Showing posts with label Regulators' Information Monopoly. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Regulators' Information Monopoly. Show all posts

Sunday, March 17, 2013

JP Morgan's Jamie Dimon confirms that requiring banks to provide ultra transparency would end their taking proprietary bets

Thanks to the US Senate panel investigation lead by Senator Carl Levin we have confirmation that requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures would be more effective than the Volcker Rule and end banks taking proprietary bets.

As discussed by Heidi Moore in her Guardian column,

Senator Levin asked a bank regulator with the OCC what had happened, how the regulator stopped getting information. 
The regulator said JP Morgan had stopped sending daily reports in August 2011. 
The OCC objected, and met with Dimon as well as CFO Doug Braunstein. 
At this meeting, the regulator said, Dimon said the bank was afraid of leaks, and that it was changing how it was distributing its information.
There is a reason that a bank is afraid of leaks.

If the market knows what your position is, it will trade against you to minimize the profitability and maximize the loss of the proprietary bet.

Equally importantly, if the market knows what your position is, it can see how risky your bank really is.  As a result, investors will charge more to provide funds.  This further minimizes the profitability and maximizes the loss from taking a proprietary bet.

The reason that a bank is afraid of leaks of its proprietary bets is precisely the reason that requiring banks to provide ultra transparency ends their taking proprietary bets.

Mr. Dimon confirms this and in doing so confirms that your humble blogger's version of the Volcker Rule should be adopted by the financial regulators.

Regular readers will recall that my version of the Volcker Rule is two paragraphs long.  Paragraph one says that banks are prohibited from taking proprietary bets.  Paragraph two says that to enforce this prohibition banks must provide ultra transparency.
Dimon allegedly hammered the OCC regulator on why he needed the information – which, at that time, was standard and expected information for the regulator to have. 
"As Mr Dimon said: why we weren't going to get it?" the regulator recalled. Braunstein said he had already sent the reports. Dimon turned on Braunstein, the regulator remembered. "Mr Dimon said it was his decision whether to send the reports to the OCC." 
"Did he raise his voice?" Levin asked. 
"He did," the regulator replied. 
This moment was damning, as damning as Ina Drew's moment of truth earlier. It showed the pattern of bullying that JP Morgan showed towards its own regulator, and that Dimon himself had a hand in it. He prevented a bank regulator from getting necessary information, and, according to the testimony, personally kept that information out of the regulator's hands in August 2011.
This moment also confirms for all time why banks must be required to provide ultra transparency.  It simply is not an option to let bankers only disclose the information that they want when they want.
Levin also pointed out that the bank misinformed the OCC on losses – at times, telling the regulator that the bank was losing only $580m on the risky trades when JP Morgan's own internal numbers showed a loss of $1.2bn. 
It was compounded because since last year, Dimon and Braunstein had both said the bank's regulators were fully informed – which, as we now know, they were not.
Regular readers of this blog know that our financial system only works properly when market participants are fully informed.

The only way to insure that market participants are fully informed about banks is to require ultra transparency.

Mr. Dimon will not object to do so.  After all, JP Morgan did it himself as he knew it was the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.

Can the same be said of Mr. Dimon's JP Morgan?

Friday, March 15, 2013

WSJ: misguided faith that rules and regulators can prevent next financial crisis

The Wall Street Journal added its support to your humble blogger's argument that the combination of complex rules and regulations will not prevent the next financial crisis.
The misguided faith that rules and regulators can prevent the next financial crisis is hard to shake, but this week brought a glimmer of hope.
Regular readers know that the combination that will prevent the next financial crisis is transparency and market discipline.

The parts of the financial system that failed in our current financial crisis are those that feature complex rules and regulatory oversight (think banks) and/or opacity (think structured finance securities).

The parts of the financial system that continued to function throughout the financial crisis without government intervention feature transparency and market discipline (think stock or non-financial corporate bond markets).
The chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision signalled that regulators might be starting to understand how their rules contributed to the 2008 financial crisis—and the damage these rules could do in the future.
It is not the rules that do the damage.

It is the regulators' information monopoly that does the damage.

The regulators' information monopoly prevents market participants from accessing all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner when it comes to financial institutions.

As a result, market participants cannot see how the rules are distorting the risk of the banks or, more importantly, how the banks are gaming the rules and adding risk.  Both lead to a financial crisis.
The Basel rules are the global standards that encouraged banks to hold mortgage-backed securities before the crisis and have since been re-written to favor investment in sovereign debt (such as Italian or U.S. bonds). 
Perhaps realizing how terrifying that sounds to taxpayers, Chairman Stefan Ingves said on Tuesday that the committee, whose members include U.S. financial regulators, has created a "high-level task force" to study the issues raised by Basel critics. 
Reformers like Andrew Haldane at the Bank of England and Thomas Hoenig at the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have pointed out that the complex Basel rules have been enormously costly yet were of little use before the crisis in determining which banks would run into trouble....
The failure of the Basel capital requirements in the run up to our current financial crisis should have forever ended the faith that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight can prevent a financial crisis.

The failure of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight in the run up to our current financial crisis should have caused us to look for an alternative.

The alternative that would have been found is the combination of transparency and market discipline.

Why would the combination of transparency and market discipline have been found?

Because our financial system is based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).  Which is simply the combination of transparency and market discipline.
Instead of relying on a straightforward calculation of how much capital banks hold, Basel has embraced complicated methods for assigning "risk-weights" to the various assets held by banks. 
The opportunity for banks is either to lobby regulators to favor particular assets, or to simply wait until regulators bless certain types of investments for political reasons, and then figure out how to construct the most Basel-friendly balance sheet. 
Either way, guess which firms are best at navigating this byzantine regulatory architecture?...
The combination of transparency and market discipline puts an end to banks gaming the rules.

It ends this gaming as the market is only concerned with the risk that banks are taking and not how the banks manipulate some meaningless rules.  If the banks are required to provide ultra transparency, the market will exert discipline based on the actual exposure details of the bank regardless of how the banks game the complex capital rules.
Mr. Ingves and his colleagues have a long way to go. 
Actually, Mr. Ingves and his colleagues will never get to the point where they acknowledge that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight will not prevent the next financial crisis.

They are regulators and this would be acknowledging a significant limitation to their capabilities.

Senate panel finds JP Morgan hid trading losses from regulators (and market)

Further highlighting the need for banks to be required to provide ultra transparency, MarketWatch reports that a US Senate Subcommittee found that JP Morgan ignored its own risk limits, manipulated risk models to avoid detection of its trades and hid trading losses from regulators (and the market).

Regular readers know that it is impossible for a bank to hide trading losses if it is required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this level of disclosure, market participants can see and track every position so banks cannot hide behind the veil of opacity provided by current disclosure requirements.

With this level of disclosure, market participants can exert discipline on the banks so that they do not exceed their own risk limits or manipulate risk models or hide losses.
A Senate subcommittee report on Thursday charged J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. with ignoring its own limits on risk taking, manipulating risk models to avoid detection and ignoring warnings from traders as the bank’s CEO, Jamie Dimon, intentionally withheld investment bank profit and loss data from federal regulators.
This does not effect just federal regulators.

Under the current disclosure rules where banks are "black boxes", market participants are dependent on the bank regulators to properly assess and communicate the risk of each bank.

If bank regulators communicate that the risk is lower than it really is (this is the result of JP Morgan hiding its losses), market participants do not raise the bank's cost of funds to reflect this risk (i.e., market participants give JP Morgan too much funding at too low a price).  This is a complete breakdown of market discipline.
The report was commissioned to examine a $6.2 billion credit derivatives trading loss last year at J.P. Morgan’s (NYSE:JPM) London investment office. The loss was partly attributed to a trader, Bruno Michel Iksil, dubbed the “London whale” for his large positions in credit derivatives. 
The report notes that the current status of the losses is unclear because J.P. Morgan dismantled the portfolio late last year, moving some funds to its investment banking unit....
The current status of the losses is unclear because JP Morgan is actively hiding it.

This action alone should compel Congress and the bank regulators to push through the requirement that banks provide ultra transparency.

Without ultra transparency, as shown by JP Morgan shuffling its losses neither the regulators nor the market know what the true level of risk is at the banks.
The panel, headed by Sen. Carl Levin, Democrat from Michigan, examined 90,000 documents, conducted over 50 interviews and reviewed over 200 taped telephone conversations and instant messages before issuing the bipartisan 300-page report. 
It includes dozens of examples in which trader warnings were ignored while risk managers at the institution appeared unaware of losses. It adds that the bank’s chief government regulator appeared oblivious in many instances or was denied critical information.
Denial of critical information...

That is the lesson about opacity from the current financial crisis and the JP Morgan trade.
However, the report does have one example showing that Dimon intentionally sought to cut off regulators from critical daily profit and loss trading data at the investment bank....
According to the report, in late January, 2012, as losses in the CIO office were increasing, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the bank’s chief regulator, said Dimon ordered the bank to stop providing a daily investment bank profit and loss report to the agency, because he believed it was too much information to provide to the OCC. 
However, Douglas Braunstein, J.P. Morgan Chase’s chief financial officer at the time, restored the daily report soon afterward at the OCC’s request. 
But, according to the OCC bank examiner, Scott Waterhouse, “Dimon reportedly raised his voice in anger” at Braunstein and disclosed that he had ordered the halt to the reports. Dimon said the OCC didn't need daily profit and loss figures for the investment bank, according to the examiner....
As always, bankers want opacity to hide what is going on.

Tuesday, March 5, 2013

UK regulator admits negligence on Libor, but says it wasn't it job to spot manipulation

The Guardian reports that the UK's Financial Service Authority admits that there was widespread knowledge of Libor manipulation among its employees, but says it wasn't a major regulatory failure because it wasn't its job to intervene.

Please re-read the highlighted text as it summarizes why financial regulators by themselves are not up to the task of exerting adequate discipline to control banker behavior or bank risk taking.

Financial regulators are not up to the task because of the way their job is defined.

Regular readers know that financial regulators do not express an opinion over any of the bank's security or loan exposures.

They do not do this because this would involve them in the allocation of capital across the financial markets.  It would also make them responsible for the performance of the banks.

Regular readers know that this definition of what is not the regulators' responsibility is not bad.  The reason it is not bad is there is a financial market participant who is suppose to care about the risk that a bank is taking with its various exposures.

The financial market participant responsible for exerting discipline on the banks over the risks they take and discouraging bad banker behavior are the investors.

However, investors cannot do this job so long as the banks remain opaque "black boxes" where only the financial regulators have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

As your humble blogger has said repeatedly since the beginning of the financial crisis, banks are currently not subjected to any market discipline because they operate behind a veil of opacity.

By requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, banks become subject to market discipline.

They become subject to market discipline because investors can independently assess the risk the banks are taking and adjust the amount and pricing of their investments in the banks to reflect this risk.  In addition, investors can catch bad behavior like the manipulation of Libor and other benchmark interest rates.

Staff at the chief City regulator should be cleared of negligence despite failing to spot clues that banks were manipulating interest rates to generate millions of pounds in bonuses and profits, an internal report into the Libor rigging scandal has ruled. 
The Financial Services Authority said staff did not have responsibility for monitoring Libor submissions, which were collected and published by a separate regulator, the British Banking Authority. 
An internal audit of 97,000 documents also found that 26 items related to Libor fixing and only two phone calls with Barclays gave a clear indication that the practice was widespread across the industry. 
The documents referred to artificially lowering the key interbank lending rate, a practice that made banks appear more secure during the financial crisis but also suggested that Libor was being manipulated by traders for profit at other times....

Andrew Tyrie, the Tory MP who heads the Treasury select committee, said the report showed the FSA was slow to act. 
"The FSA has admitted it had 26 warnings that this appalling practice was taking place. It also had other information that, taken cumulatively, ought to have set alarm bells ringing.
"It is concerning that no action was taken; that it wasn't tells us something may have been amiss at the FSA."...
Actually, what it says is that the veil of opacity hiding the banks' activities prevented interested market participants from having access to the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.
The London interbank rate (Libor) was collated by the British Bankers Association from submissions by UK banks. Unknown to most people outside a small group in the City, traders would set the rate according to their own requirements. 
In the three years before the financial crash it became commonplace for them to lift rates to increase profits and bonuses. Following the collapse of Northern Rock and the onset of the credit crunch, when banks were fearful of lending to each other and Libor was soaring as a result, bank rate setters came under pressure from traders and senior executives to depress rates supplied to the BBA. 
Between January 2005 and June 2009, Barclays derivatives traders made 257 requests to fix Libor and Euribor, the eurozone's equivalent. ... 
Turner said: "There are important lessons to be learnt about effective handling of information. A particularly important lesson is the need to have staff focused on conduct issues even when the world rightly assumes that the biggest immediate concerns are prudential; and vice versa. The new 'twin peaks' model of regulation will deliver this."
The important lesson is that regulators should not have a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner when it comes to banks.

Banks should be required to provide ultra transparency.

The new 'twin peaks' model of regulation will not solve the problem as regulators are not responsible for approving or disapproving the individual exposures on and off a bank's balance sheet.


Thursday, February 28, 2013

Despite Lord Turner's claim, it was not impossible to spot Libor manipulation

Reuters reports that in his testimony before the Parliament Commission on Banking Standards, Lord Turner, the head of the UK's Financial Services Authority, asserted that it was impossible to have had a police force big enough to spot the manipulation of Libor.

This statement is false and underscores why bank regulators by themselves will never be up to the task of policing the financial system.

Had the banks been required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, there would have been a police force big enough and motivated enough to spot manipulation of Libor and other benchmark interest rates.

Even if Libor and the other benchmark interest rates had been compiled in an opaque manner, market participants could still have double checked what the interest rates against the actual transactions entered into by the banks.

A discrepancy between the benchmark interest rates and what was actually occurring would have been noticed.

Why would market participants have been looking to see if there was a discrepancy between the benchmark interest rates and the transactions the banks actually engaged in?

Because the market participants who had an exposure to Libor and the other benchmark interest rates had a financial incentive to do so.

Regular readers know that the global financial system is based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

This framework provides a much bigger police force than just the financial regulators as every market participant has an incentive to look out for themselves.

One of the causes of our current ongoing financial crisis is the regulators' information monopoly when it comes to financial institution.  It was and still is only the financial regulators who have access to all the useful, relevant information for assessing the banks.

What the manipulation of the benchmark interest rates and the financial crisis have shown is that the financial regulators are not up to the task of replacing the market and all of its participants when it comes to policing the banks.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, I have repeatedly said that the financial regulators should give up their information monopoly, require the banks to provide ultra transparency and then piggyback off of the market's ability to both analyze the banks and to enforce discipline on the banks.

There is a role for financial regulators.  It is just not as a replacement for the market.  It is as a second line of defense should market participants fall prey to some popular delusion.

Regulators could not have spotted the "lowballing" of Libor interest rates during the financial crisis even if they had looked, Britain's Financial Services Authority said.
But financial market participants could and more importantly would have if they had access to each bank's exposure details.
The watchdog's chairman, Adair Turner, told a parliamentary commission on banking standards on Wednesday it was much easier to see abuses in share trading by using computers.
Same computers could have spotted Libor manipulation.  What is required is that the computers have the actual transaction data.
Manipulation of the London interbank offered rate (Libor) during the 2008 crisis, for which three banks - Barclays BARC.L, Royal Bank of Scotland and UBS - have been fined so far was far harder to see, he said. 
"There was no information on the trader manipulation," Turner told the commission....
There was no information disclosed to the market that would allow it to discover that traders were manipulating the benchmark interest rates.

The regulators had and still have a monopoly on the information that would have shown that the rates were being manipulated.  It is only the regulators who have access to each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The fact that the regulators were not up to the task of discovering the interest rate manipulation even after they had been told about it (see NY Fed and Tim Geithner), does not mean that the market would not have discovered it.
Neither the FSA, the CFTC - two of the regulators that have fined the three banks - or other regulators had ways to see the trader manipulation, Turner said. "We could not have got at it by intensive supervision. You just cannot have a police force big enough to spot all these problems."
When the banks are required to provide ultra transparency, there is a plenty big enough police force as every participant in the market has an incentive to police the banks.
While whistleblowing was one of the few ways to report illegal activity, Turner said trading room mentality was detached from the real economy as some traders see their job in front of a screen as being like playing a computer game, asking "Why shouldn't I cheat?".
With banks being required to provide ultra transparency, the answer to why shouldn't I cheat is because I will be caught! 

There is a reason that sunlight is the best disinfectant!

Monday, February 4, 2013

Italian bank derivative scandal offers more evidence that financial regulators need help

Reuter's is out with another article on Monte Paschi, the Italian bank involved in the derivative scandal, that offers still more evidence of why financial regulators are not up to the task of policing the financial system.

They need help.

The way to provide the regulators with help is to strip them of their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information about each bank and require each bank to provide ultra transparency and disclose its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, the market, with its ability to both analyze the financial institutions and discipline the institutions, can help the financial regulators.

Mario Draghi was informed of doubts raised by Bank of Italy inspectors about the Monte dei Paschi bank but had little control over what has been widely criticized as ineffective oversight of the scandal-hit lender, a senior BoI source told Reuters. 
The roots of the corruption and derivatives scandal at Monte dei Paschi all stem back to when Draghi, now president of the European Central Bank, was chief of Italy's central bank from 2006 to 2011. 
The Bank of Italy (BoI) says it did everything in its powers to oversee Monte Paschi, including forcing it to raise new capital and applying behind the scenes pressure to force out its executives, who left last year....
But the BoI, under Draghi's leadership, is under fire for not acting faster to sanction those managers and make its doubts public even though its inspectors had spotted the derivatives contracts at the centre of the scandal back in mid-2010....
As I have previously said, one of the problems with regulators having an information monopoly is that their disclosure to the markets seldom matches the reality of what is actually going on with a bank.
However, the senior BoI source stressed that the decision on launching a sanctions procedure, involving publicly blaming and fining bank officials, does not depend on the BoI governor and its five member executive board, but on the bank's inspectors and then a series of lower committees. 
"The inspectors are the only people responsible for initiating a sanctions procedure so if they don't find anything in the course of their inspection then it's not possible for the top management to start the process," said the source, who asked not to be named. 
"We instruct the staff to be absolutely free from any influence from us, to present exactly the case, so if a sanction is decided then they present a proposal to the board and the board decides on the actual implementation of the sanctions."
The highlighted text summarizes one of the reasons that the disclosure from financial regulators seldom matches reality.  By their very nature, financial regulators talk with one voice.

The text describes the bureaucratic process that the inspectors must go through to change what the financial regulator is saying knowing 100% of the time that the bank that is threatened with sanctions will lobby the board not to impose sanctions.  Please recall, Monte Paschi is one of Italy's most politically connected banks.
In the summer of 2010 BoI inspectors uncovered two opaque derivatives contracts that could cost Monte Paschi 720 million euros and are now at the center of fraud investigations, yet did not propose that sanctions be launched. 
That decision "had nothing to do with the board," the official said, though he added that Draghi was shown the inspectors report....
So Draghi shot down the inspectors' trial balloon.
That 2010 inspectors' report was leaked to the press and sparked much of the current criticism of the BoI because the sharp criticisms of Monte Paschi's accounts and operations made by the inspectors were not followed by pressing action....
A trial balloon that was a call for action.
"We may perhaps appear to be slow, but I think we are deliberate," the official said. He also stressed that although Monte Paschi failed to comply with the BoI's requests, the wrongdoing was already done at the time of the 2010 inspection. 
"What took place afterwards was to try to disguise the losses but it wasn't a recurrent or growing pattern of misbehaving," he said.
If banks were required to provide ultra transparency, the BoI could have taken all the time it wanted as the losses would not have been disguised to the financial markets.

For their part, market participants would have exerted discipline while the BoI was being deliberate.
The center-left has generally been more cautious, calling for more powers for the central bank rather than openly blaming it for laxity. 
The idea that the BoI lacks sufficient powers for effective oversight has become a common theme in the Italian press, with attention focusing on the fact that while it can replace the board of an offending bank, it cannot fire individual managers.
The BoI source made clear that giving the bank this power would be a welcome step, though he was careful not to acknowledge any blame for the Monte Paschi scandal. 
"If we get that power it will certainly be an additional tool but I don't subscribe to the idea that we don't have sufficient powers and that the exercise of our powers wasn't effective," he said.
Excuse me, the BoI exhibited an incredible degree of laxity by not disclosing what it knew to the market.  This failure to disclose meant that market participants did not have information they needed to properly assess the risk and solvency of Monte Paschi.  By definition, investors mis-priced any capital they invested in the bank since 2010.

In case anyone thinks that I am singling out the BoI for its failure to share with market participants information that these participants needed to properly assess the risk and solvency of each Italian bank, I have written numerous posts about financial regulators in other countries engaging in exactly the same behavior (the list includes, but is not limited to, Ireland, the UK and US).

The only way to prevent financial regulators from engaging in this behavior in the future is to strip them of their information monopoly and require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Wednesday, January 30, 2013

Italian bank derivative scandal ongoing reminder why banks should provide ultra transparency

As more information comes out about Monte Paschi's derivative scandal, the more the scandal confirms that banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Why?

Because bank regulators cannot be relied on to a) properly assess the risk of each bank, b) accurately communicate this risk to market participants and now c) effectively follow-up when banks engage in accounting irregularities.

As a result, market participants need the banks to provide ultra transparency so a) market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank and b) exert market discipline on the banks so that their accounting statements reflect the true financial condition of the bank.

From a Bloomberg article, we learn that even though it regulated Monte Paschi, the Bank of Italy did not think that it was responsible for 'policing' the bank even after it uncovered a previously unreported derivative transaction.

To say this is troubling is an understatement.

The Bank of Italy under former Governor Mario Draghi spotted accounting irregularities that allowed Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA to mask losses more than two years before the lender was forced to say it will have to restate profit. 
In 2010, “a problem came to light” on Monte Paschi’s booking of a structured deal called Santorini, Italy’s Rome- based central bank said in a report dated Jan. 28. 
The Bank of Italy alerted “other authorities” a year later and talks with those regulators, which it didn’t identify, haven’t concluded. It didn’t explain the delay in forcing the bank to disclose the information. 
The Bank of Italy’s account of Monte Paschi’s use of derivatives, released yesterday, calls into question its oversight of the world’s oldest bank, which is seeking the second taxpayer bailout in four years....  
“I would have expected the Bank of Italy to have requested transparency from Monte Paschi back in 2010 after reviewing the transactions,” said Carlo Alberto Carnevale-Maffe, professor of business strategy at Milan’s Bocconi University. “Hidden documents found recently wouldn’t have changed the substance of the original findings.”
Had all banks been required to provide ultra transparency, Monte Paschi wouldn't have "hidden documents" in the first place.

But assuming that Monte Paschi did not want to disclose the derivative deals, market participants, including regulators, could still have found out about these deals by looking at the disclosures made under ultra transparency by Monte Paschi's counter-parties.

With ultra transparency, the ability to look at the counter-parties' exposure details is a simple check and balance on each bank's disclosure of its exposure details.  This simple check and balance improves the reliability of each bank's financial statements.
The Bank of Italy said that as early as 2010 it sought daily liquidity reports from the lender as margin calls on Santorini drained funds. 
The regulator said a week ago Monte Paschi hid documents, impeding its analysis of the “true nature” of the company’s dealings. 
Regulatory oversight of Monte Paschi was “continuous and thorough” and the bank remains solid even with a capital shortfall and possible losses linked to structured deals, Finance Minister Vittorio Grilli said in parliament yesterday....
The highlighted text is a simple restatement of why market participants cannot rely on regulators to a) properly assess the risk of a bank and b) accurately communicate this risk.
Santorini helped Monte Paschi obscure a 367 million-euro loss from an older derivative contract with Deutsche Bank, according to more than 70 pages of documents outlining the deal and obtained by Bloomberg News. As part of the arrangement, the Italian lender made a losing bet on the value of the country’s government bonds. 
The bank’s new management is still trying to determine the extent to which Santorini and two other derivative deals were used to distort earnings. Monte Paschi never disclosed the effect of the 2008 deal in its annual reports. 
The bond bet was among transactions that drew the Bank of Italy’s scrutiny as early as 2009 as repo operations were “resulting in the absorption of high liquidity margins,” the regulator said in its Jan. 28 report....
The highlighted text shows why, in the absence of ultra transparency, bank financial statements cannot be relied on as they contain a) distortions in valuations that are done with regulatory approval such as suspension of mark-to-market accounting and creation of 'zombie loans' under regulatory forbearance and b) distortions in valuations by the banks themselves including not reporting the impact of derivative exposures or as shown by JP Morgan's Whale trade, understating losses.
Monte Paschi told the Bank of Italy in 2011 the structured deals were part of its “carry trade” strategies and weren’t submitted to its administrative body.... 
Italy’s third-largest bank and prosecutors are now reviewing three money-losing derivative deals, Santorini, Alexandria and Nota Italia. 
The lender said it discovered in October that former managers signed a “mandate agreement” with Nomura Holdings Inc. (8604) to cover losses on a mortgage-backed derivative called Alexandria with new, riskier derivatives. 
The hidden document, proving the link between the unprofitable Alexandria derivative with the new one, should have led the bank to book a loss of more than 200 million euros on the original transaction, instead of spreading it over the 30- year maturity of the new deal....

The Bank of Italy’s role isn’t to “police” Monte Paschi, the current governor, Ignazio Visco, 63, said Jan. 25 in an interview with Bloomberg Television in Davos, Switzerland. 
The Bank of Italy “summoned the senior management of Monte Paschi” and of the foundation that is its biggest shareholder in November 2011 “to make them face up to their responsibilities and ask Paschi to quickly and definitively turn around the way it conducts its business,” the report said.
The role of policing the banks actually belongs to the market.  However, market participants cannot police the banks so long as the financial regulators have a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

By ending the regulators' information monopoly and requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, market participants have access to the information they need to actually police the banks.
Monte Paschi risks further losses of as much as 500 million euros on a 2010 securitization of about 1.5 billion euros of real estate loans, dubbed “Chianti Classico,” weekly Panorama said today, citing documents that include minutes of board meetings from November and December of last year. ... 
“New derivative accounting policies are needed in Europe to avoid similar situations in the future,” said Giuseppe Di Taranto, professor of financial history at Rome’s Luiss University. “There’s too much room for interpretation under current rules.”
The new derivative accounting policy is that banks must disclose all of their derivative exposures.


Thursday, January 24, 2013

Italian bank derivative scandal highlights need for banks to disclose their exposure details

While the financial industry cheerleaders have gathered at Davos to declare that the financial crisis is over, a derivative scandal involving Italy's oldest bank reminds us that the crisis won't end until the global banking system is fixed and this will not occur until banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As Zero Hedge put it succinctly,
Naturally, the implication is that after 4 years of endless bailouts and "recovery", nobody has any clue still just what is on Europe's bank balance sheets. 
And the further implication is that if [the Italian bank involved in the derivative scandal] was doing it, everyone else was, of course, doing it, and much more dirty laundry is soon set to be uncovered...
As reported by Reuters,

European Central Bank President Mario Draghi is facing criticism over a scandal involving loss-making derivatives trades made by troubled Italian lender Monte dei Paschi di Siena while he was Italy's central bank governor.... 
Former Economy Minister Giulio Tremonti said in a tweet that it was "stupefying" that in his role as supervisor of Italy's banking system Draghi had failed to discover or prevent the trades, which took place between 2006 and 2009....
Current Economy Minister Vittorio Grilli avoided mentioning Draghi directly but stressed that it was not the government but the central bank that was responsible for bank supervision. 
"It wasn't us that did the controlling," he told reporters. "On the checks, all I will say is that it is the responsibility of the Bank of Italy." 
Underlining the gravity of the crisis, Italian President Giorgio Napolitano said Monte Paschi's latest problems were a "serious issue" but that he had "full confidence in the Bank of Italy." 
On Wednesday the central bank tried to deflect any criticism, saying the nature of the trades had been "kept hidden" and were only recently divulged by new management appointed last year to turn the bank around....
Please re-read the highlighted text again as it nicely summarizes why all banks must provide ultra transparency.

Until banks provide ultra transparency, market participants need to assume that the banks are hiding something.  Otherwise, they would disclose everything.
The deals under scrutiny are the so-called "Alexandria" trade with Japanese bank Nomura, the "Santorini" trade with Deutsche Bank and a derivative called "Nota Italia", with an unspecified bank.... 
Analysts fear eventual losses could be higher and have urged Monte Paschi to come clean on any other potential surprises....
Let me repeat that there is no reason to believe the management of Monte Paschi or any other banks when it says it has come clean unless the bank provides ultra transparency.
The effectiveness of the Bank of Italy's supervision is being increasingly questioned, despite the fact the country's lenders complain it is more stringent than other European regulators in its monitoring of the Italian financial industry. 
"One has to wonder what the Bank of Italy was doing given all the visits they've paid to Monte dei Paschi in recent months," said a source close to the situation. 
"If what they came here to look at was only the information publicly available in the bank's financial statements, they could have done that from Rome."
One of the lessons of the financial crisis is that market participants cannot rely on the financial regulators to provide an accurate assessment of the risk of a bank.  Even if the regulators properly assess the risk, they have concerns about the safety and soundness of the financial system that prevent them from communicating how bad the situation might be.

Requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency ends the dependence of market participants on the financial regulators.

There is a significant benefit to doing this.  Market participants become responsible for all gains and losses on their exposures as the have all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess the risk and solvency of each bank and make a fully informed investment decision.

Translation:  no more moral hazard over bailing out investors who relied on the financial regulators' representations about the solvency of a bank in making their investment decision.

Wednesday, January 23, 2013

Davos: Paul Singer versus the global financial regulators

One of the central themes of this blog is the always harmful substitution of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight for transparency and market discipline.

This theme played out in a Davos panel discussion involving Paul Singer from Elliott Management.

As reported on twitter by @Anthony_Reuben, a journalist on the BBC business desk:
Paul Singer says he sends his staff to find out about financial health of banks and they come back and shrug. Wants more disclosure. 
Mr. Singer's staff confirms the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane's observation that current bank disclosure standards leave them resembling 'black boxes'.

And why does Mr. Singer want more disclosure?  Because as an investor Mr. Singer knows that he should be responsible for all gains and losses on his exposures to banks.

Hence, he is looking for all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so he can independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision.

For banks, the useful, relevant information is their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  What your humble blogger calls ultra transparency.

Why isn't this information available?
Prudential boss: global banking standards difficult because banks in countries where banking system didn't blow up are not interested.
It is not the banks that are uninterested, but it is the global financial regulators clinging to their information monopoly who are uninterested.

Here we are five years after the beginning of the financial crisis and Paul Singer's staff still cannot access all the useful, relevant information for making an investment in a bank nor is there any movement afoot to ever require banks to provide this information.

Everyone knows that ultra transparency is the "gold standard" for bank disclosure.  But it is more than that.  It is also gives banks in countries that adopt ultra transparency a competitive advantage.

The competitive advantage comes from the simple fact that ultra transparency allows market participants to independently assess the risk of each bank.  Since everything is disclosed, market participants can do a better job of assessing the risk and as a result can reward these banks with a lower cost of funds and a higher stock price.

All those banks in countries that don't require ultra transparency are at a competitive disadvantage.  Market participants know from the lack of disclosure that the banks are hiding something.  As a result, market participants punish these banks with a higher cost of funds and a lower stock price.

Ultra transparency is actually an easy global banking standard to adopt as there are no banks who would want to be at a competitive disadvantage.

So what do we have instead of ultra transparency?

We have the pursuit of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

This takes the form of legislation like the Dodd-Frank Act that was written by and for the banks (recently, I discovered that the Volcker Rule is essentially toothless as it was written so it doesn't apply to position held for more than 90 days ... proprietary bets can last months), we have financial regulators pursuing Basel III capital regulations that are too complex to enforce and we have policymakers pursuing ring-fencing.

This pursuit of the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight shows that the first lesson of the financial crisis was not learned.  The first lesson is that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight failed.

The combination just didn't fail, it failed in a catastrophic manner as shown by our ongoing financial crisis.

Equally importantly, the financial crisis revealed that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight is prone to catastrophic failure.

Unlike Tim Geithner who believes that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight should be given another chance, your humble blogger does not believe in gambling with the stability of the financial system when it is your humble blogger and the other taxpayers who are going to be called on to bail out the financial system when this combination predictably fails again.

Ultra transparency restores stability to the financial system and does away with gambling financial stability on the success or failure of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

Saturday, January 19, 2013

Neil Irwin: 2007 Fed transcripts show how little they understood

In a Washington Post column, Neil Irwin confirms what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis, despite how much they "knew", the transcripts from the 2007 Fed meetings and conference calls reveal "how little they understood".

There is a difference between access to data and the ability to transform this data into meaningful information and an appropriate policy response.

I have tried to make the point that the Fed's actions showed it didn't and still doesn't understand what has gone wrong in the financial system in different ways on this blog including
  • I have talked about group think and the idea that data was discounted because it didn't fit with the economic models that Fed officials think describe the economy and how it works.
    • For example, I cited economist Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author, who criticized the Fed for not understanding that the problem was bank solvency and not liquidity.  
  • I have talked about Economics 101 and how the necessary condition for the invisible hand to operate properly is that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.  While the Fed officials knew about opacity, their statements showed they didn't understand the implications for
    • Predicting the path of the financial crisis.  It moved through all the opaque corners of the financial system from structured finance securities to bank balance sheets.
    • Understanding what policy responses would work to end the financial crisis.  
  • I have talked about the Blob, Jeff Connaughton's phrase for the combination of politicians, financial regulators, lobbyists and Wall Street, and how the Blob influences policy choices for the benefit of the banks.  
    • One aspect of the Blob is the notion of regulatory capture as evidenced by the Fed turning to the banks for advice on how to respond to the financial crisis caused by the banks.
Regardless of why the Fed didn't understand what was and is still happening, the lesson to be learned is that the Fed should not have had then and most definitely should not have going forward a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

For example, the Fed had information on the exposure details for the large US banks that was not available to other market participants, including the banks.  As a result, when the Fed failed to properly assess what was happening, the Fed couldn't properly convey to the other market participants the risks.

Compounding the failure to properly assess what was happening was the determined effort by the Fed officials in the 2007 transcripts to issue press releases that would not 'scare' the financial markets.

By taking away the Fed's information monopoly and making all the useful, relevant data about banks and structured finance securities available to all market participants in an appropriate, timely manner, market participants can then independently assess the risks and make fully informed investment decisions.

Investment decisions where they know they are responsible for all gains and losses (there are no bailouts for their failure to accurately assess the risk of a bank or security under the FDR Framework principal of caveat emptor (buyer beware) on which our financial system is based).
In making sense of the newly released transcripts from the Federal Reserve’s 2007 policy meetings, let’s get one thing out of the way first. Prediction is hard, as Yogi Berra said, especially when it’s about the future.
Making an accurate prediction is virtually impossible if, like the Fed officials, you don't understand what is happening.

However, if like your humble blogger you do understand what is happening, then making accurate predictions becomes much easier.
That is doubly true when you add in the way things work in financial panics, in which outcomes are highly nonlinear—that’s to say, when one bank or segment of the money markets starts to experience problems, it can rapidly become a domino effect that, as we learned, can spread in unpredictable ways that bring down the entire financial system.
Actually, it spread in a very linear fashion through the opaque corners of the financial system starting with structured finance securities and ending with the 'black box' banks.
But here’s the thing. I really thought we would see more foresight in these transcripts than there is to be found. 
I was covering the Fed at the time for the Post, and subsequently reported and wrote a book that covers the events of 2007 ... 
I had the sense that even as leaders of the central bank projected public calm, and confidence that there would be no recession (let alone the near-depression that in fact materialized), that behind closed doors they saw what direction things were heading. It isn’t so. 
Sure, there were hints of clear-headedness....
It should also be added that there’s not much reason to think the crisis could have been prevented if the Fed had been quicker on the draw. If you honestly believe that we would have skirted recession if the Fed had cut rates by 0.5 percentage points at the December 2007 meeting, not 0.25 percentage points, you have a distorted sense of the power of a central bank to shape the course of the economy.
Actually, the way to have moderated the impact of the financial crisis was to bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  Bloomberg quoted me as saying so in December 2007.

Here we are more than five years later and transparency has not been brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  As a result, the real economy has and is still experiencing the full impact of the financial crisis.
But I expected to see much more evidence in these transcripts that the Fed officials had a good grasp of how the fissures that were emerging in the summer of 2007 could spiral out of control.
That’s not to say they should have been predicting the gory details of what was to come. It would have been hard to see exactly what path the crisis would take... 
I did expect, though, that Fed officials would show more evidence of understanding the possibility that the entire financial system had become a house of cards built on mortgage securities that were anything but secure, with all sorts of financial institutions over-levered and overly dependent on assets that were near-impossible to value. 
And I expected them to understand that once a problem that deep begins correcting itself, it can spiral into all sorts of dangerous directions. Which this one did.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Irwin nicely summarizes what you humble blogger has said the problem with the financial system was and still is.
In other words, I hoped that when Fed officials publicly dismissed the chances of a recession as late as the fall of 2007, they were acting like parents who try to keep news of a layoff from their children; that they might be fully aware of how dangerous things were becoming, but didn’t want to scare anyone. 
I was wrong about that. 
Theirs was, at its core, a failure of creativity. It was an inability to see how these moving pieces of an infinitely complex financial system and economy could interact to create a very bad situation.... 
Their failure is much worse.  They failed to understand how our financial system actually works.  They failed to understand that our financial system is based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor.

The Fed officials were aware of opacity in the financial system, they had no idea what the implications of this opacity were.
One lesson here is that our public officials, even the hard-working, highly intelligent ones, are far from demi-gods. They have the same blind spots and tendency toward analytical failures of anyone else. 
Secrecy allows public officials, whether in the world of monetary policy or others like national security, to create a Wizard of Oz like illusion of holding great power, of maneuvering levers with information in hand that mere mortals can only dream of. 
When reporters interview a high official, there is often a subtext the high official aims to convey: If you knew what I know, you would understand the supreme wisdom of my actions. 
Seeing what the Fed officials were saying privately, to each other, in 2007 is a reminder that this isn’t always so, and just because a person has more information, it doesn’t mean he or she has the right answer.
Thank you Mr. Irwin for making the case for stripping the financial regulators of their information monopoly and restoring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Friday, January 18, 2013

Volcker and Ludwig: Relying on financial models to set loan-loss reserves is flawed

In their Wall Street Journal editorial, Paul Volcker and Eugene Ludwig praise the accounting board for adopting the idea that banks should reserve for losses expected over the life of the loan, but criticize the implementation because of its heavy reliance on financial models.

Actually, the real problem with the implementation is that it is subject to being gamed by bank management.

So long as banks are not required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, bank management can play games whether the loan loss reserves are set based on financial models or 'experience and judgement'.

The reason that the reserves can be gamed is that in the absence of ultra transparency market participants have no way of independently assessing how closely the reserves for losses expected over the life of the loan actually tracks with how the bank's loans are actually performing.

For example, what are the reserves set aside for the 'zombie' loans that are the product of regulatory forbearance and the banks engaging in 'extend and pretend'?
The good news: The board recognizes that its existing rules on the Allocation for Loan and Lease Losses may have worsened the 2008 financial crisis. These rules limited bank reserves to those that are already "incurred." This all but ensures that banks' rainy day funds will be too skinny, particularly in periods when credit markets are under stress. 
Worse yet, limiting loss estimates to events that have already occurred makes the allowance for loan and lease losses procyclical—reported earnings are too high in good times and losses hit hardest in bad times.
The FASB's draft proposal to reform these rules incorporates what is known as the "Current Expected Credit Loss Model." It is meant to expand reserves to reflect losses that are expected over the life of the loan, and it is a big improvement over the existing regime. 
But as it stands, the proposal could create risks for the financial system.
Risks that can only be removed by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.
In an effort to ensure that everything is "auditable," the proposal ties the loan-loss reserve to what the accounting profession will decide is an acceptable "model." While the proposal is well-intentioned and makes clear that various models can be used, this model-driven approach is dangerous. 
Modeling by its very nature is backward looking. It would push bankers to address only risks that are readily and historically quantifiable. It would discourage them from acting on forward-looking but less well-defined risks, like broader economic trends, that can be just as damaging. 
A focus on modeling also unnecessarily favors large institutions. Banks with smaller loan books and more hands-on experience have some advantages when setting their reserves.... 
While we do believe it is critical to allow bankers to use their expertise in estimating losses for reserve purposes, we also believe it is critical that they disclose to regulators and the public both the methodology they employ to set reserves and the quarter-by-quarter decisions on reserves they actually make. That way investors can follow a bank's net revenue picture before and after loan reserves are set aside, and the methods they use to establish these reserves.
Disclosing how the reserves are set without providing ultra transparency is simply an invitation for the banks to game the system.

JP Morgan report on trading losses offers illusion of transparency

In his Bloomberg column, Jonathan Weil examines many of the ways that the JP Morgan report on it CDS trading losses overs the illusion of transparency while firmly protecting the veil of opacity that surrounds the bank.

For example,
Another example: During an April 13 call with analysts, about a month before JPMorgan began acknowledging the magnitude of its losses, Douglas Braunstein, JPMorgan’s since-demoted chief financial officer, said “those positions are fully transparent to the regulators” and that the bank’s regulators “get the information on those positions on a regular and recurring basis as part of our normalized reporting.” ...
True, the positions are fully transparent to the regulators and to no one else in the market.

However, it is not the regulators' job to value the positions or to approve JP Morgan's valuation of the positions.

It is the role of JP Morgan's accounting firm to agree or disagree with how JP Morgan values its positions as this valuation directly effects the question of "does JP Morgan's financial statements provide an accurate picture of its financial condition".
The report also included this bizarre disclaimer: “This report sets out the facts that the task force believes are most relevant to understanding the causes of the losses. It reflects the task force’s view of the facts. Others (including regulators conducting their own investigations) may have a different view of the facts, or may focus on facts not described in this report, and may also draw different conclusions regarding the facts and issues.” In other words, we haven’t been told the whole story. 
You have to like Mr. Weil's summary of JP Morgan's disclaimer about exactly what is in the report.
Sure, there were colorful anecdotes, like this: “April 10 was the first trading day in London after the ‘London Whale’ articles were published. When U.S. markets opened (i.e., towards the middle of the London trading day), one of the traders informed another that he was estimating a loss of approximately $700 million for the day. The latter reported this information to a more senior team member, who became angry and accused the third trader of undermining his credibility at JPMorgan. 
“At 7:02 p.m. GMT on April 10, the trader with responsibility for the P&L Predict circulated a P&L Predict indicating a $5 million loss for the day; according to one of the traders, the trader who circulated this P&L Predict did so at the direction of another trader. 
After a confrontation between the other two traders, the same trader sent an updated P&L Predict at 8:30 p.m. GMT the same day, this time showing an estimated loss of approximately $400 million. He explained to one of the other traders that the market had improved and that the $400 million figure was an accurate reflection.” 
Who were those masked traders? How could JPMorgan employees be so willing to manipulate their numbers to achieve an outcome at odds with the facts? And how does a day’s loss go from $5 million to $400 million? Nothing is very clear, which seems to have been by design.
Mr. Weil has just highlighted why banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Among its many benefits, ultra transparency ends banks manipulating their valuation numbers.

Update
In its usual concise style, ZeroHedge nails how the JP Morgan report highlights the problem with opaque banks as the loss at JP Morgan goes from $5 million to $700 million and back to $400 million.
And this is the opacity that one gets when a firm sets off to expose what should otherwise be perfectly public information in the first place. 
One does start to wonder: if America's banks go to such great lengths to mask how ugly the behind the scenes truth really is, is thetrue undercapitalization of the US banking sector in the trillions... Or tens of trillions?

Thursday, January 17, 2013

BoE's Andrew Haldane: have we solved 'TBTF'? No!

In an interesting article on VoxEU, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane asks the question of have we solved the Too Big to Fail problem and answers with an emphatic 'no'.

Regular readers are not surprised by this answer as the only way to solve the TBTF problem is to require all banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The reason ultra transparency solves the TBTF problem is it subjects the banks to market discipline.  Specifically, with this information, market participants can truly assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure accordingly.  The result is to link each bank's cost of funds to its risk.

Linking risk to each bank's cost of funds will put pressure on the banks to reduce their risk.  Pressure that banks will respond to by becoming smaller and more easily understood.  In short, market discipline will cause the TBTF to break themselves up into smaller units with less risk that the market places a higher value on (please note that this happened with corporate conglomerates).

Today, a bank's cost of funds is not related to its risk because the banks are in Mr. Haldane's words 'black boxes'.

Leading up to the financial crisis, market participants understood the banks were black boxes and turned to the financial regulators for insight into the risk of each bank.  The reason market participants turned to the financial regulators is they have a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information on each bank in an appropriate, timely manner.  Recall that the financial regulators have examiners at the banks 24/7/365.

One lesson from the financial crisis is that even if the examiners correctly assess the risk of each bank, the financial regulators will not communicate this risk to the market.  There are a number of reasons this occurs including political pressure and concerns over the safety and soundness of the financial system.

That financial regulators will not communicate the risk of each bank to the market has been shown time and time again with the bank stress tests.  We had banks throughout Europe collapse shortly after the financial regulators said they were well capitalized.  In the US, we had at least two banks who required a subsequent bailout.

It is interesting to note that besides the banks there is another part of the financial system that is Too Big to Fail:  the financial regulators.  Without ultra transparency, market participants are dependent on the financial regulators.  When the financial regulators fail, and they did because we had a bank solvency led financial crisis, the taxpayers bailed them out.

Not only that, but the policy responses since, like the Dodd-Frank Act, have increased the size and role of the financial regulators and made them even more TBTF.

Like the TBTF banks, financial regulators and their role is also cut down to size by requiring ultra transparency.  With ultra transparency, market participants can see if the financial regulators are doing what they are suppose to do.

Mr. Haldane's answer to the question of have we solved the TBTF problem:

No. 
That is not my pessimistic verdict; it is the market’s. Prior to the crisis, the 29 largest global banks benefitted from just over one notch of uplift from the ratings agencies due to expectations of state support. Today, those same global leviathans benefit from around three notches of implied support. Expectations of state support have risen threefold since the crisis began. 
This translates into a large implicit subsidy to the world’s biggest banks in the form of lower funding costs and higher profits. Prior to the crisis, this amounted to tens of billions of dollars each year. Today, it is hundreds of billions (Haldane 2012). In other words, if the market’s expectations are to be believed, the regulatory response to the crisis has not plugged the 'too-big-to-fail' sink.... 
What is certainly true is that, in the light of the crisis, regulation to quell the too-big-to-fail problem has come thick and (at least in regulatory terms) fast. This reform effort falls into roughly three categories: 
(a) Systemic surcharges: of additional capital levied on the world’s largest banks according to their size and connectivity. ... Last year, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) agreed a sliding scale of systemic surcharges for the world’s largest banks. The highest surcharge was set at 2.5% of capital. 
Yet therein lies the problem. Based on my estimates (Haldane 2012), a charge levied at this rate would leave the majority of the systemic externalities associated with the world’s biggest banks untouched. The reduction in default probabilities associated with lowering leverage by a percentage point or two would not offset the higher system-wide loss-given-default associated with the world’s largest banks. The systemic tax is being levied at rates which are too low...
If the banks were required to provide ultra transparency, there would be no need for complex rules like systemic surcharges.

Market participants could independently assess the banks' default probabilities, also known as risk.  The result would be the banks would be under pressure to reduce their risk as their cost of funds increases and makes much of their risk taking unprofitable.

As your humble blogger has said repeatedly, the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight is an inferior substitute to transparency and market discipline.
(b) Resolution regimes: In principle, orderly resolution regimes for banks could lower the collateral costs of a big bank defaulting, thereby tackling at source these systemic externalities. .... A key component of these plans is the ability to impose losses on private creditors – so-called 'bail-in' – rather than have those losses borne by taxpayers. 
As with systemic surcharges, the issue here is not to so much the bail-in principle, but its application in practice. Bail-in, whether of big banks, sovereigns or companies, faces an acute time-consistency problem. Policymakers face a trade-off between placing losses on a narrow set of tax-payers today (bail-in) or spreading that risk across a wider set of tax-payers today and tomorrow (bail-out). 
A risk-averse, tax-smoothing government may tend towards the latter path – and historically has almost always done so, most notably in response to the present financial crisis. Next time may of course be different. But the market is sceptical.... 
As I have repeatedly said, the idea of bail-in completely misses how our financial systems were designed based on the FDR Framework.

Regular readers know that the FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

There is no need to be discussing bail-in or bail-out under the FDR Framework because market participants know under the principle of caveat emptor that they are responsible for losses on their exposures.

By definition under the FDR Framework, all unsecured debt and equity holders are subject to losses if a bank is insolvent and the financial regulators close it.

The reason these debt and equity holders will exert discipline on bank management to limit the risk of the bank is to avoid these losses.

Please note, the FDR Framework only holds true so long as the governments ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  Given the financial regulators information monopoly, this is not currently true for banks.  Hence, the discussion of bail-in versus bail-out.  A discussion that is rendered moot by requiring banks to provide ultra transparency.
(c) Structural reform: One way of lessening that dilemma may be to act on the scale and structure of banking directly. Several recent regulatory reform initiatives have sought to do just that, notably the “Volcker rule” in the US, the 'Vickers proposals' in the UK and, most recently, the 'Liikanen plans' in Europe. While different in detail, each of these proposals shares a common objective: a degree of separation or segregation between investment and commercial banking activities. 
In principle, these ringfencing initiatives confer both ex-post (improved resolution) and ex-ante (improved risk management) benefits. Because they act on banking structure, they have a greater chance of proving time-consistent. While this is a clear step forward, those benefits are only as credible as the ringfence itself. The issue raised by some is whether, in practice, the ring-fence could prove permeable. Without care, today’s ring-fence could become tomorrow’s string vest. 
Again, ultra transparency addresses the issue of structural reform.  As I have previously said, regulation has two components:  the rule and the enforcement.

The Volcker Rule says that banks should not take proprietary bets.  By making the banks provide ultra transparency, market participants can assess the bank's positions and see if they are in compliance.

Oh, by the way, ultra transparency will also improves the banks' risk management.  Recall that market discipline has a bias towards banks taking less risk.
If each of these initiatives is necessary but none is individually or collectively sufficient to tackle too-big-to-fail, what is to be done? 
One solution might lie in strengthening these proposals. For example, re-sizing the capital surcharge, perhaps in line with quantitative estimates of the 'optimal' capital ratio (Miles et al (2012), Admati et al (2011)), would be one option for bearing down further on systemic externalities. 
Another more radical option, mooted recently by a number of commentators and policymakers, would be to place size limits on banks, either in relation to the financial system as a whole or, more coherently, relative to GDP (Hoenig (2012), Tarullo (2012)). 
Proposals of this type typically face two sets of criticism. 
The first, practical issue is how to calibrate an appropriate limit. ....
The second, empirical issue is whether size limits would erode the economies of scale and scope which might otherwise be associated with big banks....
What is to be done is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Contrary to what the banking industry lobbyists say, there is no limit on transparency as there are a number of market participants who are capable of assessing the exposure details from the global banks (not the least of which are the competitor global banks).
Too-big-to-fail is far from gone. It is even more important it is not forgotten.
And it won't be gone until the banks are required to provide ultra transparency so that they can be subject to market discipline and forced to reign in their risks.

Friday, January 11, 2013

Regulators call for quick fix of Euribor (the EU version of Libor)

The Wall Street Journal reports that regulators are calling for quickly fixing the Euribor benchmark interest rate so that banks can no longer manipulate it.

Naturally, given the choice between the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight or the combination of transparency and market discipline, the regulators went the path of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

Regular readers know the combination of transparency and market discipline solves the problem with manipulation of Libor, Euribor and similar benchmark interest rates.  In addition, the combination prevents it from recurring.

With transparency in the form of banks disclosing on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, banks with deposits to lend can assess the solvency and risk of banks looking to borrow.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the interbank lending markets.

With this form of transparency, Libor, Euribor and similar benchmark interest rates can be based on all or a subset of the actual trades in the unsecured interbank lending market.

Compare and contrast this eloquent solution to the fixing the problem and restoring trust to the benchmark interest rates with the solution proposed by the financial regulators.

Two European regulators on Friday said that the continent's most prominent benchmark interest rate has "significant weaknesses," and urged the banking group that oversees the rate to quickly revamp it. 
The regulators' conclusion represents the latest blow to the euro interbank offered rate, or Euribor, and the European Banking Federation that oversees it. The rate, which serves as the basis for trillions of euros worth of loans and other financial contracts, has been tarnished by banks' attempts to manipulate it and by the recent decisions of a handful of banks to stop being involved in setting the rate. 
The European Banking Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority, both of which are pan-European Union agencies, have been conducting a review of Euribor and its governance since last fall. On Friday, they called for the Brussels-based banking federation to implement a number of changes within six months designed to improve Euribor's credibility. 
The regulators also stopped short of calling for Euribor to be run by an organization that is independent from the banking industry—a change that British regulators last year demanded for the London interbank offered rate, or Libor, which is controlled by the British Bankers' Association.....

Chief among the regulators' recommendations is changing the composition of Euribor's steering committee, which currently consists of bank officials. In the future, the regulators said, the panel should be made up primarily of outsiders. 
But European Banking Federation Chairman Andrea Enria said those spots shouldn't be filled by regulators, and that it will be left up to the EBF to decide who replaces bankers on the panel. 
"We are pleased to see that the agencies' recommendations go in the same direction as the preliminary steps we have already taken to reinforce the index-setting process and governance," Guido Ravoet, the EBF's chief executive, said in a statement. 
Euribor is calculated daily by aggregating data from about 40 banks, which each estimates what it would cost a theoretical "prime bank" to borrow money from a peer. 
Banks have repeatedly complained to the EBF that they are unclear about precisely how to define terms such as "prime bank," according to the minutes of the meetings of Euribor's steering committee. 
On Friday, the European regulators instructed the EBF to clarify such definitions, but didn't provide any guidance about how the group should do that.

Monday, January 7, 2013

FSA: 'honest and open statement' of bank balance sheets

In a classic oxymoron, the UK's Financial Services Administration is conducting an 'honest and open statement' of bank balance sheets in which it is going to report to everyone what it finds.

Hello, but an 'honest and open statement' of bank balance sheets would be to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As Matt Taibbi asserted in an article on the US bank bailouts, the US government has adopted the policy of lying about the condition of its largest banks.

Why should the UK government be any different?

After all, if the UK government is telling the truth, then it has nothing to hide and should be willing to require banks to provide ultra transparency.

The failure to provide ultra transparency is a big red flag that says 'do not trust the FSA honest and open statement of bank balance sheet findings'.

As reported by the Guardian,

Whether the rally [in bank stocks] is sustained will depend on the outcome of the "honest and open statement" of bank balance sheets currently being carried out by the FSA – another test of whether regulators will hold a hard line in the face of an ailing economy.

Monday, December 31, 2012

Banking industry's year of shame ends

A Guardian column by Heather Stewart and Jill Treanor highlights all the shameful activities that banks engaged in that came to light during 2012.

Included on the list is manipulating a benchmark interest rate, Libor, money laundering and mis-selling financial products like insurance and interest rate swaps.

By themselves, each of these activities is bad.  Together, these activities highlight the need for a radical cultural change not only at the banks, but at their regulators too.

The last time there was a need for such a radical cultural change was during the Great Depression.  What emerged to change the culture was the FDR Framework and a focus on ensuring that market participants had access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they could independently assess and make a fully informed investment decision.

The reason for this focus is that it brings about a radical cultural change as sunlight is the best disinfectant.

What allowed the bank culture to slide back to where numerous parts of the banks were engaged in shameful activities was the re-emergence of opacity in the financial system.  Opacity re-emerged because regulators both failed to ensure transparency and encouraged its re-emergence.

For example, bank regulators jealously guard their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for each bank.  Regulators have access to each bank's exposures 24/7/365.

This is the data that market participants, including competitor banks, need if they are going to assess the risk and solvency of each bank and properly price their exposures to each bank.

In the 1930's, banks routinely disclosed this data as it was the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.  By the 1980s, banks no longer made this disclosure.

The SEC failed in its responsibility to ensure that bank exposure data was made available to all market participants.  It did so with the blessing of the bank regulators.

By protecting their information monopoly, bank regulators enhanced their importance to a properly functioning financial system.  With the monopoly, bank regulators were relied on for analysis of the risk of each bank, communicating the risk of each bank to other market participants and disciplining the banks.

The financial crisis that began in 2007 revealed the wide path of destruction created by regulator driven opacity.  It is this opacity that let banks engage in manipulating Libor for example.

It is this regulatory driven opacity that also prevents the financial system from recovering.  Without transparency into each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants cannot assess the risk of each bank and whether it is solvent or not.


Thursday, December 6, 2012

Deutsche Bank: Show of strength or fiction shows ultra transparency necessary

A follow-up article in the Financial Times on Deutsche Bank potentially hiding $12 billion in losses confirms the Bank of England Financial Policy Committee's call for banks to come clean about the losses hiding on and off their balance sheets.

Regular readers know that for banks to come clean requires that it is necessary they provide ultra transparency.  Without the ongoing disclosure of a bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, it is impossible for market participants to independently confirm that the bank has come clean about its losses.

In the absence of ultra transparency, investors have reason to doubt claims by either the bank's management or the bank's regulators that the bank's balance sheet has been cleaned up?  The mere fact that the bank is unwilling to provide ultra transparency raises a bright red flag saying that the bank has something to hide.

Confirmation that the investors see this bright red flag comes from the frozen interbank lending market. Banks with deposits to lend know they cannot assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow because of the lack of ultra transparency and therefore they are unwilling to lend.
Josef Ackermann was bullish. Even as the global financial industry was reeling, the Deutsche Bank chief executive began 2009 by boldly declaring that his bank had plenty of capital and would return to profit that year. 
In an investor call that February, Mr Ackermann said he would provide “as much clarity as we can on all the positions” to refute the suggestion that banks such as his had “hidden losses, and one day that will pop up, and then ... we need more capital and the only way to go – to ask for capital – is to see the governments”. 
Please note what Mr. Ackermann claimed the bank would do:  provide as much clarity as we can on all positions to refute the suggestion the bank has hidden losses.

The only way to have met this standard would have been to provide ultra transparency and disclose the individual exposure details.  Since the beginning of the financial crisis, Deutsche Bank has never provided ultra transparency and the individual exposure details.

As a practical matter, I am not sure that they have provided any other type of disclosure beyond what is necessary to maintain the bank's balance sheet as a "black box". 
During the public relations campaign waged by Deutsche, its share price recovered from €16 in January to €39 at the end of April 2009, when it reported pre-tax profit of €1.8bn for the first quarter. 
But three of the bank’s former employees say the show of strength was based on a fiction. 
In a series of complaints to US regulators, two risk managers and one trader have told officials that Deutsche had in effect hidden billions of dollars of losses. 
“By doing so, the bank was able to maintain its carefully crafted image that it was weathering the crisis better than its competitors, many of which required government bailouts and experienced significant deterioration in their stock prices,” says Jordan Thomas, a former US Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement lawyer, who represents Eric Ben-Artzi, one of the complainants....
A series of complaints that Deutsche Bank naturally dismisses, but that investors need to take seriously as the lack of ultra transparency casts doubts on its financial reporting and solvency.
By 2012, many of the trades have matured or have been unwound. With credit markets back to more normal levels, Deutsche’s dalliance with exotic derivatives is no longer life-threatening. A person familiar with the matter says that for all the sturm und drang over gap risk, at no time was the collateral jeopardised.
First, how do we know that Deutsche's involvement with exotic derivatives is no longer life-threatening given the lack of ultra transparency?  Perhaps the bank has a different exposure.

Second, that many of the trades have matured or have been unwound does nothing to address the fact that without ultra transparency no one can tell if Deutsche is solvent or not.
But the three former employees told the SEC that this outcome does not mean the allegations should be forgotten. 
“If Lehman Brothers didn’t have to mark its books for six months it might still be in business,” says one of the men. “And if Deutsche had marked its books it might have been in the same position as Lehman.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as in confirms the second important reason why ultra transparency is necessary.  With ultra transparency banks are subject to market discipline so that they do not take on risks that might ultimately result in their being in the same position as Lehman.