Showing posts with label Wall Street Information Advantage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Wall Street Information Advantage. Show all posts

Wednesday, June 12, 2013

Paul Krugman: Unproductive finance based on knowing something before other market participants

In his NY Times blog, Professor Paul Krugman finally discovers the role of transparency in the financial markets when he discusses unproductive finance which is based on knowing something before other market participants.
More than half a century ago, in his classic paper on the economics of speculation, Paul Samuelson noted the perverse rewards to knowing stuff just slightly before everyone else. 
He asked readers to imagine someone who, somehow, consistently received crucial information one second before everyone else. 
As he pointed out, the social value of that extra second would be minimal; but the private rewards could be huge.
As regular readers know, with private label structured finance securities including CDOs, Wall Street's informational advantage was not an extra second but rather weeks.  Wall Street had this informational advantage because it owned the firms that were servicing the underlying collateral.

Naturally, when the collateral stopped performing, Wall Street was only too happy to "short" these securities before market participants received this performance information.

Your humble blogger has been saying since the very earliest days of the financial crisis that we need to bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system so as to eliminate Wall Street's informational advantages.

It is these informational advantages that give rise to unproductive finance and our current financial crisis.

Monday, October 22, 2012

At Goldman, unsophisticated investors were 'golden prize'

As reported by the Telegraph, Greg Smith expanded on his definition of a muppet by saying that
The “golden prize” at Goldman Sachs was to sell the most complex financial product to the least sophisticated investor....
The allegation is one of several made by Greg Smith, a former derivatives salesman, who used an open letter in the New York Times in March to quit Goldman in a blaze of publicity. 
“Getting an unsophisticated client was the golden prize,” Mr Smith said in a television interview ahead of the publication today of Why I Left Goldman Sachs. “The quickest way to make money on Wall Street is to take the most sophisticated product and try to sell it to the least sophisticated client.”...
Please re-read the highlighted text as it fits hand in glove with Yves Smith's observation that nobody on Wall Street was compensated for creating transparent, low margin products.

Simply put, Wall Street profits from opacity.

Why does Wall Street profit from opacity?

Because buyers and sellers of opaque financial products are not able to assess the risk or correctly price these products.  At the same time, Wall Street, which has more information, can do a better job of assessing the risk and properly pricing these products.

An example of a opaque financial product where Wall Street had an information advantage is structured finance securities.
In an interview with the US news programme 60 Minutes broadcast last night , Mr Smith recalled an episode in which he and a partner at Goldman met in Asia with the head of one of the world’s largest investment funds. 
The head of the fund, according to Mr Smith, said : “Let me be honest with you guys. We don’t trust you at all. But don’t worry. There’s nothing to worry about. We’re going to keep doing business with you because you’re the biggest bank.” 
Following the meeting, the Goldman partner described the outcome of the meeting as “great news,” Mr Smith said.
Regular readers know that in the financial markets transparency is the foundation for trust.

The investment fund manager's comments simply reflect the manager's awareness that Goldman was selling opaque financial products and therefore could not be trusted.

Update

For readers who might not know, the word 'sophisticated' carries a special meaning when applied to investors.  An individual investor or investment manager is considered sophisticated based on assets and not on their ability to assess the risk of an investment product.

Once an individual or investment manager passes the threshold for sophisticated, the relationship with a firm like Goldman changes.  It is assumed that Goldman or any firm like it is not to be trusted and the individual or investment manager knows this.  As a result, the burden is on the individual or investment manager to do their homework prior to investing.

Wednesday, May 9, 2012

Prudential RMBS suit with Morgan Stanley reminder of need to address opacity in structured finance

Bloomberg reports that Prudential is suing Morgan Stanley over the purchase of $1 billion in mortgage backed securities.

The case highlights the opacity of these securities and the fact that Wall Street's ownership of the mortgage originators and servicers provided Wall Street with an informational advantage.

Prudential Financial Inc. (PRU), the second- largest U.S. life insurer, sued Morgan Stanley over the purchase of $1 billion in residential mortgage-backed securities. 
Morgan Stanley, the sixth-largest U.S. bank by assets, made untrue statements and omitted material facts before Prudential bought RMBS certificates issued with 41 mortgage-loan securitizations from July 2004 to August 2007, according to the complaint filed in state court in Newark, New Jersey. 
“A high percentage of the mortgage loans backing the certificates have defaulted, been foreclosed upon, or are delinquent,” according to the complaint. Poor loan performance “caused a massive decline in the value of the certificates and Prudential investment losses in excess of $350 million.” 
The bank falsely claimed mortgages met underwriting guidelines, homes securing loans were legitimately appraised, and the bank properly transferred titles, according to the complaint filed April 25. 
Pools of home loans securitized into bonds were a central part of the housing bubble that helped send the U.S. into the biggest recession since the 1930s....
Morgan Stanley faced similar lawsuits in recent months from investors including Asset Management Fund, Bayerische Landesbank and MetLife Inc. (MET)  
On April 3, the Federal Reserve ordered the bank to review foreclosures conducted by its Saxon mortgage servicer before the unit was sold and compensate injured borrowers. 
Prudential claims Morgan Stanley violated the New Jersey Uniform Securities Law, engaged in common law fraud and negligent misrepresentation, and interfered with the insurer’s contractual rights. It seeks compensatory and punitive damages.


Monday, May 7, 2012

Refusing to end buyers' strike by giving up its informational advantage, the sell-side continues to block return of ABS

As predicted (see here and here) by your humble blogger, the refusal by the sell-side to give up its informational advantage is preventing the securitization industry from restarting.  Having lost trillions, the buy-side is on strike until it has access to the information on each structured finance security it needs to know what it owns.

A Financial News article looks at the current sell-side efforts to restart securitization in the EU while protecting their information monopoly.
Some might prefer to let ABS rest in peace, were it not for the fact that the market is considered crucial to the funding capabilities and survival of banks. It is even being hailed as the solution to the problem of reduced mortgage lending.... 
[The] European Central Bank announced its ABS loan-level initiative in December 2010 in a bid to kickstart the market. 
The aim is to improve transparency and investor confidence in the European ABS markets by compelling issuers to provide data on the underlying loans that are backing securities.  It is not compulsory. But any institution that wants to borrow from the ECB and post ABS as collateral will need to reveal the relevant data....
The key here is that the data is relevant for purposes of valuing the structured finance securities and knowing what you own.

Under the current data warehouse proposal, the data is not relevant.  It will be both out of date (it is being updated once per quarter) and incomplete (it includes data fields carefully selected by the sell-side and the industry trade group it controls).
Investors, by and large, are only confident buying the most senior tranche of a securitisation, leaving the bank with the junior tranche, against which they still have to hold capital....
A direct reflection of the opacity of the product and the inability to access all the useful, relevant data in an appropriate timely manner for use in valuing the lower tranches.
[The] market may be tentatively welcoming the idea of a data warehouse but there is still the thorny issue of who will pay for it. 
It is a well established principle that the issuer pays.  Payment for transparency should be built into each deal.

The fact that the current ECB endorsed data warehouse has adopted a business model that abandons this principale and makes the buy-side pay for data confirms the data warehouse is a sell-side initiative.

A source close to the project said that the data warehouse was keen to attract investment and was preparing to float but admitted it was not a “money-making machine” and was relying on banks to provide the investment. 

The source said: “The plan is to issue shares that will be bought by rating agencies, vendors and those that have a stake in the ABS market, namely banks. The incentive to create such a platform comes from banks because they have to sell securities and need to provide investors with transparency.” 
Why exactly would the buy-side end its strike when the proposed ABS data warehouse is designed to protect existing sell-side business models and would be controlled by investors with significant conflicts of interest with the buy-side?

For example, the reason for a rating agency to buy a stake is to protect its access to proprietary data (say data that is updated more frequently than quarterly).  After all, what value does a rating agency offer if investors and the rating agencies have access to the same data?

For example, why would anyone on the buy-side think that they had access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner when the data warehouse is owned and controlled by the banks.  The same banks that exploited their informational advantages prior to the financial crisis.

In short, the current data warehouse proposal doesn't work even with the ECB's prominent endorsement.

On the other hand, I proposed a viable data warehouse alternative prior to the beginning of the financial crisis.

It features current and complete information on the underlying loans backing the securities.  It complies with borrower privacy laws.  It doesn't have any conflicts of interest with the buy-side.  It has a business model that works.

It is time for the ECB to stop endorsing a sell-side initiative that will not end the buyers' strike and endorse my solution so that ABS can be restarted and the buyers' strike ended.

Wednesday, April 25, 2012

Goldman faces 'full discovery' on Abacus deal

Bloomberg reports that ACA Financial Guaranty Corp's lawsuit with Goldman over the Abacus deal has now moved to full discovery.

Like the 1930s Pecora Commission, it ought to be fascinating to see what full discovery turns up on how Wall Street operates.

Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) must face fraud claims brought by ACA Financial Guaranty Corp. over a mortgage-based investment that led to a settlement with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
ACA Financial sued Goldman Sachs in New York State Supreme Court in January 2011, accusing the company of fraudulent inducement, fraudulent concealment and unjust enrichment in connection with a collateralized debt obligation known as Abacus. 
Justice Barbara Kapnick threw out the unjust enrichment claim in an order dated yesterday, saying that the plaintiffs failed to establish that Goldman Sachs wrongly benefited at ACA Financial’s expense. Kapnick let stand two fraud claims in the complaint. 
“Justice Kapnick vindicated ACA’s position, and rejected all of Goldman’s arguments opposing ACA’s fraud claims,” Marc Kasowitz, a lawyer for New York-based ACA, said in an e-mailed statement. “Full discovery in this case will now proceed.” 
ACA seeks $120 million in compensation and punitive damages for the fraud claims, according to the statement.... 
Goldman Sachs agreed in July 2010 to pay $550 million, the largest penalty ever assessed by the SEC against a Wall Street firm, to settle allegations against it involving the Abacus deal.

Monday, April 16, 2012

Moody's weighs downgrading 114 banks in the EU

In an effort to remind the market that it may have access to information not available to other market participants, Moody's is talking about downgrading 114 banks in the EU.

Readers know that one of the reasons that banks should be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details is this ends the possibility of the rating firms having access to information that other market participants do not have.

Ultra transparency ends the rating firms' information advantage and the market participants' dependence on the rating firms.

With ultra transparency, the rating firms have to compete based on their analytical ability.

According to a Wall Street Journal article,
European banks are bracing for a wave of ratings downgrades in coming weeks that could intensify pressure on the fragile industry and further undercut recent efforts to defuse the Continent's long-running financial crisis. 
Under pressure from banks, Moody's Investors Service said Friday that it is delaying until early May its highly anticipated decision on whether to downgrade the credit ratings of 114 banks in 16 European countries....

Moody's said in a statement it is "taking an appropriately deliberate approach during this review process and will conclude when it is confident that all relevant information has been received and processed."
In the absence of ultra transparency, Moody's reminds the markets that it may have relevant information that other market participants do not.
While Moody's hasn't said whether and to what degree it will cut various banks' ratings, officials at multiple top European banks said they expect their grades to be knocked down at least one notch. 
The looming downgrades have ignited a scramble among some lenders and investors who fear the development could fan the smoldering crisis. 
In recent weeks, as Moody's has neared its decisions, big banks have been lobbying the ratings agency not to slap them with multi-notch downgrades, according to people familiar with the matter....
The source of this relevant information is the banks and their efforts to lobby Moody's on its ratings.
The costs associated with Moody's downgrades could be high, according to bank regulatory filings and people familiar with the matter. 
Lower ratings could prompt risk-averse institutions to withdraw deposits with banks. In addition, banks likely will be forced to put up additional collateral on derivatives transactions and in certain investment vehicles, including those housing pools of securitized assets, if their ratings are cut. 
"This is a serious problem for all European banks, especially in peripheral countries," said the chairman of a top European bank that expects to be downgraded. 
For example, Deutsche Bank AG said in its recent annual report that a one-notch downgrade of its credit rating could expose the bank to a €45 billion "funding gap."... 
RBS warned in a recent securities filing that a one-notch downgrade could require the lender to post an additional £12.5 billion of collateral. A downgrade "could significantly increase its borrowing costs and limit its issuance capacity in the capital markets," the bank said in the filing. 
Lloyds recently disclosed that if all major ratings agencies cut the bank's rating by two notches it could have to post an extra £28 billion in collateral tied to financial contracts with customers and the bank's secured funding. The bank also warned that such downgrades "could result in an outflow of £11 billion of cash."....

Some bank officials argue the impact of the downgrades is likely to be limited.... 
they say, investors and bank customers have had plenty of time to anticipate the downgrades and therefore won't be surprised.

Tuesday, April 3, 2012

Yet another RMBS lawsuit alleging fraud by Wall Street

The Telegraph reports on yet another RMBS lawsuit alleging fraud and misrepresentation in the quality of the underlying mortgages by Wall Street.  This time the lawsuit is between Ambac, a monoline insurer, and JP Morgan.

Regular readers know that requiring residential mortgage-backed securities to provide observable event driven disclosure would eliminate any possibility of the alleged behavior occurring in the future.

Under observable event driven disclosure, every time there is an observable event (for example, a payment, delinquency, default or modification) involving the underlying collateral, it is reported by 7:00 a.m. on the following business day and is easily disseminated for free to all market participants by using a data warehouse.

Observable event driven disclosure assures that all market participants have access to current information on the underlying collateral.  Hence, market participants do not have to rely on representations made about the underlying collateral, but can perform their own independent assessment.

In addition, no market participants have an information advantage based on their ownership of the billing and servicing firms.

Ambac, one of the world’s biggest bond insurers, is suing JP Morgan Chase in an effort to recover money it claims to have lost from insuring mortgage-backed securities sold by Bear Stearns. 
The insurer says that it has received claims of more than $200m (£125m) on a series of mortgage-backed bonds that it insured for Bear Stearns in 2006, according to a New York court filing. 
It is taking legal action because it alleges that Bear Stearns deceived it about the quality of the mortgages included in the securitised bonds, which have since “failed miserably” as homeowners defaulted on their payments. 
The aggressive push by Bear Stearns into the once-booming market for mortgage-backed bonds led to its collapse once US house prices began falling.... 
“Driven by management’s 'Bear don’t care’ mentality, Bear Stearns perpetrated a massive fraud that deceived investors and financial guarantors, such as Ambac, into believing that the mortgage loans backing its securitisations were originated pursuant to established underwriting guidelines and were therefore of good quality,” Ambac said in the filing. 
Ambac’s action is the latest in a spate of lawsuits that have been filed in the last year over losses incurred since the financial crisis.

Monday, April 2, 2012

CDO investor: 'no way of having equal information to Goldman'

A Reuters' article about a CDO-related lawsuit between Goldman and German state-owned Landesbank Baden-Wurtternburg confirms Wall Street's informational advantage.

Confirming that the buy-side knows about Wall Street's informational advantage is important because the buy-side is on strike and won't buy structured finance securities until this informational advantage is eliminated.

The only way to eliminate this informational advantage is to require all structured finance securities to disclose on an observable event basis all activity that occurs with the underlying collateral on the business day after the observable event occurs.

It is only with this reporting, that the buy-side always has current information on the underlying collateral's performance and can know what it owns.
It is one of the few cases to reach the appellate court level in which a sophisticated investor has accused a bank of profiting unjustly by being negligent in marketing and selling the product. 
Landesbank also accused Goldman of betting against its own derivative product that was riddled with risky residential mortgage-backed securities. 
In dismissing the case, U.S. District Judge William Pauley in New York had said the allegations against Goldman and TCW were "sparse and lack particulars" and speculated on events occurring long after Davis Square closed. 
Judges on the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals also zeroed in on whether Landesbank should have more carefully scrutinized what it was buying. 
"What does the record show about your client's diligence in the housing market during this period?" Judge Susan Carney asked Landesbank lawyer Arthur Miller. 
Miller responded that there was "no way of having equal information to Goldman," describing the investment bank as the "emperor" of financial institutions. 
Miller told the panel that Goldman knew what information the ratings agencies and the top market regulator, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, had about the quality of the underlying mortgages in the investment pool.
In addition, through its investment in sub-prime mortgage servicers, Goldman had current information that was not available to investors on how similar types of loans were performing.  As a result, it has insights into which RMBS deals were highly likely to lose value.
"They know that representing them as triple-A securities is false," Miller said, referring to the highest debt rating for a security. 
The judges also queried Goldman's lawyer about what it knew at the time about the securities and the risks to its client. 
Goldman lawyer Theodore Edelman told the panel that the firm's disclosures were "extremely clear and specific" and that the SEC website had timely information on loan delinquencies.
"All of this is available by a click of the mouse," Edelman said.
Actually, all of the data on loan delinquencies was out of date, particularly when compared to the data Goldman had access to.
In court papers, Goldman said Landesbank relied on a late 2007 report by Clayton Holdings, a provider of due diligence services to the mortgage industry. The report referred to loans that Clayton examined in 2006 and 2007, but the loans backing Davis Square were originated primarily in 2004 and 2005....
Excuse me, but Clayton Holdings did not look at the loans underlying the securities bought by the German bank.

Goldman had an informational advantage that it could have used (and, at least in the Abacus deal, was suspected by the SEC of having used). It had insight into the current performance of the loans backing the security that was not available to the German bank.
Landesbank accused Goldman of profiting unjustly from Davis Square by charging an excessively high purchase price and fees. It said Goldman also bet against the product by buying billions of dollars in credit default swaps that insured Goldman against the collapse of the mortgage securities collateral it sold to Landesbank.

Friday, March 30, 2012

Searching for muppets, the sell-side says its ok to chase yield and buy opaque securities

Having loaded up their balance sheets with opaque toxic structured finance securities, the sell-side turns to the mainstream media for help finding investing muppets.  Without questioning the message, the mainstream media 'reports' that it is ok for the buy-side to chase yield and buy these securities.

So what exactly has changed about these opaque toxic structured finance securities since investors were chasing yield and buying them before the beginning of the financial crisis?

Nothing.

They are still opaque.  A buyer of these securities is simply blindly gambling as the lack of current information on the performance of the underlying collateral makes it impossible to know what you own.

On the other hand, Wall Street has an informational advantage when it comes to these securities.  The source of this informational advantage is their ownership of the entities servicing the underlying collateral.  Wall Street can get regular updates on how the underlying collateral is performing  that are not available to investors.

Hence, only an investment muppet would buy a security that they cannot value and Wall Street can...

From a Financial Times article,
Allen Appen, head of European financing solutions at Barclays Capital, says it has taken time for the stigma attached to many European securitisation deals since the financial crisis to recede and for investors to realise that mortgage loans from Dutch and British markets have in some cases performed better than other funding instruments. 
While some European investors have been unwilling to return to the European RMBS market, a few large US banks, some of which were active before the crisis, “are now hugely acquisitive and driving the secondary market,” Mr Appen says. More recently there has been interest from large Japanese banks. 
The scale of US investor appetite can be seen in the frequency and size of dollar tranches in the new issue market, says Gareth Davies, head of European asset-backed securities and covered bond research at JPMorgan. Relative to US securitised products, the UK and Dutch markets offer more attractive value for investors, he says. 
A three-year UK, dollar-denominated RMBS transaction would print at about 140 basis points over Libor, the benchmark interbank borrowing rate, compared with its nearest US equivalent credit card-backed securities trading at nearer 14bp. 
In the US, some of the securities at the heart of the financial crisis – bonds backed by home loans struck during the boom years of the past decade – have rallied sharply this year. Amid rising hopes for US economic recovery, they have benefited from investors’ voracious appetite for yield while official benchmark rates remain very low.
But growth of the European securitisation market, and RMBS in particular, is still heavily constrained. Proponents argue that regulators have “tarred all securitisation products with the same brush”. They say the problems coming out of the US crisis related to bad loans and not to the products themselves....
Naturally that is what the sell-side and its industry trade groups would say.  They benefit from the inability of investors to be able to assess the risk and hence properly value these securities.

The products themselves are fundamentally flawed.

They are designed to be opaque.  By design, investors do not receive all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can make a fully informed investment decision.
Rick Watson, head of capital markets at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe [an affiliate of the sell-side's lobbying organization], ... says there continues to be “a misunderstanding about the differences between various securitisation products and the risks they carry”. 
How true.  Opacity guarantees that there is no way the investors can understand the risks of the various securitization products.
Work is under way on a labelling scheme that would help investors identify the highest-quality securitisation products.
Adding a label does not change whether an investor has access to the data they need in order to know what they own.

Adding a label through the Prime Collateralised Securities (PCS) initiative is simply a sell-side effort to repackage a product that is designed not to provide investors with the data they need in order to monitor or value the security.
Rebranding efforts aside, there are more fundamental issues.... 
Yes, opacity is a much more fundamental issue.

Saturday, March 3, 2012

Commodity trading sheds light on how Wall Street gains proprietary trading edge

Reuters ran an interesting article discussing the struggle between Wall Street's biggest banks and the Federal Reserve over Wall Street being able to retain their investment in warehouses, storage tanks and other hard assets.

Why is Wall Street fighting so hard to retain and expand their physical commodity operations?

For the same reason that they purchased mortgage origination and servicing operations in the years leading up to the financial crisis -- information.

Not just any type of information, but information that is the equivalent of having tomorrow's news today.

For example, mortgage originators provide information on both the mortgages they fund and the mortgages they decline and someone else funds.  It is useful to know who funded loans that did not meet your credit standards if you would like to short the market and not use mortgages you originated.

For example, mortgage servicers provide current information on mortgages because their data reflects all observable events that have occurred with the mortgages through the close of business yesterday.  This data provides an informational advantage when investors access to this same data lags by several days.

"The truth of it is that having access to the physical markets is about optimization and knowledge - it gives you the visibility of the market to make far more successful proprietary trading decisions in both physical and financial markets," said Jason Schenker, President and Chief Economist at Prestige Economics in Austin, Texas. 
"That's why for many years the most successful traders had access to both markets, and why we've seen little sign they're moving quickly to divest these assets now. It's trading with material non-public information - the difference compared with equity markets is that it's perfectly legal."
Mr. Schenker's point bears repeating.  There are markets like structured finance securities and commodities where it is legal for Wall Street to trade with material non-public information.

In the case of structured finance, there is a simple solution for leveling the playing field.  The solution is to require all structured finance securities to disclose all observable events involving their underlying collateral  one hour before the beginning of the business day following the business day on which the observable event occurred.

In the case of commodities, there is a simple solution for leveling the playing field.  The solution is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This way, market participants could see what these firm's trading positions are and adjust their exposures based on their assessment of these trading positions.

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

PIMCO to quit structured finance trade group

According to a Bloomberg article, PIMCO is going to quit the American Securitization Forum (ASF), a structured finance trade group, because it does not fairly represent the opinions of investors.

This is not surprising given that ASF was created by the sell side's lobbying group Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA).

As PIMCO has undoubtedly experience through its participation in the ECB's ABS data warehouse initiative, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME, another offspring of SIFMA and the former European Securitisation Forum) is just like ASF.

Based on the contributions that I have seen made by ASF, AFME and SIFMA to restarting the structured finance industry, it is clear that they are fighting to retain the current level of opacity in structured finance securities and the sell side's informational advantage.

For the last four years, your humble blogger has used a brown paper bag to show the current level of opacity exhibited by structured finance securities.  Simply put, market participants do not have access to current data on the performance of the underlying collateral.  Without this data, they are not investing, but gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag.

My solution has been to require all structured finance securities to provide observable event based disclosure.  An observable event for the underlying assets includes a payment, delinquency, default, bankruptcy or restructuring.  The day an observable event occurs, it is disclosed.  As a result, market participants always have access to current data on the performance of the underlying collateral and can value the structured finance security.

Pacific Investment Management Co. is quitting the American Securitization Forum (0150170D) after the trade group declined to issue a statement about investors’ views on the nationwide foreclosure settlement this month by five banks, two people with knowledge of the matter said. 
Pimco, manager of the world’s biggest bond fund, informed ASF Executive Director Tom Deutsch of its decision in early February, said the people, who requested anonymity because the talks were private. 
The episode underscored Pimco’s concern that the trade group doesn’t advocate for debt buyers as well as banks that underwrite mortgages, the people said....
This is not surprising because the lineage and heritage of ASF and AFME is as a direct descendent of the sell-side lobbying effort, SIFMA.
The ASF, which counted Pimco Managing Director Daniel Ivascyn as a board member, was founded in 2002 as part of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, Wall Street’s biggest lobbying group. In 2010, the New York-based ASF decided to become independent of Sifma. 
Bondholders asked the ASF to publish a press release on their views of the pending foreclosure settlement after being denied last month by Sifma, which cited the “potential legal issues involving the commercial interests of many of our members.” Both organizations include banks that sell, underwrite, service and trade debt. 
U.S. Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan told reporters Feb. 9 that “a relatively small share, in the range of 15 percent, of the principal reduction” for homeowners resulting from the settlement will come from investor-owned loans. 
“Nothing in it requires any trustee or servicer to reduce principal where it’s not allowed legally by the underlying documents,” Donovan said. “The misunderstanding somehow that investors will be paying the banks’ share is just false.”

The ASF is among groups vying to influence policy makers amid the largest financial regulatory overhaul since the 1930s and following a crisis triggered partly by securitization, the packaging of assets such as mortgages into bonds. 
The organization helped spur industry-led reforms meant to revive the almost-frozen market for home-loan securities that aren’t backed by the government. In August, for example, its “Project Restart” initiative offered suggested best practices for new mortgage-bond contracts to aid in dealing with claims of faulty loans....
Based on my experience, there is a gap between actual best practices and what the trade groups claim are best practices.

For example, best practice for tracking a loan portfolio is observable event based reporting and monitoring. It is what banks do internally and it is how loan databases are designed to operate.

However, the trade groups represent that once per month disclosure is best practice (this is the frequency of disclosure for opaque, toxic subprime mortgage backed securities).  Clearly it is not because the supporting information systems are capable of reporting on an observable event basis.

To regular readers, it appears that the trade groups are trying to retain opacity in structured finance and protect Wall Street's informational advantage.

Sunday, October 9, 2011

Opaque structured finance products allow Wall Street to 'swizz' market participants according to George Osborne's private secretary

As defined in the Oxford Dictionary, a swizz is something that represents a mild swindle.

The Telegraph carried a must read article on a structured product being offered by Barclays to its retail clients.

Since before the financial crisis began on August 9, 2007, your humble blogger has been advocating for disclosure.  One area I have focused on is disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that market participants could value structured finance products.

The reason it is important that market participants can value a security is that it is only with the ability to value a security that the market participant knows if the price that Wall Street is offering for the security is too high, what it should be, or a bargain.

Without the ability to value a security, Wall Street is in a position to take advantage of market participants through their marketing (think brokers...).  This situation is what the UK's George Osborne's aide would call a "swizz" and wonders why financial regulators would allow it to occur.

Please note that the same thing occurs with structured finance products sold to sophisticated investors. Examples of this include CDOs, subprime mortgage backed securities and interest rate swaps (think Jefferson County Alabama).

In short, the idea of a swizz applies to every opaque product created by Wall Street.

The only way to end this swizz is for global policymakers and financial regulators to adopt and fully implement the FDR Framework.  Under this framework, no financial product can be sold where all the useful, relevant information is not available in an appropriate, timely manner so that market participants can independently assess the risk of and value the product.
Greg Hands, personal private secretary to George Osborne and a junior member of the Treasury, said he had been offered the structured bond from Barclays as he was a customer of their stockbroking division. He said the complicated nature of the product revealed that banks still had a long way to go to make their offers transparent and suitable for investors. 
High levels of household debt and investments in unsuitable and complicated products was seen as one of the reasons for the financial crisis. 
Mr Hands, who worked in derivatives for eight years before becoming an MP, said the bond was almost impossible to price. "I do sometimes wonder about some of our banks and others with the marketing of their financial products," he said at a fringe meeting at the Conservative Party conference last week. 
No need to wonder Mr. Hands.  Yves Smith would tell you that the reason this product is being marketed is because no one on Wall Street is highly compensated for developing low margin, transparent products.
"I am a client of Barclays stockbrokers and I am amazed at some of the stuff they are putting out to purely retail individual investors, not high net worth clients." 
At the event organised by the Social Market Foundation Mr Hands then referred to the recent offer he had received from Barclays: "This is an exclusive offer until the 28 September," he said the offer document explained, before continuing: "It is a very complicated product that is a bond linked to the level of the FTSE. 
I used to price some of these products and it was not possible to price this product. I'm not saying Barclays is exceptional in this, I believe other banks are likely to be similar. But there are a very complicated set of options embedded in this product which are called in the world of derivatives an American style set of binary options where basically your capital is at risk if at any point during the next five or six years the FTSE falls below a certain level. 
"You could end up losing a considerable part of your capital which I don't think is particularly explicit in this product." 
There is no reason to believe that high net worth or sophisticated investors would be able to do a better job of pricing this product than an individual with experience like Mr. Hands.  The same lack of transparency into the true risk of the product would also be a barrier to their investment advisors in evaluating the product.
Mr Hands said that only at the bottom was there a suggestion that "structured products are not for everyone" or investors should "seek independent advice". He said many retail investors did not have access to suitable advice. "This is basically what you would call on the street a swizz....
Last night, a spokesman for Barclays said: "Barclays Stockbrokers provides a service through which clients can trade a wide range of securities. We make available from time to time structured products which enable sophisticated investors to express a view on the market. The literature complies with FSA guidelines and makes it clear investors' capital is at risk."
The problem currently is and has been since well before the beginning of the financial crisis that disclosure is inadequate.

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

FHFA lawsuit against banks over mortgage-backed securities documents Wall Street's informational advantage

The FHFA lawsuit on behalf of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac memorializes the informational advantage that Wall Street had regarding mortgage-backed securities and how Wall Street used this advantage to the detriment of other market participants.

Regular readers know that Wall Street invested in and purchased sub-prime mortgage originators and servicers to gain an informational advantage over other market participants.  Their investments and acquisitions put Wall Street's traders in the position of having tomorrow's news today while all other market participants had tomorrow's news several days or weeks later.

Your humble blogger has talked about this informational advantage since before the credit crisis.  My focus has always been on the need to eliminate this informational advantage to restore confidence in and attract investors back to the private RMBS market.

It is the FHFA lawsuit that has shown how the informational advantage could be used for fraud.  Courtney Comstock wrote a long post discussing the FHFA lawsuit, Goldman Sachs and Dan Sparks.
And there are two big reasons why the FHFA says Goldman's actions were fraudulent. In short, they are the money it paid to get a window into the mortgage origination process and Dan Sparks. 
Here's the first. From a key sentence in the FHFA lawsuit: 
Because the information that Goldman provided or caused to be provided [to ratings agencies] was false, the ratings were inflated... [and] also that Goldman Sachs knew, or was reckless in not knowing, that it was falsely representing the underlying process and riskiness of the mortgage loans... because Goldman’s longstanding relationships with the problematic originators, and its numerous roles in the securitization chain, made it uniquely positioned to know the originators had abandoned their underwriting guidelines... [and because] as a result, the GSEs paid Defendants inflated prices for purported AAA (or its equivalent) Certificates, unaware that those Certificates actually carried a severe risk of loss and inadequate credit enhancement.
The big thing here is that Goldman funded mortgage originators, who encouraged property appraisers to inflate home values by firing them if they didn't and gave half million dollar loans to people like hairdressers and gardeners.... 
Goldman is also on the hook because it saw the poor quality of the loans it bought from the mortgage originators it funded (the lawsuit says Goldman received daily updates on how many loans were delinquent), retained third-party due diligence providers to analyze those loans that it considered securitizing regardless of the delinquencies (a smart move considering that it might have absolved Goldman of responsibility for any poor-quality loans in the Securitizations) but Goldman didn't listen to the companies' recommendations to exclude a significant number of loans. Goldman included the loans in its Securitizations anyway. Then it got the ratings agencies to rate them attractively. But it stated in offering documents that the loans had generally met the guidelines of the due diligence review.
Please re-read the highlighted section of the lawsuit again.

Your humble blogger has been saying since before the start of the financial crisis that all structured finance market participants should have access to daily updates on all the observable events that occurred involving the underlying loans.  Observable events include payments and non-payments/delinquencies!

Compare and contrast the use by Wall Street of observable event based information to the once-per-month disclosure that the Wall Street dominated industry trade groups (American Securitization Forum and the European Securitisation Forum/Association for Financial Markets in Europe) have argued is adequate to the SEC, ECB, BoE and CEBS - regulators who tried to bring asset-level performance transparency to structured finance.

Clearly, the trade groups are trying to protect Wall Street's informational advantage.  However, with the FHFA lawsuit, Wall Street's informational advantage is over as all market participants will have to have access on an observable event basis.

ECB ABS Data Warehouse: Impact of FHFA suing banks over mortgage-backed securities

The FHFA suing many of the world's largest financial institutions over mortgage-backed securities is the last nail in the coffin for the Market Group's current implementation of the ECB's ABS data warehouse.

Simply put, the questions at the heart of the lawsuit are what did the financial institutions know and when did they know it with regards to the underlying loans.

These questions highlight why no investor, and this includes government agencies and central banks, is going to rely on loan performance information that is not as current as the information that Wall Street has.  Wall Street has observable event performance information and that is what investors are going to require too.

These questions are also the last nail in the coffin for the Market Group's current implementation of the ECB's ABS data warehouse because it is focused on once-per-month data that no investor is going to want.

My firm holds a US patent on an ABS data warehouse providing observable event performance information.  Since all ABS deals have a component that is aimed at US investors, anyone offering observable event performance information through an ABS data warehouse is going to need a license.

The Market Group is welcome to apply for a license.

Thursday, September 1, 2011

Proposed deal between banks and NY regulator highlights Wall Street's information advantage

In its discussion of the proposed deal between the NY and the banks over mortgage servicing, the Wall Street Journal article highlighted Wall Street's informational advantage.

Specifically, the article lays out Wall Street's motive for purchasing mortgage loan servicers.  The motive was to access information that was not available to other market participants and use this data in their trading strategies.

As this blog has pointed out on several occasions, the data that was available from mortgage loan servicers was the current information on the performance of the loans.  This data was the equivalent of having tomorrow's news today given the fact that other market participants only received this data later in a once per month report.

Goldman bought Litton, a major servicer of subprime loans, in 2007 as house prices were tanking in a bid to gather data on the mortgage market and build a subprime portfolio. 
Goldman at that time was making bearish bets on the mortgage market and creating securities for investors who wanted to make bearish bets. 
But the market downturn meant the subprime business never turned into the profit center Goldman expected, and the firm decided last year to try to sell Litton.
Actually, Goldman made quite a bit of money in its trading strategies based off of the information it obtained from its investments in the mortgage origination and servicing areas.

Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Borrowing a page from the sub-prime mortgage playbook, Wall Street buys commodity servicers

The Wall Street Journal ran an article on how Wall Street has moved into the commodity storage business.  The parallels between Wall Street's activities in servicing commodities and servicing sub-prime mortgage securities are unmistakable.
About 600 miles from Wall Street, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. employees are busy doing deals.  But instead of a sleek office tower, they work in a rundown warehouse deep in an industrial section of Detroit. And rather than trading in stocks or bonds, they move metal—lots of metal. 
Goldman's warehouse on the banks of the Detroit River is one of more than 100 storage facilities controlled by the giant securities firm around the world. The warehouses are part of Wall Street's effort to forge a new frontier in the commodities markets: warehousing metal. 
In the past 18 months, Goldman, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and trading firms Glencore International PLC and Trafigura Beheer BV have snapped up warehouse operators, all of them accredited to house metal traded through the London Metal Exchange, or LME. The buying binge means the four firms now are landlords to about two-thirds of the LME's entire metal stocks, from aluminum to copper to zinc. 
LME metal stocks represent a small portion of the global supply. For example, LME's total aluminum stocks are about 4.5 million tons, or about 10% of the world's annual supply. 
For Wall Street, warehouses are a way to earn extra income, especially as core businesses like trading are suffering. The facilities represent a relatively small but profitable way to bet on commodities markets without actually trading, the firms said. 
The investment in sub-prime mortgage servicers were also a small but profitable way to bet on the mortgage markets without actually trading.
But the growing muscle of securities firms in the metal-storage business is riling users and traders, who say the firms have both a bird's-eye view of supply and demand and the ability to control what goes in and out of their warehouses. These traders worry the firms could exploit their knowledge.
The investment in sub-prime mortgage servicers also provided Wall Street with a bird's-eye view of the supply and demand for sub-prime mortgages as well as their performance (equivalent to what goes in and out of a warehouse).  It is well documented that the Wall Street firms did exploit this informational advantage.
The new owners say they keep their trading arms and warehouse operations separate, and there is no evidence to suggest they share information. 
In the case of sub-prime mortgage servicers, there was plenty of evidence of information sharing.  For example, at Goldman Sachs, Dan Sparks, a senior member of the mortgage trading team, sat on the Board of Directors for Senderra, a national sub-prime mortgage originator and servicer.

In the case of commodities, one of Wall Street's famous Chinese Walls must be preventing information sharing.
Traders and metal users have complained to the U.K.'s competition watchdog and the LME about companies acting as both trader and warehouse keeper.
Apparently traders and metal users think that allowing companies to act as both trader and warehouse keeper unnecessarily tilts what would be a level playing field for no apparent improvement in the market.
On Thursday, the Office of Fair Trade said the complaints lacked substance, and the agency won't investigate. The LME says it has no evidence to support claims the warehouses are used to gain an unfair advantage. 
The SEC also did not have a problem with Wall Street owning the sub-prime servicers even though these servicers provided the trading areas with the equivalent of inside information.

It is interesting that regulators consistently allow Wall Street to be in a position where, should its Chinese walls fail, it can tilt the playing field.  Why are regulators willing to run this risk?
Goldman's operations in Detroit are at the center of the controversy, because aluminum prices are higher in that area than the trading price in London, and Goldman controls most of the warehouses in Detroit. Warehouses like the one along the Detroit River hold about one million tons of aluminum, or almost 25% of the LME's stocks. 
Metal users such as beverage giant Coca-Cola Co. and can maker Novelis Inc. have expressed concern to the LME that the Detroit warehouses send out too little of the commodities they need. The LME has responded by instructing warehouse to release more commodities. 
"This is inappropriate," says Nick Madden, chief procurement officer at Novelis, referring to the release limits and the wait to receive aluminum. Warehouses in Detroit owned by Goldman are only required to release 1,500 metric tons of metals a day. The warehouse only rarely surpasses this limit, according to LME data. 
Novelis, a beverage-can maker, is the largest user of aluminum in the U.S. "We see it as very unhealthy for the market," he says. "The ultimate bill goes to the consumers." 
Procurement officers at Coke and Novelis have said the limited releases are driving metal costs higher. A Goldman spokesman says its warehouse unit "is fulfilling the LME's requirements." 
With record levels of commodities piling up, companies that own the warehouses are raking in nearly $1 billion in rental revenue each year, according to LME data. 
Here is how it works: If a producer or merchant needs to store some aluminum, for example, it sends the metal to a warehouse, paying rent every day. In Detroit, Goldman charges 41 cents per metric ton of aluminum per day, or about $150 a year, according to LME data. The rent is offset by big cash incentives warehouses pay to attract metal. But with millions of tons in storage, even a difference of a few dollars of income per ton can quickly add up.
The business was a backwater in the commodities markets for decades, dominated by small, independent operators. Then the financial crisis put the industry on the radar screens of Wall Street firms looking for new ways to make money. The firms correctly predicted a slump in metal demand during the recession, increasing the need for storage. 
In 2010, J.P. Morgan acquired Henry Bath & Son as part of the New York bank's purchase of RBS Sempra Commodities. Goldman bought Metro International Trade Services LLC, a Romulus, Mich., warehousing company, for an undisclosed sum. Trafigura, the world's second-largest metal trader after Glencore, purchased U.K.-based NEMS Ltd. Glencore paid $209 million for Pacorini Metals, the metal-storage business of Pacorini Group, an Italian, family-run firm. 
"The warehouses give the banks exposure to commodities without them having to be involved in price volatility," said Clare Eilbeck, a metals researcher at Brook Hunt, a subsidiary of commodities consulting firm Wood Mackenzie. 
Simon Collins, a director at Trafigura, says the Amsterdam-based firm sees its warehouses as a "recession hedge" when other businesses slow. 
So far, the frenzy of warehouse buying is paying off. Glencore's Pacorini earned profits of $31 million in 2010 on revenue of $220 million, according to its recent initial-public-offering prospectus. Henry Bath was one of the biggest contributors to J.P. Morgan's base-metal business in the first five months of this year, according to people familiar with the matter. A J.P. Morgan spokeswoman declined to comment. A Glencore spokesman also declined to comment. 
In Detroit, Goldman often offers a discount to attract customers to its warehouses but sometimes forces buyers to wait seven months or longer to get their inventory back, according to some users and LME data. 
As a result of recent complaints, the LME will require most warehouses to release more metal on a daily basis starting next April. But analysts say the exchange's move isn't enough to alleviate the delays.