Showing posts with label Bank Capital. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bank Capital. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 27, 2013

UK bank demonstrates regulators' capital ratio conundrum

Regular readers know that your humble blogger thinks that bank capital requirements are incredibly dangerous (without transparency, they suggest banks are stronger and less risky than they really are) and bank capital requirements suffer from numerous problems like the fact that they are implemented on a pro-cyclical basis.

The Guardian carried an interesting article on this pro-cyclical implementation of capital requirements featuring Nationwide and the Bank of England.

The Bank of England has denied that its insistence on Nationwide holding a bigger capital cushion had forced the UK's largest building society to slow its launch of small business lending. 
The Bank of England's actions are pro-cyclical if in fact requiring the bank to hold more capital reduces its lending capacity and this reduced lending capacity has a negative impact on borrower access to funds for growth and reinvestment in the economy.
Nationwide admitted plans to expand lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are unlikely to take effect until 2014 at the earliest. 
It said plans to begin lending to smaller firms were still under development but "moving slowly"; , it denied a report that it had shelved a planned launch date for later this year....
Where there is smoke, ....
The Bank of England refuted any suggestion that Nationwide's decision to hold off from a launch into the SME sector was due to its demands on capital strength. 
A very tough assertion to prove.
A spokesman added: "The plan agreed with Nationwide to meet the 3% leverage ratio in 2015 will not result in them restricting lending to the real economy. Therefore it is wrong to blame their SME decision on the regulator."...
Banks have a limited number of ways to increase their ratio of equity to assets.  They can retain earnings or sell stock to increase the amount of equity.  Alternatively, they can decrease the amount of assets on their balance sheets.

The Bank of England spokesman suggests that Nationwide intends to meet the 3% leverage ratio by retaining earnings and/or selling stock.
However, regulators warned the lender had rapidly expanded its mortgage business while still wrestling with an overhang of bad commercial property loans. 
It was rebuked in July by the regulator, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), for running an aggressive lending policy without adequate reserves to insure against a possible collapse.
So much for retaining earnings to increase equity.

To build up reserves, banks take a provision for loan loss as an expense through their income statement.  This drives down earnings, so there is a lower level of earnings that can be retained.

Apparently Nationwide is planning a stock offering if meeting the higher capital ratios is not going to reduce its lending capacity.

But can it sell stock?
Analysts at credit ratings firm Standard & Poor's followed with a warning that a doubling in the losses on commercial property loans to £450m weakened the lender's financial position. 
S&P downgraded Nationwide's credit rating this month and signalled that further downgrades could follow without a rapid improvement. 
"These impairment charges have hindered Nationwide's internal capital generation. As a result, we have revised down our assessment of its risk position to 'adequate' from 'strong'," it said.
In the absence of disclosure of Nationwide's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, why would anyone buy stock in Nationwide?

Without this information, there is no way of knowing what additional losses might be hidden on and off its balance sheet.

So if Nationwide cannot increase its equity from either retained earnings or stock sale, then the only way to increase its leverage ratio is by decreasing its assets.

Decreasing assets strongly suggests a reduction in Nationwide's lending capacity and that it will be more difficult for borrowers to access credit for growth and reinvestment (i.e., sure as heck looks like regulator's requirement to increase capital levels is pro-cyclical and is making downturn in economy worse).

In banking, too much simplicity is dangerous

In his Financial Times editorial, Standard Chartered's chief executive, Peter Sands, puts forth a robust argument for why relying on too much simplicity in the form of bank capital requirements is dangerous for taxpayer wealth.

Simply, these capital requirements, whether specified as a leverage ratio or a risk-weighted ratio or a combination of the two, don't present a true picture of the risk that each bank is actually taking.

Regular readers know that the only way for market participants to assess the risk of each bank is if each bank discloses on an ongoing basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is only with this information, that market participants have the data they need to actually assess each bank's risk.

As shown by our current financial crisis, when market participants cannot assess the risk the banks are taking, bad things happen to taxpayer wealth.  Specifically, policymakers and financial regulators find it irresistible to reach into the taxpayers' back pocket to bailout the banks and ensure the uninterrupted flow of bonuses to the bankers.

How can people trust banks using their own models when they are so opaque and produce such different results?
Only requiring banks to provide transparency eliminates this problem.

When market participants have access to the exposure detail data, market participants can use their own models to assess each of the banks.
This concern underpins the enthusiasm for the leverage ratio, and why some advocate a return to the so-called “standardised approach”. 
Under this approach, there are no sophisticated models – simply standard risk-weightings for different categories of asset that all banks have to apply. This gives the appearance of comparability, but it is entirely illusory. 
Massive differences in risk profile are simply smoothed out by very crude assumptions. 
Like the leverage ratio, it assumes lending to a start-up and an established multinational are equivalent risks, and takes no account of collateral. Indeed, imposing the standardised approach amounts to imposing a very poor model we know is wrong.
With transparency, the massive differences in risk profile are not smoothed out by very crude assumptions.

In fact. the massive differences in risk profile are exposed for all to see.
The standardised approach and leverage ratio share two characteristics. 
First, they simplify a complex reality. But the allure of simplicity should be resisted if the simplification so dangerously distorts and obscures the real picture. 
Your humble blogger agrees with Mr. Sands that the allure of the simplicity of capital ratios as a measure of bank solvency is a simplification that dangerously distorts and obscures the real picture.

Capital ratios are a form of regulatory opacity.

It is only with transparency into the underlying exposure details that a real picture of the risk each bank is taking can be seen.
Second, they narrow the difference in regulatory approach between risky and safe assets, creating perverse and powerful incentives for banks to run higher risk portfolios....
Your humble blogger agrees with Mr. Sands that capital ratios allow bankers to operate behind a veil of opacity and take on far more risk in their portfolios.

It is only with transparency into the underlying exposure details that market discipline can be exerted on the banks to restrain their risk taking.
The fact that different institutions give apparently similar assets different risk weightings is a real problem, and it has created a serious credibility gap. 
Some of the differences between model results are good, reflecting real variations in intrinsic risks and in the effectiveness of different banks’ risk-management approaches.
When each bank is required to disclose its current exposure details, the market gets to see which banks are being overly aggressive and which banks are being conservative in the management of their risks.

Sunday, July 28, 2013

How much capital should banks have?

In a Vox EU column, the IMF's Lev Ratnovski tries to answer the question: "how much capital should banks have?".

His conclusion after studying the level of non-performing loans and then estimating losses in prior economic crises: 9% on a simple leverage ratio basis and 18% under Basel III.

Of course, Mr. Ratnovski assumes that regulators will actually require banks to recognize the losses on their exposure to excess debt.  History shows that this is not the case.

In addition, regular readers know that the amount of capital that each bank should have is the amount of capital that the market requires given the riskiness of each bank's exposures.

So that the market can assess the riskiness of each bank's exposures and exert discipline on each bank to achieve an appropriate level of capitalization, each bank must disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

During the early 1900s when banks were required to disclose their exposure details, market discipline on the banks resulted in an average simple leverage ratios that exceeded 10%.  A level that is consistent with Mr. Ratnovski's analysis.

Friday, July 19, 2013

Is Economics a science or religion? Religion.

In his Bloomberg column, Mark Buchanan asks a terrific question: is economics a science or religion.

Science is based on facts.  Theories are proven or disproven based on their ability to explain all the facts.

Religion, on the other hand, allows you to believe something in the absence of any supporting facts.

A strong case can be made that economics is a religion based on the unwillingness of economic professionals to actually look at the facts.

The unwillingness to consider inconvenient facts isn't surprising as the standard economic analysis starts off by making a series of assumptions.  Assumptions that the economic professionals consider so basic that they don't bear repeating.

Unfortunately, they are assumptions that the facts frequently show to be wrong.

For example, the economics community has championed the call for banks to hold more capital.  The core argument that the economists make is that if banks have a higher level of book capital, this will reduce if not eliminate the amount of or need for a taxpayer bailout.

On the surface, this argument seems perfectly reasonable.  By definition, if the bank has a higher level of book capital, it has a greater capacity to absorb losses before it reduces its book capital to a level where it presumably needs to be bailed out.

However, if we scratch the surface, we find out that this argument has several assumptions embedded within it.  The first of these embedded assumptions being that regulators will require banks to recognize their losses upfront and not protect bank book capital levels out of fear for the safety and soundness of the financial system.

But is there any evidence to support this embedded assumption.  If we look at the US Savings and Loan crisis, the answer is no.  If we look at our current global financial crisis, the answer is no.

There is absolutely no evidence on a global basis that regulators will require banks to recognize the losses hidden on and off their balance sheets.

Instead, as the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane elegantly said it, there is evidence that regulators have an irresistible urge to bailout the banks.

Oops.

Believing that banks holding higher levels of capital won't need to be bailed out or require as large a bailout is simply a religious belief as there are no facts to support it.

Hence, the observation that economics is a religion.

Thursday, July 11, 2013

NY Times, Financial Times & Bloomberg confirm bank capital is easily manipulated, meaningless accounting construct

To the sounds of academics economists calling for banks to hold more capital, the Fed and FDIC adopted simple bank leverage ratios to complement/strengthen the existing Basel Committee risk weighted capital ratios.

In response to this regulatory action, the NY Times, the Financial Times and Bloomberg called into question all the fuss being made by the economists by carrying articles that confirmed that bank capital is an easily manipulated, meaningless accounting construct.

The NY Times' Dealbook carried an article that attempted to answer the questions what is bank capital anyway and why is it important.
Think about capital this way: It designates the percentage of assets that a bank can stand to lose without becoming insolvent. 
If a bank’s assets decline in value, it has to account for that by adjusting the source of financing that it used. Liabilities like debt and deposits can’t be reduced, as they represent money that the bank has promised to pay to bondholders or depositors. 
But what’s useful about capital is that it can be reduced, or written down. 
That’s the whole point. Shareholders, who contribute to capital, agree to absorb losses if the bank falls on hard times. 
So, rather than a “rainy day fund,” capital is a measure of a bank’s potential to absorb losses.
The article highlights that bank book capital is an accounting construct.

Shareholders, who buy shares from the bank, contribute to the bank book capital level.  Bank book capital levels increase as a result of earnings less any dividend payments.  Bank book capital levels also decrease when the value of the bank's assets is written down (something that both banks and their regulators control through suspension of mark-to-market accounting and regulatory forbearance/'extend and pretend').

The article also defines insolvency for a bank, when its book capital level is zero or less, and leaves the reader with the impression that something really bad occurs should a bank become insolvent.

However, the article doesn't answer the question of what really bad thing happens.

The simple answer is that nothing really bad happens if a bank becomes insolvent.

Please re-read the simple answer again because a modern banking system is designed to achieve exactly this outcome.

A modern banking system can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  With deposit insurance, the taxpayers effectively become the bank's silent equity partners when the bank are insolvent (whether or not this insolvency is reflected in the bank's book capital level).  As a result, not only are there not runs on the banks by those covered by deposit insurance, but the bank can continue to operate and support the real economy.

The Financial Times carried an article that described how easily manipulated capital ratios are.  Banks have a number games they can play with their assets so as to maximize their reported capital ratios under either the simple leverage or risk-weighted capital ratios.
US banks believe they will be able to meet a new regulatory requirement on debt levels by shuffling assets between their subsidiaries and using other “optimisation” strategies to reduce the amount of leverage they report.... 
Analysts at Goldman Sachs noted in research for clients that “banks have a lot of options to mitigate the impact” – including moving assets, shortening the duration of derivatives and reducing credit commitments. 
Some of those steps would have the effect of reducing banks’ overall credit exposures but others would not – calling into question the robustness of a rule that is supposed to be difficult to evade.
Bloomberg carried an article on Deutsche Bank that discussed how the bank took the idea of playing with their assets to maximize their reported capital to new heights when it structured lending transactions so that they would have no balance sheet impact. 

Deutsche Bank relied on what it called “no-balance-sheet usage” to keep loans off its books, documents for the Monte Paschi and Banco do Brasil deals show.... 
In the no-balance-sheet transactions, Deutsche Bank received the collateral, sold it and used the cash to make the loan. By selling the collateral -- government bonds, in the deals reviewed by Bloomberg News -- Deutsche Bank created an obligation to return the securities, allowing it to net to essentially zero its assets and liabilities, the documents show. 
The lender in effect created a short position on the bonds, according to deal memos and internal e-mails about the transactions. In a short sale, traders sell borrowed securities and expect to buy them back at a lower price before returning them to the owner.

Deutsche Bank was able to sell the collateral because it didn’t have to return the bonds under the terms of the agreement. Instead, the borrower agreed that Deutsche Bank could return the “cheapest-to-deliver” equivalent in the event of default, the documents show. 
The German lender sold insurance against possible defaults of securities linked to the collateral, in effect moving the risk that the loan wouldn’t be repaid onto its trading book and away from public scrutiny, according to accountants who reviewed the documents for Bloomberg News.



Friday, July 5, 2013

Basel study shows banks game their reported capital ratios by up to 20%

Bloomberg reports that the Basel Committee has confirmed just how easy it is to manipulate and overstate bank capital ratios.

Specifically, the Committee looked at the variations in the risk-weights banks assign to their assets, particularly corporate and household debt, and found that this variation results in banks reporting capital ratios that are up to 20% higher than a more conservative peer bank's risk-weighting would suggest.

Please note, we are only talking about manipulating and overstating bank capital ratios by the assignment of risk-weights.  The study excludes manipulating and overstating bank capital ratio by suspension of mark-to-market accounting or regulatory forbearance.

Naturally, the Basel Committee is looking for how to address this problem of gaming the capital ratios.
“The short-term policy options that the committee will consider include enhanced disclosure, additional guidance and possible clarifications of the Basel framework,” the group said.
Regular readers know and the Basel Committee confirms that the number one way for ending gaming of bank capital ratios is to require the banks to provide enhanced disclosure.

Specifically, banks must disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, any market participant who is interested can independently calculate a bank's capital ratio and compare this independent calculation with what the bank reports.

With market participants having an ability to independently calculate a bank's capital ratio, banks have an incentive to be as conservative as possible in the capital ratio they report.  This minimizes the chances of the bank being portrayed as even riskier than it is.

Friday, June 21, 2013

Restoring trust in bank capital

The Lex column of the Financial Times reviewed the bank capital debate between simple leverage ratios and complex, easily manipulated risk weighted asset ratios and concluded that something must be done to restore trust in bank capital.

Regular readers know that the foundation of trust in the financial system is disclosure.  Disclosure is the foundation because without it market participants cannot Trust, but Verify.

For banks, the required level of disclosure is ultra transparency.  Under ultra transparency, banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With these details, market participants can assess the risk and value of each bank's exposures.

With this assessment, market participants can adjust a bank's book capital level for the difference between the market value of its exposures and the book value of its exposures.  The result is a realistic estimate of a bank's current capital position.

Market participants can then use this realistic estimate of a bank's current capital position if they want to look at simple leverage ratios or a risk-adjusted capital ratio and compare it to what the banks are reporting.  Trust in bank capital and its related ratios is restored when what the banks report matches up to the market participants independent assessment.

Sunday, June 16, 2013

Thomas Hoenig calls attention to well known fact: banks operating without much capital

Thomas Hoenig created a ruckus by pointing out that Deutsche Bank is "horribly undercapitalized".  Naturally, Deutsche Bank responded that in the make believe world of Basel capital requirements Mr. Hoenig was wrong.

To settle the matter, Zero Hedge weighed in and noted that EU banks, including Deutsche Bank, needed upwards of 500 billion euros of capital.  Citing the work on EU banks by Benink and Huizinga, Zero Hedge noted
Banks are already saddled with ample unrecognised losses on their assets, estimated by many observers to be at least several hundreds of billions of euros and mirrored by low share price valuations...
This whole debate highlights two important facts about our current financial crisis.

  1. Everyone knows that the banks are hiding losses and the extent of their hidden losses exceeds their current book capital levels.
  2. Banks are holding policymakers and central bankers hostage by threatening that disclosure of these losses and the related lack of capital will result in financial instability.
Please note that if everyone already knows the banks have low or negative capital, then revealing the exact amount should not result in financial instability.  Revealing the exact amount simply confirms what market participants already know and lets market participants know how close their estimates of the losses were to reality.

Your humble blogger is confident in his statement that revelation of the losses won't result in financial instability for several reasons including: market participants might have overestimated the extent of the losses and we have 6 years of experience that show that banks can continue to operate with what in reality is low or even negative book capital levels because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

If revelation of the exact amount of losses is not going to result in financial instability, then policymakers and central bankers don't have to remain hostages of the banks.  And if policymakers and central bankers don't have to remain hostages, then there is no reason to continue to pursued the failed Japanese Model and preserve bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.



Monday, May 13, 2013

Simon Johnson asks if the Fed is afraid to regulate banks


In his Bloomberg column, Professor Simon Johnson asks if the Fed is afraid to regulate banks and if it is not afraid, why doesn't it require banks to hold a much higher level of capital.

Professor Johnson observes that
capital regulation needs to be about the true ability to absorb losses relative to total assets. Regulators should focus on this measure -- known as leverage -- and its implications for what happens when a financial company faces failure.
It is interesting that Professor Johnson says this because the adequacy of a bank's capital to absorb expected losses is the principle focus of the Fed's bank examination function.  Bank examiners ask the question of do banks have enough capital to absorb the potential losses on the risks the banks are exposed to.

If yes, then the bank examiners think the bank is adequately capitalized.

If no, then the bank examiners write up the bank and require that it raise additional capital.

Apparently, Professor Johnson doesn't think that the Fed's bank examiners are up to the task of evaluating capital adequacy.  He would like someone else to determine when a bank has enough capital.

There are two potential ways to make this determination:  the market or regulatory fiat.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger favors having the market determine if a bank is adequately capitalized.  What is necessary for the market, which includes the bank examiners, to perform this task is having banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, the market can use its valuation expertise to determine if each bank is adequately capitalized or not for the risks that it is taking.

With this information, the market can also exert discipline on the banks so that the banks hold enough capital to absorb their potential losses.  Recall that when banks provided ultra transparency at the beginning of last century, banks maintain a 15+% equity to total asset ratio.

Alternatively, we could have regulators write a regulation requiring banks to hold more capital.  Not only does this involve overcoming the Too Big to Fail bank lobby, but it also means the regulators publicly saying that their bank examiners are not up to the task of evaluating the adequacy of each bank's capitalization.

Ironically, in making the case for the regulators to require the banks to hold more capital, Professor Johnson actually makes the case for doing so by requiring the banks to provide transparency.
Global megabanks are profoundly complex, and intentionally so. Investors and regulators don’t know what risks are being taken. Board members also are usually in the dark. 
Whether top management understands what is happening is an open question: Chief Executive Officer Jamie Dimon is adamant that he had no real knowledge of JPMorgan’s Whale positions, which eventually had a notional value in the trillions of dollars.
Simply requiring banks to hold more capital doesn't address the fact that no one knows what risks are being taken.  Without knowing the level of risk, it is impossible to know if the regulated level of capital is adequate.

The starting point for determining capital adequacy is ultra transparency.  With disclosure comes the ability to assess the level of risk and then exert discipline to ensure there is enough capital to absorb losses.

Sunday, April 28, 2013

Paul Krugman explains how academics from well-known universities effect policy response to financial crisis

In his NY Times blog, Professor Paul Krugman does a great job of explaining how academics from well-known universities have influenced the debate on how to end our current bank solvency led financial crisis.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger thinks their biggest contribution is to crowd out discussion of alternatives to end the financial crisis.

Professor Krugman explains how this crowding out mechanism works with Reinhart/Rogoff and austerity.

But before looking at his post, I would like readers to ask themselves one question: why were these or any academics listened to in the first place?

There are two reasons:
  1. The reputation of the institution that they work at; and
  2. The idea that a professor at one of these institutions in finance or economics would actually have some idea what they are talking about.
Between Reinhart/Rogoff's error filled paper supporting austerity and the finance and economics professions' failure to loudly warn let alone predict the financial crisis, it is clear that the idea finance or economics professors know what they are talking about isn't true.

Reinhart/Rogoff's paper confirmed that when it comes to peer reviewed papers in finance and economics there effectively is no minimum hurdle or standard they have to get over to get published.  So any fundamentally flawed idea can be published.

Regular readers first encountered this with Yale Professor Gary Gorton using bank demand deposits as an example to illustrate his concept of informationally insensitive debt (hint: deposit insurance is information as any 6-year old opening a bank account can tell you).

Reinhart/Rogoff's paper also confirmed Cullen Roche's observation that every single school of economics exists to promote a political agenda.  In this case, the authors were well paid shills for the austerity agenda.

One other point before I return to Professor Krugman's blog.  The reputation of the institutions acts to magnify the importance of what these professors say.  Do you think the austerity agenda would frequently cite the work of a junior college professor or a random blogger?

No!  Policymakers who are predisposed to these fundamentally flawed ideas want to wrap themselves in the mantle of the institution's reputation.  If a Harvard professor says its so, well then....

Let me return to Professor Krugman's blog, but let me show how the call for banks to hold more capital is simply a repeat of the call for austerity as it is based on a similarly ill-conceived idea.  
Robert Samuelson tries to minimize the significance of the Reinhart-Rogoff affair; and that, I realized, offers an interesting window into why, in fact, the affair matters so much. 
Samuelson starts by excusing R-R on the grounds that the economic crisis predates their blooper... 
But while R-R obviously had nothing to do with the start of the crisis, the question is how they played into the response. For the remarkable thing about this ongoing slump isn’t so much that we had a financial crisis as the fact that we responded to it, not by applying what macroeconomists thought they had learned, but by repeating all the policy errors of the 1930s....
The same argument could be made about bank capital.

Everyone knows that bank capital is an easily manipulated accounting construct.

Banks can manipulate it by how they reserve for bad debt.  Regulators can manipulate it through regulatory forbearance and allowing banks to use 'extend and pretend' to turn bad debt into zombie loans.  Politicians can manipulate it by pressuring accountants to suspend mark-to-market accounting for opaque, toxic structured finance securities.

Everyone knows that more capital does not mean a bank is safer.

What makes a bank more or less risky is the risk of its on and off balance sheet exposures.

Everyone knows that more capital does not mean a bank is solvent.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, there have been numerous banks that have shown high capital ratios and been nationalized shortly after passing a solvency focused regulatory stress test.  A prime example of this being Dexia.

Finally, everyone knows that calling for more capital when the banks are hiding massive losses is counter-productive.  The banks need to recognize their losses upfront and then rebuild their book capital.  Recognizing losses first means that banks don't pay the bankers cash bonuses until the bank book capital levels are rebuilt.

By putting increasing book capital ahead of recognizing losses, not only do bankers get paid their cash bonuses, but increasing book capital levels takes precedent over recognizing losses on the bad debt.  The result of this is to repeat Japan's experience and end up with Japan-style economic malaise.
Still, R-R can’t have mattered here, says Samuelson, because politicians were going to do what they were going to do regardless....
Maybe politicians are going to do what they are going to do regardless, however, academics promoting fundamentally flawed ideas are giving them intellectual cover.

For example, let's look at who is championing the idea that banks need to hold more capital.  At the head of the cue we find former and current regulators.  Individuals who had a responsibility for acting before the financial crisis, but failed to take the steps necessary to prevent the financial crisis.
Standard academic obscurity? Reinhart-Rogoff instantly became famous. Reinhart gave star testimony to the Senate Budget Committee on Feb. 9, 2010; the paper was cited everywhere in the spring of 2010.
Sounds a lot like a book written on the need for banks to hold more capital.
OK, so what is the real story here? Austerity policies would probably have proceeded without Reinhart-Rogoff ... But the paper certainly helped sell the policies. 
And anyway, the important story isn’t about the sins of the economists; it’s about our warped economic discourse, in which important people seize on academic work that fits their preconceptions.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Professor Krugman makes an extremely important point about how these professors are warping the economic discourse.  I call this crowding out.

Had these professors not offered their fundamentally flawed ideas, the discussion could have focused on solutions that would have ended our current financial crisis (the Swedish Model) and prevented a future crisis (transparency).
Even if you don’t think Reinhart-Rogoff made much difference to actual policy, the meteoric rise and catastrophic fall of their reputation speaks volumes about why this slump goes on and on.
The slump goes on and on because the academic community continues to provide intellectual cover to policy makers' worse instincts. 

Friday, April 26, 2013

Brown-Vitter highlights failure of Dodd-Frank Act

Whether you approve or disapprove of the proposal by Senators Brown and Vitter to require big banks to hold more capital, this proposal offers confirmation that the Dodd-Frank Act has failed.

Dodd-Frank has failed because it is not seen outside of Washington DC and the financial regulatory community as actually making the US financial system safer.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying since Day 1 that there are only two elements of Dodd-Frank worth saving, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Volcker Rule.  The rest should be repealed.

Dodd-Frank is based on the fundamentally flawed premise of "we should give the financial regulators who failed to prevent the current financial crisis another chance to prevent a future financial crisis".

Why?  Especially since the financial regulators have already shown themselves by not preventing the current crisis to be up to the task.

The upside of giving the financial regulators another chance is that they succeed in preventing the next financial crisis.

The downside of giving the financial regulators another chance is that they fail.

If they fail, who pays for their failure?

Are the Senators and Congressmen who drafted and voted for Dodd-Frank first in line with all of their net worth to pay?  Is the President who signed Dodd-Frank into law first in line with all of his net worth to pay?  Are the financial regulators who are suppose to have prevented the financial crisis first in line with all of their net worth to pay?

No.  It is the taxpayers who pay when the financial regulators fail.  I say "when" because the financial regulators have already shown they are prone to failure.  It is only a question of time.

And it is the knowledge that the financial regulators will fail that drives individuals like Senators Brown and Vitter to propose legislation that attempts to protect the taxpayers from the failure of the financial regulators.

The Senators hope by putting more capital into the financial system this capital rather than the taxpayers' money will be used to pay for the losses incurred during the next financial crisis.

Of course, this won't work as financial regulators have already shown they will not use the banking system as it is designed and require banks to recognize upfront their losses on private and public debt that cannot be repaid.

Financial regulators don't require the banks to recognize losses upfront as the regulators perceive that any reduction in the reported level of capital signals a problem that threatens the safety and soundness of the financial system.

As regular readers know, this assumption is false as market participants already know the banks have experienced massive losses and undoubtedly have negative book capital levels if all their losses are realized.  What market participants don't know is just how negative book capital levels really should be.

While I think that the goal of Senators Brown and Vitter to try to protect the taxpayer from the failure of the financial regulators is correct, their effort to put more capital into the financial system won't achieve this outcome.

Taxpayers would be much better off if Senators Brown and Vitter championed enforcement of the Securities Act of 1933 and requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Under the Act, the government is suppose to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision.

The current financial crisis has shown that the banks are "black boxes".  It is only when the banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants have the information that they need to make a fully informed investment decision.

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Sweden's economic elite pushing higher bank capital buffers

Bloomberg reports that Sweden's economic elite is pushing for banks to hold higher capital buffers.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has frequently debunked the myth of this easily manipulated, deceptive accounting construct known as bank capital.

My question is what part of this debunking are economists having a hard time understanding so that they stop pushing for higher bank capital requirements?

Paul Volcker says that no one knows what bank capital is.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital? No.

Sheila Bair says that bank capital is easily manipulated and therefore presents a deceptive picture of a bank's true risk. Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

The OECD says that bank capital is meaningless because as an accounting construct is is easy for both regulators and banks to manipulate.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No?

Dexia and other banks pass a regulatory stress test focused on capital adequacy with high marks and have to be nationalize shortly thereafter.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

George Akerlof won a Nobel Prize in Economics based partially on his work on accounting control fraud in banks.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

Financial regulators outside of Iceland did not require the banks to absorb the losses on their bad debt exposures at the beginning of the financial crisis.  They were worried that recognition of these losses would trigger bank runs.  This calls into question whether financial regulators are capable of requiring banks to absorb losses regardless of bank capital levels.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

Banks are designed because of deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding to be able to operate and support the real economy even when they have low or negative book capital levels (see large US banks in mid-1980s when their book capital adjusted for exposure to loans to less developed countries).  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

The economic elite failed to predict the financial crisis and their policy recommendations since have not ended the financial crisis.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

Bank lobbyists understand that higher capital requirements, which the banks will game, is a great tradeoff if banks can retain their current opacity that allows them to gamble with taxpayer money and engage in activities like manipulating the global benchmark interest rates for personal profit.  Does that stop the economic elite calling for more bank capital?  No.

The best the economic elite can do to defend their call for banks to hold more capital is to trot out the story of the Emperor's New Clothes.  A story that even the youngest child knows is about transparency.

Oh, did I say that transparency is a necessary condition for bank capital to be meaningful?  No surprise, as transparency is the necessary condition for the invisible hand of the market to operate properly.

Sweden’s economic elite are debating whether governments with oversized bank industries need to demand even tougher capital standards than those agreed after the latest wave of regulatory tightening. 
Sweden’s requirement that its four biggest banks set aside at least 10 percent in core Tier 1 capital of risk-weighted assets this year, and a minimum of 12 percent from 2015, marks one of Europe’s most stringent regulatory overhauls. 
Yet some of the nation’s most influential economists now argue those rules may be too weak to protect the economy from losses. 
“Ideally, the capital requirements for banks should be raised substantially,” Assar Lindbeck, a research fellow at the Research Institute of Industrial Economics, said yesterday in an interview. 
Lindbeck is one of the main architects behind Sweden’s budget surplus rule and a former chairman of the Nobel Economics Foundation that selects laureates every October. 
He says a capital buffer as high as 20 percent might be called for.... 
According to Lindbeck, much of the work to protect taxpayers from banking industry risks should be done through stricter capital rules and curbs on investor rewards. 
“I can imagine the possibility of putting a stop to dividends for a couple of years to build up capital buffers to between 15 percent and 20 percent,” he said. “That may possibly raise interest rates, but we have to accept that. It’s much worse if we end up with a banking crisis.”...

Banks have so far amassed more capital than the regulatory minimum. Nordea’s core Tier 1 capital ratio reached 13.1 percent of risk-weighted assets at the end of last year, while Swedbank’s was 17.4 percent and SEB’s was 15.1 percent. Svenska Handelsbanken AB (SHBA) had a ratio of 18.4 percent in the final three months of 2012. The results put Sweden’s biggest banks at the top of capital rankings in the EU. 
Even those levels may still leave room for losses, given the unstable nature of banking, Lindbeck said. 
“The banking business is risky since it lends other people’s money and you then need a sizable buffer,” Lindbeck said. “It’s a misconstruction in the world’s banking system that they’re working with so little capital.”
It is a misconstruction that banks are allowed to operate behind a veil of opacity so that market participants cannot see the risks they are taking and act to restrain these risk.

Monday, April 15, 2013

European banks need to be recapitalized when?

In his Financial Times column, Jean Pisani-Ferry asserts that European banks need to be recapitalized now.

Why recapitalize now?
Europe also made two mistakes in responding to the crisis. First, it failed to recognise the true extent of its banking problem. It believed – or pretended to believe – that the guarantees and recapitalisations of 2008-2009 had addressed the issue whereas weaknesses were in fact much more widespread. Second, it failed to appreciate that excessive private-sector debt was not just an American problem. In Europe too many households and companies needed to deleverage....

The first priority is financial repair. Banks with weak balance sheets lend on too expensive terms or lend to insolvent borrowers to keep them afloat and do not grant credit to new firms. This prevents profitable investment and the growth of new, more efficient firms.
A comprehensive bank balance sheet assessment is needed....
The first priority should be a comprehensive bank balance sheet assessment and this can only by accomplished by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  With on-going disclosure of their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can assess each of the exposures.

Market participants can then exert discipline so that banks recognize their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This market discipline ends the practice of lending to insolvent borrowers to keep them afloat.

This market discipline also rewards banks for making new loans to borrowers who can afford to repay the loans.
The ECB should not and will not accept undercapitalised – let alone insolvent – banks to fall under the common supervision. 
With this statement, Mr. Pisani-Ferry moves into the world of theory.  He assumes there are solvent banks in Europe.

In the real world, there is no such thing as a European bank that is not insolvent under the traditional definition of insolvency (the market value of its assets is less than the book value of its liabilities).  Supporting evidence for my statement comes from the need to nationalize several European banks that had passed the stress tests (for example, Dexia).

Mr. Pisani-Ferry also asserts that the ECB should not accept undercapitalized or insolvent banks.

As I discussed in a previous blog, were Walter Bagehot, who wrote the book on modern central banking, alive today he would recognize the existence of deposit insurance. This recognition would change his definition of bank solvency and result in the central bank acting as lender of last resort to banks with substantial negative book capital levels.

Mr. Bagehot would recognize that a bank that does not qualify for access to central bank funds is a bank where its interest income is not greater than its interest expense plus pre-banker bonus operating costs.
National authorities therefore have to initiate a recapitalisation of undercapitalised banks and a resolution of the insolvent ones. The moment is now. 
I agree that the moment for cleaning up the banking system is now.

Using the income driven approach to bank solvency, clearly those banks that are insolvent need to be resolved.

Using the income driven approach to bank solvency, those banks that are solvent should be required to retain 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings until such time as they have rebuilt their book capital levels to regulatory standards.

While this may take years, it is not a problem as banks can continue to make loans to support the real economy.

Sunday, April 14, 2013

How quickly do banks need to be recapitalized after recognizing losses?

How policymakers respond to a bank solvency led financial crisis is driven by how they answer the question: how quickly do banks need to be recapitalized after they recognize their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Your humble blogger's response is that banks do not need to be immediately recapitalized.  Instead, banks can rebuild their book capital levels over several years by retaining 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings.

This is not the response that the global policymakers or financial regulators would give.  Nor is it the response that almost every economists would give, particularly those who are calling for banks to hold more capital.

The fact that I am in the minority in how I responded to this question puts the onus on me to show why I am right.

To show this, we need to start with a solvent, opaque bank.  The traditional definition of a solvent bank, which comes from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, is the market value of its assets is greater than the book value of its liabilities.

           Assets
                 Cash                           5
                 Bonds
                    Government          10
                    AAA-rated            15
                 Loans                    
                    Performing            70
                   Non-performing       0
           Total Assets                 100

            Liabilities & Equity
                Core Deposits           70
                Hot Money deposits  20
                Equity                       10
            Total Liab. & Equity   100

Not only is this bank solvent, but it has terrific capital ratios.  It shows a simple equity to asset ratio of 10%.  Its Basel I, II or III capital ratios are even better.

Unfortunately, it turns out that this opaque, solvent bank was heavily exposed to subprime mortgages, commercial real estate and other areas of the financial system that collapsed at the beginning of our financial crisis.  The effects on this bank of marking all of its assets to market are shown below [AAA-rated bonds suffer loss of 10; loans suffer loss of 10; equity absorbs loss on bonds and loans and declines by 20].


            Assets
                 Cash                           5
                 Bonds
                    Government          10
                    AAA-rated             5
                 Loans                    
                    Performing            45
                   Non-performing     15
           Total Assets                   80

            Liabilities & Equity
                Core Deposits           70
                Hot Money deposits  20
                Equity                      (10)
            Total Liab. & Equity     80


Clearly, this banks is insolvent as the market value of its assets (80) is less than the book value of its liabilities (90).

Please recall that this bank is also opaque.  It provides the required disclosures that the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane would say results in its being like all the other banks, a 'black box'.

Naturally, this opacity is very important as it gives policymakers and financial regulators a choice:  make the bank publicly acknowledge and absorb its losses upfront or allow the bank to hide the true extent of its losses and slowly absorb them into earnings over the course of time.

Please note that regardless of which choice is made the bank is still insolvent under the traditional definition.

What the choice comes down to is when do the bank's financial statements reflect its true condition.  Now or at some point in time in the distant future.

If the financial regulators want to hide the true extent of the bank's losses, they can suspend mark to market and adopt mark to model accounting for its securities.  The financial regulators can also engage in regulatory forbearance and let banks practice 'extend and pretend' to turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans.

Both of these were done by global policymakers and financial regulators in response to our current financial crisis.

The impact of these actions is shown below for our now insolvent, opaque bank.


           Assets
                 Cash                           5
                 Bonds
                    Government          10
                    AAA-rated            14
                 Loans                    
                    Performing            65
                   Non-performing       4
           Total Assets                   98

            Liabilities & Equity
                Core Deposits           70
                Hot Money deposits  20
                Equity                         8
            Total Liab. & Equity     98

Please note that the bank's book capital, which is an accounting construct, no longer reflects the true condition of the bank (it is a positive 8 when the bank's true condition shows minus 10).

As Sheila Bair would say: as a result of measurement errors, this bank's capital is deceptive.  It doesn't present an accurate picture of the bank's risk or solvency.

Before going on, let me summarize three key points.
  • First, the bank is insolvent under the traditional definition of solvency regardless of what its financial statements show.  
  • Second, by fiddling with the accounting, policymakers and financial regulators are explicitly agreeing with me that a bank can operate and support the real economy even when it is insolvent under the traditional definition.
  • Third, by fiddling with the accounting, policymakers and financial regulators are explicitly agreeing with me that a bank that is currently insolvent under the traditional definition can generate and retain enough earnings so that it becomes solvent again.
So, why do global policymakers and financial regulators engage in hiding bank insolvency?

The answer to this question is driven by their answer to how quickly banks need to be recapitalized after recognizing losses.  They assert that banks need to be recapitalized as soon as possible after recognizing losses.

Why?

Because a bank that shows low or negative book capital levels is prone to bank runs or it is hampered in its ability to support the real economy.

Let me address bank runs first.

Why should this bank be any more susceptible to bank runs after it reveals the true extent of its losses than it is when the losses are being hidden?  Do global policymakers and financial regulators think that market participants missed the implosion of subprime securities, commercial real estate and other areas of the financial system?

What market participants don't know is the exact extent of the losses suffered by each bank.  Market participants are keenly aware of the fact that each bank suffered extensive losses.  Losses that if fully recognized upfront may in fact leave the bank with substantial negative book capital levels.

So why aren't depositors fleeing the banks?  Deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding.

I break depositors into two groups: core and hot money.

Core depositors like individuals and SMEs have a long-term relationship with their bank.  They trust that even highly indebted governments will honor their deposit guarantees and protect them from any losses due to bank insolvency.  As Cyprus shows, hurting the SMEs devastates the economy so policymakers and financial regulators have a strong incentive not to do this.

As a result, core depositors don't care and probably couldn't tell you what the book capital level for their bank was at the end of last quarter.  They are with their bank for the long haul.

This is a key point because it is these depositors that are the key to the viability of the banking franchise.  It is their business that allows a bank to generate and retain the earnings that rebuild its book capital level and restore it to solvency over many years.

Hot money depositors are, as their name implies, only dealing with the bank as an investor.  At the first sign of problems and clearly this bank has problems, they are gone as soon as they can get their money out.

This group is in fact already engaged in a bank run.  A run that is slowed down to a jog by having their money tied up in time deposits.

So what does the bank look like after all of its hot money depositors have left?

            Assets
                 Cash                                   5
                 Bonds
                    Government                  10
                    AAA-rated                      5
                 Loans                    
                    Performing                    45
                   Non-performing             15
           Total Assets                           80

            Liabilities & Equity
                Funds from central banks  20
                Core Deposits                   70
                Hot Money deposits           0
                Equity                             (10)
            Total Liab. & Equity           80

Please note that under Walter Bagehot's principle for central banks acting as lender of last resort, central banks are suppose to lend freely against good collateral.  In this example, good collateral at 60 is 3 times greater than the size of the loan from the central bank.  So a bank run by hot money depositors is not a problem.

This example is all well and good, however, in the EU, the ECB is restricted to only lending to solvent banks.

Let's not kid ourselves.  The fact is that all the large banks in the EU, UK and US are insolvent whether their financial statements show it or not.

First, a bank that was not insolvent would provide ultra transparency to show it.  By disclosing its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, the bank is saying it has nothing to hide.  This would give it an enormous competitive advantage in both access to and lower cost of funds over other large banks that don't make a similar level of disclosure.

Banks that don't provide ultra transparency are announcing they have something to hide and are far riskier.

Second, the existence of deposit guarantees would change Walter Bagehot's definition of solvency.  It would no longer be solvency as defined by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission.  It would be adjusted for the existence of the deposit guarantee standing behind the core depositors.

The deposit guarantee implies a far higher level of "capital".  One way to reflect this is to subtract the guaranteed deposits from the solvency equation.  A bank is solvent if the market value of its assets exceeds the book value of its liabilities less guaranteed deposits.

In our example, our insolvent bank under the traditional definition of solvency is solvent after adjusting for the deposit guarantee [80 - (90 - 70) = 60].

This is very important.  As regular readers know, the time to resolve a bank is when the interest income from its performing assets does not exceed the combination of its interest expense and its pre-banker bonus cost of operations.

Please note, the ECB is already effectively using my modified definition of bank solvency and lending to banks that would be insolvent under the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's solvency definition under its promise to do whatever it takes.  There is no reason to believe that the ECB is fooled by EU policymakers and financial regulators playing games with the banks' financial statements.

Let me now address the issue of recognizing the losses would hurt the banks' ability to support the real economy.

Why?

As shown in the example, there is no reduction in the bank's ability to fund new loans after it absorbs its losses.  Cash didn't change.

Recognizing the losses actually improves a bank's ability to make loans.  As shown by Iceland, when the banks recognize upfront the losses on all the excess debt in the financial system, collateral values adjust to a sustainable level.  This is important as banks are senior secured lenders.

What limits the ability of banks to make new loans is an artificial construct:  regulators and their obsession with easily manipulated book capital.

Quite simply, it is not access to funding that hurts a bank's ability to fund new loans and support the real economy as it is the constraint on making new loans that the regulators force on the banks in the form of capital ratios.

It is the bank regulators who insist on a positive capital ratio even when the bank should be showing a negative book capital level.

Saturday, April 6, 2013

Senators Brown and Vitter proposing that banks have capital levels they did in 1900

Bloomberg reports that Senators Brown and Vitter are proposing that banks hold significantly more capital.  The level of capital they are shooting for is the level that existed before the Fed was created in 1913.

Regular readers are not surprised that this is the time period chosen by the senators to set capital requirements.  Regular readers know that during this time period banks were subjected to market discipline and this is what the market determined was an adequate level of capital.

Banks were subjected to market discipline back then because they disclosed all of their exposure details.  Bankers knew that this level of disclosure was a sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet and the failure to make this level of disclosure was to wave a big red flag announcing the bank had something to hide.

Today, however, banks are not subjected to market discipline because they are not required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Senators Brown and Vitter try to get around this opacity by proposing complex rules.  Unfortunately, as Sheila Bair pointed out, banks are highly capable of gaming any simple rule, let alone a complex rule.

More importantly, Sheila Bair pointed out that in gaming capital rules, banks have mastered the fine art of presenting a different picture of their underlying strength, soundness and risk than actually exists.

This bears repeating:  in the absence of transparency, bank capital is deceptive (see Dexia's high capital right before it was nationalized).  It is dangerous to rely on bank capital showing anything useful due to the banks' and regulators' ability to manipulate bank capital rules.

Fortunately, Senators Brown and Vitter acknowledge that they do not have the votes to get their proposal passed.

As a result, they are freed up to focus on having the banks provide ultra transparency.  With ultra transparency, the Senators get the banks to hold the levels of capital the Senators want due to market discipline and avoid the banks gaming their safety, soundness and risk.

When the Senators focus on having the banks provide ultra transparency, they will find that the laws requiring this level of disclosure are already on the books.  They are part of the Securities Acts that require that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess and make a fully informed decision.

The largest U.S. banks, including JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp., would have to hold capital in excess of Basel III standards under a proposal being drafted by Senate Democrats and Republicans to curb the size of too-big-to-fail banks. 
The current draft of the legislation would require U.S. regulators to replace Basel III requirements with a higher capital standard: 10 percent for all banks and an additional surcharge of 5 percent for institutions with more than $400 billion in assets. 
Senators Sherrod Brown, a Democrat from Ohio, and David Vitter, a Republican from Louisiana, have said they intend to introduce the bill this month.... 
Karen Shaw Petrou, co-founder of Federal Financial Analytics Inc., a Washington-based consulting firm, said the proposal would return the banking system to a time before the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. was set up to guarantee bank deposits. 
“I view it as a radical view of how American banks should be restructured that seems to disregard the role of the FDIC coverage, prudential regulation and the totally different structure of the 2013 economy,” Petrou said in an interview.
In the run up to the financial crisis, prudential regulation didn't work.

Common sense says that having failed once, there is no good reason to bet the stability of the financial system on its not failing again.

Fortunately, by simply requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, there is no reason to have to rely on prudential regulation not failing again.  With market discipline, the banks will be kept on a much shorter leash with much higher capital levels.

Tuesday, April 2, 2013

Sheila Bair: capital ratios let regulators make banks look safer than they are

In her Wall Street Journal column, former FDIC chairwoman Sheila Bair drives a stake through the heart of bank capital, the Basel capital requirements in particular, by observing that capital ratios let regulators make banks appear safer than they actually are.

Ms. Bair's conclusion is exactly what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Bank capital ratios suffer from two fundamental flaws:

  • They are easily manipulated by banks, regulators and policy makers.  Banks manipulate the ratios by gaming the calculation of risk adjusted assets.  Regulators manipulate the ratios by practicing regulatory forbearance and letting banks engage in 'extend and pretend' to turn their non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans.  Policy makers manipulate the ratios by insisting on the suspension of mark-to-market accounting for securities.
  • They are designed to hide the true condition of the banks.  Having been involved in the development of Basel I, I can tell you the basic idea behind Basel I was to hide the amount of leverage that banks were taking on so they could generate a high return on equity.  Regulators bought into the idea that banks needed a higher return on equity to attract capital.
There is only one way to assess the risk of a bank.  That is to look at a bank's current global exposure details.

This is why your humble blogger has been saying that banks need to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can assess the true condition of the bank.

With this information, market participants can, if they want, calculate a capital ratio that is not subject to measurement errors introduced by banks, regulators or policy makers.
The recent Senate report on the J.P. Morgan Chase JPM +0.77% "London Whale" trading debacle revealed emails, telephone conversations and other evidence of how Chase managers manipulated their internal risk models to boost the bank's regulatory capital ratios. 
Risk models are common and certainly not illegal. Nevertheless, their use in bolstering a bank's capital ratios can give the public a false sense of security about the stability of the nation's largest financial institutions. 
At a minimum, risk models introduce measurement error and the ability for banks to manipulate their appearance of safety and soundness.
Capital ratios (also called capital adequacy ratios) reflect the percentage of a bank's assets that are funded with equity and are a key barometer of the institution's financial strength—they measure the bank's ability to absorb losses and still remain solvent.
Capital ratios are nice in theory, but don't work in practice for two reasons.

First, capital ratios are easily manipulated, they are not an accurate measure of a bank's ability to absorb losses and remain solvent over the long term.

Second, banks are uniquely designed so they can continue to operate even when they are insolvent for a period of time.

This is a very important point as it highlights the simple fact that only in the world of bank regulators and academic economists are capital ratios important.

As I highlighted in my hierarchy for dealing with insolvent banks (where the market value of the bank's assets is less than the book value of its liabilities), the first place to absorb losses and the primary source of a bank's financial strength is the bank's ability to generate earnings before banker bonuses in the future.  It is a bank's ability to generate earnings in the future that allows it to rebuild in book capital levels.
This should be a simple measure, but it isn't. That's because regulators allow banks to use a process called "risk weighting," which allows them to raise their capital ratios by characterizing the assets they hold as "low risk."...
As we learned during the 2008 financial crisis, financial models can be unreliable. Their assumptions about the risk of steep declines in housing prices were fatally flawed, causing catastrophic drops in the value of mortgage-backed securities. 
And now the London Whale episode has shown how capital regulations create incentives for even legitimate models to be manipulated....
The ease with which models can be manipulated results in wildly divergent risk-weightings among banks with similar portfolios. 
Ironically, the government permits a bank to use its own internal models to help determine the riskiness of assets, such as securities and derivatives, which are held for trading—but not to determine the riskiness of good old-fashioned loans. 
The risk weights of loans are determined by regulation and generally subject to tougher capital treatment. As a result, financial institutions with large trading books can have less capital and still report higher capital ratios than traditional banks whose portfolios consist primarily of loans.
Regulators need to use a simple, effective ratio as the main determinant of a bank's capital strength and go back to the drawing board on risk-weighting assets. 
It does make sense to look at the riskiness of banks' assets in determining the adequacy of its capital. 
But the current rules are upside down, providing more generous treatment of derivatives trading than fully collateralized small-business lending.
Your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that the only way to determine the riskiness of a bank is by looking at its assets.  Here is Ms. Bair confirming that point.

All of this makes the case for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current exposure details as it takes away the ability of either banks or regulators to distort the true safety of the banks.

It is intuitively ridiculous to have capital requirements that assign a lower risk weighting to derivatives that fully collateralized loans.
The main argument megabanks advance against a tough capital ratio is that it would force them to raise more capital and hurt the economic recovery....
That is the beauty of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It doesn't force the banks to raise more capital.  It gives them the alternative to shrink by eliminating proprietary bets and subsidiaries that exist solely to engage in regulatory or tax arbitrage.

Wednesday, March 27, 2013

The UK's bank capital fudge

The Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee highlighted why bank capital regulations without banks being required to provide ultra transparency are completely meaningless.  Without disclosure by the banks of their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, it is impossible to measure a bank's capital adequacy.

I give the FPC a tremendous amount of credit for simply stating that UK banks don't have enough capital.

Now the question is given the losses and risks that are hidden on and off the banks' balance sheets is $75 billion of new capital enough and which banks need to raise the capital?  Without the banks being required to provide ultra transparency, market participants don't know the answer.

Given its mandate to protect the financial system from systemic risks, I wish the FPC had also called for the banks to provide ultra transparency.  Not only would the FPC have solved the measurement problem with bank capital, but it would also have addressed a systemic risk.  Specifically, our current financial crisis shows that opacity in the banking system is a systemic risk.

From a Simon Nixon Wall Street Journal Heard on the Street column,
So that's clear then. The U.K. banking system has a capital hole of around £50 billion ($75.8 billion), according to the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee. Well, actually, that hole shrinks to around £25 billion relative to a new BOE benchmark of a 7% minimum core Tier 1 capital ratio on a Basel III basis after making various regulatory adjustments. 
OK, the true capital hole may be only half this size once one takes account of anticipated retained earnings and other capital-enhancing actions under way at U.K. banks. 
But the final size of the capital hole and the identity of the guilty banks must remain a state secret, only the regulators and the banks themselves to know. 
This is, of course, nonsense.
Actually, it is worse than nonsense that the size of the capital hole is a state secret known only to the regulators and banks.

It puts the financial system at risk.  Effectively, the regulators are gambling with taxpayer money.  I say this because experience shows that banks that need to raise capital would rather try to "earn" the capital by taking on risk than sell shares.

A classic example of this were the US Savings and Loans.  Everyone knew they needed more capital, but rather than try to sell stock at low prices, bank management preferred to gamble on redemption on risky exposures.  The end result was bigger losses for the taxpayers.

This state secret also distorts the financial system as those banks that need additional capital benefit from investors providing them with funds at too low a rate of return.  Recall that investors don't know how big each bank's capital shortfall is as it is a state secret.
With its latest pronouncement on the capital adequacy of the banking sector, the FPC has effectively introduced a new regulatory capital standard for U.K. banks. Yet it has failed to spell out key details of how this regime works in practice. 
At best, this creates an opportunity for fudge, with key decisions relating to the safety and soundness of the financial sector taken behind closed doors on the basis of a negotiation between regulators and banks.
Excuse me, but how much capital a bank should hold should not be limited to a negotiation between regulators and bankers.

Ideally, unsecured bank creditors should have a say as they should be exposed to the risk of loss on their investment.  The only way these investors can have a say is if there is ultra transparency and they can assess the risk of loss for themselves.
At worst, it risks creating a false market, with investors in U.K. bank shares—particularly Royal Bank of Scotland RBS.LN -2.83%and Lloyds Banking Group, LLOY.LN +2.42% believed to be the FPC's primary target—denied information vital to making informed decisions.
Please re-read Mr. Nixon's comments about the false market because investors are denied information vital to making informed decisions.

Your humble blogger has been making this point since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Tuesday, March 19, 2013

JP Morgan, other banks gaming risk models renders bank capital meaningless

As reported by Fox Business, JP Morgan and other banks have engaged in gaming their risk models so as to minimize their risk adjusted assets and maximize their capital ratios.

By doing so, the banks reveal the simple fact that bank capital and the ratios on which it is based are easily manipulated and, therefore, are meaningless.  A fact previously highlighted and reached by the OECD.

Regular readers know that bank capital is an accounting construct.  This bears repeating, bank book capital levels are an accounting construct and reflect accounting rules rather than reality.

Because it is an accounting construct, it is by definition easy to manipulate.  

By simply shifting a security from the trading account to the investment portfolio, the security goes from being subject to mark-to-market accounting to held at cost.  In a market where the value of the security is declining, which is the only market that the security will be moved to the investment portfolio, this overstates both assets and bank book capital.

Manipulation of bank book capital levels is not just something done by the banks.  It is done by the regulators too.

For example, regulators adopted regulatory forbearance at the beginning of the financial crisis.  This allowed and still allows banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' and turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans.  The result is that assets, net income and bank book capital levels are overstated.
In 2011, senior executives at JPMorgan Chase & Co told one of the bank's trading and hedging groups to scale back its riskier positions as new regulations would make these bets much more expensive to maintain. 
The group, called the Chief Investment Office (CIO), was asked to cut risk-weighted assets, a key measurement that regulators use when assessing a bank's stability and how much capital it needs to hold, according to a U.S. Senate subcommittee report on Thursday. 
In December 2011, the CIO came up with a plan to change its risk models. It estimated that by calculating risk differently, the bank could reduce its risk-weighted assets by $7 billion - more than half the targeted amount - without having to actually sell the securities....
Who would use an easily manipulated, accounting construct like bank book capital as a key measurement when assessing a bank's stability?

Only a market participant who is shortly to see the value of their exposure decline. [Banks with high capital levels have a history of being nationalized.  See Dexia.]
Investors say they fear that JPMorgan is not alone in tinkering with risk models to meet tougher capital requirements laid out in new regulations known as Basel III. 
Global banks are spending hundreds of millions of dollars to install elaborate computer models to measure risk and make sure they are adequately capitalized. 
Under Basel III, banks can shrink their risk-weighted assets - and boost profits - if they can build a model to prove the bond or loan is not so risky. 
While banks can use these models legitimately, they can also be tweaked to try to game the system, said Adam Compton, a portfolio manager at Atlanta-based hedge fund GMT Capital Corp. 
"You're naive if you don't think it ever happens," said Compton, who scrutinizes financial statements for banks.
The EU bank regulators have been talking about just how much difference exists between the banks on how they value and assign a risk-weight to the same asset.

A game that banks can only engage in because they are not required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants, including banking competitors, would be easily able to identify banks that are gaming the rules so as to maximize the capital ratios they show.
Capital is a key source of safety for the global banking system, and bad models could lead to undercapitalized banks. 
Many big banks were not holding enough capital when the financial crisis erupted in 2008, forcing some to fail or take government bailouts as they were unable to absorb losses.
There is a fallacy that bank capital is there to absorb losses.  In fairy tales like the Bankers' New Clothes it is, in reality it is not.

The US Treasury and Federal Reserve adopted the policy of financial failure containment and its corollary, the Geithner Doctrine years ago.  Under this policy, bank capital levels are protected at all costs because of concerns about financial contagion (if one bank fails it could bring down others).
But keeping capital levels high makes banks less profitable. 
As JPMorgan's experience with the CIO shows, the line between optimizing capital and manipulating it is fine, and often hard for outsiders - including regulators - to discern, say experts in regulatory measurements of risk.....
With ultra transparency, it would be easy for outsiders, including regulators, to see which banks are optimizing capital and which are manipulating it.
Banks need to seek regulatory approval for new risk models, but regulators may not have the time or sophistication to figure out when they are being duped, according to financial risk experts.
Basel III rules run to 616 pages, compared with 347 pages for Basel II and 30 pages for the 1988 Basel I accord. 
An examiner of bank books, who is stationed inside one of the biggest U.S. banks by a regulatory body, said regulators can - and do - back-test model changes, ask for detailed information on what specifically changed, and fight the banks on changes if they are inappropriate. 
"We are going into their credit books all the time, literally pulling out securities and testing them on the models every quarter," the regulatory examiner said...
Who can do a better job of valuing a bank's risk models:  an examiner or the market with all of its experts?

With ultra transparency, the examiner gets to piggy-back on the market's expertise in analysis.
A survey by a research analyst at Barclays Capital last year found that half of investors distrust banks' risk-weighted asset figures....
On both sides of the Atlantic, 13 of the biggest financial institutions have together announced plans to reduce their risk-weighted assets by 20 percent, or $1 trillion in total, according to consulting firm McKinsey & Co.
JPMorgan, for example, wants to reduce its risk-weighted assets by $80 billion to $100 billion. Goldman Sachs Group (GS) plans to shed $28 billion worth of risk-weighted assets by the end of this year, from $728 billion as of September 30. 
Goldman is using new technology so that traders can assess risk-weightings of individual securities more quickly, Chief Executive Lloyd Blankfein said in November. The bank has said that without its modeling efforts, upcoming Basel III rules would result in 40 percent higher risk-weighted assets, compared with the prior risk-weighting regimen....

"Risk-weighted assets used to be done by some department of the bank and no one concentrated on them; they were insignificant," the European bank source said. "Now, we're all trying to optimize them."...