Showing posts with label Government Guarantees. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Government Guarantees. Show all posts

Saturday, April 7, 2012

Ireland demonstrates why nations recapitalizing banks is a flawed idea

As Greece considers whether or not to use its scarce access to capital on recapitalizing its banks or on boosting economic growth, it might want to consider the Irish experience.

As described in his Irish Times column, Simon Carswell looks at the current status of the Irish banking system.

ANY BANKING SYSTEM that posts combined losses of €6 billion for a year is far from out of the woods, particularly when the road back to profitability is not straightforward, or even assured for some.  
The State-owned banks have all reported results for 2011, and it is clear the lenders, even plugged with €63.7 billion of State capital (including the €1.3 billion to go into Permanent TSB from the sale of Irish Life) still require further help to return to full health....
By comparison, the Greek banks lost 32 billion euros in the Greek sovereign debt restructuring.

But that is not the full extent of their losses.  These banks are also holding loans to Greek borrowers that are unlikely to be repaid given the on-going contraction in the Greek economy.  How much more will be lost on these loans is anyone's guess.

Given that it is a guess, the EU insisted that the Greek government pay BlackRock Solutions to provide an estimate.  Like Ireland, no one will believe this estimate as market participants know this estimate is constrained by the simple fact that Greece has only been given 50 billion euros to recapitalize its banks with to maintain the fiction of the banks having positive book capital levels.
As for the four State-supported banks, the big questions the 2011 results raise is whether last year’s bank stress tests by the Central Bank, verified by a group of costly outside consultants, stand up or whether the banks require further capital....
This is one of the problems with bailing out the banks.  Not only does bailing out the banks divert scarce funds from being used to boost the real economy, but it sets up the situation where there is a call on additional scarce resources when the initial guess on losses is shown to be wrong.
While the losses at the domestic banks have already hit the base case losses expected in the Central Bank stress tests in March 2011, the banks have enjoyed more success on the “deleveraging” of their businesses as they attempt to shrink in size and get off the drip of cheap funding....
On the issue of deleveraging, the lenders have so far picked the low-hanging fruit, selling assets overseas where there were buyers rather than dumping Irish loan assets for which there are few buyers and only at loss-making firesale prices at that.... 
Bank of Ireland offloaded 86 per cent of the €10 billion in assets that it must shed by the end of 2013 and managed to take a hit of just €600 million – a 7 per cent discount in the process. 
AIB’s €12.7 billion deleveraging in 2011 was €3.3 billion ahead of target at an average discount of 4 per cent, again within targets....
Is selling off the good loans on the balance sheet rather than writing down and working out the bad loans a good thing for a banking system?
AIB and IBRC both acknowledged during their respective results presentations that discussions were taking place on the future of residential mortgages across the banks. 
This was a reference to plans to shift the tracker mortgage books out of AIB (€18 billion) and Permanent TSB (€16 billion) to IBRC or another vehicle to run them down. 
Otherwise known as yet another bailout.
The removal of the tracker books forms part of the technical discussions around the next restructuring of the banks, tied in with a replacement of the promissory notes funding the bailout of Anglo and Irish Nationwide. 
Taking the tracker mortgages out of AIB and Permanent TSB not only purges them of loss-making loans that are a drag on a return to profitability, but may also encourage investors to take out some of the State’s shareholding in these financial institutions. 
“The removal of tracker mortgages from banks’ balance sheets would significantly improve net interest margin and enhance the prospect of attracting fresh equity investment to the pillar banks,” said IBRC in its results presentation. Reading between the lines, it would appear that IBRC would welcome the trackers with open arms.....  
Tracker mortgages reflect a more structural problem and the dysfunctional nature of Irish banking – banks are paying far more for funding than they are charging to lend it out. 
The debt markets remain closed to them, at least at any kind of meaningful rate at which they can repair their business models....
So, despite multiple rounds of bailouts from the government, market participants still do not have confidence in them.

The reason there is no confidence is related to the simple fact that market participants do not know how many more problems are hidden on and off the bank balance sheets or the capacity of Ireland to continue bailing out the banks.
In the meantime, the deteriorating situation regarding the mortgage crisis means arrears will continue to increase. 
While the high level of loan losses is a concern given that they have not reached the stress test base-case levels, the banks have not used up as much of the capital set aside to cover the deleveraging as was expected, said Stephen Lyons, analyst at stockbrokers Davy. 
This has created a contingency fund in addition to the €5.3 billion existing contingency buffer factored into last year’s additional €24 billion bank recapitalisations. 
But, as Michael Cummins says, the stress tests failed to resolve the issue of future operating profitability at the banks, despite the banks being recapitalised based on loan loss projections over three years and assuming a return to profitability after the three years. 
“At present, that assumption is beginning to look at risk,” he said.... 
The fact that the banks have not been aggressive in recognizing losses on their mortgage loans has had no impact on the ongoing collapse in the value of the collateral.  As a result of the delay in loss recognition, when the losses are finally recognized, they are likely to be far greater.
Until more light is shed on the next restructuring of the banks, their future is far from bright.
Once you start shedding light on the banks, there is no reason to stop at the form of the next bailout.  Better to go all the way and require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This immediately weans the banks off of sovereign bailouts.

Instead, it sets up the condition under which the banks can recognize all of the losses hidden on and off their balance sheet today and through retention of earnings rebuild their book capital in the future.

At the same time, it frees up the funds that would be used for bailouts and allows them to be used to support the real economy.

So the question the Greek government faces is:  support endless rounds of bailouts to the detriment of the real economy or support the real economy and not invest a single euro or drachma in the banks.

Wednesday, April 4, 2012

The key to handling a banking crisis is to keep confidence of depositors

Ultimately, in a bank solvency led financial crisis, the key issue is maintaining depositor confidence.  This is important because if depositors lose confidence, it triggers a downward economic spiral.

As shown by Ireland, Greece and Spain, lending to and growth in the real economy declines as a result of a run on the deposits of the banking system.

The question is how to maintain depositor confidence.

The Japanese and Swedish models for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis offer different answers.

Under the Japanese model, depositor confidence is equated to the level of bank book capital on the theory that if bank book capital declines so too will depositor confidence.  As a result, policies like government capital injections have to be pursued that protect the level of bank book capital.

Under the Swedish model, depositor confidence is equated to the perceived strength of the deposit guarantee on the theory that depositors don't care if a bank has a positive or negative book capital position so long as their deposit is safe.  As a result, policies are pursued that protect the real economy from the losses on the excesses in the financial system and, by doing so, the creditworthiness of the government deposit guarantee.

Thursday, February 9, 2012

Does it matter that Eurozone banks are pledging more and more of their assets to the ECB?

With the unsecured Eurozone bank debt market essentially frozen like a block of ice, does it matter that more and more of the assets of the Eurozone banks are being pledged to the ECB?

Said a different way.

While existing unsecured Eurozone bank debt holders are becoming structurally subordinated to the ECB, does this matter given that these debt holders are not rolling over their existing debt, but instead taking their investment and going elsewhere?

Isn't it also true that government deposit guarantees are becoming structurally subordinated to the ECB as the ECB has first claim to the pledged assets?

Finally, isn't the issue of structural subordination just a symptom of the real problem:  no one knows if Eurozone banks are solvent or not.

Solvency is defined as the market value of the bank's assets exceeds the book value of its liabilities.

If a bank is insolvent by this definition, then the follow-up question is 'how large is the shortfall?'

It is entirely possible that the market value of the bank's assets is less than the book value of its guaranteed deposits.  In this case, the ECB is clearly increasing the amount at risk for the government guarantor -- the government guarantee has effectively become the 'equity' supporting the bank -- and the unsecured debt holders have to be happy with additional borrowing from the ECB as it is used to pay them out at maturity when they would otherwise not be entitled to repayment.

Friday, December 2, 2011

EU bank write-down plan said to exclude forcing losses on pre-2013 debt

There are a number of issues that must be addressed to transition from the current model of governments' guarantee all investments in banks from solvency risk to a model where investors are responsible for bank solvency risk.

A Bloomberg article looked at a proposal by the European Union for how this might be accomplished.

Regular readers know that so long as financial regulators continue to perform and publish the results of stress tests, governments have a moral obligation to bailout investors for any solvency related losses.

The most recent example of this was Dexia Bank passing the European stress tests earlier this year and now having to be nationalized by the French and Belgium governments.

This blog has long said that the only way to make investors take on the responsibility for bank solvency risk is by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  By disclosing each bank's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can assess the risk of each bank.

With the ability to assess the risk of an investment in a bank comes the responsibility for accepting all gains and losses on that investment.

This blog has said that the way to manage the transition is for governments to continue to guarantee all investors from solvency risk until a bank has been providing market participants with ultra transparency for 6 months.

After this time, market participants will have been able to assess the risk of the bank and should be held responsible for all gains or losses.  This will apply to all new securities issued by the bank after the 6 month mark.

The European Union may exempt bank debt issued before 2013 from proposals forcing investors to take losses at failing lenders, said a person familiar with the plan.... Michel Barnier, the EU’s financial services chief, has promised to propose draft rules to end the need for taxpayer bailouts of failing banks. ... 
“From a funding point of view it brings two words to mind -- cliff effect,” Bob Penn, financial regulation partner at Allen & Overy LLP, said in a telephone interview in London today. 
“There’ll be swathes of bank-funding issuance and then it will fall off a cliff” when the so-called bail-in rules are implemented. 
Under draft proposals obtained by Bloomberg News, holders of long-term unsecured senior debt in a collapsing bank would be first in line to take losses once a lender’s capital and other subordinated debt is exhausted. Long-term bonds would be those with a maturity of more than one year....
Short-term debt, with a less than one-year maturity, and derivatives should only be written down by regulators as a last resort if losses from longer-term debt aren’t “sufficient to restore the capital of the institution and enable it to operate as a going concern,” according to the draft. 
“Exempting short-term debt and derivatives may be justifiable, but this would increase the use of systemically risky derivatives and excessive levels of short-term debt that contributed to the ongoing crisis,” said Sony Kapoor, managing director of policy advisory firm Re-Define. 
Taxing them “may help alleviate some of these distortions.” 
Regulators would also have the power to forcibly convert a bank’s bonds into ordinary shares, according to the draft. 
Authorities could intervene to impose losses if a bank was “likely, in the near future,” to breach its minimum required capital levels, or be unable to meet its obligations to creditors, according to the EU document. 
There is a “growing acceptance on the part of regulators” that the wind-down plans “have to be implemented in a way which does not overly conflict with the ability of financial institutions to refinance themselves in the near-term,” Richard Reid, research director for the International Centre for Financial Regulation, said in an e-mail.... 
Efforts amid the debt crisis to force investors to share in bailout costs have roiled markets and sparked disputes among policy makers. 
Last week, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schaeuble suggested European governments may ease provisions in a planned permanent rescue fund requiring bondholders to share losses in sovereign bailouts. 
Other parts of the commission plans include giving regulators the power to force healthy banks to sell off parts of their business so that they could be wound up in a crisis. This process is known as bank “resolution.” 
“We need to put resolution regimes in place for every type of institution,” Paul Tucker, deputy governor of the Bank of England, told reporters at a Financial Policy Committee press conference in London today.... 
EU leaders last month agreed to offer their banks temporary guarantees on their debt issuance as part of a package of measures to restore confidence in lenders. 
Finance ministers agreed yesterday to coordinate the national guarantee programs, while rejecting proposals to pool them.

Friday, November 25, 2011

Banks and sovereigns 'inter-dependent'

The Telegraph published a column by Christine Johnson, a corporate bond fund manager for Old Mutual, that is a must read piece.

Mrs. Johnson cuts straight to the heart of the problem in the financial markets when she observes

But the reality is that the Santander deal is emblematic of a much wider – and in my view permanent – disruption to fixed income markets. 
Banks are now clients of state. States own bank equity and banks own state debt. Banks depend on the state, by way of monetary authorities, for their liquidity. 
What has developed is an intense, introverted, inter-dependent patron-client relationship. States and banks have become equivalent, and equally distressed. 
For bond investors, the outcome is brutal. Santander is not alone. Other banks are also keen to make their bond-holders offers they can’t refuse. It is being called by the euphemism ‘liability management’ but in essence it is a form of default. 
The rules that once applied are no longer relevant. Once the state is involved regulation can be re-written, as can the law. Where politics is concerned, etiquette is soon brushed aside....


The conclusion should not be hard to draw, though it is quite different to the one we are used to hearing. Neither governments nor banks are capable of providing a safe-haven in the challenging times we face. They are not the solution. They are the problem.

Over the last several months, this blog has documented how the relationship between banks, regulators and sovereigns has perpetuated the financial crisis to the detriment of investors and society.

I know I have said this before, but requiring the banks to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is the only way to solve the problems created by the relationship between banks, regulators and sovereigns.

Ultra transparency ends, at a minimum:

  • regulators hiding a bank's condition from the market while they try to stabilize the bank (think extend and pretend).  Instead, it substitutes market discipline with the idea being to prevent the bank from becoming a problem in the first place;
  • the focus on meaningless, highly manipulated bank book capital.  Instead, it substitutes the combination of a bank's solvency (the market value of its assets less the book value of its liabilities) with the reality that so long as depositors trust in the guarantee of their deposits, they will keep their money in the bank regardless of its solvency.  With this combination, banks can spend the next several years retaining earnings to restore their solvency; and
  • regulators, and by extension sovereigns, incurring the moral obligation to bailout investors when the regulators announce that a bank has passed a stress test.  Instead, investors know that they are responsible for all gains and losses which gives them the incentive to assess the risk of each bank independently using the data disclosed under ultra transparency.

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Dexia, Ireland and the Good Bank/Bad Bank fallacy

According to a Bloomberg article, Dexia will be split up into a Good bank and a Bad bank.

Readers may remember that Ireland tried to do the same thing with its banks.  In fact, Ireland tried without success on multiple occasions to remove all of the bad assets from its banks.

The fallacy of the Good bank/Bad bank concept is it requires market participants to "believe" that all the losses were put in the bad bank.  Without disclosure of the good bank's current asset and liability-level data, how are market participants suppose to verify how the bad assets were actually split up?

Without this verification, why should investors trust that the Good bank was cleaned-up and they should invest?
Dexia SA (DEXB), Belgium’s biggest bank, plans to pool its troubled assets into a “bad bank” with Belgian and French government guarantees to protect depositors and its municipal-lending business. 
The Belgian-French lender bailed out by the two governments in 2008 will put its “legacy” division, which held 113 billion euros ($150 billion) of assets at the end of June, into the bad bank, Belgian Prime Minister Yves Leterme told reporters in Brussels yesterday. Finance Minister Didier Reynders said...“What we’re looking for is not to spend taxpayers’ money on a dossier such as this one,” Reynders said. “Our wish is to consolidate, reinforce and safeguard the banking activity in Belgium, as our colleagues will do in France.” 
The creation of a separate entity with government guarantees may help shield Dexia’s banking units and avoid a repeat of the 2008 taxpayer-funded capital infusion. Belgium and France said yesterday they will take “all necessary measures” to protect clients and will guarantee Dexia’s loans. Both governments have stakes in the bank following its 2008 bailout...
For Dexia, “the fact that two countries are involved, both under pressure from rating agencies, makes it even more difficult,” said Benoit Petrarque, an Amsterdam-based analyst at Kepler Capital Markets with a “hold” rating on the shares. “We are not in 2008 anymore, when you could just inject multibillions of cash.” 
Prime Minister Leterme said yesterday that there’s “no reason justifying” Dexia Bank Belgium’s clients pulling deposits from the bank. Belgium guarantees that no client “will lose a single eurocent,” he said....
Dexia posted a 4 billion-euro loss for the second quarter, the biggest in its history, after writing down the value of its Greek debt. Once the world’s biggest lender to municipalities, it received a 6 billion-euro bailout from Belgium, France and its largest shareholders in September 2008 following the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc.... 
Reynders said yesterday the guarantees that will be provided now will be “inferior” to the ones granted in 2008, when Belgium’s share exceeded 90 billion euros. 
He also said that Belgium has “no intention” of chalking up losses, adding that it will collect a fee in return for the guarantees. Dexia paid 489 million euros last year for use of guarantees, according to company filings. 
Dexia’s legacy division, which will be folded into the bad bank, has a pool of long-term assets that were put together so they could be financed with earlier debt guarantees. The division was created to meet European Union demands that earlier debt guarantees not be used to finance its commercial businesses and give investors greater clarity about its capacity to generate profits. 
At the end of June, the division included 95 billion euros of bonds with an average maturity of almost 13 years and $9.5 billion of mostly U.S. residential-mortgage backed securities, the majority of which were sold in July. 
It also had 11 billion euros of municipal loans in countries where Dexia has halted operations. 
Dexia may also transfer an additional 50 billion euros of assets from its municipal-lending units in Italy and Spain into the bad bank. Dexia agreed to dispose of its controlling stakes in Rome-based Dexia Crediop SpA and its joint venture with Barcelona-based Banco de Sabadell SA to win European Commission approval for its 2008 bailout. 

Monday, September 5, 2011

Markets remind Deutsche's Ackermann of 2008 right down to banks needing another bailout

Bloomberg ran an article on a Euroforum speech given by Deutsche Bank AG's Chief Executive Officer Josef Ackermann.  In the speech, he observed that the markets remind him of 2008.  This is not surprising given that the solvency crisis which began in 2007 is still with us and the issue of which banks are solvent and which are not has re-emerged.

Just like 2008, the banks need a bailout because "some" banks cannot afford the losses from restructuring debt.  In 2008, we were talking toxic securities.  In 2011, we are talking sovereign debt.

Having determined that some banks cannot afford the losses on a specific asset type, the next concern is contagion.  If those banks that cannot afford the loss were forced to realize the loss, this would spread problems throughout the European banking system.

This blog has repeatedly observed that there is a big difference between disclosing and realizing losses.  The former involves reporting to all market participants the information they need to assess the risk of investing.  The latter involves accounting.

Since mark-to-market was suspended at the beginning of the solvency crisis, when banks would account for the losses on the sovereign debt is no longer linked to disclosure.

“The ‘new normal’ is characterized by volatility and uncertainty -- not only in respect to market developments, but also in consideration of the future of the financial branch,” Ackermann said today at a conference in Frankfurt organized by Euroforum. “All this reminds one of the fall of 2008, even though the European banking sector is significantly better capitalized and less dependent on short-term liquidity.” 
It is the lack of disclosure that creates uncertainty and volatility in the financial branch.

If the European banking sector is so much better capitalized, then why is disclosing and realizing the losses on sovereign securities a problem?  Either the banks are adequately capitalized or they are not.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. in September of 2008 froze credit markets and forced taxpayer-funded bailouts of banks from Washington and London to Berlin. 
Concern Europe’s sovereign debt crisis is worsening and global economic growth is slowing wiped about 5 trillion euros ($7 trillion) from stock values since the end of July, with banks leading the slide, Ackermann said.... 
Many European banks “obviously” wouldn’t be able to shoulder writedowns on sovereign debt held in their banking books based on market values, Ackermann said today. Therefore European governments agreed to financial aid measures for countries, and forcing banks to boost their capital would undermine the credibility of existing support measures, he said.... 
Since there are now significant restrictions on the ability of governments to access funds for another bailout, there is a certain logic to requiring banks to pay for their own bailout by boosting capital.

If there were disclosure, market participants would know which banks were adequately capitalized and which were not as well as how much capital the European banking system needs to raise to shoulder the write-downs on sovereign debt.
DZ Bank AG Chief Executive Officer Wolfgang Kirsch, speaking at the same conference, said European politicians need to agree on a solution for the sovereign debt crisis to avoid a repeat of the events of 2008. “Otherwise we will enter a very difficult market situation,” Kirsch said.
Disclosure and not austerity is the simple solution.

It is only after market participants know the facts that a plan for writing-down the sovereign debt and recapitalizing banks can be determined and confidence restored to the financial markets.

Thursday, July 28, 2011

Solvency, US debt ceiling and European Solvency Crisis

It appears that it has become much more difficult for politicians to buy time in face of the solvency crisis that began in 2007.

Faced with a global solvency crisis, governments on both sides of the Atlantic chose to buy time through a combination of bailouts for the banks, socialization of some of the losses in the financial system and massive economic stimulus packages.

As a result of this decision, in the US there is a debate over whether to permanently end the role of US government debt as the risk-free asset off of which all other financial assets in the world are priced.  This debate takes the form of a partisan debate over whether to raise the US debt ceiling or not and, if the debt ceiling is raised, whether the additional debt should be paid for by the middle class or by the rich.

As a result of their kick the can down the road decision, European countries are facing a sovereign debt crisis of their own.

I am not going to debate whether buying time was a good decision or not.  What is much more important is the issue of what do you do to address the solvency problem with this very expensively purchased time.

From an economic perspective, it was used to pray for a miracle.  Paul Krugman summarized this miracle in his NY Times column as
Everything might still have been O.K. if other major economic players had stepped up their spending, filling the gap left by the housing plunge and the consumer pullback. But nobody did. In particular, cash-rich corporations see no reason to invest that cash in the face of weak consumer demand.
This blog has documented why this miracle was made even more unlikely by the strategies adopted by the governments.

For example, the central bankers pursued zero interest rate policies.  As Walter Bagehot pointed out a century ago, when interest rates drop below 2%, prudent individuals adjust their behavior (as previously discussed, there are three types of individuals - those who spend everything they earn, those who earn so much they cannot spend it all and those who are prudent and save for retirement).  In this case, faced with the loss of earnings on their savings that they need for retirement, prudent individuals cut back on current consumption to make up for the shortfall.

While zero interest rates make it cheaper for corporations to expand, the incremental benefit of lower financing costs in no way offsets the impact on their investment decision of the drop in demand for their product(s) corporations are currently experiencing.

The fact that central bankers are praying for the miracle of corporations to hire employees and invest with no demand in sight means that central bankers should at a minimum pursue policies that increase demand not reduce it.

From a regulatory perspective, the time purchased was used to increase the regulators' role in the financial system.  The Financial Stability Oversight Council's 2011 annual report describes this as:
The challenge of maintaining a stable financial system is exacerbated by the difficulty of
balancing the benefits of regulation against the costs of excessively restraining prudent risk
taking behavior. If we were to set the overall combination of margin, liquidity, and capital
requirements too high, we could handicap the ability of the financial system to support
economic growth. Further, financial activity would inevitably move more quickly to firms,
markets, and countries where the intensity of regulation is weaker. So we need to continue
to strive for a careful balance between the imperatives of creating a more stable system and
promoting a level of innovation and dynamism.
With all of these new powers, shouldn't the financial system be safer?

In Europe, the regulators recently ran stress tests that suggested that a de minimus amount of equity was needed to maintain the solvency of over 90 banks.  Why is it if the regulators are on top of everything that the European governments needed to step in subsequently with another bailout?  

Regular readers know that the bank solvency crisis has not been addressed.  If it had, disclosure under the FDR Framework would have been adopted and implemented.

Sunday, July 17, 2011

Bailouts are for buying time, disclosure is for restoring functioning capital markets

The Telegraph ran a column asking the question of whether more bailouts is really the right solution for the European sovereign debt crisis.

This is a trick question because everyone knows that all bailouts do is buy time.  By themselves, bailouts do not solve any problems.

For example, putting more capital into large US banks did not cause the losses on their toxic security holdings or second mortgages to go away - that was achieved through suspension of mark-to-market accounting and adoption of extend and pretend regulatory forbearance.  In theory, bankers could have realized their losses using the bailout capital.  In practice, bankers preferred to return the bailout funds and resume paying themselves large bonuses even though the losses still remain on their bank balance sheets.

The real question is how is that time purchased by the bailout going to be used to cure the underlying intertwined problems of sovereign debt and bank solvency.

Your humble blogger has proposed using that time to implement disclosure under the FDR Framework to restore functioning capital markets.
In the light of the deepening eurozone crisis and concerns over the implications of the EU bank stress tests, many commentators are now saying that the EU sovereign debt bailout fund needs to be perhaps five times as big, and that governments must declare themselves willing to recapitalise any insolvent or capital-inadequate banks as soon as next week. 
Really? You really think that the lesson of the past four years, since the financial crisis began in mid-2007, has been that governments have just not been sufficiently willing to stand behind the banks? That the problem with the eurozone is that governments that aren’t broke haven’t been willing to lend enough to those that are? That the poor impoverished bondholders in banks and sovereign debt have just been exposed to totally unreasonable levels of credit risk? 
... But surely anyone can see now that this has been a Failed Strategy  Surely anyone can see that the answer, from here, just can’t be for governments to become even more committed to their banking sectors, and bank bondholders even more shielded from any risk of loss? Surely anyone can see that the answer can’t be to move banking sector losses from poorer governments’ balance sheets onto richer governments’? Someone has to be left that isn’t broke! 
... This is a Failed Strategy. I understand perfectly well the political attractions of Denial, that governments in 2007 and 2008 wanted to pretend that nothing was really wrong, that it was all evil speculators or irrationally pessimistic markets, and if they could just bluff it out then the markets would understand that they’d got it wrong. Even if markets had been wrong (and they do get these things wrong sometimes), I wouldn’t have agreed that the government should pursue Denial – were governments truly in a position of such omniscience that they could declare, arrogantly, that the markets were wrong? And was the cost – the destruction of Private Capitalism, a system in which capital was allocated through private banks with depositors and bondholders subject to risk of loss - really worth it? In practice the government’s strategy was immoral – involving bailing out the richest 20 percent of the population (those with large deposits, those with large pension pots invested in the banking sector) at the expense of taxing the poor. 
Since I regarded the strategy as arrogant, destructive of our economic order (Private Capitalism) and immoral, I would have objected to it even if it had “worked” in its own terms.  But it didn’t.  Surely – surely – it’s time to try something else?

Friday, July 15, 2011

Why the 2009 US stress tests worked

This blog has frequently observed that the reason why the US stress tests worked in 2009 was because the 19 banks that were tested were then backed by a pledge to inject as much capital as necessary by the US government.

Today, a Wall Street Journal article independently confirmed that it was the pledge to inject capital by the US that accounts for why the 2009 US stress tests were successful.
On Feb. 10, 2009, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner outlined the new administration's plan to subject 19 large U.S. banks to government-administered "stress tests" to see how much more capital they would need to fill the hole in the event of another severe recession or collapse of housing prices. 
The speech flopped. The Dow Jones Industrial Average lost nearly 400 points while he was speaking. The very phrase "stress test," though common in financial circles, conjured up images of Citigroup Inc. collapsing on a treadmill. The left derided stress tests as a poor substitute for nationalizing banks, the right as a precursor to nationalization, financial pundits as a whitewash or worse. 
Yet by most retrospective accounts, the stress tests worked better than hoped. Despite sniping that the worst-case scenario used wasn't bad enough, the tests were credible enough to help markets distinguish between weak and strong U.S. banks and to bolster investor confidence in the stability of the U.S. banking system. 
"The U.S. stress tests were a key driver of the recovery from the financial crisis both because they made bank balance sheets more transparent but also because they forced banks to recapitalize, with some government help," says Frederic Mishkin, a Columbia Graduate School of Business economist and former Federal Reserve governor... 
When results were disclosed in May 2009, after much speculation and back and forth between banks and regulators, 10 banks were told to raise $75 billion in new capital. The U.S. government had said taxpayers would provide capital from the Troubled Asset Relief Program unless banks could raise money from markets; all but one raised the money privately. 
Regular stress tests are now among the tools the Federal Reserve and other bank regulators are using to try to prevent a repeat of the financial crisis...
"The U.S. stress tests succeeded because they forced banks to raise a lot of capital," says Anil Kashyap, an economist at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, noting the U.S. government's willingness to provide a "backstop"' source of capital if needed. 
"The last European test failed because it did not mandate recapitalization. Whether this one succeeds will hinge on whether they are honest about the capital shortages and include a backstop that will force the banks to raise capital one way or another."

Friday, July 1, 2011

Faced with lack of disclosure, investors migrate to government guaranteed debt

To nobody's surprise, government guaranteed debt is emerging as the biggest source of debt in the capital markets.  This is completely expected when regulators fail to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner on non-government guaranteed debt.

It is one thing for market participants to buy a non-government guaranteed debt security when they know what is in it, but quite another to buy a non-government guaranteed debt security when they do not know what may or may not be in it.

This blog has held up structured finance securities and financial institutions as examples of where inadequate disclosure leaves investors guessing at what may or may not be standing behind the debt repayment.

When market participants cannot analyze the risk, they do not know if they are being compensated for it.  As a result, market participants have an incentive to purchase securities where they can analyze the risk and see if they are being compensated for it.  Today, those securities tend to be government guaranteed.

According to a column in the Financial Times,
By the time you read this column today, a fascinating shift will almost certainly have occurred in the nature of US finance: for the first time the government will be the biggest source of outstanding home mortgage and consumer credit loans in the US, eclipsing private sector banks or investors. 
Or that, at least, is the forecast recently made by Investor Business Daily, a US publication. 
... What should investors make of this? There are at least three lessons to ponder. 
First, the data provide a powerful sign of just how distorted the US financial system remains in the aftermath of the great credit crunch. This might not seem obvious to investors or voters; after all, in recent months the large banks have repaid their troubled asset relief programme funds, stock markets have rallied and credit spreads have shrunk. 
But behind this veneer of normality, banks are still deleveraging, and the private sector mortgage securitisation world remains almost dead. Indeed, were it not for the activity of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the giant state institutions, mortgage finance would, in effect, have seized up in the past three years. 
Actually, what the data shows is that there is a buyer's strike going on until market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information on private sector mortgage securitizations in an appropriate, timely manner.

As predicted under the FDR Framework, zero interest rate policies were not going to lead to blindly chasing after yield in the structured finance market.  Market participants learned their lesson with the credit crisis that these securities do not have adequate disclosure. Notice how the lack of buyers in this $2 trillion market expressed itself with prices for non-government guaranteed mortgage-backed securities slumping almost 20% when the Fed tried to sell its $30 billion AIG portfolio.
The second fascinating point, though, is the cognitive dissonance surrounding this pattern. Six years ago, when I first started writing about the credit markets, I often heard US financiers praise America’s capital markets as the most developed system of free market finance in the world. Indeed, techniques such as securitisation were presented as a natural outcome of American enthusiasm for free market ideals. 
One of the major themes of this blog has been that "free markets" have a role for both government and market participants.

The US version of free markets under the FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the practice of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

  • government is responsible for ensuring that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.
  • market participants are responsible for the outcome of any investment decision and as a result they have an incentive to adjust both the price and amount of their exposure based on the results of their analysis of this information.
The US version of free markets ceases to function when the government does not ensure access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner, but instead claims that it is the investors' responsibility to require disclosure. [See Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's speeches and the Presidential Working Group on structured finance.]

Investors have limited ability to require disclosure.  Instead, they go on a buyer's strike covering the types of securities with inadequate disclosure.  While waiting for the government and issuers to provide adequate disclosure, investors turn to alternative investments that do provide adequate disclosure.  It is only when the issuers provide all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner that the buyer's strike will end.
But the dirty secret behind this rhetoric was that government-backed institutions such as Fannie and Freddie were playing an important role in the modern financial system, even before the credit crisis erupted. And what is remarkable now, given that the role of Fannie and Freddie has swelled, is just how little debate this patter continues to generate. 
After all, with the US remaining wedded to free market ideals, it is uncomfortable to admit that “capital markets in the US have become reliant on government guarantees”, says Viral Acharya, an economist and co-author of a thought-provoking book.* 
Capital markets in the US are not "reliant" on government guarantees.  They use these guarantees as a substitute for access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

If the US wanted to reduce the total amount of government guaranteed debt, it could simply provide access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner instead. This would allow the guaranteed debt to runoff and be replaced by non-guaranteed debt.