Showing posts with label Deposit Guarantees. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Deposit Guarantees. Show all posts

Thursday, July 25, 2013

Swallowing the bankers' line

Earlier this month, Robert Jenkins, former external member of the Bank of England's financial policy committee, observed:
I fear that the banks have bamboozled government into believing that society must choose between safety and growth, between safer banks and bank shareholder value, and between a safer financial framework and a competitive City of London. These are all false choices.
Please re-read the highlighted text and ask the question of how could this have come to pass.

In his Project Syndicate commentary, Professor Simon Johnson offers a series of potential explanations for how banks have bamboozled government.

There are three possible explanations for what has gone wrong. 
One is that financial reform is inherently complicated. But, though many technical details need to be fleshed out, some of the world’s smartest people work in the relevant regulatory agencies. They are more than capable of writing and enforcing rules – that is, when this is what they are really asked to do. 
Your humble blogger wonders when the regulators within the SEC decided that they were not really being asked to ensure transparency in the financial system?

Regular readers know the SEC was ground zero for the financial crisis and it was the failure of the SEC to ensure transparency that created the conditions for the financial crisis.  Specifically, the SEC allowed opacity for both banks and structured finance securities.

For banks to be transparent, they must disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This was the law in the UK since the 1870s and the standard in the US in the 1930s when the SEC was created.  Clearly, by the start of the financial crisis in 2007, this was no longer true.

For structured finance securities to be transparent, they must disclose on an observable event based basis.  Every observable event like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying assets must be reported to all market participants before the beginning of the next business day.  Clearly by the start of the financial crisis in 2007, this was not true as opaque, toxic sub-prime RMBS deals report on a once per month basis.
The second explanation focuses on conflict among agencies with overlapping jurisdictions, both within and across countries. Again, there is an element of truth to this; but we have also seen a great deal of coordination even on the most complex topics – such as how much equity big banks should have, or how the potential failure of such a firm should be handled. 
Another source of conflict is the regulatory race to the bottom.
That leaves the final explanation: those in charge of financial reform really did not want to make rapid progress.  
In both the US and Europe, government leaders are gripped by one overriding fear: that their economies will slip back into recession – or worse.  
The big banks play on this fear, arguing that financial reform will cause them to become unprofitable and make them unable to lend, or that there will be some other dire unintended consequence. There has been a veritable avalanche of lobbying on this point, which has resulted in top officials moving slowly, for fear of damaging the economy.
Professor Johnson has nicely explained that fear is why the banks were successful in bamboozling government leaders.

But did the government leaders actually have anything to fear?  After all, the first response to the financial crisis was to put the banking system on life support.

Regular readers know that the answer has always been no  There was nothing to fear, but fear itself.

Our financial system was designed to survive even the failure of the SEC to ensure transparency.  Our financial system was designed to survive a massive credit bubble with the creation of excess debt that was well beyond the borrowers' capacity to repay.

Our financial system was designed to survive because it has a safety valve to release its excesses while protecting the real economy.

This safety valve is the ability of banks to absorb upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to operate and service the real economy.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partners when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Of course, because government leaders swallowed the bankers' line, we have never used the safety valve.

Instead, we have protected bank book capital levels and banker bonuses while at the same time burdening the real economy with servicing the excess debt.  The result has been economic stagnation, an unwinding of the social contract and an increase in inequality.

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Rogoff & Reinhart and the crowding out of solutions that would end the financial crisis

Whether it is accurate or not, a paper was published that says the 90% debt threshold found by Rogoff & Reinhart was the result of an Excel spreadsheet error.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger previously debunked the implications of their study for how to handle a bank solvency led financial crisis by simply observing that it ignores the creation of a) the modern central bank and b) the adoption of deposit guarantees.

The combination of a modern central bank and deposit insurance makes it easy to handle a bank solvency crisis as the combination makes it possible for banks to operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Simply, banks can both absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system to protect the real economy from the burden of servicing this debt and continue to provide the loans needed to support the real economy.

This means that the correct policy response to a bank solvency crisis is the Swedish Model under which banks recognize upfront all their losses on the excess public and private debt.

So why hasn't this policy been adopted anywhere besides Iceland (where it has been highly successful) to address the current bank solvency led financial crisis?

One of the reasons your humble blogger has discovered is that, even when fundamentally flawed, books written by economists from Harvard (This time its different) or Stanford (the Bankers' New Clothes) receive excessive amounts of attention in the mainstream media and from policymakers.

This attention crowds out consideration of alternative solutions, like adopting the Swedish Model, for ending our current financial crisis.

Saturday, April 13, 2013

Greek PM: Deposits are safe

Reuters reports that the Greek PM is saying that uninsured deposits in Greek banks are safe due to the planned recapitalization of the Greek banking system.

The PM made the statement because of concerns raised by a merger of two Greek banks being called off due to the lack of new equity from private investors. [Regular readers know that the lack of new equity from private investors reflected the lack of transparency into the banks and the inability of the private investors to assess the risk and or solvency of the banks.]

Of course, the Greek PM has to say this.

The question is where is the proof that this is true.

If the Greek banks have been successfully recapitalized and all their losses recognized, then the banks disclosing their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details should simply confirm this fact.

The absence of the banks providing ultra transparency so that the safety of uninsured deposits can be confirmed is a big red flag.  Uninsured depositors should see this red flag waving and recognize that their deposits are at risk of a Cypriot style haircut.
Greek bank deposits are safe and the country's lenders are protected due to a recapitalization scheme which will be completed by the end of April, Prime Minister Antonis Samaras said on Saturday. 
In an interview with Imerisia, Samaras ruled out a tax on deposits over 100,000 euros ($131,000) allaying fears of austerity-hit Greeks that their savings may be at risk after a raid on Cyprus depositors as part of the island's bailout. 
"No, I'm categorical. There is no such issue. We have no reason to think about it," he said. "The Greek banking system is shielded due to the recapitalization."...

The banking sector was shaken this week by the unexpected suspension of National Bank's plans to integrate its newly acquired rival Eurobank after the lenders said they were unlikely to raise enough capital to stay private. 
Samaras said the deal depends on the recapitalization. Under the terms of the plan, a minimum amount of new equity must be raised from the market for the banks to remain privately run. 
"If the two banks raise the funds to recapitalize alone, then they will decide if they still want to merge. If they don't raise the demanded funds they will fall under the control of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund which will decide if their merger is beneficial," he said.

Thursday, April 4, 2013

Draghi: EU needs bank-loss rules ASAP

As reported by Bloomberg, the ECB's Mario Draghi would like to see the EU adopt rules for dealing with insolvent banks as soon as possible.

In an earlier post, I laid out what the rules should be and the need for banks to provide ultra transparency so that the rules could be enforced without triggering a bank run in any part of the EU.
Your  humble blogger would suggest the following hierarchy for apportioning the pain of recapitalizing the bank or absorbing the losses.
  1. Future earnings generated by the bank;  
  2. Common stock holders;  
  3. Preferred stock holders; 
  4. Junior unsecured bondholders; 
  5. Senior bondholders; 
  6. Uninsured depositors; 
  7. Host country taxpayers through the deposit guarantee;  
  8. Foreign taxpayers.
What distinguishes this hierarchy is that it explicitly recognizes that a bank can transition between solvency and insolvency and back to solvency as the market value of its assets changes between greater than to less than to greater than the book value of its liabilities. 
As I describe in an earlier post explaining why a bank never needs to be bailed out, we can determine if a bank has a viable franchise by looking at whether its assets after recognizing its losses on its excess debt exposures generate enough interest income to exceed the interest expense on its liabilities.   
If interest income exceeds interest expense, the bank franchise is viable and the bank can generate the earnings to rebuild its book capital levels.  If interest income is less than interest expense, the bank should be resolved.  It is only then that we go past step 1 in the hierarchy. 
Naturally, bankers are going to fight against adoption of this hierarchy.  The reason they will fight adoption is that it puts the pain for the losses currently hidden on and off the bank balance sheets directly on the bankers. 
Specifically, while a bank is generating earnings to absorb the losses, banker pay is likely to be highly restricted.  As oppose to the current situation where taxpayers are absorbing the losses and bankers are paying themselves near record levels of pay. 
Of course, from the standpoint of everyone lower down in the hierarchy, including taxpayers, they prefer to maximize the amount of future earnings generated by the bank that are used to absorb the losses. 
This preference for maximizing future earnings to absorb losses highlights a critical issue:  how quickly do banks need to be recapitalized after they become insolvent? 
A modern banking system is designed so that banks can operate for years, even decades, with low or negative book capital levels.   
Banks can operate and support the real economy as a result of the combination of deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding.  With deposit guarantees, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner when the banks are in the process of generating earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.  
Regular readers know that to prevent bankers gambling on redemption to restart their bonuses sooner and to ensure that banks absorb all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system, banks must provide ultra transparency.   
With disclosure of the banks' current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can exert discipline on the banks to clean-up their exposures and restrain their risk taking. 
But what about the fact that banks are going to have negative or low levels of book capital? 
It is the deposit guarantee that makes bank book capital levels irrelevant to insured depositors.  A lesson learned from their parents when they opened up their first bank account as a child and asked how could they trust that the bank would give them their money back. 
Yes, uninsured depositors, bondholders and stockholders are going to be concerned about the level of book capital.  The low level is a source of market discipline as it gives them a vested interest in making sure that banks minimize their risk while rebuilding book capital levels. 

Sunday, March 31, 2013

Hierarchy for resolving bank insolvency

The bail-in of uninsured depositors in the Cyprus banks highlights the need to establish a global hierarchy for resolving insolvent banks.

Your  humble blogger would suggest the following hierarchy for apportioning the pain of recapitalizing the bank or absorbing the losses.
  1. Future earnings generated by the bank;
  2. Common stock holders;
  3. Preferred stock holders;
  4. Junior unsecured bondholders;
  5. Senior bondholders;
  6. Uninsured depositors;
  7. Host country taxpayers through the deposit guarantee;
  8. Foreign taxpayers.
What distinguishes this hierarchy is that it explicitly recognizes that a bank can transition between solvency and insolvency and back to solvency as the market value of its assets changes between greater than to less than to greater than the book value of its liabilities.

As I describe in an earlier post explaining why a bank never needs to be bailed out, we can determine if a bank has a viable franchise by looking at whether its assets after recognizing its losses on its excess debt exposures generate enough interest income to exceed the interest expense on its liabilities.  

If interest income exceeds interest expense, the bank franchise is viable and the bank can generate the earnings to rebuild its book capital levels.  If interest income is less than interest expense, the bank should be resolved.  It is only then that we go past step 1 in the hierarchy.

Naturally, bankers are going to fight against adoption of this hierarchy.  The reason they will fight adoption is that it puts the pain for the losses currently hidden on and off the bank balance sheets directly on the bankers.

Specifically, while a bank is generating earnings to absorb the losses, banker pay is likely to be highly restricted.  As oppose to the current situation where taxpayers are absorbing the losses and bankers are paying themselves near record levels of pay.

Of course, from the standpoint of everyone lower down in the hierarchy, including taxpayers, they prefer to maximize the amount of future earnings generated by the bank that are used to absorb the losses.

This preference for maximizing future earnings to absorb losses highlights a critical issue:  how quickly do banks need to be recapitalized after they become insolvent?

A modern banking system is designed so that banks can operate for years, even decades, with low or negative book capital levels.  

Banks can operate and support the real economy as a result of the combination of deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding.  With deposit guarantees, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner when the banks are in the process of generating earnings to rebuild their book capital levels. 

Regular readers know that to prevent bankers gambling on redemption to restart their bonuses sooner and to ensure that banks absorb all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system, banks must provide ultra transparency.  With disclosure of the banks' current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can exert discipline on the banks to clean-up their exposures and restrain their risk taking.

But what about the fact that banks are going to have negative or low levels of book capital?

It is the deposit guarantee that makes bank book capital levels irrelevant to insured depositors.  A lesson learned from their parents when they opened up their first bank account as a child and asked how could they trust that the bank would give them their money back.

Yes, uninsured depositors, bondholders and stockholders are going to be concerned about the level of book capital.  The low level is a source of market discipline as it gives them a vested interest in making sure that banks minimize their risk while rebuilding book capital levels.

But if banks have low or negative book capital levels, how can they support the real economy by lending?

A distinction must be made between a bank's ability to originate a loan and its ability to fund the loan on its balance sheet.

Banks can always originate loans.  When they are rebuilding their book capital levels, they are restricted in their ability to fund the loan on their balance sheets.

This is okay because banks can always sell the loan to investors like insurance companies, pension funds, hedge funds and better capitalized banks that would like to hold the loan.

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

Dean Baker: in reality, it's the failure of financial reform

In his Guardian column, Dean Baker observes in his usual understated tones that financial regulators are simply not up to the task of overseeing the large, global financial institutions and that financial reform since the beginning of the financial crisis is inadequate.

He suggests that what is needed to fix this situation is for citizens to pressure their policy makers so that the policy makers adopt legislation that breaks up these Too Big to Fail institutions.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger prefers a much simpler solution that doesn't require policy makers to adopt new legislation over the objections of the banking industry.  I would like to see our policy makers pressure financial regulators to simply use the laws on the books.

During the 1930s, Congress adopted the securities laws that require that market participants be provided with access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they could independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision [note: similar laws have been adopted in Europe and Japan].

For banks, all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner is defined by ultra transparency under which the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This definition of what constitutes all the useful, relevant information is an appropriate, timely manner is not just mine.  At the time the securities laws were passed, it was also the definition used by the banking industry.  

The banking industry use to see a bank disclosing all its exposure details as a bank that could stand on its own two feet as it had nothing to hide.  I realize that the current banking industry doesn't believe this and will push back against the regulators because they prefer to hide their true risk.

So let me offer a compromise:  only banks that have government insured deposits need to provide ultra transparency.

There is no legitimate business reason why a bank that benefits from having the taxpayers guarantee their deposits should be allowed to hide the risks that it is taking.

My compromise gives all banks a choice:  keep their insured deposits and provide ultra transparency or get rid of their insured deposits and continue to hide behind the veil of opacity of current disclosure requirements.

JP Morgan is a huge bank and can swallow $6bn in losses, but the incident showed as clearly as possible that the Dodd-Frank reforms are not working. The London Whale's losing trades were all done in the Dodd-Frank era. The bill's provisions did not prevent JP Morgan from making massive bets and misleading regulators about their nature and the risks involved. 
If the regulators were not able to catch the London Whale's huge gambles before they went bad, why would we think that they will catch the next crapshoot from the Wall Street gang? 
It's time that we looked at this seriously: the regulators lack either the will or the competence to rein in the big banks. 
The big banks are going to get away with everything they want, regardless of the provisions of Dodd-Frank. 
If the big banks are too big to regulate and, according to Attorney General Holder, too big to prosecute, then the only sensible course is to break them up.... 
Or simply require them to provide ultra transparency if they are to have access to deposit insurance.
At the top of the list is Elizabeth Warren's election to the senate. Senator Warren has already made it clear that she will use her seat on the Senate banking committee to try to hold the banks and bank regulators accountable. The other important development is that Warren seems to have an ally in Louisiana Senator David Vitter. 
At first glance, this might seem an unlikely alliance. Warren is clearly on the left side of the Democratic party and Vitter is to the right of center of a very conservative Republican party. But Vitter, apparently, takes his belief in the market seriously enough ...
Disclosure is not a Democrat or Republican issue.  Disclosure is the necessary condition for the invisible hand of the market to operate properly.
The point is straightforward: if a bank's creditors know that the government will cover its losses, the bank is gambling with the taxpayers' money, not its own.... 
Hence my compromise: if the government will cover a bank's losses, then the bank must provide ultra transparency.  Transparency ends the bank's gambling with the taxpayer's money.
As it stands, the leadership of both parties is too closely tied to the financial sector to take any steps that fundamentally threaten their interests. 
This has nothing to do with political philosophy: the leadership of both parties is owned by the financial industry. 
However, if the outsiders in both parties can build up enough popular outrage over Wall Street's shenanigans, the party leadership will follow.
All that is required is that enough pressure be applied so that regulators use the laws on the books.

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Cyprus fallout: over half of Germans doubt deposit guarantee

Reuters reports that according to a survey by Stern magazine over half of Germans doubt that their government will honor its deposit guarantee.

At a minimum, this suggests how big the blow was to trust and confidence in the EU financial system caused by the decision to bail-in depositors to pay for the losses hidden on bank balance sheets.

Regular readers know that ultimately there is only one way to restore trust and confidence in the financial system: bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

For banks, this means that they will have to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is only with this disclosure that market participants can see the true condition of these banks.

As predicted at the beginning of the financial crisis by your humble blogger, until transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system, the global economy will continue in a downward spiral (even with central banks and governments pursuing stimulative policies).

According to a recent survey commissioned by the magazine "Stern" 54 percent of Germans believe the promise of the Chancellor no longer that savings are safe in Germany.  
Conversely, only 41 percent trust their warranty.  
67 percent of Germans are great or at least a little worried about their savings. 
Because of the initially planned compulsory levy on Cypriot bank deposits under € 100,000 Merkel reaffirmed their guarantee for German savers last week over government spokesman Steffen Seibert. "It is the mark of a guarantee that it is," he said. Cyprus is a special case.  

Thursday, March 21, 2013

Rather than tax deposits and threaten stability of financial system, use deposit guarantee as basis for ending financial crisis

A Reuters poll reveals that 20 out of 22 economists and bond strategists see the Cyprus deposit tax as undermining both the deposit guarantee and the stability of the EU financial system.

This poll confirms what your humble blogger has been saying about how a modern banking system is designed so that banks can operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Why does this poll confirm this statement?

Because everyone in Cyprus already knows that the banks are insolvent (the book value of their liabilities exceeds the market value of their assets) even if the bank regulators have taken steps so that banks do not show this reality in their financial statements.

What is going to cause the run on the banks not only in Cyprus but across the EU is not the banks being insolvent or having a negative book capital level, rather it is the tax on the deposits to cover the losses that the banks' incurred.  This tax effectively ends the deposit guarantee which is suppose to protect depositors from bank losses.

So long as the deposit guarantee is in place, depositors are completely insensitive to the solvency/insolvency or book value of the bank.

This is behavior that was learned from the depositor's parents when they first opened up a bank account and asked how do they know they will be able to get their money back and were told that the government guarantees they can get their money back.

This behavior shows up when you ask people do they know what the total amount of shareholder equity at their bank was at the end of last quarter.  Virtually no one knows including the economists, regulators and central bankers who are campaigning for banks to hold more capital.

Why don't they know?  Because if you keep your deposits below the government guarantee, there is no reason to know or care.

This observation has important implications for how policymakers should respond to a financial crisis where there is a significant amount of excess debt in the financial system.

Your humble blogger was the first person in the world to talk about how deposit insurance makes it possible for the banks to protect the real economy by absorbing all the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Yes, the banks will have negative book capital levels.  But absolutely no one cares (except the bankers as it restricts their cash bonuses).

Ending this financial crisis is easy.  Rather than destroying the deposit guarantee, use the deposit guarantee and have the banks absorb the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

A proposed levy on deposits in Cyprus would pose a threat to the financial stability of other vulnerable euro zone countries, according to a near-unanimous sample of analysts polled by Reuters. 
Twenty out of 22 economists and bond strategists surveyed since Monday said a tax on deposits risks undermining the banking systems of other countries threatened by the euro zone debt crisis....

In theory, euro zone deposits up to 100,000 euros are guaranteed, but analysts warned the proposal of a levy risked debasing that principle, literally overnight. 
"The risk is that ... bank customers no longer trust the guarantee for private deposits in all member states of the European Union," said Gernot Griebling, head of bond research at German bank LBBW. 
"In the case that rumors on solvency problems of another bank come up, this might lead to a bank run." 
Jeroen Dijsselbloem, who chairs meetings of euro zone finance ministers, said any bailout of Cyprus, one of the currency union's smallest economies, will have to involve some kind of levy on depositors.... 


Monday, March 18, 2013

Thanks to Cyprus, issue of who pays for bank losses re-emerges

By proposing to violate the sanctity of deposit guarantees to help fund its bailout of its banks, Cyprus has put the issue of who pays for bank losses back onto the agenda.

Thank you Cyprus and by extension Germany, Finland and the IMF.

Regular readers know that a modern banking system is designed so that the banks can pay for their losses, but that since the beginning of the current financial crisis, politicians have prevented this from occurring and instead have made savers and/or taxpayers pay for the banks' losses.

Let me unpack the bolded statement.

A modern banking system is designed so that banks can absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to operate and support the real economy even if the banks have low or negative book capital levels.

Why?

Because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.  With this "silent equity partner", banks can continue to extend the credit that the real economy needs for growth.

The idea that banks can continue to operate with low or negative book capital levels doesn't appear in any textbook or article in a scholarly journal.  What proof is there that the modern banking system is designed to act this way?

Let me provide you three examples that confirm the banking system is designed to act this way.

First, in the mid-1980s, the write-down of loans to Less Developed Countries meant that Security Pacific effectively had negative book capital.  This fact was well known to market participants as they knew the size of Security Pacific's exposures, the size of write-downs other banks were taking on similar exposures and how much book capital Security Pacific had before the LDC write-downs began.

Not only was Security Pacific not closed, but it was allowed to engage in a large acquisition (Rainier) to help it rebuild its book capital levels (pooling accounting).

Second, in the late-1980s, the US Savings and Loans saw their book capital disappear as a result of losses incurred in a rising interest rate environment by the mismatch in pricing between their assets and their liabilities.

The savings and loans didn't go away.  Rather they continued in operation, some would say gambling on redemption by making loans to real estate developers, until closed by the financial regulators several years later.

Third, in 2008, Citigroup's book capital level dropped to what can only be described as a low level.  Citigroup was not closed.

In each of these examples, despite low or negative book capital levels, the financial institutions continued to operate and provide credit to support the real economy.

In each of these examples, the ultimate authority that made the decision to close or not close the financial institutions was the financial regulator responsible for protecting the deposit insurance fund and the taxpayers and not the debt or equity markets.

What ultimately caused the savings and loans to be shutdown is that their franchise was unable to generate earnings that could be retained to rebuild their book capital levels and reduce the risk of loss to the deposit insurance fund and taxpayers.

Please note, that while the examples were drawn from the US, just from the latest financial crisis there are numerous international examples too.

The fact that a modern banking system is designed to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system is inconvenient for policymakers and bankers.  

It is inconvenient because it provides an alternative to savers and/or taxpayers as the answer to the question of who pays for bank losses.  The alternative being the banks and bankers themselves by applying as much of their future earnings as is needed to absorb the losses.

Since the beginning of our current financial crisis, global policymakers have been pursuing a strategy of protecting bank book capital levels and, with it, banker bonuses at all costs.

They have done so under what I have called the Japanese Model (named after the failed policy response that Japan has been pursuing for the last 2+ decades to its financial crisis).  The Japanese Model always fails as a policy response because it is fundamentally flawed.

In protecting bank book capital levels, the Japanese Model allows the banks to kick the can down the road on recognizing losses.  This is not a costless exercise.  In fact, the cost of carrying those losses is very high.

The cost of carrying the losses includes zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies (which hit savers), fiscal stimulus (which hits taxpayers through the additional debt governments take on) and austerity (which hits the poor through a reduction in social programs).

What Cyprus did by "taxing" bank depositors was to simply speed up the process by which financial repression under the Japanese Model takes money from the savers and gives it to the banks (notice that no bankers in Cyprus were going to lose their jobs despite losing billions).

This confiscation of saver funds put the issue of who pays for bank losses back on the agenda.

Why?

Because the savers and taxpayers now know that their governments could also confiscate their deposits without warning to absorb the bank losses.  The lack of warning highlights the simple fact that savers and taxpayers were never consulted about who should pay for the bank losses at any time since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Having been fooled once into paying for the banks' losses, savers and taxpayers are now unlikely to be fooled again.

Germany provides confirmation of this as the current German government is facing defeat because the German citizens are tired of paying for bank losses that could and should be paid for by the banks themselves (even if this means that bankers' cash bonuses will be reduced).

Primary difference between financial repression and deposit confiscation: speed

In an excellent Telegraph column, Ian Cowie looks at the depositor haircut in Cyprus to bailout its banking system as petty theft compared to what savers have been "stealthily robbed" robbed of by financial repression (think zero interest rate policies) to bailout the global financial system.

The primary difference, other than sheer quantity of money pilfered, is speed.

The depositor haircut happened over-night.  Financial repression has been going on since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Your humble blogger uses the word "primary" on purpose.  Both the depositor haircut and financial repression are the result of government policies to bailout the financial system by imposing its losses on savers/taxpayers.

Regular readers know the politicians are making a conscious decision to impose losses on savers/taxpayers and not on the bankers who caused the loss in the first place.  In fact, these bankers continue to be rewarded with nary an interruption in their bonuses.

Politicians are making a conscious decision because the banking system is designed to absorb losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue operating even though the banks have low or negative book capital levels.

Banks can do this because of the existence of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.    Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  As a result, banks have unlimited capital against which to continue lending.

Every day since the financial crisis began, politicians have made the decision to steal, whether through financial repression or a depositor haircut, from savers/taxpayers and give to the bankers rather than use the banking system as it is designed to be used.

I admit that having the banking system absorb the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system would be bad for banker cash bonuses.  However, given the choice between the government stealing from the savers/taxpayers or reducing banker cash bonuses (not necessarily the total size of banker bonuses), I opt for reducing banker cash bonuses.
Outrage about the Cyprus banks euro tax bail-out should not be allowed to obscure the fact that millions of savers in British banks have already lost much more of the real value or purchasing power of their money to prop up financial institutions closer to home. 
Savers in British banks and building societies have been stealthily robbed of more than £43bn of the real value of their savings since the Bank of England froze interest rates at 0.5pc four years ago. 
That's the total shrinkage of bank and building society depositors' purchasing power caused by inflation exceeding frozen interest rates, according to calculations by the pressure group Save Our Savers, following similar calculations by Yorkshire Building Society that the average saver has lost £2,500 in real terms since the credit crisis began. 
Both figures have got much bigger than they were a couple of years ago, as inflation has continued to run ahead of interest paid on deposits.  
Pensioners have suffered even more because higher than average proportions of their fixed incomes are spent on food and fuel. They are the largely silent victims of the Bank of England's policy of running negative real interest rates. 
But this slow-motion bank robbery is more difficult to describe than the short, sharp, smash-and-grab in Cyprus. So, despite the best efforts of this column to blow the whistle, more attention will be given to smaller losses for fewer people in Cyprus than millions of savers and pensioners who have lost much more in British banks and retirement funds. 
Suggested levies of 6.75 per cent of all deposits up to €100,000 (£86,500) and 9.9 per cent for larger deposits caused many savers in Cyprus to withdraw their money from banks over the weekend.... 
Elsewhere, Government sources stressed that deposits held in the London branches of Bank of Cyprus UK and Laiki Bank would not be subject to the new levy. Treasury sources said that “deposits in UK subsidiaries and branches [of Cypriot banks] aren’t affected” by the crisis. 
If only small savers with Britain’s high street banks and building societies could say the same. Nor are they the only victims to pay a high price for quantitative easing and QE’s aim of protecting over-stretched banks and borrowers at the expense of savers. 
Unfortunately, in a vicious seesaw effect, extra demand for gilts created by QE has pushed up the price of bonds, pushing down their yield or the income pensioners can obtain with their savings. Laith Khalaf of wealth managers Hargreaves Lansdown reckons annuity yields have fallen by about a fifth during the last four years. 
So savers of all descriptions are paying a high price for the Bank of England’s strategy of maintaining negative real interest rates. 
Sadly for the millions of victims of this slow-motion bank robbery in Britain, it remains too complex to explain on the front page or in TV bulletins and so much more coverage will be given to a relatively small scale smash and grab with fewer victims in Cyprus.

Sunday, March 17, 2013

Raid on Cypriot deposits shakes Europeans' faith in safety of bank deposits

As expected, concern over the safety of their bank deposits has spread across Europe.  Reuters reports that while Europeans outside of Cyprus have not rushed to take their money out of the banks this is simply because they do not know where else to put it.

I suspect that there are any number of financial players, think money market mutual funds, who are rapidly gearing up to explain why they are a better alternative than a bank.

Their argument is pretty simple.  They might say that unlike a bank, they don't carry the risk of having the government confiscate your money to recapitalize the banking system.

So the final word on how much in deposits this will cost the global banking system will take a while to determine.

What can be determined is that the EU policymakers have managed to violate the cardinal rule and ended the public's trust in the safety of bank deposits.

Cyprus: Panic as deposits set to be confiscated

Apparently the government of Cyprus is having second thoughts on confiscating the deposits of its banks as the vote to do so has been postponed.

What lead to the postponement was the panic that occurred when it was announced that the deposits were to be confiscated so as to recapitalize the banking system.

As everyone has known since they first opened up a bank account with deposit insurance, governments guarantee that the depositor will get 100% of their money back up to a pre-set limit regardless of how the bank performs financially.

At the urging of the EU and IMF, Cyprus was not only going to unilaterally end this guarantee, but it was also going to seize (they called it a "tax") more than 5% of the depositors' money to cover the banks' bad financial performance.

This unilateral removal of deposit insurance will lead to a much higher level of instability in the global financial system.  By putting back on depositors the burden of determining if a bank is solvent, the EU and IMF have reintroduced bank runs.

Why, in the absence of ultra transparency under which banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, there is no way to tell which banks are solvent and which are not.

It therefore becomes prudent for a depositor to a) reduce their balances at a bank and b) run to the bank to withdraw their money on any rumor indicating the bank may not be solvent.

Of course, there is a certain irony in the EU and IMF compelling Cyprus to end its deposit guarantee and Cyprus' politicians trying to save 8,000 banking jobs (aka, the bonuses of the Cyprus bankers).

The EU and IMF were advised by bankers who were looking to preserve their bonuses and continue to socialize the losses in the financial system.

The irony is that the only banks that will be trusted going forward will be those that provide ultra transparency and show the world that they have nothing to hide.

As reported by the Guardian, the reaction to the announcement was:

People rushed to banks and queued at cash machines that refused to release cash as resentment quickly set in. ... The move in the eurozone's third smallest economy could have repercussions for financially overstretched bigger economies such as Spain and Italy. 
People with less than 100,000 euros in their accounts will have to pay a one-time tax of 6.75%, Eurozone officials said, while those with greater sums will lose 9.9%. ... 
The prospect of savings being so savagely docked sparked terror among the island's resident British community.... 
"There's a run on banks. A lot of us are really panicking. The big fear is that there soon won't be cash in ATMs," said Arlene Skillett, a resident in Nicosia. "People are worried that they're automatically going to lose ten present [of their savings] in deposit accounts. Anastasiades won elections saying he wouldn't allow this to happen." 
She said a lot of elderly Britons had transferred savings to the island when they had decided to retire there. "Nobody can understand how they can do this – isn't it illegal? How can they just dock money from your account?" she asked. 
In the coastal town of Larnaca, Cypriots described how they had queued from the early hours in the hope of withdrawing deposits from banks. "A lot of us just can't believe it," said Alexandra Christofi, a divorcee in her 40s who said she had rushed to her bank before doors even opened at 6am. 
"I had put my money there for a rainy day. It's absolutely all I have and I cannot understand how Cyprus is being singled out. Other EU countries got bailouts and we're only in this position because we supported Greece," she said, referring to the massive losses the Cypriot banking system suffered as a result of Greece's restructuring its debt last year. "Where is the fairness in that? Where is the solidarity and support that is meant to be the reason why we are all unified in this common currency in the first place?" 
Maria Zembyla, from Nicosia, said the levy would make a "big dent" in her family's savings and "erode the investor confidence". "It is robbery. People like us have been working for years, saving to pay for our children's studies and pensions and suddenly they steal a big share of this money. Russians that currently keep the economy afloat will leave the country along with their money," she added. 
Howard Skelton, in Limassol, said: "The only people who will benefit in the long term are the banks. It will be many years before the man in the street begins to feel any benefit from this bailout. The sooner I can return to the UK the better."...

Depositors started queuing early to withdraw their cash, and protestors gathered outside the presidential palace. "I'm extremely angry. I worked years and years to get it together and now I am losing it on the say-so of the Dutch and the Germans," said British-Cypriot Andy Georgiou, 54, who returned to Cyprus in mid-2012 with his savings. 
"They call Sicily the island of the mafia. It's not Sicily, it's Cyprus. This is theft, pure and simple," said a pensioner.

Saturday, March 16, 2013

Rather than confiscate insured deposits, could we please fix the global financial system

EU policy makers have crossed the rubicon and decided that insured deposit holders should no longer be protected from the financial performance of the banks, but rather are a source of funds to recapitalize the banks.

With this single action, EU policy makers have undermined the global financial system and dramatically increased its instability.

Why?

Because depositors trusted that their governments would honor their deposit guarantees.  They have repeatedly demonstrated this across countries like Greece and Spain where no matter how insolvent their banks looked, the depositors kept their money in the banks out of a belief it was safe.

This is simply no longer true no matter how EU policy makers try to spin it.

The burden is now on depositors to determine if their bank is sitting on losses that the depositor will now have to absorb.

We are about to experience the same response as happened with structured finance securities when investors suddenly discovered that they did not know what they owned.  Banks are "black boxes" and structured finance securities are "brown paper bags" when it comes to looking to find out what their underlying exposures are.

Depositors, like structured finance security investors, are going to look for the door.

Why stay and risk the possibility of loss for no return?

As part of confiscating insured deposits in Cyprus, the ECB is standing ready to provide the banks with funds to offset the run that is going to start next Tuesday.  So in fairly short order, the ECB will be the primary funding source for the Cyprus banks.

Please note that all of this is avoidable if policy makers stop listening to bankers (who got us into the financial crisis and truly only care about protecting their bonuses) and PhD economists (who frankly don't understand how a bank actually works so they excluded it from their models).

Policy makers have to start listening to individuals like your humble blogger who has a track record that shows they understand what is wrong with the global financial system and what it will take to fix it.

I am on record for "predicting" the financial crisis and with this blog have consistently been accurate when stating what policies will work and what policies will not work as soon as they are mentioned, let alone adopted.

My blueprint for saving the global economy is pretty simple.

First, use the banks as they are designed to be used.  Banks are designed to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to support the real economy.

It is a myth that banks need to be recapitalized immediately after absorbing these losses.  Banks are designed to operate with low or negative book capital levels.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.  With taxpayers as a silent equity partner, banks have virtually unlimited "equity" so they can continue to extend credit to support the real economy.

Then, over time, banks can rebuild their book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

Call step one:  freely spend as much as it takes in future bank earnings to absorb all of the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

Two, bring transparency back to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

For banks, this means requiring them to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can confirm that the banks have absorbed all the losses on their exposures.  With this information, market participants can exert discipline and restrain risk taking by bankers and gambling on redemption.

For structured finance securities, this means requiring observable event based reporting under which all activities like a payment or delinquency on the underlying collateral are reported to market participants before the next business day.  Observable event based reporting allows market participants to know what they are buying and know what they own.

Three, use expansionary fiscal policies to kickstart the global economy.

Four, raise interest rates back to the 2% minimum set by Walter Baghot in the 1870s by ending zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

This is critical because it ends the ongoing Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Under this spiral, current demand is reduced as savers, both individuals and companies, try to offset the drop in earnings on their investments.  Raising rates allows savers to make some money which in turn shows up as current demand.

No matter what the economic models say, raising rates will not discourage business investment.  What discourages business investment is lack of demand.  This has been proven since the beginning of the financial crisis.

EU policy makers throw HSBC and Standard Chartered deposits under the bus

The BBC's Robert Peston reports that the EU policy makers only violated the sanctity of the deposit guarantee so as to punish money launderers.

There is a wee bit of a problem with this policy that goes by the name of HSBC and Standard Chartered.

For those of you who don't remember, both of these banks just paid a cost of doing business fine to the US for violating its money laundering rules.

If the EU policy makers are to be believed, HSBC and Standard Chartered are no longer covered by deposit guarantees.  After all, we know they have a substantial amount of laundered money in them.

Or are all money launderers not created equal....

A well-placed official rings to tell me why investors should not be panicking that the punishment of Cypriot depositors is a precedent, or that lenders to Spanish and Italian banks will be spanked as well before too long.
A call to control the damage from adopting a stupid policy and undermining the global financial system.
He says the structure of the Cypriot bailout has been determined by German politics. (Aren't all eurozone bailouts fixed in that way?) 
Here is the logic behind imposing a hefty levy on Cyprus deposits, according to this official: 
1) Regulators and politicians are convinced that a vast amount of cash in Cypriot banks belongs to Russian money launderers.
2) Few German politicians of any persuasion would have voted for a Cyprus rescue that simultaneously rescued these launderers.
3) So the only way to get the bailout through the Bundestag is for the launderers to be taxed to the tune of almost 10% of their allegedly ill-gotten cash. And if innocent savers are hurt too, that is the way this particular "Keks" will crumble.
And with that logic, HSBC and Standard Chartered deposit holders have just been thrown under the bus.

Since neither of these banks provides ultra transparency so we can determine if they are solvent or not (if not, it is a question of time before a depositor gets hit for a loss), the best thing a depositor can do is run, don't walk, to the bank and remove all of their money.
On that analysis, private sector lenders either to Spanish banks or to the Italian government - as two topical and relevant examples - need not fear that it is their turn next to take a write-off.
Only true if Cyprus is a one-time policy.  However, no reason to believe this as EU policy makers were willing to throw Greece and Spain into depressions while blaming their citizens.
That may be seen as comforting by investors, up to a point. 
Except that if we are to see the Cypriot rescue as a very public statement that "hot money", which might be deemed to be laundered, has no place in the eurozone, then this money may well be withdrawn from wherever it sits in the currency union.
Hence, HSBC and Standard Chartered are now front and center.

EU establishes principle of imposing losses on insured depositors

As reported by Bloomberg, EU policymakers are establishing the principle of imposing losses on insured bank deposits.

By doing so, in a single stroke, they have undermined the whole concept of deposit insurance and created massive instability in the financial system.  Deposit insurance is suppose to be an ironclad guarantee by the sovereign that up to a specified level, all money put into a bank is protected from the financial performance of the bank.

The EU policymakers have decided to unilaterally end this guarantee.

At a minimum, for countries like Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy and France, this should accelerate the run on their banks.

Why should depositors take the risk of losing money when there is no way of knowing if the banks are solvent?

This is a global issue.  Just this past week, the Fed effectively said that JP Morgan was insolvent by calling into question its fortress balance sheet (I know JP Morgan passed a stress test, but banks around the world, see Dexia and banks in Ireland, have been nationalized shortly after passing a stress test).

In the absence of ultra transparency where banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, there is no reason to believe that a bank is solvent and that depositing money in the bank is nothing more than a chance to have a high risk of loss for zero return.

With the EU policymakers ending trust in the sanctity of the deposit insurance guarantee, the only way to re-stabilize the financial system is by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

With this information, market participants can independently determine which, if any, banks are solvent and therefore safe to put money into.

Euro-area finance ministers agreed to an unprecedented tax on Cypriot bank deposits as officials unveiled a 10 billion-euro ($13 billion) rescue plan for the country, the fifth since Europe’s debt crisis broke out in 2009. 
Cyprus will impose a levy of 6.75 percent on deposits of less than 100,000 euros -- the ceiling for European Union account insurance -- and 9.9 percent above that....
A tax is just another name for a loss.
Officials have struggled to find an agreement that would rescue Cyprus, which accounts for just half of a percent of the euro region’s economy, without unsettling investors in larger countries and sparking a new round of market contagion....
The European Central Bank will use its existing facilities to make funds available to Cypriot banks as needed to counter potential bank runs. Depositors will receive bank equity as compensation. 
Finance Minister Michael Sarris said the plan was the “least onerous” of the options Cyprus faced to stay afloat....
Actually, there was a far less onerous option that I have been talking about since the beginning of the financial crisis:  Let the banks recognize their losses and rebuild their book capital levels out of future earnings.

There was absolute zero reason to impose losses on depositors other than the EU policymakers are trying to bailout banks in countries like Germany that invested in the Cyprus banks.

The option chosen by the EU policymakers was the absolutely worse option available.
While the tax on deposits will hurt wealthy Russians with money in Cypriot banks, it will also sting ordinary citizens. 
Some ATMs in the country have run out of cash, Erotokritos Chlorakiotis, general manager of the Cooperative Central Bank, told state-run CYBC.
A run on the banks that will not be limited to Cyprus.
Funds to pay the levy were frozen in accounts immediately, ECB Executive Board Member Joerg Asmussen said. The levy will be assessed before Cypriot banks reopen on March 19 after a March 18 national holiday.... 
“As it is a contribution to the financial stability of Cyprus, it seems just to ask a contribution of all deposit holders,” Dijsselbloem said... 
Asmussen said tapping deposit holders was needed to expand Cyprus’s tax base. 
European Union Economic and Monetary Affairs Commissioner Olli Rehn called the assessment a strictly fiscal measure. Rehn had warned against so-called haircuts on depositors to avoid setting a destabilizing precedent. 
When asked if a deposit assessment could be ruled out for future rescues, Rehn said in an interview: “It can and there is no concrete case where it should be considered.”
Mr. Rehn's comment that losses will not be imposed on depositors in other countries is completely unbelievable.  As Mr. Asmussen said, it was necessary to impose losses on the depositors in order to be able to recapitalize the banks today.
“This kind of stability fee is clearly a much better choice from the point of view of financial stability and Cypriot citizens than a full-scale bail-in, which would have led to very chaotic consequences in the Cypriot economy,” he said.
This stability fee is a loss assessed on depositors.

From the standpoint of Cypriot taxpayers, it would have been far better to have the banks recognize their losses today and let the banks slowly recapitalize themselves through retained earnings.

This was possible to do as the banks have deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  The deposit insurance effectively made the taxpayers the Cypriot banks' silent equity partners until the banks had rebuilt their capital.

The lesson of the stability fee will not be missed by bank depositors globally.

Wednesday, January 30, 2013

Lessons from Icesave: who is a depositor and who is an investor

The Guardian ran an editorial on Iceland prevailing in its interpretation of how deposit insurance is suppose to work.

the decision in favour of Iceland has thrown a far more troublesome spotlight on the legal relationship between all European states and the guarantees purportedly offered by their banks to retail depositors. 
Troublesome, or has the ruling highlighted the critical distinction between depositor and investor?

The Icesave ruling effectively defines a depositor as an individual or company from the host country and everyone else is effectively defined as an investor.

This distinction is logical because a deposit guarantee is really between the government and its citizens.

Can this deposit guarantee be expanded beyond a country's citizens?

Yes.  For example, if the country is a member of the EU.  In this case, the deposit guarantee is extended to the citizens of the EU member countries.  However, it is not extended to citizens outside of the EU.

Why are citizens outside of the EU treated differently?

Because they are really investors.  These citizens are making an investment choice.  They could deposit their funds with a bank in their country and receive a lower return or deposit their funds with a foreign bank and receive a higher return.
What advice would George Osborne today offer ordinary retail savers thinking of placing their savings with an online account offered by a bank based in a financially weak European member state? 
The advice should be that the retail saver should think of themselves as an investor.

The question they have to ask is does the higher interest income earned on the account adequately compensate them for the risk of not being repaid if the bank becomes insolvent.
And what sanction might a financially stretched government face if its desperate banks went chasing foreign deposits, knowing the accompanying guarantees were flimsy?
The lesson from the Icesave case is that foreign depositors must think of themselves as investors.  As an investor, they are responsible for all losses on their investments.  As a result, the need to ask the question of "will the deposit guarantee actually cover my deposits".

If it is a bank in an EU member country and the investor is from an EU member country, the answer is the deposit guarantee covers their deposits.

If it is a bank in a small, financially stretched, non-EU member country, the answer is the deposit guarantee does not cover their deposits.  This is a reasonable conclusion from a practical standpoint even if the deposit guarantee in theory did cover their deposit as there is no reason to believe that a small, financially stretched country could make good on the guarantee anyway.

Monday, January 28, 2013

Iceland and deposit guarantees

Your humble blogger has written extensively about deposit guarantees and the role they play in allowing policymakers to adopt the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Specifically, I have asserted that deposit guarantees make the taxpayers the 'silent equity partner' of the banks when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.

Why?

Because the government is both explicitly and implicitly on the hook for making the depositors whole.

More importantly, depositors assume that governments will honor their deposit guarantee.  From the time they open their first bank account they are told not to worry about bank book capital levels (please recall, when a 6-year old opens a bank account, their parents answer their question of how do they know they can get their money back by saying the government guarantees the 6-year old will get their back and not "look at a bank's financial statements and if the book capital level is positive....).

The case of Iceland and its handling of deposit guarantees confirms the expectation that government's will honor their deposit guarantees.

However, the case of Iceland reminds everyone that foreign depositors who only have an account at a bank to earn a higher rate of interest should recognize that they are "investors" and as investors they should not assume that they will be repaid under the country's deposit guarantee program.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal,
Iceland won a sweeping victory in a court fight over its responsibilities to foreign depositors in the Icelandic bank Landsbanki, which failed in 2008. 
The court of the European Free Trade Association on Monday said Iceland didn't breach European Economic Area directives on deposit guarantees by not compensating U.K. and Dutch depositors in Landsbanki's online savings accounts, known as Icesave accounts.... 
The EFTA Court sets up a vexing question: If deposit-guarantee programs don't protect everyone, are they really effective?  
That issue was raised by the European Commission, the EU's executive arm, which joined the case against Iceland.... 
Yes, deposit-guarantee programs are still effective even if they don't protect everyone.

They are effective even with a distinction between "depositors", individuals and firms that have a reason other than interest earned for having money at a bank, and "foreign investors", who have money at the bank solely for the purpose of receiving a higher interest rate.

Foreign investors recognize that under the FDR Framework the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware) applies and they are responsible for all losses on their exposures.  Hence, they have an incentive to independently assess the risk of investing money in a bank of a small country.
Because its banks opened Internet arms seeking deposits from foreigners, Iceland had an unusually high proportion of foreign depositors in the system..... 
These foreign depositors were investors.
Iceland didn't force losses on domestic depositors. In the windup of the banks, the authorities put domestic deposits and assets into new "good" banks and left foreign deposits in the old, insolvent banks. 
The EFTA Surveillance Authority argued that Iceland violated nondiscrimination rules by treating domestic depositors differently. 
The court agreed with Iceland that the transfer didn't break the rules. 
The EU's common-market rules require that every country establish a deposit-guarantee program that provides a minimum level of compensation to savers in case of a bank failure.  
Iceland's banking collapse took down all the island's major banks, and the Icelandic deposit-guarantee fund didn't have nearly enough money to pay out insurance. 
At the core of the Icesave case is exactly what a country must do in such a total failure. 
Iceland said its obligation was simply to make sure that a reasonable guarantee plan existed. The U.K. said a country is obliged to make sure that insured depositors are actually paid. 
The Icelandic government expressed "considerable satisfaction" that the country's stance had prevailed in the Icesave case....
By compensating their depositors, the U.K. and the Netherlands received priority claims on the assets of the failed Landsbanki. The ministry said it expects those assets will be enough to pay all the British and Dutch claims. 
A spokesman for the European Commission, Stefaan De Rynck, said the commission would "maintain its interpretation" of the deposit-guarantee requirements in the 27 member states of the EU, where Mr. De Rynck says the guarantees must "also apply in the event of a systemic crisis." ...
The message from the EU being that both "domestic" depositors and "foreign investors" can expect an EU member states deposit guarantee to cover their bank deposits.
The Icesave affair has been an acrimonious backdrop to Iceland's relatively successful attempt to recover its economic footing in the aftermath of 2008.... 
Iceland adopted the Swedish Model and required its banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  By sparing its real economy the burden of servicing this excess debt, Iceland has seen its real economy bounce back quickly.
The British shelled out £2.35 billion ($3.7 billion), and the Dutch €1.32 billion, to repay their depositors in Landsbanki shortly after it collapsed....
As it became clearer that Landsbanki's assets would cover most, if not all, of the balance, the impact of the dispute faded.....

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

In defending Geithner's bank bailouts, Roger Lowenstein cites modern bank run

In his Bloomberg column defending the Geithner led bailouts of the banks, Roger Lowenstein said they were necessary as the banks were experience the modern version of a bank run.  More importantly, Mr. Lowenstein notes that deposit insurance was adopted to prevent an old-fashion bank run, but virtually nothing has been done to address the modern version.

We know what happened in 2008: Wall Street was struck by a modern-style bank run. Yet most of the regulatory response hasn’t been concerned with deterring another panic. 
The Dodd- Frank financial-reform law and other measures are mostly about making sure that banks don’t do something stupid, such as operate with too little capital, or trade derivatives without transparency. These are good and worthy goals. 
But at some point, if history is any guide, banks will discover some new, supposedly foolproof, asset class and become too exposed to it. It won’t be tulips; it won’t be subprime mortgages; it will be something we can’t anticipate now. And when this new “sure thing” starts to look dicey, banks will be vulnerable again.
Actually, it was not simply that banks became too exposed to a supposedly foolproof asset class that was the problem.

The problem was and still is that banks are 'black boxes'.

As a result, market participants, including other banks, had no way of knowing which banks were solvent and which banks were not (this conclusion appears in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report).

When a lender doesn't know if the borrower is solvent or not, they don't make a loan.  This has been confirmed for the last 5 years by the simple fact that the interbank lending market remains frozen.
Although Congress mostly avoided the issue after 2008, we do have experience in deterring panics. 
Regulations tend to focus on what banks own (assets such as loans and securities). Avoiding panics is concerned with what they owe (liabilities, which include deposits).
Actually, there is no reason to believe that the institutions involved with the bank liabilities panicked.

In fact, all the evidence points to them behaving in a very rational manner.  Since they could not determine if the borrowing bank was solvent or not and therefore capable of repaying their loans, they chose not to roll-over their loans.
After the bank runs of the early 1930s, the U.S. enacted deposit insurance. And since then, customers haven’t run to the bank, even if the bank is thought to be unsound. 
This poses a moral hazard: What if banks, realizing their deposits are insured, recklessly gamble on unsound assets? 
This happened in the savings-and-loan crisis in the 1980s, and it was expensive....
This is why there is a need for banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants, including regulators, can exert discipline so that bankers don't  'gamble on redemption' (which was what drove up the cost of the savings-and-loan crisis).
We did have bank runs in 2008, though not the kind seen in the old photographs with men in hats and coats lined up on the sidewalk. 
Instead of ordinary depositors, the people who pulled their money out were investors in various unregulated instruments such as repurchase-agreement loans, short-term commercial paper and money-market funds. 
Each of these is similar, in an economic sense, to a deposit: They offer people and institutions a place to park savings with seeming security and the option of immediate withdrawal. 
During the financial crisis, it was these “depositors” who panicked....
Again, I disagree with Mr. Lowenstein that these investors panicked.  When you cannot tell if the bank you are lending to has the ability to repay the loan, you don't make the loan.
The difference between old- fashioned deposits and the so-called shadow-market loans described above is that the former can only be issued by banks and in certain well-defined circumstances. And banks must purchase deposit insurance. 
Shadow deposits are uninsured and mostly unregulated. 
The solution, as in the 1930s, is to regulate short-term IOUs and to require, in many cases, insurance. 
In broad terms, if you are a financial institution, you would be able to borrow short-term funds only under certain conditions and, when you did, you would need insurance. This would have a cost, just as deposit insurance has a cost....
Insurance is the wrong solution for this problem.  The right solution is to require banks to provide ultra transparency.

With ultra transparency, these investors can assess the risk and solvency of each bank.  As a result, these investors can adjust both the price and amount of their exposure based on the risk of the bank.

These investors have an incentive to assess the risk and adjust their exposure because they know that as a result of the banks providing ultra transparency the investors are responsible for all gains and losses on their bank exposures.

Unlike insurance which doesn't adjust to the increase risks that the banks take on, the cost of funds from investors who can assess the bank's risk because of ultra transparency does increase as more risk is taken on.  Unlike insurance, investors provide a restraint on bank risk taking.
Banks are likely to oppose such measures, which would cut into their profits. Recently, to the satisfaction of bankers, international regulators in Basel, Switzerland have actually loosened liquidity standards aimed at preventing a repeat of 2008.
As I have previously stated, one of the benefits of ultra transparency is that the market doesn't care what the banks think.  Knowing that they are at risk of loss, market participants independently assess the risk for themselves and act based on this independent assessment.
Morgan Ricks, a former Treasury senior policy adviser and now an assistant professor at Vanderbilt Law School, says the banks’ cheap overnight funding provides undeserved, “subsidy profits." 
Their borrowing costs, he says, are inordinately cheap because the market believes that banks won’t be allowed to fail. Insurance would put a price on that subsidy.
The subsidy would be ended by providing ultra transparency.  Insurance does not end the subsidy as there is no reason to think that deposit insurance is priced at a level that removes 'subsidy profits'.
Ricks says the regulatory response to the crisis “focused on the wrong stuff.” The first priority should be “the instability of the funding model.”
I agree and the only way to make the funding model stable is by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Tuesday, January 8, 2013

Greek banks say they need more money for their recapitalization

Ekathimerini (hat tip Zero Hedge) reports that Greek banks say the current funds for their recapitalization are inadequate and that they need more money.

And why do they need more money?

Two reasons:

  • The level of non-performing loans greatly exceeds the level estimated by BlackRock; and
  • Loss of interest income on Greek sovereign debt that was written down as part of the latest Greek sovereign debt restructuring.
Regular readers know that your humble blogger predicted that BlackRock's estimate would not just be wrong, but that nobody outside of the financial regulators would care about it.  As a result, any payments made for this estimate was a waste of Greek taxpayer resources (the same was true in Ireland).

In addition, regular readers know that there is no reason to bailout a bank.  A modern banking system is designed so that banks can operate with low or negative book capital levels.  

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

So long as banks are able to generate earnings before banker bonuses, they have a franchise that is capable of rebuilding their book capital levels.  This can be done by retaining 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings until the desired level of bank book capital is achieved.

As a result, there is no need to bailout the banks and the Greek government should instead use the funds it has received to support the Greek citizens by implementing programs that support growth in the real economy.
The country’s main banks are considering requesting additional funds for their recapitalization. 
Senior bank officials say that the rapid deterioration in financial conditions caused by the back-to-back elections in mid-2012 has led to a greater increase in nonperforming loans than originally foreseen in the BlackRock report a year ago. 
They add that banks should proceed to greater share capital increases in order to respond to the new reality. 
Ernst & Young estimates that nonperforming loans in Greece approached 24 percent of all loans at the end of 2012.
Who could have guessed that nonperforming loans would skyrocket with the government having adopted austerity measures and the economy plunging into a depression?
The bond buyback dealt another great blow to the credit sector that has made a revision of the capital requirements necessary. 
The Bank of Greece had estimated that operating profits for National, Alpha, Eurobank and Piraeus for the 2012-14 period would amount to 11.09 billion euros, which had been excluded from the calculation of the lenders’ capital needs. 
One of the main sources of those future revenues would have been the interest from the bonds amounting to 16 billion euros that banks had in their portfolios. However, the so-called voluntary sale of the bonds entailed a loss of those revenues for the banks. 
According to estimates for the country’s four main banks, the buyback signifies a revenue reduction of at least 1.5 billion euros, thereby increasing their capital requirements.
Actually, there is no need for more capital.  These banks should generate 9.5 billion euros in operating profits (11.09 - 1.5).

All the loss of revenue on the sovereign debt means for the banks is it will take them longer to rebuild their book capital levels while they retain 100% of their operating profit.
The Bank of Greece has announced that the four systemic banks will need in the region of 27.5 billion euros for their recapitalization, but if that estimate on the buyback is upheld, the bill will reach up to at least 29 billion euros. 
The four lenders’ losses from the credit risk (including loans in Greece and abroad) are estimated at 14.58 billion euros, but if the deepening of the recession is factored in, the losses would grow by about 10 to 20 percent and the capital needs would expand by between 1.5 and 3 billion euros. 
As a result the capital stock of 5 billion euros formed by the Bank of Greece for future needs may have to be used immediately by the big banks, eventually taking the total bill of the recapitalization process to over 30 billion euros.

Friday, December 14, 2012

EU seeks plan to handle failing banks without costing taxpayers money

Bloomberg reports that lead by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the EU is looking for how to handle failing banks without costing the taxpayers any money.

Regular readers know that a modern banking system is designed to handle failing banks without costing taxpayers any money.

A bank "fails" when it becomes insolvent and the market value of its assets is less than the book value of its liabilities.

However, just because a bank is insolvent doesn't mean that the bank has to stop operating and supporting the real economy.  Modern banks are designed to operate and support the real economy even when they are insolvent.

How can banks that fail stay in business?

The combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding let banks stay in business even when they have failed and are insolvent.  When banks are insolvent or have either low or negative book capital levels, deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner.

As a result, the only market participant who can close a failed bank is its regulator.

Under what condition should a failed bank be allowed to continue to operate and support the real economy?

So long as the bank can continue to generate earnings, it should be allowed to continue to operate.  100% of these earnings before banker bonuses are retained and used to rebuild the bank book capital level and reduce the taxpayers' exposure to the bank.

To prevent the bank's managers from gambling on redemption, the bank must provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants and regulators can exert discipline to restrain the banks risk taking.

Under what condition should a failed bank be resolved?

When it cannot generate earnings for its core banking franchise.

But doesn't this mean that the taxpayer is on the hook for the losses when this bank is resolved?

No, the industry is on the hook for the losses.  The industry pays for deposit insurance.  The cost of deposit insurance increases to cover these losses.

So the answer to the question of who pays for all the losses on the legacy assets is first, the bank that holds these assets if they have a franchise that lets them generate earnings and second, the banking industry through higher assessments on their deposit insurance.

European Union chiefs pledged to seek a joint strategy for handling failing banks as German Chancellor Angela Merkel demanded taxpayers be spared the costs. 
Leaders agreed to start work next year on a single resolution mechanism for euro-area banks to complement the European Central Bank oversight role approved yesterday by European finance chiefs. Lenders should underwrite financial stability by repaying governments as needed, EU leaders said. 
Resolution “may not be at the cost of the taxpayers, but has to be structured so that those responsible for the failures of the banks carry the burden,” Merkel told reporters at 2:15 a.m. after nine hours of talks in Brussels. 
Bolstering confidence in banks is a key component of policy makers’ effort to defeat the debt crisis that has rattled markets since late 2009. They must decide how to handle existing bank weakness as well as future failures that emerge after the ECB takes on its oversight duties. In the first half of 2013, they will seek a deal on the terms of allowing the EU’s 500 billion-euro ($656 billion) rescue fund to provide direct aid to banks. 
“We made progress” on a resolution mechanism, said ECB President Mario Draghi. He pressed government leaders to confront how they will handle banking woes that spread across borders and exacerbate financial crises.....