Showing posts with label Frozen Capital Markets. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Frozen Capital Markets. Show all posts

Sunday, January 20, 2013

Fed chose not to understand fundamental driver behind financial crisis

Why has the Fed chosen not to understand that opacity and with it the freezing of major areas of the capital markets is the fundamental driver behind our current financial crisis?

In an earlier post (see here), your humble blogger looked at the transcripts from the Fed's 2007 meetings and conference calls and noted that Fed officials knew about the problem with opacity in large areas of the financial system.  Yet, they effectively ignored it by assuming it away.

For example, in response to the freezing of the subprime mortgage securities market at the beginning of the financial crisis, the Fed chose to provide liquidity to the capital markets until such time as the market figured out how to value and price these opaque securities.

Of course, without transparency, the market will never be able to figure out how to value and price the opaque subprime mortgage-backed securities.

The Washington Post's Neil Irwin (see here) suggested that the reason the problem of opacity was and still is ignored is that very bright people can have access to data that the rest of the market participants would love to have, but still not understand how to interpret this data to make it useful information for purposes of setting policy and addressing the financial crisis.

I have written numerous posts that would support Mr. Irwin's observation.  These posts cover group think (many of the leading central bankers were at MIT at the same time), failure to understand that transparency is the necessary condition for the proper operation of the invisible hand, and regulatory capture by the banking industry directly and indirectly through politicians.

However, I don't think these posts provide a satisfactory answer to why the Fed continues to choose not to understand the role of opacity in the current financial crisis.

Princeton's Paul Krugman (see here) provides more insight into the Fed's actions as he saw the 2007 transcripts providing personal vindication for the economic policies that he has been suggesting.

He too completely skips the importance of opacity.  He seems to think that because he said that the fiscal stimulus program was too small to restore the economy to health that this indicates his analysis of the problem is correct.

In reality, as shown by Japan over the last 2+ decades, the burden on the real economy from servicing all the excess debt in the financial system can offset a tremendous amount of fiscal stimulus.

Professor Krugman prediction was directionally correct, but this was not because of his insight into the driver of the economic crisis, but rather because the impact of this driver was in the same direction he predicted.

The reason I said that Professor Krugman provides more insight into why the Fed chose not to understand that opacity was the fundamental driver of the current financial crisis is that his self-serving analysis reminded me of my conversations with various Fed officials ranging from governors to economists.

Regular readers know a) I worked at the Fed in the early 1980s and b) that I was very vocal about the impending financial crisis and how to moderate its impact.

Naturally, I reached out to the Fed and these officials.

Each of my conversations fit perfectly into the Professor Krugman view of the world.  Each of these officials effectively told me that opacity could be ignored because their economic model of how the economy worked explained what the right policy response was.

I recall one governor hearing my description of opacity (I used my example comparing structured finance securities to a Brown Paper Bag) and the response was the Fed could predict the US economy using data that was available on a quarterly basis and therefore a Brown Paper Bag was not opaque.

This mind set continues to this day.  It is clear that the Fed officials will cling to the belief in the infallibility of their economic models.  After all, they have modified their models to include a banking sector (something that prior to the crisis the models assumed was irrelevant).

What we have learned in the 2007 transcripts and since is that the Fed's economic models could not predict the US economy as they didn't predict the financial crisis and they have not predicted the success or failure of the various fiscal and monetary policies implemented since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Despite this track record of failure, the Fed continues to chose not to understand the role of opacity as the fundamental driver behind our current financial crisis.

As shown by Professor Krugman, his comments reflect the simple reality that economists prefer working with their models and the assumptions behind these models and ignoring inconvenient real world facts.

Real world facts tend to make the models messy.  Although, in this case, the real world fact of opacity actually makes the model much simpler.  After all, their economic models are built on the assumption that the invisible hand is operating properly.

The existence of opacity gives them an excuse to say why their models haven't worked and that the models cannot be expected to work until transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Update
From a quest post on Zero Hedge by Gary Evans of Global Macro Monitor:

In his lecture at the Latsis Symposium 2012 “Economics on the Move” in Zurich,  Nobel Laureate Joe Stiglitz nails the fundamental problem and crisis of modern macroeconomics, which failed to predict the financial crisis. 
If you say…what is good science is prediction… and you can’t predict the most important event in 75 years, what good are you?  
In particular, it might be very nice you can talk about the likelihood of an one tenth increase in GDP growth rate…and you miss a major economic downturn….or worse, they said the things can’t happen… 
Here are the money quotes: 
We all know the shock in this crisis…was a credit bubble and we have had those credit bubbles since the beginning of capitalism…So it was remarkable the intellectual bubble led people to believe there were no such thing as credit bubbles when there was 200 years of history of that…..How could people be so stupid? …The theory was with well functioning financial markets, spreading risk, diversifying risk, risk is contained.  They came to believe the models and that’s always dangerous.
Actually, it is not that they came to believe the models so much as they did not know that the models are based on the idea of transparency.

The models assume that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

The models and the economic system failed because large parts of the financial system are opaque.  This includes both structured finance securities and bank balance sheets.

Sunday, December 30, 2012

Issuance of debt by banks at lowest level in a decade

The Financial Times reports that issuance of debt by banks is at the lowest level in a decade.  Particularly hard hit has been unsecured bank lending.

Regular readers know that since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, market participants have been unable to determine which banks are solvent and which banks are not.  As a result, the unsecured bank debt market is effectively frozen and the secured bank debt market is slowly freezing over.

Bond issuance by banks is at its lowest level in a decade... 
Global debt issuance by banks stands at $1.26 trillion – the lowest since 2002 – according to figures from Dealogic, the data provider. 
The amount of senior unsecured debt, a mainstay of bank funding, is at its lowest since 2003. 
Issuance of covered bonds – debt secured against pools of loans that carries an additional bank guarantee – has also fallen, and the total raised via asset-backed securities continues to be a fraction of pre-subprime crisis levels....

Friday, August 24, 2012

Bank unsecured debt market remains unhealthy

The Wall Street Journal reports that despite a shortage of fixed income investments the bank unsecured debt market essentially remains closed.

Regular readers know there are two reasons the bank unsecured debt market is not functioning.

First, to restore investor interest, banks need to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  Investors need this information if they are going to be able to independently assess the risk of each bank and adjust the amount and price of their exposure.

Without ultra transparency, investors are being asked to blindly bet on the contents of a 'black box'.

Second, central banks have been pursuing policies that favor banks using the central banks as a source of low cost financing.  The result of this has been that banks have pledged most, if not all, their high quality collateral to the central banks.

With banks using so much central bank funding, investors in unsecured bank debt have become even more deeply subordinated than they normally would be.  This increase in risk also drives up the interest rate that the investors need to be paid to compensate them for this risk.

Europe's banks have jumped on the August market rally to sell a type of debt that had been their main source of funding before the sovereign-debt crisis, but analysts warn that the recent rush doesn't signal a return to health, with some deals struggling to attract much demand. 
Banks issuing euro-denominated senior, unsecured bonds-a type of debt backed by a bank's credit-worthiness rather than collateral-have raised €8 billion ($9.98 billion) this month, according to Société Générale data. That compares with nothing last August, and just €4.5 billion the year before, the data show..... 
And with banks repaying bondholders at a faster rate than they are selling new debt, investors are finding themselves flush with cash that they urgently need to put to work, boosting the appeal for banks to sell bonds....
One of the under-appreciated features of setting up funds to invest in specific types of securities is that regardless of what is happening in the market for these securities, these funds will continue to invest so long as they have investable cash.

Managers of these funds say they continue to invest regardless of the risk of the securities because their investors have made the asset allocation decision and want exposure to these securities.

More cynically, managers of these funds invest because telling their investors that they are blindly betting with the investors' cash would not be good for job security.
The recent string of bond deals also shows only the biggest names among Europe's banks have the trust of investors. "We've seen a lot of issuance but it has been top-tier institutions coming to market," Roberto Henriques, a bank credit analyst at J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., said....
Actually, this reflects the belief that the biggest banks are Too Big to Fail and the investors will be bailed out.

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

BoE's Mervyn King calls for 'radical reform of the Libor system'

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Bank of England's Mervyn King has written a letter to the world's leading central banks asking them to dinner to discuss 'radical reform of the Libor system'.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has already suggested how to reform the Libor system in a simple way that is consistent with the intent of what the Libor interest rate is suppose to show and that market participants can have confidence in.

Specifically, I have recommended that banks are required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The reason for doing this is so that Libor could be based off of all the actual trades.

One of Mr. King's main concerns in the letter is what happens if there are no trades for a particular Libor currency or maturity.

There are two reasons that there might not be trades.  First, the interbank lending market is frozen.  Second, banks elect not to trade in that currency or maturity.

The interbank lending market has frozen repeatedly since the beginning of the financial crisis because banks cannot assess the risk of any other bank.  As a result, the banks cannot determine the proper amount or price for their exposure to any other bank and therefore, the banks do not lend.

The reason for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose all of their exposures and not just their funding exposures is that ultra transparency provides the data that each bank needs in order to assess the solvency of every other bank and determine the amount and price they are willing to lend to each of the other banks.

Ultra transparency is the key to unfreezing the interbank lending market and to preventing it from freezing again.

So long as the interbank lending market is functioning, there are a number of ways to determine a Libor interest rate when a specific currency or maturity is not traded.  For example, if there are trades available to calculate a Libor interest rate for both a shorter and longer maturity than the maturity that was not traded, it is easy to mathematically determine an interest rate for the non-traded maturity.

Your humble blogger is agnostic to which of these solutions is adopted.  What is important is that there is ultra transparency so that the interbank lending markets do not freeze in the future.

Wednesday, May 30, 2012

Banks shrink from counterparty risk as EU financial crisis gathers steam

Both Reuters and the Wall Street Journal had articles (see here and here) on how banks, including Chinese banks, are reducing their exposure to other banks because they cannot assess the risk of the other banks.

Regular readers know that in the absence of ultra transparency where banks disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that the interbank lending market is prone to freezing.

This is further confirmation of that fact.

From Reuters,

Alarmed by Europe's latest debt crisis and its unpredictable outcome, banks are getting increasingly picky about who they do business with for fear of taking on risky exposures to rivals who could be about to be whipsawed by bad debts. 
Greece's slow-motion crash towards default, coupled with the poor health of banks in Spain, have left banks wondering if any of their fellow institutions will end up holding catastrophic losses and will be unable to meet their obligations.
Only the requirement that banks provide ultra transparency fully addresses this issue.  It is only with this data that can assess whether any of their fellow institutions will end up holding catastrophic losses and will be unable to meet their obligations.
All banks then are becoming increasingly cautious about their dealings with counterparties perceived to be in the firing line - making it harder for those firms to do their everyday business, throwing grit into the cogs of the financial system and ultimately crimping prospects for economic recovery. 
"Banks are particularly wary of counterparties at the moment and no compliance officer is going to take on exposure to a counterparty just because historically they have a strong track record," said Christopher Wheeler, an analyst at Mediobanca.
Being wary translates into a freezing of the credit market and a disruption of the real economy.

This disruption to the real economy was completely preventable.  It has been well known since the beginning of the credit crisis, which also saw the interbank lending market freeze because banks could not tell who was solvent and who was not, that the solution was to require ultra transparency.

The fact that policymakers and financial regulators have not made ultra transparency a requirement is an example of the efforts of Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team as well as regulators gambling with financial stability to protect their information monopoly.
In the fast-moving banking sector, failures can happen quickly. Just ask anyone involved with MF Global, which collapsed overnight in October last year after clients and trading partners pulled back amid rumours of a trading loss in the European sovereign debt crisis. 
Three years previously, Lehman Brothers became the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history, after it was brought to its knees by a combination of losses, nervous clients and credit rating downgrades. 
Failures like those can leave massive losses splattered across the financial system, reason enough for compliance officers to rein in risky exposures to their peers. 
For any bank, loss of trust is potentially fatal and can catch it in a pincer movement where it rapidly finds it harder to borrow money, while being asked to put up more costly security in its daily trading. 
There are signs in the market this is already happening. 
"Banks are being very cautious over who they do business with. They are avoiding counterparties they perceive to be risky ... and this attitude will become more extreme if market conditions deteriorate further," said Wheeler.
An added problem is that many of the markets in which investment banks participate are virtually invisible to regulators.
The problem is not that the markets are invisible to regulators.  The problem is that each bank's positions are not visible to their banking fellows.  Without this data, the other banks cannot make an assessment of each bank's riskiness.

From the Wall Street Journal,
Some of China's biggest banks have cut off a handful of their European counterparts from borrowing and derivatives trading as they seek to reduce their exposure to the simmering crisis on the Continent, people familiar with the matter said....

The moves by the Chinese banks, which occurred late last year and early this year, aren't believed to have had a significant impact on the funding or trading positions of their European counterparts, analysts say, given the still-limited role played by the Chinese in global funding markets and derivatives trading.... 
Many analysts view the Chinese banks' pullback from the European counterparties as a sign of improvement in how they manage risks posed by banks they do business with.
At the height of global financial crisis in 2008, some Chinese banks, including Bank of China, got burned because they failed to unwind their exposure to now-defunct Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. fast enough.
"The Lehman bankruptcy was a wake-up call to many of us," said a senior Chinese banking executive based in Beijing. "Now we monitor the risks posed by our counterparties all the time, and it's the responsibility of our financial institutions and risk-management departments to adjust the amount of credit extended to our counterparties accordingly."
The European financial crisis has intensified in recent weeks because of fears that Greece will withdraw from the euro. European banks have been largely cut off from public funding markets and are reluctant to lend to one another, though most are under no immediate financial pressure because of the huge loan program implemented late last year and early this year by the European Central Bank.
Big Chinese banks started reviewing the credit profiles of their European counterparts in the second half of last year, with Bank of China—the most international of all Chinese banks—being one of the first to cut back on trading with and counterparty exposure to European banks.
Since late last year, the bank has suspended purchasing derivatives including credit-default swaps—or insurance-like financial contracts—from European banks including Société Générale and Crédit Agricole. ....
In addition, Bank of China also stopped trading certain foreign-exchange derivatives with UBS and BNP Paribas. ... 
Even as they have vowed to further liberalize the domestic financial markets, Chinese regulators have fretted that foreign banks could be a new source of risk to the domestic financial system.
"Risks associated with foreign banks shouldn't be overlooked," Shang Fulin, chairman of the China Banking Regulatory Commission, said in February.

Thursday, February 9, 2012

Does it matter that Eurozone banks are pledging more and more of their assets to the ECB?

With the unsecured Eurozone bank debt market essentially frozen like a block of ice, does it matter that more and more of the assets of the Eurozone banks are being pledged to the ECB?

Said a different way.

While existing unsecured Eurozone bank debt holders are becoming structurally subordinated to the ECB, does this matter given that these debt holders are not rolling over their existing debt, but instead taking their investment and going elsewhere?

Isn't it also true that government deposit guarantees are becoming structurally subordinated to the ECB as the ECB has first claim to the pledged assets?

Finally, isn't the issue of structural subordination just a symptom of the real problem:  no one knows if Eurozone banks are solvent or not.

Solvency is defined as the market value of the bank's assets exceeds the book value of its liabilities.

If a bank is insolvent by this definition, then the follow-up question is 'how large is the shortfall?'

It is entirely possible that the market value of the bank's assets is less than the book value of its guaranteed deposits.  In this case, the ECB is clearly increasing the amount at risk for the government guarantor -- the government guarantee has effectively become the 'equity' supporting the bank -- and the unsecured debt holders have to be happy with additional borrowing from the ECB as it is used to pay them out at maturity when they would otherwise not be entitled to repayment.

Tuesday, January 10, 2012

UK banks being made riskier says UBS

According to analysts at UBS, UK banks are being made riskier as a result of policies being implemented by the Bank of England.

As reported by Harry Wilson in a Telegraph article, the policy that is making the UK banks riskier is requiring the banks to fund themselves in the capital markets and not turn to the Bank of England as lender of first resort.

Apparently, the UBS analysts prefer that all central banks maintain a policy of subsidizing their banking systems by providing below market rate funding.

For its part, the Bank of England clearly prefers a return to pre-August 9, 2007 when banks funded themselves from the private sector.  A not unreasonable preference.
Comparing the BoE’s policy to that of the European Central Bank, UBS analysts warned the lack of an emergency scheme to support the UK banking system in the event of a new crisis already led to rapidly rising funding costs for lenders. 
Pointing to bonds sold by Barclays and Lloyds Banking Group since the start of the year, the analysts said both banks had to pay a very high price to access the debt markets. 
Barclays had to offer investors a rate of 2.15pc to sell a 10-year covered bond, which is secured against assets of the bank. This is nearly 1 percentage point - or 100 basis points - more than the equivalent estimated borrowing cost for the UK government. 
French banks, by contrast, can issue debt cheaper despite recent market concerns over their solvency due to the ECB’s recent opening of a new three-year borrowing facility for eurozone lenders. 
The impact of this on the economy has been profound. UBS says five-sixths of British private sector workers are employed by companies with no access to the bond market, while bank lending to the UK economy continues to decline. 
Noting recent Bank of England figures showing a decline in Britain’s foreign trade deficit, UBS said the authorities were ignoring “the lost GDP from inappropriately high cost of debt”. 
“That the trade deficit is mainly shrinking thanks to people not taking holidays abroad any more. That certainly smells less of rebalancing; more of the nation just getting poorer,” said UBS. 
Government attempts to make British banks safer are also panned in the UBS report, with the increased cost of funding and the collapse in the share prices of major lenders cited as “clear signs of distress” in the sector. 
“For all the billions put into bank capital by taxpayers and stockholders; and for the all the dramatic reversals in wholesale funding needs and liquidity positions, no durable equilibrium looks close,” said the analysts.
The fact that no durable equilibrium looks close is a direct result of the opacity of the banks.

Until market participants have access to each bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details and can confirm for themselves the solvency of each bank, market participants are simply not going to trust that the banks are solvent.

If market participants aren't comfortable with a bank's solvency, they are not going to lend it money.  An example of this is the frozen interbank lending market in the Eurozone.

Wednesday, January 4, 2012

Bill Gross puts the issue of 'trust' front and center

In his monthly news letter, PIMCO's Bill Gross puts the issue of 'trust' front and center.  Specifically, he observes
But before ringing in the New Year with a rather grim foreboding, let me at least describe what financial markets came to know as the “old normal.” It actually began with early 20th century fractional reserve banking, but came into its adulthood in 1971 when the U.S. and the world departed from gold to a debt-based credit foundation. Some called it a dollar standard but it was really a credit standard based on dollars and unlike gold with its scarcity and hard money character, the new credit-based standard had no anchor – dollar or otherwise. All developed economies from 1971 and beyond learned to use credit and the expansion of debt to drive growth and prosperity. Almost all developed and some emerging economies became hooked on credit as a substitution for investment in tangible real things – plant, equipment and an educated labor force. They made paper, not things, so much of it it seems, that they debased it. Interest rates were lowered and assets securitized to the point where they could go no further and in the aftermath of Lehman 2008 markets substituted sovereign for private credit until it appears that that trend can go no further either. Now we are left with zero-bound yields and creditors that trust no one and very few countries. The financial markets are slowly imploding – delevering – because there’s too much paper and too little trust.
Please re-read his comment about creditors that trust no one and financial markets with too little trust.

Why has trust evaporated from the financial markets?

Opacity.

As this blog has observed many times before, on August 9, 2007, the financial markets effectively shutdown for every type of opaque security.  This list includes mortgage backed securities as well as unsecured bank debt and equity.

Quite simply, buyers went on strike.

Since then, central banks and governments have tried numerous programs to try to get the buyers to end their strike.  Predictably, all these programs have failed.

The cause of their failure is the same.  None of the programs addressed the issue of restoring trust.

There is only one way to restore trust:  provide ultra transparency.

Providing anything less than ultra transparency will not see the buyers end their strike because they have learned from structured finance securities like CDOs that what they cannot see and therefore evaluate can and will cause investment losses.

Tuesday, December 27, 2011

The Euro crisis deepens

In his Guardian column, Aditya Chakrabortty lays out all the facts that support his observation that the Euro crisis is getting worse.

He then asks the question of why have the Eurozone policymakers and financial regulators been unable to end the crisis.

The answer is that the Eurozone and the rest of the global financial system are facing a solvency crisis that they have been treating as a liquidity crisis since 2008.  Treating the symptom is kicking the can down the road and not curing the cause.

Europe's leaders have spent most of the euro crisis denying there's a euro crisis....
The denialism ended this summer, as the financial bushfire moved to Italy and even began to menace Belgium and France.... If the rhetoric and the not-so-faint snobbery have vanished, to be replaced by panic about "a last wakeup call" and "a crucial crossroads", the actual policy-making is as clueless as ever.... 
The eurocrats can impose austerity, and bring in Goldman Sachs employees such as Mario Monti to run newly impoverished economies; but anything that might actually break the fire still eludes them. 
In the meantime, the crisis has just kept growing. 
Which is exactly what you would expect given that they are focused on treating the liquidity symptoms and not the underlying solvency cause of the crisis.
In February 2010, Greece needed to raise just €53bn for the entire year; now euro leaders are looking for a trillion euros and counting. Compare and contrast: in his memoirs, Alistair Darling recounts that it took ministers and officials 10 days and one curry-fuelled all-nighter in autumn 2008 to hammer out the complex and costly combination of ready cash, loans and guarantees that saved the British banking system....
Actually, they did not save the British banking system.  They kicked the can of solvency down the road.

Incidentally, these same policies were adopted by both the US and the Eurozone.

Does anyone really believe that the large British banks are solvent given the fact that their exposure to Eurozone governments and banks vastly exceeds their equity?
A good rule of thumb in this crisis is that when a European state pays more to borrow than an ordinary taxpayer shells out for a bank loan, the government eventually has to call in the rescue brigade. 
For much of November, Italy was borrowing at a rate of 7% – and probably the only thing that has kept interest rates from going higher still is that the European Central Bank (ECB) has been buying Rome's IOUs. 
In other words, the markets trust the Italian state – with its own tax-raising powers – less than it does a couple in Kettering who'd quite like a new kitchen. Which, given that Italy plans to roll over more than €360bn (£310bn) of debt next year, is hardly sustainable for the new prime minister Mario Monti. Indeed, on 1 February, Rome will have to either repay or renew €28bn of loans. Even now, no one has the faintest idea how it will do that.  
Over the next couple of months, Italy's crisis can go one of three ways: either the ECB keeps on buying its bonds, with the blessing of northern-European voters and markets; or ECB head Mario Draghi pledges to fund financially distressed eurozone governments; or Rome gives in and calls for a bail-out. If the last even looks likely, financiers will almost certainly panic that Italy is about to default on its debt. With about a third of the country's bonds held abroad, this could wreak chaos in world markets – including in Britain, which is by far the biggest foreign owner of BTPs. That's the sort of event Barack Obama has in mind when he remarks that Europe's crisis is "scaring the world". 
The idea that owners of Italy's debt might have to take a haircut is not what scares the world.  What scares the world is no-one knows who is holding onto the losses.  It is the possibility of contagion pulling down the global financial system that scares the world.

Regular readers know that the way to eliminate the fear of contagion pulling down the global financial system is not more expensive bailouts, but disclosure.  Specifically, every bank must be required to provide ultra transparency by disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this data, everyone knows who is holding the losses.  More importantly, market participants can take steps to adjust the amount and price of their exposure so that they do not lose more than they can afford to lose.

As for the banks in any country that sees its sovereign default, what is needed is a backstop to the sovereign's guarantee of the banks' deposits.  In Europe, this backstop could be provided by the EFSF or the ESM.  The backstop is needed to prevent a run on the banks.

It must be remembered that history has shown that banks with negative book equity can continue to operate and provide loans and payment services.
Rome's not the only government whose finances are in jeopardy; Madrid is in the same boat, while Brussels and Paris have also seen a surge in loan rates. 
Less often talked about is that many of Europe's banks, even well-known French names, are unable to borrow unless from the ECB. "You have European banks nowadays claiming they're not European at all because they're worried the very word will scare away investors," says Grant Lewis, head of research at Daiwa Europe. That credit crunch cannot carry on for much longer without causing either a full-scale banking crisis or throttling economic growth. 
Not that there's much growth to be had, because the prescription of austerity for sick economies simply makes them sicker. By the IMF's own projections, 2012 will be Greece's fifth straight year in recession, which by now should really be termed a depression...

Friday, December 23, 2011

Eurozone banks confirm interbank loan market frozen, ECB deposits reach new 2011 highs

One of the signs of a solvency crisis is when the interbank loan market is frozen.  Banks refuse to lend to each other because they cannot determine if the borrower is solvent or not and if not solvent, whether they will repay the loan or not.

The Wall Street Journal ran an article that showed the Eurozone interbank loan market is frozen and treating it with massive amounts of liquidity is ineffective as the issue is one of solvency.
Use of the European Central Bank's overnight deposit facility reached a new record high for the year Thursday, suggesting recent measures by central banks and policy makers still aren't enough to restore confidence in inter-bank lending markets. 
Banks deposited €346.99 billion ($453.38 billion) in the overnight deposit facility, up from €264.97 billion a day earlier and a previous high for the year of €346.36 billion, reached earlier this month. 
The high level reflects ongoing distrust in inter-bank lending markets, where banks prefer using the ECB facility as a safe haven for excess funds rather than lending them to other banks. 
The high deposit level also suggests markets aren't fully convinced that the ECB's massive long-term loan allotment is enough to fortify the currency bloc's banking sector. 
The central bank extended nearly half a trillion euros in long-term loans to euro-zone banks Wednesday, hoping to ease fears of a new credit crunch as banks struggle to borrow from markets. 
Separate actions in recent weeks by central banks and policy makers have also sought to make dollar loans cheaper for euro-zone banks and to boost fiscal integration in the bloc.... 
The ECB further said banks borrowed €6.34 billion from the ECB's overnight lending facility, compared with €7.55 billion borrowed a day earlier. When markets are functioning properly, banks only use the facility to the tune of a few hundred million euros overnight.

Tuesday, December 6, 2011

Concerned about the freeze in interbank lending, Bank of England introduces new liquidity facility

A Telegraph article reports that the Bank of England has introduced a new facility to make sterling available to the banking system if UK interbank lending freezes further.

Once again, a central bank treats the symptom of a solvency crisis with liquidity.

The reason that banks refuse to lend to each other is that they cannot tell if the borrowing bank is solvent or not.  They cannot assess solvency because banks are not required to provide ultra transparency.

Without on-going disclosure of each bank's asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, banks cannot assess the risk and solvency of their competitors.  When banks cannot make this assessment, they cannot lend to each other because of concern they may not be repaid.

Another way banks show they do not trust in the solvency of other banks is in the repo market.  Here, the bank with cash to lend requires better collateral and higher haircuts - a higher haircut is another way of saying the lending bank requires more collateral to support a given loan amount.

In the repo market, the symptoms of the solvency crisis express themselves as a shortage of collateral.  This particular problem is exacerbated by quantitative easing which sees the central banks purchasing the better collateral and making it unavailable to the repo market.

The move comes just days after the BoE joined the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Banks and other major central banks to boost the global supply of dollar liquidity by making it cheaper to borrow. 
However the Bank stressed today there was no "short term" shortage of sterling for UK banks. 
The Bank said its new Extended Collateral Term Repo (ECTR) Facility would enable it to offer banks 30-day loans of sterling on an ad hoc basis. 
"There is currently no shortage of short-term sterling liquidity in the market. But should that position change, the new facility gives the Bank additional flexibility to offer sterling liquidity in an auction format against the widest range of collateral," the BoE said in a statement. 
The Bank said its new facility came "in light of the continuing exceptional stresses in financial markets" and that its design had been influenced by feedback from market contacts.... 
The new ECTR Facility will have an auction format, with loans available for 30 days against collateral. 
The BoE accepts as collateral sovereign debt, residential mortgage-backed securities, securitised credit card debt, student and consumer loans and some types of asset-backed commercial paper, amongst other assets.

Thursday, December 1, 2011

Shortage of collateral in Europe

One way to solve the shortage of collateral in Europe is by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

By disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures, banks allow market participants to price their loans and investments.

Central banks can then lend against the bank's whole loan portfolio since the central bank can now look to an independent market value for the portfolio.

This frees the banks up to lend other assets into the repurchase funding markets.

Monday, November 28, 2011

Secret Fed bank loans make definitive case for requiring the financial system be based on ultra transparency

Bob Ivry wrote a must read article for Bloomberg on how secret Fed loans during 2008-2009 gave banks an undisclosed $13 billion boost to income.  As Mr. Ivry observes, 'a fresh narrative of the financial crisis emerges' when actions by the Fed, like the loans, are examined.

In fact, the narrative that emerges is my narrative on an opacity driven solvency crisis where the only way to fix the financial system is to require ultra transparency from all market participants, including banks and the Federal Reserve.

These loans illustrate everything that is wrong with the current financial system including:
  • The opacity of banks.  This blog has frequently cited Bank of England's Andy Haldane referring to banks as 'black boxes'.
    • As documented by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee, the crisis began with banks asking the question of which banks are solvent and which are not.  Clearly, there was inadequate disclosure.  The fact that the Fed could make secret loans confirms this inadequacy and the need for banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
    • The reason that banks were asking about solvency was the exposure of banks to opaque, toxic securities -- CDOs, sub-prime mortgage backed securities.  Clearly, ultra transparency needs to be applied to these securities too.
  • The relationship between banks and their regulators.  
    • In a NY Times article, Gretchen Morgenson and Louise Story covered how the Office of Thrift Supervision advised IndyMac to misrepresent its capital to market participants.  How is offering secret loans to the banks any different than advising the banks to misrepresent their capital to market participants?
    • The Nyberg Report on the Irish Financial Crisis showed how even when a member of the regulatory body saw that something was wrong, the regulatory bureaucracy pushed to suppress this finding.  Contributing to this result was both political pressure on the regulator and lobbying from the banks.
  • The dependence of market participants on the regulators because of the regulators' information monopoly.
    • Unlike every other market participant, banks are not a black box to financial regulators as they have access to all the useful, relevant information.  This includes access to the bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  The result of this access is that market participants rely on the regulators to properly assess the risk of the bank and to communicate this risk to the market.
    • The moral obligation to bailout investors after each round of stress tests where the banks are deemed to be solvent.
I could go on, but the more the facts behind what caused the financial crisis and how the crisis was handled come out, the stronger is the case for requiring ultra transparency.
The Federal Reserve and the big banks fought for more than two years to keep details of the largest bailout in U.S. history a secret. Now, the rest of the world can see what it was missing. 
The Fed didn’t tell anyone which banks were in trouble so deep they required a combined $1.2 trillion on Dec. 5, 2008, their single neediest day. 
Bankers didn’t mention that they took tens of billions of dollars in emergency loans at the same time they were assuring investors their firms were healthy. 
And no one calculated until now that banks reaped an estimated $13 billion of income by taking advantage of the Fed’s below-market rates, Bloomberg Markets magazine reports in its January issue. 
Saved by the bailout, bankers lobbied against government regulations, a job made easier by the Fed, which never disclosed the details of the rescue to lawmakers even as Congress doled out more money and debated new rules aimed at preventing the next collapse. 
A fresh narrative of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 emerges from 29,000 pages of Fed documents obtained under the Freedom of Information Act and central bank records of more than 21,000 transactions 
While Fed officials say that almost all of the loans were repaid and there have been no losses, details suggest taxpayers paid a price beyond dollars as the secret funding helped preserve a broken status quo and enabled the biggest banks to grow even bigger....
The size of the bailout came to light after Bloomberg LP, the parent of Bloomberg News, won a court case against the Fed and a group of the biggest U.S. banks called Clearing House Association LLC to force lending details into the open. 
The Fed, headed by Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, argued that revealing borrower details would create a stigma -- investors and counterparties would shun firms that used the central bank as lender of last resort -- and that needy institutions would be reluctant to borrow in the next crisis....
Here we have the major bank regulator in the US arguing for opacity.  Chairman Bernanke takes the position that market participants should not know the true condition of the banks because if they did the market participants might properly assess the risk of the banks and adjust the amount and price of their exposure accordingly.

Think of how absurd a position that is for the Chairman of the Federal Reserve to be arguing.  Particularly one who is a scholar of the Great Depression and the introduction by FDR of a financial system based on transparency.

There is only one way to prevent any Fed Chairman from ever being in a position for making this argument again and that is requiring ultra transparency.

Had ultra transparency existed for the structured finance securities, CDOs like Abacus could never have been sold.

Had ultra transparency existed for banks, market discipline would have restricted casino banking activities to what a bank could have afforded to lose.  If the bank insisted on taking more risk than this, its cost of funds would have gone up and its access to funds down as investors adjusted their exposure to reflect the risk of the bank.

Had ultra transparency existed for the Fed, it would never have violated Walter Bagehot's advice to lend against good collateral at high rates of interest.  There would not have been a $13 billion gift from the Fed to the banks.
Bankers didn’t disclose the extent of their borrowing. 
On Nov. 26, 2008, then-Bank of America (BAC) Corp. Chief Executive Officer Kenneth D. Lewis wrote to shareholders that he headed “one of the strongest and most stable major banks in the world.” He didn’t say that his Charlotte, North Carolina-based firm owed the central bank $86 billion that day....
Is this a fundamental misrepresentation similar to the advice of the Office of Thrift Supervision to IndyMac on its capital?

With ultra transparency, regulators are permanently blocked from inadvertently supporting misrepresentations to the financial markets.  Market participants could have seen that BofA was borrowing from the Fed and that IndyMac did not have adequate capital.
The Fed has been lending money to banks through its so- called discount window since just after its founding in 1913. Starting in August 2007, when confidence in banks began to wane, it created a variety of ways to bolster the financial system with cash or easily traded securities. 
By the end of 2008, the central bank had established or expanded 11 lending facilities catering to banks, securities firms and corporations that couldn’t get short-term loans from their usual sources.

“Supporting financial-market stability in times of extreme market stress is a core function of central banks,” says William B. English, director of the Fed’s Division of Monetary Affairs. “Our lending programs served to prevent a collapse of the financial system and to keep credit flowing to American families and businesses.”...
As regular readers know, restoring and maintaining confidence in banks comes from providing market participants with access to ultra transparency so that the market participants can independently analyze each bank.

None of the lending programs engaged in by the Fed restored confidence.  This is supported by the fact that the Fed announced that its late 2011 round of stress tests is designed to restore confidence.

As previously discussed on this blog, all the Fed's latest stress tests will do is create a moral obligation for the Fed to bailout investors.  After all, investors cannot be expected to incur losses on a bank that is reported as solvent under the Fed's stress tests subsequently blows up ... look at the need to bailout the investors in Dexia after the latest round of European stress tests found it adequately capitalized.
While the emergency response prevented financial collapse, the Fed shouldn’t have allowed conditions to get to that point, says Joshua Rosner, a banking analyst with Graham Fisher & Co. in New York who predicted problems from lax mortgage underwriting as far back as 2001. 
The Fed, the primary supervisor for large financial companies, should have been more vigilant as the housing bubble formed, and the scale of its lending shows the “supervision of the banks prior to the crisis was far worse than we had imagined,” Rosner says.
Ultra transparency is needed so that the failure of bank supervision no longer puts the financial system at risk.

With ultra transparency, market participants are no longer reliant on the regulators to properly assess the risk of the banks.  Market participants can assess the risk for themselves.
“I believe that the Fed should have independence in conducting highly technical monetary policy, but when they are putting taxpayer resources at risk, we need transparency and accountability,” says Alabama Senator Richard Shelby, the top Republican on the Senate Banking Committee....
So Senator Shelby when can I expect a call from your staff to discuss legislation bringing ultra transparency to the financial markets before December 31, 2011?
“Some might claim that the Fed was picking winners and losers, but what the Fed was doing was exercising its professional regulatory discretion,” says John Dearie, a former speechwriter at the New York Fed who’s now executive vice president for policy at the Financial Services Forum, a Washington-based group consisting of the CEOs of 20 of the world’s biggest financial firms. “The Fed clearly felt it had what it needed within the requirements of the law to continue to lend to Bear and Wachovia.”
Ultra transparency ends regulatory discretion of picking winners and losers.  That is the job of the market.
On May 4, 2010, Geithner visited Kaufman in his Capitol Hill office .... At the meeting with Kaufman, Geithner argued that the issue of limiting bank size was too complex for Congress and that people who know the markets should handle these decisions, Kaufman says....
Provide ultra transparency and banks will come under enormous pressure from the market to reduce their risk and shrink their asset base.  It will also be harder for them to run their casino banking business because everyone can see their proprietary positions ... a trader's worse nightmare because of the potential to be front run when buying or selling.
Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, says banks “were either in bad shape or taking advantage of the Fed giving them a good deal. The former contradicts their public statements. The latter -- getting loans at below-market rates during a financial crisis -- is quite a gift.”...
Regardless of which one, requiring ultra transparency eliminates this from occurring again in the future.

European Banking Authority warns on bank funding...ultra transparency emerges as only solution

A Reuter's article reports on how the European Banking Authority (EBA) is growing increasingly concerned over the fact that the inter-bank funding market is frozen and Eurozone banks need to rollover almost $1 trillion in debt.

The EBA is looking at all the solutions tried in 2008-09 to unfreeze the market -- for example, state guarantees, stress tests, higher capital ratios -- and has concluded that these are not working.

The solutions are not working because banks simply do not trust each other or the sovereigns that stand behind them (this is not confined to the Eurozone as a collapse of the Eurozone banks will wreak havoc in the UK and US too).

Why don't banks trust each other?

Because banks are unable to evaluate the solvency of other banks.  As the Bank of England's Andy Haldane would say because each bank is a 'black box'.

Four years ago, I said predicted a solvency crisis driven by opacity in the financial marketplace.  One area of opacity is bank balance sheets.

Regular readers know that in order to assess the risk of a bank, market participants, including the bank's competitors, need access to the bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details on an on-going basis.

It is the ability to independently analyze this data that restores and maintains trust in the banks.

Until this data is made available, as I predicted, the financial system and the real economy will continue on a downward spiral.
Europe's finance chiefs try again next week to end a deadlock over bank funding, after the industry regulator warned time is running out to revive confidence across the troubled euro zone. 
Over breakfast on Wednesday, European Union finance ministers will seek agreement over state-backed guarantees in a bid to unblock wholesale funding markets. With 700 billion euros ($933 billion) of bank debt needing to roll over next year, the need is pressing. 
One solution touted, a pooling of state-backed guarantees, has effectively been abandoned, while another, individual national guarantees, is seen as unlikely to help banks in euro zone countries whose government bonds are being given a wide berth. 
The European Central Bank (ECB) may end up having to step in with a band-aid solution of two-to-three year liquidity lines to banks. 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) has drafted a three-pronged package to shore up confidence in banks: a 106 billion euro recapitalisation by mid-2012, writedowns on exposures to stressed sovereign debt and the funding guarantees. 
But EBA Chairman Andrea Enria signalled this week his increasing frustration with the deadlocked political process, including how to leverage the EU's new bailout fund, the EFSF. 
"The fact that so far only the EBA's measures to strengthen bank capital have been publicly put forward is for us a source of real concern," Enria said in a speech. "We believe that further delays to having all the elements in place are severely affecting the effectiveness of the whole package."... 
But the EBA package is already in danger of being left behind by the deepening euro zone crisis, making it harder for banks to find enough quality collateral to back loans and which is often in the form of government bonds. 
"With the sovereign debt crisis moving to the bigger euro zone countries, there is no longer any confidence in collateral, and the only way to get banks lending to each other again is to restore trust and confidence in sovereign debt used for collateral," said Godfried de Vidts, director of European Affairs at brokerage ICAP. 
So far the EBA is sticking with its timetable to publish by the end of November how much capital each bank must raise, but it and bankers now worry more about funding than capital. 
"We are in a bad spot," Stefano Marsaglia, chairman of Barclays Capital's financial institutions group, said at a Thomson Reuters IFR Bank Capital conference on Thursday. "The problem for banks is very much a funding problem, it's not so much a capital problem." 
The EBA has told banks they need to raise about 106 billion euros to repair their balance sheets, but that amount could rise as the watchdog may take a tougher line on what qualifies as capital and losses on sovereign bonds.... 
Banks are expected to mostly meet shortfalls by selling assets and loans, retaining earnings and cutting dividends or pay, and the amount of capital needing to be raised could be less than 30 billion euros, analysts have estimated.  
Regulators and national governments ... have become increasingly concerned that aggressive "deleveraging" to lift capital ratios will squeeze credit and hurt economic growth. 
Of course they are worried, as it appears that their policies have triggered a mini-credit crisis in the Eurozone.

To try to alleviate this de-leveraging, regulators are proposing a new way for banks to raise capital.
Banks will be given details of how they can plug their capital with debt that converts into equity, or "contingent capital" instruments dubbed CoCos. 
Contingent capital will be accepted if it meets "strict and harmonised" criteria, the EBA has said. It plans to issue a common European "term sheet" to make that clear. 
That is desperately needed, as uncertainty about how regulators view key aspects such as the point where bonds have to convert into equity -- probably when core Tier 1 capital drops to about 7 percent -- have held back issuance. 
But with some investors steering clear of investing in bank shares and most types of debt, market confidence will need to improve first.
Who would invest in contingent capital that converts to equity if they cannot assess the risk of the underlying bank?

Without ultra transparency, there is no real market for contingent capital.

The only way to improve market confidence is by providing ultra transparency.
UK investor M&G said where it has exposure to financials it is "very conservative" and senior in the capital structure. "That is unlikely to change soon. It is difficult to quantify banks' exposure to the periphery but the sector needs better disclosure, more liquidity and less reliance on interbank funding," said M&G fund manager Stefan Isaacs.
Investors, including banks making loans to each other, are on a buyers' strike until ultra transparency is provided.

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

Eurozone banks face funding stress as the question of who is solvent and who is not re-emerges

A Wall Street Journal article describes the steps that Eurozone banks are taking to secure funding as the inter-bank lending market freezes over.

This was both predictable and avoidable.

It was predictable because policymakers and financial regulators have not required each bank to disclose on an on-going basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure detail.  As a result, market participants do not have the data to assess who is solvent and who is insolvent.

Without an answer to that question, banks are naturally reluctant to lend to each other.

It was avoidable if current detail disclosure had been required.

Instead, Eurozone banks are relying on a financing technique that increases the fragility of the financial system.

Update


Previously, I presented a blueprint for saving the European financial system.  At the heart of the blueprint was current detail disclosure.

One of the benefits of this type of disclosure is that it supports the ability of the ECB to lend against a wider range of assets.  Specifically, it lets the ECB extend its lending from covered bonds and asset-backed securities to whole loan portfolios.

In short, the ECB can take as collateral all the assets held by a bank.  When combined with the European Financial Stability Fund and national governments guaranteeing deposits, this means that Eurozone banks can continue to function even if they have significant negative book capital for a number of years.
European banks, increasingly concerned about their ability to access funding, are devising complex and potentially risky new deals that enable them to continue borrowing from the European Central Bank. 
The banks' maneuvers, which include behind-the-scenes swapping of assets among financial institutions, could heighten risk across Europe's already fragile financial system, say some senior industry officials and regulators. 
They also are a sign that struggling banks across Europe are preparing for a period of prolonged reliance on financial lifelines from the ECB. 
The Continent's intensifying financial crisis has made it difficult for many banks to obtain funding from customary market sources. 
Some banks are exhausting their supplies of assets—such as European government bonds and certain types of asset-backed securities—that the ECB accepts as collateral and that the banks haven't already committed to other uses, according to bankers and analysts. 
Others are scrambling to stockpile such assets to comfort analysts and investors worried about the banks' abilities to weather a long-term freeze in bank-funding markets....
And some European bank customers are balking at doing business with the banks.... 
To ensure that their access to ECB loans continues, the banks are entering into a variety of complex transactions with other financial institutions to come up with billions of euros worth of assets that they can pledge as collateral to secure ECB loans, according to bankers and industry officials. 
Some regulators and bankers are worried. By transferring potentially risky assets among a wide range of institutions, the so-called liquidity swaps have the potential to "create a transmission mechanism by which systemic risk across the financial system may be exacerbated," the U.K.'s Financial Services Authority warned in a July consultation paper... 
The scramble for ECB-eligible collateral highlights the tenuous state of Europe's banking industry. Traditional sources of bank funding, including institutional investors and fellow banks, have largely fled amid concerns that many lenders are sitting on huge piles of risky government bonds and loans to shaky borrowers....
It is exactly this concern that current detail disclosure addresses.
In the increasingly popular liquidity swap, banks transfer illiquid assets such as non-investment-grade loans to corporations or to finance public-infrastructure projects—and which aren't eligible to serve as collateral for ECB loans—to investment banks or insurance companies. 
In return, the investment banks or insurers provide government bonds or other liquid assets that the original bank can use as collateral to secure loans from the ECB. 
The investment banks apply a discount to the assets they are receiving—shielding them from some potential losses—and receive commissions on the trades.... 
A number of French, Italian and other European banks, including bailed-out Franco-Belgian lender Dexia SA, recently have entered into such transactions, according to people familiar with the matter.

"It's a way to improve your liquidity and to get liquid some assets that are not liquid," said a senior Dexia executive, who says he has crafted billions of euros of such trades in recent months. 
The Frankfurt-based central bank accepts a wide variety of assets as loan collateral, including European sovereign bonds, securities comprised of mortgages and other assets, and "covered bonds" backed by loans and other assets on banks' balance sheets. 
The ECB's extensive loans to banks have put its own balance sheet at risk, many analysts say. 
Partly to protect banks in the periphery, ECB officials suspended rules that had confined the central bank to only accepting investment-grade government bonds. As a result, the ECB now holds junk-rated Greek, Irish and Portuguese bonds. 
ECB officials insist their balance sheet is safe. The central bank has taken steps to protect itself, including doubling its capital base. 
At the end of October, euro-zone banks had borrowed a total of nearly €600 billion ($811 billion) from the ECB, up from €495 billion at the start of the year, according to data from individual central banks. 
Among the biggest borrowers are banks in France and Italy, with each country's sector having borrowed a total of more than €100 billion at the end of September, up sharply from prior months. 
At giant French bank Crédit Agricole SA, executives said last week that they are taking steps to "rapidly increase" their holdings of assets that can be pledged as collateral. Among those actions are bundling together large numbers of mortgages and other loans into asset-backed securities that the ECB will accept, according to a person familiar with the matter. 
Some executives are pleading with the ECB to accept a wider array of assets. "In the name of the smallest Italian banks, I will ask [the ECB] to look into the possibility to broaden access to ECB liquidity by expanding the type of collateral offered," UniCredit SpA Chief Executive Federico Ghizzoni told an Italian newspaper Wednesday. 
For months, European banks have been pursuing innovative strategies to address their real or perceived collateral shortages. Several Greek banks, for example, recently issued government-backed bonds that analysts say are likely to serve as collateral for ECB borrowings. 

Monday, November 14, 2011

Lack of transparency leads to anxiety among banks

A NY Times article confirms that the lack of transparency into each bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is causing tension in the interbank lending market.
The tension in interbank lending is not as acute as it was in 2008 and early 2009, but the underlying anxiety is the same. 
Banks have incomplete information about what unpleasant surprises may be lurking in one another’s vaults, and they are beginning to doubt whether the euro will survive. 
Since 2008, the European Central Bank has been allowing euro area banks to borrow as much as they want at low interest, currently 1.25 percent. It is also lending banks dollars, to compensate for an unwillingness by U.S. money market funds to lend to European banks. 
The amount that banks have been drawing from the E.C.B. has been rising, an indication that many institutions are having trouble raising money on open markets. Last week, banks took out €195 billion, or $268 billion, in one-week loans. That is less than half the levels of emergency borrowing seen in the dark days after Lehman Brothers collapsed, but it is still well above normal. 
“It is not a sustainable level,” said Nicolas Véron, a senior fellow at Bruegel, a research organization in Brussels. What is more, he said, it is an inefficient use of capital because the E.C.B. cash is keeping alive some weak banks. 
“You have a bunch of zombie banks sustained by public intervention,” he said. 
The pain is not equally distributed. Banks in countries whose economies are strong and whose finances are solid, like Germany or the Netherlands, do not seem to be having much trouble raising money. 
“It is not a problem for Swedish banks, because our banks have very little exposure to Southern Europe compared to many other banks,” Stefan Ingves, the governor of the Riksbank, the Swedish central bank, said by telephone.

Tuesday, November 8, 2011

Global liquidity drying up could and should have been prevented

Once again, the failure to require financial institutions to disclose their current asset, liability, and off-balance sheet detail is causing liquidity to vanish.

The Wall Street Journal carried a long article that confirms that banks with liquidity are still unwilling to lend to banks without liquidity because they cannot become comfortable with the risk or solvency of the borrowing bank.

Instead, the Eurozone banks with liquidity would rather park their funds at the ECB.
Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney said Tuesday that global liquidity is about to dry up again as the European banking system deleverages, and warned that the real economy will soon feel the impact. 
"Global liquidity has fluctuated wildly over the past five years and we are on the cusp of another retrenchment,"...
The reason that liquidity has fluctuated wildly is that banks do not trust their counter-parties.  This is a problem that could be addressed.

Regular readers know that the solution is to have each bank disclose its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure detail.  With this data, other banks can assess the risk of insolvency and adjust both the amount and pricing of their exposure accordingly.

As a result, fluctuation in liquidity would be minimized.
Mr. Carney said bold actions by the European Central bank and the €4 trillion ($5.511 trillion) of unencumbered capital at European banks should ensure there is no European equivalent of Lehman Brothers....
As I recall, Lehman Brothers was undone by its exposure to opaque, sub-prime securities.  Is there any reason to believe that a Eurozone bank cannot be undone by its exposure to the combination of these opaque, sub-prime securities still on their books and sovereign debt?
Mr. Carney said European authorities could reduce the spill-over of deleveraging by having their banks meet at least part of the new requirements through private capital, including so-called contingent capital, an idea championed by Canada.  
Mr. Carney said the current situation is "ideally suited" for this instrument as capital is being raised for an "extreme tail event"—losses on highly rated sovereign debt—"the public nature of which would involve no risk of regulatory forbearance." 
The success of contingent capital is directly related to the degree to which banks provide detailed disclosure of their current assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposures.

Without this disclosure, investors have no way of assessing the riskiness of the bank and the likelihood that the contingent capital will be converted.

What Mr. Carney appears to suggest is that banks issue contingent capital that only converts if highly rated sovereign debt is written down.  I am not sure that this security would sell today as I am not sure that investors can find a single highly rated sovereign debt that they can be comfortable is unlikely to be written down over the next few years.
Mr. Carney said large, abrupt fluctuations in global liquidity are having a major impact on global financial stability and economic growth. He said the G20's financial reform agenda, when fully implemented, will dampen global private liquidity cycles. 
But the impact of reforms will be weakened if new regulations push activity to the unregulated parts, or the so-called shadow banking system. He said enhanced supervision and regulation of shadow banking will be one of the top priorities for the FSB in coming months....
I look forward to talking with the FSB and seeing them call for making banks disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details a requirement.
Meanwhile, banks' use of the European Central Bank's deposit facility hit a new high for the year Monday for a third consecutive day, data released by the ECB showed Tuesday. 
Banks parked €298.591 billion at the facility, the ECB said. These data represent the highest level since June 30, 2010, when banks parked €310.43 billion. Friday banks parked €288.429 billion at the ECB's deposit facility. 
The amount of deposits has been elevated, around the €200 billion mark, since late October, indicating that banks prefer to park their money with the ECB instead of lending it to one another. 
Banks are afraid of lending because they don't know the extent of their counterparties' exposure to weak euro-zone sovereign debt. 

Thursday, October 27, 2011

Opacity has a high price: EU response to sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis shows it

Opacity has a very high price.

First, there were the losses on the opaque securities sold before the solvency crisis began on August 9, 2007.  This includes the opaque toxic structured finance securities loaded with fraudulently underwritten sub-prime mortgages as well as CDOs like Abacus that were designed so that Wall Street could profit from the collapse in the sub-prime market.

The Bank of England's Andy Haldane estimated the losses from the opaque securities exceeded $4 trillion globally.

Second, there is the on-going cost of bailing out the banking system.  The banks themselves hid risk both on and off their opaque balance sheets.

Based on a chart showing actual US Debt versus its pre-crisis trend line by Diapason's Sean Corrigan, Zero Hedge suggests that this cost is $3.5 trillion.

Third, we have the EU's sovereign debt crisis which to a significant extent is the result of attempting to bail out the banks in 2008/2009.

Based on the tentative agreement reached by EU policy makers, it appears that the cost is at least 440 million euros - the "equity" that the EU is putting into the European Financial Stability Fund.

This tally of costs only looks at the direct costs of opacity.

Hidden are the indirect costs like zero interest rate policies that transfer wealth from savers to bankers (banks pay nothing for the deposits and can park them at central banks and earn a risk free spread).

In short, opacity has a very high price.

Unfortunately, so long as we have pockets of the financial system that remain opaque, the cost of opacity will keep increasing.

For example, in the Eurozone, bank balance sheets are opaque.  What this means is that no one, including the regulators, knows how much exposure any bank has to any other bank, to any sovereign or how the bank might be trying to hedge the risk of this exposure.

As a result, the options available to Eurozone policy makers and financial regulators in how to respond to the sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis are limited.

For example, how many times did the policy makers express fear of causing contagion.  This "fear" clearly influenced the negotiations over the size of the haircut on Greek debt.  The banks knew that the policy makers would not be willing to risk a blow-up of the Eurozone banking system.  Hence, banks could negotiate to minimize the haircut and receive a 30 billion euro credit enhancement.

Imagine how differently the negotiations would have gone if all market participants knew the intimate details of each bank's assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposures.  With this information, policy makers could have seen if it fact a 100% write down of the Greek debt would have triggered contagion.

[This blog has suggested on several occasions that disclosure is the cure for contagion.  I have argued that   as soon as the data is made available to the market, it is in each bank's best interest to adjust their exposures to the other banks so that their exposures are not more than they can afford to lose.]

However, the EU policy makers and financial regulators did not have disclosure.

  • This is despite the fact that all of the assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposures are knowable facts since they are in each bank's information systems.  
  • This is despite the fact that the EU policy makers and financial regulators had gone through the first stage of the financial crisis in 2008/2009 and seen that the the financial markets broke down everywhere that there was opacity and that the policies that they adopted then had failed to provide disclosure - actually, they bought time in which disclosure could have been implemented and the current round of the financial crisis avoided.

Instead, the EU policy makers and financial regulators were faced with opacity and the fear of the unknown.

The results were predictable.  Once again opacity extracted its high price.

Now the question is will the Eurozone policy makers end opacity by setting up a data warehouse to collect the current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures from each bank and providing this data for free to market participants.

Tuesday, October 25, 2011

Contagion: A Wall Street term to remind regulators that they do not know what is going on

The Independent ran an interesting column discussing the fact that no simple deal can save Greece.  What made the column interesting is its explanation for why Greece had to be saved.

Contagion.

As described by Wall Street, contagion occurs when banks are required to recognize losses.  Once banks are forced to recognize their losses, there is a risk of a loss of confidence in these banks and that, like a disease, this loss of confidence will spread to other presumably healthy banks.

In short, contagion is Wall Street's term for reminding regulators that they do not know what is going on in the banking system.

Previously, this blog described the immunization against contagion.  This immunization was implementation of the FDR Framework.

Under the FDR Framework, governments ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information they need to make a fully informed decision.  Market participants, since they are responsible for all gains and losses under the principle of caveat emptor, have an incentive to use this data to assess the risk of any exposure.

It is the principle of caveat emptor that immunizes against contagion.  Since each market participant is responsible for the gains and losses on their exposures, they have an incentive not to take on any exposure that is bigger than they can afford to lose.

For banks who have to disclose their current detailed asset and liability information, market discipline acts to enforce adherence to not taking on any exposures greater then they can afford to lose.  Each bank has an incentive to limit its exposures to other banks to only those banks that limit their exposure to what they can afford to lose.

THE eurozone debt crisis rumbles on. To be more accurate the current impasse is the Greek debt crisis but the key issue is what impact the Greek default will have on the rest of the eurozone. 
Greece is going to default. What is needed is not another part-attempt at a resolution of the problem but a realisation that the Greek government cannot repay it’s debts....
The problem the ongoing EU summits are trying to address is to minimise the fallout when it is finally accepted that Greece cannot pay backs its creditors.... 
It is now accepted that Greece will also require at least a 60pc write down on its government debt. It is estimated that the losses that will be imposed on other European banks will be as high as €100bn. 
The sticking point in the current EU negotiations is where are the banks going to get the money to cover these losses .... The funds will have to be provided to cover the losses as many of these banks are retail banks that have huge connections with the real economy. These banks have billions on deposit from savers and also owe substantial sums to their own bondholders.
While it is reasonable to expect that depositors will have their money protected, the mantra of the crisis over the past few years has been that “bank bondholders will not be burned”.  If this is to be maintained public money will once again have to be used to cover for losses in banks. 
This policy has been adopted to try to avoid contagion and a loss of confidence in the European banking system. This policy has failed. No one has confidence in the European banking system, least of all the banks themselves. 
Why should they as no one has any idea of each banks exposure to the other banks or to sovereign debt?  As this blog has repeatedly said, the only way to restore confidence is through disclosure, specifically by making each bank disclose its current detailed assets and liabilities.
Usually, there are hundreds of billions of overnight deposits moving from bank to bank as banks seek and use liquidity. In recent weeks banks have been less and less willing to deposit money with each other.
Banks are now more willing to place excess liquidity on deposit with the ECB at very low rates, rather than earn a better return by lending the money to other banks. There have been occasions where the ECB has received nearly €250 billion of overnight deposits. This is the money that should be providing liquidity to the European banking system but doubts about the strength of all banks to handle the Greek default have meant that the money is warehoused in the ECB. 
EU leaders have to banish these doubts. At least now there is a realisation of the scale of the problem and the proposals on the table are based on realistic losses from the Greek default. 
Markets are likely to be indifferent between each solution but just want to see that something will be done.
This is an important point and needs to be re-read.

Markets are looking for a process that leads to resolution of the solvency problem at both the sovereign debt and bank level.  That is what has been proposed under the FDR Framework blueprint for saving the financial system.

Markets are not looking for a solution that just purchases a one to two year reprieve.