Showing posts with label Complexity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Complexity. Show all posts

Tuesday, April 9, 2013

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane takes on combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight

Reuters reports that the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane has escalated his fight to dismantle the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight.  

He advocates simpler rules that are harder to game.  An example of a simple rule would be that banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Regular readers know that the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight has been used unsuccessfully as a substitute for the combination of transparency and market discipline.  Examples of where the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight failed include banks and structured finance securities.
Bank regulators need to develop much simpler rules to make it harder for large financial firms to game the supervisory system, Bank of England official Andrew Haldane said on Tuesday. 
"We need to do a radical pruning, simplifying of our regulatory apparatus (that) places much less emphasis on what are unreliable measures of risk," Haldane, the BoE's executive director for financial stability, told a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta....
Examples of unreliable measures of risk include, but are not limited to, bank book capital level and bank risk based capital measures.

Bank book capital levels are an easily manipulated accounting construct.  Since the beginning of the financial crisis, bank book capital levels have been manipulated by the regulators through suspension of mark to market accounting and by the banks through implementation of extend and pretend on nonperforming loans.

Bank risk based capital levels are also easily manipulated as banks simply game their internal models.
"Complex frameworks if anything are easier to arbitrage, easier to game," he said....
Too Big to Fail banks lobby for complex frameworks precisely because these frameworks are easier to arbitrage and game.
The Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. financial reform law that Congress passed in response to the financial crisis, is some 2,300 pages long, and has been criticized for its complexity and opaqueness.
As your humble blogger noted about Dodd-Frank, it was written by the banks' lobbyists for the benefit of the banks.  Not surprisingly, it is long on complexity and short on substance that will actually make the financial system safer.

In fact, it is long on complexity so as to keep opacity in the financial system.  Opacity that allows the banks to place proprietary bets and gamble with the taxpayers' money.  Opacity that allows the bankers to engage in bad behavior (see manipulating Libor).

Monday, March 4, 2013

Bankers prefer complex regulations governing their pay over providing transparency

Do you think that bankers would rather provide ultra transparency and disclose their current exposure details or try to get around complex regulations on bank pay?

Trick question.

Of course the bankers prefer complex regulations as they have an ability to influence how the regulations are drawn up so that their earnings are not interrupted.

The Guardian provided an example of the bankers' ability to influence how the regulations are drawn up.  It reports that
The Chancellor, George Osborne, goes to Brussels on Tuesday in what looks like a forlorn attempt to prevent the European Union from imposing swingeing curbs on bankers' bonuses in the City.
The bankers in London say jump and the Chancellor says how high.

It makes for great political theatre, but will have no impact on the bankers.

Regular readers know that the bankers won when it comes to their pay when they got the policymakers to focus on complex regulations to solve the problem.

The focus on complex regulations to solve the problem meant that more effective solutions were not considered.  Specifically, there was no consideration given to making the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With ultra transparency, banker pay would dramatically decrease.

There are several reasons for this including

  • The cost of funds to each bank would reflect the risks it took and therefore banks would lose the subsidy provided by the combination of financial regulators' information monopoly and their statements about the level of risk at each bank.
  • Market participants could trade against proprietary bets in such a way as to minimize a bank's upside from taking a proprietary bet while maximizing its downside.

Wednesday, February 6, 2013

HSBC chief admits that complexity exposed bank to problems

Over shadowed by RBS reaching a settlement  for its role in manipulating Libor was that admission by HSBC's chief that complexity exposed the bank to problems.

As reported by the Telegraph,
Stuart Gulliver said HSBC's structure "was not fit for purpose for a modern world"....
Please reread the highlighted text as Mr. Gulliver has nicely made the case for why banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, it is easy for market participants to see just how complex the banks are and, as a result, exert discipline on bank management to make their organizations much less complex.
"To be honest, our geographic footprint became very attractive to trans-national criminal organisations, whether they are terrorist in origin or criminal in origin," he added, responding to questions from the parliamentary commission on banking standards on Tuesday....
As shown by the ongoing Libor benchmark interest rate manipulation scandal and the mis-selling of insurance and interest rate derivatives scandals, criminal activity also existed inside the bank.

What allowed this type of activity to flourish is opacity.

HSBC and the other banks are currently, as the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane says, a 'black box'.   It is this opacity that hid the complexity the Mr. Gulliver says was a major factor in money laundering.
HSBC Chairman Douglas Flint said the bank was too slow to improve its systems and controls. 
"There were things we were not aware of, and standards we believed were being applied that were not," Mr Flint said. 
While admitting past fault, the pair insisted the bank is no longer out of their control. 
"I do not believe this bank is too big to manage or too big to control [any more]," said Mr Gulliver. 
"We have re-organised HSBC. We have implemented the highest standards, which are the US standards, everywhere in the world."
With ultra transparency, it is not a question of whether Mr. Gulliver thinks HSBC is too big to manage or too big to control, it is a question of what the market thinks.  

Tuesday, December 4, 2012

WSJ's Francesco Guerrera calls for Simpler Remedies for Banks

The Wall Street Journal's Francesco Guerrera became the latest to call for ending regulatory complexity and instead implementing simpler solutions that improve the safety and soundness of the financial system.

The reason for ending the race towards ever greater levels of regulatory complexity is the current financial crisis showed that the combination of complex rules/regulations and regulatory oversight fails as a substitute for transparency and market discipline.

Since transparency and market discipline are superior, the focus should be on bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system so that market discipline can works its magic.

For example, by bringing transparency to banks, we get a culture change as sunlight is the best disinfectant for bad banker behavior.

Or, as another senior watchdog told me, "We have enabled banks to get bigger in the crisis but we haven't devised a way not to bail them out in case of failure." If the statement sounds scary, that is because it is. 
Part of the reason for these shortcomings is that regulators and banks are drowning in complexity. As lenders have become more and more complicated, the authorities have responded in kind.
A response that protects the regulators' information monopoly and market participants' dependence on the regulators.

Remember, if banks have to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank themselves.

This dramatically decreases the influence of the regulators in the financial system.
The seminal Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which forced banks to split their securities businesses from consumer units, was 37 pages long. Dodd-Frank is more than 20 times that, with some 30,000 pages of associated regulations expected on top. 
"Dodd-Frank makes Glass-Steagall look like throat-clearing," quipped Andrew Haldane, a top Bank of England regulator, at the Federal Reserve's Jackson Hole symposium in August. 
The arms race of complexity between banks and their guardians is having the same result as its Cold War equivalent: stalemate.
Stalemate that benefits the banks.  The banks continue to extract money from the real economy that they would not otherwise receive if there were transparency.
Regulators are struggling to catch up with banks' increasingly arcane businesses, while lenders and investors bemoan the paralysis created by the proliferation of rules. 
If the final goal is to make banks smaller and less risky, one solution would be for regulators to take a step back, limiting themselves to rules that are broad and easy to understand, as Glass-Steagall was. Mr. Haldane, among others, has made a strong case for simplicity.
Banks have increasingly arcane businesses as they are focusing on the opaque areas of the financial system where they can engage in bad behavior behind the veil of opacity.

Both the behavior and these businesses would effectively go away if there were transparency.
But broad-brush regulation can succeed only if two conditions exist. 
First, banks would have to shed unprofitable businesses much faster than they have.
And second, regulators would need to rely less on the rule book and more on their knowledge of individual institutions.
 
Rules that are constantly fine-tuned in a vain attempt to keep up with the industry would be replaced by more general rules policed by watchdogs with their ears to the ground.
Knowledge of individual institutions that regulators can obtain by harnessing the market's ability to assess each institution.

Friday, October 26, 2012

Bank of England's Andrew Haldane calls for 'curbing King Kong banks'

The Bank of England's Andrew Haldane in his speech 'on being the right size'  became the latest regulator to call for cutting the Too Big to Fail banks down to size.

Besides Mr. Haldane's typical insightful analysis, his speech reiterated many of the observations made by Paul Volcker on why the regulations proposed since the beginning of the current financial crisis are not going to be effective at dealing with the Too Big to Fail banks.

Regular readers know that there is only one way to right size these banks:  require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Ultra transparency harnesses the market in shrinking these global financial institutions.

For example, the market shrinks these banks by charging the banks more for their complexity.  It is one thing to say these big banks have 14,000+ subsidiaries, it is another to make these banks disclose the intimate details of each subsidiary so the market participants can assess their risk.

In addition, the market shrinks these banks by restraining proprietary trading.  Management and traders know that disclosing their positions limits how much can be earned from proprietary trading.  At a minimum, market participants can use programs similar to IBM's Watson to identify trades that appear to violate the Volcker Rule and call these trades to the regulators' attention.

More importantly, ultra transparency ends contagion in the financial system.  With ultra transparency, market participants have the information they need to independently assess the risk of each of these banks and adjust the amount of their exposure to what they can afford to lose given the risk assessment.

As reported by the Telegraph,
Andrew Haldane, the Bank’s executive director for financial stability, claimed that current bank reforms – including the Government’s plans to ringfence retail banks – do not go far enough and further measures should be considered. 
To address properly the “too-big-to-fail” problem, he said regulators should consider doubling banks’ loss-absorbing capital buffers to around 20pc, “placing limits on bank size”, or imposing a “full separation of investment and commercial banking” rather than a ring-fence.
Each of these alternatives has problems.

The OECD observed and your humble blogger has fully documented why the accounting construct known as bank capital is meaningless.  It bears repeating that bank capital is meaningless because it is easily manipulated by both banks and their regulators.

Limiting the size of banks sounds nice in theory, however, the question is whether it is size that makes the Too Big to Fail problematic or the risk that if they fail it will cause damage to the rest of the financial system.  The way to mitigate this risk is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Ring-fencing or full separation of investment and commercial banking sounds nice in theory, but the reason that Glass-Steagall fell was banks and their regulators had discovered that banks were bad holders of credit, interest and liquidity risk.  It was far more sensible for banks to originate and service loans and distribute these loans to investors who were better able to hold the loans.

The freezing of the structured finance market is a reflection of the failure to require that each deal provide observable event based reporting so that investors could know what they own.  The fact that the market froze does not say that it is a bad idea to have banks reducing their credit, interest and liquidity risk.
He added that the evidence pointed to the optimal size for a bank to be as small as $100bn (£62bn). ... 
Although banks claim to be more efficient the larger they are, Mr Haldane said the analysis ignored the cost of the implicit taxpayer guarantee that he calculated was worth $70bn a year for the world’s largest banks between 2002 and 2007, and $300bn a year now. 
Without the subsidy, “there is no longer evidence of economies of scale at bank sizes above $100bn. If anything, there is now evidence of dis-economies which rise with bank size, consistent with big banks becoming ‘too big to manage’,” he said. 
“Subtracting this subsidy, removing the state crutch, would suggest a dramatically lower socially-optimal banking scale. Like King Kong and Godzilla, these giants would arguably then be physiological impossibilities ... the weight transfer associated with a single step would have shattered their thigh bones.”
Mr. Haldane does have a wonderful way with words.

I know what his analysis suggests, but it is not clear to me that a bank that provides ultra transparency and operates as a utility doesn't have economies of scale when it gets larger than $100 billion.
Mr Haldane was warning that, despite regulators efforts to build regimes that allow banks to fail without taxpayer support, the risk is that – in the practical event of a giant lender’s imminent collapse – the government would discard the theory and step in. 
“Consider that trade-off when a big, complex bank hits the rocks,” Mr Haldane said. “On the one side is a simple, but certain, option – state bail-out. On the other is a complex, and less certain, option – resolution. If governments are risk-averse ... then bail-out may look attractive on the day. 
“The history of big bank failure is a history of the state blinking before private creditors.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as the point that Mr. Haldane makes is extremely important.

Our modern banking system is designed not to require government bailouts of the banks, however, there is a long tradition of bank regulators urging governments to bailout failing institutions (think Savings & Loans for example).
In his speech at the Institute of Directors, he argued that “one way of lessening that dilemma, and at the same making resolution more credible, is to act on the scale and structure of banking directly”....
The most direct way to act on scale and structure of banking is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It would be amazing how much the banks would change by simply shining the bright light of transparency on them and letting it act as the best disinfectant.
Mr Haldane warned of potential loopholes in the structure. “Today’s ring-fence [can become] tomorrow’s string vest,” he said. He also questioned whether banks would properly separate “cultures and capital” as long as the two operations remained under one roof.
Both of these loopholes were identified by Paul Volcker in his testimony before Parliament prior to Mr. Haldane's speech.

As I learned when working for Mr. Volcker, what he says might not be the word of god when it comes to banking, but it does come from closer to god given his 6'7" height.
Although he welcomed the progress made on bank reforms so far, he added: “Claims that they have solved the too-big-to-fail problem appear to me, however, premature, probably over-optimistic. Worse, they risk sending a false sense of crisis comfort.”
His comments were released shortly after Christine Lagarde, managing director of the International Monetary Fund, spoke out against the “vested interests” in banking and said that unfinished reforms were hampering economic recovery. 
“There are many vested interests working against change and push-back is intensifying,” she said. “It is interesting how some banks say the new regulations will be too burdensome, but then spend hundreds of millions of dollars lobbying to kill them.”
The leading unfinished reform that is hampering economic recovery and that is being strongly resisted by the banks is requiring them to provide ultra transparency.

The banks know if they provide ultra transparency the market will force them to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.  This will take the burden of supporting this debt off of the real economy and, as shown by Iceland, result in the economy growing again as capital that was used for debt service is now used to buy goods and services.

The banks know if they provide ultra transparency they will be forced to shrink dramatically.  Gone will be the subsidiaries to arbitrage rules and regulations.  Gone will be proprietary trading.  Gone will be behavior like manipulating Libor.
She added that progress was needed on resolution regimes to allow banks to fail and for regulators to coordinate and align their rules, particularly over new rules on bank structures such as ring-fencing or proprietary trading bans. “We need a global level discussion of the pros and cons of direct restrictions on business models,” she said.
Actually, we need to stop talking and simply implement ultra transparency.

Thursday, October 25, 2012

You know bank capital is meaningless when a Basel executive defends it citing need for regulatory complexity

The Financial Times ran an article in which Wayne Byres, the secretary-general of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision, defended the enormous complexity of Basel III and provided a number of legitimate reasons why a simple formula favored by the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane and the FDIC's Thomas Hoenig doesn't work.

Your humble blogger is not going to get in the middle of this debate beyond reminding regular readers that bank capital is meaningless.  An opinion shared by the OECD.

Bank capital is meaningless because it is an easily manipulated accounting construct.

For example, when regulators adopt forbearance, banks can engage in 'extend and pretend' and transform their bad debt into 'zombie' loans.  By definition, this activity overstates both the value of the assets and the level of book capital (as the losses did not flow through earnings).

If bank book capital levels are overstated, they are meaningless.  If assets are overstated, they too are meaningless.  Dividing one meaningless number by another meaningless number does not create a meaningful number.

Allowing banks to 'risk' adjust their assets using internal models or external weightings from the Basel Committee does not change the simple fact that these risk adjusted asset levels are also meaningless.  Dividing meaningless book capital levels by meaningless risk adjusted asset levels does not create a meaningful number.

Dexia demonstrate that capital ratios are meaningless as it had great capital ratios shortly before being nationalized.

Regular readers know that the focus on bank capital is simply a way to divert attention from the real issue and that issue is transparency into each bank's exposure details.  It is only with access on an ongoing basis to each bank's current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants can assess the risk and solvency of each bank.

It is solvency that market participants care about as equity investors are first in line to lose money if the bank becomes insolvent.

With ultra transparency, market participants could adjust each bank's assets and book capital level to reflect the losses currently hidden on and off their balance sheets.  Then, if the market participants cared to, market participants could calculate capital ratios for themselves.

I realize that bank regulators are desperate to keep the focus on bank capital and not on the need for ultra transparency.  So long as the focus is on bank capital, the financial market is dependent on them.  If banks were required to provide ultra transparency, the market would no longer be dependent on them and the regulators would experience a substantial decline in their importance.

I would like to remind regular readers that so long as the market is dependent on regulators it is inherently unstable (see current financial crisis).  It is only when the market is not dependent on regulators that market discipline acts as a restraint on bank risk taking and the financial system is stable.
Bank safety rules cannot be reduced to a simple formula and recent calls to scrap the “Basel III” reform package because of its complexity are unrealistic, the secretary-general of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision warned on Wednesday. 
“Being reliant on a single metric to capture all risks within something as complex as a modern bank is asking too much,” Wayne Byres told a Lisbon conference sponsored by the Bank of Portugal. 
The Basel package, which begins to take effect in January, uses complicated formulae and models to determine how risky a bank is and how much capital it must hold against unexpected losses.
Rather than use complicated formulae and models with millions of assumptions, doesn't it make sense to simply have the banks disclose their current exposures?
But a growing chorus of critics wants to scrap the hard-fought global agreement in favour of a much simpler metric, known as a leverage ratio, which simply divides the bank’s equity by its total assets.
I want to scrap both complicated and simple metrics.  I think that market participants should look at the actual bank exposures and determine for themselves how risky they think the bank is.
In a speech that compared running a global bank to flying a modern passenger aircraft, Mr Byres warned that banks would seek to game such a simple calculation by piling into risky, high-yielding activities. Instead, he said, regulators need to use several measures including both the leverage ratio and more complicated formulae that take riskiness into account. 
Citing Albert Einstein’s famous dictum that “everything should be as simple as possible, but not simpler”, Mr Byres said, that in banking regulation “a solution of either extreme complexity or absolute simplicity will almost inevitably be suboptimal – like most things in life, we need to find a balance between the two.”
The simplest is scrapping both measures and requiring the banks to disclose their current exposure details.

I also find it interesting that Mr. Byres thinks that bank regulation requires calculating a capital ratio.  It doesn't.

For example, the C in CAMEL Ratings used by bank examiners stands for capital adequacy and not capital ratio.  The issue addressed by capital adequacy is does the bank have enough capital to protect the taxpayer deposit guarantee for any losses it might incur on is current exposures.

Under the FDR Framework, which is the basis for most western countries financial systems, the role of the regulators is to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so the market participants can independently assess this data and make a fully informed investment decision.

Nowhere in the FDR Framework does it say that the role of bank regulators is to calculate a capital ratio.

Regular readers know that capital ratios are a creation of regulators and came into being as a way to allow banks to leverage up their balance sheets in a hope that this would improve their Return on Equity and allow them to attract more capital. [I know because I was involved in Basel I].

Hence, the time has come to scrap any further discussion of bank capital.
Mr Byres’s speech marks the global regulator’s most cogent response to the criticism of Basel III launched in August by Andrew Haldane, director of financial stability at the Bank of England. 
Mr Haldane called on regulators to tear up the rulebook and restart in a much-cited speech entitled “The dog and the frisbee” that compared the scientific formulae needed to predict the flight of a frisbee to the actions of a dog, which simply watches the toy in flight and then moves to catch it....
The dog and the frisbee solution is exactly what market participants would do if they had access to each bank's exposure details.
But the Basel secretary-general countered the frisbee analogy with one of his own – the aircraft pilot. Modern aircraft, like global banks, are extremely complicated and it is all but impossible for users to tell whether they are safe....
It is impossible for market participants to tell if the banks are safe because as Mr. Haldane observed their disclosure leaves them resembling 'black boxes'.

However, if the banks were required to provide ultra transparency, then the users could independently determine if they were safe.
Rather than obsessing about finding the perfect formula for bank safety, Mr Byres said, regulators should focus on making sure that bankers’ personal incentives are aligned with those of their customers and investors. 
“Our goal is rather simple: to reduce the risk of flying in unsafe planes where the pilot is the only one with a parachute,” he concluded.
Given this goal, the only solution is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  It is only with this data that market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure to each bank based on what they can afford to lose given the risk of the bank.

Monday, October 22, 2012

S&P: Volcker Rule could lower bank profits by $10 billion

S&P estimates that out of more than $70 billion in earnings, $10 billion in earnings comes from banks making proprietary bets that the Volcker Rule would eliminate.

On reading this in a Bloomberg article, I immediately had two observations:

First, given that banks don't disclose how much they make from gambling, how would S&P know?

Second, no wonder the banks have been fighting against providing ultra transparency and disclosing on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposure details so hard.

As everyone knows, if banks had to provide ultra transparency, their ability to profit from proprietary betting would effectively disappear as market participants would engage in behavior to reduce the profit potential of these bets.

It is no surprise that the bankers prefer the almost 300 pages of complex, loophole ridden regulations that the Volcker Rule requires over being required to provide ultra transparency.  With the Volcker Rule, they can use the loopholes to continue gambling.

The Volcker rule could cut profit at the biggest U.S. banks twice as much as earlier estimates if regulators take a strict stance on limiting proprietary trading, Standard & Poor’s said. 
“We currently estimate that the Volcker rule could reduce combined pretax earnings for the eight largest U.S. banks by up to $10 billion annually, up from our initial $4 billion estimate two years ago,” S&P said today in a statement announcing a new report on the issue. 
Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) and Morgan Stanley, which were the two biggest U.S. securities firms before converting to banks in 2008, stand to lose the most because they get a larger percentage of their revenue from trading than the other lenders, S&P said in the report. Regulators are unlikely to draft a final version of the rule until the end of 2012, S&P said. 
“Less strict rules would have a limited impact on banks’ earnings and business positions, so it’s unlikely that we would take any rating actions as a result,” S&P said in the statement. “Stricter rules could lead us to take negative rating actions on certain banks.”
In addition to Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley (MS), S&P included Bank of America Corp. (BAC), Citigroup Inc. (C), JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM), PNC Financial Services Group Inc. (PNC), U.S. Bancorp, and Wells Fargo & Co. (WFC) in its analysis. Those eight banks earned a combined $70.5 billion in pretax profit in the first nine months of this year, according to company reports.

Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act, also known as the Volcker rule, limits federally regulated banks’ ability to make proprietary trades, or bets on their own behalf, and curbs their investments in private equity and hedge funds to 3 percent of Tier 1 capital. While proponents of the rule say it will help minimize risk-taking, executives at some of the banks say the rule is unnecessary. 
S&P said proprietary-trading restrictions could help make banks safer. 
“The implementation of the Volcker rule could have favorable implications for the credit profiles of some of the largest U.S. banks, such as reducing trading portfolio risk,” S&P said. “This risk mitigation could lessen revenue and earnings volatility, which we would view favorably.”

Representative Brad Miller: 'the right way to break up the big banks'

In a Bloomberg column, Representative Brad Miller argues that the right way to break up the big banks is to make each of its subsidiaries a stand alone entity with, among other items on the list, its own board of directors, assets and capital.

He asserts that this would help the market exert discipline on the big banks.

Unspoken, but underlying his argument, is the idea of bringing ultra transparency to each of the bank's subsidiaries.

The only way the market can know what the assets and liabilities of a subsidiary are is if the banks are required to disclose them.  Specifically, if the banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis for each of their subsidiaries their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As your humble blogger has said repeatedly, it is only when the market knows what the assets and liabilities of a subsidiary are that market participants become responsible for all gains and losses on their exposures to the banks and their subsidiaries.

Market participants become responsible because they have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner for making a fully informed investment decision.  As a result, under the principle of caveat emptor in the FDR Framework, market participants have an incentive to use this information to assess the risk of the banks and their subsidiaries.

Since the market participants are responsible for absorbing any losses, they have an incentive to adjust their exposure to reflect the risk of the banks and their subsidiaries and the market participant's ability to absorb any losses given the risk.

Regulators already have the power to cure many ills of too-big-to-fail banks....
Requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency is at the top of the list of unused power.
The nine biggest bank holding companies together have almost 20,000 subsidiaries. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) has 3,391 subsidiaries;Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) has 3,115; Morgan Stanley (MS) has 2,884; Bank of America Corp. has 2,019; and so forth. Each of the seven biggest bank holding companies has units in at least 40 countries. Goldman Sachs has 1,670 subsidiaries abroad. 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., with about 8,000 units, left them all in the shade. 
More subsidiaries are apparently not an indicator of better management.....
Regular readers know that there are two primary reasons for all these subsidiaries:  create opacity and arbitrage rules and regulations.
Bank holding companies create subsidiaries for tax or regulatory purposes, but rarely to limit liability, the usual reason for creating corporations. 
The liability of a corporation is limited to the assets of the corporation where the corporation meets certain legal requirements. .... The assets of the corporation must be kept separate, rather than commingled with those of others. The capital of the corporation must be reasonably adequate for its business. 
Most important, the corporation must present itself as a separate entity, so any business partners know its obligations will only be satisfied by that corporation’s assets.
In practice, bank holding companies’ subsidiaries do little of that. The holding companies operate as a single enterprise with consolidated management and a common pool of capital and liquidity. 
In short, each of the megabanks is just one big sloppy mess of an enterprise, with every subsidiary on the hook for the liability of the parent corporation and all of the siblings. The megabanks regard that as a virtue....
Imagine how much opacity it created that makes it impossible for regulators or market participants to figure out exactly how much risk the banks are taking.
That is a nightmare for bank supervision. 
A regulator has no realistic way to assess the risk posed in thousands of subsidiaries engaged in all manner of businesses with unlimited liquidity, and the experience of American International Group Inc. teaches that the liability of one relatively small subsidiary can matter.... 
It is for this reason that I have been recommending ultra transparency.

Market participants have the resources and capabilities to assess the risk hiding in each of these subsidiaries.

More importantly, because they are on the hook for any losses, market participants have an incentive to exert discipline on the banks to reduce their risk and the number of subsidiaries.
Market participants cannot realistically assess the assets and liabilities of a megabank any more than a regulator can.
Market participants cannot realistically assess the assets and liabilities of a megabank because of a lack of ultra transparency, not a lack of resources, expertise and incentive to do the job if they had the data.

Even though regulators have access to the necessary data, they fail to realistically assess the assets and liabilities of a megabank.  This is a reflection of regulatory capture as well as the structure of the regulators (need to speak with one voice even when there is dissenting opinion) and the monitoring of regulators by politicians.
They assume that megabanks are still too big to fail, so they will get paid one way or another. If market participants knew they could be paid only from the assets of the specific subsidiary with which they did business, they would consider that subsidiary’s assets and potential liabilities. 
The reason that market participants 'assume' they will get paid one way or another is because they are not provided with all the useful, relevant information they need in an appropriate, timely manner through ultra transparency so they can make a fully informed investment decision.
That diligence is part of “market discipline,” a drastic change from the unlimited liquidity for every line of business. Governor Tarullo really should consider requiring stand-alone subsidiaries under existing law, just in case Senator Brown’s and my bill hits a snag.
Governor Tarullo, Senator Brown and Representative Miller should focus on making sure the banks provide ultra transparency.

Monday, October 1, 2012

After a weekend to consider Wheatley's Libor recommendations, reviews point out harmful unintended consequences

After a weekend to consider Martin Wheatley's recommendations for fixing Libor, reviewers have concluded that not only will Libor not be fixed, but the result will be worse than where we currently are.

Regular readers are not surprised by this for the simple reason that the only way to fix Libor was to adopt your humble blogger's call for banks to provide ultra transparency.

It is only with banks disclosing on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that the interbank lending market unfreezes and remains unfrozen.

It is only with this level of disclosure that market participants can see all of each bank's actual trades.  With all of the trades visible, it is possible for the market participants to analyze those trades used to calculate Libor to see if there is manipulation.

A Bloomberg article discusses the negative unintended consequences from implementing Wheatley's recommendations for fixing Libor.

Borrowing costs for consumers and companies will rise as efforts to revive confidence in Libor increase the number of banks involved in setting the rates, which determine more than $300 trillion of securities. 
A higher number of lenders will include smaller, weaker institutions that pay more to borrow, according to James Edsberg at Gulland Padfield, a London-based financial services consultancy....
“If you expand the panel by including banks beyond the largest ones, you will boost borrowing costs,” said Edsberg..... 
As part of the revamp the FSA will encourage more banks to submit quotes and will have powers to force the unwilling to take part in the process, Wheatley said in his report. The banks that will make up the pool will be selected by the new administrator, said Chris Hamilton, a spokesman for the FSA, who declined to comment further.
With the ability to force banks to submit quotes, the new administrator has the ability to redefine what Libor is suppose to represent.  Is it the rate that 'largest' banks borrow at?  Is it the rate that the 'most creditworthy' banks borrow at?

Originally, Libor reflected the rate the largest banks could borrow at regardless of their credit rating.
Rising borrowing costs risk deepening Europe’s debt crisis, making it harder for countries in the grips of austerity to foster economic growth....
A definite unintended consequence.
The panel setting Euribor includes National Bank of Greece (TELL) SA in Athens, which is awaiting recapitalization, and Bank of Ireland Plc, that country’s biggest lender. There are also four Italian lenders, including Intesa Sanpaolo SpA (ISP) and UniCredit SpA (UCG), the two largest, and four Spanish banks including Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (BBVA) and Banco Santander SA (SAN), also the two biggest. 
The British Bankers Association panel for euro Libor includes Santander unit Abbey National Plc as the only lender connected to the peripheral countries. 
“On day one of the new rate being introduced it will jump higher if you increase the number of participating banks beyond the biggest ones that currently set it,” said Ian Gordon, a London-based analyst at Investec Plc. (INVP) “That obviously raises questions about the viability of the contracts that reference the old rate. It would seem to be a fundamental flaw in the new proposals.”...
Another unintended consequence.
“If you expand the panel to include a set of smaller banks, all else being equal that would tend to push up the average rate,” said Steve Hussey, a London-based financial- institutions analyst at AllianceBernstein Ltd., which oversees about $400 billion. “You could weight it by size or rating but that would be complex and may not be effective.”
As I previously pointed out, the Wheatley recommendations substitute complex rules and regulatory supervision for simple transparency.
Wheatley proposes allowing banks to wait three months before disclosing their Libor submissions, rather than publish them daily as at present. While immediate publication of individual submissions increases transparency, it makes manipulation easier because contributors are able to estimate the impact of the quote they put in.
Not if the banks are required to provide ultra transparency and disclose all their trades.  With this data, it is obvious who is submitting quotes that are not reflective of their borrowing experience.
Added to that, at times of stress, changes in submissions may be viewed as reflecting the contributor’s credit strength, offering an incentive to submit a lower rate than otherwise, according to the report. 
To rectify the “reduction in immediate transparency” the report recommends lenders publish a regular bulletin that includes trading volumes. 
“A three-month wait and then we find out that some of these institutions are more wobbly that we thought,” said James Ferguson, chief strategist at Westhouse Securities Ltd. in London. “That’s a horrible legacy for us to leave for the next crisis.”
Mr. Ferguson's observation summarizes why ultra transparency is needed to fix Libor and the Wheatley recommendations should be tossed in the recycle bin.

Tuesday, September 18, 2012

John Kay effectively calls for FDR Framework if you want reform

In his Financial Times column, John Kay concludes that a new, simpler approach to building a resilient financial system is needed and this approach must be based on the principle that the most effective bank supervisors are not financial regulators but rather other banks.

Regular readers know that this resilient financial system is what your humble blogger has been calling for the FDR Framework.

Regular readers also know that the only way to implement Professor Kay's principle is to require banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this information that each bank can independently assess the risk of every other bank and adjust their exposure to each of the other banks based on the risk of these banks.
the right long-term response is not to try to stop future bank failures, but to construct a global financial and economic system that is robust to individual bank failures....
We actually have this system in place if the financial regulators and policymakers do not interfere.

As the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane observed in his speech at the 2012 Jackson Hole Conference, over the last 50 years the financial regulators have interfered.  Specifically, bank regulators have replaced transparency and market discipline with complex regulations, opacity and ineffective supervision.
It has proved difficult to find executives and management systems able to control the risk exposures of large financial conglomerates: even the halo above Jamie Dimon looks tarnished. 
To believe that the control these managers failed to establish will be achieved by the supervisory efforts of junior officials in public agencies is a delusion.  
Even if regulators had the technical competence, they do not have the political backing. Hotlines from bank boardrooms to ministerial offices are answered as promptly as ever. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Professor Kay makes a very important point about why bank regulatory supervision is destined to be ineffective.
Public opinion excoriates regulators for their ineffectiveness as it nurtures exaggerated expectations of what future regulation might achieve.
Actually, it is the politicians and financial regulators that exaggerate expectations of what future regulation might achieve.

A classic example of this is the Dodd-Frank Act which doubles down on regulators and has as cheerleaders the politicians, the US Treasury Secretary and the financial regulators.
Establishing bodies with grand-sounding responsibilities for global financial stability represents only a tiny step towards these goals.
Regulation based on target capital ratios not only failed in the past, but will fail again in the future. Not because the fine print of the risk weighting is defective, but because any target will be gamed by those who observe its letter rather than its spirit.
Regulation based on target capital ratios also fails because it is written by the banks for the banks.  The whole idea behind the target capital ratios is to let banks increase and hide the amount of leverage and risk they have on their balance sheet.
The achievement of the regulatory reform agenda has been to ensure that when the next financial crisis occurs it will not take exactly the same form it did in 2007-8. 
The objective of preventing individual bank failures will largely be accomplished, but by socialising much of the downside risk in the financial system, rather than by addressing the underlying issues. 
The socialization of losses is the direct result of the choice by policymakers and financial regulators to interfere at the beginning of the financial crisis and protect bank book capital levels.

Without this interference, banks would absorb the losses they are designed to absorb and the real economy would be protected from the negative impact of these losses.
Effective reform should aim at structures, not at intensified supervision. 
Resilient systems are simple ones. 
The most effective supervisors of financial institutions are not bureaucrats but other financial institutions. 
These principles should be fundamental to a new approach and they have wide implications.
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Professor Kay is calling for the FDR Framework.

The FDR Framework is a resilient structure because it assigns achievable tasks.

Governments are responsible for ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  In the case of banks, this is the information disclosed through the requirement of ultra transparency.

Market participants, including other financial institutions, are responsible for all gains and losses on their exposures.  This gives market participants the incentive to use the disclosed information to independently assess the risk of each bank and to adjust their exposure to what they can afford to lose given the risk of each bank.

Please note, under the FDR Framework, governments are not suppose to provide investment advice.  This principle is currently being violated as banks are 'black boxes' and governments are providing investment advice by saying after stress tests that they are solvent.
Bad lending in the US mortgage market and the creation of debt instruments were only proximate causes of the 2007-8 crisis. The establishment of complex financial conglomerates, whose assets and liabilities were mainly the liabilities and assets of other financial conglomerates, created a structure in which minor disruptions were likely to have large and unpredictable consequences throughout the financial system. 
This issue cannot be addressed by establishing committees to watch it happen. To respond by public insurance of the structure is dangerous, not just because it imposes obligations on taxpayers but because it largely relieves private actors of the obligation to monitor their own counter-party risks. 
Alan Greenspan expressed puzzlement that shareholders and managers of banks had not controlled risk more effectively. But shareholders who provide less than 5 per cent of the capital of a business are not equity participants, but owners of a call option: in turn, corporate executives with bonuses and remuneration plans hold options on these options. 
How can we expect stability when volatility increases the value of the instruments owned by the people who make or influence all important decisions? 
The true equity participants in highly geared ventures are the owners of debt who are now reassured that the businesses in which they invest are “too big to fail”....
The only way that the owners of the debt can exert the restraint on risk that Professor Kay calls for is if they have ultra transparency and can independently assess the risk of each bank.  With ultra transparency comes market discipline.  Something that is currently missing from the banking industry.
Until politicians are prepared to face down Wall Street titans on that issue, regulatory reform will not be serious.

Sunday, September 16, 2012

Requirement for 'superman' as next Bank of England governor highlights even how even role of head of BoE too complex

As I read the advertisement for the next governor of the Bank of England, I couldn't help but think of how complexity doesn't just exist in the financial regulations written by the regulators, but also in the role for the appointed head of the Bank of England.

From the position description,
The Governor leads the Bank of England, and plays an important role in setting monetary and regulatory policy, chairing the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee and (from next year) the board of the Prudential Regulation Authority....
Please note the diverse skill sets the Governor will need.  Not only will they need to be a big picture thinker who is comfortable with abstract economic theories, but they will also need to be detail oriented. 

Big picture thinking is needed for monetary policy and a detail orientation is needed for bank regulation and supervision.

If the history of Federal Reserve chairmen shows anything, it shows that you can have a big picture thinker or a detailed oriented operator, but you cannot have both in the same individual.

Not only does the Governor need to be a big picture thinker who is detailed oriented, but the Governor also needs to be a good systemic risk manager.  The Governor has to be able to separate what is the source of risk to the financial system from what is a symptom of the risk.  

An example of this would be understanding that opacity is why structured finance securities brought down the financial system and not that the securities held high risk assets.
The Governor will work closely with the Chancellor of the Exchequer and H M Treasury, which is responsible for setting the framework under which the Bank operates. 
Yet another skill set the Governor will need is to be a politician. 
The new Governor will lead the Bank through major reforms to the regulatory system, including the transfer of new responsibilities that will see the Bank take the lead in safeguarding the stability of the UK financial system. 
Of course, the first decision the new Governor will have is how to shrink the Bank and their role to a size where they could hope to perform it successfully.

Your humble blogger would say this decision is easy if the new Governor uses the Bank's authority to require all banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this decision, the Governor has chosen to leverage off of rather than replace the financial markets.

With ultra transparency, markets will analyze each bank to assess its risk.  Using this assessment, market participants will exert discipline on each bank to restrain its risk taking.

With ultra transparency, the Bank can tap the analytical ability of the market for help in assessing each bank.

With ultra transparency, the Bank can tap the market's disciplinary mechanism to restrain risk taking.

With ultra transparency, the Bank can minimize the risk of contagion in the financial system as each market participant can adjust their exposure to each bank to reflect the risk of that bank.
The successful candidate must demonstrate that they can successfully lead, influence and manage the change in the Bank’s responsibilities, inspiring confidence and credibility both within the Bank and throughout financial markets.
And in the Governor's spare time, leap tall buildings in a single bound.
The successful candidate will have experience of working in, or with, a central bank or similar institution; or will have worked at the most senior level in a major bank or other financial institution. 
He or she will demonstrate strong leadership, management and policy skills; will have an advanced understanding of financial markets and good economic knowledge. 
He or she will be a strong communicator, have good interpersonal skills and will be a person of undisputed integrity and standing.
Please note that absent from the list was the ability to spot the current financial crisis before it occurred. This is the critical requirement if the next Governor of the Bank of England is to have any credibility on day 1 and not be seen as simply an appointment to protect the status quo.

If they couldn't spot the last crisis beforehand, why should anyone believe a) they know how to conduct policies that will get us out of the current crisis or b) they could ever spot the next crisis.

Before you assume that your humble blogger is running for Governor of the Bank of England, regular readers know that I do not have the political instincts or, because of a non-verbal learning disability, the interpersonal skills for the job.

This can be easily shown by the simple fact that I am the type of person who says that banks should be required to recognize all the losses currently hidden on and off their balance sheets today regardless of the short- and long-term damage this might do to banker cash bonuses.

Now is that anyway to get the financial markets to sing your praises?

Sunday, July 22, 2012

BarCap trader explains how Barclays used derivatives to take advantage of clients

The Sunday Telegraph ran a must read article on how Wall Street, Barclays in particular, used its informational advantage and expertise in derivatives to benefit at their clients' expense.
A former Barclays Capital trader, who asked to remain anonymous, speaks about his job and the relentless pressure to achieve higher margins....
The problem with BarCap was that we were making so much money on FX products [hedges] we were constantly looking for structures to fling to clients. We were looking for higher margins. That’s where swaps came in. 
In 2008, we see crude go up and up and up. The hedges that we created left companies hugely exposed. There was really no insurance or hedge in there at all. Crude was over $110 and these clients found they had zero protection. 
With the hedges we created, the sales guys were making much more money. The margins were incredible. You were making $50,000 as opposed to $5,000 on the same quarter barrel. 
In 2008 we got a big lecture about leaving money on the table. The noise from the higher-ups was that we needed to be doing more – much more. 
BarCap was the Wild Wild West – that’s what we called it, that’s how it was. That year especially. 
Commodities was the big thing to be in. Barclays was this old great institution, but it had turned into a bucket shop. We hired a bunch of quants [quantitative traders] to just dream up these products. Layers of complexity in each hedging product. Each layer created a new angle to take a turn.
Regular readers know that complexity creates opacity and opacity was the foundation of profitability on Wall Street.
Suddenly at BarCap we were handed all the corporate clients to sell to. We all talked about it like it was lambs to the slaughter.... 
That's because corporate clients perceived the bank to be looking out for their interests and not as an adversary.
Before that, we were trading with people like BHP who knew everything about the market, the prices and the basis on which we set our prices. They knew all the reference points better than we did.
Suddenly our clients are people who know nothing about the business, nothing about trading, nothing about the products they should or shouldn’t buy.... 
People like BHP had transparency into the market and therefore couldn't be fooled by Wall Street.  The profit to be made off of people like BHP was much less because they had access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.
The BarCap mantra was that if at all you had a competitive advantage you ran all the way with it.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes the culture on Wall Street.  Notice the emphasis on maximizing any competitive advantage and imagine the culture that surrounds this emphasis.

It is this type of culture that deliberately creates opaque products to take advantage of clients who see banks as business partners and not as counter-parties trying to maximize their profits at the client's expense.

It is this type of culture that deliberately creates opaque sub-prime mortgage backed securities to take advantage of investors who do not have access to current information and therefore don't know what they are buying.

It is this type of culture that sees the profitability in breaking the law to transfer cash for criminals and rogue states and doesn't think twice about do so.

It is this type of culture that manipulates Libor interest rates to take advantage of market participants on the other side of derivative contracts the bank has sold.

It is this type of culture that permeates all of the banks and is why each scandal is not the result of a few rogue traders, but is the personal responsibility of every employee of the banks.

Wednesday, June 13, 2012

Thomas Hoenig: Basel III "overly complex and opaque"

The newest members of the FDIC board question whether the Basel III capital requirements will be effective.

Regular readers know that Basel III will not end the current financial crisis, prevent a future financial crisis or provide market participants with any useful, relevant information on the risk being taken by the banks.

According to a Reuters' article,

The newest members of the U.S. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp raised concerns on Tuesday that forthcoming international bank capital standards, known as Basel III, might not be tough enough. 
At an FDIC meeting, board members Thomas Hoenig and Jeremiah Norton questioned the complexity of the new rules and whether the minimum requirements go far enough. 
"I remain concerned that as proposed, the minimum capital ratios will not significantly enhance financial stability," said Thomas Hoenig, who joined the FDIC board in April after retiring as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. 
"The rules continue to focus on risk-based capital ratios, which strike me as overly complex and opaque," Hoenig said.
By design, the rules are supposed to be overly complex and opaque.  
The Basel III capital agreement is the cornerstone of efforts by international regulators following the 2007-2009 financial crisis to make sure the global banking system is more resilient....
Given  that transparency is the cornerstone of resiliency and stability for the financial system, it is really an amazing comment that regulators are focused on overly complex and opaque capital requirements.
Norton said his worries included the robustness of proposed methods for determining the risk of an asset and, consequently, the corresponding capital requirement. 
"I remain concerned that the risk weightings for certain assets and exposures do not reflect sufficiently the inherent risk of default," he said. 
Particularly since the banks get to model the assets as part of determining how much capital to hold.

Needless to say, the whole discussion of Basel III is much ado about nothing as bank capital and capital ratios have been meaningless since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Friday, March 23, 2012

Head of derivative structuring: Structurers are like snakes

The Joris Luyendijk banking blog on the Guardian provides a monologue by a former head of derivative structuring.  The monologue touches on several of the issues discussed on this blog.

A rule of thumb in trading that I learnt very early on, says: there is a fool in every trade. You have to know who the fool is, because if you don't, then you are the fool. 
The financial markets are a shark tank, it's in the nature of the beast. Trading is a zero-sum game. Either you win, or you lose. There's no middle ground.... 
"Structuring is a bit like project management, in a way. You need to work out what it is that your client, often a corporation, wants, because they often come to you with rather vague ideas. 
Then you break it down into pieces and work your way down the list of what needs to be done. Figure out which financial instruments they need, work down the legal and tax aspects, and so on.... 
"All the Greek stuff that happened, where investment banks helped the Greek government move many of its debts off balance so their budget would look better – that was typically the job of structuring. 
Here is an example where structuring is not about laying off some type of financial risk, but rather helping the client to deceive other market participants.
"Lots of the derivative business is tax-driven. There is the so-called stamp duty tax of 0.5% on particular financial transactions. Banks and other members of the London Stock Exchange are exempt. You may structure a derivative for a client in such a way that technically it's the bank doing the transaction, saving you the stamp tax.... 
"Generally, I'd say that 80-90% of all derivatives are morally ambiguous, to say the least. It's mostly to do with accounting, legal or tax needs, with greed or fear or with gambling. .... 
"There is value in some of this. Derivatives can help you eliminate certain risks, for example price fluctuations. The textbook example is of farmers who could sell their harvest months in advance for an agreed-upon price with a future. 
"Great example. Except my own grandparents were farmers. They never used futures because they considered them too complicated.
However, interest rate swaps were not considered too complicated for RBS to sell to a 19 year-old.
"So why did I quit? It was like the story of Dr Faustus, where you sell your soul to the devil. I sold my soul for worldly riches. The price the devil demanded was my moral bankruptcy. 
"For a long time I was OK with that, until I wasn't. What triggered this change of heart? There was not one particular moment. You have to look yourself in the mirror every morning. I imagined a future son or daughter ask me, daddy what do you do for a living? What was I going to say? 'Well, sweetie, daddy rips clients off?' ...
"Obviously I read the Greg Smith resignation letter. He raises valid points, but I take issue with the idea that the toxic practices he describes are that different from what went on in the past. The main difference is that it's now much bigger, and even more complex.... 
"The advisory part of investment banking, mergers and acquisitions and corporate finance, are still more like the banking of old. There it's about nurturing relationships with clients over many years, very refined and working on trust. 
The trading floor is more like a poker table. People look at odds instead of trust. Put simply: the advisory part of investment banking is about clients who need money, the financial markets-part about clients who have money. That's the difference.
Investment bankers have clients, traders have counter-parties.
"These days I believe regulators need to become much, much firmer. I have been thinking about joining them, in fact. 
My sense is that regulators have good intentions, but the complexity of the industry makes it very difficult. And there's the lobbying. The Dodd-Frank act in the US is supposed to prevent another Lehman Brothers-type crash. It is over 2,000 pages long by now. 
"This financial crisis has crippled the western world, and the consequences will be with us for another ten years, at least. It is really big, and something like that can happen again. I'm sure that in four or five years, some smart structurer will find a clever way to get around this regulation, and God knows what will happen then. 
"There are always unintended consequences of any new regulation. Do we need all this complexity? I kind of agree with the joke making the rounds among bankers that the last useful financial innovation was the ATM machine – and that was 40 years ago....
Requiring ultra transparency is the simplest regulation that there is.  It is easy for banks to provide on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
"I am still pro-free market, no mistake about that. Companies need to raise money to invest, innovate, expand. Ordinary people need returns on their savings so at some point they can retire. This should be the raison d'etre for the financial sector. 
But by now the sector has grown so much in size and complexity ... And as a result the opportunities to abuse the system have multiplied by many times. Many times.
Complexity that is not needed to support either companies or ordinary people.

Complexity that is only there so that the banks can make more money and hide how much they are making.
"A term like 'derivatives' puts people off but it's not terribly complicated, once you get beyond the lingo. Equity is roughly the same as shares. Equity derivatives are products that derive their value from them. 
"There are options, when you can buy or sell shares for a particular price at a particular moment. There are futures, when you oblige yourself to buy or sell something for a particular price at a particular moment. My favourite example: When I order pizza delivery, I agree to buy a product for a particular price at a particular time. That's how a future works. There are swaps when you agree to exchange something at some point in the future. 
"A big thing in derivatives is figuring out the value of these contracts. You don't know what the price is going to be of a certain share in three months time. So what is the contract worth that allows or obliges you to buy that share in three months time? There are complicated simulations for determining the value. 
The problem lies with the assumptions underlying those simulations. For instance the assumption there will always be buyers and sellers. In times of crises, that is not the case. 
"Everything we built was bespoke, specifically designed for the client. Now, the trouble was that such a bespoke product would be sold on, and then it would be sitting somewhere in the financial system. But where? 
"This doesn't really matter, until you have a major event like the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and suddenly everybody worries about so-called counterparty risk. Who is holding what financial obligations to whom?... 
Hence the reason that ultra transparency needs to be required on a global basis.
In equity derivatives there are different categories of clients. 
You have got retail customers, ordinary people if you will, who are pretty well protected. 
There is also the class of professional investors or market counterparties and with them it's anything goes, really. The assumption is that professional counterparties should know what they are doing, caveat emptor and all that. 
"Now there are very sophisticated parties out there. But there are also smaller players who basically have no idea what they're doing. Some small Spanish savings bank perhaps or some municipality in Sweden. What got to me after a while is how I'd be lying in the faces of these less sophisticated parties. And I'd be thinking, wow, this is my parents' pension money down the drain.... 
Worth re-reading as lying to less sophisticated parties was okay because these parties had to protect themselves under caveat emptor.
"Structuring people would be like snakes.