Showing posts with label lobbying. Show all posts
Showing posts with label lobbying. Show all posts

Friday, July 19, 2013

Is Wall Street winning or because of its high profits losing the long-war against regulation

Approximately one month ago, in her Guardian column, Heidi Moore described why Wall Street is winning the long-war against regulation.
Feeble as it was, Dodd-Frank was a high point of reining in abuses. Thanks to financial lobbying, it's business as usual.
Today, in his NY Times column, Peter Eavis describes why Wall Street's high profits set them up to lose the long-war against regulation.
In recent weeks, the Treasury Department, senior regulators and members of Congress have stepped up efforts intended to make the largest banks safer. 
The banks have warned that more regulation could undermine their ability to compete and curtail the amount of money they have to lend, but the strong earnings that came out over the last week could undercut their argument. 
Which view is right?

Ms. Moore described how Wall Street wins the long-term war against regulation.
It will surprise no cynic that there is a financial connection between the members of Congress who approve these measures and the industry they are supposed to regulate.... 
It's no surprise, of course – given the well-known influence of Wall Street in writing and influencing the bills that regulate Wall Street. Citigroup lobbyists infamously drafted 70 lines of an 85-line amendment that protected a large acreage of derivatives from regulation.... 
Wall Street is keenly interested in weak regulation and weak regulators.... 
Think of derivatives – these complex securities that render ignorant and bewildered even the CEOs of the finance firms that engineer them – and think about whether a newcomer has a chance against the slick bankers and lobbyists armed with intimidating jargon. 
No matter how strong the personality, knowledge matters, and it takes years to understand the Wall Street fast-talking game....
All of this is part of the process of killing off the one flailing, pathetic attempt at financial reform: the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Dodd-Frank, bloated and vague from the beginning, was never a threat to Wall Street. 
Big banks thought they could wait out the outrage, then start undermining the intent of the law. 
They were right, this time. 
Mr. Eavis counters.
The most pressing concern for banks is a relatively tough new rule that regulators proposed last week that could force banks to build up more capital, the financial buffer they maintain to absorb losses.
Relatively tough might be overstating the new rule.  Many regulators, like the FDIC's Thomas Hoenig, and Economists, like Anat Admati, would like to see rules that require twice the amount the regulators proposed last month.

By setting the proposed level of bank capital where the regulators set it, the banks have already effectively won when it comes to capital regulation.
But the banks did not demonstrate any difficulty in meeting the proposed rules, and the banks now appear to have fewer allies in Washington than at any time since the financial crisis.
This was highlighted on Wednesday when the Treasury secretary, Jacob J. Lew, effectively issued an ultimatum to Wall Street, calling for the swift adoption of rules introduced through the Dodd-Frank financial overhaul law, which Congress passed in 2010.... 
“If we get to the end of this year, and cannot, with an honest, straight face, say that we’ve ended ‘too big to fail,’ we’re going to have to look at other options because the policy of Dodd-Frank and the policy of the administration is to end ‘too big to fail,’ ” Mr. Lew said.... 
In Congress on Thursday, Ben S. Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman,... said that if the measures already planned did not remove the risks posed by large banks, “additional steps would be appropriate.”
Still, some analysts remain skeptical that the Fed and the Treasury would really lend their weight to the sort of aggressive measures some lawmakers are contemplating. The recent comments may be an attempt to gain some political benefit from looking tough on the banks. 
And the remarks may be aimed at reducing any momentum that the more draconian pieces of bank legislation are gaining in the Senate.... 
Still, the stronger words from government officials could shift the balance of power away from the banking industry. 
“I sense a sea change in this,” Sheila C. Bair, a former chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a primary bank regulator, said. “It’s not moving with the banks, it’s moving against them.” 
The resurgence in bank profits appears to have been an important factor in persuading regulators to do more....
“The regulators are doing this because they can,” Michael Mayo, a banking analyst at CLSA, said. “And they can at this time of relative stability.”....
Excuse me, but the argument that stability was needed before the banks and the financial system could be reformed is pure and utter garbage.

By late 2008, governments around the globe had put the financial system on life support.  This support was the equivalent of putting a patient on a heart/lung machine so that the patient's heart can be operated on.

While the financial system was on life support it would have been easy to pass and implement the necessary changes to fix the financial system and end Too Big to Fail.

Global policy makers and financial regulators did not do so.  They couldn't even be bother with taking the time to set up the equivalent of a Pecora Commission to discover what caused the crisis in the first place, opacity.

Instead, they rolled out the Dodd-Frank Act which was effectively written by and for the banks by the banks' lobbyists.
Still, Mr. Mayo and others question how healthy the banks are.... 
Mr. Mayo and others are going to continue questioning how healthy the banks are until such time as the banks are required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Without this level of disclosure, there is no telling what risks and losses are hidden on and off the banks' balance sheets.
Still, some banking experts think the banks are bluffing when they say more regulation could hamper lending. 
“They can’t see that it is in their long-term interests to have a credible regulatory process,” Ms. Bair said.

The banks understand that they have already captured the regulatory process.

The only way for the regulators to re-establish any credibility is by giving up their monopoly on all the useful, relevant information about banks and requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Monday, January 28, 2013

Abandon, don't electrify ring-fence

In his Financial Times op-ed, Andrew Tyrie, the chairman of the Parliament's Commission on Banking Standards, argues for 'electrifying the ring-fence' between investment and retail banking because banks will relentlessly lobby until the ring-fence has been effectively torn down.

I agree with Mr. Tyrie's observation about the behavior of bankers and what the final result of adopting a ring-fence will be.

What your humble blogger disagrees with Mr. Tyrie on is substituting the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight (which is what an electrified ring-fence would be) for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

If banks were required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, this would go further to eliminating casino banking and the danger it presents to utility banking than a ring-fence would.

With ultra transparency, market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess the risk of each bank and make a fully informed decision.  The result of this independent assessment will be market discipline on the banks to reduce their risk taking.

Ultra transparency also has the added advantage that risk reduction is enforced by the market and not by regulators and policymakers who are subject to being lobbied over time.  So ultra transparency directly addresses Mr. Tyrie's concerns about long-term enforceability of reforms.

The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, which I chair, supports the creation of this ringfence. However, in our report scrutinising the draft legislation, the commission also concluded that without significant changes it may well not achieve its objectives. 
The ringfence must be “electrified” if it is to stand a better chance of success – in other words, if the banks test the ringfence too much, they will get a shock. 
Any reform where there is significant doubt about its long term viability is a reform that shouldn't be pursued.
We therefore recommended a reserve power for full separation, an approach Sir John himself endorsed in evidence to the commission this month. 
The regulators, too, have told the commission they want electrification. And they have come forward with proposals to give it practical effect. 
The banks, on the other hand, do not want electrification. They seem to be the only ones. 
The lobbying campaign against this proposal predictably started the moment our report was published – just as it did when the ICB first suggested introducing a ringfence. 
The strength of the industry’s lobbying, even at this early stage, makes the case eloquently for electrification. Even while chastened by public anger over their role in the financial crisis and subsequent revelations such as Libor rigging , they are lobbying....
Please note that the banks have been lobbying against any proposed reform since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Your humble blogger has documented this lobbying in the area of structured finance reform.  The bottom line is the banks have effectively blocked reform.

Even when the EU passed legislation mandating that banks know what they own and that the issuers provide the data to make this possible, the banks managed to lobby the banking regulators and have these regulators agree that opaque, toxic subprime mortgage backed securities qualify for know what you own.

The other way that banks succeed in their lobbying is by keeping certain reforms off the table.  Banks have successfully blocked bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system by "supporting" through their lobbying the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight as a replacement for transparency and market discipline.
All history tells us that banks will be at the ringfence like foxes to a chicken coop unless they are incentivised not to do so. On past evidence, they will test it nonstop and try to persuade politicians to alter it in their favour. 
Electrification is therefore essential to ensure that the banks comply not just with the rules of the ringfence but also with the spirit. 
We must legislate now for more benign economic circumstances, when banks are under less intense scrutiny. At that time, politicians will be particularly susceptible to lobbying and the integrity of the ringfence will be most at risk.
 Our proposals help protect the ringfence from such pressures in the long term. Banks see it as a starting point for negotiations; we view it as a starting point for a more stable and sustainable banking system.... 
Mr. Tyrie is wrestling with the issue of how to enforce any complex regulation in light of what we know about the banks' ability to relentlessly lobby.

This issue goes directly to the heart of why the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight fail catastrophically and make the financial system far more unstable.  Ultimately the banks will get around the regulation.

This is why your humble blogger has been pounding the table on the issue of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It is a simple regulation that the market can enforce.
Of course, structural reform is by no means the only way to improve banking standards and the commission will now be largely focusing on the second phase of its work. This will involve examining whether changes in areas such as corporate governance, competition, the regulatory and tax framework, and the civil and criminal law could enhance standards and improve behaviour in the banking industry.
Regular readers know that sunshine is the best disinfectant of bad banker behavior and ultra transparency is the gold standard for sunshine.

Regular readers also know that ultra transparency is the key to restoring trust in the banks.  After all, providing ultra transparency use to be the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet because it had nothing to hide.

Your humble blogger hopes that Mr. Tyrie and his commission will consider it.

Friday, December 28, 2012

Did losses on "London whale" trade succeed in defanging bank lobbying when financial crisis couldn't?

In his Wall Street Journal article, Scott Patterson lays out how the losses sustained by JP Morgan on its "London whale" trade effectively defanged the bank lobbying efforts when it came to implementation of the Volcker Rule.

Regular readers know that there are two elements to each rule:  what the rule says and how it is enforced.

Your humble blogger showed how this would work for the Volcker Rule.  The rule says that banks are not allowed to engage in proprietary trading.  This is enforced by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants could see if the bank were engaged in proprietary trading and exert discipline to stop this proprietary trading.

Compare this with the 200+ pages that is going to emerge from the bank regulatory complex and that bank examiners are suppose to enforce.  Enforcement which will be problematic because one of the cardinal rules of bank examiners is not to approve or disapprove of an exposure taken by a bank because this gets the bank examiners into allocating capital across the financial system.

Which rule and enforcement mechanism looks more likely to be successful in permanently ending proprietary trading by the banks?

The bank lobby already won when they ended up with a 200+ page rule from the bank regulatory complex.  What the "Whale" trade cost the banks is that it will be a little harder for them to engage in proprietary trading.
Wall Street banks entered 2012 confident they could stall a wave of rules that they feared would hurt profits. But they are ending the year largely resigned that their activities will be constrained and monitored more closely by the government. 
One big reason for the change: J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.'s "London whale" losses. 
The bad trades, ultimately resulting in about $6 billion in losses, disrupted the banks' campaign against the Dodd-Frank financial overhaul, according to regulators, lawmakers and close observers of policy debates in Washington. 
I find this a stunning statement for the simple reason that the banks blew up the financial system prior to the beginning of the financial crisis on August 9, 2007.

Apparently, the regulators tasked with writing the Volcker Rule forgot this and needed to be reminded by the losses on the London whale trade.
The trades damaged the reputation of J.P. Morgan, which suffered less than other banks from the financial crisis, and its chief executive, James Dimon, during a crucial period of policy debate in Washington, putting critics of Dodd-Frank on the defensive. 
Before news of the whale losses emerged, banks were arguing, with some success, that too-tight regulations were crimping lending during a time of slow growth....
And what exactly does banning proprietary trading have to do with crimping lending?

Ending the banks proprietary trading would in fact free up capital that could be used to support lending as the banks would be forced to shed the assets they bet on.
Perhaps the most significant fallout was on the "Volcker rule," which bans banks from making bets with their own money. While the final version of the Volcker rule hasn't been released, people with knowledge of the latest version said that it is likely to be more restrictive of bank's trading activities and might not allow broad hedging of bank portfolios.
Hello, it takes two paragraphs to both write the rule and its enforcement mechanism (see above).

Monday, November 5, 2012

HSBC chairman: banks have lost 'right to self-determination'

HSBC chairman Douglas Flint says that banks have lost the 'right to self-determination'.

But that is certainly not going to stop their spending massive amounts of money lobbying for regulations that are favorable for them.

As reported by the Telegraph,

Mr Flint admitted lenders had “lost the right to self-determination” following the financial crisis and now had little influence on new regulation.
Based on the litany of bad behavior including manipulation of Libor, money laundering, and mis-selling of interest rate swaps,  banks should have lost the right to self-determination.

However, as shown by US banks, that is clearly not the case.
“It doesn’t really matter whether any of us think it [the new rules] will be our optimal choice as I think we’ve lost the right to determine ourselves what we think the optimal choice is,” he told the parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. 
Mr Flint warned that overly-onerous regulation could still force the bank to relocate to another country but said any decision on the long-standing issue had been put back to 2015.
The threat to move is a prime example of a bank lobbying.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been advocating requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

There are several reasons for doing this including:

  1. it reduces the need for overly-onerous regulations that are simply a substitute for ultra transparency and the market discipline it enables (examples of unnecessary regulations include ring-fencing);
  2. it triggers a regulatory race to the top as no country wants to be seen as hosting banks that could be hiding all sorts of risks on and off their balance sheet; and
  3. it does not have loopholes that banks can exploit so that the requirement becomes ineffective over time.
As I have stated previously, requiring transparency is an elegant solution.

However, Barclays chief executive Antony Jenkins sounded an optimistic note as he claimed the bank could “accomodate” government plans to impose a ring-fence on major lenders, whereby they will be forced to isolate retail businesses from investment banking arms. 
“My personal view is that we can accommodate ring fencing without affecting our capacity to lend,” he said.
Talk about a red herring.  Ring-fencing was never going to impede a bank's ability to lend.  Heck, insolvency doesn't impede a bank's ability to lend as the bank can always sell the loan to another financial market participant.
However, HSBC landed a blow on Government plans to establish so-called 'depositor reference’, whereby consumers would have the first call on a bank’s assets in the event of its failure. In its written submission to the Commission, HSBC said the plans were “not permitted” under new European rules currently under discussion. 
HSBC said the authorities should work towards a “single position” on the issue to avoid what would be an embarrassing climbdown for the government. 
Mr Jenkins backed that call and said any expansion of depositor preference should be “carefully coordinated across at least Europe”.
One of the best elements of ultra transparency is that it can be applied in the same way globally. 

Sunday, October 21, 2012

Fixing 'zombie' banks is the key to economic recovery

In his Telegraph column, Liam Halligan discusses that it is time to abandon the 'absurd growth versus austerity debate' because the key to economic recovery is fixing the 'zombie' banks.

In making the case for fixing the banks, like your humble blogger, Mr. Halligan shreds a number of myths about the economic and financial reform policies being pursued.

For all the “austerity” rhetoric, we’ve actually seen little overall spending restraint. Public sector net borrowing during the financial year to last month was £65.1bn, almost £3bn higher than the same period last year, according to official data released on Friday.... 
this country will borrow a massive £120bn during the current financial year, with the outstanding stock of government debt set to triple between 2008 and 2015/16.... 
For all that debt must be serviced, with the spiralling interest payments detracting from spending on schools, hospitals, defence and the other public services our country obviously needs.
Ministers claim that financial markets are “rewarding” the UK by demanding only low yields when lending the government money. I so wish that were true. 
For it is only the virtual money-printing that we’ve seen on an unprecedented scale – a grotesque, kleptocratic policy, which is storing up untold future problems – that has prevented a catastrophic creditors’ strike....
Our paltry growth, though, has little to do with “austerity” – as the Office for Budget Responsibility confirmed in a little-noticed report last week. The UK economy is so weak because household consumption is stagnant, in part because real incomes have fallen amid stubbornly high inflation. Growth is low because investment has stalled and exports have continued to disappoint.
There is this horrible circularity in the economic and monetary policies being pursued.  The UK, like the US, is experiencing an explosion in sovereign debt that is being driven by the economic and monetary policies being pursued.

The unprecedented money-printing has kept interest rates low.  This in turn has triggered the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.

When retirement plans, both individual and pension, do not generate the expected earnings on their assets, the earnings shortfall needs to be covered.  Individuals cover it by reducing current consumption.  Companies cover it by diverting funds needed for reinvestment in the real economy.

Covering the earnings shortfall deprives the real economy of the demand it needs to grow.

This lack of demand is then used by the government to justify more quantitative easing and fiscal policies that oscillate between stimulus and austerity in an endless doom loop (see Japan and 2+ lost decades).
Above all, growth is low because bank lending continues to sharply contract, with the UK’s banking sector still denying finance to millions of creditworthy households and firms. 
This is the biggest and most damaging vested interest of all that ministers have failed to take on – namely, our moribund, zombie banks. 
The UK’s political leadership is relying on deeply damaging policies such as “quantitative easing” and the odd half-hearted “scheme” to boost growth. But no amount of QE, and no other “eye-catching initiative” will allow the British economy to get back on track until the banks are restructured and the enormous losses that lurk on unaudited parts of their balance sheets are written-off. 
“I’m the Chancellor in a government that has done more to reform finance and banking than any before it,” George Osborne said at the recent Conservative Party conference, citing the Vickers Commission and the “ringfence” that will be established within the UK’s financial monoliths to separate investment and commercial banking. 
It was the co-mingling of such activities, with bonus-fuelled traders gambling with ordinary punters’ deposits, while enjoying an implicit state guarantee which, more than anything else, caused the financial mess we are in. 
It strikes me that Osborne’s claim to have “reformed” the banks is a long way from the truth. Last week, Paul Volcker, the former Federal Reserve chairman who has fought to introduce a full “Glass-Steagall” separation of investment and commercial banking in the US, a fight he could yet lose, gave his verdict on the UK’s reforms. 
The Vickers ringfence is “full of holes ... that are likely to get bigger over time”, said Volcker. “The concept that different subsidiaries of a single commercial organisation can maintain total independence either in practice or in public perception is difficult to sustain.” 
Oh – and the Vickers measures won’t be binding until 2019, giving our vociferous banking lobby plenty of time to water them down even more.
This is a very important point:  the focus of bank reform has been on complex rules and additional regulatory oversight.  Both have been shown not to work.

Complex rules do not work because the banks use the loopholes in the rules to neuter the rules.  Glass-Steagall was repealed because the banks had found so many ways around it that they had essentially rendered it ineffective.

Regulatory oversight does not work because regulators themselves are prone to industry capture.  This capture can be top down (banks influence politicians) or bottom up (the revolving door).

In addition, there is an overlay of regulators failing in their primary responsibility:  making sure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can make a fully informed investment decision.

There is a role for regulators assessing the risk of the banks so as to protect the taxpayers through their exposures to the banks through the deposit guarantee.  However, this role does not require the regulators to be the only market participants with access to all the useful, relevant information.

In fact, the regulators could do a much better job of assessing risk, it they let the markets' analytical resources help them by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
This coming Thursday, the Office for National Statistics publishes its preliminary estimate of UK growth between July and September. If these third quarter numbers confirm that Britain is still in recession, and even if they don’t, their publication will mark the start of yet another chapter in the absurd “growth versus austerity” debate. 
That discussion is based on a false dichotomy and is anyway a diversion from the real issue. For the only way genuinely to fix the UK economy is to fix the banks. I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: there really is no alternative.
Mr. Halligan makes a very important point that applies not only to the discussion of "growth versus austerity", but also to the discussion of financial reform.  To date, it has all been a diversion from the real issue:  fixing the banks.

This is no surprise as it reflects the original choice to pursue the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

Were the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis to be pursued, not only would the banks be fixed, the economy growing, social programs protected, but, we would set in place the few necessary financial reforms to reign in both banks and regulators and prevent a future financial crisis.

Monday, October 1, 2012

To break up or not to break up the banks is a distraction, the issue is requiring them to provide transparency

To give regular readers some idea of just how powerful the Blob (aka, financial regulators, bankers and their lobbyists) is, five years after the financial crisis began we are still debating whether to break up the banks or not.

Regular readers know that the issue of breaking up the banks is nothing more than a distraction.  The real issue is requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclosing on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this information that market participants can exert discipline on the banks and get them to refrain from excessive risk taking in both the retail and casino parts of the bank.

It is only with this information that market participants can assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure to each bank to a level that the market participant can afford to lose given the risk of the bank.  It is this adjustment of each market participant's exposure that ends the risk of contagion.

As discussed by the Guardian,
In January 2010, the then chancellor, Alistair Darling, was asked about breaking up banks to make them safer. He had just pumped around £65bn of taxpayer funds in to the banks and replied: "I have always thought to separate banks doesn't deal with the full problem … It is the connections between institutions that cause problems not the legal entity. The large bank/small bank division, experience shows, does not answer the question either of Lehmans."
The problem of connections between institutions can only be solved with ultra transparency.

It is the information that banks with deposits to lend need to independently assess the risk of banks looking to borrow.

It is the information that banks entering into a derivative contract need to independently assess the risk of the counter-party bank.

With the independent assessment of risk, the banks can adjust their exposures to each other to a level where they can afford to absorb the loss on their exposure without failing themselves.

Banks will do this because of market discipline.  Banks that are at risk of failure from the collapse of another bank will see a much higher cost of funds and lower stock price than banks that are not at risk of failure from the collapse of another bank.
Roll on September 2012 and Labour, now in opposition and under new leadership, is baiting the coalition government for not going far enough in implementing the ringfencing proposals outlined by the Independent Commission on Banking. 
Chaired by Sir John Vickers, who has expressed disappointment that the government has not endorsed the proposals in full, the ICB calls for a ringfence to be erected between high street banks and investment banks, dubbed casinos.
Ring-fencing will do nothing to address the interconnectedness of the banks.  Without ultra transparency, banks will still not be able to independently assess each other's risk, let alone tell which banks are solvent and which are not.
The shadow chancellor, Ed Balls, had made it clear in December that he would support what he described at the time as "these important banking reforms" and called for no "backsliding, foot dragging or watering them down". 
By June, among the areas watered down was the leverage ratio – one of the ways to measure the risks banks take – and allowing the bits of the banks inside the ringfence to sell derivatives....
This just shows that the Blob knows how to play the game.  Get proposed regulations to focus on your issue and then lobby to get the regulations water-down.
Meanwhile, on Tuesday it is the turn of a panel set by European commissioner Michel Barnier to give its verdict on the merits – or not – of breaking up banks. The report by Erkki Liikanen, governor of the Bank of Finland, will be read closely by the heads of banks across Europe. 
The heads of banks across Europe will be looking to confirm that Erkki Liikanen restricts the discussion to breaking up or not breaking up the banks.

The heads of banks across Europe know they are in trouble if the question is asked if this is the most effective way to restrain risk taking or financial contagion.
Extraordinary, really, that four years on from the banking crisis politicians and policymakers are still arguing about the ideal shape for such a critical industry.
As I said, arguing about the ideal shape for the financial industry is a distraction.

If you require high street and casino banks to provide ultra transparency, the market will figure out what is the ideal shape for the industry.

Friday, September 21, 2012

Jeff Connaughton: Why Wall Street always wins

ZeroHedge carried excerpts from Jeff Connaughton's book, The Payoff:  Why Wall Street Always Wins.

In the book excerpts, Mr. Conaughton discusses one aspect of the Financial, Regulatory, Academic Complex (FRAC).  He specifically focuses on how FRAC goes about maintaining a status quo where complicated regulations and regulatory supervision has replaced transparency and market discipline.

The Blob (it’s really called that) refers to the government entities that regulate the finance industry—like the Banking Committee, Treasury Department, and SEC—and the army of Wall Street representatives and lobbyists that continuously surrounds and permeates them. 
The Blob moves together. Its members are in constant contact by e-mail and phone. They dine, drink, and take vacations together. Not surprisingly, they frequently intermarry. 
Indeed, a good way to maximize your family income in DC is to specialize in financial issues and marry someone in The Blob. Ideally, you and your spouse take turns: One of you works for a bank, insurance company, or lobbying firm while the other works for a government entity that regulates, or enacts legislation for, the financial industry. 
Every few years, you reverse roles: “Sally Striver, staffer on the Senate Banking Committee,” so might read a typical notice in Roll Call, “today announced her departure to work for the Financial Services Roundtable”; inevitably, she’s replaced with someone from the financial industry because, so runs the justification, the committee needs people familiar with the issues. 
What you and your spouse do all the time is share information. After all, no lobbying restrictions yet promulgated can prevent pillow talk between Blob spouses. 
Actually, marrying The Blob isn’t even necessary. A Blob member can simply take his or her non-Blob spouse to Blob parties—convivial gatherings of lobbyists and Wall street emissaries, SEC and Treasury Department officials—to help gather and disseminate intelligence. It’s a weekly, and sometimes nightly, occurrence in Washington. 
Ted and I quickly learned that, when you take on Wall Street in Washington, you take on The Blob....
Please take the time to re-read the description of the Blob keeping in mind the Dodd-Frank Act.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger views the Dodd-Frank Act as written by and for the financial industry with the exception of the Volcker Rule and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.

The Act is 2,000+ pages calling for an enormous expansion in complicated regulation and regulatory supervision of the financial sector.  This is undoubtedly good for the Blob.

However, if the last 50 years have shown anything, it has shown that a financial system that is dependent on complicated regulations and regulatory supervision is an inherently unstable financial system prone to collapsing like it did in 2007.

The reason for this instability is that complicated regulations and regulatory supervision create opacity.  Where there is opacity, market participants cannot properly assess risk.  When risk is mis-priced, too much of it is created.

The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane used Basel capital requirements to make the point about creating opacity.  He points out that under Basel I, capital ratio could be calculated on an envelope and under Basel III, capital ratios require 19 million assumptions and a computer to calculate.

While I like this analysis, Mr. Haldane needs to go back one step further.  Why did we have Basel I?  We created Basel I to hide the fact that banks were increasing their leverage (this was sold to regulators as banks need a higher ROE if they are going to attract equity investors).

Why do I know this?  I worked on Basel I.
In August 2009, then Senator Kaufman wrote SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro to urge her to study how dramatic changes in our stock markets in only a few years time had led to an explosive growth in computerized trading. 
Ted's letter to Chairman Schapiro helped draw the media's attention to dark pools and HFT, which began to receive extensive (and concerned) coverage in the financial press. 
The letter also transformed Ted from a virtually unknown Senate newcomer into a brightly flashing blip on Wall Street's radar screen. 
In response, Wall Street scrambled an entire air wing of bankers and lobbyists to buzz Capitol Hill. Soon, squadrons were swooping into our office, anxious to thwart new regulations following the financial crisis and, particularly, to prevent a crackdown on HFT.  
They were numerous (we typically met with five high-level Wall Street executives at a time) and unanimous. 
Whether a megabank, broker-dealer, or a hedge fund, they all said they believed that the stock market had never functioned better. "Competition has driven down the costs of trading," said one. "The spread between a stock's asking price and offer price has never been so narrow," said another. "There's always enough liquidity -- even during times of market stress -- to ensure that trades will almost certainly be executed," said a third. The refrain "mom-and-pop investors have never had it so good" was intoned by nearly all of them. 
As a former lobbyist, I almost had to admire the way they unswervingly stayed on message. And the message was that the status quo was good for everyone and that Ted and I were wasting our time exploring whether market changes might call for statutory and regulatory changes. 
It would've been easy, and quite understandable, for us to be convinced by Wall Street's unanimous message....
I have had a very similar experience trying to bring transparency to banks and structured finance securities.

For example, I like to point out the 19 responses received by Committee of European Bank Supervisors (CEBS) on Article 122a of the European Capital Requirements Directive.  Article 122a requires commercial and investment banks to 'know what they own' when they purchase structured finance securities.

As confirmed by the NAIC white paper, in order to know what you own, structured finance securities need to provide observable event based reporting and before the next business day disclose any activities like payments or defaults involving the underlying collateral.

This compares to current reporting practices where activities involving the underlying collateral are reported once per month or less frequently.  An example of a security that reports once per month is the opaque, toxic subprime mortgage backed security.... hence its first name: opaque.

18 of the 19 responses came from the Blob and made the case that current reporting practices were adequate for knowing what you own.  Not only did they make this argument, but they showed that modern word processing does a terrific job at cut and paste as most of them used the same words to make the argument.
Our top priority was to get the SEC to identify (or, to use the industry term: tag) high-frequency traders and collect data about their trades. Under current rules, such data weren’t collected. So it’s impossible to track an order as it wends its way—if “wend” can apply to a journey that takes a microsecond—through the electronic trading labyrinth and is executed. 
In fact, the entire reporting system for the execution of trades is antiquated. The SEC doesn’t even monitor brokers to ensure they execute trades fairly. Oversight in this area has been outsourced to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), of which Schapiro was the chairman and CEO from 2006 to 2008. A self-regulatory organization for broker-dealers, FINRA has often been criticized for being lax in policing the industry and generous in compensating its executives (Schapiro’s regular compensation for 2008 was $3.5 million).... 
For our part, we were determined to prove that a workable monitoring solution was possible. So we threw ourselves into composing another letter to the SEC. Attached was a five-page memorandum that detailed the obsolescence of the current reporting requirements and offered specific suggestions, gleaned from some of the top experts in the field, on how to update them. 
Meanwhile, the pushback from Wall Street was intense and multi-pronged. The Blob oozed through the halls of government, seeking, through its glutinous embrace, to immobilize the legislative and regulatory apparatus, thereby preserving the status quo. The executive jets of the Wall Street air force flew sortie after sortie, transporting high-ranking emissaries from new York to Washington to meet with the SEC, [Senator Chris] Dodd and [Senator Richard] Shelby staff, and the staff of other senators on the Banking Committee.... 
The research companies and market experts Wall Street employs also raised their voices against us. ...
 
Just like with derivatives, which blew up and nearly sank the country, we’ve got the same formula with HFT. I call it the Kaufman Formula. Whenever you’ve got a lot of change, a lot of money, no transparency, and therefore no effective regulation—watch out. Because the next thing you could hear is “boom.” 
There’s been a lot of change. The stock markets have transformed dramatically in only a few years time. There’s a lot of money. The daily market volume by high-frequency traders is now over 60 percent. And they’re making billions of dollars a year. 
There’s no transparency. The SEC has admitted you’re not collecting any data and you have almost no baseline understanding of HFT. And therefore we have a rapidly expanding market that’s operating completely in the dark, with no effective regulation. I’m very worried that this is a prescription for another disaster.... 
Please note that high frequency trading like structured finance and black box banks is simply a variant of Wall Street using opacity to make money even as it puts the entire financial system at risk.
On the other hand, we were well aware of the three main impediments to the SEC taking meaningful action. 
First, nearly all the data, evidence, and analysis the SEC uses to monitor the financial industry come from the industry itself, creating a temptation for the industry to spin the data in its favor (as we’d seen with the naked-short-selling data provided by Goldman Sachs). 
Second, The Blob oozes endlessly in and out of the revolving door of public service. According to the Project on Government Oversight, 219 former SEC staff members filed 789 “post employment statements indicating their intent to represent an outside client before the commission” between 2006 and 2010. In other words, 219 former government officials were representing Wall street clients on matters before the SEC. 
Third, because the SEC has been so slow to start collecting data about HFT, it’s still years away from being able to propose HFT regulatory rules that it can empirically justify based on hard data (as the federal courts will require it to do)....
When it comes to bringing transparency to banks and structured finance securities, the SEC no longer has to rely on Wall Street for evidence and analysis.

It is very well documented, see Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission for example, that market participants did not have adequate transparency to be able to value either banks or structured finance securities.

It has been empirically justified based on hard data with the benefit of bringing transparency to banks and structured finance securities starting at $2 trillion and increasing from there.

Thursday, September 20, 2012

Through the Revolving Door: Wall Street critic becomes a lobbyist

As reported by Minnpost, Tim Pawlenty has gone through the revolving door and come out as the new head of the Financial Services Roundtable.
Former Minnesota Governor and presidential candidate Tim Pawlenty is the new CEO of the Financial Services Roundtable, a bank lobbying firm in Washington D.C., the group announced Thursday. 
The Roundtable represents 100 banking, insurance and investment firms. The group lobbies against the implementation of the Dodd-Frank financial regulation law Congress passed in 2010. 
Pawlenty replaces outgoing CEO Steve Bartlett, who reportedly made $1.8 million in 2010.
According to a Bloomberg article,
The new job means quitting his post as national co-chairman of Mitt Romney’s presidential campaign, Pawlenty said today. 
In a Bloomberg Television interview last year before he ended his presidential run and joined Romney’s campaign, Pawlenty said his “truth message to Wall Street is going to be, ‘Get your snout out of the trough’.” ... 
“Obviously, I was one of the voices saying we need to fix the problems,” Pawlenty said in an interview today. “There’s been an attempt to fix them. Now we just need to make sure they don’t overreach and stifle economic investment and job growth.”....
“We went through a big crisis, had a big reform take place,” Pawlenty said in the interview today, adding that the job now is to insist the changes don’t discourage capital deployment and employment growth. “It’s not a question of repealing Dodd-Frank. It’s a question of refining it,” he said.
As regular readers know, with the exception of the Volcker Rule and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Dodd-Frank Act was written by the banking industry and its lobbyists for the banking industry.  So, of course the banks and their lobbyists don't want to repeal the Act.

More importantly, the banks and their lobbyists don't want the idea of a second attempt to fix the financial system to gain momentum.

The preferred way to prevent a second attempt at fixing the financial system from gaining momentum is to argue that Dodd-Frank really fixes the problem and just needs to be refined.

However, momentum for a second attempt to fix the financial system is gaining substantial momentum.

As has become abundantly clear since the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane broke the ice in his 2012 Jackson Hole speech, everyone knows that a financial system dependent on complicated rules and regulatory supervision is prone to crash.

The reason that complicated rules and regulatory supervision make the financial system prone to crash is they replace transparency and market discipline.

Fortunately, our financial system is designed not to be dependent on complicated rules and regulatory supervision.

Returning the financial system to its historic roots in the FDR Framework is simple.  It requires that regulators focus on bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.
  • For banks this means requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
  • For structured finance securities this means requiring that the securities provide observable event based reporting and disclose before the beginning of the next business day an activity like a payment or default that has occurred involving the underlying collateral.
Rather than doubling down on more complicated rules and regulatory supervision as proposed under the Dodd-Frank Act, the financial regulators should use their existing authority to compel this transparency.

If they do not have sufficient authority, then, as part of repealing all parts of the Dodd-Frank Act other than the Volcker Rule and the CFPB, the regulators should be given this authority.

Tuesday, August 21, 2012

HSBC to fight British regulator 'to the death' to save dividend

The Telegraph carried an interesting article that provides an insight into how banks pressure their financial regulators when it comes to the amount of capital they hold.

In this particular case, HSBC argues that the British regulator don't understand how financial markets work and that paying dividends is a necessity.

It is well known that paying dividends is not a necessity.  Just look at all those high growth non-dividend paying tech stocks.

Paying dividends does broaden the pool of eligible investors, but it is not a necessity.

HSBC is willing to “fight to the death” to prevent British regulators from attempting to force it to stop paying its dividend in order to preserve capital. 
The bold statement by group finance director Iain Mackay reflects the continuing battle between regulators – including the Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Bank of England’s new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) – and banks over capital enhancements. 
In the statement, made to analysts earlier this month, Mr Mackay criticised certain FPC members, alleging that they did not comprehend fully the way capital markets work.... 
Explaining the challenges banks such as HSBC face, Mr Mackay said: “They [regulators] believe banks are capable of reinforcing their capital by cutting the variable compensation of their employees, by restricting dividends to their shareholders and by raising capital in the marketplace.” 
But Mr Mackay said such thinking was misplaced. “From Stuart’s [Gulliver, HSBC chief executive] and my perspective, we will fight to the death if they go after our dividends. That is not on. 
“If you expect to be able to raise capital in the marketplace at any point, you’ve got to remunerate your shareholders. So from our standpoint, pretty much everything else will go before the dividend.”...
He went on to suggest that among certain parts of the regulatory sector there is a view “that the shareholder doesn’t matter”, something that he finds “more than a little bit worrying”. 
Actually, it is not in the regulator's mandate to worry about the shareholder.  They are suppose to worry about ensuring that shareholders have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can assess the risk of investing in a bank and adjust the amount and price of their investment.
Mr Mackay’s frank comments are a window into the bank’s continued difficult relationship with regulators.

Monday, August 6, 2012

Cost-Benefit analysis by SEC major factor in financial crisis

Dennis Kelleher, Stephen Hall and Katelynn Bradley of Better Markets wrote a very interesting white paper on cost-benefit analysis and financial reform at the SEC.

In the paper, they make the critically important point that the SEC is specifically excluded from having to factor in a cost-benefit analysis when they introduce a rule.  What the SEC must consider is does the rule protect investors and the public interest.

While the authors do not say it directly, the common sense reason that the SEC is exempted from worrying about a cost-benefit analysis is that the cost of a financial crisis is far greater than the cost of any single rule or combination of rules that might be applied on the financial industry.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been very active in trying to bring transparency to structured finance securities.  Specifically, I have both talked with individuals at the SEC about the revision of Reg AB (the regulation that lays out the disclosure requirement for structured finance securities) and provided input through a response to their public consultation.

My recommendation has been that all structured finance securities, including covered bonds, be required to report on an observable event basis any activity that occurs with the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day [as opposed to the sell-side's preferred once per month reporting after the end of the month].

In addition, the disclosure should include all data fields tracked by the originators, billers and collectors while protecting borrower privacy consistent with HIPAA standards [as oppose to the sell-side's preferred data templates that exclude valuable data fields].

With that background, now to the role that cost-benefit analysis played in the financial crisis.

During one of my conversations with a senior SEC staff member, the subject turned to the cost-benefit analysis that was done when Reg AB was originally mandated in the mid-2000s.  According to the staff member, while the SEC knew that disclosure should include all data fields and be made on an observable event basis, it could not justify this requirement based on their internal cost-benefit analysis.

Let me repeat that:  based on the results of its cost-benefit analysis, the SEC knowingly backed off of requiring transparency and instead issued a rule saying that then existing disclosure practices that were inadequate for valuing individual structured finance securities (see the Brown Paper Bag Challenge) were adequate.

Shortly after the financial crisis began, the Bank of England's Andy Haldane estimated that the losses on structured finance securities from investors not being able to value these opaque securities exceeded $1 trillion.

My bet is that the SEC's cost-benefit analysis did not place the benefit of being able to value the structured finance securities at over $1 trillion.  Hence, the reason that the SEC did not require transparency when it promulgated Reg AB.

However, now that we know the benefit is over $1 trillion, an annual cost of $10 billion to provide investors with disclosure of all borrower privacy protected data fields on an observable event based reporting basis under a revised-Reg AB can easily be seen as money well spent.

The fact that the SEC's internal cost-benefit analysis did not include the benefit of avoiding over $1 trillion in losses reaffirms the common sense reason for not subjecting any single rule or combination of rules from the SEC to a cost-benefit analysis.

Common sense says that if the SEC does not perform a cost-benefit analysis, there is no chance that doing a cost-benefit analysis incorrectly will result in a rule that doesn't protect investors and the public interest.


Friday, July 27, 2012

While writing rules, financial regulators talk to banks 5 times more often than reform organizations

The American Banker reports that Dodd-Frank rule makers met 5 times more frequently with the big banks than with reform organizations.

Regular readers know that these meetings are one of the ways that banks influence the Financial-Academic-Regulatory Complex (FARC).  Specifically, to the extent that the regulators rely on the banks or their lobbyists for technical understanding, the banks or their lobbyists shape how the final rule turns out.

Let me give you an example from the SEC's proposal to revise the disclosure requirements for structured finance securities.  The SEC is proposing that loan level data be disclosed.

The banking industry and its lobbyists have put forth the idea that while loan level detail makes sense for a mortgage-backed security with 1,000 to 5,000 mortgages, it does not make sense for a credit card receivable backed security with 40 million receivables.

The SEC has accepted that this is true.  Proof of this acceptance can be shown by the inclusion of this argument in a recent paper written by Henry Hu, a former senior SEC official.

However, to anyone with any experience using a computer or monitoring a loan portfolio, they know this statement is factually not true.

Nobody looks at 1,000 or 5,000 mortgages by hand.  They use a computer.

A computer doesn't care if it looks at 1,000, 5,000 or 40 million records (and yes, the buy-side can afford computers that can process 40 million records).  So if it makes sense for 1,000 to 5,000 mortgages, it also makes sense for 40 million credit card receivables.

In Mr. Hu's case, he confesses that he doesn't really know anything about computers.  Hence, he is susceptible to being manipulated by the banks and their lobbyists for their benefit.
Regulators implementing Dodd-Frank met with big banks nearly 1,300 times in the past two years, but held only 242 meetings with reform-oriented organizations, according to a reportfrom the Sunlight Foundation. 
The numbers “call attention to the intensity of resources that big banks are devoting to Dodd-Frank rulemaking," Lee Drutman of the Sunlight Foundation tells American Banker’s Rob Blackwell. 
Though it does not necessarily prove influence, “to the extent that regulators are relying on bank representatives to understand the technical side of these rules, they are likely to see the world from the banks' perspective. This is bound to have at least some impact on how the final rules turn out," Drutman says.

Tuesday, July 24, 2012

Former HSBC chairman Lord Green: banking industry not 'corrupt'

As reported by the Telegraph,

The Trade Minister and former HSBC chairman [Lord Green] acknowledges "failures" at the bank under his stewardship but denies the industry as a whole is corrupt.
Between money laundering and the Libor interest rate manipulation (and a long list of other scandals), it is abundantly clear that the industry as a whole is corrupt and not to be trusted.

With money laundering for drug lords and terrorists, the banks have shown just how pervasive the corruption is.

With Libor, the banks have shown that it is standard operating procedure to lie.  Lying to make money is okay.  Lying to present the bank's financial condition in a more favorable light is okay.

What remains a great mystery is that policymakers and financial regulators continue to listen to former or current bankers who rose to their positions in the banking industry in the last ten years by thriving in an environment dominated by corruption and lying.

Monday, July 23, 2012

Neil Barofsky: "suspicions that the system is rigged...are true"

In her NY Times' column, Gretchen Morgenson reviews former Special Inspector General for the Trouble Asset Relief Program Neil Barofsky's new book, Bailout, in which he describes his experience with the Washington - Wall Street power game.

His conclusion is that the financial system is rigged in favor of the banks and that Washington, both the policymakers and the regulators, have been effectively captured.
Nearly four years after Washington began its huge rescues of banks with taxpayer dollars, an important player in this, one of the great financial dramas of all time, is offering a damning account of how the Bush and Obama administrations handled the whole episode.
Regular readers know that the Bush administration chose to pursue the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under this model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are perserved at all cost.  The selection of this policy for addressing the crisis is not surprising given that the  Treasury Secretary at the time was a former senior officer from Goldman Sachs.

What was surprising to your humble blogger is that the Obama administration came in and embraced the Japanese model and protecting the banks at all costs too.

What was well known at that time was the existence of an alternative policy:  the Swedish model.  Under this model, the real economy is protected as banks absorbed all of the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets.

Even more surprising, was the Obama administration's failure to appoint a modern day Pecora Commission to examine exactly what caused the crisis.  Everyone knew that the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission did not have the budget or time to do more than a cursory job.  Even working with  these severe limitations, the FCIC found that the financial crisis was preventable.

Regular readers know that the financial crisis would have been prevented if the financial regulators had performed their primary function under the FDR Framework and prevented Wall Street from making sizable areas of the financial system opaque (structured finance securities, banks, Libor).  It was these areas that blew up.

I say it was surprising that there was limited investigation of the causes of the financial crisis because it meant that when financial reform legislation was passed it was not informed by what had gone wrong. Rather, it was legislation written by and for the industry (the exceptions being Elizabeth Warren's Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule; both of which had sponsors with the capability of taking their story directly to the American people).
He is Neil Barofsky. Remember him — the man whose job it was to police the $700 billion Troubled Asset Relief Program? ... 
His story is illuminating, if deeply depressing. ...  
Government officials, he says, eagerly served Wall Street interests at the public’s expense, and regulators were captured by the very industry they were supposed to be regulating....
Mr. Barofsky confirms the same behavior that was described in the Nyberg Report on the Irish financial crisis.

Where there was suppose to be a counter-balance to the banks, there were instead regulators and policymakers who were complicit in supporting what the banks were doing.
Thus the collision course was set between Mr. Barofsky and a crew of complacent, bank-friendly Treasury officials. He soon discovered that the department’s natural stance of marching in lock step with the banks meant that he had to question its policies and programs repeatedly to ensure that taxpayers weren’t at risk for fraud and abuse.
Why would Treasury's natural stance be to march in lock step with the banks?

If this is true, wouldn't this imply that the Financial Stability Oversight Council which has all of the financial regulators on it and is chaired by the Treasury Secretary would march in lock step with the banks?

If this is true, then the Office of Financial Research is truly where transparency goes to die as it reports to the bank friendly Treasury.

[This confirms your humble blogger's observation that the "Mother of All Financial Databases" needs to be run by a conflict of interest free independent third party whose only business is ensuring transparency.  This database should contain all of the global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures for each bank as well as observable event based collateral performance data for each structured finance security.]

If this is true, then the inescapable conclusion is that the Dodd-Frank Act truly was written by the large banks for the large banks.
“The suspicions that the system is rigged in favor of the largest banks and their elites, so they play by their own set of rules to the disfavor of the taxpayers who funded their bailout, are true,” Mr. Barofsky said in an interview last week. “It really happened. These suspicions are valid.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as it stands on its own merit.
To be sure, Mr. Barofsky and his team were up against a powerful status quo. And that meant that they ran into plenty of brick walls....
during which, he says, Washington abandoned Main Street while rescuing Wall Street. 
The Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis is all about abandoning Main Street in favor of Wall Street.  It is all about transferring onto Main Street the cost of the excess debt in the financial system and as a result, sacrificing the real economy.
“There has to be wide-scale acknowledgment that regulatory capture exists, dominates our system and needs to be eradicated,” Mr. Barofsky said in the interview. “It was my job to bring as much transparency to taxpayers so they knew what was going on. Writing the book, I tried to bring the same level of transparency so people understand how captured their government has become to the financial interests.”...
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Barofsky explains why despite four plus years of terrible results from pursuing the Japanese model, Washington remains committed to continuing to pursue it.

Your humble blogger continues to point out that under the Swedish model, Wall Street rescues Main Street.  I continue to point out that our modern financial system was designed so that the Swedish model would be the policy of choice.

With the existence of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding, banks can operate with negative book capital levels and continue to support the real economy.  As a result, rather than burden the real economy with the excess debt in the financial system, banks should absorb the losses on the excess debt.

The choice Washington faces continues to be Main Street or banker bonuses.
Mr. Barofsky’s assessment of his former regulatory brethren is crucial for taxpayers to understand, because Congress’s financial reform act —the Dodd-Frank legislation — left so much of the heavy lifting to the weak-kneed. 
“So much of what’s wrong with Dodd-Frank is it trusts the regulators to be completely immune to the corrupting influences of the banks,” he said in the interview. “That’s so unrealistic.”....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Barofsky summarizes why the Dodd-Frank Act is a failure and the financial system should not be dependent on financial regulators for stability and proper functioning.
Finally, Mr. Barofsky joins the ranks of those who believe that another crisis is likely because of the failed response to this one. “Incentives are baked into the system to take advantage of it for short-term profit,” he said. “The incentives are to cheat, and cheating is profitable because there are no consequences.”
This is why there is the need to bring transparency to all of the opaque corners of the financial system.  With transparency it is dramatically harder for the bankers to cheat.

Wednesday, July 18, 2012

The HSBC and Libor scandals show the time for politicians to act on bank reform is now

As Joris Luyendijk said in his Guardian column, 'the defining issue of our time is how to bring the financial sector back under control'.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger views bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system as a critical element in bringing the financial sector back under control.

The reasons are simple:

  • Sunshine is the best disinfectant; and
  • With transparency, that market can exert discipline on and restrain the risk taking of each bank.
From Mr. Luyendijk's column,
But as it stands, all three major [UK] parties seem to be in the same camp: implementing the Vickers report which mandates the untested "ringfencing" of investment and retail banking plus more capital reserves – in 2019. 
If there is a fundamental, paradigmatic difference in approach between the government and the opposition, the public has yet to be told about it. 
This is not how democracy is supposed to work, and the consequences can be felt with every new scandal. In the absence of a credible alternative vision about financial reform, we are left with outrage and futile symbolism each time a new scandal breaks.
It is a sign of how powerful the financial sector is that there is not a credible alternative vision for financial reform being talked about by the politicians.


Your humble blogger has been offering a credible alternative vision for financial reform as transparency has passed the test of time!  Transparency was first implemented in the 1930s.  Over the next 75 years, it was the foundation for confidence in and the smooth functioning of the financial system.  


Yet, politicians are not talking about the need for transparency despite the fact that every place in the financial system that has encountered difficulties since the beginning of the financial crisis, you will find opacity (banks, structured finance, Libor interest rates,...).  


Yet neither politicians or the mainstream media talk about the need for transparency.
It's always a variation of the following sequence: denials, apologies, hearings, sacrificial sackings or resignations – followed by calls for more sacrificial sackings. Every now and then a knighthood gets stripped, but that's it.

The sequence is actually slightly different than Mr. Luyendijk portrays.

He skips over the step where the regulators talk with and rely solely on the bankers at the heart of the scandal for a solution.  Naturally, the bankers are going to protect opacity as it is a key to their current profitability.  

The result of this reliance on the bankers can be seen in the Libor scandal.  The NY Fed and now the Federal Reserve have backed is a series of bank talking points that don't include transparency and don't prevent the banks from manipulating Libor in the future.

How bad does it have to get before politicians act?

Monday, July 16, 2012

Bank lobbying stalls implementation of Dodd-Frank Act

The Boston Globe carried an interesting article on how bank lobbying was effectively stalling implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act.

Regular readers know that you humble blogger thinks that the only parts of the Dodd-Frank Act worth saving are the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule.  As a result, by stalling the implementation of the rest of Dodd-Frank, the banks have done a great service.

Now, in the light of the Libor scandal and the related financial regulator cover-up, everyone can see that the Dodd-Frank Act was written by the banking industry for the banking industry.  They can see this because a fully implemented Dodd-Frank would not have prevent the banks from being able to manipulate the Libor interest rate for their own profit or to misrepresent their financial strength.

The next financial reform legislation will do away with the non-CFPB and Volcker Rule portions of Dodd-Frank and substitute requirements that bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

These requirements will include:
  • Banks will disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
  • Structured finance securities will report on an observable event basis any activity, like a payment or default, involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.
Back to the Boston Globe article which provides a detailed discussion of how Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team operates.
Nearly two years after the signing of the landmark Dodd-Frank legislation, many of the rules meant to restore public trust in the country’s financial institutions have yet to be enacted. 
Squads of lobbyists and lawyers have overwhelmed the rule-making process in minutia, blizzards of paper, and hundreds of meetings. 
As a result, government regulators have missed more than half of their rule-making deadlines, with just 120 of the 398 regulations enumerated by the law in effect, according to a tally by the Wall Street law firm Davis Polk. Key provisions are still months away, most notably the so-called “Volcker Rule” meant to rein in banks’ appetite for risky investments and prevent a repeat of the 2008 meltdown that led to the public bailout of some of the country’s largest financial institutions. 
“The richest industry in the history of the world is using its vast and unlimited resources to slow, delay, gut, and weaken as many of the rules as possible,” said Dennis Kelleher, a former aide to the late Senator Edward Kennedy and the chief executive of Better Markets, a Wall Street watchdog group. “If they don’t get their way, they file suit.” 
A year ago, a federal court in Washington sided with the US Chamber of Commerce when the business group challenged the Securities and Exchange Commission on a controversial rule that made it easier for shareholders to replace corporate directors. Although the court did not invalidate the rule, it required the SEC to launch a rigorous — and time-consuming — cost-benefit analysis before finalizing the regulation. 
At least two other lawsuits are pending, challenging other aspects of the rule-making process. One was filed by a Texas community bank, and the second by several financial industry associations.... 
If the Opacity Protection Team cannot win with lobbying, well there is always calling in favors from a few friends.
Still, the power dynamics in Congress remain a serious threat, said Representative Barney Frank, a Democrat from Newton. Frank, who is retiring from Congress at the end of the year, will spend his final months in Washington defending his namesake law and protecting funding for those regulatory agencies writing the rules and overseeing the firms. 
“There’s this egregious effort to kill it by not funding them,” Frank said, referring in particular to potential cuts to the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and the SEC.
“Republicans don’t want to give enough money to do the job right,” he said. “We are pushing back to get them more money, and we’ll be fighting in the House.” 
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which will have to enforce dozens of new rules on the $300 trillion derivatives industry, faces uncertainty because House Republicans are seeking to slash its current $205 million budget by $25 million. Senate Democrats have backed President Obama’s request to boost the agency’s funding to $308 million. 
“Even if we finish the rules, we won’t have the resources, the people,” said commission chairman Gary Gensler. He likened his challenges to a football game without enough referees. “Without appropriate funding, we can’t truly oversee these markets.”
Actually, by requiring transparency the regulators can do their job of overseeing the markets much more cost effectively.

Instead of being the only ones with access to the information needed to oversee the market, now everyone has access to this information.

As a result, regulators can utilize the markets' analytical expertise.
Until its enactment on July 21, 2010, the financial industry had been focused on blocking the overhaul, swarming the nation’s capital with some 600 lobbyists to influence the deliberations.
With such high stakes, industries spent a record $302 million in 2010 for lobbying, according to OpenSecrets.org. That same year, the US Chamber, a fierce critic of Dodd-Frank, spent $157 million for lobbying, also a record.
And Dodd-Frank is a testament to the fact that the financial industry got what it paid for.  An Act that preserves opacity and lets the banks get away with manipulating benchmark interest rates like Libor.
Industry representatives are unapologetic for their efforts on Capitol Hill.... 
Tom Quaadman, vice president of the chamber’s center for capital markets and competitiveness, said much of the slowdown naturally arises from the complexities of the law and the issues involved.
Remember, complexity creates opacity.
He cites as an example that government regulators, including the Federal Reserve and SEC, asked industry representatives to weigh in on 1,400 questions having to do with the Volcker Rule, a linchpin of Dodd-Frank authored by Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve. 
The rule, which would limit high-risk trading by banks, is far from finalized because many of the 17,000 written public comments submitted to the SEC still await review, page by page.
Imagine the Volcker Rule combined with banks being required to provide their current exposure details.  Implementation of the Volcker Rule would be straightforward as bank disclosure would allow market participants to see any position taken by the bank.
Most of the comments are short, pithy postcards from ordinary Americans, but others are hundreds of pages of dense legalese that require careful reading by staffers. 
“Sometimes, regulators don’t understand the markets they regulate, and the regulators themselves don’t even know how to construct a system to enforce a provision of the law,” Quaadman said....
This is frequently the case.

Your humble blogger had this experience with numerous regulators including the SEC who had difficulty understanding why valuing the contents of a brown paper bag was harder than valuing the contents of a clear plastic bag.
Derivatives reform, Gensler said, is about “to spring to life,” ordaining the finalized rules on swaps announced last week as a breakthrough that will begin clearing a backlog of other stalled rules meant to bring transparency to markets mostly operating in the shadows....
The reason that the Dodd-Frank Act is fatally flawed and the bulk of it should be repealed is that the law does not address the issue of valuation transparency, it only addresses price transparency.

In the absence of valuation transparency (where market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner), price transparency is irrelevant.

The way the investment cycle works is that investors are suppose to use valuation transparency to independently assess the risk and value of each investment and then and only then look at the price being shown to them by Wall Street to make a buy, hold or sell decision.

Without valuation transparency, how does an investor know if the price paid by the last buyer reflects a shrewd purchase or the price paid by the biggest fool.

If investors do not have valuation transparency (an example of this is structured finance securities), then they cannot assess the investment and should not buy or sell regardless of the price being shown by Wall Street.
“To the extent that the purpose of this entire exercise is to restore confidence in our financial system, then that objective is far off in the distance,” said Cornelius Hurley, a professor and the director of Boston University’s Morin Center for Banking and Financial Law. “A deeply flawed statute is being implemented haltingly under very difficult circumstances.”
Hence, the reason for repealing the vast majority of the Dodd-Frank Act and replacing it with the valuation transparency requirements discussed above that actually would restore confidence in the financial system and prevent future Libor-type scandals.

Tuesday, May 22, 2012

Bank lobbyist uses JP Morgan to make case for ultra transparency

As reported by the Wall Street Journal in an article discussing the impact of JP Morgan's trading loss on the on-going writing of banking regulation (like the Volcker Rule, swap rules, and TBTF living wills).
"Everybody needs to take a breath. Very few people have the facts. We don't have them, and the regulators don't have them," said Tim Ryan, chief executive of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association.
Please re-read the highlight text as the head of Wall Street's lobbying firm has just made the case for THE regulation that should emerge as a result of JP Morgan's trading loss:  the requirement that banks provide ultra transparency.

If JP Morgan was required to disclose on an on-going basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, then everyone would have the facts.

This would be a vast improvement over the current blindly guessing (the range of guesses currently being the Independent indicates that traders believe JP Morgan's losses are now approaching $7 billion while ZeroHedge indicates we might be talking about the potential for losses approaching $30 billion; update:  ZeroHedge is now estimating that the maximum loss was $8 billion).