Showing posts with label Covered Bonds. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Covered Bonds. Show all posts

Thursday, May 10, 2012

As Spain demonstrates, covered bonds are not a panacea

Bloomberg ran an interesting article discussing how the collapse in Spanish real estate prices is undermining Spain's banks that relied on covered bonds to secure funding from the ECB.

Covered bonds are perhaps the oldest form of structured finance security.  They have a reputation for safety of principal as the bonds are backed first by a pool of mortgages on the bank's balance sheet and second by the bank itself.

However, this reputation for principal safety comes at a cost to the issuing bank.  Specifically, the bank must have mortgages that meet the requirements for inclusion in the mortgage pool or it must set aside a higher quality asset, say cash, for the benefit of the covered bond holders.

This requirement to post qualifying collateral for the covered bond sets up the risk of a funding death-spiral.

The trigger for this death spiral would be the contraction in the value of the mortgages that qualify for inclusion in the mortgage pool.  As a result, the bank must post other high quality assets.  Assets that could otherwise be used as collateral to attract low cost funding from sources like the ECB.

So exactly when a bank needs earnings to support the losses on their assets (there is a reason the mortgages no longer qualify for the covered bond pool), its ability to access low cost funds and the related earnings is restricted.

Protections are also being eroded for investors in 367.6 billion euros of Spanish mortgage covered bonds even as they’re in a better position to recover from potential losses than unsecured creditors.

Asking prices for homes in Spain have dropped about 30 percent since the first quarter of 2008, according to a survey by real-estate website Fotocasa.es and IESE Business School. 
New mortgages awarded are at the lowest level since at least 2004, after total capital lent for all type of mortgages fell almost 50 percent from a year earlier, the government said April 24. 
Under Spanish law, lenders can only issue covered bonds against home loans with loan-to-value ratios of 80 percent or less, or 60 percent if the loans are secured by other types of properties. Outstanding covered bonds shouldn’t surpass 80 percent of banks’ eligible mortgages, and a lenders whole book of mortgages can be called to repay the debt ahead of the rest of the creditors. 
“The decline of house prices plus the negative net production of mortgages mean that if banks are updating their loan-to-value ratios they face shortages of eligible collateral,” said Alexander Batchvarov, the London-based head of structured finance research at Bank of America Merrill Lynch. “We think the asset encumbrance could be a serious issue in Spain.” 
Santander and BBVA, the country’s two largest banks, have increased issuance of covered bonds to 80 percent of their eligible mortgages, the maximum allowed under the Spanish law. 
Banco Santander has 27.81 billion euros of outstanding Spanish covered bonds, according to the prospectus of its 2 billion euros of 3.25 percent 2015 bonds due sold in February. That’s up from 23.5 billion euros of the outstanding debt at the end of 2010, according to an Oct. 18 prospectus filed with the Spanish market regulator. 
BBVA had 44.7 billion euros of covered bonds at the end of the year, according to the company’s website. They account for 49 percent of the total 85 billion euros of the lender’s wholesale funding, more than other type of debt, according to a company presentation.

Bankia Group’s ability to increase mortgage covered bond issuance declined almost 40 percent to 6.5 billion euros at the end of 2011 down from 10.6 billion euros, a year earlier, according to a May 4 report from the company. That compares with 20.3 billion euros of maturing debt this year, including 9 billion euros of bonds that have the backing of the Spanish government. 
The ECB applies a discount on top of the market valuation of as low as one percentage point on a covered bond, compared with at least 6.5 percentage points for an unsecured bank bond, or 16 percent for asset-backed securities, according to the central bank. The so-called haircut can be increased when banks pledge their own bonds. 
“Banks in the euro region have the incentive to pledge covered bonds more than any other type of bank debt due to the lower haircuts the ECB applies to those instruments,” Jose De Leon, a Madrid-based analyst at Moody’s Investors Service said in a telephone interview. 
“That is prompting Spanish banks to issue, in some cases, close to the legal limits, which in practical terms means the erosion of protection for the covered bond investors, and for the rest of creditors including depositors and unsecured bondholders.”

Banks are also using their holdings of mortgage-backed securities for central bank loans after investor demand for debt pooling Spanish assets disappeared in 2007 following the collapse of the U.S. subprime-mortgage market that froze credit markets globally. 
The Bank of Spain values senior bonds backed by residential mortgages issued by Madrid RMBS IV, created in 2007 by Caja Madrid, the largest lender integrated into Bankia, at 59.7 cents on the euro. That means the securities would yield 11.9 percentage points more than the euro interbank offered rate, according to data compiled by Bloomberg based on the repayment rate of the underlying mortgages in the last three months. 
That compares with 90.9 cents net on the euro that the Bank of Spain is willing to provide against Bankia’s 1.6 billion euros of mortgage covered bonds due 2019. The central bank valuation implies a spread of about 453 basis points more than the asset swaps rate, according to Bloomberg data.

Spanish banks have 167.5 billion euros of outstanding mortgage-backed securities, according to Spanish Mortgage Association data at the end of the year. Lenders in the country, which stopped selling the debt in 2007, had retained about 145 billion euros of the debt, which mostly are being used to build their reserves of assets potentially accepted by ECB as collateral to raise loans, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co (JPM) data. 
Investors demand 565 basis points above the euro interbank offered rate, or euribor, to buy a senior bond backed by Spanish home loans compared with 25 basis points in July 2007, according JPMorgan Chase & Co. data. That’s four times the spread for comparable debt backed by British home loans. 
Mortgages are considered better collateral than other types of loans as arrears typically are lower than the average, and recovery levels in a default are higher than for consumer loans. 
Spanish banks’ non-performing loans as a proportion of total lending increased ten-fold since June 2007 to 7.8 percent at the end of last year, according to data compiled by the Spanish Mortgage Association. That compares with a six-fold increase to 2.7 percent for home loans, which account for 60 percent of collateral backing Spanish mortgage covered bond programs, according to Moody’s data.

Tuesday, December 20, 2011

Europe wishes now more than ever that it could restart structured finance

Europe wishes now more than ever that it could restart structured finance.  Unfortunately, that is not going to happen until structured finance securities provide on-going disclosure of the current performance of the underlying assets.  So long as this disclosure is not available, there will be a buyers' strike.

Since the beginning of the solvency crisis on August 9, 2007 when BNP Paribas said it could not value sub-prime mortgage backed securities, the City and its lobbyists have run circles around the financial regulators on everything related to structured finance.

For example, the European Parliament adopted Article 122a of the Capital Requirements Directive, otherwise known as the 'know what you own' requirement.  The Committee of European Bank Supervisors, now called the European Banking Authority, was given responsibility for translating this requirement into a regulation.

By the time the City and its lobbyists were done with the individuals at CEBS who were writing this regulation, these individuals had agreed that the disclosure provided by sub-prime mortgage backed securities was adequate to know what you own.

What is adequate for regulators to know what they own is not adequate for private investors to be able to value the securities.

Naturally, having been burned by the securities they bought prior to the start of the solvency crisis, the private investors are staying on strike.

Replacing the private investors are the European Central Bank and the Bank of England.  Both of these central banks allow structured finance securities to be pledged as collateral.  Collateral that apparently violates Bagehot's rule that central banks should only lend against good collateral.

Since the start of the crisis, your humble blogger has been offerring to help ECB, BoE and other European policymakers get the structured finance market restarted with on-going disclosure of the current performance of the underlying assets.

A Reuter's article provides more on the European actions to restart structured finance.

After nearly four years in the doghouse, regulatory bias against securitisation could finally be easing, if recent progress in market-led initiatives and policy statements continues. 
The ECB has relaxed ABS repo rules, progress is being made with the Prime Collateralised Securities (PCS) initiative and in the UK the FSA has more closely aligned covered bond reporting and disclosure rules with RMBS. 
By lowering the requirement on the second-best rating to Single A from Triple A, the ECB is making it easier for Portuguese banks to repo bonds, confirms Italian issuers' eligibility (a downgrade to A minus of the sovereign, for instance, will cost all Italian ABS their Triple A rating due to the rating caps) and also assist Irish originators. 
Nevertheless, the ECB's shift is unlikely to stimulate public market activity, because the countries that stand to gain the most (the peripherals) are the least likely to be able to bring publicly-marketed deals. 
But the decision should help ease the stress on liquidity-starved banks - many of which have faced progressively higher haircuts on ABS repo and more stringent rating rules. Furthermore, banks can now also pledge raw mortgage or SME loan portfolios. 
And the UK's FSA has introduced new rules that will equalize the pressures on covered bonds and RMBS, such as through loan-level requirements. 
JP Morgan analysts said the changes are "in line with those already adopted by the BoE relating to ABS, and leverage the work of the ECB ABS loan level data technical working groups." 
They hope that these initiatives are indeed "the start of the process of leveling the regulatory playing field for Europe's secured debt market."

The Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) and the European Financial Services Roundtable (EFR) have been pushing the PCS. This market-led initiative aims to produce a high quality label for European securitisation, with the hope that regulators will agree, and ease what ABS practitioners view as unfavourable treatment of the product. 
Covered bonds, for instance, are eligible for liquidity buffers under the Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) but securitisation is not. This dissuades some investors from buying the assets, while Solvency II rules also make it expensive for insurance companies to buy ABS because of the capital they have to hold against it....
But there are doubters. At Global ABS conference in June various market contacts questioned whether this project could succeed due to variations in underlying markets across Europe, for example between high LTVs. But AFME and EFR are confident PCS will work. 
"One thing unique about Europe is that assets are different across countries, but we still feel that a consistent labelling process is do-able. Investors who have invested in this product in the past do understand that even though the underlying products are different the securities that come out the other end have a lot of similarities to them," said Watson. 
To do this, it has to be tagged clearly. The pool will be verified by the PCS Secretariat, which checks for basic agreed eligibility criteria. 
"Those would be consistent across European countries, for example certain types of underwriting criteria and documentation requirements. They wouldn't have to be the same, we're not saying the underwriting is exactly the same across different countries, but there would be agreed underwriting criteria which are achievable," explained Watson. 
But simply giving deals a new moniker will not solve all problems. 
"Generally investors as well as issuers concluded that a label by itself doesn't achieve all that much because the investors can always create their own internal labels if they want to, however they do recognise that if the label is combined with some type of regulatory changes over time, it could be a potentially significant benefit to the entire market," said Watson...
Pricing differentiation is one side-effect of PCS/non-PCS structures that could be felt sooner than regulatory changes with "high quality" eligible deals printing tighter than non-qualifying issues. And market players do appear to be willing to take the risk. 
"The decision to do something with the label does involve a risk that it does split into a PCS and non-PCS market but investors do recognise there will non-label deals that are also still good securitisations but may not have the label for various reasons," added Watson. 
The PCS strategy is also an attempt to focus the minds of policy-makers, as well as boards of investors who have not seen the same level of support for securitisation as other assets. 
If ratified by the regulators, the PCS' allure could spread beyond typical investor types such as banks and funds, with Bank of America Merrill Lynch analysts suggesting in their 2012 outlook that retail clients could also feature. 
"The aim is to create a pan-European market. It will help investors in the future to make decisions, to look at investor reporting and documentation in a more consistent way - that is one of the potential benefits of PCS," summarised Sebastian Fairhurst, secretary general of the EFR.

Thursday, December 1, 2011

Shortage of collateral in Europe

One way to solve the shortage of collateral in Europe is by requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.

By disclosing on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposures, banks allow market participants to price their loans and investments.

Central banks can then lend against the bank's whole loan portfolio since the central bank can now look to an independent market value for the portfolio.

This frees the banks up to lend other assets into the repurchase funding markets.

Monday, October 10, 2011

As Dexia shows, without disclosure, bank bond investors will always be protected like depositors

A Richard Barley Heard on the Street column in the Wall Street Journal observed that Dexia's bond investors are being protected from losses.

Regular readers know that without disclosure of each bank's current asset and liability-level data, bank bondholders will be protected just like depositors.

Without this level of disclosure, bank bondholders and other creditors do not have the data they need to assess the risk of the bank.  Therefore, if policymakers and financial regulators want the banks to have access to the capital markets, they have to protect the debt.

The question is how to transition from where we are today (only the financial regulators have access to this data and bondholders are protected from losses) to a point in time in the future (when all market participants will have access to this data and bondholders can incur losses).

The transition requires two activities:

  • banks must be required to disclose all of their current asset and liability-level data through a data warehouse with 5 years.  This information will be provided for free to market participants;
  • governments will guarantee all debt issued prior to the availability of a bank's current asset and liability-level data in the data warehouse.  Banks have an incentive to disclose their data as quickly as possible because the market will assume a delay in disclosure reflects the fact that a bank has something to hide and will reduce its access to and drive up its cost of funds regardless of any government guarantee.
Removing the implied guarantee from bank bondholders is another reason that European policymakers need to require current asset and liability-level disclosure in their "solution" to recapitalizing the Eurozone banks.
So much for bail-in. Financial policy makers have spent the last three years discussing the need to ensure that bank bondholders bear losses in future bailouts. Yet Dexia has just been rescued for a second time in a deal that will include a €90 billion ($120.4 billion) funding guarantee over 10 years from the governments of France, Belgium and Luxembourg—effectively allowing bondholders once again to walk away. 
True, Dexia has some specific features that could make greater burden-sharing risky. For a start, there is a limited amount of debt available: Of its €186 billion of long-term capital-markets funding, €99 billion is in covered bonds, Fitch notes. These rank as senior secured debt, backed by pools of assets as well as the bank....
This need to bailout Dexia's covered bond holders confirms the FDIC's worse fears about covered bonds and highlights the potential for abuses of these securities.

Think what would have happened if all of Countrywide's subprime mortgage backed securities had instead been issued as covered bonds.  The short term profits would have gone to management and the shareholders.  The long term cost of all these underperforming assets would have been picked up by the US taxpayers - as oppose to investors in structured finance securities.

By bailing out the covered bond holders, France and Belgium are taking on the risk of the performance of the underlying collateral.
The European Commission may yet require some burden-sharing from subordinated bondholders. But that may only go as far as deferred coupon payments, an outcome already priced in. 
But there are good reasons why policy makers wouldn't want to inflict losses on senior unsecured bondholders .... policy makers will have been conscious of the significant contagion risks at a time when the European bank-funding market is frozen and the sector faces €1.7 trillion of refinancing over the next three years. 
Denmark, the only European state to force losses on unsecured creditors in bank restructuring, has had to back down after the country's banks found themselves shut out of funding markets: This weekend's rescue of Max Bank treated unsecured bondholders equally with depositors.

Wednesday, September 14, 2011

S&P discovers that collateral backing covered bonds is important

Tracy Alloway at the Financial Times wrote an article on S&P cautioning investors to distinguish between covered bonds based on the loans supporting them.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger introduced this idea several months ago while discussing the problems with covered bonds.  The solution is to provide market participants with current loan-level performance data so they have the ability to analyze the supporting loans.
Covered bonds are not the universally safe assets that some investors think they are, rating agency Standard & Poor’s has warned in a new report. 
“There remains a tendency for investors to treat all covered bonds as alike in credit terms, which we believe is not the case,” S&P’s Karen Naylor said. The report, called ‘Never underestimate credit risk in mortgage bonds’, argues that the riskiness of the loans underlying the bonds can vary significantly from deal to deal. 
Sales of covered bonds have boomed in recent months, with about €1,000bn of the debt now outstanding in Europe alone. The bonds are gaining in importance since, for many European banks, they remain the only source of funding amid eurozone turmoil. Unsecured debt issuance, traditionally the biggest funding tool for Europe’s banks, has dried up since July, leaving covered bonds to plug some of the gap... 
Many investors consider the bonds “super-safe” because, if the underlying assets sour, they also have a claim on the issuing bank. However, in the report, S&P warns that “the common perception of mortgage covered bonds as a homogeneous and universally low-risk product is misleading. In fact, the characteristics of individual mortgage covered bonds are not only diverse, but can change over time.” 
Covered bonds are typically backed by either mortgages or government-related loans, the analysts explained. The bonds remain on issuing banks’ balance sheets, unlike other forms of structured finance such as mortgage-backed securities. Moreover, the issuer must “top up” the bonds if underlying loans go bad, meaning the assets backing the debt can vary, within certain legal boundaries. 
In covered bonds comprised only of mortgages, for instance, there may be a mix of residential and commercial loans. In covered bonds backed by public sector debt, there may be a mix of exposure to different governments, S&P said. 
Investors in what appears to be staid public sector Pfandbriefs, as German covered bonds are known, may be surprised, for example, to find the bond also contains loans to civil servants in Greece. Barclays Capital estimated last year that 10 per cent of the assets in public sector Pfandbriefs are exposed to European peripherals, though that figure is likely to have altered significantly since then. 
The report comes just as the covered bond industry grapples with record issuance and a wider international roll-out. The Association of German Pfandbrief Banks, for instance, has warned that new proposals for covered bonds in the US, which may use student or car loans as collateral, will damage the debt’s reputation.