Showing posts with label Opacity Protection Team. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Opacity Protection Team. Show all posts

Monday, August 26, 2013

Why should ECB's bank asset quality review be believed?

Given Mario Draghi's commitment to do whatever it takes, why should the ECB's review of the asset quality at the EU banks be remotely believable?

Please recall, this is not the first time a governmental entity has overseen an asset quality review.  Previously, these reviews were done in Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain.

The result of these reviews was predictable.  The banks took additional reserves for potential losses and the governments declared their balance sheets had been cleaned up.

Of course, the banks were not required to disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details so that market participants could confirm that all their losses had been recognized.

A few savvy market participants recognized that this lack of transparency was the equivalent of waving a giant red flag and announcing that the banks were still hiding losses on and off their balance sheet.

These market participants' insight have always been confirmed as shortly after the asset reviews it would be shown that there were in fact many more losses hiding on and off the bank balance sheets.

This pattern has held true whether the asset review was carried out by the government itself or using an "independent" third party (accounting firm or BlackRock).

This pattern has also held true when the asset quality review has been combined with stress tests.

So your humble blogger's question stands: why in the absence of transparency would anyone believe the results of the ECB's asset quality review?

One of the downsides of the ECB running an asset quality review without requiring the banks to provide transparency is that ECB puts itself in the position of now having to accept as collateral any of the assets it reviewed and didn't require loss recognition on.

From a Financial Times article on the ECB's asset quality review,

Within a matter of weeks, assuming legislative go-ahead, the ECB is expected to establish its new “single supervisory mechanism”, hiring the 1,000 staff it will need to police the banks, and making its mark with a tough root-and-branch Asset Quality Review (AQR) to determine how truthful banks are being about the loans on their balance sheets....
Properly done, the exercise could quickly establish the ECB as a tough regulator and help restore investor faith in Europe’s lenders. A succession of botched stress tests over recent years and laggardly recapitalisation of troubled lenders have deterred investors from backing the sector. 
A credible AQR, followed immediately by a stress test to show how balance sheets would stand up to further trouble, would, it is hoped, convince the world that Europe’s lenders are as resilient as US banks okayed by the Federal Reserve’s annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR).
No one thinks the US banks are okay.  Everyone knows that as a result of the stress tests the US on an annual basis renews the vow made by then US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner when he pledged the full faith and credit of the US to keep the banks solvent.
All of which explains the flurry of preparations. 
Italy’s Intesa SanPaolo has been the most upfront about its desire to be ready for the ECB process. This month the bank revealed a “conservative” 30 per cent increase in the amount it has set aside to cover bad loans, undertaken explicitly “in the light of the [ECB’s] asset quality review”....
In the absence of exposure detail transparency, how would anyone know if a 30 percent increase in the amount set aside to cover bad loans is "conservative" or not?

Based on the history of Ireland, Greece,.... it is a fairly safe bet that this additional 30% will not be shown to be conservative and that much more in the way of losses will materialize.
The ECB exercise is set to implement new pan-European definitions of non-performing loans, standardising an NPL as anything that is 90 days past due, and also forcing banks to categorise all exposures to a single borrower as non-performing, even if only one of a number of loans is actually in default....
In the presence of regulatory forbearance which allows banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' and turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans, it is nice to have a standard, but the regulators have already undercut it.
Autonomous, an independent research house, predicts the changed definitions could increase problem loans by an average of 40 per cent – forcing weaker banks to raise fresh capital. Lenders in Germany, Austria and France could face the biggest shocks in the AQR....
I guess Autonomous doesn't see the 30% increase in loan loss reserves as conservative.
But a litany of ifs and buts still hangs over the whole process. Most immediately, it is still uncertain whether the EU will deliver the legal go-ahead to empower the ECB next month.  
More fundamentally, there is still disagreement about how to deal with a bank if it fails to plug a capital shortfall under its own steam. 
Here, too, Europe must learn from the US, where the government’s Tarp scheme injected capital as necessary back in 2009. For the ECB exercise to work, the sovereign-focused European Stability Mechanism must become a bank bail-out vehicle of last resort.
The issue for a bank fixing its book capital shortfall is can it generate earnings after all the losses have been realized.

If a bank can generate earnings after taking the losses on its dud exposures, it can recapitalize itself over time by simply retaining earnings.

If a bank cannot generate earnings after taking the losses on its dud exposures, it should be resolved.

Friday, July 19, 2013

Is Wall Street winning or because of its high profits losing the long-war against regulation

Approximately one month ago, in her Guardian column, Heidi Moore described why Wall Street is winning the long-war against regulation.
Feeble as it was, Dodd-Frank was a high point of reining in abuses. Thanks to financial lobbying, it's business as usual.
Today, in his NY Times column, Peter Eavis describes why Wall Street's high profits set them up to lose the long-war against regulation.
In recent weeks, the Treasury Department, senior regulators and members of Congress have stepped up efforts intended to make the largest banks safer. 
The banks have warned that more regulation could undermine their ability to compete and curtail the amount of money they have to lend, but the strong earnings that came out over the last week could undercut their argument. 
Which view is right?

Ms. Moore described how Wall Street wins the long-term war against regulation.
It will surprise no cynic that there is a financial connection between the members of Congress who approve these measures and the industry they are supposed to regulate.... 
It's no surprise, of course – given the well-known influence of Wall Street in writing and influencing the bills that regulate Wall Street. Citigroup lobbyists infamously drafted 70 lines of an 85-line amendment that protected a large acreage of derivatives from regulation.... 
Wall Street is keenly interested in weak regulation and weak regulators.... 
Think of derivatives – these complex securities that render ignorant and bewildered even the CEOs of the finance firms that engineer them – and think about whether a newcomer has a chance against the slick bankers and lobbyists armed with intimidating jargon. 
No matter how strong the personality, knowledge matters, and it takes years to understand the Wall Street fast-talking game....
All of this is part of the process of killing off the one flailing, pathetic attempt at financial reform: the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Dodd-Frank, bloated and vague from the beginning, was never a threat to Wall Street. 
Big banks thought they could wait out the outrage, then start undermining the intent of the law. 
They were right, this time. 
Mr. Eavis counters.
The most pressing concern for banks is a relatively tough new rule that regulators proposed last week that could force banks to build up more capital, the financial buffer they maintain to absorb losses.
Relatively tough might be overstating the new rule.  Many regulators, like the FDIC's Thomas Hoenig, and Economists, like Anat Admati, would like to see rules that require twice the amount the regulators proposed last month.

By setting the proposed level of bank capital where the regulators set it, the banks have already effectively won when it comes to capital regulation.
But the banks did not demonstrate any difficulty in meeting the proposed rules, and the banks now appear to have fewer allies in Washington than at any time since the financial crisis.
This was highlighted on Wednesday when the Treasury secretary, Jacob J. Lew, effectively issued an ultimatum to Wall Street, calling for the swift adoption of rules introduced through the Dodd-Frank financial overhaul law, which Congress passed in 2010.... 
“If we get to the end of this year, and cannot, with an honest, straight face, say that we’ve ended ‘too big to fail,’ we’re going to have to look at other options because the policy of Dodd-Frank and the policy of the administration is to end ‘too big to fail,’ ” Mr. Lew said.... 
In Congress on Thursday, Ben S. Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman,... said that if the measures already planned did not remove the risks posed by large banks, “additional steps would be appropriate.”
Still, some analysts remain skeptical that the Fed and the Treasury would really lend their weight to the sort of aggressive measures some lawmakers are contemplating. The recent comments may be an attempt to gain some political benefit from looking tough on the banks. 
And the remarks may be aimed at reducing any momentum that the more draconian pieces of bank legislation are gaining in the Senate.... 
Still, the stronger words from government officials could shift the balance of power away from the banking industry. 
“I sense a sea change in this,” Sheila C. Bair, a former chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a primary bank regulator, said. “It’s not moving with the banks, it’s moving against them.” 
The resurgence in bank profits appears to have been an important factor in persuading regulators to do more....
“The regulators are doing this because they can,” Michael Mayo, a banking analyst at CLSA, said. “And they can at this time of relative stability.”....
Excuse me, but the argument that stability was needed before the banks and the financial system could be reformed is pure and utter garbage.

By late 2008, governments around the globe had put the financial system on life support.  This support was the equivalent of putting a patient on a heart/lung machine so that the patient's heart can be operated on.

While the financial system was on life support it would have been easy to pass and implement the necessary changes to fix the financial system and end Too Big to Fail.

Global policy makers and financial regulators did not do so.  They couldn't even be bother with taking the time to set up the equivalent of a Pecora Commission to discover what caused the crisis in the first place, opacity.

Instead, they rolled out the Dodd-Frank Act which was effectively written by and for the banks by the banks' lobbyists.
Still, Mr. Mayo and others question how healthy the banks are.... 
Mr. Mayo and others are going to continue questioning how healthy the banks are until such time as the banks are required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Without this level of disclosure, there is no telling what risks and losses are hidden on and off the banks' balance sheets.
Still, some banking experts think the banks are bluffing when they say more regulation could hamper lending. 
“They can’t see that it is in their long-term interests to have a credible regulatory process,” Ms. Bair said.

The banks understand that they have already captured the regulatory process.

The only way for the regulators to re-establish any credibility is by giving up their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information about banks and requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Thursday, July 11, 2013

Robert Jenkins: "banks have bamboozled government" with false tradeoffs

Former Bank of England Financial Policy Committee member Robert Jenkins said that "banks have bamboozled government" with false tradeoffs.

As reported by Bloomberg,

banks have wrongly convinced government that measures to improve the safety of the financial system will curb growth. 
“I fear that the banks have bamboozled government into believing that society must choose between safety and growth, between safer banks and bank shareholder value, and between a safer financial framework and a competitive City of London,” Jenkins said in an interview. “These are all false choices.”
Regular readers know that the best example of where the banks wrongly convinced government is the need to protect bank book capital levels including the use of taxpayer bailouts to recapitalize the banks.

Bankers argued that if they had to absorb losses on the excess debt in the financial system they would not be able to make new loans to support the economy.  As shown by the US during the Great Depression, Sweden during the 1990s and Iceland with the current financial crisis, this tradeoff does not exist.

The banks recognizing the losses upfront on the excess debt in the financial system protected the real economy and set the stage for growth in the real economy.  This growth was supported by loans originated by the very banks that had taken the losses.

How was this possible?

Regulators recognized that because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding the banks could continue to operate even with low or negative book capital levels.  While operating, the banks generated earnings that could be used to recapitalize the banks over several years.

Asked what surprised him the most while at the Bank of England,

 Jenkins said what surprised him most during his time on the panel was the absence of a “banker-statesman” among the current crop of British bank chief executives. 
“Name one who has acknowledged the industry’s failings, embraced the need for reform and then got out and worked with wisdom, humility, selflessness and objectivity to structure a sound, stable and fair financial system,” he said. “Most have fought the regulatory agenda. None has got out in front of it -- much less set it. Society deserves better of the financial leaders who claim to be serving society.”
The absence of a banker-statesman is not surprising.  It is entirely consistent with an industry that has compensated its members for developing opaque, high margin products.

If you want a banker-statesman, you have to require the banks to provide transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this level of disclosure, sunshine can act as the best disinfectant.

Thursday, June 13, 2013

Robert Reich: lack of accountability by Wall Street creating huge problems

On his blog, Robert Reich looks at the problems that are created by not holding Wall Street accountable.

Regular readers know that the only way to hold Wall Street accountable is with transparency.  Sunlight is the best disinfectant because it makes the bankers and their financial regulators responsible for their actions.
The second center of unaccountable power goes by the name of Wall Street and is centered in the largest banks there. 
If we trusted that market forces kept them in check and that they did not exercise inordinate influence over Congress and the executive branch, we would have no basis for concern. 
However, market forces can not keep them in check because market forces do not operate where there is opacity.  Market forces require transparency to exert influence.
We wouldn’t worry that the Street’s financial power would be misused to fix markets, profit from insider information, or make irresponsible bets that imperiled the rest of us. 
Fix markets like the benchmark interest rates (Libor). Profit from insider information like structured finance products (ownership of servicers allows Wall Street to have tomorrow's news today and legally trade on it). Place bets like JP Morgan's London Whale CDS trade.
We could be confident that despite the size and scope of the giant banks, our economy and everyone who depends on it were nonetheless adequately protected.  
But those banks are now so large (much larger than they were when they almost melted down five years ago), have such a monopolistic grip on our financial system, and exercise so much power over Washington, that we have cause for concern. 
The fact that not a single Wall Street executive has been held legally accountable for the excesses that almost brought the economy to its knees five years ago and continues to burden millions of Americans, that even the Attorney General confesses the biggest banks are “too big to jail,” that the big banks continue to make irresponsible bets (such as those resulting in JP Morgan Chase’s $6 billion “London Whale” loss), and that the Street has effectively eviscerated much of the Dodd-Frank legislation intended to rein in its excesses and avoid another meltdown and bailout, all offer evidence that the Street is still dangerously out of control. 
Dodd-Frank was effectively written by and for the Too Big to Fail banks.  The banks were so confident in their writing of the legislation that they even created the Office of Financial Research so that transparency would have a place to go to die.

The only elements not approved of by Wall Street were the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule.
It is rare in these harshly partisan times for the political left and right to agree on much of anything. But the reason, I think, both are worried about the ... depredations of “too big to fail or jail” Wall Street banks on our economy, is ...: It is this toxic combination of inordinate power and lack of accountability that renders ... them dangerous, threatening our basic values and institutions. 
Ultimately policymakers will have to make a choice: bankers or society.

Saturday, May 11, 2013

One of best indicators of genuine reform in financial sector shows no reform

In his Guardian banking blog, Joris Luyendijk interviews an equity sales director who explains how Wall Street profits from both valuation and pricing opacity when it buys or sells derivatives and why it is fighting so hard to retain opacity.

The equity sales director compares his product, which represent an investment in the real economy, with derivatives, which represent a zero-sum bet on the direction of, for example, interest rates.
Which brings me to complex derivatives. The culture of equity is so different from derivatives. We try to build relationships with clients who invest money in real companies, for the long term. Complex derivatives traders work with a far larger and diffuse pool of clients, who could decide at any point to switch from one product to the next.... 
With complex derivatives it's very much about here and now, as you can make money in a market that's going down as well as up. There's no direct relationship with the economic cycle. 
My clients choose to deal with me for the quality of advice, the execution of their trades and the value of our research. With complex derivatives it's mostly driven by price. 
Often complex derivatives are not traded on an open exchange but over the counter [OTC] – in other words, it's an agreement directly between bank and client. One reason is that OTC derivatives are usually custom-made for the client, so there's only of them in the world. 
To illustrate how transparency in equity works, suppose a client places an order to buy a particular stock at careful discretion which is trading at 25. My trader goes into the market and executes it for 25.12. At the end of the day my client sees on his information terminal that the day's average price was 25.10. Did he overpay? He calls me and I go over to our trader. If it's really the trader's fault we might take the loss and give the client a better price. Otherwise we could lose our reputation and he will go elsewhere. 
Now, with OTC derivatives, how does a client find out he was disadvantaged? There's no exchange. Traders and clients base prices for OTC derivatives on a number of 'Greeks' – parameters indicating levels of volatility and other derivative characteristics of the product. 
It all comes down to client's ability to understand these Greeks' their sophistication. There is a huge difference between genuinely sophisticated clients and those eager to be seen as professional who actually don't grasp [all of] it. 
I have heard OTC derivatives traders use the term 'rape and pillage'. That means selling a less sophisticated client a financial product carrying a high likelihood of blowing up and causing that client never to deal with you again. 
"Rape and pillage" was not confined to large investors or corporations.  Regular readers might recall that UK banks were involved in the mis-selling of interest rate derivatives to small companies and individuals.
A lot of regulation has come in to prevent this, but in some non-EU jurisdictions these can still be sold. Again, note the difference with equity. A client can lose money on my recommendations, but it is almost impossible to bring down the client. 
"You could argue that OTC derivatives are among the best indicators of the degree of genuine reform in the financial sector. 
If reform of OTC derivatives is one of the best indicators of genuine reform in the financial sector, what  does reform in this area show?
One reason the crisis of 2008 got so bad was that banks had these totally opaque derivatives on their books, so nobody knew who had what.
Nobody knew which banks were solvent and which were not.  So it is very clear that the reform that is needed is to bring transparency to bank derivatives books.
Since then there's been a fight to improve transparency but banks resist with all their means.  Transparency correlates inversely with profitability; it has always been like that. 
Given that transparency will reduce the profitability of the banks, the banks are fighting to retain opacity in the derivatives and about their exposure details (their books).

So have the banks been successful in retaining their profitability and fending off transparency in derivatives and their exposure details?

Yes.

Since OTC derivatives are one of the best indicators of genuine reform in the financial sector, the lack of transparency shows there has not been genuine reform in the financial sector.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Meet the man who could finally destroy the Too Big to Fail banks

According to a Business Insider article, the man who could finally destroy the Too Big to Fail banks is the head of the Office of Financial Research.

And why might this individual end TBTF?

Because of the Office of Financial Research's access to data on the banks' exposures.  With this data, the head of OFR can highlight the hidden risks taken by these banks.

Regular readers know that Business Insider is right that transparency is the key to ending the threat of TBTF (hence your humble blogger is really the man who could destroy the TBTF).  Business Insider just doesn't understand that the Office of Financial Research is where transparency goes to die (as a result, TBTF is permanently protected by the veil of opacity).

Transparency in our financial system works because it ensures that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  Market participants independently assess this data and adjust their investment exposures based on this assessment.

The Office of Financial Research makes it impossible for market participants to do their own independent assessment.  It has been given a monopoly on bank exposure detail information and there is absolutely no reason in the world to believe that it will be any good at or better at assessing this data than the collective known as the market.

The Office of Financial Research is specifically set up to protect bank opacity.  That is why the banks' lobbyists included it in the Dodd-Frank Act.  It is specifically prohibited from sharing the underlying data with anyone including market participants, Congress or the financial regulators.

It is able to share its conclusions, but not the data itself.  Hence, a dependence on the analytical ability of the Office of Financial Research.

In yet another display of how the economics profession does not understand how our financial system works, a major contributing force behind the creation of the Office of Financial Research were several Nobel prize winning economists.  They advocated for the creation of a bank data black hole.

Not a big name at all, even though it could help to settle the debate by virtue of its data-driven philosophy.

Few Americans have heard of the Office of Financial Research—and even some DC insiders occasionally forget about the $100 million-plus agency created by Dodd-Frank. It lacked a director until the start of this year, when Richard Berner—previously one of the top economists for Morgan Stanley and a counselor for former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner—received a long-awaited Senate confirmation. 
It could be Berner's work over his six-year term that determines whether ‘too big to fail’ is over or more dangerous than ever. 
The trouble is that the office—which is contained inside the Treasury Department—has been slow to get on its feet as the controversy smolders. 
“They’ve been in the process of setting up for a couple of years,” explained Marc Jaruslic, a former Senate staffer who is now chief economist for Better Markets, an advocacy group pushing for tighter regulation. “I’d really like to see the OFR play the role intended for it in the statute. … We’re just missing a very important voice.”

The mission at the Office of Financial Research is to track previously hidden financial data and identify potential risks to the economy, a process that requires the agency to develop an unprecedented system for monitoring in real-time Wall Street and its darkest of alleys. 
Before the 2008 financial crisis, regulators essentially tried to oversee the markets by looking through the rearview mirror. The shortage of real-time information made it difficult for regulators to fully understand the problems of mortgage-backed securities and the highly-leveraged firms with a web of vast, unseen connections.
Actually, it was opacity that caused the problems.

Market participants did not have access to the data they needed to assess either banks or structured finance securities.

OFR will do nothing to change this.
Through its research and analysis, the OFR can report independently to Congress on dangerous patterns in the markets. It also advises the Financial Stability Oversight Council—the group of 10 federal regulators responsible for overseeing the companies that might pose a threat to the entire financial system....
The way our financial system is designed, market participants are suppose to adjust their exposures so as to avoid taking on too much risk.

OFR is suppose to report on dangerous patterns in the market.  Excuse me, but this is regulators replacing their judgement for the market's.

More importantly, we have market participants blindly gambling while OFR sits on the relevant data.

This is simply not a prescription for a stable financial system.
The OFR currently has about 140 staffers, half the number envisioned for this year under past budget proposals.
The 280 staffers at OFR ars suppose to replace and do a better job than the thousands of individuals the market would deploy to assess bank exposure details.  Intuitively, this is nonsense.
For now, its major initiative involves finalizing a unique code—known as a Legal Entity Identifier—to detect exactly which firms are involved in individual trades before the end of 2013, a key tool the government does not currently have.
Wow, we could have already built the "Mother of all Financial Databases" and made each bank's exposure details available to market participants in the same time OFR has wrestled with how we identify each firm involved in a trade.

The Office of Financial Research should be closed and the portion of the Dodd-Frank Act that created it repealed as soon as possible.

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Guardian's Seamus Milne calls for change in policy to save real economy

In his Guardian column, Seamus Milne channels what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis and makes the case for adopting the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency crisis to save the EU and UK economies.

Europe's flesheaters are back. The claim that the worst of the eurozone crisis is behind us now looks foolish.
Please recall that your humble blogger predicted at the beginning of the financial crisis that until transparency was brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system that the global economy would spiral downwards (despite the best efforts at economic stimulus by central banks and governments).
The deal forced on Cyprus by the German-led Troika at the weekend isn't a bailout: it will effectively destroy the island's economy. Instead of getting a grip on its grossly inflated banks, it will impose a brutal credit contraction, combined with sweeping cuts and privatisations, wiping out perhaps a quarter of Cyprus's national income. Ordinary Cypriots, not Russian oligarchs, will pay the price. 
Of course Cypriot politicians are to blame for having allowed the country to be turned into an adjunct of a bloated financial sector and a refuge for hot Russian money. 
But what tipped the divided island over wasn't foreign investors' sharp practices, but the impact of Europe's wider crisis on its banks: in particular, their exposure to devastated Greece, currently also in the Troika's tender care. 
Some have hailed the fact the raid was carried out on Cypriot bank deposits over €100,000, rather than the public purse. 
At last the rich and those responsible for private banking failures are being made to cough up, it's been said. Which would have been a good thing. But it's savers, not bankers or shareholders, who are taking the 40% hit.  
And many of the targeted depositors, such as pensioners, are scarcely rich – or are small businesses which will now go bust. 
The Cypriot government should instead have learned from Iceland: taken over the banks, isolated the bad loans, protected deposits, imposed losses on the wealthy, and used a publicly owned banking sector to rebuild the domestic economy. That would have offered its citizens a better future, almost certainly outside the eurozone. 
But it would have also encroached on private capital's privileges and clearly couldn't be tolerated. ...
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Milne has nicely summarized the benefits of the Swedish Model and why bankers are vehemently opposed to its adoption.
As the Greek economist Costas Lapavitsas argues, Cyprus has "reactivated" the European banking crisis. 
Not that it had been resolved. Only last month the Dutch government was forced to nationalise the Netherlands' fourth biggest bank, SNS Reaal, partly because of its over-exposure to losses in Spain.... 
Now the Troika's decision to help itself to Cypriot savings has paved the way for a new contagion. In the short term that may be contained because of the island's minuscule proportion of eurozone output. 
But the move has demolished confidence in bank deposits – a point rammed home by the Dutch finance minister's blundering signal that the deal had set a precedent. That could easily turn into bank runs in states likely to need new bailouts, as investors move cash to safer locations.
Safer locations like German government debt and not Deutsche Bank deposits.  Safer locations like money market mutual funds invested in UK or US government debt and not EU or UK banks.
Given the spectacular failure of austerity across the continent to overcome the crisis, rather than deepen it as output shrinks and debts mount, more such breakdowns are clearly on the cards.
The choice of austerity or stimulus didn't matter for ending the financial crisis.  If stimulus, all that was going to happen is the stimulus would ultimately be swallowed by the burden of debt service on the excess debt in the financial system.

Stimulus could buy a short-term reprieve from the downward spiral, but once the stimulus ended, the real economy would resume its contraction as money needed for growth and reinvestment was diverted to debt service on the excess debt.
The eurozone has now become a zombie zone.... 
Whatever the focus of the meltdown in each country – banking in Cyprus, property in Spain – all flow from the same crisis that erupted in 2007-8 out of a deregulated profit-hunting credit boom across the western world and has delivered a prolonged depression....
In Britain, the power and weight of the City of London are a particular block on sustainable recovery. 
But across Europe, people are being held to ransom by banks, bondholders and corporations determined to ensure that it's not they who bear the costs of the crisis they created – and politicians who regard it as their job to oblige them. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Milne nicely summarizes why we have made no progress to addressing the underlying issues that caused the financial crisis and why the financial crisis continues.

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

A zillion banks, the futile search for one set of rules

In a column by the Bloomberg editors, they discussed how in the aftermath of the financial crisis the global financial regulators agreed there should be one rulebook for all financial institutions.

As predicted by your humble blogger, this search for one rulebook with complex rules like the Basel III capital regulation has proved futile.  This was predictable because by definition the bank regulators could be easily played against each other by the banks.

The large, global banks understand that it is easy to trigger a race to the bottom in regulation by simply threatening to move their business and the taxes it pays to another country with less rigorous regulations.

There is only one regulation that can be applied globally.  There is only one regulation that does not trigger a race to the bottom, but rather a race to the top.

That regulation would be to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It triggers a race to the top because any bank that says it is unwilling to comply with this regulation is waving a large red flag saying it has something to hide.

What investor wants an exposure to a bank that is saying it has something to hide?  What country would let a bank in that says it has something to hide?

It is only transparency that is a regulation that can be applied globally.

Shortly after the financial crisis spread around the globe like a plague, the world’s leaders developed what they thought would be an antidote. 
Working through the Group of 20, they agreed to adopt common rules for all financial companies, no matter where they operated. 
The global system would be less risky, the thinking went, if derivatives dealing, an opaque $639 trillion market, worked more like stock trading on exchanges. If large banks had more capital, they would be able to absorb losses so taxpayers wouldn’t have to. And if money-market funds and other parts of the shadow banking system were more tightly regulated, there would be fewer hidden risks....
Do you notice that transparency into all the opaque corners of the financial system was not on the list and therefore the hidden risks that precipitated the financial crisis are not addressed?

Sure the regulators focused on "price" transparency, but price transparency is not crucial to the functioning of the global financial system.  What is crucial to the stability and functioning of the global financial system is "valuation" transparency.

Regular readers will recall that the investment process has 3 steps:

First, buyer and seller independently assess the risk of and value a security.  This is where valuation transparency comes in.  What is needed for valuation transparency is all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

Second, buyer and seller obtain a price from Wall Street for the security.  This is where the price transparency that the regulators are fixated on comes in.

Third, buyer and seller compare the price from Wall Street with their valuation of the security.  They engage in a transaction based on this comparison.

Without valuation transparency, step one of the investment process cannot be completed.

If step one cannot be completed, any purchases or sales of securities without valuation transparency are simply blindly gambling on the contents of a black box.
But the dream of convergence remains, well, a dream. Conflicting national and regional laws, regulations and accounting standards have blocked the world from getting on the same page on financial reform. This, in turn, has jeopardized the ability of regulators to work across borders to address the next crisis. 
Shutting down a large failing bank that, say, loses all its capital because of a trading strategy gone haywire isn’t possible without universal rules for resolving sick banks. Moreover, financial companies will be able to take advantage of regulatory arbitrage -- shifting operations to countries with the loosest rules. 
What happened? Let’s take a tour. 
In the U.S., regulators have been lobbied to a standstill....
In Europe, the situation is no more auspicious.... 
Another rift is between Europe and the U.S. -- this one over capital requirements. New rules being written in Basel, Switzerland, have been watered down after much bickering. The level is now set at 7 percent of risk-weighted assets, up from 2 percent. Still, it falls short of the 10 percent initially sought by the U.S., and way short of the 20 percent of total assets that some economists and academics recommend. France and Germany led the opposition, seeking to protect the interests of their biggest lenders, which would have needed to raise more capital than foreign competitors, Bloomberg News has reported. 
Not only is the global financial system no safer now than it was in 2008, it’s also clear that the project of convergence is badly stalled.  

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

Dodd-Frank swap data fails to catch JP Morgan's "Whale" trade

Bloomberg reports that the Dodd-Frank derivative rules are inadequate for helping regulators catch the existing JP Morgan "Whale" trade or any other similar position.

Regular readers are not surprised by this because Dodd-Frank was effectively written by and for Wall Street.  The derivative rules are an example of this as rather than use a simple direct solution they rely on the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

The simple, direct solution is to have each financial institution disclose to all market participants on an ongoing basis its current global derivative exposure details.

This makes it easy for the regulators to find risky positions (at a minimum, the regulators tap the analytical expertise of the market for help in finding and assessing these positions).

Instead, Dodd-Frank proposed complex regulations where the authors knew they were creating a data nightmare.  Remember, Wall Street wants to protect opacity and they knew what they allowed to be written into Dodd-Frank and the subsequent regulations would protect opacity by creating this data nightmare.

Dodd-Frank Act derivatives rules are failing to give regulators a full picture of the swaps market and wouldn’t help them detect a loss similar to JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)’s London Whale trades, according to Commodity Futures Trading Commission member Scott O’Malia. 
Swap-trade data the agency has been receiving since the end of last year from repositories including the Depository Trust and Clearing Corp. is inadequate to identify large positions and have overwhelmed government computer systems, O’Malia said... 
The data “is not usable in its current form,” said O’Malia, 45, one of the agency’s five commissioners. “The problem is so bad that staff have indicated that they currently cannot find the London Whale in the current data files.”... 
Dodd-Frank was enacted in part to give regulators better oversight of the $639 trillion global swaps market after largely unregulated trades help fuel the 2008 credit crisis. The CFTC and Securities and Exchange Commission were granted authority to write rules requiring trade information to be reported to so- called swap data repositories that function as central recordkeepers.

Hundreds of pages of rules governing the databases were among the first regulations completed by the five-member commission and began to take effect at the end of 2012....
Different swap dealers and trading counter-parties are using their own reporting formats because the government failed to specify standards, O’Malia said. 
“It means that for each category of swap identified by the 70-plus reporting swap dealers, those swaps will be reported in 70-plus different data formats because each swap dealer has its own proprietary data format it uses in its internal systems,” he said. “The permutations of data language are staggering. Doesn’t that sound like a reporting nightmare?” 
The CFTC’s computer systems are failing to handle the incoming data. “None of our computer programs load this data without crashing,” O’Malia said.

Friday, March 15, 2013

Barry Ritholtz: Bankistan vanquishes America (and the EU, Japan and UK too)

From Barry Ritholtz blog, the Big Picture comes a terrific summary of exactly where the global financial system is currently:
Is there a single doubt left in your mind? 
Are you still a believer in Rufus T. Firefly Jamie Dimon as the world’s smartest banker? 
Is there a scintilla of wonder left in your mind that the giant banks are legitimate? 
Have you come around to understanding — finally — what some of us have long understood about banks? 
Are you willing to accept the truth about these corporate behemoths — that they are a horrific combination of economically dangerous, criminally inept, led by pathologically lying CEOs? 
Do you harbor any doubts that the giant banks are anything less than ruthlessly efficient criminal enterprises? 
Can you — finally — admit that our bank-created financial crisis of 2008-09 has led us to where we are today? 
Do you understand the only options presented as a result of that — either corporate bankruptcy and nationalization or a completely artificial Fed driven recovery? (The third option was a Japan-like multi decade recession). 
Do you realize that the feeble recovery, the slow, deleveraging-driven process of gradual economic healing was the result of how our policy makers chose?
Our policy makers chose the Japan-like multi decade recession in which bank bonuses are protected at all costs and society, particularly through cuts in social programs like Medicare and Social Security, pays the cost.
Do you recognize that the world of banking is divided into two camps? 
On one side, there are those who understand that the giant banks must be broken up. They are dismayed at the large banks  under-capitalization, over-leverage and opacity.  
These folks have figured out that these banks are not only too big to fail, but are so large that they are too big to succeed, and that the best route is to let insolvent banks fail. They are unhappy that our finance sector is a trillion dollar black box. 
Insert call for banks to provide ultra transparency here.
They know that the majority of giant banks’ profits come from bailouts, and subsidies. This group is dismayed at the corruption of our political system by financiers.
Insert Jeff Connaughton and the Blob (aka, politicians, regulators, lobbyists and Wall Street) here.
They understands huge banks are anti-competitive, a blaspheme against capitalism.
Insert that we need to adopt the Swedish Model and require the banks to recognize the losses on the excess debt upfront here.
They are shocked about  corruption of even the most fundamental measures of interest rates such as LIBOR.
Insert bankers behaving badly behind a veil of opacity and the need for ultra transparency as sunlight is the best disinfectant and the source of confidence in the financial system.
They are stunned that bankers have overturned a bedrock, fundamental principle of our society — the rule of law rule — with the threat of disrupting the world’s economy if prosecuted for their crimes.
Insert need for requiring ultra transparency as it is only the market that can discipline the banks as they are too big for individual nations to control.
On the other side lay the bank apologists, corrupted politicians, and crony capitalists.  
They advocate the Big Lie of the financial crisis. They choose to ignore the facts and data that disprove their narrative. 
They continue to push the lies that the bailouts were a good investment. (They weren’t). 
They work against the Bipartisan consensus that the giant banks should be broken up.
Insert if banks provided ultra transparency, market discipline in the form of higher cost of funds would force them to reduce their risk and complexity (closing those thousands of subsidiaries that only exist to arbitrage regulations and taxes).

A likely outcome of reducing risk and complexity is that the banks would shrink significantly in size.
They ignore the many former bank CEOs who call for thebreak up of “Too Big to Fail” banks. 
They mandated that GSEs were banned from Lobbying, but they made sure that the big banks retained their influence peddling and hold on Washington DC. 
They no longer represent the voters of their districts, but instead are the elected representatives of Bankistan. 
And unless we do something — and soon — they will vanquish America.
This is also true of the EU and UK.

In the EU, we had the appointment of technocrats to carryout austerity in countries that should have had the banks take losses on their sovereign debt holdings. 

In the UK, we had the chancellor pleading with the EU not to limit bankers' bonuses.

Senate panel finds JP Morgan hid trading losses from regulators (and market)

Further highlighting the need for banks to be required to provide ultra transparency, MarketWatch reports that a US Senate Subcommittee found that JP Morgan ignored its own risk limits, manipulated risk models to avoid detection of its trades and hid trading losses from regulators (and the market).

Regular readers know that it is impossible for a bank to hide trading losses if it is required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this level of disclosure, market participants can see and track every position so banks cannot hide behind the veil of opacity provided by current disclosure requirements.

With this level of disclosure, market participants can exert discipline on the banks so that they do not exceed their own risk limits or manipulate risk models or hide losses.
A Senate subcommittee report on Thursday charged J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. with ignoring its own limits on risk taking, manipulating risk models to avoid detection and ignoring warnings from traders as the bank’s CEO, Jamie Dimon, intentionally withheld investment bank profit and loss data from federal regulators.
This does not effect just federal regulators.

Under the current disclosure rules where banks are "black boxes", market participants are dependent on the bank regulators to properly assess and communicate the risk of each bank.

If bank regulators communicate that the risk is lower than it really is (this is the result of JP Morgan hiding its losses), market participants do not raise the bank's cost of funds to reflect this risk (i.e., market participants give JP Morgan too much funding at too low a price).  This is a complete breakdown of market discipline.
The report was commissioned to examine a $6.2 billion credit derivatives trading loss last year at J.P. Morgan’s (NYSE:JPM) London investment office. The loss was partly attributed to a trader, Bruno Michel Iksil, dubbed the “London whale” for his large positions in credit derivatives. 
The report notes that the current status of the losses is unclear because J.P. Morgan dismantled the portfolio late last year, moving some funds to its investment banking unit....
The current status of the losses is unclear because JP Morgan is actively hiding it.

This action alone should compel Congress and the bank regulators to push through the requirement that banks provide ultra transparency.

Without ultra transparency, as shown by JP Morgan shuffling its losses neither the regulators nor the market know what the true level of risk is at the banks.
The panel, headed by Sen. Carl Levin, Democrat from Michigan, examined 90,000 documents, conducted over 50 interviews and reviewed over 200 taped telephone conversations and instant messages before issuing the bipartisan 300-page report. 
It includes dozens of examples in which trader warnings were ignored while risk managers at the institution appeared unaware of losses. It adds that the bank’s chief government regulator appeared oblivious in many instances or was denied critical information.
Denial of critical information...

That is the lesson about opacity from the current financial crisis and the JP Morgan trade.
However, the report does have one example showing that Dimon intentionally sought to cut off regulators from critical daily profit and loss trading data at the investment bank....
According to the report, in late January, 2012, as losses in the CIO office were increasing, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the bank’s chief regulator, said Dimon ordered the bank to stop providing a daily investment bank profit and loss report to the agency, because he believed it was too much information to provide to the OCC. 
However, Douglas Braunstein, J.P. Morgan Chase’s chief financial officer at the time, restored the daily report soon afterward at the OCC’s request. 
But, according to the OCC bank examiner, Scott Waterhouse, “Dimon reportedly raised his voice in anger” at Braunstein and disclosed that he had ordered the halt to the reports. Dimon said the OCC didn't need daily profit and loss figures for the investment bank, according to the examiner....
As always, bankers want opacity to hide what is going on.

Monday, March 11, 2013

BBC's Robert Preston searches for how to restrain bank risk taking

In a terrific column, the BBC's Robert Preston examines how both bank regulators and Basel capital requirements failed in the run-up to the financial crisis and asks what can be done to restrain bank risk taking.  Mr. Preston proposes a cap on bank leverage as a solution.

Regular readers know that the only way to restrain bank risk taking is to subject the banks to market discipline by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is not the size of the bank nor the leverage that it has, but the riskiness of all of its exposures that needs to be restrained.
Leverage is the ratio between what banks lend and invest on the one hand and the capital they hold to absorb potential losses on their loans and investments. 
So all else being equal, which they never are of course, a bank with a lower leverage ratio is a safer bank, because it has relatively more capital to protect depositors from losses.
But that doesn't necessarily mean that you should always place your precious savings in the bank with the lowest leverage ratio: the bank with the low ratio might be lending and investing in a particularly reckless and risky way; although it might have more capital than other banks, its losses might turn out to be massively bigger than those other banks. 
That's why a low leverage ratio is not a guarantee that a bank is safe..... 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Preston makes a very important point that a bank's leverage ratio is not necessarily a good indicator of how much or little risk it has.

Dexia confirms this.  Dexia had one of the lowest leverage ratios as measured by the Basel capital requirements in the EU shortly before it was nationalized.
Here are the important points: riskier loans and investments provide bigger rewards to banks, until the loans and investments go bad; and capital is expensive for banks. 
Which is why governments did not trust banks to behave prudently if they were subject to a simple gross leverage restriction. 
The assumption was that if every bank was told it could not lend - for example - more than 20 times its capital, large numbers of those banks would lend everything they could to reckless gamblers prepared to pay the highest interest rates, till gamblers and banks went bust. 
Instead governments hired regulators to check that banks were not taking insane risks. And the regulators invented the Basel system of risk-weighted capital ratios, which stipulates different leverage ratios for different categories of loan, in theory to take account of the riskiness of those loans. 
To put it another way, governments set up a system that in effect treated bankers as naughty children or ravenous puppies who could not be trusted not to eat too much of the dangerously fattening stuff - and regulators were to be the health conscious parents. 
The perhaps predictable result is that the bankers lived up to the low expectations of their common sense, and devised ever more clever ways to raid the biscuit tin without being seen. And the regulators turned out to be the worst kind of parents: ignorant of what was really happening in the world; prescriptive in all the wrong ways....
In the many hundreds of pages of Basel rules in their assorted iterations since the 1980s, each bank became an amalgam of hundreds of different leverage ratios, reflecting the perceived riskiness of the different categories of the loans it made and indeed of the age and size of the bank....
With good intentions on the road to ruin, regulators through the Basel rules were trying to provide a framework in which the risks and rewards of lending were properly captured. 
In practice they did precisely the opposite: the Basel system provided the following arguably insane incentives: 
1) banks had incentives to become bigger and bigger, to benefit from "advance" status that rewarded them with relatively lower capital requirements; 
2) banks had a disincentive to know their corporate and personal customers, but instead had an incentive to insist that each loan was a mortgage backed by property - thus encouraging a dangerous boom in property lending; 
3) banks had an incentive to become huge in trading loans and investments; 
4) banks had incentives to convert risky loans into opaque AAA bonds that appeared - spuriously - to be safe. 
In other words, regulation in the form of the Basel rules contributed directly to so much that is wrong with today's banks....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Preston has nicely summarized why when it comes to restraining bank risk taking the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight doesn't work.

Besides, all of the Basel capital requirements have been designed to provide opacity so that banks can increase their leverage and their return on book equity.
And the big banks could stick to the letter of the Basel rules and appear to be sound, when in fact they were massive, fiendishly complex and impenetrable institutions taking insane risks....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Preston makes the case for why banks should be subjected to market discipline and required to provide ultra transparency.

With ultra transparency, banks cannot hide behind the facade of appearing sound under either the complex Basel capital requirements or leverage ratios.

With ultra transparency, banks are no longer impenetrable institutions and their complexity and risks are exposed.
Now the 2008 Crash made it impossible any longer to pretend that the system of keeping banks on the straight and narrow was working. 
But government's response has been a bit skewed and odd. 
On the one hand, the collapse of the financial system has been taken as proof that bankers are incorrigibly, irredeemably naughty children. 
By contrast, there is a presumption that the regulators who got it so wrong - the useless parents - can be redeemed.
Who can forget former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner assuring us that the regulators had learned their lesson from the 2008 Crash?

Actually, the response of the regulators and policymakers was predictable because they are simply continuing with their existing policy of financial failure containment and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine.
One consequence is that the Basel rules that were so hopelessly flawed have been redrafted, and in the process have become even more complicated and impenetrable. 
And regulators have been given more powers to interfere in banks, to supervise them, and deter them from misbehaving. 
Some might say that the banks have been punished, and the regulators - who arguably were just as much at fault - have been rewarded.....
Actually, neither the banks or the regulators have ever been punished.
Which brings us back to where we started, the bloomin' gross leverage ratio. And it is to ask the question whether the global financial system, and the economies of developed countries like Britain, would be in such dire straights if banks had been subject to a simple leverage ceiling, limiting how much banks could lend in total, irrespective of the nature of their loans, as a multiple of their capital....
It brings us back to the issue of how to restrain bank risk taking as Mr. Preston has already acknowledge that a bank with a low leverage ratio can be carrying substantially more risk and incur far greater losses than a bank with a higher leverage ration and lower risk profile.
All that said, some might argue that this important debate still misses the big point. Because any leverage ratio is being seen - in Basel and Westminster - as a backstop, or only a bit of background insurance in case the Basel rules prove inadequate yet again. 
There is no serious discussion of the idea that a low leverage ratio should be the first line of defence, and that the Basel risk-weighting rules should be less prescriptive and more in the form of guidance....
The entire discussion needs to be taken off of leverage ratios or Basel risk-weighting rules.

The discussion needs to be focused on requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their exposure details.  It is the exposure details that reveal the risk a bank is taking.

Ultimately, it is the amount of risk that a bank takes that needs to be restrained.  And the best way to limit bank risk taking is to have the investors who are first in line for absorbing any losses exerting discipline to restrain bank risk taking.
All of which is perhaps to point out that the terms of the debate about how to sanitise the bloated financial system have been set by a regulatory community whose legitimacy should perhaps have been destroyed but which still seems (amazingly?) to be in loco parentis.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Preston confirms Jeff Connaughton's observation about why Wall Street always wins.  The Blob (aka, policymakers, regulators and Wall Street's lobbyists) set the terms of the debate.

Do you think it is by accident that transparency is not in the discussion by regulators and policymakers as a means for restraining bank risk taking?

Monday, March 4, 2013

Did the US securitization lobby just collapse?

Bloomberg reports that the American Securitization Forum is in disarray and on the brink of collapse after most of its Board of Directors quit.

Regular readers know that ASF is a sell-side dominated lobbying firm (it use to be a "subsidiary" of the sell-side's leading lobbying firm the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA)).  This is confirmed when one reads the list of members that quit the Board.

The fact that these members quit is a sign that ASF has outlived its usefulness and is now seen even by the financial regulators like the SEC as speaking only for the sell-side.

It is not surprising that the sell-side no longer feels the need to control this lobbying firm.

The few recent structured finance securities that have been sold have been done on terms that make them even more toxic to investors than the opaque, toxic sub-prime mortgage-backed securities at the heart of the financial crisis.

At the same time, a number of sell-side dominated data warehouse initiatives have come on line.  As a result, the sell-side can maintain opacity across the structured finance securities while wrapping themselves in the mantle of providing transparency.

The American Securitization Forum, the leading trade association for the securitization industry, fell into turmoil last week when most of the board resigned ....
The exodus puts the future of the trade group in question, said the people, who spoke on condition of anonymity because the dispute isn’t public. 
Members that quit include Bank of America Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), Deutsche Bank AG, Citigroup Inc. (C) and law firm Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, the people said....
Note: not a buy-side firm or firm beholden to the buy-side on the list.

Sunday, March 3, 2013

Capping banker bonuses is treating a symptom not cause of excessive risk taking by banks

In yet another display of treating the symptoms and not the cause of the problem, EU financial regulators have tentatively agreed to cap banker bonuses beginning in 2014.

The justification for capping bonuses is to limit risk taking by banks.

At best, capping bonuses is a one off solution for reducing risk taking.  The thinking behind why capping bonuses will work to reduce risk taking going as follows:  if bankers can earn less, then they have an incentive to take less risk and as a result they will take less risk.

Forgive your humble blogger for not having a lot of faith in this reasoning as its success if dependent on the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

Don't kid yourself that the rules on banker pay are not going to be complex.  Bankers receive compensation in many different forms including base salary, short-term cash bonus, long-term cash bonus and stock.

Simply changing one component of banker compensation is not going to change their incentive to take risk.  Bankers will still take risk and privatize the gains while socializing the losses by simply changing where in their compensation they are awarded for taking risk.

Regular readers know that you humble blogger despises any solution that relies on the use of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight when there is a better, simpler alternative.

In this case, the better, simpler alternative is to stop focusing on banker pay and instead focus on limiting their ability to take risk.

The way to limit their ability to take risk is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can assess the risk each bank is taking and adjust the amount and pricing of their exposure to each bank to reflect its risk.  When risk and cost of funds are linked, banks are subject to market discipline to reduce their risk profile.

For example, banks are subject to market discipline at the proprietary trading level.  When all market participants can see what a trader is gambling on, they can trade against the trader in such a way as to minimize the potential upside of the trade while maximizing the downside.  Market discipline acts to restrain, if not eliminate, proprietary trading.
"For the first time in the history of EU financial market regulation, we will cap bankers' bonuses," said the European Parliament's head negotiator, Austria's Othmar Karas, in a statement. 
"The essence is that from 2014, European banks will have to set aside more money to be more stable and concentrate on their core business, namely financing the real economy, that of small and medium-sized enterprises and jobs." 
The bonus cap was part of a package of financial laws hammered out between EU officials, the European Commission and representatives of the 27 member states in negotiations led by Ireland's Finance Minister Michael Noonan. 
The goal is to prevent bankers from taking excessive risks, which can shake the financial industry. 
"This overhaul of EU banking rules will make sure that banks in the future have enough capital, both in terms of quality and quantity, to withstand shocks," Noonan said. "This will ensure that taxpayers across Europe are protected into the future."
It is far from clear that capping banker bonuses will achieve this outcome.

What is clear is that requiring banks to provide ultra transparency would achieve this outcome.


Thursday, February 21, 2013

European banks resort to manipulation to make their capital ratios look better

In yet another article on the manipulation of capital ratios by the banks, the Wall Street Journal looks at how European banks are attempting to look better and disguise their true financial condition.

Regular readers know that the Basel capital requirements are an open invitation to the banks to manipulate their reported capital ratios.

By design, Basel capital requirements hide the true leverage and risk of the banks (I say this as an individual who helped to create Basel I and the reason for hiding the true leverage and risk was to allow the banks to earn a higher ROE - the regulators believed this was necessary to attract capital).

The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane notes what a good job the Basel capital requirements do at hiding leverage and risk when he observed that there are literally millions of assumptions that go into calculating Basel III.

Big European banks are boosting a key gauge of their financial health through largely cosmetic maneuvering, even as regulators in some countries try to crack down on the practice. 
The only way to crackdown on the practice is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can calculate capital ratios for each bank themselves.
Banks are recalculating the risks in their loan portfolios and trading books in flattering ways, a move that has the effect of raising their ratio of capital to "risk-weighted" assets—a metric that investors and regulators use to assess banks' abilities to absorb unexpected losses. 
While such maneuvering has been going on for years, analysts say it appears to be accelerating at some major European banks, which are under pressure to raise their capital ratios as new regulations known as Basel III start phasing in this year.

Thursday, February 14, 2013

Robert Shiller: Capitalism and Financial Innovation

At the 2012 CFA Institute Financial Analysts Seminar, Yale professor Robert Shiller laid out his views on capitalism and financial innovation.

Professor Shiller channeled his inner Gary Gorton, another Yale Professor whose work on informationally insensitive debt and safe assets your humble blogger has previously debunked, and talked about the benefits of financial innovation, in particular securitization.

According to Professor Shiller,
The ideas I posit are basically an appreciation of financial innovation. Today, cynicism and skepticism regarding financial innovation abound.
Your humble blogger is neither a cynic or a skeptic.  I simply subscribe to Yves Smith's maxim:  nobody on Wall Street is compensated for creating low margin, transparent products.

Financial innovation is primarily about how to create opacity so that the bankers can extract excess rent from investors who are gambling on the value of the opaque innovation rather than investing in a transparent investment.
Even former Fed chairman Paul Volcker contributes to these views. A couple years ago, he famously said that he couldn’t think of any useful financial innovation within recent memory besides ATMs. 
What Volcker says gets a big audience, but I couldn’t disagree with him more.
Which puts the burden on Professor Shiller to show a financial innovation that is actually useful for something other than extracting excess rent from investors (we'll get to that when he talks about securitization).
Our civilization is built on financial innovation. Finance begets and supports almost all activities; it makes the world turn in a modern and civilized way. 
Innovation is necessary if finance is to remain relevant as a means of achieving society’s goals. Perhaps what I have to say will help the finance community defend itself better and encourage finance professionals to assume personal responsibility for their role in making markets more efficient....
This is quite a statement as most people would think that it is the real economy and its inventions that built our civilization.

Finance certainly has a role in supporting the real economy, but it is not at all clear that it is financial innovation that lead the real economy and its inventions and built our civilization.
Securitization was an innovation that blew up in the latest crisis because the process was fraught with errors. 
The most notable error in securitization was in real estate—the subprime loan securitization, which blew up because people didn’t appreciate the risk that home prices would fall. 
It is misleading to say that people didn't appreciate the risk that home prices would fall as a drop in home prices is not what caused the losses on these securities.

What caused the losses was that the borrowers were not making payments on their mortgages.

Since the value of these securities is based on the ongoing payments on the mortgages, so long as the borrowers are paying on their mortgages, the security is performing regardless of what is happening to the price of the house the mortgage is secured against.

Perhaps Professor Shiller never heard the expression "opaque, toxic sub-prime mortgage-backed securities".


What made these securities so dangerous to investors' wealth was that opacity hid their true toxicity.

Specifically, the lack of observable event based reporting on all activities like a payment or delinquency on the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day made it impossible for market participants to know what they were buying or know what they owned.

Your humble blogger has demonstrated this numerous times using a Brown Paper Bag to represent a security using current industry disclosure practices and a Clear Plastic Bag to represent a security using observable event based reporting.

As a concept, however, securitization will survive because it is a means through which a large number of people benefit.
I happen to agree with Professor Shiller that securitization will survive.  The question is whether it will survive in its current opaque form that allows bankers to extract excess rent from investors or in a transparent form where it supports society.
Securitization is an innovation designed to solve an asymmetric information problem.
Actually, as Wall Street uses securitization, it is an innovation designed to create an asymmetric information problem.

The asymmetry is that Wall Street has the information on the current performance of the underlying collateral (they see these securities as if they are Clear Plastic Bags) and the rest of the market place has out of date performance information (they see these securities as they truly are, Brown Paper Bags).

This information asymmetry effectively lets Wall Street trade on tomorrow's news today.

As the financial crisis showed, Wall Street is more than willing to take advantage of this information asymmetry at the expense of the investors.
In the case of the mortgage market, mortgages and thus mortgage-backed bonds require a lot of analysis that many investors are unable to do, so without securitization, those investors would forgo investing in this market.
By securitizing mortgages, tranches of similar credit quality are created, allowing a large swath of the general investing population to buy mortgage-backed bonds that they otherwise would not buy. 
Professor Shiller's observation about the need for analysis reminds me of Professor Gorton's theory on informationally insensitive debt.

Professor Gorton cited bank deposits as an example of informationally insensitive debt.  There is one small problem with this example.  Bank deposits are insured and depositors are very sensitive to this fact.  Confirmation of this can be seen in Greece and Spain where doubts have arisen about whether deposit insurance will be honored and depositors have pulled their money.

Regular readers know that our financial system is based on the FDR Framework under which the government is responsible for ensuring that all useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner and investors are given the incentive to use this information as they are responsible for all losses on their investments.

Investors know this.  As a result, if investors cannot assess the information on the mortgages themselves, rather than forgo making an investment they simply engage third party experts who can assess the information.

Individuals hire portfolio managers.  Portfolio managers, if they or their organization cannot do the analysis themselves, hire third party experts.

The simple point is that if there is transparency and all the useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner, it is used by investors so they can make a fully informed investment decision for any type of investment.

Unfortunately, current securitizations are opaque and there is no information for investors to analyze.  As a result, buying or selling these securities is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a Brown Paper Bag.
Thus, mortgage securitization creates a financial market that allows many people to buy homes that they otherwise might not be able to buy, and it also lowers mortgage rates. 
Isn't one of the problems we have is that people bought houses that they couldn't afford?
The theory of finance involves asymmetric information as one of the elements that financial professionals have to engineer and design around. 
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Professor Shiller has effectively praised Wall Street for creating high margin, opaque products where Wall Street has an asymmetric information advantage.

What is good for society is when financial products are designed to eliminate asymmetric information.

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

In defending Fed, Ken Rogoff shows that the economics profession has nothing to offer for predicting or handling a financial crisis

In his column in the Guardian, Harvard Professor Ken Rogoff defends the Fed's inability to predict our current financial crisis and admits in discussing his own pre-Lehman speech that the economics profession has nothing to offer when it comes to preventing or predicting a financial crisis.

Regular readers know that this admission is not surprising given that this requires an understanding of how to apply transparency in the real world and not just assume that it will magically come into existence.

Transparency is the necessary condition for the invisible hand to operate properly.  Transparency is also  built into the FDR Framework on which our financial system is based.
Critics of the US Federal Reserve are having a field day with embarrassing revelations of its risk assessments on the eve of the financial crisis.... 
While the full-blown crisis did not erupt until the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, it was clear by the summer of 2007 that something was very wrong in credit markets, which were starting to behave in all sorts of strange ways. Yet many Fed officials clearly failed to recognise the significance of what was unfolding.... 
Various critics are seizing on such statements as evidence that the Fed is incompetent, and that its independence should be curtailed, or worse. This is nonsense. ... 
The Fed was hardly alone.
This is not an excuse.  The Fed was one of several financial regulators with a responsibility for understanding what was happening and preventing another financial crisis/depression.
In August 2007, few market participants, even those with access to mountains of information and a broad range of expert opinions, had a real clue as to what was going on.
Confession, your humble blogger was one of the few market participants who had a real clue as to what was going on and is still going on.
Certainly the US Congress was clueless; its members were still busy lobbying for the government-backed housing-mortgage agencies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, thereby digging the hole deeper. 
Our financial system is not set up to be dependent on the US Congress to see a financial crisis coming.

There are any number of market participants including the Fed who are suppose to be warning the US Congress that a financial crisis is coming.
Nor did the International Monetary Fund have a shining moment....
Am I the only one who spots a trend that any organization that is dominated by economists managed to miss predicting the financial crisis (other than the BIS and William White who the economics profession kicked to the sidelines)?

No.  The Queen of England spotted the same trend and asked at the London School of Economics why didn't the economics profession see it coming.
Central banks' state-of-the-art macroeconomic models also failed miserably – to a degree that the economics profession has only now begun to acknowledge fully. 
Although the Fed assesses many approaches and indicators in making its decisions, there is no doubt that it was heavily influenced by mainstream academic thinking – including the so-called real business cycle models and New Keynesian models – which assumed that financial markets operate flawlessly. 
Indeed, the economics profession and the world's major central banks advertised the idea of the "great moderation" – the muting of macroeconomic volatility, owing partly to monetary authorities' supposedly more scientific, model-based approach to policymaking.
Yes indeed, the models and the economics profession behind them failed miserably as stated by William White in a paper published by the Dallas Fed.
We now know that canonical macroeconomic models do not adequately allow for financial market fragilities, and that fixing the models while retaining their tractability is a formidable task. 
Frankly, had the models at least allowed for the possibility of credit-market imperfections, the Fed might have paid more attention to credit-market indicators as a reflection of overall financial-market conditions, as central banks in emerging-market countries do.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it provides a terrific illustration of why the economics profession does not understand what happened and why it hasn't been able to offer any useful advice on how to end the financial crisis and fix the financial system.

Perhaps it is not the models that need to be fixed to allow for the possibility of credit-market imperfections.

Perhaps what needs to be fixed is the economic professions understanding of how our financial system is actually designed to operate.

If you understand the FDR Framework, it is easy to see what has to be done to fix the financial system and end our current financial crisis.
Last but not least, even if the Fed had better understood the risks, it would not have been easy for it to avert the crisis on its own. The effectiveness of interest rate policy is limited, and many of the deepest problems were on the regulatory side.
This is pure and utter b.s. and reflects a lack of understanding of the Federal Reserve and the Fed's role in precipitating the financial crisis by undermining the financial system.

Specifically, the Fed is in charge of bank regulators who jealously guard their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information on each of the large banks. (I know they are housed in a building across the street from where the economists have offices, but these bank regulators are there to do something other than fill the office space below where the economists eat lunch.)

It is the Fed that is responsible for the opacity of these banks that has the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane calling the banks 'black boxes'.

It is the Fed that substituted the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

Please note, it is the Fed that is busy running stress tests on the large banks and pronouncing them solvent.  Who can challenge this when it is only the Fed that has access to the data needed to run these stress tests?

We headed into our current financial crisis with the Fed telling everyone that the level of risk at the large banks had actually gone down as a result of financial innovation.  Oops.

It is the Fed that created massive overexposure to the banks (investors, including other banks, heard the regulators say they were less risky).

It was the Fed that created the moral obligation to bailout unsecured bank debt holders.  After all, how can you expect the investor to take a loss after the Fed opines that the banks are low risk and highly solvent?
And calibrating a response was not easy. 
Actually, calibrating a response was very easy and a Bloomberg article on me in late 2007 showed just what it would take.  Simply put, it required bringing transparency to structured finance securities and all the other opaque corners of the financial system.
By late 2007, for example, the Fed and the US Treasury had most likely already seen at least one report arguing that only massive intervention to support subprime loans could forestall a catastrophe.  
The idea was to save the financial system from having to deal with safely dismantling the impossibly complex contractual edifices – which did not allow for the possibility of systemic collapse – that it had constructed. 
Such a bailout would have cost an estimated $500bn (£317bn) or more, and the main beneficiaries would have included big financial firms. Was there any realistic chance that such a measure would have passed Congress before there was blood in the streets?
Excuse me, but by late 2007, I had already presented an alternative to the US Treasury and Fed that would not have required a bailout and would have moderated the impact of these securities.

The idea for a bailout comes from the Wall Street firms and the bankers who wanted to protect their bonuses.

Please recall that under the FDR Framework in exchange for transparency investors become responsible for all losses on their investments.  By bringing transparency to the financial system, we would have seen where the losses were located.

More importantly, the FDR administration had the foresight to build into the financial system a special place to park losses:  the banks (a fact not missed by the bankers who wanted to protect their bonuses).

By design, banks can continue to operate with low or negative book capital levels.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, the taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.  As a result, there is no need to formally bailout the banks.

Instead, banks with low or negative book capital levels are simply prevented from paying cash bonuses to bankers or dividends until such time as they have rebuilt their book capital levels through retention of earnings.
Indeed, it was precisely this logic that me led to give a very dark forecast in a widely covered speech in Singapore on August 19 2008, a month before Lehman Brothers failed. 
I argued that things would not get better until they got much worse, and that the collapse of one of the world's largest financial firms was imminent. 
My argument rested on my view that the global economy was entering a major recession, and I had the benefit of my quantitative work, with Carmen Reinhart, on the history of financial crises.
I believe Professor Rogoff when he tells you what went into his thinking.  He confirms that there was nothing systematic in what he did that would help in identifying the next financial crisis or ending the current financial crisis.