You cannot impose moral standards on those that do not wish to be moral," he said,
Please re-read the highlighted text especially if you are the chief executive of Barclays and you wonder why no-one believes that your rhetoric will make one iota of difference in your bank's culture.

Regular readers know that the FDR Framework is built on the idea that you cannot impose moral standards on those that do not wish to be moral.  You can on the other hand use transparency to limit what these individuals can get away with.

Mr. Cameron went on to explain why opacity is attractive to those that do not wish to be moral,
adding Libor manipulation had not been seen as a potential danger for banks. 
"It just did not occur to anyone that this was a rate that could be fiddled."
Excuse me, but Libor was designed so that it could be fiddled without the market knowing.

From its inception, Libor and its related benchmark interest rates (Tibor and Euribor) were not based on actual transactions that the market could verify but rather constructed in as opaque a manner as possible.  This meant the rates could be fiddled.

As your humble blogger has repeatedly said, had banks been required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, Libor could not have been manipulated.

It couldn't have been manipulated because it would have been based on all the actual transactions in the unsecured interbank lending market.

Bottom line:  you cannot impose moral standards on those who do not wish to be moral, but you can use transparency to limit their ability to act in an immoral manner.

Friday, February 8, 2013

Ultra transparency solves problem of enough banks on Libor-Euribor panels

With their ability to profit from manipulating benchmark interest rates like Libor and Euribor temporarily gone, Bloomberg reports that banks are dropping off the rate setting panels.

Naturally, the reaction of the regulators is to think about forcing some of the banks to stay on or rejoin so that the panel is a representative sample of banks.

Of course, by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, both the problem of having enough banks for the panel as well as the banks manipulating Libor/Euribor/Tibor goes away.

When all banks have to disclose all their transactions in the unsecured interbank lending market, then market participants can choose any combination of banks, from some to all, to include in the calculation of the benchmark interest rate.

Europe’s top financial regulator said he’s considering forcing banks to participate in setting Libor and Euribor rates after lenders including Citigroup Inc. and HSBC Holdings Plc pulled out of some panels amid the rigging scandal. 
Regulators will draw up a list of lenders that should be forced to participate in the setting of interbank rates “in view of their involvement” in those markets, Michel Barnier, the EU’s financial services chief, said in an e-mailed statement today. 
“Any banks considering withdrawing from the contributing panels should therefore take into account that they may be required to rejoin,” Barnier said. 
The plans to force banks to submit data for rate setting will be included in draft legislation on benchmark setting that the European Commission will present in the first half of this year.... 
“The Eurosystem strongly encourages banks to remain in, or join, the Euribor panel to prevent potential disruptions to the functioning of the financial markets while the regulatory framework is being refined,” the ECB said in a statement on its website.
U.K. Regulator 
“For such rates to remain representative, it is essential that there is an appropriate level of bank participation in the respective panels,” the Frankfurt-based ECB said. 
Martin Wheatley, the managing director of the U.K. Financial Services Authority, called last year for oversight of Libor to be handed to the U.K.’s financial regulator, and dozens of the currencies and maturities that make up the benchmark axed, under proposals designed to revive confidence in the rate....
Wheatley's recommendation are a classic example of substituting the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline and making the financial system worse off.
Since July, as many as ten banks have dropped out of the setting of the Eurepo Index, which is also managed by Euribor- EBF. These lenders include Societe Generale SA, UBS AG and HSBC. Euribor is derived from a daily survey of interbank lending rates conducted for Euribor-EBF by Thomson Reuters Corp.