Showing posts with label EFSF. Show all posts
Showing posts with label EFSF. Show all posts

Sunday, September 23, 2012

Europe's bank recap strategy has hit its limit

In his Breakingviews column, Peter Thal Larsen makes the argument that Europe's bank recap strategy has hit its limit and that until Europe's banks clean up all of the bad debt hidden on and off their balance sheets no one will trust them regardless of the book capital ratios they show.

This is true and the only way that anyone will believe the banks have cleaned up all the bad debt is if they banks provide ultra transparency to prove it.  Under ultra transparency, the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can independently confirm that the banks have addressed all their bad debt.

Without this information, market participants have to assume that banks have something to hide or otherwise they would provide ultra transparency.

Europe’s bank recapitalisation strategy has reached its limits. The continent’s lenders have added 94 billion euros to their capital buffers since the end of September, comfortably exceeding demands set by the European Banking Authority. Yet they are not yet in the clear. To restore trust, banks will have to clean up their loan books – and hope the euro zone can solve its sovereign woes....
Moreover, banks used relatively few tricks to hit their targets. Most of the improvements to capital came from banks issuing equity and convertible bonds; buying back hybrid debt at a discount; retaining earnings; or offloading assets. True, some banks tweaked risk models to reduce their risk-weighted assets, but this sleight of hand accounted for just 10 percent of the total capital raised. Concerns that banks would respond to the EBA’s demands by shrinking their balance sheets proved wide of the mark. Total loans contracted by just 0.62 percent. 
But anyone who expects faith in Europe’s banks to be magically restored will be disappointed. Not only are funding markets largely closed to the continent’s lenders, many are dangerously dependent on the European Central Bank for liquidity. 
Regular readers know that until banks provide ultra transparency they are 'black boxes'.

As 'black boxes', banks with deposits to lend cannot evaluate the risk of the banks looking to borrow.  The result is that interbank lending market remains frozen.

If banks cannot evaluate the risk of an investment in another bank, how can any other source of funding be expected to evaluate the risk of an investment in a bank?  They cannot and as a result, funding markets remain largely closed.
Rebuilding confidence will require banks to clear out the bad assets still clogging up their balance sheets. And Spain’s bank bailout illustrates the extent to which domestic regulators have allowed lenders to keep their problem loans hidden from view. 
Without ultra transparency, how can investors tell if the banks have cleared out the bad assets still clogging up their balance sheets?

As Spain shows, the regulators are not forcing the banks to address the bad assets.
Such a clean-up would clear the way for the creation of a pan-European banking union, backed by joint deposit insurance. That would help to break the toxic embrace between euro zone banks and governments.
Please re-read the highlighted text as your humble blogger has made exactly this argument in my blueprint for fixing the financial system.

Our financial system is designed so that banks can protect the real economy by acting as a shock absorber and absorbing the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Banks can do this because of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  Deposit insurance and access to central bank funding allow banks to continue to operate and support the real economy even if the banks have low or negative book capital levels.

Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Hence, it is important to insure that depositors 'trust' the guarantee.  In Europe, this trust has been shaken by the threat to a) boot Greece from the EU ... this has created redenomination risk and b) the possibility of sovereign bankruptcy ... this has created doubts as to whether the deposit guarantee will be honored.

To insure that depositors 'trust' the guarantee, I have argued that the European Financial Stability Fund and the European Stability Mechanism should backstop the sovereign's deposit guarantee.  This should be the only use for these funds.

Please recall that the funds are not needed to bailout the banks.  Banks that are capable of generating earnings can rebuild their book capital levels over time.  Banks that are not capable of generating earnings can be merged into healthier banks or closed.

This completely severs the toxic link between bailing out the banks and their host government's access to funds.

Saturday, November 12, 2011

Eurozone bailout fund has to buy own debt is a sign a different approach is needed

In the category of you cannot make this stuff up, the Telegraph reports that the Eurozone bailout fund had to buy its own debt because investment bankers could not find enough willing buyers.

If ever there was a clear signal that a different approach is called for this is it.

Regular readers know that I have proposed a different approach based on disclosure, deposit guarantees and the fact that banks can continue to operate while having significant negative book capital.
The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) last week announced it had successfully sold a €3bn 10-year bond in support of Ireland. 
However, The Sunday Telegraph can reveal that target was only met after the EFSF resorted to buying up several hundred million euros worth of the bonds. 
Sources said the EFSF had spent more than € 100m buying up its own bonds to help it achieve its funding target after the banks leading the deal were only able to find about €2.7bn of outside demand for the debt. 
The revelation will be seen as a major failure and a worrying sign of future buyers strike after EFSF officials and their bankers had spent recent weeks travelling the world attempting to persuade key investors, including China's national wealth fund and Japanese government funds, to buy its bonds....
Chinese and Japanese money was crucial to last year's first bond sales by the EFSF, but they have since been dismayed by the eurozone's failure to resolve the worsening debt crisis and alarmed at how fund has morphed from being a rescue facility for European banks into a potentially €1 trillion leveraged first-loss insurer for eurozone governments. 
Other European Union funds are also understood to have supported the EFSF's bond sale....
At a private breakfast organised by PI Capital last week, Mark Hoban, the Treasury minister, said: "What it doesn't do is provide the next stage of the solution, which is how do you stop this from happening again?" he said. 
The move, by the European Investment Bank, will cause more disquiet among non-eurozone EU members who have become concerned about their growing exposure to the cost of rescuing the currency bloc.

Thursday, October 27, 2011

Opacity has a high price: EU response to sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis shows it

Opacity has a very high price.

First, there were the losses on the opaque securities sold before the solvency crisis began on August 9, 2007.  This includes the opaque toxic structured finance securities loaded with fraudulently underwritten sub-prime mortgages as well as CDOs like Abacus that were designed so that Wall Street could profit from the collapse in the sub-prime market.

The Bank of England's Andy Haldane estimated the losses from the opaque securities exceeded $4 trillion globally.

Second, there is the on-going cost of bailing out the banking system.  The banks themselves hid risk both on and off their opaque balance sheets.

Based on a chart showing actual US Debt versus its pre-crisis trend line by Diapason's Sean Corrigan, Zero Hedge suggests that this cost is $3.5 trillion.

Third, we have the EU's sovereign debt crisis which to a significant extent is the result of attempting to bail out the banks in 2008/2009.

Based on the tentative agreement reached by EU policy makers, it appears that the cost is at least 440 million euros - the "equity" that the EU is putting into the European Financial Stability Fund.

This tally of costs only looks at the direct costs of opacity.

Hidden are the indirect costs like zero interest rate policies that transfer wealth from savers to bankers (banks pay nothing for the deposits and can park them at central banks and earn a risk free spread).

In short, opacity has a very high price.

Unfortunately, so long as we have pockets of the financial system that remain opaque, the cost of opacity will keep increasing.

For example, in the Eurozone, bank balance sheets are opaque.  What this means is that no one, including the regulators, knows how much exposure any bank has to any other bank, to any sovereign or how the bank might be trying to hedge the risk of this exposure.

As a result, the options available to Eurozone policy makers and financial regulators in how to respond to the sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis are limited.

For example, how many times did the policy makers express fear of causing contagion.  This "fear" clearly influenced the negotiations over the size of the haircut on Greek debt.  The banks knew that the policy makers would not be willing to risk a blow-up of the Eurozone banking system.  Hence, banks could negotiate to minimize the haircut and receive a 30 billion euro credit enhancement.

Imagine how differently the negotiations would have gone if all market participants knew the intimate details of each bank's assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposures.  With this information, policy makers could have seen if it fact a 100% write down of the Greek debt would have triggered contagion.

[This blog has suggested on several occasions that disclosure is the cure for contagion.  I have argued that   as soon as the data is made available to the market, it is in each bank's best interest to adjust their exposures to the other banks so that their exposures are not more than they can afford to lose.]

However, the EU policy makers and financial regulators did not have disclosure.

  • This is despite the fact that all of the assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposures are knowable facts since they are in each bank's information systems.  
  • This is despite the fact that the EU policy makers and financial regulators had gone through the first stage of the financial crisis in 2008/2009 and seen that the the financial markets broke down everywhere that there was opacity and that the policies that they adopted then had failed to provide disclosure - actually, they bought time in which disclosure could have been implemented and the current round of the financial crisis avoided.

Instead, the EU policy makers and financial regulators were faced with opacity and the fear of the unknown.

The results were predictable.  Once again opacity extracted its high price.

Now the question is will the Eurozone policy makers end opacity by setting up a data warehouse to collect the current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures from each bank and providing this data for free to market participants.

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

Expect European banks to voluntarily adopt detailed disclosure of assets and liabilities

As we approach the finish line for the EU's resolution of its sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis, it is becoming clearer that Eurozone banks are going to opt for providing 'utter transparency.'

As this blog has said on several occasions, utter transparency is disclosure of the bank's current asset and liability details.

Why are banks going to voluntarily adopt detailed disclosure of their current assets and liabilities?

First, because no investor is going to put money into a Eurozone bank without being able to assess the risk of the bank and knowing if it is currently solvent or not.  This was definitively shown in Spain, where the cajas did not disclose this information and most of them ended up being nationalized because they could not tap the capital markets for new equity.

Second, because the Eurozone bank managers want to raise equity from the capital markets and avoid the numerous restrictions that will be placed on them if they cannot do so and instead have to turn to their host government or the European Financial Stability Fund for capital.  These restrictions cover bonus payments and dividends.

As the Telegraph live reports,
Banks should first use private sources of capital, including through restructuring and conversion of debt to equity instruments. 
Banks should be subject to constraints regarding the distribution of dividends and bonus payments until the target has been attained. 
If necessary, national governments should provide support, and if this support is not available, recapitalisation should be funded via a loan from the EFSF in the case of Eurozone countries.

Saturday, October 22, 2011

Its hard to fix the European financial system when bank lobbyists are invited to the summit

According to a Bloomberg article, as the European finance ministers debate how to solve the sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis the banking industry lobby is present at the summit.

How ridiculous is that?

Do any of these finance ministers expect the industry lobbyists or the European equivalent of Wall Street investment bankers to actually recommend a solution that does not benefit the industry?

Do any of these finance ministers actually understand that Wall Street is set up to make money if the ministers adopt their self-serving suggestions or to make money by saying the sky is falling if the ministers do not adopt these suggestions?

When I first proposed the FDR Framework's blueprint for saving the financial system, I realized it was an uphill fight to get it implemented even though the mainstream media had finally discovered the link between disclosure and trust/confidence.

Even though the banks have their lobbyists present and Wall Street is also well represented, I still expect the EU finance ministers to realize that all they are seeing is variations of failed ideas.  The EU finance ministers know these ideas failed before because they previously implemented them and turned a bank solvency crisis into a sovereign debt crisis.

I expect the EU finance ministers to listen to the UK's George Osborne's call to end "sticky plaster" short-term solutions.

When that occurs, the EU finance ministers will recognize that US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner is right.  They do have the ability to solve the problem themselves.

They can simply apply what Walter Bagehot recognized in 1883.  "A well-run bank needs no capital.  No amount of capital will rescue a badly run bank."

The solution that common sense dictates is not to bailout banks, but rather to force the banks to become well run banks.

This requires the banks to take the losses on all the debt that the banks should not have underwritten in the first place.  This is not some option to be negotiated with the banks.  This is the country which hosts each of these banks exorcising its authority and telling the banks what they will do.

At the same time, the EFSF will guarantee all deposits at the European banks to reduce the possibility of a bank run.  Finally, the finance ministers will require that all Eurozone banks disclose their current asset and liability level data on an ongoing basis so that market participants, including regulators, can monitor these banks to be sure that they are well-run from now on.

Of course the lobbyists and investment bankers will dislike this solution, which is another reason to believe that it is the right solution.
A 10-hour meeting in Brussels failed to yield a blueprint for banks’ role in a revamped Greek rescue as European finance ministers haggled over what they called a “credible firewall” against fallout from deeper writedowns. 
The ministers’ meeting broke up at about 7 p.m. after reaching agreement that European banks may need about 100 billion euros ($139 billion) in capital after marking their sovereign-debt holdings to market values, according to a person familiar with the discussions. This amount is needed to reach a core tier 1 capital level of 9 percent based on a European Banking Authority test, said the person, who declined to be identified because discussions are private. 
The struggle to get an accord on bank capital was just one piece of solving the two-year-old financial crisis. Governments also are pushing for deeper writedowns on banks’ holdings of Greek debt, a step the investors are resisting. 
“Discussions are making progress, albeit limited,” Charles Dallara, managing director of the Institute of International Finance, the umbrella group for 450 of the world’s biggest financial companies, said in a statement late today. 
The negotiations were part of a six-day stretch of talks aimed at stopping contagion spreading to Spain and Italy as the turmoil pushes Greece closer to default, roils global markets and dents confidence in the survival of the 17-nation currency. Finance ministers now yield the conference tables after two days of talks to leaders, who meet tomorrow and on Oct. 26.

EU finance minister review variations on strategies that failed to end solvency crisis in 2009

According to a Bloomberg article, the EU finance ministers are reviewing a number of different strategies for addressing the sovereign debt/bank solvency crisis.

So far, the review appears to be covering variations of all the strategies that failed to end the bank solvency crisis in 2009 and resulted in the crisis also becoming a sovereign debt crisis.

An example of failed strategy from 2009 that has been dusted off for Europe is PPIP (the public private investment partnership).  PPIP has been dragged out as a way for Europe to leverage up the European Financial Stability Fund.

In the US, PPIP was a failure from the standpoint of restoring a normal functioning to the market for private label residential mortgage-backed securities.  That market is essentially closed.  For example, the Fed reduced prices across the $2 trillion market by 20% when it tried to sell $32 billion in securities.

PPIP has been good for Wall Street, so it is no surprise that a variation of it has been trotted out for Europe.

It is not at all clear why the European version of PPIP should also not be a failure.  In the US, PPIP put the government at risk for the first loss and the US government provided most of the funds to support the investment.  In essence, the investors were buying a low cost option that the securities were worth at least their purchase price.

In Europe, investors are looking at a situation where when large sovereigns default, they tend to have very large losses on their debt - see Greek bonds currently trading for 30% of par.  If the EFSF is only guaranteeing the first 20% of losses so it can "support" 2 trillion euros of bond purchases, it does not appear to offer the investors that good of a return for the risk.

Alternatively, does the EU expect to enhance the bonds of any country that relies on investors who receive a guarantee from the EFSF by requiring the country to effectively sign over control of its budget?  This includes agreeing to implement austerity and any other structural reforms (including raising taxes) necessary to repay their bonds.  I cannot see this form of indenture-hood being acceptable to any EU country.

Regular readers will remember that under the FDR Framework's blueprint for saving the financial system, the EFSF is going to be highly leveraged.  It is going to insure the deposits in the Eurozone banks.

This is necessary because the Eurozone banks are going to be required to write their assets down to a price where they could expect to sell the asset to an independent third party.  Recognizing these write downs is highly likely to result in every Eurozone bank having a negative book value.

At the same time, every Eurozone bank will be required on an ongoing basis to disclose through a data warehouse their current assets and liability-level details.  This way market participants can monitor the risks the banks take and ensure that the banks stay on a path towards rebuilding their book capital.
European finance ministers are considering setting up a fund to entice outside investors to buy troubled euro-area government bonds, as they struggled over how to tame the Greece-fueled debt crisis, said a person familiar with the matter. 
The investment vehicle was one of two options being weighed, along with using the European Financial Stability Facility to boost the rescue firepower from 440 billion euros ($611 billion) currently, the person said. 
“The principle that we leverage the EFSF with private money is being subscribed by everyone, but the level of success is uncertain,” Dutch Finance Minister Jan Kees de Jager told reporters on the second day of crisis talks in Brussels. “How much can we raise, that is being looked at.” 
Europe’s room for maneuver narrowed yesterday with a report thatGreece’s economy is deteriorating, piling on pressure to build a stronger anti-crisis firewall by a self-imposed Oct. 26 deadline. Measures being considered include a boost in bailout funds to 940 billion euros, deeper writedowns on Greek debt, and a demand that banks increase Tier 1 capital to 9 percent by mid-2012.

Wednesday, October 19, 2011

Eurozone crisis highlights need for replacement for sovereign guarantee of bank deposits

In a Telegraph article, Citigroup's Willem Buiter, a highly regarded economist and former member of the Bank of England's monetary policy committee, warned that the Eurozone crisis could cause the collapse of the global banking system.
"If things get out of hand in the euro area, no bank in the financial integrated world will stand," he told a parliamentary committee ... the recapitalisation of banks and other systemically important institutions should be a priority in the region.
Actually, disclosure of each bank's current detailed asset and liability-level data should be the priority as simply injecting capital does not answer the question of which banks are solvent and which are insolvent.

With this data, market participants can assess which banks are solvent, which are insolvent and how and over what timeframe the recapitalization of insolvent banks should take place.

Of the insolvent banks, a determination can be made which have viable franchises and which do not.  The banks that have a viable franchise as shown by their ability to either retain enough earnings to restore their solvency or by attracting equity from the capital markets will continue.  The others will be closed.
"If they don't, we are setting ourselves up for a financial crisis following the sovereign crisis," he said, giving evidence at a session of the House of Lords EU Economic and Financial Affairs Sub-Committee on the eurozone crisis. 
In worrying about a financial crisis following the sovereign crisis, Mr. Buiter highlights the need for a replacement in Europe for the sovereign's guarantee of bank deposits.  Specifically, who steps in to guarantee the deposits at banks where the host nation restructures its debt and the banks are insolvent?

Reinforcing this guarantee is important to prevent a potential run on these banks.  In fact, the Eurozone governments don't have to recapitalize the banks if they guarantee the deposits.  So long as the banks have a franchise that is capable of earning money, over time they can retain enough earnings to restore their solvency.

The logical guarantor of the deposits is the European Financial Stability Fund.  It is also the most efficient way to leverage the EFSF in helping to recapitalize the Eurozone banks and sovereigns.

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

Germany's Merkel backs plans to recapitalize banks, but how much capital do they need? (updated)

A Telegraph article reports that Germany's Chancellor Angela Merkel backs plans to recapitalize the Eurozone banks.

The key questions are:  how much capital do the banks need and will there be disclosure of each bank's current asset and liability-level data so that market participants can confirm the adequacy of this additional capital injection?

Confirmation of the adequacy of the capital injection is critically important to restore market confidence because the mere discussion of another round of capital injections in the Eurozone banks clearly shows that the first round of capital injections was inadequate.

As previously discussed on this blog, potential recapitalization amounts range from the single digit billion euros (based on the EU financial regulators stress tests) to 200 - 300 million euros (based on the IMF's analysis) to maybe as much as 2 trillion euros (based on BlackRock Larry Fink's comment).

Regardless of what number is selected for recapitalizing the banks, market participants and Germany's Merkel are going to want to be able to verify that this recapitalization is sufficient to restore and maintain bank solvency.  The only way to do this is if each bank discloses its current asset and liability-level data.

If regulators do not require banks to make this disclosure, market participants and Germany's Merkel could easily conclude that the regulators are hiding something and that the banks are in fact not adequately capitalized.  After all, there is no reason not to disclose this data unless the banks are hiding something.
The German Chancellor's intervention on Wednesday rallied European markets after fears that EU's determination to prop up banks was wavering after a meeting of finance ministers on Monday failed to take a decision. 
"I think it is important, if there is a general view that the banks are not sufficiently capitalised for the current market situation, that one does it," she said following talks in Brussels.  Chancellor Merkel said that she was ready to support and to decide on a eurozone bank capitalisation plan as early as October 17, at an EU summit. 
"Germany is prepared to move to recapitalise. We need criteria. We are under pressure of time and we need to take a decision quickly," she said. 
Actually, as your humble blogger has repeatedly pointed out, Eurozone policymakers are not under time pressure to inject capital into the Eurozone banks.

Eurozone policymakers are under time pressure to put in place a mechanism for determining how much capital each bank needs.

Only after the size of the capital shortfall has been determined is it appropriate to talk about how and if each bank will be recapitalize - which banks will recapitalize themselves through retained earnings, which banks will be recapitalized by raising equity from the capital markets, which banks will be recapitalized by their host governments, and which banks are so far underwater that they will be closed.

The "how to" roadmap for doing this involves the following steps:

  1. Each bank discloses its current asset and liability-level data to all market participants;
  2. Market participants analyze this data and determine how much capital each bank needs;
  3. Working with market participants, the regulators determine appropriate strategy for recapitalizing each bank; and 
  4. Banks recapitalized.
Please note, these steps will not be completed in 5 weeks.  However, that is not what is needed to restore confidence in the market.

What is needed is that the market sees the Eurozone governments committed to a path that will address and end the solvency crisis.

... Germany is said to support a move by the European Banking Authority to raise minimum capitalisation levels, a change that would lead to a need for financial support for banks with exposure to Greek or other sovereign debt risk.... 
Germany's intervention soothed markets but will intensify pressure on France. 
France, with banks that are among the most exposed, including its stake in Dexia, is opposed to recapitalisation. Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president, is concerned that the huge sums he might have to pay out could threaten the French AAA sovereign debt rating ahead of elections next year.
Using my approach, it is not clear that governments will have to inject huge sums of money in their banking systems.  Private investors are likely to put up the money when they can assess the risk of each bank.
"I think it will be a very important signal to the international financial markets," she said.
The key is to send the right message.  My modest proposal is the message that needs to be sent.
"There's just news of discussions about a possible bank recapitalisations, there's no details yet," said Kasper Kirkegaard, currency strategist at Danske in Copenhagen. "There's a high risk of a further sell-off if we don't get details on this soon."
The details that need to be laid out is a credible plan for addressing the need to recapitalize the banks.

Update


A Wall Street Journal article discusses a 'plan' to restore investor confidence in Eurozone banks.  Under the plan, each EU nation and its financial regulators are now suppose to tell how much capital each bank actually needs.

Currently, the plan lacks verifiability by market participants.  Instead, market participants are suppose to simply believe these numbers.

This plan is highly unlikely to restore confidence.  At a minimum, it excludes two key ingredients to restoring confidence.  These ingredients are current asset and liability-level disclosure and investor participation in the determination of how much capital each bank needs.

Germany is putting pressure on other euro-zone governments to declare how they would recapitalize their banks if the need arose, as part of a concerted effort to repair investors' battered confidence in European banks....

German officials hope that a coordinated demonstration by euro-zone governments that they have contingency plans for their banks in place would calm financial-market fears of a banking crisis in the region....
As well as alleviating such funding strains, German officials hope that a system of backstops for banks would give the euro zone more freedom to deal with Greece's teetering debts—including the option of restructuring Greek bonds. 
Investors fear that some European banks would struggle to digest the losses that would follow from a major Greek debt restructuring, unless the banks receive capital injections from national or European authorities....

Banks should seek to raise capital first from private investors, and from national authorities if they can't tap the market, she said. If national authorities don't have the necessary resources, banks should turn to currency bloc's main bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Facility, she said....

Germany has said in recent days that it stands ready, if necessary, to reactivate its national banking bailout fund, which was set up in 2008 but is now closed to new aid requests from banks. Reopening the fund would require approval from Germany's parliament, but Berlin officials believe they could get that authorization quickly.

Germany professes confidence that its own banks, which have so far avoided the worst of the recent funding strains, don't need more capital. But Europe's biggest economy wants the single-currency bloc to send a united, reassuring signal to financial markets about its banks.

German officials have complained that some other governments haven't put in place national contingency plans to support their banks. German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble was frustrated at the lack of progress in some countries when European finance ministers discussed the issue in Luxembourg early this week, according to people familiar with the matter....

France's government, however, is reluctant to reactivate its banking bailout measures dating from 2008, according to people familiar with the matter. Paris is deeply worried about losing its triple-A credit rating if the rating agencies decide the country can't afford any costly new bank-support measures, these people say....

French banks are also against announcing a new national banking backstop, for fear that it could spook financial markets already worried about French lenders' exposure to indebted Southern European countries.

Monday, September 26, 2011

Bankers splinter on remedy for European debt

As predicted under the FDR Framework, without the appropriate disclosure, bankers splinter on what the appropriate remedy for the European debt crisis is.

A Bloomberg article reports,
Wall Street leaders, urging coordinated action from world governments to solve the European sovereign-debt crisis, struggled themselves during four days of meetings in Washington to agree on what’s needed to end it. 
The chiefs of firms including JPMorgan Chase & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Deutsche Bank AG and Societe Generale SA met for three hours at the National Archives on Sept. 23. They differed on which government and private solutions may restore confidence in European debt and banks, and on some elements of regulation, said two participants who spoke on condition of anonymity because the meeting wasn’t public.
Since all the solutions that have been tried since the solvency crisis began on August 9, 2007, have failed - we would not be worrying about solvency now if they had worked - it is not surprising the bankers were skeptical that variations of these solutions would work now.

As Winston Churchill said of the US, they always find the right solution, they just have to try everything else first.

In the case of restoring confidence, the only idea that has not been tried is the roadmap based on the FDR Framework which requires disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

Bankers are unlikely to voluntarily choose the roadmap, because it eliminates their ability to profit from opacity or take proprietary trading positions.
... Bank-stock indexes in Europe and the U.S. have dropped more than 30 percent this year and borrowing costs for European lenders have climbed amid concern that Greece and other European countries may default. The level of disagreement between bankers and government officials who gathered for the annual IMF meeting was matched only by their shared sense that the stakes have rarely been higher.... 
Discussion of European governments’ options, including how to use their 440 billion-euro ($596 billion) rescue fund, dominated the policy meetings. Most European parliaments, including Germany’s, still haven’t voted on a July 21 plan to endow the fund with more powers, including the ability to buy bonds and inject money into banks.

U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy F. Geithner urged governments to unite with the European Central Bank to increase the firepower of the fund, known as the European Financial Stability Facility. 
Having experience with leveraging up TARP in the US, think PPIP, Geithner is exporting the Geithner Plan to Europe.

For better or worse, Europe does not seem eager to embrace the Geithner Plan given that it did not work in the US.  For example, PPIP was suppose to restore a normal market for private label RMBS.  Clearly, it did not do this as the Fed could not sell a trivial amount of RMBS paper without causing the price on RMBS paper to decline by 20%.
The Institute of International Finance, an organization of more than 400 financial companies worldwide, holds its annual meetings in parallel with the IMF’s. In normal times, the private-sector bankers use the weekend to mingle with one another, and with government ministers and central bankers, trying to win business and get policy insight.,,, 
A classic opportunity for lobbying.
Yet in private discussions, bankers said the environment was exceptional. A senior European banker said he sees policy makers’ decisions as being as momentous as those in the 1930s. A senior U.S. bank executive said he’s more worried than he was at any point during the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009.
It is not surprising the level of concern as the limits of fiscal and monetary policy are quickly being reached as this marks the end of pushing addressing the solvency crisis into the future.

To address solvency in the 1930s, policy makers adopted disclosure. Will policy makers repeat a successful strategy now?
... Schaeuble, the German finance minister, addressed the same room hours later with a contrasting message: “We won’t come to grips with economies deleveraging by having governments and central banks throwing -- literally -- even more money at the problem,” he said. 
Regular readers know this is true.  What is needed is disclosure so that market participants know if the money that is being literally thrown everywhere is in fact addressing the solvency crisis.

Saturday, September 24, 2011

Europe's Super TARP

Another weekend, another grand bank bailout scheme.

Based on what has been reported, Europe is apparently going to set up a super TARP with 1.5 trillion euros.  The funds are going to be spent to ring-fence Ireland, Greece and Portugal debt and to recapitalize the European banks.

As always, the critical question is:  where did the figure come from?

Apparently European banks were not as well capitalized as the recent stress tests suggested.

However, the idea that the European banks that passed the stress tests need a significant capital injection:

  • Completely discredits the national bank regulators and anyone else involved in the stress tests.  Who would trust anything they have to say now?
  • Says that the size of the equity injections are a reflection of "Kentucky Windage" - make believe.  After all, it is one thing to represent that the banks need to raise a few billion euros of additional capital, it is entirely another to say that the banks actually need upwards of a trillion euros of additional capital.
  • Clearly, this will not restore confidence in the markets.  Remember, in a leveraged financial system there is never enough equity in the face of fears of contagion from a meltdown of sovereign debt and real estate debt.  The situation can be much worse than is being presented - if in doubt, look at the Irish experience.
If the Europeans ever want to solve their problem, they will turn to the FDR Framework based roadmap.  Until that time, they are simply wasting taxpayer money.

Friday, July 22, 2011

Latest European bailout buys time for implementing FDR Framework disclosure

European leaders unveiled their latest effort to address the sovereign debt and bank solvency crisis.  It is a fund to bailout countries and banks.

As regular readers know, bailouts do not address the underlying solvency issues of the countries or the banks, but rather buy time.  This time can be used to pray for a miracle or to actually address the underlying solvency problem.

Since I am an optimist, I will assume that the time will be used to address the underlying solvency problems.

For European banks, the first step in doing this is to adopt and implement the disclosure requirements of the FDR Framework.  This means providing market participants with access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  For banks, this information is current asset and liability-level data.

Market participants will then use this data to determine which banks are solvent and which are not.  This is done by comparing the market value of each bank's assets to the book value of its liabilities.  If the market value of its assets exceeds the book value of its liabilities, the bank is solvent.  Otherwise it is insolvent.

Perhaps more importantly, everyone knows how much capital is needed by the insolvent institutions to restore them to solvency.  The insolvent banks can either be recapitalized by the national government using funds from the bailout fund or closed.

Adopting disclosure under the FDR Framework and combining it with the bailout fund allows each country to restore solvency to its banking system independent of its sovereign debt situation.