Showing posts with label Conflicts of Interest. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Conflicts of Interest. Show all posts

Saturday, December 8, 2012

Survey finds bank staff still feels pressured to sell unsuitable products

The Guardian reports that a survey of bank staff performed by a UK consumer group, Which?, found that the bank staff still feels pressure to sell products even if they are unsuitable for the client.

In his Bloomberg column, Jonathan Weil linked this pressure to sell unsuitable products to why Glass-Steagall separated commercial and investment banking.
There’s a better argument for separating securities firms from commercial banks: to protect consumers. 
The banking industry has a long history of preying on unsophisticated depositors by selling them garbage investments without regard to suitability. 
 From the Guardian,

Staff at Britain's big five banks feel under pressure to sell to customers, according to research by Which?, despite promises the institutions have changed their ways and removed the incentive schemes that fuelled the mis-selling scandals of the past.
Interviews with more than 550 frontline staff found that despite the banks paying billions of pounds in compensation to consumers for mis-selling insurance and investment products, nearly half of those employed in a sales role felt they were expected to push products, regardless of whether they were appropriate to the customer....
"Our survey reveals the stark realities of the sales culture that still exists at the heart of the banking industry," Peter Vicary-Smith, chief executive of Which?, said. 
"Senior bankers say the culture is changing, but this shows it just isn't filtering through to staff on the frontline who remain under real pressure to put sales before service, even after incentives are taken away." 
The survey comes as banks are still dealing with the fallout from the scandal of mis-selling payment protection insurance, which resulted from years of offering staff heavy incentives to push the cover. 
Although many of the banks have since adjusted their incentive schemes, Which?'s research suggests they are still operating sales drives that focus on numbers rather than customers, with four in 10 of those questioned saying that they took part in "power hours" where they had to make a certain volume of sales within a designated period of time. 
"This proves the need for big change across the industry and for bankers to put customers first, not sales," Vicary-Smith said. "We're calling on the banks to be much more transparent about their sales targets and incentives....
Please note that once again transparency is being called on as sunshine is the best disinfectant for bad behavior by bankers.

Tuesday, September 11, 2012

Don't let bankers police themselves or Libor

The Bloomberg editors make the case for why bankers should not police themselves or Libor.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has recommended as the permanent solution for fixing the problems with the Libor interest rates that banks be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This disclosure is needed so that banks with deposits to lend can assess the risk of the banks looking to borrow.  This unfreezes and keeps unfrozen the interbank lending market.

This disclosure is needed so that the Libor interest rates can be based off of all or a subset of the actual trades.

I have recommended that this disclosure be collected, standardized (including stripping off borrower privacy protected information) and disseminated by a data warehouse.  The day to day operation of the data warehouse should be run by a global information technology firm with no conflicts of interest in the dissemination of the data.

Overseeing the global information technology firm and coordinating all aspects of the data warehouse is a firm with the subject matter expertise.  This firm must have no conflicts of interests including any ownership by the banks.  This firm's sole business should be making sure the data warehouse provides reliable information.

From the Bloomberg editors,

Sooner or later, the global inquiry into the rigging of Libor will have to deal with a sticky issue: what to do with the British Bankers’ Association, the trade group that was supposed to guarantee the integrity of one of the world’s most important financial benchmarks. 
Founded in 1919, the BBA exists primarily to lobby for the interests of its member banks.... 
If the BBA had set out to design a system that its members could manipulate, it couldn’t have done a much better job. Instead of using the interest rates from actual transactions, the association relies on banks to report their borrowing costs. The chairmen of the committees that are supposed to oversee Libor, investigate misbehavior and impose sanctions are all from contributing institutions. Absurdly, the BBA won’t say whether the committees have ever taken any enforcement actions, and keeps secret the names of all the committee members. That amounts to letting the banks act as police, judge and jury in a Star Chamber.

We now know that bankers exploited Libor’s flaws as early as the 1990s. They manipulated their numbers to improve traders’ profits and to hide their financial troubles. 
All the while, the BBA demonstrated its utter inability -- or unwillingness -- to stop it. There is even evidence suggesting the BBA was complicit.
Consider, for example, a conversation between a senior Barclays Plc manager and a BBA representative cited in the bank’s settlement with the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. 
In April 2008, when a Wall Street Journal article questioned the integrity of Libor, the manager “informed BBA in a telephone call that it had not been reporting accurately, although he noted that Barclays was not the worst offender of the panel bank members. ‘We’re clean, but we’re dirty-clean, rather than clean-clean.’ The BBA representative responded, ‘no one’s clean-clean.’” 
The BBA’s response has been a case study in self-regulation gone wrong. Throughout the period of manipulation, the BBA consistently claimed that Libor was reliable....
The primary reason that self-regulation goes wrong is opacity.  In the case of setting the Libor interest rate, without disclosure of the actual trades, banks were free to engage in misbehavior and manipulate the rate.
Given the BBA’s history and inherent conflicts, it’s hard to imagine how it could be found fit and proper to manage Libor. This is a big problem, because the association owns the Libor trademark. Hundreds of trillions of dollars in financial contracts cite BBA Libor.
In order to restore trust in Libor, besides requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, it is critical to eliminate, where possible, all conflicts of interest in the operation and management of the data warehouse.

That is why I stressed the need for the firm coordinating all aspects of the data warehouse and overseeing the information technology firm running the database to be free of all conflicts of interest.

Introducing conflicts of interest creates doubt about the trustworthiness of the data for no benefit.
Even if the market moves to a different benchmark, as Bloomberg View has advocated, those legacy contracts will be around for decades. 
What to do?....
Have the data warehouse license the BBA Libor trademark for 1 pound per year.  
One option is to bring the currently unregulated Libor process under the purview of U.K. financial authorities. Regulators could sit on the Libor oversight committees and set enforceable rules for contributing banks. They could also mandate more transparency by requiring contributors to publish information on actual borrowing transactions, against which a bank’s Libor quotes could be checked.
As per the recommendation of your humble blogger.
Ideally, the BBA should be removed from the picture. U.K. regulators persuaded Barclays Chief Executive Officer Robert Diamond to step down; they should put similar pressure on the BBA to sell Libor. 
An organization such as a financial exchange or financial information company would have an incentive to guarantee the benchmark’s accuracy. (Disclosure: Bloomberg LP, the parent of Bloomberg News, has proposed its own alternative to Libor, and is a competitor of Thomson Reuters Corp., which conducts Libor surveys on behalf of the BBA.)
No reason to use an existing market competitor with a conflict of interest to operate and manage this database.  This creates an un-level competitive playing field for no advantage.

Rather, use the conflict of interest free coordinator and global information technology firm as I suggested.

Patrick Honohan: Some lessons from Irish experience on when and how to recapitalize banks

Irish central bank governor Patrick Honohan delivered an interesting speech at the 44th annual Trinity College Money, Macro and Finance conference on some lessons from the Irish experience on when and how to recapitalize banks.

He concludes
Prompt, transparent over-capitalisation in a systemic crisis should remain the preferred option for dealing with failing banks that it is deemed necessary to save.
Regular readers know that with the design of a modern banking system, it is not necessary to bailout and recapitalize any bank.  By design, banks can continue to operate for years and support the real economy while they have low or even negative book capital levels.

The reason they can do this is deposit insurance.  Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the bank's silent equity partner during periods when they are rebuilding their book capital levels.  There is no need to bailout the bank and make the taxpayer the explicit owner of the bank.
Losses should be shared by both junior and senior creditors where necessary (unless the amounts involved are small) in cases where the banks are put into resolution. 
This is call for implementing the Swedish model and requiring banks to absorb the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and not have these losses socialized.
Experience shows, however, that this may be a counsel of perfection not always achievable.... 
Why would this always not be achievable?
it proved hard to generate reliable and precise information quickly. Clearly it would have been better if comprehensive accurate estimates of future loan-losses had been available from the outset.  However, despite best efforts, accurate information emerged only slowly. 
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Professor Honohan has made the case for requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

This disclosure provides the precise, reliable information needed.

With this disclosure, market participants have the information they need to analyze each bank and create an up to date estimate of future loan-losses.
Given the early decision to socialise the losses by guaranteeing all senior debt and some subordinated debt for two years, the scope for over-capitalisation was very limited in Ireland because the Government’s finances quickly became over-stressed. 
By removing the possibility of more extensive burden-sharing with private creditors, the initial guarantee narrowed the options available to Irish policymakers and pushed public debt levels to the limits of sustainability.  
Not only was over-capitalisation no longer a serious option and the chance of deeper burden-sharing with bank creditors shut-off, but in addition some resolution actions had to be deferred lest they trigger an immediate cash call on the guarantee...
And who offered the advice to guarantee all senior debt and some subordinated debt before getting the precise, reliable information to determine exactly how much in the way of future loan losses might be on the banks' balance sheets?

Why the bankers!

Bankers with an extraordinary conflict of interest who stood to gain substantially if the advice they provided was acted on as it would be the Irish economy and taxpayer who absorbed the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and not the banks.

I bet the bankers did not explain to the Irish government how their advice was likely to bankrupt Ireland while at the same time letting the bankers escape any losses for having made bad lending or investment decisions.

Friday, August 10, 2012

Justice Department finds 'no viable basis' to prosecute Goldman for its activities involving sub-prime RMBS

CNN reports that despite a Senate inquiry recommending legal action against Goldman for its sub-prime RMBS activities, the Justice Department has decided to take no action.
The Justice Department says after a "careful review" it has determined there is no basis for bringing a criminal prosecution against Goldman Sachs or its employees in regard to allegations set forth in a congressional report.
This is not a surprising conclusion as the Justice Department has consistently managed to minimize the number of individuals or companies prosecuted in connection with the financial crisis.
In an unsigned statement from the Justice Department issued Thursday night, it said the department conducted an exhaustive review for more than a year examining allegations in the Levine-Coburn Report. 
Headed by Sen. Carl Levin, D-Michigan, and Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Oklahoma, the 635-page report in 2011 singled out Goldman and Deutsche Bank as examples of Wall Street firms that reaped huge profits by marketing securities backed by subprime mortgages as safe investments to clients, even as the banks bet against these very same securities. 
"In my judgment, Goldman clearly misled their clients and they misled Congress," Levin told reporters on a conference call in April 2011. The Senate subcommittee, which spent two years on the investigation, based its report on thousands of internal company documents and e-mails, as well as hundreds of interviews and congressional testimony....
So the firm that paid $550 million for its role in the Abacus deal and sold other deals like Timberwolf walks away...
Goldman Sachs spokesman David Wells said in a statement, "We are pleased that this matter is behind us."
No kidding.

Tuesday, January 17, 2012

Economists' 'Inside Job' problem requires more than just disclosure

Bloomberg published an interesting column on the American Economic Association's new guidelines that require economists to disclose all potential conflicts of interest when publishing papers or making public comments.

This disclosure should be valuable, particularly if the press refers to it when seeking public comments.

However, this disclosure does not go far enough.

In the course of discussing the form of this disclosure, economists also talked about creating the equivalent of the Hippocratic Oath for economists ('do no harm').

While I think this is moving in the right direction, I much prefer a simpler disclosure attached to all economic papers:
The following are the three most important assumptions on which this paper is based.  If they are not correct, accepting or applying any aspect of this paper, including its recommendations, is likely to cause significant economic damage.
Please note that this puts a heavy responsibility on the author and the reviewers of the paper.  Between them, they have to actually ask the question of what are the three most important assumptions on which the paper is based.

Let me give you an example of how this might work.

The paper, Haircuts, I have chosen was written by Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick.  They examine what they refer to as the 'Run on the Repo' and assert that the financial crisis that began in August 2007 was a banking panic that resulted from the previously informationally insensitive debt, the repos, becoming informationally sensitive.
The following are the three most important assumption on which this paper is based.  If they are not correct, accepting or applying any aspect of this paper, including its recommendations, is likely to cause significant economic damage.
  1. The invisible hand does not require that buyers know what they are buying.  [In Econ 101, everyone is taught that the necessary condition for the invisible hand to work properly is that buyers know what they are buying.  Therefore, if buyers have to know what they are buying, then by definition there can be no such thing as informationally insensitive debt.]
  2. The invisible hand can work properly in the presence of information asymmetry.  [In Econ 101, everyone is taught that if one party has more information than another, the price a good exchanges between the two parties will favor the party with more information.]
  3. The invisible hand can work properly in the presence of opacity.  [In Econ 101, everyone is taught that prior to buying a good/security buyers must have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  Opacity exists when the buyer does not have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  The result of opacity is that the buyer cannot properly assess the value of the good/security and an exchange will mis-price the good/security.]
Professor Gorton was a derivatives consultant for AIG and developed a model used by AIG to assemble a large portfolio of derivative contracts on sub-prime mortgage backed securities.

Friday, August 5, 2011

Finalist for ECB ABS data warehouse could have problems

According to a NY Times article, the New York Attorney General contents that Bank of New York Mellon breached its duties as trustee for several Countrywide residential mortgage backed securities.

Whether the attorney general is right or not, his actions once again highlight why everyone involved in controlling and operating a financial information vendor like the ABS data warehouse must be free of conflicts of interest.  If there are conflicts of interest present, market participants will not trust the data.
Mr. Schneiderman’s contention that Bank of New York breached its duties to investors is significant because a trustee that agrees to oversee loan pools like those issued by Countrywide must abide by the rules governing the securities. Such rules require that lenders deliver to the trust complete and original mortgage documents for each loan in a pool, for example, and require that the trustee notify investors when such loan documents are missing. 
Bank of New York led investors in the Countrywide pools to believe that the lender had in fact delivered complete and adequate mortgage files for each loan as was required, the lawsuit said. The bank also misled investors by confirming that loan files relating to hundreds of thousands of mortgages were complete. 
But the bank failed in these duties, the attorney general’s complaint said. After conducting a review of court records in the Bronx and Westchester County, Mr. Schneiderman’s investigators have determined that Bank of New York did not ensure that notes underlying properties were delivered properly to some trusts, according to the lawsuit. If loan documents were not delivered as required to the trustee, investors could recover the money they invested in the mortgages. 
“Investors in the trusts were misled by Bank of New York Mellon into believing that Bank of New York Mellon would review the loan files for the mortgages securing their investment, and that any deficiencies would be cured,” the lawsuit said.

Friday, July 22, 2011

ECB set to select advisor to restore confidence in Irish banking system

A Reuters' article discussed how the ECB is in the process of selecting advisors to help it deal with both a restructuring of the Irish banking system and the management of its own exposure.

Ultimately, the solution to both of these issues goes under the broader heading of restoring confidence in the Irish banking system.  For example, with the restoration of confidence, private investors and depositors will provide the funds the Irish banks need to repay the ECB funding.

The question is what does it take to restore confidence in the Irish banking system?

Regular readers know that restoring confidence requires adoption and implementation of the FDR Framework.

The key to restoring confidence is making available to market participants all the useful, relevant information on the Irish banks in an appropriate, timely manner.  This information consists of the banks' current asset and liability-level data.

Market participants, knowing that they are responsible for any gains or losses on investments in these banks, will analyze this data to understand the risk/reward of an investment.  Confident in their analysis, market participants can then make a decision to invest.

Absent current asset and liability-level disclosure, any solution that the select advisor(s) propose will not work and is not worth the money spent for the advice.

This is not the first time your humble blogger has made this observation with respect to Ireland.  It is a matter of record that before Ireland spent a significant amount of money on a BlackRock Solution led stress test and bank restructuring your humble blogger said it would not restore confidence.  It is a matter of record that the exercise failed to restore confidence.
The European Central Bank is in the closing stages of appointing advisers to help it deal with Ireland's battered banking system and manage its own exposure to the heavily indebted country. 
The ECB asked potential advisers at the end of April to make proposals on how best to restructure Ireland's banking system, reduce banks' dependency on ECB funding and sell off their assets or alternatively transfer them to resolution funds....   
Only a handful of financial advisers were invited to pitch to the ECB, in part because institutions such as Barclays Capital, BlackRock Solutions and Boston Consulting Group might face a conflict after advising the Central Bank of Ireland in the run up to its stress tests. 
The conflict these firms face is their recommended solution failed to restore confidence.
The ECB could pick from the biggest debt restructuring houses like Rothschild -- which was the main adviser for the previous Irish government -- and Lazard. 
In November investment banks including Bank of America Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs and UBS headed to Dublin to counsel the government and banks.
Aside from bank advisers, fixed income independent advisory firms like AGFE and Stormharbour have built specialist teams, as have alternative asset managers, such as BlackRock Solutions and PIMCO.
Other than adopting disclosure as recommended by your humble blogger, what these firms have to offer are variations of solutions that Barclays, BlackRock Solutions and Boston Consulting previously rejected as inferior to the failed stress test and bank restructuring they led.  The problems identified with these variations that made them inferior to the failed stress test and bank restructuring still exist.

More importantly, there is no reason to believe that the variations of the solutions that Barclays, BlackRock Solutions and Boston Consulting previously rejected will restore confidence.
The dependency of Irish and other periphery banks on the ECB is complicating the process of raising interest rates, and runs the risk of tarnishing the image of its lending operations.
Actually, what tarnishes the ECB's image is the activities it undertakes that are outside of its staff's highly regarded expertise in the conduct of monetary policy.  Examples of these activities outside the expertise of the ECB's staff include the ECB's attempts to restore confidence in the Irish national banking system or to bring transparency to the market for structured finance securities.

In attempting to restore confidence in the Irish banking system, the ECB is tarnishing its image.  It does this by appearing to practice Albert Einstein's definition of insanity:  doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results.  The Irish have already tried investment banking, asset management and global management consulting firms and this has not worked to restore confidence.  Why would trying other firms from these industries as advisors produce a different result?

In attempting to bring transparency to the structured finance securities market, the ECB is permanently staining its image.  This blog has documented three significant problems with the ECB's solution.  Its proposed ABS data warehouse violates fair disclosure regulations.  It provides updated data on a frequency not satisfactory for timely rating changes or knowing what you own under Article 122a of the Capital Requirements Directive.  It features exactly the types of conflicts of interest in control of a data vendor that the European Union's Competition Committee does not want.  Each of these problems by itself should have caused the ECB to announce that it was withdrawing its proposal and going to rethink how it pursued this initiative.  Instead, the ECB has carried on as if these problems do not exist.
The decision to go to the private sector is evidence of the problems the ECB has encountered over the past two years in trying to come up with an in-house plan to wean weak banks off its liquidity support.     
It came close to launching a medium-term funding facility for Irish banks, which it hoped could have been a template for others, back in March, but eventually shelved the plans after hitting resistance from some of its own policymakers. 
The ECB is estimated to have bought around 15-20 billion euros of Irish government debt under its controversial bond buy programme. 
Irish banks are also borrowing almost a quarter of all the money it lends, leaving the ECB with over 100 billion euros worth of Irish collateral on its balance sheet. 
The Irish banking system has encountered the modern equivalent of a bank run.  Market participants do not know which banks are solvent and which are not. Because solvency is the issue, it is not surprising to see investors and depositors reducing their exposure to these banks.  As this occurs, the ECB is required to step up and cover the shortfall in funding at the banks.

It is not surprising that any in-house plan that did not involve disclosing all the current asset and liability-level data to market participants has failed.  Disclosing this data to a limited group of market participants in the Irish stress tests also failed. 
The proposal that the ECB's market operations and financial stability departments sent to potential advisers specified that the bank was looking for an independent assessment and a set of recommendations guided by the ECB's policy objective.
My firm could take on the assignment.
The winner of the main 3 million euro contract, which lasts until the end of 2011 but could be extended, will have to provide updates to the ECB before each EU/ECB/IMF mission to Dublin, meaning the first recommendations are likely to come around mid-October. 
Unlike the firms that assisted in running the latest Irish stress test and reorganization that failed to restore investor confidence, my firm would be willing to put some of its fee at risk that its solution will restore investor confidence.
Staff teams from this "troika" published the outcome of their latest quarterly review this week. 
The ECB's requirements include an assessment of how much capital Irish banks require for markets to perceive them as safe.
Why guess how much capital is needed for markets to perceive the Irish banks as safe when providing disclosure results in the markets telling everyone how much capital is required for the markets to think the Irish banks are safe?
It also wants opinions on liquidation prices and investor demand for various types of banks' assets, including potential proposals for the consultant to partner with private equity or distressed debt specialists to sell assets, and an assessment of the potential for selling securities backed by banks' assets.
Again, why guess when by providing disclosure to the markets the answer can be known?  Without the answer from the market, all the solutions the ECB is looking at are designed to maximize the looting of the Irish.

I look forward to advising the ECB and restoring confidence in the Irish banking system.


Wednesday, July 6, 2011

Borrowing a page from the sub-prime mortgage playbook, Wall Street buys commodity servicers

The Wall Street Journal ran an article on how Wall Street has moved into the commodity storage business.  The parallels between Wall Street's activities in servicing commodities and servicing sub-prime mortgage securities are unmistakable.
About 600 miles from Wall Street, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. employees are busy doing deals.  But instead of a sleek office tower, they work in a rundown warehouse deep in an industrial section of Detroit. And rather than trading in stocks or bonds, they move metal—lots of metal. 
Goldman's warehouse on the banks of the Detroit River is one of more than 100 storage facilities controlled by the giant securities firm around the world. The warehouses are part of Wall Street's effort to forge a new frontier in the commodities markets: warehousing metal. 
In the past 18 months, Goldman, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and trading firms Glencore International PLC and Trafigura Beheer BV have snapped up warehouse operators, all of them accredited to house metal traded through the London Metal Exchange, or LME. The buying binge means the four firms now are landlords to about two-thirds of the LME's entire metal stocks, from aluminum to copper to zinc. 
LME metal stocks represent a small portion of the global supply. For example, LME's total aluminum stocks are about 4.5 million tons, or about 10% of the world's annual supply. 
For Wall Street, warehouses are a way to earn extra income, especially as core businesses like trading are suffering. The facilities represent a relatively small but profitable way to bet on commodities markets without actually trading, the firms said. 
The investment in sub-prime mortgage servicers were also a small but profitable way to bet on the mortgage markets without actually trading.
But the growing muscle of securities firms in the metal-storage business is riling users and traders, who say the firms have both a bird's-eye view of supply and demand and the ability to control what goes in and out of their warehouses. These traders worry the firms could exploit their knowledge.
The investment in sub-prime mortgage servicers also provided Wall Street with a bird's-eye view of the supply and demand for sub-prime mortgages as well as their performance (equivalent to what goes in and out of a warehouse).  It is well documented that the Wall Street firms did exploit this informational advantage.
The new owners say they keep their trading arms and warehouse operations separate, and there is no evidence to suggest they share information. 
In the case of sub-prime mortgage servicers, there was plenty of evidence of information sharing.  For example, at Goldman Sachs, Dan Sparks, a senior member of the mortgage trading team, sat on the Board of Directors for Senderra, a national sub-prime mortgage originator and servicer.

In the case of commodities, one of Wall Street's famous Chinese Walls must be preventing information sharing.
Traders and metal users have complained to the U.K.'s competition watchdog and the LME about companies acting as both trader and warehouse keeper.
Apparently traders and metal users think that allowing companies to act as both trader and warehouse keeper unnecessarily tilts what would be a level playing field for no apparent improvement in the market.
On Thursday, the Office of Fair Trade said the complaints lacked substance, and the agency won't investigate. The LME says it has no evidence to support claims the warehouses are used to gain an unfair advantage. 
The SEC also did not have a problem with Wall Street owning the sub-prime servicers even though these servicers provided the trading areas with the equivalent of inside information.

It is interesting that regulators consistently allow Wall Street to be in a position where, should its Chinese walls fail, it can tilt the playing field.  Why are regulators willing to run this risk?
Goldman's operations in Detroit are at the center of the controversy, because aluminum prices are higher in that area than the trading price in London, and Goldman controls most of the warehouses in Detroit. Warehouses like the one along the Detroit River hold about one million tons of aluminum, or almost 25% of the LME's stocks. 
Metal users such as beverage giant Coca-Cola Co. and can maker Novelis Inc. have expressed concern to the LME that the Detroit warehouses send out too little of the commodities they need. The LME has responded by instructing warehouse to release more commodities. 
"This is inappropriate," says Nick Madden, chief procurement officer at Novelis, referring to the release limits and the wait to receive aluminum. Warehouses in Detroit owned by Goldman are only required to release 1,500 metric tons of metals a day. The warehouse only rarely surpasses this limit, according to LME data. 
Novelis, a beverage-can maker, is the largest user of aluminum in the U.S. "We see it as very unhealthy for the market," he says. "The ultimate bill goes to the consumers." 
Procurement officers at Coke and Novelis have said the limited releases are driving metal costs higher. A Goldman spokesman says its warehouse unit "is fulfilling the LME's requirements." 
With record levels of commodities piling up, companies that own the warehouses are raking in nearly $1 billion in rental revenue each year, according to LME data. 
Here is how it works: If a producer or merchant needs to store some aluminum, for example, it sends the metal to a warehouse, paying rent every day. In Detroit, Goldman charges 41 cents per metric ton of aluminum per day, or about $150 a year, according to LME data. The rent is offset by big cash incentives warehouses pay to attract metal. But with millions of tons in storage, even a difference of a few dollars of income per ton can quickly add up.
The business was a backwater in the commodities markets for decades, dominated by small, independent operators. Then the financial crisis put the industry on the radar screens of Wall Street firms looking for new ways to make money. The firms correctly predicted a slump in metal demand during the recession, increasing the need for storage. 
In 2010, J.P. Morgan acquired Henry Bath & Son as part of the New York bank's purchase of RBS Sempra Commodities. Goldman bought Metro International Trade Services LLC, a Romulus, Mich., warehousing company, for an undisclosed sum. Trafigura, the world's second-largest metal trader after Glencore, purchased U.K.-based NEMS Ltd. Glencore paid $209 million for Pacorini Metals, the metal-storage business of Pacorini Group, an Italian, family-run firm. 
"The warehouses give the banks exposure to commodities without them having to be involved in price volatility," said Clare Eilbeck, a metals researcher at Brook Hunt, a subsidiary of commodities consulting firm Wood Mackenzie. 
Simon Collins, a director at Trafigura, says the Amsterdam-based firm sees its warehouses as a "recession hedge" when other businesses slow. 
So far, the frenzy of warehouse buying is paying off. Glencore's Pacorini earned profits of $31 million in 2010 on revenue of $220 million, according to its recent initial-public-offering prospectus. Henry Bath was one of the biggest contributors to J.P. Morgan's base-metal business in the first five months of this year, according to people familiar with the matter. A J.P. Morgan spokeswoman declined to comment. A Glencore spokesman also declined to comment. 
In Detroit, Goldman often offers a discount to attract customers to its warehouses but sometimes forces buyers to wait seven months or longer to get their inventory back, according to some users and LME data. 
As a result of recent complaints, the LME will require most warehouses to release more metal on a daily basis starting next April. But analysts say the exchange's move isn't enough to alleviate the delays. 

Wednesday, June 29, 2011

ECB's ABS Data Warehouse and Why issuers always pay for disclosure

To date, I have documented two strikes against the Market Group's version of the ECB data warehouse and why it is unlikely to restore investor confidence in the structured finance market.  They are:

  • It is riddled with conflicts of interest that most likely will not be acceptable to investors or the European Union's Competition Committee based on that committee's preference that financial information data vendors be free of all conflicts of interest; and
  • It is based on providing data on a once-per-month basis that the rating agencies have already testified before the US Congress is inadequate for timely updates to ratings (a form of valuation) so by definition, this data is not adequate for financial institution investors to know what they own under Article 122a of the European Capital Requirements Directive.  Furthermore, the SEC is investigating the rating agencies for potential fraud from publishing ratings based on out of date information.  
Today, I would like to add strike three.  The Market Group is moving forward with a plan to a) collect the data for free from the issuers and b) charge the investors and data distributors for accessing the data in the data warehouse.  Unless the issuers also provide the data for free at the same time to all market participants, this plan is likely to violate existing disclosure regulations in the US and Europe.

In the US, the relevant disclosure regulation is Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD for short).  This regulation is the global gold standard for fair disclosure and is very explicit in the requirements it places on issuers.
  • It requires that all material items in the investment mosaic be disclosed.  When it comes to the loans underlying a structured finance security, it would suggest that all the borrower privacy protected data fields track by the originator as well as the firm engaged in the daily billing and collecting be disclosed because there is reason to believe that these fields are part of the investment mosaic for valuing the loans and hence the security.  Please note that this definition excludes price and trading data;
  • It requires that all market participants have equal access to the information used in analyzing and valuing a security at the same time.  This rules out the business model where issuers only release the information to a distributor that charges for access to the information because not all market participants can afford the access charge.
Please note that Reg FD and the European disclosure regulations do not say that a data distributor cannot collect publicly available information, package this information and sell it to investors.  There are several companies that already do this for structured finance including LoanPerformance, Lewtan, Bloomberg and ThomsonReuters.

What Reg FD and the European disclosure regulations do say is the model of collecting, packaging and selling cannot be applied to non-public performance data that is used for analyzing and valuing a security as a means for making the non-public data public.

Like baseball, with three strikes the Market Group should be out as far as any involvement in the ECB's ABS data warehouse.

The ABS data warehouse I proposed several years ago does not suffer from the problems plaguing the Market Group's version of the ECB's ABS data warehouse.  It has no conflicts of interest.  It offers current loan-level performance data so that financial institution investors can always know what they own.  It provides the data for free to all market participants at the same time.

I look forward to hearing from the ECB and being given the mandate to create their ABS data warehouse.