Showing posts with label Bank Supervision: A New Model. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bank Supervision: A New Model. Show all posts

Thursday, April 11, 2013

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane and the campaign to reduce financial regulatory complexity

In case you missed his fabulous speech on Turning the Red Tape Tide, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane has elevated his campaign to reduce financial regulatory complexity.

Specifically, Mr. Haldane focuses on the pattern of regulation increasing at an exponential rate.
The facts are striking. 
In the UK, the Banking Act (1979) covered 52 sections and 75 pages. By the mid-1980s, the Financial Services Act (1986) and an updated Banking Act (1987) had expanded primary legislation to 110 sections (106 pages) and 212 sections (299 pages) respectively. 
The Financial Services and Markets Act (2000) took this to 433 sections or 321 pages. And the new Financial Services Act (2012) takes this to 695 sections or 534 pages – a tenfold increase in primary legislation in a generation. 
In the US, the picture is no less dramatic. Contrast the legislative responses in the two largest financial crises of the past century – the Great Depression and the Great Recession. The Great Depression spawned the Glass-Steagall Act (1933) – perhaps the single most important piece of financial legislation of the 20th  century. That ran to a mere 37 pages. 
As an aside, I disagree with Mr. Haldane that Glass-Steagall is the single most important piece of financial legislation of the 20th century.  That distinction belongs to the Securities Act (1933) which made the FDR Framework the foundation for our financial system.

It is the Securities Act that introduces the philosophy of disclosure.  This Act makes it the government's responsibility to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.
More recently, the Great Recession has spawned the Dodd-Frank Act (2010). It runs to 848 pages or more than 20 Glass-Steagalls. Once completed, Dodd-Frank might run to 30,000 pages of rulemaking.
Clearly, the facts speak for themselves that we have seen a tremendous increase in the number of financial regulations.   We have also seen a tremendous increase in the complexity of the individual regulations.

For example, as Mr. Haldane previously observed, you could calculate the Basel I capital requirements on the back of an envelope.  By the time Basel III capital requirements are done, you will need a powerful computer to handle the millions of assumptions.

What has caused this increase in both amount and complexity of regulation?
In this respect, financial regulation shares many evolutionary characteristics with elements of the legal framework – for example, the tax code. It too has been responsive to events and circumstance including crises, scandals, innovation and liberalisation. And for many of the same reasons, it too has resulted in a rising tide of rulebook complexity....
Viewed through the lens of history, it is not difficult to explain this evolution. As cracks have emerged in the plaster – for example, regulatory and tax loopholes – they have been papered over. Like a bad painter and decorator, new layers have been applied to support the layers below. These were rational responses to real problems. And for a time they will have filled cracks, reduced uncertainties, corrected incentives. 
Yet this evolutionary path leads inexorably towards a framework – whether regulatory or tax – which is a patchwork of make-do-and-mend. History locks in the idiosyncrasies and complexities of the past, generating a steadily rising tide of red tape. As the regulatory and tax codes attest, the resulting frameworks can be Byzantine in their complexity and Heath-Robinson in their design.
In short, regulation is a response to market failure and the complexity of the regulation is a direct result of the market failure that is being fixed.

For the financial system, the market failure the regulations are trying to address is opacity.

For example, regulators are proposing complex rules to limit interbank exposures so as to reduce the risk of financial contagion.

The risk of financial contagion would be reduced if the banks provided ultra transparency and disclosed on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, banks could assess each of the other banks they do business with and limit the risk of their exposure to these banks based on the riskiness of each bank.

Mr. Haldane then effectively renders complex financial legislation, like the Dodd-Frank Act and its resulting regulations, as much ado about nothing and heading in the wrong direction by simply observing
complex frameworks tend ultimately not to solve the problems for which they were a response. 
They may be ineffective. In filling old cracks, complex rulebooks tend to open up opportunities for new ones to emerge. Indeed, they may increase the likelihood of new loopholes or workarounds emerging. 
Regular readers know that the areas of the financial system that failed in the current financial crisis were those areas where the FDR Framework was not adhered to.

Rather, there was substitution of the combination of complex regulation and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.  Examples of these opaque areas include banks and structured finance securities.

Since August 9, 2007, it has been obvious that the FDR Framework was not adhered to and that transparency needs to be brought to all the opaque areas of the financial system.

Mr. Haldane offers an explanation for why that hasn't happened yet.
Resistance is strong, particularly among those who gain most from squeezing through the loopholes. 
There is also an in-built professional inertia among regulators [and] lawyers... with large amounts of human capital invested in complexity. 
In removing complexities, society’s gain would be their loss.
He then suggests that there is hope that we will in fact bring transparency to all the opaque areas of the financial system and adhere to the FDR Framework.
Nonetheless, in the light of the financial crisis, we may be nearing an inflection point, where the societal pendulum begins to swing in the opposite direction. There are certainly signs of the red tape tide beginning to turn in the area of financial regulation. A growing chorus of concern has emerged recently about complexities and inconsistencies in banking regulation.... 
For financial regulation, that means asking some big questions [and answering them in light of the banks providing ultra transparency as required under the FDR Framework]. 
Is risk-weighting of bank assets worth the costs? Are bank’s internal risk models more regulatory trouble than they are worth? Does complexity unduly advantage large incumbents over small new entrants? Are armies of supervisors and compliance officers a sign of success or failure?...
When market participants have access to each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, the answer to the questions is easy: No, Yes, No (in fact, market discipline will reward banks that are less complex with a lower funding cost as they are more easily understood), Failure.
This could transform the regulatory framework, for the simpler, for the better.
Requiring banks to provide ultra transparency transforms the regulatory framework for the simpler and better because now the regulators can piggy-back off the analytical and disciplinary capabilities of the markets.

When market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank for themselves, or use third party experts to assess the risk for them, the focus is where it should be: on the risk each bank is taking.

The focus is on risk because under the FDR Framework, market participants know they are responsible for all loses on their exposures and therefore they have an incentive to limit their exposures to what they can afford to lose given the level of risk.

Not only does this end the risk of financial contagion, but market participants can help the regulators identify potential problems by highlight what they see as the risks of each bank.

Sunday, March 10, 2013

Head of Parliament's banking standards commission say UK's bank reform bill "wholly inadequate"

To no one's surprise given what is in the bank reform bill currently before Parliament, the head of the Commission on Banking Standards, MP Andrew Tyrie, called it "wholly inadequate".

As reported by the Guardian, Mr. Tyrie was not pleased with either the bill's proposed implementation of a ring-fence between investment and commercial banking or the bill's proposed leverage ratio to limit the risks banks can take.

What makes both of these wholly inadequate is that ring-fencing and leverage ratios substitute complex rules and regulatory oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

Our current financial crisis shows that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight doesn't prevent a bank solvency led financial crisis from occurring.  More importantly, had all the additional complex rules and regulatory oversight been in place, it still wouldn't have prevented the financial crisis from occurring.

The combination doesn't work for a simple reason:  the job of financial regulators is to protect the sovereign from making payments on its deposit guarantee.

By choice, financial regulators do not protect the sovereign by approving or disapproving of every exposure that a banks takes.  If financial regulators did so, they would be responsible for determining where capital is allocated across the real economy.

Rather, financial regulators try to assess the risk of each bank's exposures and determine if the bank has enough capital to absorb the expected losses on these exposures without relying on the taxpayers.

Compare and contrast this with how the combination of transparency and market discipline works.

When investors in unsecured debt and equity have access to all the information they need to assess the risk of each bank, they are responsible for any losses on their investments.  As a result, they have an incentive to use the information on a bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Effectively, investors approve or disapprove of every exposure.  This makes sense as they have a much lower tolerance for loss than financial regulators have (investors are in a first loss position and the taxpayers are in a second loss position).

A key plank of the chancellor's plans to reform Britain's banks in the wake of the financial crisis and the Libor rate-fixing scandal is "wholly inadequate", MPs have warned as they reopened the debate on breaking up the banks. 
The parliamentary commission on banking standards said the government's proposal for the regulator, the Financial Policy Committee (FPC), to review the strength of the ringfence between high street and riskier investment banks was little more than the regulator "marking its own examination paper". 
It said the government should include a specific provision to consider a full, industry-wide split-up of the banks if the ringfence was judged to be failing.... 
Tyrie said the bill was "certainly much improved". "However, the government rejected a number of important recommendations. The commission has examined these again, alongside the government's explanations for rejecting them. 
"We have concluded that the government's arguments are insubstantial. There remains much more work to be done to improve the bill." 
The commission also called for limits on the risks banks take through what is known as the leverage ratio. The government has set it at 3% – allowing banks to borrow against their capital 33 times – while Sir John Vickers in the report by his Independent Commission on Banking had called for 4%.... 
It is highly regrettable that the government appears to be compressing the timetable and railroading the bill through committee stage," Tyrie said. "The task of sorting out the banking industry, of which this Bill will form a major part, is absolutely essential for the long-term health of the British economy. Let's get it right."

Sunday, February 10, 2013

Patrick Honohan makes the case for new model of bank supervision combining ultra transparency and market discipline

In his speech at the second UCC Garrett FitzGerald Spring School, Irish central bank Governor Patrick Honohan talks about an EU banking union, but in doing so makes a very strong case for a new model of bank supervision based on requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and subjecting the banks to market discipline.

The combination of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and subjecting them to market discipline achieves all of the benefits and none of the pitfalls Professor Honohan mentions from a banking union.
First, I hope that it will go some distance to removing politics from the enforcement of bank supervision.
Markets are decidedly non-political and unlike the regulators are not susceptible to lobbying by the banks.  The markets are non-political because the investor is concerned with whether they make or lose money on their investments.
Second, I hope that it brings emotional detachment to the process of supervision. 
While markets are driven by fear and greed, monitoring the banks for changes in their risk profile is done in an unemotional manner.
Third, I hope that it manages to lever the diversity of supervisory experience and aptitude across Europe to provide multiple cross-checks on bank soundness, while not limiting into straitjacket bank behaviour. 
Requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency not only levers the diversity of supervisory experience and aptitude of the regulators, but it also levers the diversity of the market.

For example, brought into the supervisory mix is each bank's competitors.  Each competitor understands how to assess the risk a bank takes and will adjust the amount and price of its exposure based on its assessment of the bank's risk profile.
Fourth, I hope it is effective in breaking the link between sovereign and banks, not only to protect the sovereign but to allow banks to operate effectively and have access to European funding markets on a basis that is not subject to a sovereign risk-add on, but depends only on the bank’s own creditworthiness and standing.
Requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency breaks the link between sovereign and bank as it relates to unsecured debt and equity investments.

When every bank is required to disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants have the information they need to independently assess the risk of each bank.

With access to the information necessary to assess each bank's risk, market participants become responsible for any losses incurred on their investments in the unsecured debt and equity of the banks.  This responsibility for loss gives the market participants an incentive to use the disclosed information.

The combination of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and subjecting them to market discipline has none of the pitfalls that Professor Honohan thinks can occur with the EU banking union.
First, I hope that it doesn’t get bogged-down in overly complex layering of decision-making structures. 
Second, I hope that the huge task of transferring knowledge to the centre and building new communications channels between national supervisors and the central team does not result in process overwhelming product in an interim period with the result that some problems remain undetected, hidden by the dust kicked-up by the creation of the new structure. 
Third, I hope that the decision-making bodies are truly communautaire and not simply an amalgamation of national interests.  
Fourth, I hope that moving decisions to the centre and away from national authorities in what can be a very sensitive area will not result in divisive clashes between broad European and national interests.   

Friday, February 8, 2013

Italian bank derivative scandal shows that transparency and discretion in bank supervision cannot co-exist

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the lesson from the Monte Paschi derivative scandal is that transparency and discretion in bank supervision cannot co-exist and therefore, discretion must be ended.

This is an incredibly important point.

The choice we have is between a stable financial system based on transparency and market discipline or an unstable financial system based on opacity, complex rules and regulatory oversight.

In the stable financial system, investors are responsible for the losses on their investments and hence they have an incentive to use the information disclosed to independently assess the risk of each bank.  Specifically, investors link the amount of their exposure and the return they require on this exposure to each bank's risk.

This results in market discipline as banks with higher risk have to pay more to attract funds.  This also results in ending financial contagion as investors limit their risk to what they can afford to lose.

In an unstable financial system, investors are not responsible for the losses on their bank investments as they have to rely on bank supervision for the assessment and disclosure of risk at each bank.  Bank supervision that is concerned with the safety and soundness of the banking system and therefore exercises discretion in its disclosures about the riskiness of the banks.

This results in banks not being subject to market discipline as the price they are able to access funds at is substantially less than what it would be if investors had transparency and could assess the risk for themselves.

This also results in financial contagion as investors, including other banks, have far greater exposure to each other than they can afford to lose.

Finally, this results in moral hazard and the need to bailout the investors who relied on the bank supervisors' disclosure of the risk of each bank.

Your humble blogger thinks that a stable financial system is preferable.  Achieving this requires having the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

I recognize that this will end the bank supervisors' information monopoly and will limit their ability to exercise discretion.  This is a feature and not a bug in a stable financial system.

There is no reason that bank supervisors should be able to exercise wide discretion.

As I have previously said, bank supervisors don't approve or disapprove of any exposure that a bank takes on.  Bank supervisors don't do this because they do not see it as their job to allocate capital across the economy.

Bank supervisors attempt to focus on one question:  does the bank have enough book capital to absorb the expected losses on its exposures.  Bank supervisors focus on this question because they are attempting to protect the taxpayers by limiting losses that the taxpayers might have to cover because of the deposit guarantee.

The irony here of course is that if banks are required to provide ultra transparency, the bank supervisors could harness the market's analytical power to assess the banks and market discipline to restrain the banks' risk taking.  Both of these would lower the risk to taxpayers of losses on deposit insurance.

Ultimately, the real issue bank supervisors would like discretion on is when to resolve a bank.

Bank supervisors would like this discretion because a bank can be insolvent (the market value of its assets is less than the book value of its liabilities) at one moment in time and can subsequently earn its way back to solvency (the market value of its assets exceeds the book value of its liabilities).

However, this discretion over when to resolve a bank is not needed in a stable financial system.

Requiring banks to provide ultra transparency is not incompatible with letting a bank continue operating and earn its way back to solvency.  In fact, ultra transparency helps in this situation by eliminating the possibility that bank management will 'gamble on redemption'.  An insolvent bank that takes on more risk would see its cost of funding rise substantially.

In a financial system with deposit guarantees and banks providing ultra transparency, the only banks that need to be resolved are the banks that cannot generate pre-banker bonus earnings.  All the rest of the banks should they be temporarily insolvent have the ability to earn their way back to solvency.

The recent trouble at Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena ... highlights potential vulnerabilities in plans for a new single European bank supervisor. 
The Tuscan lender, which bills itself as the world's oldest bank, used complex derivatives to tweak its balance sheet that have now triggered massive losses contributing to a €3.9 billion ($5.23 billion) black hole to be filled by taxpayers. Many of these derivative schemes are now the subject of judicial probes.
It wasn't the use of derivatives to tweak its balance sheet that was the problem, but rather that it hid the derivatives so that market participants did not know about them.  As a result, the bank's financial statements did not present a true picture of the bank's condition.
The Bank of Italy admitted its supervisors were aware of the schemes, fueling demands for a wider investigation. 
The Bank of Italy is under pressure because it exercised its discretion and it too did not disclose the existence of these derivatives.

So here is a bank supervisor with concerns about safety and soundness of the banking system supporting the mis-representation of the true level of risk at the bank.
In reality, the BOI's freedom for maneuver was limited. One problem was that the derivative deals did not violate accounting rules. 
While international accounting standards require that a seller of credit default swaps mark their position to market, that's not the case for "structured repos"—an innovative transaction that achieves the same effect—for which historical costs can be used. 
Monte dei Paschi took advantage of this loophole to issue structured repos, thereby spreading out accrued losses over a longer period even though the bank remained fully exposed to fluctuating liquidity risks. 
Thanks to this ruse, the bank posted a profit in 2009, enabling it to pay a dividend—which it had secretly promised to creditors that had subscribed to preferred shares used to bolster the capital base. 
Although the BOI was critical of the structured repos, it was hamstrung because no rule was broken.... 
The fact that the derivatives deals did not violate accounting rules does not mean that the Bank of Italy could have have publicly questioned the quality of Monte Paschi's earnings and mentioned the use of these structured repos in achieving these earnings.
But the way in which [the BOI] has handled the affair has led to allegations of subterfuge that have pulled in Mr. Draghi, now president of the European Central Bank. 
Those charges may be wide of the mark, but the political fuss is a timely reminder that bank supervision is a highly charged activity requiring delicate judgments to balance competing interests. 
One of the benefits of requiring banks to provide ultra transparency is that it eliminates the need for bank supervisors to balance competing interests.

With ultra transparency, bank supervisors can concentrate on protecting the taxpayers.
Mr. Draghi will be fully aware just how much more politically sensitive banking regulation will become when conducted cross-border by the ECB as part of the euro zone's proposed banking union. 
Indeed, the discretion required for bank supervision sits uncomfortably with the transparency the ECB deploys in the conduct of monetary policy where clear communication is essential to the management of expectations. 
By requiring banks to provide ultra transparency, we end bank supervision discretion.  As a result, the ECB can continue to provide clear communication about its conduct of monetary policy.

Sunday, January 27, 2013

Poll: Will Barclays' new value statement change its culture?

The Guardian ran a poll in which it asked "will Barclays' new value statement change the bank's culture".

72% of the respondents answered No.

This result is not surprising as talk is cheap and, after engaging in a series of unacceptable business practices ranging from mis-selling of insurance to manipulating benchmark interest rates, there is very little trust in what Barclays has to say.

Regular readers know that if Barclays was serious about cleaning up and changing its culture it would voluntarily commit to providing ultra transparence and disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Adopting this disclosure allows sunshine to act as the best disinfectant for past, present and future bad banker behavior.

The fact that Barclays doesn't provide ultra transparency is the equivalent of waving a red flag and saying that Barclays has something to hide.

Friday, January 25, 2013

Regulators begin to think that maybe market should be used to value securities

Bloomberg reports that away from the bank cheerleading at Davos, financial regulators might have suddenly realized that the best way to limit the variation in values banks put on their assets is to require disclosure and let the market value the assets instead.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been calling for regulators to take this step and require banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, the market can value each of the bank's exposures and exert discipline on the banks if the banks' valuation of the exposures for calculation of the riskiness of their assets strays from the market's.

Global regulators may impose restrictions on the way lenders model risk and assign capital after a review of banks’ trading practices found wide differences in their number crunching. 
A probe of banks’ calculation of the riskiness of their assets found “material variation” across the industry, Stefan Ingves, chairman of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, said in a speech in Cape Town. 
Regulators could respond with tougher disclosure rules or “limitations in the modelling choices for banks,” Ingves said in the prepared remarks today. 
“The committee’s work on how banks calculate risk weighted assets also feeds into a broader concern that, in pursuit of risk sensitivity, the Basel III framework has grown too complex.” 

Monday, January 21, 2013

BoE's Andrew Haldane: changes coming to "too complex" bank capital rules

Reuters reports that the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane has told British MPs that changes are coming to both "too complex" bank capital regulations and bank accounting rules.

In both cases, the changes are aimed at getting the regulation and rules to better reflect reality.

Regular readers know that even though these are steps in the right direction, at the end of the day we are still talking about the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight being substituted for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

The number one lesson from the financial crisis is that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight doesn't work and the continued pursuit of this combination will result in another financial crisis.

Requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details would be far more effective in preventing future financial crises than the modest improvements Mr. Haldane is suggesting might occur in bank capital regulations and accounting rules.

Bank capital rules coming into force this month are too complex and efforts to simplify them are already underway, a senior Bank of England official said on Monday. 
Andrew Haldane, the bank's director of financial stability, was among the first senior regulator to question Basel III, the world's core regulatory response to the 2007-09 crisis, that led to banks being bailed out by taxpayers. 
Basel III, agreed by world leaders, forces lenders to hold more capital, but Haldane says it is too complex and relies on banks using their own models to determine capital buffers. 
He told British MPs there was an increasing awareness among international regulators they may have taken a "false turn in the road" by backing Basel III which was written by the Basel Committee. 
"Regulators cannot really police this complex beast," Haldane said. "There are moves afoot with the Basel Committee to seek ways to simplify and streamline the move to a proper regulatory rather than self-regulatory edifice. That may take some time."....
Regulators can't police even the simplest bank capital rules.  It frankly isn't in their job description.

The question that financial regulators ask is 'does the bank have enough capital to absorb the potential losses from the exposures on and off its balance sheet?'  The answer is either the bank has enough capital to absorb the potential losses or it does not regardless of what its capital ratio might be.

That global financial regulators have a tough time answering the capital adequacy question has been shown many times over the last few years when banks that passed the regulators' stressed tests subsequently needed another bailout or to be nationalized.
The Basel Committee said earlier this month work on reviewing in-house models would be accelerated this year. 
"There is a big straw in the wind ... The big trend here is the retreat is from in-house models," said Simon Gleeson, a financial lawyer at Clifford Chance....
But Haldane said Britain won't wait for Basel's work to finish and the Financial Services Authority watchdog was already forcing banks to use simpler models for totting up risks from commercial property on their books. 
"There is no reason why they could not do that across a wider set of portfolios," Haldane said. 
There was also nothing to prevent UK regulators from imposing "floors" below which capital levels could not fall irrespective of what internal models show, Haldane added.
All of this is simply rearranging the deck chairs on the RMS Titanic.
He is member of the bank's Financial Policy Committee (FPC), which sets the tone and direction for regulation in Britain. From April, the bank becomes the regulator for lenders.
There was also support on the FPC for a higher leverage ratio or balance-sheet cap on banks than the 3 percent set under Basel III, he said....

Accounting rules used in the EU, drawn up by the International Accounting Standards Board, were also "not as prudent as they could and should be for financial firms," he said, arguing the rules failed to ensure banks make early provisions on souring loans and also lead to under-recognition of losses. 
Reforms to accounting rules put forward by the IASB and its U.S. counterpart were still "unfinished business" and therefore Britain was asking banks directly to make bigger provisions than they need to under accounting rules. 
"We are working privately with FSA and auditing firms to see if we can't at least provide better disclosure about fair value gains and losses than is the case right now," Haldane said. 
The UK authorities are thrashing out a "prudent valuation framework" to put a price tag on illiquid or toxic assets, and force banks to make deductions from their capital buffers.
Excuse me, but it is the role of the markets and not the financial regulators to value financial securities.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis it has been abundantly clear that the market cannot value opaque securities like the 'black box' banks or the 'brown paper bag' structured finance securities.

Common sense suggests that the regulators' time would be better spent bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system rather than creating unenforceable regulations.
"We might in time be able to inject a notion of prudent valuation into accounting," he added.
Actually, if banks were required to provide ultra transparency it would be unnecessary to inject the notion of prudent valuation into accounting.

Market participants would simply adjust each banks' accounting numbers for the difference between the actual value of the bank's assets and the reported value.

Thursday, January 17, 2013

BoE's Andrew Haldane: have we solved 'TBTF'? No!

In an interesting article on VoxEU, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane asks the question of have we solved the Too Big to Fail problem and answers with an emphatic 'no'.

Regular readers are not surprised by this answer as the only way to solve the TBTF problem is to require all banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The reason ultra transparency solves the TBTF problem is it subjects the banks to market discipline.  Specifically, with this information, market participants can truly assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure accordingly.  The result is to link each bank's cost of funds to its risk.

Linking risk to each bank's cost of funds will put pressure on the banks to reduce their risk.  Pressure that banks will respond to by becoming smaller and more easily understood.  In short, market discipline will cause the TBTF to break themselves up into smaller units with less risk that the market places a higher value on (please note that this happened with corporate conglomerates).

Today, a bank's cost of funds is not related to its risk because the banks are in Mr. Haldane's words 'black boxes'.

Leading up to the financial crisis, market participants understood the banks were black boxes and turned to the financial regulators for insight into the risk of each bank.  The reason market participants turned to the financial regulators is they have a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information on each bank in an appropriate, timely manner.  Recall that the financial regulators have examiners at the banks 24/7/365.

One lesson from the financial crisis is that even if the examiners correctly assess the risk of each bank, the financial regulators will not communicate this risk to the market.  There are a number of reasons this occurs including political pressure and concerns over the safety and soundness of the financial system.

That financial regulators will not communicate the risk of each bank to the market has been shown time and time again with the bank stress tests.  We had banks throughout Europe collapse shortly after the financial regulators said they were well capitalized.  In the US, we had at least two banks who required a subsequent bailout.

It is interesting to note that besides the banks there is another part of the financial system that is Too Big to Fail:  the financial regulators.  Without ultra transparency, market participants are dependent on the financial regulators.  When the financial regulators fail, and they did because we had a bank solvency led financial crisis, the taxpayers bailed them out.

Not only that, but the policy responses since, like the Dodd-Frank Act, have increased the size and role of the financial regulators and made them even more TBTF.

Like the TBTF banks, financial regulators and their role is also cut down to size by requiring ultra transparency.  With ultra transparency, market participants can see if the financial regulators are doing what they are suppose to do.

Mr. Haldane's answer to the question of have we solved the TBTF problem:

No. 
That is not my pessimistic verdict; it is the market’s. Prior to the crisis, the 29 largest global banks benefitted from just over one notch of uplift from the ratings agencies due to expectations of state support. Today, those same global leviathans benefit from around three notches of implied support. Expectations of state support have risen threefold since the crisis began. 
This translates into a large implicit subsidy to the world’s biggest banks in the form of lower funding costs and higher profits. Prior to the crisis, this amounted to tens of billions of dollars each year. Today, it is hundreds of billions (Haldane 2012). In other words, if the market’s expectations are to be believed, the regulatory response to the crisis has not plugged the 'too-big-to-fail' sink.... 
What is certainly true is that, in the light of the crisis, regulation to quell the too-big-to-fail problem has come thick and (at least in regulatory terms) fast. This reform effort falls into roughly three categories: 
(a) Systemic surcharges: of additional capital levied on the world’s largest banks according to their size and connectivity. ... Last year, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) agreed a sliding scale of systemic surcharges for the world’s largest banks. The highest surcharge was set at 2.5% of capital. 
Yet therein lies the problem. Based on my estimates (Haldane 2012), a charge levied at this rate would leave the majority of the systemic externalities associated with the world’s biggest banks untouched. The reduction in default probabilities associated with lowering leverage by a percentage point or two would not offset the higher system-wide loss-given-default associated with the world’s largest banks. The systemic tax is being levied at rates which are too low...
If the banks were required to provide ultra transparency, there would be no need for complex rules like systemic surcharges.

Market participants could independently assess the banks' default probabilities, also known as risk.  The result would be the banks would be under pressure to reduce their risk as their cost of funds increases and makes much of their risk taking unprofitable.

As your humble blogger has said repeatedly, the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight is an inferior substitute to transparency and market discipline.
(b) Resolution regimes: In principle, orderly resolution regimes for banks could lower the collateral costs of a big bank defaulting, thereby tackling at source these systemic externalities. .... A key component of these plans is the ability to impose losses on private creditors – so-called 'bail-in' – rather than have those losses borne by taxpayers. 
As with systemic surcharges, the issue here is not to so much the bail-in principle, but its application in practice. Bail-in, whether of big banks, sovereigns or companies, faces an acute time-consistency problem. Policymakers face a trade-off between placing losses on a narrow set of tax-payers today (bail-in) or spreading that risk across a wider set of tax-payers today and tomorrow (bail-out). 
A risk-averse, tax-smoothing government may tend towards the latter path – and historically has almost always done so, most notably in response to the present financial crisis. Next time may of course be different. But the market is sceptical.... 
As I have repeatedly said, the idea of bail-in completely misses how our financial systems were designed based on the FDR Framework.

Regular readers know that the FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

There is no need to be discussing bail-in or bail-out under the FDR Framework because market participants know under the principle of caveat emptor that they are responsible for losses on their exposures.

By definition under the FDR Framework, all unsecured debt and equity holders are subject to losses if a bank is insolvent and the financial regulators close it.

The reason these debt and equity holders will exert discipline on bank management to limit the risk of the bank is to avoid these losses.

Please note, the FDR Framework only holds true so long as the governments ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  Given the financial regulators information monopoly, this is not currently true for banks.  Hence, the discussion of bail-in versus bail-out.  A discussion that is rendered moot by requiring banks to provide ultra transparency.
(c) Structural reform: One way of lessening that dilemma may be to act on the scale and structure of banking directly. Several recent regulatory reform initiatives have sought to do just that, notably the “Volcker rule” in the US, the 'Vickers proposals' in the UK and, most recently, the 'Liikanen plans' in Europe. While different in detail, each of these proposals shares a common objective: a degree of separation or segregation between investment and commercial banking activities. 
In principle, these ringfencing initiatives confer both ex-post (improved resolution) and ex-ante (improved risk management) benefits. Because they act on banking structure, they have a greater chance of proving time-consistent. While this is a clear step forward, those benefits are only as credible as the ringfence itself. The issue raised by some is whether, in practice, the ring-fence could prove permeable. Without care, today’s ring-fence could become tomorrow’s string vest. 
Again, ultra transparency addresses the issue of structural reform.  As I have previously said, regulation has two components:  the rule and the enforcement.

The Volcker Rule says that banks should not take proprietary bets.  By making the banks provide ultra transparency, market participants can assess the bank's positions and see if they are in compliance.

Oh, by the way, ultra transparency will also improves the banks' risk management.  Recall that market discipline has a bias towards banks taking less risk.
If each of these initiatives is necessary but none is individually or collectively sufficient to tackle too-big-to-fail, what is to be done? 
One solution might lie in strengthening these proposals. For example, re-sizing the capital surcharge, perhaps in line with quantitative estimates of the 'optimal' capital ratio (Miles et al (2012), Admati et al (2011)), would be one option for bearing down further on systemic externalities. 
Another more radical option, mooted recently by a number of commentators and policymakers, would be to place size limits on banks, either in relation to the financial system as a whole or, more coherently, relative to GDP (Hoenig (2012), Tarullo (2012)). 
Proposals of this type typically face two sets of criticism. 
The first, practical issue is how to calibrate an appropriate limit. ....
The second, empirical issue is whether size limits would erode the economies of scale and scope which might otherwise be associated with big banks....
What is to be done is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Contrary to what the banking industry lobbyists say, there is no limit on transparency as there are a number of market participants who are capable of assessing the exposure details from the global banks (not the least of which are the competitor global banks).
Too-big-to-fail is far from gone. It is even more important it is not forgotten.
And it won't be gone until the banks are required to provide ultra transparency so that they can be subject to market discipline and forced to reign in their risks.

Monday, December 31, 2012

Banking industry's year of shame ends

A Guardian column by Heather Stewart and Jill Treanor highlights all the shameful activities that banks engaged in that came to light during 2012.

Included on the list is manipulating a benchmark interest rate, Libor, money laundering and mis-selling financial products like insurance and interest rate swaps.

By themselves, each of these activities is bad.  Together, these activities highlight the need for a radical cultural change not only at the banks, but at their regulators too.

The last time there was a need for such a radical cultural change was during the Great Depression.  What emerged to change the culture was the FDR Framework and a focus on ensuring that market participants had access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they could independently assess and make a fully informed investment decision.

The reason for this focus is that it brings about a radical cultural change as sunlight is the best disinfectant.

What allowed the bank culture to slide back to where numerous parts of the banks were engaged in shameful activities was the re-emergence of opacity in the financial system.  Opacity re-emerged because regulators both failed to ensure transparency and encouraged its re-emergence.

For example, bank regulators jealously guard their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for each bank.  Regulators have access to each bank's exposures 24/7/365.

This is the data that market participants, including competitor banks, need if they are going to assess the risk and solvency of each bank and properly price their exposures to each bank.

In the 1930's, banks routinely disclosed this data as it was the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet.  By the 1980s, banks no longer made this disclosure.

The SEC failed in its responsibility to ensure that bank exposure data was made available to all market participants.  It did so with the blessing of the bank regulators.

By protecting their information monopoly, bank regulators enhanced their importance to a properly functioning financial system.  With the monopoly, bank regulators were relied on for analysis of the risk of each bank, communicating the risk of each bank to other market participants and disciplining the banks.

The financial crisis that began in 2007 revealed the wide path of destruction created by regulator driven opacity.  It is this opacity that let banks engage in manipulating Libor for example.

It is this regulatory driven opacity that also prevents the financial system from recovering.  Without transparency into each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants cannot assess the risk of each bank and whether it is solvent or not.


Wednesday, December 19, 2012

Geithner Doctrine undermines Draghi's claim that ECB oversight of banks will restore confidence

In a Reuters article, the head of the ECB, Mario Draghi, asserts that having the ECB at the head of a single eurozone bank supervisory mechanism will help to restore confidence.

In the US, the Fed is responsible for supervision of large, global banks.  Since at least the start of the current financial crisis, the Fed has operated under the Geithner Doctrine.  Yves Smith at NakedCapitalism stated the doctrine as follows:
Nothing must be done that will hurt the profits or reputation of any bank that is pretty big and/or well connected.
The manipulation of Libor provides an example of how the Geithner Doctrine is applied.

When told in May 2008 that banks were manipulating Libor interest rates for profit, in addition to trying to make their financial health look better than it was, Mr. Geithner sends to the UK a proposal to reform Libor that would not have ended the banks' ability to manipulate Libor.

For those who believe that the Geithner Doctrine is only being followed in the US, the ECB has already shown that it subscribes to the Geithner Doctrine.

For example, the ECB has been actively pushing for the creation of the European Data Warehouse so that banks can sell the equivalent of subprime mortgage-backed securities (think bank profits).  I say banks can sell the equivalent because transparency has two equally important elements, "what" is disclosed and "when" it is disclosed, and opaque subprime mortgage-backed securities meet the definition of transparency used by the data warehouse and endorsed by the ECB.
New European Central Bank powers to oversee euro zone banks will help restore confidence in the sector and revive interbank lending, its president, Mario Draghi, said on Monday. 
European ministers clinched a deal last week to give the ECB powers to supervise the currency bloc's banks from March 2014, taking the first step in a new phase of integration to help underpin the euro. 
"The single supervisory mechanism will contribute to restoring confidence in the banking sector across the euro area. It will help revive interbank lending and cross-border credit flows, with tangible effects for the real economy," Mario Draghi told the European Parliament's Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee. 
Bank-to-bank lending has yet to recover from the onset of the global financial crisis in 2007, and many banks rely on the ECB for their liquidity needs while others hoard their cash rather than lend it on....
Regular readers know that the interbank lending market is frozen because of a lack of transparency.  Banks with deposits to lend cannot assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.

The solution for unfreezing and keeping the interbank lending market unfrozen is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, banks with deposits to lend can independently assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.
Draghi said: "The national supervisors' role gets bigger as the banks get smaller, but all national supervisors will be subject to the single rulebook as regulated from the centre. The ECB will retain power to call in any bank under its domain." 
Once ECB supervision is in place, the euro zone's rescue fund - the European Stability Mechanism - will be allowed in principle to recapitalise banks directly. 
For now, euro zone governments have had to shore up their banks, adding further to public debt and creating a vicious circle between weak banks and states. 
"Combined with possible direct recapitalisation of banks by the European Stability Mechanism and an envisaged single resolution mechanism, the single supervisory mechanism will go a long way towards breaking the vicious feedback loops between sovereigns and banks," Draghi said.
Regular readers also know that there is no legitimate reason (protecting banker bonuses not being a legitimate reason) that euro zone governments needed to shore up their banks and add further to public debt.

Modern banks are designed to be able to continue operating even when they have low or negative book capital levels.  They can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, taxpayers become the banks' silent equity partners when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  Since taxpayers are already the silent equity partners, there is no need to use the government's ability to borrow in the capital markets to recapitalize the banks.

Thursday, October 11, 2012

Fed stress tests confirm need for ultra transparency

The Wall Street Journal ran an interesting article on the Fed's bank stress tests.  What makes the article interesting is that it confirms your humble bloggers observation that ultra transparency is needed to evaluate the solvency of the banks.

Specifically, banks must be required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Please note the trends in the Fed's data requests from the first round of stress tests to the current round of stress tests:  more frequent and more granular.
One new frustration for big banks is that the information requested by the Fed is changing. 
This year the Fed began requiring banks to submit data on a monthly and quarterly basis, in addition to the annual submission. Banks must also submit much more granular information, including dozens of details about individual loans. 
Fed officials say the new data gives them the information they need to build their stress-test models and to see banks' risk-taking over time. 
The trend is clear:  the Fed is headed towards ultra transparency as they know it is the data they need in order to truly assess the solvency of each bank.
Banks say the Fed has asked them for too much, too fast. 
Some bankers, for instance, have complained the Fed now is demanding they include the physical address of properties backing loans on their books, not just the billing address for the borrower.  Not all banks, it turns out, have that information readily available....
The Fed has backed off some of its original requests after banks protested. 
For example, the Fed announced Sept. 28 that it wouldn't require chief financial officers to attest to the accuracy of the data submitted after banks and their trade groups argued that the still-evolving process was too fresh and confusing for any CFO to be able to be sure his bank had gotten it right. 
Banks needed more time to build up the systems and controls to report data reliably, the Fed said. 
The problem here is not the Fed's asking for detailed data.  The problem here is that these banks are blowing smoke about the capabilities of their information technology systems.

If banks lack critical information for managing a loan portfolio, like the physical address of the collateral, it should show up in their CAMEL rating as at least a 2 point increase in the rating (CAMEL ratings go from 1(best) to 5(close the bank's doors)).  Not knowing where the collateral is for a mortgage calls into question the quality of both the assets and management.

Based on the banks' difficulties in producing the requested data, requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency would be very useful.  Then, the Fed could simply download the data it wants.

Also please note that the banks complain about how the Fed conducts its analysis.  If there were ultra transparency, then each of the banks could analyze the other banks and we could see it their assessments produced similar conclusions as the Fed's.
The clash centers on the math regulators are using to produce the results. Bankers want more detail on how the calculations are made, and the Fed thus far has resisted disclosing more than it has already. 
A senior Fed supervision official, Timothy Clark, irked some bankers last month when he said at a private conference they wouldn't get additional information about the methodology, according to people who attended the event in Boston.  
Wells Fargo & Co. Treasurer Paul Ackerman said at the same conference that he still doesn't understand why the Fed's estimates are so different from Wells's.
With ultra transparency we could find out why the Fed's and Well's estimates differ so much and also what do other market participants think.  As an added bonus, with ultra transparency we can re-open the interbank lending market and eliminate fraud in calculating the Libor interest rate.

Friday, August 10, 2012

Standard Chartered shows that banks shrouded in opacity develop cultures that make them 'unfit' to hold banking license

One of the main themes of this blog is the opacity that surrounds modern banks contributes directly to their culture.  A culture where bad behavior (think manipulating Libor and money-laundering for starters) is embraced.  Behavior that makes them unfit to hold their banking licenses.

Standard Chartered is the latest example of opacity driving out good behavior.

I ask readers to imagine that a decade ago Standard Chartered and other banks were required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Imagine the culture that would exist when there is this level of sunshine and everyone knows that any bad behavior today ends up on the front page of the Financial Times, the Telegraph and the Wall Street Journal tomorrow.

How do you think that a bank with this culture would approach clearing funds for Iran?

I think that a bank with this culture would take steps to ensure that it clears funds in as transparent a manner as possible (no stripping off who sent the money and where it went).  It would also take steps to  prevent clearing transactions that are money laundering.

Of course, Standard Chartered wasn't required to provide ultra transparency and Bloomberg reported on the resulting culture that is 'unfit' for holding a New York banking license.

New York’s financial-services regulator has grounds to shut Standard Chartered Plc (STAN) in the state even if he accepts the firm’s argument that it illegally laundered only a fraction of the $250 billion he claims. 
As the state’s top banking regulator, Benjamin Lawsky has power to act in his discretion against any financial institution he deems untrustworthy, according to the charter of his year-old department. 
Penalties he could impose include fines and the revocation of the bank’s license to operate in the state.... 
Since the Aug. 6 issuance of an order from Lawsky’s Department of Financial Services threatened to revoke Standard Chartered’s license, the bank has focused its defense on the amount it laundered, saying it involved less than 1 percent of the 60,000 Iranian wire transfers asserted by Lawsky. 
Even if Standard Chartered’s position is legally sound, the order’s disclosure of internal e-mails suggesting a conspiracy to hide the identity of Iranian clients from regulators has given Lawsky grounds to act ... 
“I don’t care whether it is a half of 1 percent that weren’t right,” said Arthur Levitt, former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in an interview yesterday on Bloomberg Radio.
“There are going to be more that weren’t right,” said Levitt, a board member of Bloomberg LP, parent of Bloomberg News. “The e-mails are really outrageous. I think Lawsky has uncovered something that probably has a much deeper depth.” 
Standard Chartered’s e-mails, cited by Lawsky in the Aug. 6 order, provide suitable grounds for his action, said Owen Watkins, a partner with the London law firm Lewis Silkin. 
“Making and publicizing the order was within the power conferred on Mr. Lawsky by section 39 of the New York Banking Law,” he said. “On the basis of the order, you can see that the superintendent has an arguable case, with the e-mails and the comments made by certain Standard Chartered staff internally.”...

“Willful non-compliance is very serious,” said Tariq Mirza, a former Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. official now with Grant Thornton. “If those allegations can be substantiated, regulators throw the book at institutions.”
Standard Chartered’s apparent effort to conceal the identity of its Iranian counterparties violated the terms of a 2004 settlement between it and the state of New York, in which the London bank pledged “to ensure compliance with all record keeping and reporting requirements,” according to the order. 
For almost a decade starting in 2001, Standard Chartered operated under what Lawsky’s order called a “deceptive business plan” designed to conceal from regulators that it was processing money transfers for Iranian clients, including the central bank’s U.S. dollar transactions related to oil sales. The order cites bank e-mails and other internal documents to support its accusations.

Even before 2001, the order states, the bank’s general counsel “embraced a framework for regulatory evasion” by keeping its New York branch in the dark about Iranian transactions. 
The bank allegedly accomplished this goal by stripping out the name of Iranian clients so as not to slow down transfers that might have to be reviewed for compliance with U.S. economic sanctions. Those restrictions allowed some transactions but not others as long as non-Iranian banks were involved on both ends.... 
All this alleged misconduct by “a rogue institution” had an effect on the “safety and soundness” of its New York branch and on the department’s confidence in the unit’s “character, credibility and fitness as a financial institution licensed to conduct business under the laws of this state,” according to the order. 
Accusing the bank of “being motivated by greed,” the department’s order concludes that Standard Chartered’s “most senior management designed and implemented an elaborate scheme by which to use its New York branch as a front for prohibited dealngs with Iran -- dealings that indisputably help sustain a global threat to peace and stability. By definition, any banking institution that engages in such conduct is unsafe and unsound.”

Monday, July 23, 2012

Ending the notion that the banking system can be kept safe by on-site examiners

In his Wall Street Journal column, Francesco Guerrera makes the case for doing away with on-site bank examiners and replacing them with disclosure to market participants.

On-site bank examiners have two roles.

First, they are there to ensure compliance with the numerous banking laws.

Second, they are there to try to minimize the exposure of the taxpayers as silent equity partners to losses that the bank incurs on its positions.  In a modern banking system, the taxpayers are a silent equity partner because of the deposit guarantee.

On-site examiners are not there to approve or disapprove of any specific exposure the bank takes as this would be engaging in the capital allocation process of the financial markets.  Rather, they are there to estimate the loss that could arise from the position and determine if the bank has enough book capital to absorb the loss.

Mr. Guerrera presents the argument by the Fed governor who oversees bank supervision and regulation, Daniel Tarullo, for taking away the role of estimating capital adequacy and replacing it with data driven analysis at the Board of Governors' level.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger doesn't think this will solve the problem as the Fed is still substituting its analytical expertise for the markets.  Rather, I think that banks should be required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, the best analysts in the world, including each bank's competitors, can assess each bank's risk and capital adequacy.  The responsible individuals at the Board of Governors can then incorporate these results into their own assessment of each bank's risk and capital adequacy.

Do bankers really need nannies? ... The financial baby sitters I have in mind wear suits, sit in cubicles and pore over spreadsheets. 
They are called "on-site examiners"—regulators who work in the offices of large banks to oversee their management, risks and operations. 
They are a faceless army—the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency alone has around 500 of them while the Federal Reserve counts hundreds of on-site staff among its 1,800-plus examiners. They are almost unheard of in other sectors. And they are fast becoming an anachronism that should be ended or at least sharply downsized. 
Modern banks' propensity to commit costly mistakes on a periodic basis makes it imperative they are regulated in the most efficient manner....
The most efficient manner is by requiring that the banks provide ultra transparency.  The market knows how to assess this information.
Theory and practice militate against deploying such a large portion of regulators' limited resources this way. 
The theory is easier to grasp: The idea that the 100 or so examiners stationed at J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. may be able to police 260,000 employees sitting on a $2.3 trillion balance sheet is a nonstarter. 
The practical experience is trickier. Recent examples suggest that examiners aren't equipped to spot brewing crises ...
The huge trading losses at J.P. Morgan, for example, went undetected by on-site sleuths.
Remember, on-site examiners are not there to prevent the trading losses, but rather to ensure there is enough book capital to absorb the losses.
And last week the OCC was lambasted by U.S. lawmakers for failing to crack down on money laundering at HSBC Holdings PLC.... 
This was a failure to ensure compliance with banking laws for which the on-site examiners have no excuse.
Some critics argue that examiners sitting in the same bank for several years develop Stockholm syndrome and are unwittingly easy on their subjects. A former regulator was even more explicit: "Name a crisis that was prevented by on-site examiners." 
That criticism isn't completely fair. Examiners aren't expected to detect every loss, fraud or mistake in such complex and opaque institutions.... 
More importantly, it is not their role to approve or disapprove of the position that leads to the loss.
But perceptions count and the perception given by regulators since the crisis is that throwing more bodies at banks ought to prevent a repeat of the 2008-2009 turmoil. 
Aided by the Dodd-Frank law, the number of cops on the financial beat has surged. The Fed, for example, has nearly 40% more examiners today than it did in 2008, but is the financial system 40% safer because of that? 
I doubt it and so do some senior regulators.
On-site examiners are not there to make the financial system safer, but rather to try to minimize the taxpayers' exposure as a silent equity partner.  These are very different focuses.
The success of recent "stress tests" of banks' capital buffers has sparked a debate inside the Fed over the merits of these sectorwide, number-crunching exercises versus the traditional oversight that focuses on specific banks and on-site probes. 
As Fed governor Daniel Tarullo told me: "Prudential regulators certainly need to maintain a presence at the largest bank-holding companies. But I think we may need to devote more of our supervisory resources to data-driven, comparative assessments of capital, liquidity and other conditions in these firms." 
This approach has the advantage of relying on hard data, making it more difficult for banks to hoodwink regulators through obfuscation or malice. It would also produce results that, unlike examiners' assessments, are public and easily comparable by investors.... 
Actually, this approach is fatally flawed as it relies on substituting the Fed's analytical expertise for the market's.

Who do you think would be better at analyzing the JP Morgan's exposures provided under ultra transparency, Deutsche Bank or the Fed?  Given how much Deutsche spends on information systems and salaries for its analysts, I would bet on it.
by reducing the number and the importance of on-site examiners, it would do away with the misleading notion that the banking system can be kept safe by dozens of people who "get their coffee, sit in their offices, and…don't work for us," as Goldman Sachs Group Inc. chief Lloyd Blankfein once put it.
The only thing that can keep the banking system safe is by eliminating opacity and requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose all their current exposures.

Friday, July 20, 2012

Transparency: A world transformed by technology

The Guardian ran an interesting article on how information can be extremely powerful in improving the provision of services and bringing about behavioral change.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger would like to see banks required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This information would be aggregated on a borrower privacy protected basis, standardized and made available to all market participants through a data warehouse that hosts what I refer to as the "Mother of All Financial Databases".

With this data, market participants could assess the risk of each bank as well as exert discipline on each bank's risk taking.

With this data, the interbank lending market would be unfrozen and unlikely to refreeze.  This data is the key to on-going liquidity because market participants can continually update their assessment of each bank.  In fact, market participants can do a much better job of matching each bank's cost of funds to the riskiness of the bank.

With a liquid interbank lending market, Libor could be based off of actual trades.

With this data, sunshine can act as the best disinfectant.

Through information technology, society has been given an opportunity to redefine the way individuals conduct their everyday lives.... Communities are in a position to share data amongst themselves, and with the wider world, improve services and the lives of individuals. 
For banking, data would no longer be constrained by national boundaries, but could be looked at from a global perspective.
The way societies use this information will transform the economy, quality of life, and resource consumption. 
One core opportunity offered by information systems is the ability to manage utility networks within cities, such as the creation of a smart energy grid. If operators are able to collect detailed information about what is going on in the grid, they'll be able to manage it more efficiently, making the architecture increasingly robust, cost effective and ultimately provide better services to its citizens...
 The same should be true of the financial sector.
Information can also be leveraged in cities to encourage behavioural change....
Bob Diamond said that culture is important for when people aren't being watched.  Information technology dramatically reduces the reliance on culture by increasing the market's ability to watch.
But the implications of a data-rich world stretch far beyond the operational efficiency. The wide range of information at our fingertips is also driving a new competitive marketplace and transforming not only the economy, but also the way people, companies and governments choose to operate. 
Global corporations are using information as a core asset, with companies like Google and Facebook building their whole business model around the availability of data and the public demand for information....
Given the value in financial information, I would think we would see many new businesses started around the data made available through the 'Mother of All Financial Databases'.
Imagination is the often the biggest restraint when tackling global challenges.


Friday, July 13, 2012

In seeking to improve its oversight of JP Morgan, Fed misses credit default swap trade

Periodically an article comes out and confirms everything that your humble blogger has been saying about a topic.  The NY Times Dealbook carried such an article on bank supervision and the $5 billion trading loss at JP Morgan.

For example, your humble blogger has been saying the the purpose of bank supervision is not to approve or disapprove of any specific exposure, but rather to estimate the potential for loss from an exposure and ensure that there is adequate book capital to absorb the loss.

Regular readers know that I proposed a new model for bank supervision based on ultra transparency.  With banks required to disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can assist the regulators in supervising the banks.  This addresses a number of the problems the Fed encountered in trying to supervise JP Morgan.

First, with this data, nobody is dependent on the bank's internal models or reports.  Instead, market participants including competitors can apply their analytical expertise to assessing the risk of each bank.  As a result, regulators have the benefit of being able to tap the market experts and comparing their findings to the regulators' own internal analysis.

Second, with this data, market participants will adjust the amount and price of their exposure to each bank to reflect the current risk of the bank.  This is known as market discipline and acts as a restraint the bank takes on its risk.

Third, with this data, regulatory capture becomes a non-issue.  Market participants are not susceptible to being captured by the banks nor can officials of the banks push them around.
After the financial crisis, regulators vowed to overhaul supervision of the nation’s largest banks. 
As part of that effort, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in mid-2011 replaced virtually all of its roughly 40 examiners at JPMorgan Chase to bolster the team’s expertise and prevent regulators from forming cozy ties with executives, according to several current and former government officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity. 
But those changes left the New York Fed’s front-line examiners without deep knowledge of JPMorgan’s operations for a brief yet critical time, said those people, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because there is a federal investigation of the bank.
With ultra transparency, regulators at all times would have access to the best expertise the market can provide without the cozy ties.
Forced to play catch-up, the examiners struggled to understand the inner workings of a powerful investment unit, those officials said. At first, the examiners sought basic information about the group, including the name of the unit’s core trading portfolio....
They “couldn’t ask tough questions,” said a former official who was based at JPMorgan.
With ultra transparency, this would have been a non-issue as the market experts could have gotten them up to speed and helped them identify what were the tough questions to ask.
The situation highlights the fundamental challenge of policing big banks, even after the crisis.... 
Even so, the current and former officials said the Fed examiners faced a daunting task, given that the bank has more than $2 trillion in assets. 
Faced with overseeing large banks like JPMorgan, regulators cannot possibly comb through every loan document or trade.
Since the 40 examiners cannot comb through every loan document or trade, it makes sense to end the regulators' monopoly on this information and let market participants who could have access to the data. Hence the reason for requiring ultra transparency.
Instead, they rely primarily on a bank’s own analysis of its risk, a broad portrait that can mask problems. 
“They aren’t examiners as much as they are overseers, forced to peer over the banks’ shoulders,” Bart Dzivi, who served as special counsel to the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission, said in reference to the general state of large bank supervision.
The New York Fed’s shake-up only aggravated a continuing struggle between JPMorgan executives and regulators from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which supervises banks. 
For years, the agency, with dozens of its own examiners at JPMorgan, worried that the bank had been miscalculating how much money it could lose in extreme situations, according to the current and former officials.
Examiners are overseers whose main mission is to estimate the size of the loss that could occur as a result of the exposure and ensuring there is adequate book capital to absorb the loss.
Examiners challenged the executives who stonewalled, and the conflict left agency supervisors with an incomplete picture of the bank’s risk. At one point in early 2012, JPMorgan briefly stopped providing examiners with an important risk estimate for the chief investment office, the group at the center of the recent trading losses, the current and former officials said. Executives told examiners not to worry. 
For their part, regulators say it is not their job to micromanage or remove risk altogether. Their goal is to protect the financial system broadly....
Examiners do not approve or disapprove of any position the bank takes as this would put them into the role of allocating capital across the financial system.
Years before the multibillion-dollar losses, the embedded staff from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency questioned how JPMorgan was estimating its risk.... 
One report, for example, estimated that the bank’s chief investment office would lose no more than $400 million in a two-week period even under the most stressful market conditions, one of the government officials said.
Confirmation of the focus by examiners on the potential for loss.
Some of the agency’s examiners said they had battled to get senior executives at JPMorgan to share how the bank’s internal stress tests were structured. One of the former officials described the analysis as a virtual black box, in which the bank provided few details about the variables.
One of the reasons for requiring ultra transparency is that the important information is the actual exposures and not some 'black box' model.  The model is a form of opacity that hides what is really going on.

The model also provides the bank with a convenient excuse if one of its gambles blows up.  It was the "fault" of the model and not the simple fact that the bank was gambling that was to blame.  As a result, the focus is on developing a new model and not stopping the gambling.
JPMorgan executives resisted providing any additional information about the stress tests, including how they chose the variables used to forecast potential losses. The bank routinely pushed back scheduled meetings to review the matter, the current and former officials said. 
“We were most concerned with the fact that the stress test is one of the most important risk management reports,” said one of the former bank examiners, and the test’s methodology “had not been reviewed by regulators.”....
Having adopted the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and with it policies like regulatory forbearance, the bank supervisors have lost their moral authority to compel the release of information.  What is worse is the actions by JP Morgan's executives confirm this and they are not concerned that the bank supervisors will take any action against them.

Without ultra transparency, bank supervisors are at the mercy of bank management in analyzing the risk the bank is taking.

With ultra transparency, bank supervisors can turn to market experts outside of the bank for help in analyzing the risk the bank is taking.  More importantly, because the data is made available to all market participants market discipline can be enforced to restrain risk taking.

Saturday, June 30, 2012

UK regulator: banks were 'unethical' in years leading up to crisis

As Harry Wilson of the Telegraph reports, Martin Wheatley, the head of financial conduct at the Financial Services Authority,

has branded the conduct of banks in the years running up to the crash as “unethical”, saying that in many cases staff at major lenders did not understand the products they were selling or that they might harm their customers.... 
Britain has been left with a “big problem” as a result of what he described as the “back book legacy” of the banks actions in the boom years. 
“I think the banks suspended normal ethical standards and were selling products that were profitable for the investment banks, not well understood by the banking staff that were introducing them, and not at all understood by the customers who were buying them,” he said.
Last week, the FSA announced a settlement with Barclays, HSBC, Lloyds Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland over the mis-selling of interest rate hedging products to small business customers. Compensation could reach as much as £6bn, according to one law firm..... 
Mr Wheatley, who takes charge of one of the FSA’s two successor organisations next year, also admitted that the FSA had “conflicting objectives” when dealing with banks.
It is refreshing to hear a regulator confess that they have 'conflicting objectives' when dealing with banks.

Regular readers know that it is the existence of these 'conflicting objectives' that makes it mandatory that banks be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, at least one major source of conflicting objectives is removed from the bank supervision process.

With this disclosure, sunlight can be used as the best disinfectant for unethical behavior.

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

Like US and Irish financial regulators, Spain's missed or downplayed problems in banking sector

The NY Times carried a terrific article exploring yet another example of financial regulators publicly downplaying the risks in their banking systems.

This article confirmed a principal finding of the Nyberg report on the Irish financial crisis that the current structure of bank supervision causes financial instability because it suppresses expressing dissenting opinions on the riskiness of the financial system to the public.

While your humble blogger appreciates that regulators don't want to say anything that would cause market participants to question the safety and soundness of the banks or potentially trigger a bank run, this lack of criticism creates several problems.

First, it contributes to market participants mis-pricing the risk of the banks.  Since the regulators have an informational monopoly on the data needed to fully assess the risk of the banks, the regulators statements influence the perception of risk at the banks.

Second, it undermines the credibility of the government when it comes to dealing with a financial crisis.  Has anyone else noticed a cycle under which policymakers and financial regulators roll out a solution, sound the all clear and then repeat the exercise when the solution is shown as inadequate?

Regular readers know that your humble blogger proposed a new model for bank supervision that ends these problems.  The model is based on the idea of ending the financial regulators' information monopoly.

Specifically, it requires the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can assess the risk of each bank for themselves.

As a result, regulators do not have to offer up an opinion on the banks.  In fact, the regulators can easily piggyback off of the markets' analytical capability in their internal assessment of the banks.

It ends the cycle of inadequate solutions.  In particular, it ends the perception that governments and banks are hiding something.

As Spain edged closer to a real estate and banking crisis that led to its recent bank bailout, Spanish financial leaders in influential positions mostly played down concerns that something might go terribly wrong. 
The optimism of Spanish central bankers who went on to top jobs at the International Monetary Fund echoes the attitudes of officials in the United States who misjudged the force of a housing collapse several years ago that crippled banks and the economy. And it underscores the complications that can arise when government officials take watchdog roles at international agencies that pass judgment on the policies they once directed....
From their lofty perches, first at Spain’s central bank and then as the I.M.F.’s top executives assessing global banking risk, José Viñals and Jaime Caruana were well positioned to sound alarms about the looming bank debacle. 
But at a news conference in Washington in April 2010, when analysts were raising red flags about failing Spanish real estate loans, Mr. Viñals — who a year earlier had succeeded Mr. Caruana — offered assurances. The Spanish system was “fundamentally sound,” he said, and its needs for cash “very small.” 
A year later, as the banking crisis showed little sign of improving, Mr. Viñals again called for calm, saying the market panic that had led to bailouts in Ireland and Portugal would not infect Spain. 
Now that the recent failure of Bankia, the big mortgage lender, has prompted a 100 billion euro (about $125 billion) European rescue, it is clear that Mr. Viñals’s forecasts were too sanguine. 
Mr. Caruana was no more prescient. Pressed at an I.M.F. news conference in July 2008 about falling house prices in Spain, he acknowledged there might be loan losses. But he said, “The financial system in Spain is able to cope with that and is properly capitalized.”...
The names have changed, but the same story could be told of senior bank regulators in Ireland and the US.
Certainly, Spanish officials were slow to acknowledge the depths of the problem. 
In early May, Rodrigo Rato, then the executive chairman of Bankia, told journalists that the bank was in a situation of “great robustness, both in terms of solvency and liquidity.” 
Even after the bank’s bailout a few days later, Spain’s economy minister predicted that no more than 15 billion euros of public funds would be required to clean up the banks....
Officials everywhere have been slow to acknowledge the depths of the problem.
Most prominent by far was Mr. Rato, now better known for his disastrous two-year run at the helm of Bankia. In 2004, he was picked to lead the I.M.F. after winning global recognition during an eight-year run supervising Spain’s growth burst as the country’s economy minister. 
Until he left the fund three years later, Mr. Rato was better known for praising Spain’s economic miracle — one that relied largely on revenue driven by real estate to drive growth and balance budgets — than questioning its sustainability. 
He considered himself the intellectual father of that miracle, as he made clear in a 2004 speech, citing his reforms as marking “a new era in economic policy” for Spain. Mr. Rato, too, declined to be interviewed for this article. 
There were many others, of course, who did not foresee the Spanish banking blowup. 
Topping the list is Europe’s main bank overseer, the European Banking Authority. 
In December 2011, the authority concluded that Spain’s two strongest institutions — Santander and BBVA — would need to raise more money than the 1.3 billion euros that was required of Bankia, which would need to be rescued just six months later.... 
In Spain, the increase in house prices between 2000 and 2007 was particularly extreme — so much so that as early as 2006, a team of inspectors within the Bank of Spain sent a cautionary report to the government. 
The study criticized the “passive attitude” of Mr. Caruana, who led the central bank from 2000 to 2006, and the extraordinary acceleration of loans to homebuyers and real estate developers. 
The inspectors also warned of Spanish banks engaging in unusually heavy short-term borrowing at levels far beyond their deposits. 
The 2006 report painted a much darker picture than Mr. Rato and the I.M.F. saw a short time later when the fund made its own assessment in 2007 of Spain’s economic and financial health — and the Bank of Spain’s ability to rein in excesses. 
The analysis praised the “dynamism of Spain’s financial system,” and said that “its strong, prudential supervision and regulation remain a forte of the economy.”...
In fact, up through the 2008 global financial crisis, Bank of Spain officials had become the toast of the international regulatory circuit for their innovations. Most notable of those was a so-called dynamic provisioning policy, a set of rules that forces banks to set aside extra cash during good economic times to protect against the inevitable rainy days.
For a time, Spanish financial institutions were hailed as paragons of responsible banking — having set aside over 110 billion euros in reserves. 
But José Garcia Montalvo, a real estate specialist based in Barcelona, says that this figure could have been higher — and the banks better prepared for the housing collapse when it came. 
The reserves proved insufficient, he said, because the Spanish central bank in 2004, led then by Mr. Caruana, succumbed to bank lobbying and pressure from Europe by halving the amount that banks had to set aside to 15 percent of overall loans, from 30 percent. 
From that point, Spanish bank lending, already growing at 14 percent annually, went into overdrive — up 27 percent in 2005 and an additional 25 percent in 2006.
Yet another replay of the Irish experience.
Mr. Caruana’s career has since thrived. After just three years at the I.M.F., he left in 2009 for one of the plum global finance jobs: chief executive of the Bank for International Settlements, the Basel-based regulatory body that serves as a forum for the world’s central banks. 
Last weekend, in a speech that explored the roots of the financial crisis, Mr. Caruana highlighted the economic distortions caused by frantic real estate lending, and he called for banks to be quicker to recognize losses and raise capital — although he did not mention Spain by name