Showing posts with label Mother of all financial databases. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Mother of all financial databases. Show all posts

Friday, November 30, 2012

Office of Financial Research: looks for advice in all the wrong places

In his ProPublica article, Jesse Eisinger confirms your humble blogger's observation that the Office of Financial Research is a tool of the financial services industry to bury transparency.

Regular readers know that there are two pillars underlying the FDR Framework:

  • The philosophy of disclosure; and
  • The Principle of Caveat Emptor (buyer beware).
OFR was designed under the Dodd-Frank Act to bring as much opacity to the financial system as possible.  Specifically, OFR can collect data, but it cannot share this data with market participants.  It can only provide summary analyses.

As a result, the ability of the market to analyze the data collected by OFR is never brought to bear on the data.

As Mr. Eisinger observed,
But hardly anyone is paying much attention to the Office of Financial Research. 
This entity was created by the Dodd-Frank Act to conduct independent research on the sweeping risks to the financial system. Ah, right, another group of Washington wonks who will issue reports carrying vague warnings of risks looming sometime in the uncertain future. Yawn. I hadn't paid much attention either. 
But then I spoke to Ross Levine, an economist and specialist in regulation at Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, and I finally got it. The Office of Financial Research is a great idea.
Indeed it is as it is based on my call since the beginning of the financial crisis to create the "Mother of all financial databases".
And as I grasped it, I felt a minor sense of horror, as when you see a precious ring slip off a finger in slow motion and go down the drain while you are powerless to stop it. 
This was exactly how I felt when I saw the supporters of the National Institute of Finance come bumbling into the space I had defined with the call for the "Mother of all financial databases".
The office is looking as if it will be a tool of the financial services industry, instead of a check on it. 
Which is exactly what the National Institute of Finance and its supporters managed to achieve because they had not the slightest clue about what they were doing.
Its main role is to serve the Financial Stability Oversight Council, providing the systemic risk overseer with data and analysis of where the nukes are buried.
This is where they made there first mistake.  OFR should never have been in the research business.  It should solely have been in the business of overseeing a data warehouse run by a third party that collected, standardized and disseminate data to all market participants.

Everyone knows except the ego maniacs who were part of the National Institute of Finance that the market is better collectively at doing analysis than a handful of economists.

By insisting on doing analysis, the supporters of the National Institute of Finance opened the door for the Wall Street lobbyists to both neuter OFR and protect opacity in the financial system by burying transparency in the form of the "Mother of all financial databases".
But the Office of Financial Research was hobbled from the get-go by a poor design. It is housed in the Treasury Department, while ostensibly being independent of it. It has a small budget. And it has to report to the very regulators it is supposed to report on. 
This month, it announced its advisory committee. Thirty big names charged with giving the fledgling operation direction and gravitas. But these same people have also compromised it. 
A committee that by design substitutes for the market if OFR had been a tool to bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system like I intended that it should be.  Instead...
By my count, 19 of the 30 committee members work directly in financial services or for private sector entities that are dependent on the industry. There are academics, but many of them have lucrative ties to the financial services industry. I noted only one financial industry critic: Damon A. Silvers, the policy director for the A.F.L.-C.I.O.... 
The Treasury Department sees it differently. 
"We were not looking for critics or proponents. That wasn't the goal," said Neal S. Wolin, the Treasury deputy secretary. "We were looking for people with a range of perspectives who understand keenly the systemic risks in the financial system."... 
The world is teeming with expert critics of Big Banking; they just aren't heard from much in the halls of Washington. 
The Federal Reserve Banks of Kansas City and Dallas have candidates. The economist Joseph Stiglitz would make a good choice. The Bank of England houses two prominent banking critics, Andy Haldane and Robert Jenkins. Outfits like Better Markets or Demos could nominate people who would give Jamie Dimon some indigestion. 
Certainly, financiers are not a monolithic lot. Investors often have differing interests from those of banks, and investment banks from commercial banks, and the small from the large. Even in big institutions, there are secret sharers of anti-Wall Street sentiment. ...
Clearly, there is a place for finance professionals. But shouldn't the balance of the committee be tilted in the opposite direction and give greater voice to the critics and the banking skeptics? This is a panel that is supposed to identify giant risks in the system that bankers ignore in their pursuit of profit and bonuses and to spot flaws in regulations that could cost the public and economy trillions....
Imagine how all of these market participants could have been utilized to identify problems in the financial system if OFR were there to foster transparency rather than create opacity by monopolizing information. 
So why does yet another Washington advisory panel of worthies matter? Mr. Levine has a subtle and fascinating answer. He starts by pointing to the mystery of the home-team advantage in sports, which has long puzzled researchers.
It turns out that umpires are biased toward the home team not out of conscious or recognizable bias. Rather, they subconsciously gravitate toward their immediate "community" — in this case, the home-field crowd, especially at crucial moments in a game. (Researchers will next study how this appears to have no effect whatsoever on the New York Jets.) 
To minimize the bias, you can tell the umpires that they are being monitored. Introduce instant replay. With that, you have expanded the community that is watching the umpires to an audience far beyond the home crowd....
Which is exactly what happens when the data is made available to all market participants.
The Office of Financial Research is well on its way to barring the gate. 
Before the crisis, the consensus was that the Office of Thrift Supervision was the regulator most in the pocket of Big Banking. For its efforts, it got shut down as part of the postcrisis regulatory overhaul. 
"Now, the title of ‘Most Captured' is up for grabs," Mr. Johnson said. "And I think we have a contender." 

Saturday, November 24, 2012

European Parliament call for transparency and the creation of the "Mother of all financial databases"

In studying how to balance the risks and benefits of shadow banking, the European Parliament concludes this is best done by enhancing transparency and creating the "Mother of all financial databases".

From a European Parliament press release,

Better prudential oversight is needed to reduce shadow banking's systemic risks, without stifling its benefits to the economy, say MEPs in a resolution voted on Tuesday. 
Shadow banking institutions account for up to 30% of the global financial system, worth over €50 trillion in 2011. In good times, they provide credit to people or entities that otherwise cannot get it and so fund the real economy. But if they make bad investments they have no protection, because they do not hold deposits and have no access to central bank liquidity. 
Risks to regular banks
Shadow banks do not exist on their own. They are interconnected with regular banks, which often use them to get round capital and accounting rules. If they collapse, they can cause a domino effect across other financial institutions and borders, bringing down regular banks and ultimately harming taxpayers across the EU who are obliged to come to the rescue. 
Safeguard alternative funding
MEPs say that shadow banking should be better monitored and supervised, so as to reduce the systemic risks they pose without cutting of the benefits that they provided to the real economy. 
Prudential oversight should reduce the systemic risks that shadow banking may pose due to the lack of data on financial flows and interconnections and the highly complex nature of its financial products....
Identify systemic risks
MEPs also suggest ways to reduce identified systemic risks, such as extending capital requirements to all unregulated entities, imposing limits on the complexity of  financial products or considering whether shadow banking entities linked to a bank should be included in the bank's balance sheet. 
Finally, MEPs call on the Commission to adopt a consistent approach to collecting data centrally, with a view to mapping all financial service transactions in real time so as to capture the riskiest deals.
The first step in mapping financial flows is to collect the data on each financial institution's exposures.  Doing this requires that the financial institutions provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This data should be collected and made available to all market participants through the "Mother of all financial databases".

Tuesday, October 23, 2012

Time to rethink regulatory reform and replace it with ultra transparency

The American Banker ran an interesting article on all the complex rules that are being implemented as a result of the Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III and asking if there is a better solution.

Regular readers know that all these complex rules and increases in regulatory oversight are a substitute for the simple solution of transparency and market discipline.

As I have said numerous times, with the exception of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule, Dodd-Frank should be repealed.

It should be replaced with an Act that brings transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  At a minimum, this Act should
  • Require that banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This is the data market participants need to independently assess the risk of the banks and exert discipline to restrain risk taking.
  • Require that structured finance securities provide observable event based reporting on all activities like a payment or default involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.  This is the data that investors need to know what they own.
Utilizing 21st century information technology, all of this disclosure can be centralized in the 'Mother of All Financial Databases' and made available to all market participants.

Market participants have an incentive to use this data because there is money to be made from using it.
  • For example, banks with deposits to lend can use this data to assess the risk of banks looking to borrow.  With this assessment, the interbank lending market can reopen.
  • For example, market participants can calculate Libor because they have access to all of the interbank transactions.
Regular readers know that unlike complex rules and regulatory oversight, transparency and market discipline have pass the test of time.
How ripe is the moment? Even lawmakers who voted for the 2010 reform law are open to improving it. 
"Congress never gets it right, when you're looking at massive reform legislation, the first time through," Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., told The Hill newspaper last week. "You directionally head in an area and then you come back, two years, three years hence to do a corrections legislation."...
Ammunition for anyone seeking change arrived Monday from Karen Shaw Petrou of Federal Financial Analytics.... 
Her stark conclusion: even if regulators did everything called for in Dodd-Frank, and did it perfectly, financial services supervision would still be a mess. Throw Basel III in the mix and it just gets worse. 
The end-result of numerous agencies pumping out massive rules to meet statutory deadlines will be a tangle of contradictory mandates that will be tough to enforce and impossible to comply with....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Petrou makes the case for restarting financial reform with a simple focus on bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

As I have documented on this blog, simply bringing transparency back to the opaque corners of the financial system will go a long way towards fixing all of the problems that financial reform is suppose to address.

Transparency has one more advantage over loophole ridden complicated regulations that the industry will render irrelevant.  Transparency has been shown to prevent a financial crisis in the first place.  

Saturday, September 29, 2012

Repost: The Future of Finance: The end of opacity and the Mother of all financial databases

This post originally appeared on November 22, 2010.  Bloomberg's Jonathan Weil linked to it (see: markets) in his column on Sheila Bair's new book when he concluded
So let’s eliminate the secrecy. It damages our economy, undermines investor confidence and gives financial institutions too much leeway to go astray. 
Regulators haven’t shown themselves to be any better than the markets are when it comes to uncovering big problems at federally insured banks. We might as well make all their examination findings open records. That way, the public can see when the regulators are failing at their jobs. Depositors can make fully informed choices about where to keep their money. And banks will be under much greater pressure to fix their problems.
The post

The future of finance is the elimination of opacity throughout the financial system by using 21st century information technology.

This statement is the logical conclusion of the Bank of England's plan to substitute market discipline for bank examination.

As discussed in an earlier post, Bank of England Adopting 21st Century Oversight of Financial Institutions,  the current model of bank examination does not work.

The current bank examination model, as practiced by regulators like the Financial Services Authority and Federal Reserve, involves sending out large numbers of examiners to look through the banks' books, demanding lots of detailed information for their internal review and asking the banks to run stress tests on assumptions the regulators provide.  A key feature of this model is that no detailed information is shared with the markets.

If this model looks like it parallels how the rating agencies operate, it does.

The parallel in the US goes all the way to the issuance of a CAMELS rating by the regulator.  A CAMELS rating is for regulators eyes only and is a reflection of a bank's overall condition in the areas of capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management (M), earnings (E), liquidity (L) and sensitivity to market risk (S).

Just like the ratings produced by the rating agencies, since the markets do not have the information to do their own homework, the markets have to trust that the regulators get their ratings right.

Unfortunately, recent history shows that regulators were just like the rating agencies and they did not always get their ratings right.

According to a WSJ article,
a top Bank of England official, Andy Haldane, said the new regulator will curtail the FSA's practice of dispatching dozens of examiners to banks to collect loads of granular information... Mr. Haldane noted that ... they rarely yield much useful information for regulators, who can find themselves overwhelmed by the quantity of data."
Mr. Haldane identified the flaw in the bank examination model and the reason that regulators need to have banks disclose more information to the markets.

The markets are not overwhelmed by the quantity of data disclosed by financial institutions.  There are a number of market participants who are able to and have an incentive to analyze all of the individual asset level data these institutions could provide and turn it into useful information.




Andrew Redleaf, a hedge fund manager, takes the idea of banks disclosing data and market participants using this data further.  

He wrote
the late crisis happened not because banks were reckless or regulators incompetent, though both were surely true. It happened because together banks and regulators forged a system that denied citizens and markets the information they needed to respond rationally to events.

Banking has always been too secretive in this country. Banks are quasi-public institutions, performing both private and public functions, including sustaining the credit system that sustains the dollar itself. In return, the big banks especially are granted extraordinary privileges, such as the right to borrow from the Fed virtually for free at times of crisis.
 
Under the circumstances there is no excuse for bank balance sheets to be anything but utterly transparent to the citizens and investors.... 
Imagine for a moment that in 2004 the government had required every major financial institution in the U.S., any one with the potential for imperiling credit markets, to publish their investment positions. All of them. In detail. Lists of every security or derivative held in their portfolios, along with all data about the underlying mortgage pools, defaults so far, etc.
With such a rule in place, the mortgage crisis likely would never have happened on the scale it did. Most of the worst mortgages, the loans that crashed the system, were written from 2005 through the early days of 2007. Opening the banks' books would have revealed just how near the edge they were playing. 
The resulting market pressure on bank securities would have forced them to cut back their mortgage books. This would have been a crisis of a sort; the housing bubble would have popped. But popping the bubble two years earlier would have avoided the worst of the damage.
Even if transparency failed to avoid the mortgage crisis, it almost certainly would have prevented the banking crisis and the crash of 2008. Because we would have known. 
We would have known how much -- or how little -- trouble Bear was in long before March 2008. We would have known, for better or worse, about Lehman, and Morgan, and Goldman, and Citi. Not instantly. 
It would take time to digest millions of lines of information kept secret for decades. But surely millions of investors poring over the information, including those heroic rag-pickers, of capitalism the vultures and short-sellers would have given us a quicker and better answer than the grand-high-poo-bahs.
The megabanks would hate it....They would scream bloody murder about being forced to let competitors see what they owned. Nonsense. 
Investors who hold interesting or unusual positions in their portfolios may have something to lose by disclosure. But too-big-to-fail banks have no business taking "interesting" positions. Banks are not supposed to be extra clever, they are supposed to be extra careful."
On February 23, 2009, in a Wired article, Daniel Roth provided the support for Mr. Haldane's observation and solution in much more detail.  
"Even the regulators can't keep up. A Senate study in 2002 found that the SEC had managed to fully review just 16 percent of the nearly 15,000 annual reports that companies submitted in the previous fiscal year; the recently disgraced Enron hadn't been reviewed in a decade. 
We shouldn't be surprised. While the SEC is staffed by a relatively small group of poorly compensated financial cops, Wall Street bankers get paid millions to create new and ever more complicated investment products. By the time regulators get a handle on one investment class, a slew of new ones have been created. 
'This is a cycle that goes on and on—and will continue to get repeated,' says Peter Wysocki, a professor at the MIT Sloan School of Management. 'You can't just make new regulations about the next innovation in financial misreporting.' 

That's why it's not enough to simply give the SEC—or any of its sister regulators—more authority; we need to rethink our entire philosophy of regulation.
 
Instead of assigning oversight responsibility to a finite group of bureaucrats, we should enable every investor to act as a citizen-regulator. We should tap into the massive parallel processing power of people around the world by giving everyone the tools to track, analyze, and publicize financial machinations. 
The result would be a wave of decentralized innovation that can keep pace with Wall Street and allow the market to regulate itself—naturally punishing companies and investments that don't measure up—more efficiently than the regulators ever could.

Tracking Wall Street's complex inventions may be difficult for regulators, but it's a snap given the right software....
 
When data is kept under lock and key, as mysterious as a temple secret, only the priests can read and interpret it. But place it in the public domain and suddenly it takes on new life. People start playing with the information, reaching strange new conclusions or raising questions that no one else would think to ask. It is impossible to predict who will become obsessed with the data or why—but someone will. 
'People care about money,' Tim Bray, director of Web technologies at Sun Microsystems says. 'There's money in money and substantial personal upside to someone who can mine the data and uncover the truth.'"
How can the disclosure pushed by regulators like Haldane and investors like Redleaf actually be implemented?

By creating the "mother of all financial databases."  This is the database that your humble blogger has been pushing since before the credit crisis (here, here and here) and is necessary if European investors are going to be able to comply with the 'know what you own" provision of Article 122a of the European Capital Requirements Directive.  

This is the database that the Office of Financial Research and Data (OFR) is suppose to develop, but because it is a governmental entity never will.  OFR is fundamentally handicapped because:
  1. The current operating philosophy of the regulators is not to share detailed information with the market.  
  2. By law it must, where possible, use information collected by other governmental agencies.  What if the frequency that another governmental agencies collects data, say monthly, is not what is required to, as Lloyd Blankfein advised, monitor every position every day?
What is required is an independent third party to run the mother of all financial databases.  The independent third party must only be in the business of managing this database.  This assures all market participants that the database is free of all conflicts of interest and they can trust the numbers.

Tuesday, September 11, 2012

Don't let bankers police themselves or Libor

The Bloomberg editors make the case for why bankers should not police themselves or Libor.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has recommended as the permanent solution for fixing the problems with the Libor interest rates that banks be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This disclosure is needed so that banks with deposits to lend can assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the interbank lending market.

This disclosure is needed so that the Libor interest rates can be based off of all or a subset of the actual trades.

I have recommended that this disclosure be collected, standardized (including stripping off borrower privacy protected information) and disseminated by a data warehouse.  The day to day operation of the data warehouse should be run by a global information technology firm with no conflicts of interest in the dissemination of the data.

Overseeing the global information technology firm and coordinating all aspects of the data warehouse is a firm with the subject matter expertise.  This firm must have no conflicts of interests including any ownership by the banks.  This firm's sole business should be making sure the data warehouse provides reliable information.

From the Bloomberg editors,

Sooner or later, the global inquiry into the rigging of Libor will have to deal with a sticky issue: what to do with the British Bankers’ Association, the trade group that was supposed to guarantee the integrity of one of the world’s most important financial benchmarks. 
Founded in 1919, the BBA exists primarily to lobby for the interests of its member banks.... 
If the BBA had set out to design a system that its members could manipulate, it couldn’t have done a much better job. Instead of using the interest rates from actual transactions, the association relies on banks to report their borrowing costs. The chairmen of the committees that are supposed to oversee Libor, investigate misbehavior and impose sanctions are all from contributing institutions. Absurdly, the BBA won’t say whether the committees have ever taken any enforcement actions, and keeps secret the names of all the committee members. That amounts to letting the banks act as police, judge and jury in a Star Chamber.

We now know that bankers exploited Libor’s flaws as early as the 1990s. They manipulated their numbers to improve traders’ profits and to hide their financial troubles. 
All the while, the BBA demonstrated its utter inability -- or unwillingness -- to stop it. There is even evidence suggesting the BBA was complicit.
Consider, for example, a conversation between a senior Barclays Plc manager and a BBA representative cited in the bank’s settlement with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
In April 2008, when a Wall Street Journal article questioned the integrity of Libor, the manager “informed BBA in a telephone call that it had not been reporting accurately, although he noted that Barclays was not the worst offender of the panel bank members. ‘We’re clean, but we’re dirty-clean, rather than clean-clean.’ The BBA representative responded, ‘no one’s clean-clean.’” 
The BBA’s response has been a case study in self-regulation gone wrong. Throughout the period of manipulation, the BBA consistently claimed that Libor was reliable....
The primary reason that self-regulation goes wrong is opacity.  In the case of setting the Libor interest rate, without disclosure of the actual trades, banks were free to engage in misbehavior and manipulate the rate.
Given the BBA’s history and inherent conflicts, it’s hard to imagine how it could be found fit and proper to manage Libor. This is a big problem, because the association owns the Libor trademark. Hundreds of trillions of dollars in financial contracts cite BBA Libor.
In order to restore trust in Libor, besides requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, it is critical to eliminate, where possible, all conflicts of interest in the operation and management of the data warehouse.

That is why I stressed the need for the firm coordinating all aspects of the data warehouse and overseeing the information technology firm running the database to be free of all conflicts of interest.

Introducing conflicts of interest creates doubt about the trustworthiness of the data for no benefit.
Even if the market moves to a different benchmark, as Bloomberg View has advocated, those legacy contracts will be around for decades. 
What to do?....
Have the data warehouse license the BBA Libor trademark for 1 pound per year.  
One option is to bring the currently unregulated Libor process under the purview of U.K. financial authorities. Regulators could sit on the Libor oversight committees and set enforceable rules for contributing banks. They could also mandate more transparency by requiring contributors to publish information on actual borrowing transactions, against which a bank’s Libor quotes could be checked.
As per the recommendation of your humble blogger.
Ideally, the BBA should be removed from the picture. U.K. regulators persuaded Barclays Chief Executive Officer Robert Diamond to step down; they should put similar pressure on the BBA to sell Libor. 
An organization such as a financial exchange or financial information company would have an incentive to guarantee the benchmark’s accuracy. (Disclosure: Bloomberg LP, the parent of Bloomberg News, has proposed its own alternative to Libor, and is a competitor of Thomson Reuters Corp., which conducts Libor surveys on behalf of the BBA.)
No reason to use an existing market competitor with a conflict of interest to operate and manage this database.  This creates an un-level competitive playing field for no advantage.

Rather, use the conflict of interest free coordinator and global information technology firm as I suggested.

Sunday, August 19, 2012

Bank of England issued warning last year that UK banking system could collapse

The Telegraph reports that before last Christmas the Bank of England's Paul Tucker warned the heads of the largest UK banks that their businesses would not survive a collapse of the eurozone.

What has changed since then?

Have the banks completely sold off all of their exposure to the EU?  Have the banks raised so much capital that they could absorb the losses on the EU exposures?

At a minimum, this confirms the needs for ultra transparency and the creation of the "Mother of all financial databases" so these questions can be answered by all market participants.

Bank of England officials were so concerned about the potential for a financial crisis late last year they took the extra­ordinary step of warning the entire banking system could collapse “before Christmas”. 
Paul Tucker, the deputy governor of the Bank of England, told an October meeting of the chief executives of Britain’s largest banks that there was a serious chance none of their businesses would survive to the end of the year. 
“Gentlemen, you could all be out of business by Christmas,” Mr Tucker said in a stark warning to the bank chiefs, according to three sources present at the meeting. 
The revelation of Mr Tucker’s remarkable warning shows the depth of fear among senior officials over the havoc the collapse of the eurozone would wreak on the British financial system.... 
Minutes published by the Bank’s Financial Policy Committee in September and December made clear the depth of its concerns, but the explicit warning given to the chief executives shows that officials feared a crisis even greater than that in the wake of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
The meeting led directly to the creation of working groups at banks to gauge the potential for a full-scale collapse of the financial system. 
One executive present said his institution had been so concerned by Mr Tucker’s warning that it had re-evaluated its entire risk positions. 
It is shocking to think that the banks late last year had no idea their exposure to an EU collapse.

This is further confirmation of the need to require the banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this data, everyone would know everyone else's exposure.
However, another executive present said he had been disappointed with the Bank of England’s response and said that, despite the dire warning, it actually did “very little” to help deal with the situation. 
The most important aspect of transparency is that it puts each market participant into a position where they can do something to help deal with the situation.  They can take action based on facts and not fear.

Finally, there is a need for financial regulators to distinguish between bankers who will not be there if losses occur and banking institutions that will not be there.

As regular readers know, banks are designed to continue to operate even when they have negative book capital levels due to the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  While they are rebuilding their book capital through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings, the taxpayers are the bank's 'silent' equity partner.

However, there is no reason that the bankers responsible for losing the bank's book capital should continue to be employed.

Saturday, August 18, 2012

Parliament Libor Report: Both Banks and Regulators need to change

Parliament's Treasury Select Committee led by Andrew Tyrie issued a report on the Libor rigging scandal in which it concluded:
Among its wide-ranging conclusions were that Barclays operated for years with woefully inadequate controls, that senior staff at the bank should have taken action earlier, that the Financial Services Authority (FSA) failed in its duty as regulator to respond to rumours of rate-fixing, and that the Bank of England had been “naive” and “inactive”. 
“Public trust in banks is at an all-time low,” Andrew Tyrie, chairman of the TSC, said. “Urgent improvements, both to the way banks are run and the way they are regulated, is needed if public and market confidence is to be restored.”
This conclusion applies not just to UK regulators, but to EU and US regulators too.

In his Telegraph column, Damian Reece discusses the implications of Parliament's conclusion:

But what we’re also left with, yet again, is a story of regulatory failure. Since 1997 the UK has been plagued by porous rules that have allowed unalloyed avarice to seep into every nook and cranny of City life. 
It is Tyrie’s conclusions and recommendations in this area which are the most important elements of the report. 
The committee has quite rightly used its findings into the Libor scandal as ammunition in its attempts to get urgent changes made to the legislation passing through Parliament that will merge two failing institutions (the Financial Services Authority and the Bank of England) into one, even larger, failing institution. If we don’t get the future of regulation right, we’ll never get the future of banking right.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Reece has elegantly made the case for why we need to bring transparency back of every opaque corner of the financial system and create the 'Mother of All Financial Databases".  Everyone knows that sunlight is best disinfectant.

By requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, bank behavior can be changed and avarice held in check.

The regulators failed in the lead up to the financial crisis.  Libor is simply another example of their failure.

The only way to get the future of regulation right is not to let the regulators operate behind a veil of opacity. There is no reason to put the financial system at risk of failing again because the financial regulators fail once again to accurately assess the risk in the banks and the rest of the financial system.

Transparency reduces, if not eliminates, the financial markets dependence on the regulators as market participants can assess the data for themselves and adjust the amount and price of their exposures accordingly.
Tyrie’s report does highlight how the FSA, led by chairman Lord Turner, has shown glimpses of the so called “judgment-led” regulation that will be the founding principle of the new regime. 
Judgment-led regulation is the notion of regulators standing toe to toe with bank chiefs and telling them when they don’t like what they see on their balance sheets and informing them what needs to change. It’s about telling a board that changes need making to key personnel. The banks will hate it but that’s exactly the point. The quid pro quo is that at least some of the petty box ticking will be abolished that drives bankers wild and probably encourages, rather than discourages, the culture of pushing regulatory boundaries to the limit. 
Here is a classic example of the Financial-Academic-Regulatory Complex (FARC) trying to protect itself and expand its power.

A problem the financial crisis exposed is that regulators are not a reliable substitute for the market in enforcing discipline on banks.  Yet, judgment-led regulation is based on the notion of the regulators going toe-to-toe with the banks.

How dumb is that?

To enforce discipline, the regulators first have to be able to assess what is going on at the banks.  Without ultra transparency, the regulators are substituting their analytical ability for the markets' analytical ability.

It is well known that the market does a better job of analysis as it has much more in the way of resources (financial and expertise) as well as an incentive to do a better job than the banks.

To enforce discipline, the regulators then have to go toe-to-toe with bank executives. This is regulators substituting their machismo for the market.

Given the recent Standard Chartered money laundering scandal, we can see that the regulators are going to back down.  If engaging in $250 billion of money laundering with Iran after entering an agreement to prevent this practice is not enough to lose a banking license, bankers have nothing to fear from regulators other than a fine which is an insignificant cost of doing business.

Markets are much bigger than the banks and much more capable of meting out discipline than regulators.  This discipline takes the form of reducing bank stock prices and access to funds to reflect the performance of the bank.
But Tyrie’s report also reveals how Lord Turner and his counterpart at the Bank of England, Sir Mervyn King, were unable to exercise that judgment-based regulation properly when it came to the removal of Bob Diamond. They wielded the axe in an arbitrary way which was inappropriate and which cannot be tolerated. 
The fact that Lord Turner tried and failed to secure Diamond’s resignation and subsequently had to get Sir Mervyn involved also exposes him as a weak operator. Put this together with the fact that the FSA, along with the Bank, failed to spot Libor manipulation in the first place and that “doesn’t look good” to quote Tyrie once again. It doesn’t look good for the FSA but neither does it look good for Lord Turner’s candidacy to be the next Governor of the Bank of England, with supreme power over all financial regulation. 
So what have we learnt? We’ve learnt that the old guard has had its day. It’s changing at the banks but now it must change at the regulators too.

Monday, August 13, 2012

We finally have a way to measure which banks are Too Big to Fail

Business Insider carried an interesting column by RaĂşl Ilargi Meijer in which he reviews the idea that it is the interconnectedness of a bank rather than its size that determines the impact its failure would have on the financial system.

More importantly, he concludes that the only way to know this interconnectedness is if banks are legally required to provide ultra transparency and disclose all of the current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is nice to have a portion of the academic community backing your humble blogger's call for ultra transparency.

It is even nicer given that they showed how using existing technology, in this case the Google page ranking algorithm, can be used to make the financial system safer should ultra transparency and the "Mother of all financial databases" be implemented.
Team studies the innermost circle of the financial crisis“Too central to fail” instead of “too big to fail”: whether banks pose a risk to the financial system when they get into distress has more to do with their level of networking than with their size. 
Economic researchers at ETH Zurich have developed a method to deduce the “systemic importance” of banks from their complex connections within financial networks. 
“Between 2008 and 2010 a total of 22 banks formed the innermost circle of the financial crisis. They were so intensely connected with each other through credit relationships, mutual equity investments and financial dependencies that the distress of any single one of them could endanger the entire financial system. [..]... 
How Google Can Avert the Next Financial CrisisThe mathematical insight that turned Google Inc. into a multibillion-dollar company has the potential to help the world avert the next financial crisis. If only banks made public the data required to do the job.
Please re-read the highlighted text as the key to averting the next financial crisis is requiring banks to disclose the data required to do the job.
Sixteen years ago, the founders of Google -- computer scientists Larry Page and Sergey Brin -- introduced an algorithm to measure the “importance” of Web pages relative to any set of keywords. Known as PageRank, it works on the notion that Web pages effectively vote for other pages by linking to them. The most important ones, Page and Brin reasoned, should be those drawing links from many other pages, especially from other really important ones. 
If this definition sounds circular, it is. It also captures an authentic reality, which is why respecting it gives far superior results. Page and Brin’s breakthrough involved using mathematics to make it work. The required ideas don’t go much beyond high-school algebra, although it takes lots of computing power to make something as sprawling as the World Wide Web possible. 
What could this have to do with finance? Quite a lot. The systemic risk that turned the U.S. subprime-lending crisis into a global disaster is circular, too. We can’t identify it simply by looking for the banks with the most assets or the biggest portfolios of risky loans. 
What matters is how many links a bank has to other institutions, how strong those links are and how risky those other banks are, not least because they too have links to other risky banks. 
Something like PageRank might be just the right thing to cut through it. That’s the argument, at least, made by a team of European physicists and economists in a new study. Their algorithm, DebtRank, seeks to measure the total economic value that would be destroyed if a bank became distressed or went into default. 
It does so by moving outward from the bank through the web of links in the financial system to estimate all the various consequences likely to accrue from one failure. Banks connected to more banks with high DebtRank scores would, naturally, have higher DebtRank scores themselves.... 
What does all this mean? Well, there are plenty of caveats involved, so many that any a voice can say many a thing to discredit the report, and its validity. But in the end, we can only conclude that there is indeed a way to measure the impact of too-big-to-fail and/or too-central-to-fail financial institutions on our economies. Or at the very least that there is one that is worth examining, that very strongly promises to provide us with a way to measure it. 
We just need to feed in the data. That won't make the debt go away, but at least we would know how much it is, and, perhaps even more importantly at this point, where it is. 
But of course the data are not made available. Not by the banks themselves, and not by the regulators that are supposed to control them. And not by the lawmakers who are the only ones that would have the power to demand they're made available....
Of course the members of Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team (banks, regulators and lawmakers) are  working to prevent the data being made available to all market participants.

If the data were made available, market participants would likely use it in ways that would promote financial stability and reduce banker bonuses.  At a minimum, the Opacity Protection Team will fight to the bitter end to avoid disclosure that might reduce banker bonuses.
Still, let no-one anytime anywhere anymore tell you that the whole financial mess we've been sinking into for years now is too complex to measure. 
It's not. 
It's just that nobody wants to measure economics using scientific standards.... Here's Matt Buchanan again, putting it very eloquently: 
An algorithm alone can’t save the world, and this isn’t the final word on the best way to measure systemic risk.
Yet the apparent superiority of the DebtRank approach underscores how our ability to monitor the financial system depends wholly on the availability of data. Currently, most of the information that would be needed to calculate DebtRank or any other similar measure is simply not public. 
It is not public even though under the FDR Framework it is the government's primary responsibility to ensure that market participants have access to exactly this data.
Imagine a world in which banks and other financial institutions were legally required to disclose absolutely all of their assets and liabilities to central banks, which would in turn make that information public on a website. Regulators -- indeed, anyone -- would then be able to see the whole network and assess a bank’s situation in full clarity.
This would be ultra transparency and the "Mother of all financial databases" that your humble blogger has been calling for.
Anyone so inclined could calculate measures such as DebtRank and assess how much any particular bank is contributing to potential financial instability.
More importantly, anyone so inclined could calculate the risk of each bank and adjust the amount and price of their exposures to each bank to reflect this independent assessment.
With full transparency, it’s just possible that the core business of lenders would go back to assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers. They would need to do so to maintain a good reputation and to borrow themselves, as any risky loans they made would be known to all....
As I have said many times previously, it is this ability to assess each bank's current exposures that unfreezes the interbank lending market and keeps it unfrozen.
That is a radical idea, so radical it is almost certainly a political nonstarter.
Since the beginning of the financial crisis pursuing policies that damage the real economy and society has been politically acceptable. while protecting banker bonuses has been a political nonstarter.

Your humble blogger would like to see this reversed so that policies that may minimize banker bonuses are politically acceptable, while policies that damage the real economy and society are political nonstarters.

Regular readers know doing this requires abandoning the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and adopting the Swedish model.  Rather than protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses, the real economy and society are protected.

Rather than hide losses on and off bank balance sheets and force the real economy to contract under the burden of supporting the excess debt, banks absorb the losses on the excesses in the financial system.

A modern banking system is designed to absorb the losses and continue to operate and support the real economy as the banks have both deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding.  Deposit guarantees means that banks have a silent equity partner in the taxpayer when they have negative book capital levels.

It is the existence of this silent equity partner that allows banks to retain 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings to rebuild their book capital levels after absorbing the losses.
But as the British physicist William Thomson, also known as Lord Kelvin, put it back in the 19th century: “What you cannot measure, you cannot hope to improve.” It’s a lasting piece of wisdom.




Tuesday, August 7, 2012

Without data, US housing policy "absolutely insane"

Salon (hat tip Matt Stoller) ran an interesting article on the need for a single mortgage database so that housing policy could be based on facts.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has called for building this database since before the beginning of the financial crisis as it is also necessary to support the residential mortgage-backed securities industry (everything from covered bonds to securitizations).  The Federal Housing Finance Agency has also called for building this database as it sees its future in having oversight over the database.

Six years after the foreclosure crisis began in earnest, as former Congressional Oversight Panel vice chair and current AFL-CIO general counsel Damon Silvers put it, “it’s impossible to get reliable, comprehensive information on foreclosures.” ... 
Or on performing mortgages.
There are four separate widely followed private foreclosure tracking services — Corelogic, LPS, RealtyTrac, and the Mortgage Banker’s Association National Delinquency Survey. Each has problems, and none is comprehensive. 
There are also government sources for foreclosures. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which regulates national banks, has a widely cited Mortgage Metric Report. The data for that report comes from the big mortgage services, and it is “rigorously reviewed”, according to Bryan Hubbard, spokesman for the OCC. It’s considered good data, but it covers only 50 to 60 percent of the market, the part controlled by services regulated by the OCC. 
The FHFA tracks some limited data around Fannie and Freddie loans, and the VA and FHA track some data around loans guaranteed by those agencies. But like the private data services, none of these foreclosure sources are comprehensive.
Please recall that Phillip Swagel and the Paulson Treasury team called for the creation of this database at the start of the mortgage crisis.
This causes significant problems for policymakers (and thus homeowners). 
As Silvers put it, “If you do x, whatever x, refis, principal write-downs, interest subsidy programs, how much is it going to cost?” 
The lack of data is impacting the key policy question over debt relief for homeowners. 
Currently, there are proposals outstanding for Fannie and Freddie to write down mortgage principals for homeowners that are underwater, or owe more on their mortgage than their home is worth. Liberal groups are seeking to have the official in charge of these two entities, acting FHFA chief Ed Demarco, fired for his intransigence in this policy area. 
There are also proposals for municipalities to seize performing underwater mortgages through eminent domain and restructure and resell them. 
A key question in these disputes is how these proposals would impact foreclosures. And because of the lack of data, we can only guess. 
“If you write up some sort of protocol for doing something with mortgages, the question can’t really be answered vigorously under the current data regime. And the consequence is actually that it produces a reluctance to act. The lack of good data has seriously contributed to the inability to make good policy in this area,” says Silvers.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Silvers nicely summarizes what your humble blogger has been saying not just about mortgages, but also about the banks.

A lack of good data makes it virtually impossible to address the problems.
The problem of foreclosure data has been understood for years. 
In April, 2009, Elizabeth Warren’s Congressional Oversight Panel released a report detailing problems in this space and citing a “failure of regulatory intelligence gathering and analysis.” 
Dodd-Frank even included a provision for the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban Development to create a national database of foreclosures. The bill, however, did not provide the necessary funding mechanism for HUD to do so, nor did it include a deadline. 
The next Congress, not surprisingly, has also failed to appropriate the funds. According to Brian Sullivan at HUD, the agency also lacks “statutory authority to compel the reporting to HUD of information necessary to compile localized loan performance data.”
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, which has a strong research component, has partially stepped into the breach. HUD is working with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to begin “exploring and evaluating options for creating the database,” according to Pete Carroll, CFPB’s assistant director of mortgage markets. “In order to best understand what is going on in the mortgage marketplace, regulators need solid loan performance data.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Carroll confirms what I have been saying about the need for loan performance data.
But there is no deadline or dedicated congressional funding for the joint HUD-CFPB project, and other priorities that are funded take precedence. There are no congressional hearings scheduled over this crucial element of Dodd-Frank, nor is there congressional pressure to look into whether the regulators can even peer into the housing market with precision. And should Mitt Romney win and alter the direction of the CFPB, or should the CFPB lose a funding battle in Congress, the creation of a database will stop at the exploration stage.
A victory for Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team.
The lack of data speaks to the “absolutely insane way we do housing policy,” according to Georgetown law professor Adam Levitin. The problems in this area are exacerbated by a mix of failed leadership and bureaucratic design.
 What I refer to as the financial-academic-regulatory complex (FARC).
“What is our housing policy? We don’t have one, because no one’s responsible for it. Treasury and the Fed are not housing experts, but they seem to be as involved as anyone. We don’t have a housing czar. The system worked fine before 2008, because housing policy was very simple. It was, increase homeownership. Now that we’re more sophisticated about housing policy, we have a problem because no one’s in charge of it.”... 
As Levitin puts it, “the lack of accountability for housing policy is especially galling in 2012 because for years we’ve had people saying ‘housing is at the center of our economic troubles,’ and yet the administration has done nothing to produce a housing policy apparatus. You can see this in where they put HAMP, they put this in Treasury. Prior to 2008, Treasury had zero experience in housing. You see it with the fact that Demarco is the head of FHFA. If I were the President and I knew that housing was our number one economic policy problem, I’d want my guy running that agency.” 
In the housing and foreclosure space, Levitin notes, there is no leadership: “No one wants the football.” That’s why the government doesn’t have adequate data on the characteristics of the foreclosure epidemic. You can’t manage what you can’t measure. So if you want to avoid managing a problem, just don’t measure it.
If the database existed, the problem would be addressed.

Addressing the problem would reduce the power of FARC.  As a result, FARC has an incentive to act as a barrier to the creation of the database and solving the problem.

Sunday, August 5, 2012

Banks are using computer systems that are "unfit for purpose"

In a Telegraph article, Intellect, the trade body for the UK's technology sector, exposes the dirty secret of banking:  their information technology is 'unfit for purpose'; specifically, to providing managers and regulators with the information they need to assess the risk of each bank.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been advocating the creation of the 'Mother of All Financial Databases' to collect, standardize and disseminate all of the current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures of each bank.

It is the data in this database that would provide the information all market participants, including the banks themselves and the regulators, need to assess the risk of each bank.

Creating the data warehouse to support the Mother of All Financial Databases would be less expensive than having each bank upgrade its information systems.  Plus, it has the added benefit that the data warehouse bring transparency to the banking sector.
Banks are using computer systems that are “unfit for purpose” and as a result have little idea what is going on inside their own businesses, a report has warned. 
Banks are using computer systems that are “unfit for purpose” and as a result have little idea what is going on inside their own businesses, according to a new in-depth report on the technological problems facing the industry. 
Decades of under-investment in up-to-date technology mean the basic “plumbing” that underpins banking operations is not up to the task of providing managers and regulators with the information they need to understand the risks banks face, according to the report by Intellect, the trade body for the UK’s technology sector. 
Intellect warns that four years on from the financial crisis when banks’ systems were shown to be unable to provide timely and accurate information on risk exposures, little has been done to improve the situation.
This is the direct result of the financial regulators and policymakers failure to require banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This information can easily be made available on a borrower privacy protected basis.

Your humble blogger knows, because he has developed information systems for doing precisely this!
“Within individual banks, poor infrastructure does not afford a timely and accurate view of 'the whole’ of their operations and exposures. 
Please re-read the highlighted text because it nicely summarizes what your humble blogger has been saying about both banks and structured finance securities.

Please note the emphasis on timely.  Regular readers know that "timely reporting" for banks and structured finance securities is observable event based reporting.  Whenever there is an activity that effects the underlying exposures at banks or structured finance securities, it should be reported to all market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

This reporting would be easy to do as it is consistent with how bank information systems currently track the underlying exposures.
“In effect, they do not know their own businesses well enough. Therefore it is impossible for the regulatory authorities to build a macro view of 'the whole’ of the financial system that allows them to identify and mitigate risks across it,” said Intellect.
The bottom line:  providing ultra transparency will be as helpful to the banks in understanding the risks they are taking as it is to market participants.

Saturday, July 21, 2012

Draghi: Libor case undermines financial confidence; a lot needs to be done

As reported by Bloomberg,

European Central Bank President Mario Draghi said that revelations about the setting of the Libor, or London offered interbank rate, undermine confidence in the the world’s financial system, according to an interview with French newspaper Le Monde. 
Rebuilding the financial-services industry after the crisis requires “lots to be done,”....
Regular readers know that there is 'lots to be done' to restore confidence in the global financial system.

Specifically, they know that restoring confidence requires that transparency be brought to all the currently opaque corners of the financial system.  This includes, but is not limited to:
  • requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details; and
  • requiring structured finance securities to provide observable event based reporting under which any activity like a payment or default involving the underlying collateral is reported before the beginning of the next business day.
Regular readers also know that this data should be made available through a data warehouse hosting what your humble blogger calls the "Mother of All Financial Databases".

In addition, regular readers know that this data warehouse should be coordinated by a firm with proven expertise in transparency and that is free of all conflicts of interest with existing market participants.  Structured finance showed the perils of allowing firms with conflicts of interest to be involved in ownership, oversight and management of a data warehouse that was suppose to bring transparency to the market.

The focus of the coordinator should be on optimizing transparency now and in the future.

The day to day operation of the data warehouse can be run by one of a number of global data management companies.

Friday, July 20, 2012

Transparency: A world transformed by technology

The Guardian ran an interesting article on how information can be extremely powerful in improving the provision of services and bringing about behavioral change.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger would like to see banks required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This information would be aggregated on a borrower privacy protected basis, standardized and made available to all market participants through a data warehouse that hosts what I refer to as the "Mother of All Financial Databases".

With this data, market participants could assess the risk of each bank as well as exert discipline on each bank's risk taking.

With this data, the interbank lending market would be unfrozen and unlikely to refreeze.  This data is the key to on-going liquidity because market participants can continually update their assessment of each bank.  In fact, market participants can do a much better job of matching each bank's cost of funds to the riskiness of the bank.

With a liquid interbank lending market, Libor could be based off of actual trades.

With this data, sunshine can act as the best disinfectant.

Through information technology, society has been given an opportunity to redefine the way individuals conduct their everyday lives.... Communities are in a position to share data amongst themselves, and with the wider world, improve services and the lives of individuals. 
For banking, data would no longer be constrained by national boundaries, but could be looked at from a global perspective.
The way societies use this information will transform the economy, quality of life, and resource consumption. 
One core opportunity offered by information systems is the ability to manage utility networks within cities, such as the creation of a smart energy grid. If operators are able to collect detailed information about what is going on in the grid, they'll be able to manage it more efficiently, making the architecture increasingly robust, cost effective and ultimately provide better services to its citizens...
 The same should be true of the financial sector.
Information can also be leveraged in cities to encourage behavioural change....
Bob Diamond said that culture is important for when people aren't being watched.  Information technology dramatically reduces the reliance on culture by increasing the market's ability to watch.
But the implications of a data-rich world stretch far beyond the operational efficiency. The wide range of information at our fingertips is also driving a new competitive marketplace and transforming not only the economy, but also the way people, companies and governments choose to operate. 
Global corporations are using information as a core asset, with companies like Google and Facebook building their whole business model around the availability of data and the public demand for information....
Given the value in financial information, I would think we would see many new businesses started around the data made available through the 'Mother of All Financial Databases'.
Imagination is the often the biggest restraint when tackling global challenges.


Tuesday, July 17, 2012

Ben Bernanke and Mervyn King see British Bankers' Association as responsible for dealing with Libor 'fraud'

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, we have had a number of 'you could not make this stuff up moments'.  Today's testimony by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke to Congress and by Bank of England's Governor Mervyn King to Parliament provided one of those moments.

Both men indicated that it was the responsibility of the British Bankers' Association to deal with the fact that Libor could be manipulated by the banks for their benefit.

The British Bankers' Association that just happens to be run for the benefit of the banks that were engaged in manipulating Libor for their benefit.  As David Zervos at Jeffries & Co said,

It should come as no surprise to anyone that major commercial banks manipulate Libor submissions for their own benefit. 
The OTC derivatives markets was designed by the big banks, for the big banks, to ensure that as they set up their own private securities exchanges - away from regulatory scrutiny - they could control the interest rate settings. 
Money center commercial banks did not want the "truth" of market prices to determine their loan rates. Rather, they wanted an oligopolistically controlled subjective survey rate to be the basis for their lending businesses.
It was not just anyone who was saying it was and is the British Banker's Association's responsibility.
  • Mr. Bernanke is the chairman of the US central bank that just happens to have full responsibility for the supervision and regulation of the large US banks involved in the Libor scandal.
  • Mr. King is the governor of the UK central bank that just happens to be in the process of having full responsibility for the supervision and regulation of the large UK banks involved in the Libor scandal transferred to it.
At a minimum, this recommendation to outsource supervision to the banks who are committing fraud suggests that PhD economists are unfit for heading up or having any involvement with an organization responsible for bank supervision.

From a Guardian article on their testimony,
The heads of the US and UK central banks have described as "fraud" the manipulation by Barclays of the international lending rate, Libor. 
The US Federal Reserve chairman, Ben Bernanke, said the process for setting the rate was "structurally flawed" and that he could not guarantee its reliability.
The solution of course is to base Libor off of actual trades that are disclosed as part of the requirement that banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis all of their current global asset, liability and off balance sheet exposure details.
Mervyn King, the Bank of England governor, said that deliberately rigging the Libor rate for private gain was "my definition of fraud"....
Bernanke told a Senate banking committee hearing that there was little the US central bank could do to reform the system, which has rattled investor confidence in financial markets, because it has no control over how it is set.
Actually, there was plenty the US central bank could do, but so far has elected not to do.

For example, it could have required US banks that are on the Libor panel to disclose their trades.

For example, it could have mentioned the fact that Barclays had confessed to manipulating Libor prior to the debate over the Dodd-Frank Act.  The Financial Times' Martin Wolf showed that this would have resulted in transparency being included in the Dodd-Frank Act as he linked the need for transparency to the Vickers Commission reforms.
The reliability of the London Interbank Offered Rate, the interest rate that underpins transactions worth trillions of dollars, is under question with the revelations that bankers sought to move rates to profit on trades and to hide its borrowing costs during the 2007-09 financial crisis. 
"I would like to see additional reforms to the Libor process, assuming that Libor will continue to be a benchmark for financial contracts," Bernanke said at a Senate banking hearing held to discuss the state of the economy. 
Libor is set by a panel of banks, which submit estimates of how much they believe they have to pay to borrow from each other. Barclays is the only bank so far to settle with US and UK regulators over allegations that it manipulated the key interest rate. Dozens of other big banks – including at least two American institutions – are currently under investigation. 
Bernanke said the Fed had little power to change the way the benchmark rate is set. "We are and need to continue advocating for reforms to the Libor process. It is constructed by private organization in the UK, and so our direct ability to influence that is limited," he told lawmakers. 
In short, it is up to the British Bankers' Association.
Bernanke said he could not say "with full confidence" that Libor is reliable, because the "British Bankers' Association did not adopt most of the recommentations made by the New York Fed".
The recommendations by the New York Fed that came from the very banks manipulating Libor.  Had all the recommendations been adopted, it would not have prevented the ongoing manipulation of the Libor interest rates.

From a Telegraph article on Mr. King's testimony,
The BBA had to be nudged to get into the right direction, but once they had been nudged...they did work very hard to make a successful consultation.
So successful that the banks could continue to manipulate Libor through at least 2010.