Showing posts with label Fed Policy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fed Policy. Show all posts

Thursday, September 19, 2013

Roger Lowenstein: Obama should name banker, not economist, to Fed

In a Bloomberg column that sent fear through macro economists everywhere, Roger Lowenstein laid out the case for why Obama should appoint someone other than a macro economist as the next chairman of the Fed.

Mr. Lowenstein looked at the task at hand and identified what he felt were the credentials the next Fed chairman should have.

Rather remarkably, your humble blogger possesses these credentials.

Mr. Lowenstein left out the two most important credentials for the next Fed chairman.

First, did they predict the financial crisis.  This is important because it strongly suggests that they had an insight into why the crisis occurred.

Second, do they have a plan for ending the financial crisis and restoring the economy and financial markets to normal functioning based on this insight.

I have written extensively on this blog about how I would end our bank solvency led financial crisis.  Virtually every aspect of my plan can be implemented by the Fed chairman.

As the head of bank regulation, the chairman has the power to bring transparency to the banking system and require banks to disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As the head of monetary policy, the chairman has the ability to raise short-term interest rates above 2% and eliminate the economic headwinds caused by ultra-low rate monetary policy.

Mr. Lowenstein observed:

But the next chairman will have to decide when to trim the Fed’s portfolio, swollen with its extraordinary program of bond purchases. And it will have to raise short-term interest rates, which are currently near zero. It may be sooner, it may be later -- the moment will come. 
Money cannot be free forever. 
To make this decision, the Fed should be led by a fresh pair of eyes -- one not compromised by its current policies....
And what will these fresh pair of eyes see?
ultra-low interest rates are punishing savers and discouraging thrift, not a healthy condition. 
Investors are responding to razor-thin yields by “looking for yield” in suspect places. (Rwanda offered $400 million of debt this year, and the issue was wildly oversubscribed.) 
As we’ll recall from the mortgage crisis, chasing yield can lead to big trouble....
If ultra-low interest rates worked as a monetary policy for ending a bank solvency led financial crisis, then Japan's crisis should have been over years ago.  Instead, Japan has had ultra-low interest rates for 2+ decades.

In addition, there was no reason to believe ultra-low interest rates would work as Walter Bagehot, the founder of modern central banks, set the minimum interest rate at 2%.  He observed that there are changes in economic behavior that occur below 2%.
History suggests that moving away from zero rates will be unpopular and difficult -- especially for a Fed on cozy terms with the White House....
Actually, moving away from zero rates would be incredibly popular with individuals who save and invest.

Moving away from zero rates would be unpopular with the banks.

For those of us who are concerned with fixing the financial system and restarting the economy, winning popularity contests is not a consideration.
If the next chairman isn’t a Washington hand, who should it be? 
It is too soon after 2008 to tap an executive from Wall Street, which bundled the toxic mortgages at the heart of the crisis. That rules out William Dudley, president of the New York Fed and a former Goldman Sachs Group Inc. economist. 
There is no head-hunting recipe for a Fed chairman, but knowing a little institutional background helps....
I got this credential covered.
In recent times, the Fed has been dominated by policy makers. Bernanke was an academic and then a government official (Yellen has a similar background, though she also ran the San Francisco Fed). Greenspan was a consultant and adviser to President Gerald Ford. Geithner was a Treasury official before taking over the New York Fed. 
But Paul Volcker, the most independent Fed chairman in history, was a banker -- president of the New York Fed and an economist at Chase Manhattan Bank when Chase was a lender to corporations....
I got the banking credential covered.
Rather than look for a consultant, an academic or a regulator, Obama should nominate a chairman with an institutional grasp of the banking system.
I have the required institutional grasp of the banking system.

Regular readers have read literally hundreds of posts that I have written on how a modern banking system is designed and how it can be used to end our financial crisis.

Monday, September 16, 2013

Anne Pettifor: This is not the road to recovery, but to Wongaland

In her Guardian column, Anne Pettifor questions whether a UK economic recovery based on low interest rates and housing speculation is really the cure for an economy suffering from excess debt from a prior housing bubble.

Much of her argument applies equally well to the US.

The question posed is this: is the direction of the supposed recovery a sound one? Is it based on solid foundations? The reason I doubt that is ...
Before becoming chancellor, George Osborne provided a sound analysis of the British economy. In his Mais Lecture of February 2010, he said: "The overhang of private debt in our banking system and our households weighs heavy on future prosperity." A new model, he announced, rooted in more investment, more savings and higher exports, would require "new policies and new institutions". 
Then, as chancellor, he changed direction. He ignored the vast burden of private debt, which has not been deleveraged. ... 
For three years the government has revived and propped up a very old, Victorian model of the economy. 
Just as in the 19th century, bankers or creditors dominate policymaking, ensuring that the value of their assets (mainly debt) is not just stable but rises relative to profits, wages and incomes. Above all, as in pre-Keynesian times, creditors lobby to ensure limited public oversight or regulatory control over their huge power to determine the rate of interest on the full spectrum of lending.
So the nationalised Bank of England is stealthily recapitalising the private banking sector with low rates of interest while turning a blind eye to the much higher rates charged to productive economic actors. 
All the time, the illusion that the Bank's base rate is dominant, and that overall rates are very low, is maintained, encouraging consumers and homebuyers to go shopping – and the poor to turn to payday lenders for "help". 
But that illusion has already been shattered by the bond markets. Yields on government bonds – which will ultimately influence mortgages – have been rising, and the chancellor, governor Mark Carney and his colleagues at the Bank are determined to leave control over these rates to the money-lenders. 
As retail sales increase, a new threat looms: rising imports that satisfy consumer demand but worsen the trade deficit. ...
At this point, the next election began to loom on the political horizon. 
The government decided to deploy taxpayer resources into stimulating economic recovery. But the resources are aimed not at increasing investment in productive activity, but rather at subsidising, for instance, buy-to-let investors speculating on future house-price inflation. 
So, far from pursuing a "new economic model" based on investment, savings and exports, it's back to the old inflate-the-housing-market-and-boost-consumption meme – but this time with a high-debt, low-wage economy. That is the road to Wongaland.

Wednesday, August 7, 2013

It is time to think the unthinkable and raise interest rates

Allister Heath triggered an epic twitter debate when he called for the Bank of England to do the unthinkable and raise interest rates.

On the one side, represented by former Monetary Policy Committee member Danny Blanchflower, were those who argued that we continue to need near zero interest rates until such time as the economy recovers and unemployment drops close to pre-financial crisis levels.

On the other side, represented by Ros Altmann, an economist who focuses on retirement issues, were those who argued that zero interest rate policies hurt the real economy by stifling demand.

Regular readers won't be surprised that your humble blogger (tweeting @tyillc) joined in the debate.

Before going further, let me remind readers that unlike Ms. Altmann and Mr. Blanchflower, I do not have a PhD in Economics.  As a result, like Walter Bagehot, the Economist Magazine editor who invented the modern central bank, I focus on what is actually happening and providing a framework for understanding what it will take to end our current financial crisis and prevent future financial crises.

To his credit, Mr. Blanchflower presents an energetic defense of the indefensible.  He argues that given the current level of unemployment there is no empirical support in a peer reviewed economic article that supports the notion that interest rates should be raised.  The economic literature calls for aggressive monetary stimulus.

Hmmm...is this the same peer group of economists that failed to predict the financial crisis?

Hmmm...is this the same peer group that is making economic forecasts at both the Bank of England and Fed and since the beginning of the financial crisis has routinely predicted better economic performance than has occurred?

I called Mr. Blanchflower's position indefensible because the peer reviewed economic literature never considers that there might be an inflection point where the strong relationship between lower interest rates and lower unemployment no longer holds.

Regular readers know exactly where this inflection point is:  it is Walter Bagehot's 2% lower bound.  He observed in the 1870s that economic behavior changes when interest rates drop below 2% and as a result said interest rates must be kept above this level.

Once one realizes there is an inflection point, it is easy to explain why the Bank of England and the Fed are predicting better economic performance than has occurred.  Below the inflection point, economic behavior changed and this change in behavior is not incorporated into the models used by the Bank of England and the Fed.

On the other side of the debate, Ms. Altmann supported Mr. Heath's observation on the impact of the zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.
Keeping rates artificially low for extended periods of time inevitably distorts economies and misallocates resources. 
It allows unsustainable projects to survive, pushes bond, equity and property prices too high, depresses the value of sterling without, in a modern economy, boosting exports, messes up the pensions market, and incentivises consumption over saving – and all of that even before inflation begins to rear its ugly head.
Ms. Altmann puts forth the arguments the regular readers are familiar with under the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.  Current consumption is reduced as savers, both individuals and corporations, offset the loss of earnings on their retirement plans by saving more money.

As you can imagine, the debate became show me the empirical proof versus here is the anecdotal evidence.

To see if Mr. Blanchflower might acknowledge that maybe zero interest rates and quantitative easing are not the appropriate policy response to a bank solvency led financial crisis, I introduced the WSJ interview of Anna Schwartz.

Ms. Schwartz observed that these policies were wrong, wrong, wrong.

Mr. Blanchflower asked if this was the best I could do.

Naturally, I responded with a yes.  After all, Ms. Schwartz was an expert on the Great Depression and co-authored THE book on monetary policy.

To see if there were a position of compromise, I introduced the simple fact that back when I was working at the Fed and the Fed was taming inflation the economy was not particularly sensitive to changes in interest rates of less than 1%.

Despite Alan Greenspan cutting rates by a quarter of 1% at a time, there is no reason to believe the real economy has gotten to be more responsive to changes in interest rates.  Does anyone really think a company doesn't move ahead with a project because the cost of debt goes up by 0.25%?  Does anyone really think people don't buy a house because the cost of debt goes up by 0.25% (hint: they buy a smaller house)?

Faced with this fact, Mr. Blanchflower offered the real reason that central bankers will never be able to allow interest rates to increase.
tyillc because mortgage holders have had falling real wages compensated for by low mtg payments so if rise disaster
Translation: central bank policy is held hostage by excess public and private debt in the financial system and the need to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses.

I would like to thank Mr. Blanchflower for a) his willingness to engage in the discussion and b) his insights.

I would be remiss to not share one other insight.  As Mr. Blanchflower observed, he and I can debate what the policy should be, but the policymakers need to get it right.

In two days, it will be six years since the beginning of the financial crisis and the policymakers have not gotten right.  As documented by the Dallas Fed, the cost of the financial crisis has now grown to well in excess of $12 trillion with no end in sight.

Thursday, July 18, 2013

Bernanke's epitaph: "We had to do something"

In his testimony before the US House of Representatives, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke provided his own epitaph when he observe "we had to do something" in response to the financial crisis.

Remarkably, since the moment he appeared in panic before Congress to testify on the need for TARP, the self-described Great Depression expert hasn't been unable to come up with a better thought through strategy for ending the financial crisis than "we had to do something".

Actually, as Mark Twain would say, you only have to pay taxes and die.  Everything else you do is optional.

Mr. Bernanke's testimony confirmed that either he a) didn't understand that he was dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis and the solution is adoption of the Swedish Model or b) he understood that pursuing the Japanese Model would not work and he is trying to defend his legacy.

Bernanke's defensiveness can probably be chalked up to the one thing he could plausibly be afraid of: watching his legacy go the same way as that of former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, who left while excoriated for his seeming friendliness toward big banks.
The Geithner Doctrine doesn't "seem" friendly to big banks.  It is designed to be friendly to big banks.

The Geithner Doctrine is don't do anything that will harm the profitability or reputation of big and/or politically connected banks (hat tip Yves Smith).
Bernanke has done more than Geithner did, and took on the economic job left undone by a dysfunctional Congress and a distracted president as well. He became a one-man economic Mr Fix-it, not by choice but by necessity.
Mr. Bernanke told everyone who would listen that he is an expert on the Great Depression.  Hence, he was a logical person to lead the response to our current financial crisis.

The one problem as pointed out by Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author and a noted expert on the Great Depression too, is that Mr. Bernanke learned the wrong lessons (see here and here) about the Great Depression.

When faced with a bank solvency led financial crisis, ending the crisis requires having the banks recognize upfront their losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.

Until banks recognize the losses, monetary policy is not going to end the crisis.

A fact that should be apparent to all as we approach the six year mark on August 9, 2013 of the beginning of the financial crisis.
Now, facing the end of his term, he is fighting an uphill battle to get the credit for the work laid at his door. 
He wasn't often right – in fact, in forecasting, often wrong – but his Fed did more than any other government or private entity to tackle the country's economic problems. 
That's something.
Your humble blogger would give Mr. Bernanke a significant amount of credit for trying and doing something were it not for one small fact: he didn't use all the tools at the Fed's disposal from the beginning of the financial crisis.

As he testified before Congress, he talked about not being successful at ending the crisis and the need for the Fed to have additional tools if it were to successfully end the crisis.  However, he completely ignores the fact that the Fed has an entire toolkit from its role as lender of last resort and responsibility for bank supervision that he chose not to use.

The Fed could have used both of these tools to end the financial crisis by requiring the banks to recognize their losses upfront on the excess public and private debt in the financial system and protect the real economy and the social contract.

Mr. Bernanke elected not to do so.

He chose to pursue zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies that Walter Bagehot, who invented the modern central bank in the 1870s, said would create economic headwinds that render these policies ineffective.  Turns out Bagehot was right. The economic headwinds existed in the form of the Retirement Plan Death Spiral as both individuals and companies cut back current consumption to fund the shortfall in earnings on retirement assets.

He chose to allow bankers to continue to pay themselves large cash bonuses at the same time the Fed engaged in regulatory forbearance and let the banks transform their non-performing loans through 'extend and pretend' into 'zombie' loans.

He chose to put the real economy into a downward spiral by placing the burden of the excess debt on the real economy where it diverted capital needed for reinvestment, growth and supporting the social contract to debt service.

Update:
In his testimony, Bernanke also observed that
Fed didn't have a way to oversee the shadow banking system.
As regular readers know, the inability to see what is going on in shadow banking should have been a less than subtle hint that there was a need for transparency.

Sunday, July 7, 2013

Bundesbank chief: ECB cannot solve Eurozone crisis

Reuters reports that Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank chief, said the ECB's monetary policy could buy time to end the Eurozone crisis, but it cannot solve the Eurozone crisis.

Please recall that Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author, said the Fed and the policies that Ben Bernanke chose to pursue also would not end the US financial crisis.

The reason that monetary policies will not end the global financial crisis is that we are dealing with opacity in large parts of the global financial system that has expressed itself in a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Until transparency is brought back to all the opaque corners of the financial system, pricing in the global financial market is distorted and capital is misallocated.

Contributing to this distortion and misallocation are the low interest rate and quantitative easing policies being pursued by central banks.  Since they are contributing to the distortion of prices and the misallocation of capital, by definition we know central bank policies cannot end our financial crisis.

Anna Schwartz made this point when she Bernanke's policies would not end the problem of bank solvency.

The European Central Bank cannot solve the euro zone crisis, Bundesbank chief Jens Weidmann told economists on Sunday, pressing the bloc's governments to get their economies in shape and tighten their fiscal rules. 
Weidmann addressed an economists' conference in Aix-en-Provence, southern France, only three days after the ECB broke with precedent by declaring that it intended to keep interest rates at record lows for an extended period and may yet cut further. 
"Monetary policy has already done a lot to absorb the economic consequences of the crisis, but it cannot solve the crisis," Weidmann said in his speech. 
"This is the consensus of the Governing Council. The crisis has laid bare structural shortcomings. As such, they require structural solutions."... 
While he does not see sufficient support in the euro zone for governments to give up sovereignty on fiscal matters to forge a fiscal union to prevent such crises in the future, Weidmann pressed them to stiffen Europe's fiscal rules. 
"To fully unleash the common currency's potential, efforts are needed on two fronts: structural reforms as well as the abolition of implicit guarantees for banks and sovereigns (government bonds)," Weidmann said. 
"In addition to stronger rules, we need to make sure that in a system of national control and national responsibility, sovereign default is possible without bringing down the financial system. Only then will we really do away with the implicit guarantee for sovereigns." 
The Bundesbank chief also called for euro zone governments to sever what he describes as the "excessively close links" between banks and sovereign governments, saying that European banks hold too many of their own governments' bonds. 
"This is because banks do not have to hold any capital against their government debt, as the risk-weight assigned to sovereign bonds is zero. 
To counteract excessive investment in sovereign bonds, Weidmann believes that the capital rules need to be changed to take account of risk and exposure levels. 
"Only then will banks be able to cope with the repercussions of sovereign default."

Thursday, June 13, 2013

Small problem with Fed policies, it is real wages, not wealth effect, that drive US consumer spending

As Pedro da Costa reports in his Reuters blog, a survey shows that it is real wages and not the wealth effect that drive US consumer spending.

This is important because the Fed's monetary policy, including zero interest rates and quantitative easing, is reliant on the wealth effect to drive growth in demand.

Did this reliance ever make sense in anything other than an economic model?

No.

There is no reason to believe that the wealthy dramatically increase or decrease their spending because of the level of interest rates rather than base their spending on what they earn as income each year.

If your humble blogger had to guess why economists believe in the wealth effect it is that they confuse correlation with causation.

Specifically, they saw consumption pick up over the last 30 years as both stock and house prices increased and said "aha, there must be a wealth effect as an increase in wealth is correlated with higher consumption".

In reality, what was really happening is that Wall Street became quite proficient at letting Main Street tap the equity in their houses and Main Street needed to tap this equity because growth in income was insufficient to support the lifestyle they had from previous years.

Federal Reserve officials have touted the ‘wealth effect’ from higher stock prices and rising home values as a key way in which monetary policy boosts consumer spending and economic activity. 
But according to the results of a recent survey from the Royal Bank of Canada, that ethereal feeling of being richer on paper is no substitute for cold, hard cash.
Here’s how Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke explained the benefits of rising asset prices to the real economy during a press conference in September. 
The tools we have involve affecting financial asset prices and those are the tools of monetary policy. There are a number of different channels – mortgage rates, I mentioned corporate bond rates, but also prices of various assets, like for example the prices of homes.  
To the extent that home prices begin to rise, consumers will feel wealthier, they’ll feel more disposed to spend. If house prices are rising people may be more willing to buy homes because they think that they will make a better return on that purchase. So house prices is one vehicle.... 
The issue here is whether or not improving asset prices generally will make people more willing to spend. 
One of the main concerns that firms have is there is not enough demand, there’s not enough people coming and demanding their products. If people feel that their financial situation is better because their 401(k) looks better for whatever reason, or their house is worth more, they are more willing to go out and provide the demand..... 
RBC survey’s findings, explained by the bank’s chief U.S. economist, Tom Porcelli, in a research note: 
That wages and the jobs backdrop matter for consumption is not only borne out in the hard data, but this also came through loud and clear in our June consumer survey. 
When asked about what would embolden them to increase spending, nearly half of respondents noted wage increases while about 1/5 said a better job backdrop. So 65% of consumers think employment dynamics are what matter most. Contrary to popular belief, there was little “wealth effect” from stocks and housing apparent here. 
The bad news: U.S. wages have been stagnant for quite a while.

Friday, April 19, 2013

Is the Federal Reserve insane? No. It only has one tool and it uses it to try to solve all problems.

In a must read Bloomberg editorial, Matthew Klein asks if the Federal Reserve is insane because its response to every economic problem it to try to solve it with a bigger economic bubble.

I would not argue that the economists who run the Fed are insane.  I would say they are a product of their training.  In the course of studying for their PhDs, they have learned a particular way of looking at the world.

It is this rigidity in thinking and the desire to defend the PhD theses that resulted that prevents them from implementing alternative responses to solving an economic problem.

My case in point would be our current financial crisis.  It is well known that we are dealing with a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Yet, the Fed continues to treat it as if it were a bank liquidity crisis.

Your humble blogger is not the first to make this observation that the Fed is treating a bank solvency problem as a liquidity problem.

The loudest voice on this was Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author and an authority on the Great Depression and monetary policy before Ben Bernanke began his studies.  In a Wall Street Journal interview, she debunked the Fed's response, which is a reflection of what Mr. Bernanke argued should have been done at the time of the Great Depression, to our current crisis.

Ms. Schwartz made the case for bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system, including banks and structured finance securities.

The Fed, as Mr. Klein observes, is not interested in bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  Instead, the Fed is only interested in implementing what Mr. Klein describes as the Fed bubbles only policy:

Back in the 2000s, however, most people just wanted to get out of the funk associated with the aftermath of the tech boom. 
There was also a widespread belief that bubbles aren't dangerous as long as the central bank is around to "clean up" the mess when they burst. This view was best articulated by Ben Bernanke in 1999. 
As a result, many monetary policymakers were untroubled by the prospect of creating a new bubble to replace the old one. 
Transcripts of the Fed's internal meetings make it clear that this was their conscious plan. 
On March 16, 2004, Donald Kohn, a longtime Fed staffer who later became the Fed's vice chairman, said that the credit bubble was "deliberate and a desirable effect of the stance of policy." 
According to Kohn, the Fed's strategy was: "boost asset prices in order to stimulate demand." 
That appeared to work for a short time, but it ended badly. We're still struggling to emerge from the wreckage despite, yet again, incredibly low real interest rates and very large government budget deficits. 
Clearly, cleaning up after bubbles is harder than it's made out to be. 
One might think that the Fed has learned something from this experience.  A recent speech from Nayarana Kocherlakota, the president of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank, suggests otherwise. 
He said that the Fed "will only be able to achieve its congressionally mandated objectives by following policies that result in signs of financial market instability." 
In other words, he wants to repeat the exact same formula that Donald Kohn endorsed in the 2000s.
Please note that there is nothing in the Fed's blow bubbles strategy that directly addresses bank insolvency.  So what are the chances it will be successful in ending a bank solvency led financial crisis?

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

Paul Krugman: do central banks purchases of government debt influence level of interest rates

In his NY Times blog, Nobel prize winning economic Professor Paul Krugman examines the conventional wisdom that the Fed's buying US debt is keeping interest rates artificially low and concludes that this is simply not true.

Given this conclusion is also supported by Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, your humble blogger is left to ask the question of why then is the Fed engaging in zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies?

If the Fed has no impact on the level of interest rates, these policies are completely ineffective.  So why pursue policies with no benefit?

If the Fed has no impact on the level of interest rates, then why is it trying to claim credit for the pickup in activity in the housing market?

Wednesday, March 20, 2013

Bernanke gets his wish, comeback of financial system's most toxic securities

The Retirement Plan Death Spiral has been overtaken as the most toxic side effect of Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke's zero interest rate policies by the comeback of the financial system's most toxic securities: synthetic collateralized debt obligations.

Regular readers will recall that these synthetic CDOs were at the heart of the financial crisis.  These were the securities that let Wall Street ,which knew that subprime mortgages were going bust faster than was assumed in the investors' pricing models, successfully "bet" on this knowledge.

The fact that these opaque, toxic securities which the regulators and market cannot value have re-emerged is the direct result of 5 years of zero interest rate policies.

Surely, investors and the financial system will have a better experience gambling on these securities this time around.

As reported by Bloomberg,

Derivatives that pool credit- default swaps to make magnified bets on corporate debt, popularized in the last credit bubble, are making a comeback as investors search farther afield for alternatives to bonds at record-low yields....
Synthetic credit, which amplified the financial crisis five years ago, is enticing investors after corporate-bond yields dropped to less than half the 20-year average. 
By betting on the degree to which a group of companies will default, a CDO may pay relative yields of more than 5 percentage points, four times that of a typical credit-swaps transaction on similar debt.
Please note the use of the word "betting".  An opaque security cannot be valued.  Therefore, buying it is simply an exercise in betting.
“That’s a valid strategy for this part of the credit cycle: Don’t stretch on credit quality, but rather leverage your exposure to better-quality credit,” Ashish Shah, the head of global credit investment at New York-based AllianceBernstein LP, which oversees $256 billion in fixed-income assets, said ....
Betting is not a valid investment strategy.  Betting is gambling.

The distinction between gambling and betting is subtle.

Gambling involves buying opaque, toxic securities and guessing what the value of their contents is.  Investing involves have transparency into all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so as to independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.
“Investors are in a desperate search for yield,” said David Knutson, a credit analyst at Legal & General Investment Management America. “CDO products offer incremental yield to plain-vanilla transactions.”...
Bernanke's zero interest rate policies deliberately make investors desperate when it comes to yield.  They are designed to be coercive and force investors to take more risk.

However, there is a real difference between taking more risk while investing and simply taking risk by gambling.
Sales of bespoke synthetic CDOs are climbing after the market all but shut down during the financial crisis in 2008.
Bernanke's legacy is the revival of the synthetic CDO market that produced the following spectacular results:
After the amount of credit protection sold through CDOs in that period climbed to about $1 trillion, investors took losses of up to 90 percent on deals that bet heavily on financial firms that failed during the crisis, including Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. and Icelandic banks. 
In the mortgage market, CDOs that packaged home-loan securities and were given top AAA ratings by S&P wiped out investors in a matter of months, according to a lawsuit by the Justice Department filed Feb. 4 in Los Angeles. 
Synthetic CDOs “enabled securitization to continue and expand even as the mortgage market dried up and provided speculators with a means of betting on the housing market,” the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee wrote in a 2012 report. “By layering on correlated risk, they spread and amplified exposure to losses when the housing market collapsed.”
And thanks to Fed Chairman Bernanke's policies, this particularly toxic security has, like Dracula, come back to life to suck the lifeblood out of the real economy.
As the Federal Reserve holds its benchmark interest rate near zero for a fifth year, investors including pension funds and hedge funds are again seeking out more structured debt or derivatives that offer greater yields than the bonds or loans underlying them....
Your humble blogger doesn't mind if hedge funds gamble on these opaque, toxic securities.  This is what investors in hedge funds expect.

However, pension funds and insurance companies should never be allowed to invest in opaque, toxic securities.  Regulators for pension funds and insurance companies have had 5 years to adopt regulations that would prevent this from occurring.
Trading in synthetic CDOs will continue to rebound even after global bank capital rules and the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act make derivatives more expensive to trade and hold, Peter Tchir, founder of New York-based TF Market Advisors, said in a March 15 e-mail to clients. 
“There’s going to be this bigger search for yield and spread, and tranches are a natural way to do it,” he said.
As previously pointed out by your humble blogger, global capital rules do not stop gambling on opaque securities.  

As previously pointed out by your humble blogger, Dodd-Frank also did nothing to restore transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  

As a result, investors have been coerced by the Fed to return to opaque areas where Wall Street can handsomely profit off of the investors inability to price the securities. 

Monday, March 18, 2013

Primary difference between financial repression and deposit confiscation: speed

In an excellent Telegraph column, Ian Cowie looks at the depositor haircut in Cyprus to bailout its banking system as petty theft compared to what savers have been "stealthily robbed" robbed of by financial repression (think zero interest rate policies) to bailout the global financial system.

The primary difference, other than sheer quantity of money pilfered, is speed.

The depositor haircut happened over-night.  Financial repression has been going on since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Your humble blogger uses the word "primary" on purpose.  Both the depositor haircut and financial repression are the result of government policies to bailout the financial system by imposing its losses on savers/taxpayers.

Regular readers know the politicians are making a conscious decision to impose losses on savers/taxpayers and not on the bankers who caused the loss in the first place.  In fact, these bankers continue to be rewarded with nary an interruption in their bonuses.

Politicians are making a conscious decision because the banking system is designed to absorb losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue operating even though the banks have low or negative book capital levels.

Banks can do this because of the existence of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.    Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  As a result, banks have unlimited capital against which to continue lending.

Every day since the financial crisis began, politicians have made the decision to steal, whether through financial repression or a depositor haircut, from savers/taxpayers and give to the bankers rather than use the banking system as it is designed to be used.

I admit that having the banking system absorb the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system would be bad for banker cash bonuses.  However, given the choice between the government stealing from the savers/taxpayers or reducing banker cash bonuses (not necessarily the total size of banker bonuses), I opt for reducing banker cash bonuses.
Outrage about the Cyprus banks euro tax bail-out should not be allowed to obscure the fact that millions of savers in British banks have already lost much more of the real value or purchasing power of their money to prop up financial institutions closer to home. 
Savers in British banks and building societies have been stealthily robbed of more than £43bn of the real value of their savings since the Bank of England froze interest rates at 0.5pc four years ago. 
That's the total shrinkage of bank and building society depositors' purchasing power caused by inflation exceeding frozen interest rates, according to calculations by the pressure group Save Our Savers, following similar calculations by Yorkshire Building Society that the average saver has lost £2,500 in real terms since the credit crisis began. 
Both figures have got much bigger than they were a couple of years ago, as inflation has continued to run ahead of interest paid on deposits.  
Pensioners have suffered even more because higher than average proportions of their fixed incomes are spent on food and fuel. They are the largely silent victims of the Bank of England's policy of running negative real interest rates. 
But this slow-motion bank robbery is more difficult to describe than the short, sharp, smash-and-grab in Cyprus. So, despite the best efforts of this column to blow the whistle, more attention will be given to smaller losses for fewer people in Cyprus than millions of savers and pensioners who have lost much more in British banks and retirement funds. 
Suggested levies of 6.75 per cent of all deposits up to €100,000 (£86,500) and 9.9 per cent for larger deposits caused many savers in Cyprus to withdraw their money from banks over the weekend.... 
Elsewhere, Government sources stressed that deposits held in the London branches of Bank of Cyprus UK and Laiki Bank would not be subject to the new levy. Treasury sources said that “deposits in UK subsidiaries and branches [of Cypriot banks] aren’t affected” by the crisis. 
If only small savers with Britain’s high street banks and building societies could say the same. Nor are they the only victims to pay a high price for quantitative easing and QE’s aim of protecting over-stretched banks and borrowers at the expense of savers. 
Unfortunately, in a vicious seesaw effect, extra demand for gilts created by QE has pushed up the price of bonds, pushing down their yield or the income pensioners can obtain with their savings. Laith Khalaf of wealth managers Hargreaves Lansdown reckons annuity yields have fallen by about a fifth during the last four years. 
So savers of all descriptions are paying a high price for the Bank of England’s strategy of maintaining negative real interest rates. 
Sadly for the millions of victims of this slow-motion bank robbery in Britain, it remains too complex to explain on the front page or in TV bulletins and so much more coverage will be given to a relatively small scale smash and grab with fewer victims in Cyprus.

Thursday, March 14, 2013

Sheila Bair: don't call it a housing recovery, Fed just blowing bubbles

According to an NPR post, Sheila Bair is less than enthusiastic about the idea we are seeing either a housing or economic recovery.

But one banking expert who grappled with the colossal housing bust during the Great Recession says it's too soon to celebrate. 
Despite a recent upturn in sales and prices, "the housing market is still very weak," said Sheila Bair, who headed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. from 2006 to 2011. Bair, speaking at a Washington "economic summit" organized by The Atlantic magazine, warned homeowners that "we need more experience and data to know if it's really turned around." 
Bair said lenders may be sitting on huge numbers of foreclosed upon houses that have been held back from the market. As housing prices start to perk up, that hidden inventory may come flooding into the market - and pushing prices back down, she said. 
Moreover, millions of homeowners are "under water," i.e., they still owe more on mortgages than they could get by selling their homes. As soon as they can sell at prices high enough to pay off old loans, they'll put their properties on the market— and again drive down prices, she said. 
And there could be another worry: prices for all sorts of assets may already be too high now because interest rates have been held too low for too long by the Federal Reserve, she said. 
The Fed policy makers have had good intentions, but their low-interest-rate efforts have not revived the economy. 
"We are not getting new lending and new jobs out of this," Bair said. However, we do have "the risk of asset bubbles developing... well, they've already developed," she said. 

Thursday, March 7, 2013

Sheila Bair is not a substitute for market supervision

In his NY Times Economix column, Professor Simon Johnson argues that it is important to appoint Sheila Bair to the vacant post of Fed Vice Chairwoman for Supervision because without filling this vacancy the Fed faces a potential crisis of legitimacy for its handling of the Too Big to Fail banks.

While there is much to recommend his column, Professor Johnson misses two critical facts.

First, a major reason for the financial crisis was the failure of regulatory supervision.  There is little that has happened since the beginning of our current financial crisis to indicated that the reasons that regulatory supervision is not a viable substitute for market discipline, including regulatory capture, have been fixed.


Second, the Fed has a long running policy of financial failure containment and its corollary the Geithner Doctrine (from Yves Smith, nothing should be done that hurts the profits or reputation of a big or politically connected bank).


As regular readers know, banks are not subject to market discipline because they are, in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, "black boxes".  When market participants do not have the information they need to independently assess the risk of the banks, they cannot exert discipline on the banks by adjusting both the amount and price of their exposure based on each bank's risk.

Leading up to the crisis and even now market participants rely on the regulators' representation about the riskiness of the banks.  This reliance is the result of the simple fact that the regulators have access to all the useful, relevant information on each bank in an appropriate, timely manner and investors don't.

Unfortunately, this reliance is misplaced as the regulators have to both correctly assess this information and accurately communicate the results of this assessment to the market.  By definition, regulators cannot accurately communicate the results because of concerns over the safety and soundness of the financial system (the regulators won't say anything bad about the banks).

This problem is compounded by the moral hazard creating Dodd-Frank Act mandated stress tests.  Each year, the Fed performs a stress tests on the banks and pronounces them solvent under extreme economic conditions.  This announcement effectively makes the taxpayer obligated for bailing out the investors for any solvency related losses.

Why?  Where is there the investor who is going to argue with the Fed given that the Fed has better access to information than the investor?

That the government making investment recommendations creates moral hazard has been well known since the 1930s.  FDR warned about it and specifically said that the government should stay out of the business of making investment recommendations as this create a moral hazard to bailout investors who relied on the government's recommendation.  The Fed's stress tests are nothing less than the government making an investment recommendation.

More troubling is that former Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner pledged the full faith and credit of the US to provide the banks with all the capital they need as a guarantee to investors that they would not suffer any losses from investing based on the stress test findings.

The policy of financial failure containment was in place back when I worked for the Fed and can be seen in the handling of Continental Illinois and the Savings & Loan crisis.

This policy has already destroyed the Fed's legitimacy when it comes to dealing with the Too Big to Fail banks.  Everyone knows the Fed will not do anything to control them and prevent them from taking outsized risks.

Rather, the Fed will come along and try to "mop up" after one of these banks blows up again.

If the Fed were truly interested in having the Too Big to Fail banks subjected to appropriate levels of supervision, the new Vice Chairwoman for Supervision would be leading the charge to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With ultra transparency, the banks would be subjected to both market supervision and market discipline.  Supervision that would be far superior in terms of both manpower and resources than anything that our regulators can offer.

The Dodd-Frank Act created the position of the Vice Chairwoman for Supervision at the Fed precisely because Wall Street knows that the Fed will never support ultra transparency.  Supporting ultra transparency means giving up its information monopoly.

It also means that the market could exert discipline on the Fed in its performance of is supervisory duties.  The last thing the Fed and its economists would ever be willing to do would be to put themselves in a position where they could be held accountable for their actions or lack thereof.

Friday, February 15, 2013

Parliament committee concludes that monetary policy experiments put taxpayers at risk for no known benefit

The Telegraph reports that Parliament's Public Account Committee has concluded that monetary policies like quantitative easing that are backed by the taxpayer put the taxpayer at risk for no known benefit.

The Treasury has put billions of pounds of taxpayer money at risk by sticking state guarantees on “a series of expensive experiments” that it does not fully understand, an influential group of MPs has warned. 
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) claimed the Chancellor’s department does not have any clear goals for either the Bank of England’s £375bn quantitative easing (QE) programme or its £80bn Funding for Lending scheme (FLS), both of which are backed by the taxpayer, and had no means of monitoring their progress. 
Margaret Hodge, chair of the committee, said: “The Treasury has not convinced us it understands either the risks it has taken on by indemnifying the Bank against losses on QE or the expected economic benefits... The Treasury seems to be embarking on a series of expensive experiments, indemnified with taxpayers’ money.” 
Experiments that are likely to end badly.  After all, if these monetary policy experiments worked, why isn't Japan, which has implemented these policies, experiencing tremendous economic growth?
The Treasury has resorted to providing guarantees and indemnities in an attempt to drive the recovery without increasing public borrowing. However, such “contingent liabilities” carry a risk of loss as the state has pledged to bear some or all of the downside. 
With QE, the taxpayer has fully indemnified the Bank. Under the FLS, high street lenders can swap risky bundles of loans for low-risk Treasury bills. Both schemes were designed to help boost growth, but carry the potential for losses..... 
Giving evidence to the committee in October, Sir Nicholas Macpherson, the Treasury’s Permanent Secretary, described QE as “an experiment, and we won’t know the ultimate answer for many years”. Although the scheme was in profit in 2011/2012, he warned that there was a risk of losses from QE. 
“At some point interest rates will start rising... and at that point you could sustain quite big losses. My guess is that it will all wash out in the end, “ he said....
The size of the losses should the central banks try to resell the bonds they bought under quantitative easing will be orders of magnitude larger than the interest income generate on the bonds.

Fortunately, because central banks have zero "cost" to carry the bonds, they can hold the bonds to maturity and never realize the loss.  Of course, this assumes that the central banks have other ways of reducing the money supply that don't cost money.

In the US, Chairman Bernanke has continued to say that the Fed won't have to sell, it can manage the money supply by paying more interest on the excess reserves in the banking system and therefore control the potential inflationary impact of these reserves.  The problem with this is that it effectively recognizes the losses on the bonds purchased under QE (the alternative to paying interest is to sell the bonds and reduce reserves that way).
The PAC urged the Treasury to “provide more transparency on what QE is seeking to achieve”, and to work with the Bank to “understand and publish data on the effects and benefits of the measure”. 
The very last thing that the central banks want to do is provide more transparency on what QE is seeking to achieve and publish data on its effects and benefits.

Doing so will highlight that QE and its related zero interest rate policies are creating an economic headwind (recall the Retirement Plan Death Spiral) that is causing both consumer and business demand to shrink.

The conclusion will be that these economic experiments in monetary policy, while shown to be very effective by the central banks' models that didn't predict the financial crisis, are a real world disaster.

Wednesday, February 13, 2013

Fed's Jeffrey Lacker: Rescue policy worsened financial crisis in 2007

Bloomberg reports that the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond's Jeffrey Lacker said that the financial system was weakened in 2007 by the rescue policy pursued.

The Richmond Fed president has been one of the biggest critics of an expanded safety net which he says reduces market discipline and creates more risk by raising expectations of bailouts. 
The Fed used multiple tools to aid financial institutions during the crisis, including opening a funding facility for corporate commercial paper and offering direct support for the Bear Stearns Cos. and American International Group Inc....
Please recall that the policies pursued reflected the US Treasury and the Fed's decades old policy of financial failure containment that was adopted and formalized under Robert Rubin, Alan Greenspan and Larry Summers.

The policy of financial failure containment expressed itself in 2008/2009 through the adoption of the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  This model protected bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

The question in 2007 was whether the Treasury and the Fed would be willing to sacrifice the US economy and the social contract to implement the Japanese Model.

By not raising capital and therefore weakening the financial system, bankers increased the likelihood that the Treasury and the Fed would be willing to adopt the Japanese Model.
“It seems quite plausible to me that the signal sent by the Fed’s lending actions in August 2007 dampened the willingness of troubled institutions, such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, to seek safer solutions to the strains they were facing -- whether by raising capital, selling assets or reducing reliance on short-term funding,” Lacker said... 
Lacker said perceptions of government support had built over decades which may have underpinned the dependence of investment banks such as Bear Stearns on low-cost short-term funding such as repurchase agreements. 
“When Bear lost funding in mid-March, the critical fear was that without government support, investors would pull away from other investment banks as well,” Lacker said. 
“Backstop lending was thus necessitated by expectations of backstop lending.” 
Your humble blogger disagrees with Mr. Lacker about why the market expected the Fed to provide backstop lending.  I think the market expected the Fed to act as a lender of last resort and lend freely against good collateral at high rates of interest.

The fact that the Fed did not lend at high rates of interest sent a message to the banks that confirmed the Fed's willingness to adopt the Japanese Model and that bank book capital levels and banker bonuses would be protected at all costs.

Sunday, February 3, 2013

Prudential CEO says QE "depressing growth"

Prudential's CEO, Tidjane Thiam, explains in a few brief comments why quantitative easing (QE) is a barrier to economic growth.

These comments should be familiar to regular readers as your humble blogger has been making this point for several years now.

As reported by the Telegraph,
“QE was a good short-term fix,” Mr Thiam said at a private breakfast last week. “In 2008, 2009 and 2010 it was the right answer. But now, it is different.  “We are just storing long term trouble by minimising short term pain.”
I would disagree with Mr. Thiam that QE was ever a good short-term fix as monetary policy is not a cure for a bank solvency led financial crisis.
The Prudential CEO ... said that the deepening market distortions created by quantitative easing had a negative effect on growth and damaged savers. 
Mr Thiam said that there was now a reliance on cheap money without a sensible exit plan. This, he warned, left the door open for inflation shocks that could throw the economic recovery off course. 
Mr. Thiam is absolutely right that QE damages savers and as a result has a negative effect on growth.  I refer to this effect as an economic headwind as savers cut back on current consumption to offset the loss in earnings on their savings.

Mr. Thiam's next point about the lack of a sensible exit plan is incredibly important.

Central bankers will say they have a sensible exit plan.  Unfortunately, these are the same central bankers who did not see the financial crisis coming and are frustrated that savers are not acting in the same way that the central bankers' models say they should act (with rates at 0%, they should be drawing down their savings rather than cutting back their current consumption).
“In the macro economy: savings equal investments. But QE is depressing savings and therefore depressing investment. This means, QE is depressing growth,” he said. 
While I agree with Mr. Thiam that QE is depressing growth, I don't agree with his causality.

QE and similar low interest rate monetary policies are depressing both return on savings and demand as savers offset the loss of income on their savings by cutting back on consumption.  By reducing consumer demand, QE is depressing the return on investment by companies.  Companies respond by reducing investments and this in turn further depresses growth.  Bottom line:  QE is depressing growth.
“It is a really strange economic strategy because everyone is looking for growth – but the monetary policy is completely anti-growth. There is no other exit to indebtedness than growth,” he said, referring to the UK’s £120bn or so deficit..... 
I agree with Mr. Thiam that it is a really strange to pursue anti-growth monetary policies like QE and similar low interest rate policies when the central bank is trying to stimulate growth.

I disagree with Mr. Thiam that the only way out of the indebtedness is growth.

There is a much quicker way.  Adopt the Swedish Model and have the banks recognize upfront the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system.
“I am very worried we are creating bubbles, everywhere. Interest rates will have to normalise. And it is not clear to me what the exit strategy is. I ask central bankers this all the time and I still have not heard a single sensible answer,” he said.... 
“QE creates a total distortion in the economy,” said Mr Thiam. “The risk free rate is possibly the single most important piece of economic information we have and we shouldn’t mess with it. That is a dangerous game, because, to manipulate the risk free rate is to introduce huge distortions.”
The role of central banks has always been to "distort" the risk free rate in an effort to smooth the business cycle (lower highs in economic expansion and lower lows during recessions).

What makes QE and similar low interest rate policies different this time is they have been shown to be ineffective at generating economic growth, but the central banks keep doubling down despite the lack of a sensible exit strategy and the huge distortions these policies are causing in the economy. 

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Pension experts: QE is a 'monumental' mistake

The Guardian reports that pension experts have gone before a Parliament committee and explained why the Bank of England's pursuit of quantitative easing (QE) has been a 'monumental' mistake and how the economy would recover if the BoE stopped pursuing all the related low interest rate policies.

Regular readers of this blog will be familiar with the arguments that the pension experts put forward on why QE should be abandoned as they were presented here first.

The Bank of England's policy of pumping money into the economy has been a "monumental mistake", pensions experts have warned . 
A committee of MPs heard that measures taken by the Bank to drive the economy had backfired by squeezing individuals' incomes – both pensioners and those in work – and forcing companies to divert cash into pension funds rather than investing.
I referred to these two economic headwinds as the retirement fund death spiral.  The trigger for the death spiral is the adoption of zero interest rate and related policies like QE.

Both individuals and companies move to offset the loss of earnings on their savings and reinforce the negative feedback loop.  Individuals do this by cutting back current consumption and saving more.  Companies offset the decline in earnings on pension funds by diverting cash rather than investing.

The actions by both individuals and companies reduce aggregate demand.  Since the BoE wants to boost aggregate demand, it pursues the low interest rate policies even more aggressively.  The result is a further drop in aggregate demand as both individuals and corporations move to offset the loss income.

That individuals change their spending and saving habits in the face of low interest rates has been known since the 1870s.  Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, even stated that interest rates should never be less than 2%.
Ros Altmann, pensions expert and director general of Saga, said current policies devalued pensioners' incomes, making them less willing to spend: "Quantitative easing and ultra-low interest rates have hampered the spending power of those in the economy who were not over-indebted and who would otherwise have spent money." ...
Altmann said ending the QE programme was much more likely to herald a period of growth than its introduction had done. "History will judge this as a monumental mistake," she said. "If we do not have any more quantitative easing, the economy will be freer to grow than if we do."
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ros Altmann has nicely summarized what your humble blogger has been saying about why zero interest rate policies never work to boost demand and why abandoning these policies would actually produce the growth in the economy that central bankers want.
Under the QE programme, the Bank of England has bought £375bn of UK government bonds, or gilts, with newly created electronic money. It now owns almost a third of all gilts in the market. This huge influx of demand has driven gilt prices higher and means yields, or the effective interest rates on them – which represent government borrowing costs – are at record low levels. 
That has the unintended consequence of pummelling pension funds, which use gilt yields to calculate their future liabilities. When gilt yields plummet, pension fund deficits effectively balloon. 
The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) estimated last year that QE had increased pension deficits by at least £90bn over the past three years. 
Current regulations mean companies must plug those holes. Mark Hyde Harrison, the chairman of NAPF, said businesses are now having to contribute to their pension schemes instead of investing for the future, which negates any positive impact of QE....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Harrison has described the retirement fund death spiral triggered by zero interest rate policies.
QE has also reduced the incomes of recent retirees using their pension pot to buy an annuity, which sets the size of their income for life, as annuities are also linked to gilt yields. 
Altmann said monetary easing had acted like a "tax increase" on older people. She said the economy is in "unprecedented territory" and the gilt market had never been distorted in such a way. 
The Bank of England had not properly considered whether carrying out a policy which penalises certain sections of society is acceptable, because it has assumed that the path it has taken was the only option. 
QE is not creating growth and is hampering the spending of people who are not particularly burdened with debt because they are "worried about what's coming next," she said.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Altmann has made a very important point.  Specifically, the pursuit of zero interest rate policies including QE sends a message that undermines consumer confidence as these policies reflect the simple fact that central banks are still in crisis management mode.

Monday, January 21, 2013

Jens Weidmann: "Monetary policy can only buy more time"

From a Telegraph article, Jens Weidmann, president of Deutsche Bundesbank, observed that it was "wrong and dangerous" to rely on the central banks because "monetary policy can only buy more time".

Please re-read the highlight text as Mr. Weidmann makes the very important point that monetary policy is not the right tool for fixing the problems that led to the financial crisis.

Japan has shown this to be true for the last 2+ decades.  The EU, UK and US have shown this to be true since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007.

The question is 'using the time that the central banks buy at great expense, what needs to be done to resolve the financial crisis?'

Your humble blogger has laid out a blueprint for what needs to be done.  This includes adopting the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to recognize upfront the losses on all the excess public and private debt in the financial system.  In addition, there is a need for fiscal stimulus.

To date, our policymakers and financial regulators have not followed this blueprint.  Instead, they have managed to substantially increase the cost of the crisis by pursuing policies that have been shown to never end a bank solvency led financial crisis.

The global policymakers' and regulators' actions have worked out well for bankers, it has worked out badly for taxpayers and society.
"Central banks in recent years have been pulled into the role of a crisis manager. Some think that central banks are the only able ones. I consider this thinking wrong and dangerous," Mr Weidmann told Finnish newspaper Helsingin Sanomat in an interview. 
"The program can bring considerable risks to the monetary policy. Those risks now have to be limited and prevented," he was quoted as saying...
"Monetary policy can only buy more time. It is like a painkiller which will not erase the reasons but can cause risks and side effects," he said. 
He also warned against Europe depending on the ECB to supervise banks in the banking union. "That would mask the conflict of interest between the supervision task and monetary policy. I hope that the ECB would only serve as a helper," he said.
A conflict of interest that exists at the Fed and has lead to the Fed identifying with the banks/Wall Street and adopting the policies that the banks/Wall Street prefer (don't take my word for it, Professor Stiglitz made this observation in his recent speech in India).

Sunday, January 20, 2013

Fed chose not to understand fundamental driver behind financial crisis

Why has the Fed chosen not to understand that opacity and with it the freezing of major areas of the capital markets is the fundamental driver behind our current financial crisis?

In an earlier post (see here), your humble blogger looked at the transcripts from the Fed's 2007 meetings and conference calls and noted that Fed officials knew about the problem with opacity in large areas of the financial system.  Yet, they effectively ignored it by assuming it away.

For example, in response to the freezing of the subprime mortgage securities market at the beginning of the financial crisis, the Fed chose to provide liquidity to the capital markets until such time as the market figured out how to value and price these opaque securities.

Of course, without transparency, the market will never be able to figure out how to value and price the opaque subprime mortgage-backed securities.

The Washington Post's Neil Irwin (see here) suggested that the reason the problem of opacity was and still is ignored is that very bright people can have access to data that the rest of the market participants would love to have, but still not understand how to interpret this data to make it useful information for purposes of setting policy and addressing the financial crisis.

I have written numerous posts that would support Mr. Irwin's observation.  These posts cover group think (many of the leading central bankers were at MIT at the same time), failure to understand that transparency is the necessary condition for the proper operation of the invisible hand, and regulatory capture by the banking industry directly and indirectly through politicians.

However, I don't think these posts provide a satisfactory answer to why the Fed continues to choose not to understand the role of opacity in the current financial crisis.

Princeton's Paul Krugman (see here) provides more insight into the Fed's actions as he saw the 2007 transcripts providing personal vindication for the economic policies that he has been suggesting.

He too completely skips the importance of opacity.  He seems to think that because he said that the fiscal stimulus program was too small to restore the economy to health that this indicates his analysis of the problem is correct.

In reality, as shown by Japan over the last 2+ decades, the burden on the real economy from servicing all the excess debt in the financial system can offset a tremendous amount of fiscal stimulus.

Professor Krugman prediction was directionally correct, but this was not because of his insight into the driver of the economic crisis, but rather because the impact of this driver was in the same direction he predicted.

The reason I said that Professor Krugman provides more insight into why the Fed chose not to understand that opacity was the fundamental driver of the current financial crisis is that his self-serving analysis reminded me of my conversations with various Fed officials ranging from governors to economists.

Regular readers know a) I worked at the Fed in the early 1980s and b) that I was very vocal about the impending financial crisis and how to moderate its impact.

Naturally, I reached out to the Fed and these officials.

Each of my conversations fit perfectly into the Professor Krugman view of the world.  Each of these officials effectively told me that opacity could be ignored because their economic model of how the economy worked explained what the right policy response was.

I recall one governor hearing my description of opacity (I used my example comparing structured finance securities to a Brown Paper Bag) and the response was the Fed could predict the US economy using data that was available on a quarterly basis and therefore a Brown Paper Bag was not opaque.

This mind set continues to this day.  It is clear that the Fed officials will cling to the belief in the infallibility of their economic models.  After all, they have modified their models to include a banking sector (something that prior to the crisis the models assumed was irrelevant).

What we have learned in the 2007 transcripts and since is that the Fed's economic models could not predict the US economy as they didn't predict the financial crisis and they have not predicted the success or failure of the various fiscal and monetary policies implemented since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Despite this track record of failure, the Fed continues to chose not to understand the role of opacity as the fundamental driver behind our current financial crisis.

As shown by Professor Krugman, his comments reflect the simple reality that economists prefer working with their models and the assumptions behind these models and ignoring inconvenient real world facts.

Real world facts tend to make the models messy.  Although, in this case, the real world fact of opacity actually makes the model much simpler.  After all, their economic models are built on the assumption that the invisible hand is operating properly.

The existence of opacity gives them an excuse to say why their models haven't worked and that the models cannot be expected to work until transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Update
From a quest post on Zero Hedge by Gary Evans of Global Macro Monitor:

In his lecture at the Latsis Symposium 2012 “Economics on the Move” in Zurich,  Nobel Laureate Joe Stiglitz nails the fundamental problem and crisis of modern macroeconomics, which failed to predict the financial crisis. 
If you say…what is good science is prediction… and you can’t predict the most important event in 75 years, what good are you?  
In particular, it might be very nice you can talk about the likelihood of an one tenth increase in GDP growth rate…and you miss a major economic downturn….or worse, they said the things can’t happen… 
Here are the money quotes: 
We all know the shock in this crisis…was a credit bubble and we have had those credit bubbles since the beginning of capitalism…So it was remarkable the intellectual bubble led people to believe there were no such thing as credit bubbles when there was 200 years of history of that…..How could people be so stupid? …The theory was with well functioning financial markets, spreading risk, diversifying risk, risk is contained.  They came to believe the models and that’s always dangerous.
Actually, it is not that they came to believe the models so much as they did not know that the models are based on the idea of transparency.

The models assume that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

The models and the economic system failed because large parts of the financial system are opaque.  This includes both structured finance securities and bank balance sheets.

Saturday, January 19, 2013

What did I know and When did I know it?

In a self-congratulatory blog posting, Paul Krugman asserts that he would probably have been the most alarmist person in the room for the 2007 FOMC meetings about the potential for a really big financial crisis.  But then this isn't saying much as he says the FOMC was complacent.

He then goes on to explain what he saw that made him alarmist and why he has "had a pretty good stretch" since then.

For the record, my stretch over the same period has been vastly superior to Professor Krugman's.

People have been poring over the just-released 2007 Fed transcripts, and the main surprise seems to be how complacent the institution was. 
Some members of the open market committee, including Janet Yellen and, let’s give credit where due, Tim Geithner, seem to have had a sense of dread; but the overall consensus was that nothing really bad would happen. 
The obvious question if you’re a pundit, then, is “How did I do?” And the answer is, not too badly. Yes, I hedged — it was a statement of possibilities, not a straight prediction. But I clearly would have been in the camp of Fed alarmists, and probably the most alarmist of them all. 
It is a matter of public record that I wasn't hedging about the problems in the credit markets.  I was featured in a Bloomberg article on December 4, 2007 on how to actually moderate the impact of and deal with the problems in the financial system.
It seems to me that the really big determinant of whether you were intellectually ready for this crisis was how much attention you paid to events in the late 1990s — the crisis in emerging Asia, LTCM here, and the Japanese liquidity trap. I paid a lot of attention back then (as did Nouriel Roubini), taking the lead in resurrecting the theory of the liquidity trap (pdf) and writing a book, The Return of Depression Economics. 
And the result is that I’ve had a pretty good stretch; the only big thing I got wrong, I think, was in underestimating the stickiness of wages, and hence inflation, and therefore overestimating the risks of actual deflation. 
Professor Krugman and I differ on what it took to be intellectually ready for this crisis.  I think it took an understanding of Economics 101.

Specifically, it took an understanding that the necessary condition for the invisible hand and therefore capital markets to operate properly is that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make an informed decision.

It took an understanding that since the Great Depression our financial system has been based on the FDR Framework which combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principal of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

As I was reading the Fed meeting transcripts, what was clear was that nobody in the room understood this necessary condition or the role it plays in our FDR Framework based financial system even though they were well aware that both structured finance securities and bank balance sheets were opaque.

Confirmation of this assertion comes from the Fed's adopting the policy of injecting liquidity into the financial system with the idea that the market would figure out how to value or price the opaque structured finance securities and bank balance sheets.

Hello, the market couldn't figure out how to value or price either structured finance securities or bank balance sheets because they are opaque.

Recognizing that the markets were going to be on life support until transparency was brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system, I have had a much better performance than Professor Krugman since the beginning of the financial crisis.

For example, I knew that the burden of supporting the excess debt in the financial system would swallow both fiscal and monetary stimulus efforts and leave the US economy in a Japan-style economic slump (our economy "grows" only while there is fiscal stimulus and will immediately go back into recession when austerity policies are adopted).
That said... it’s not clear how much difference it would have made if the Fed had grasped the scale of the danger back in 2007.
It makes all the difference in the world because it drives their policy responses.
The big errors came later, after the depth of the crisis was apparent to all, and they came mainly in fiscal and housing policy, not monetary policy.
Actually, there were and still are too many monetary policy errors to mention.

This started with disobeying the father of modern central banking Walter Bagehot's directive that at times of crisis  a central bank lend freely at penalty rates against good collateral.  In 2007, the Fed choose to lend freely at rates they knew the banks would find attractive against bad collateral (I think the term that was used was "dreck").