Showing posts with label observable event based reporting. Show all posts
Showing posts with label observable event based reporting. Show all posts

Sunday, September 1, 2013

BoA showed why asset level transparency needed for RMBS deals

Bloomberg reported on how Bank of America included questionable mortgages in its RMBS deals in the run-up to the financial crisis.

BofA was able to do this because RMBS deals were and still are opaque.

Investing requires transparency.

Regular readers know that the investment process has three steps:

  1. Independent analysis of the data disclose to assess the risk of and value a security;
  2. Soliciting prices from Wall Street that it would be willing to buy/sell the security at; and
  3. Comparing Wall Street's prices with the result of the independent assessment to make buy/hold/sell investment decisions.
Without transparency, Step 1 of the investment process cannot be completed.

If the investment process cannot be completed, then the only thing that buyers or sellers of an opaque security are doing is gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag.

It is this simple fact that buyers were willing to blindly gamble on the contents of a brown paper bag that let BofA offload its questionable mortgages into a security.

Regular readers also know that the only way to encourage investors to come to the RMBS market is by providing observable event based reporting.  With observable event based reporting, any activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral is reported before the beginning of the next business day.

Observable event based reporting is necessary so investors can know what they own or what they are buying.

Absent observable event based reporting, buyers and sellers of RMBS securities are simply gamblers.


Bank of America Corp.’s traders fought off efforts by the firm in 2007 to include risky Alt-A mortgages in a securitization. That wasn’t enough to spare investors from being cheated, according to the U.S. 
The Department of Justice accused the company in a lawsuit yesterday of misleading investors about the quality of loans tied to $850 million in mortgage-backed securities. 
The complaint chronicles friction among bank staff in 2007 and 2008 as they excluded risky Alt-A loans while leaving in wholesale debts once scorned as “toxic waste” by the firm’s then-chief. 
“None of these loans are suitable for a prime jumbo A-credit securitization,” one trader wrote in an e-mail, expressing discomfort with adding the low-documentation Alt-A debts to the pool. 
“Like a fat kid in dodgeball, these need to stay on the sidelines,” another trader wrote, according to the Justice Department’s complaint.

Tuesday, August 6, 2013

Fannie and Freddie look to run out the clock on reform

The International Financing Review had an interesting article on how Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are trying to run out the clock on reform of the US mortgage finance system.

It came out shortly before President Obama announced his support for reform along the lines of the Corker/Warner bill in the Senate.

President Obama supports, according to a Bloomberg article,
A reformed system must have a limited government role, encourage a return of private capital and put the risk and rewards associated with mortgage lending in the hands of private actors, not the taxpayers.
Regular readers know that the only way to achieve President Obama's goal for a reformed system is by setting up an independent securitization platform that provides observable event based reporting on the performance of the mortgages underlying each security whether the security is a covered bond, securitization or something else that Wall Street creates.

Naturally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac do not want to see this type of reform occur.

One way that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are running out the clock on reform is by developing their own securitization platform.  Based on documents released by their regulator, the FHFA, this platform will disclose mortgage performance data once per month.

As we learned in the run-up to our current financial crisis, once-per-month or less frequent performance reporting is useless.  Subprime mortgage-backed securities provided this frequency of disclosure and they were called "opaque" by market participants.

The only reporting frequency that lets all market participants know the current status of each mortgage is observable event based reporting.  Under observable event based reporting, every activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying mortgages is reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

It is only with observable event based reporting that investors know what they are buying and know what they own.

When investors know what they are buying and know what they own, there is little or no need for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.

This is understood by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and that is why they are taking action to make sure it doesn't occur.

Key to GSE reform: disclosure


The key to success for any GSE reform and getting private investors to absorb more of the risk of default on mortgages is information.  Specifically, disclosure of information so that investors can "know what they are buying" and "know what they own".

In the run-up to the financial crisis, we learned that once-per-month or less frequent disclosure was inadequate to know what you were buying or know what you own.  We know this because sub-prime mortgage-backed securities disclosed on a once-per-month basis and they were referred to as "opaque".

It is only disclosure on an observable event basis that allows investors to know what they own or know what they are buying.  

This can be easily shown with a clear plastic bag, which represents observable event based reporting, and a brown paper bag, which represents once-per-month or less frequent disclosure.  Which is easier to value the contents of: paper or plastic?

Under observable event based disclosure, any activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral is reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, the only non-conflicted buy-side regulator, thinks highly enough of the need for observable event based reporting that it included it in its future of mortgage financing white paper.

This information is best collected and distributed through a securitization platform.

Please note that both the Senate (Corker, Warner) and House bills call for the creation of this securitization platform.

Based on this, you would expect that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac would, rather than delay and create their own platform, simply use the exiting securitization platform operating in Europe, the EU Data Warehouse.  

This is particularly true because the EU Data Warehouse's pricing model is to charge enough to break-even.  This pricing model caps what a Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac securitization platform could charge and effectively means that there would be no return on, let alone return of, US taxpayer funds used to build the platform.

The case for not using the EU Data Warehouse is it doesn't provide observable event based reporting.  However, based on disclosures by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac they are not intending to provide observable event based reporting either.

Thursday, August 1, 2013

Transparency needed to end Wall Street's ratings game

Reuters ran an article describing how rating firms, in a replay of the run-up to the financial crisis, are once again using more favorable ratings to win business.

Regular readers know that the way to end this ratings game is to require transparency.  Specifically, valuation transparency so that all market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

With equal access to the useful, relevant information, market participants can choose to independently assess this information for themselves or hire a third party expert to do the assessment for them.

Regardless of whether market participants do the assessment themselves or hire a third party the result is the dependence of the financial system on the rating firms is ended.

They become nothing more than a third party expert competing for business.
Five years after inflated credit ratings helped touch off the financial crisis, the nation’s largest ratings agency, Standard & Poor’s, is winning business again by offering more favorable ratings. 
S.& P. has been giving higher grades than its big rivals to certain mortgage-backed securities just as Wall Street is eagerly trying to revive the market for these investments, according to an analysis conducted for The New York Times by Commercial Mortgage Alert, which collects data on the industry. 
S.& P.’s chase for business is notable because it is fighting a government lawsuit accusing it of similar action before the financial crisis. 
As the company battles those accusations, industry participants say it has once again been moving to capture business by offering Wall Street underwriters higher ratings than other agencies will offer. 
And it has apparently worked. Banks have shown a new willingness to hire S.& P. to rate their bonds, tripling its market share in the first half of 2013. ... 
“The general consensus was that these changes have let them get their market share back,” said Darrell Wheeler, a bond analyst at Amherst Securities....
But David Jacob, who ran the S.& P. division that rated mortgage-backed bonds until 2011, said that in his time at the company, after the financial crisis, he saw employees adjusting criteria in response to business pressure. 
“It’s silly to say that the market share doesn’t matter,” said Mr. Jacob, who is now retired. “This is not God’s holy work. It’s a business.”...

But Mr. Shugrue said that the little things being allowed could turn into steps toward much bigger problems. 
“You can see that we are slipping our way back to 2007,” he said.

Monday, July 29, 2013

In absence of transparency, banks and insurers wary of Freddie Mac risk sharing deal

Reuters reported that banks and insurers are wary of Freddie Mac's inaugural risk sharing deal.

Banks and insurers had good reason to be wary of this deal because it provides the same level of transparency that opaque, toxic sub-prime RMBS deals offer:  none.

This lack of transparency means that investors in the deal are blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.

This lack of transparency is ironic because under the guidance of the FHFA Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae are constructing a securitization platform.  The purpose of the securitization platform is to provide disclosure to market participants.

So in theory, Freddie Mac is aware that it needs to provide observable event based disclosure under which any activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral is reported to market participants before the next business day.

Perhaps Freddie Mac chose to not provide transparency because doing so would have highlighted the fact that there is already an existing securitization platform, the EU Data Warehouse, that is fully capable of doing everything the Freddie Mac/Fannie Mae joint venture would do.

Since a securitization platform that is endorsed by the ECB already exists, why is the joint venture building another one at taxpayer expense?

Why is the FHFA not requiring that Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae use the EU Data Warehouse and bring disclosure to the US RMBS market sooner rather than allowing them to delay and build their own?  After all, the FHFA could regulate the EU Data Warehouse's activities in the US as easily as regulate the joint venture's securitization platform.

Perhaps Freddie Mac chose to not provide transparency because doing so would have also highlighted the fact that the EU Data Warehouse has set the global price for any securitization platform providing this type of service.  The EU Data Warehouse set its price at a break-even level.

If the EU Data Warehouse is willing to operate at effectively a break-even level, where are the earnings to repay the US taxpayer for building the securitization platform?

Perhaps Freddie Mac chose to not provide transparency because doing so would have also highlighted the fact that a securitization platform can be a stand-alone business.  There is no reason it needs to be owned by Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae.

Perhaps Freddie Mac chose to not provide transparency because doing so would have highlighted to Congress, where there is bi-partisian support for a securitization platform as shown in the House and Senate bills, that given the existence of the EU Data Warehouse there is no real justification for building another securitization platform.

Monday, July 8, 2013

S&P defends its ratings by saying investors wouldn't rely on them

Defending itself against a US Justice Department action, S&P said that investors in RMBS deals wouldn't rely on their ratings in their investment decision.

Why might an investor have relied on S&P's rating?

Because part of the S&P business model is the representation that the rating firm has access to information that is not available to other investors.  For example, S&P and other rating firms are privy to confidential information about company business plans.

Regular readers know that it was not until the fall of 2007 that S&P and Moody's testified before the US Congress and told investors that they did not have access to any information that the investors had access to.

At that point, the structured finance market effectively froze as investors realized they could not value the securities they own because they did not know what was the current condition of the collateral supporting these securities.

Why might an investor not have relied on S&P's rating?

The only reason that an investor would not rely on a rating is if it had all the necessary information so that it could independently assess the underlying assets.  If it had the necessary information, the investor could conduct their own due diligence.

What would it take for an investor to have the information so they could do their own due diligence?

Besides information on the terms of the mortgage and the borrower, the RMBS deal would have to provide observable event based reporting and disclose on an ongoing basis all activities like a payment or delinquency that occur with the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.

Did RMBS deals provide observable event based reporting?

No.

Having said that there wasn't adequate information for an investor to know what they are buying let alone know what they own, whether an investor relied on S&P's rating or not, the buyer or seller of an RMBS deal was simply gambling.

Our financial system is based on the philosophy of disclosure and the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).  This makes buyers responsible for losses on their investments and gives them an incentive to assess the disclosed data.

In the case where there is no information disclosed, buyers are suppose to be aware that they cannot independently assess the risk and value of the security and therefore cannot make a buy, hold, sell decision by comparing their independent valuation against the price shown by Wall Street.

When a buyer cannot make an investment decision, they have to know they are simply gambling if they  have any exposure to the security.

Wednesday, May 15, 2013

Bank of France turns to "super" transparency to restart securitization in EU

Bloomberg reports that the Bank of France is rolling out what it believes is the model for restarting securitization in the EU.

The distinguishing feature of the Bank of France's model is the reliance on making these deals "super transparent" so that market participants can know what they are buying and know what they own.

This is precisely what your humble blogger has been calling for since the earliest days of the financial crisis.

Why would the Bank of France feel the need to roll out deals that are "super transparent" when the ECB has already endorsed the level of transparency provided by the EU DataWarehouse?

Because the Bank of France sees that the EU DataWarehouse doesn't bring transparency that would allow an investor to know what they own or a buyer to know what they are buying.  Rather, the EU DataWarehouse is the industry's effort to retain opacity at the levels associated with opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities.

Please note, that the Bank of France recognizes that the only way to reduce, if not totally eliminate, the rating firms' role in securitization is to make the deal "super transparent".  When a deal is "super transparent", reliance on rating firms is greatly reduced as investors can do the analysis for themselves or hire a third party expert.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has defined what it takes for a structured finance deal to be "super transparent".

First, the deal must provide observable event based reporting under which all activities, like a payment or delinquency, involving the underlying collateral are reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

Second, the deal must make available all data fields tracked by the originator of the underlying collateral and the servicer of this collateral.  These firms are experts and would only track data fields that are relevant for valuing or monitoring the underlying collateral.  There is no legitimate business reason for depriving market participants of the right to piggy-back off this expertise.

The Bank of France wants to help banks package loans to businesses into tradable securities with the creation of a special-purpose vehicles, in what could become a template for the euro area. 
As the European Central Bank looks for ways to improve the flow of credit to small and medium-sized enterprises, or SMEs, the project started by the French central bank in July last year could provide one possible solution, the head of its markets division, Alexandre Gautier, said in a telephone interview. 
He’s in talks with the Frankfurt-based ECB and other national central banks on the initiative, which would ideally create securities that qualify as collateral in ECB refinancing operations. While banks can currently securitize SME loans and use them as collateral at the ECB, the process is complicated and not centralized. 
“We want a vehicle that is super simple and super transparent,” Gautier said. “We’d very much like these securities to be eligible in the euro system, but it’s not a condition. We’ll go ahead on our own if we have to to show that it’s doable.”... 
The aim is to make it easier for banks to re-finance existing loans and incentivize them to extend credit to small businesses. That would especially be the case if the new securities were eligible as collateral with the ECB, said Gautier. 
“The banks were very interested but they said that to make it really attractive, any securities should be eligible as collateral for refinancing within the euro system so that they would be liquid in the event of a crisis,” he said. “That’s now what we’re aiming for.” 
ECB President Mario Draghi said on May 2 that policy makers will start consultations with other European institutions on initiatives to promote lending to SMEs in the euro area using asset-backed securities.

Tuesday, May 14, 2013

As market for asset-backed securities rebounds, ratings shopping resumes

In yet another sign that zero genuine financial reform has occurred since the beginning of the financial crisis, Bloomberg reports that as the market for asset-backed securities rebounds, credit ratings shopping has returned.

Regular readers will recall that in the run-up to the financial crisis, rating firms were willing to put a AAA-rating on securities that the firms admitted they did not have adequate information monitor prior to issuance of the securities and after the securities traded in the secondary market.

In fact, structured finance securities developed a nickname: opaque, toxic.  Where the opacity of the security hid its toxicity.

Here we are almost 6 years after the financial crisis began and policymakers and financial regulators have done nothing to bring transparency to the structured finance market.

As regular readers know, the only way to bring transparency to structured finance securities is to require that they disclose on an observable event basis all activities like payments or delinquencies that occur with the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.

It is only with observable event based reporting that investors know what they own and potential buyers can know what they are buying.

Here we are almost 6 years later and policymakers and financial regulators have not brought observable event based reporting to structured finance.

In fact, policymakers and financial regulators have gone out of their way to keep these securities opaque.  For example, the ECB puts its blessing on a data warehouse that provides disclosure on the same frequency as opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities.

Almost six years after the start of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, bond issuers are again exploiting credit ratings by seeking firms that will provide high grades on debt backed by assets from auto loans to office buildings considered inappropriate by rivals. 
Fitch Ratings isn’t grading a deal linked to a Manhattan skyscraper after saying investors needed more protection. The securities won top grades from Moody’s Investors Service and Kroll Bond Rating Agency Inc. 
Blackstone Group LP’s Exeter Finance Corp. got top-tier ratings from Standard & Poor’s and DBRS Ltd. in the past 15 months on $629 million of bonds backed by car loans to people with bad credit histories, even as Moody’s and Fitch said they wouldn’t grant such rankings.
Borrowers are finding more options than ever to get the top ratings that many investors require after U.S. regulators doubled the number of companies sanctioned to assess securities to 10 since 2006.... 
Issuance of bonds linked to loans and leases are staging a comeback as the Federal Reserve (FDTR)’s unprecedented stimulus, including a pledge to keep benchmark interest rates close to zero into a fifth year, pushes investors into riskier assets. 
Banks have arranged $31.5 billion of commercial mortgage-backed securities this year with issuance poised to climb 50 percent from 2012 to $70 billion, according to Credit Suisse Group AG. Issuance of bonds tied to subprime auto debt of $7.7 billion this year compares with $5.7 billion in the first four months of 2012, according to Wells Fargo & Co.... 
“Nothing’s really changed” in the ratings business, David Jacob, former head of structured finance at S&P, said in a telephone interview. Regulation “changed some of the processes that they do, but what led to a lot to this bad behavior hasn’t really changed.”
The only way to bring about true change is to require the structured finance securities to provide observable event based reporting.

With this information, market participants can assess for themselves the risk and value of these securities.  Market participants can either do the due diligence themselves or hire third party experts to do the due diligence for them.

This ends any reliance on the rating firms.  With transparency, rating firms become just another third party expert offering an opinion.
Debt graders led by S&P and Moody’s helped ignite the credit seizure that began in August 2007 by lowering their standards to win business before defaults soared on home loans to subprime borrowers, the Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission said in a January 2011 report. 
“My plea today is that you take action,” Franken, a Democrat from Minnesota elected to the Senate in 2008, told participants at the SEC roundtable today. “If we maintain the status quo we are leaving ourselves far too vulnerable to another catastrophe.”...
Where the status quo is opacity.  Bringing transparency to opaque securities like structured finance reduces our vulnerability to another catastrophe.

Monday, May 6, 2013

ECB continues to do everything it can, except require transparency, to restart structured finance

The Wall Street Journal reports that the ECB is continuing to do everything it can, except require transparency, to restart structured finance as it sees structured finance as crucial to reviving lending to small and medium size eurozone companies.

Regular readers know that in the absence of observable event based reporting on the performance of the underlying collateral, buying or selling structured finance securities is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag.

Leading up to the financial crisis, this gamble did not work out to well for buyers.

The realization that Europe’s troubled economies are faced with long and protracted weakness has encouraged European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to suggest a long-term solution to unlock credit to their cash-starved businesses.... 
Mr. Draghi on Thursday said the ECB was working to promote a funding market for asset-backed securities, which allow banks to pool together shorter-term debt they have sold–such as auto loans, credit cards, and residential or commercial mortgages–and sell those pools as a single package to investors.
The ECB wants ABS to be a sizeable source of bank financing that will encourage lending to small-to-medium sized companies, or SMEs....
Your humble blogger thinks that there is a significant role for structured finance to play in supporting the lending to small-to-medium sized companies not just in the eurozone, but globally.

The issue is what does it take to restart the structured finance market?

I have been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that what it takes to restart the structured finance market is disclosure that allows investors to know what they own or know what they are buying.

The only way to achieve this level of disclosure is by having observable event based reporting on all activities like payments or delinquencies involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.

With this reporting, investors have access to current collateral performance so they know what they own or know what they are buying.

Without this reporting, investors are simply guessing at what is a readily knowable fact.  A knowable fact that the sell-side knows and uses when it trades against the buy-side (see WSJ article on Goldman and Senderra Funding).

Your humble blogger predicted at the beginning of the financial crisis that the buy-side, except for hedge funds who charter is to gamble with their investors' money, would stay away from structured finance until this informational advantage was eliminated.

To date, despite 5+ years of zero interest rate and quantitative easing monetary policies, this prediction has been accurate.
At the moment, banks aren’t lending to SMEs. Without financing, these companies can’t grow: can’t hire employees, can’t invest in new projects. This is a serious problem in Europe, especially in the southern countries facing multi-year recessions and unemployment at depression levels. 
The ECB cut its main interest rate to a record low 0.5% Thursday, with the idea that cheaper money will help encourage a greater flow of money, eventually boosting the economy. 
But getting this extra cash to the real growth engines, i.e. companies, is not as easy as cutting rates. This is where ABS comes in. 
“Securitization can play a key role in funding Europe’s growth since it provides funding which matches the cash flows of the securitized assets and carries little or no refinancing risk, which is an important component of Basel III capital requirements,” said Rick Watson, head of capital markets at the Association for Financial Markets in Europe. 
But at the moment, these products still suffer from an association with bad deals sold before the financial crisis, like U.S. subprime mortgages, a type of ABS that catalyzed fears across the banking system. 
Since then, investors, especially those in Europe, have yet to regain confidence in the product....
Investors staying away from structured finance securities isn't a question of confidence, but rather the result of a costly lesson.  Investors know that while the product retains its information asymmetry it is good for Wall Street and bad for them.
“We’re seeing a market that is slowly grinding to a halt. The market isn’t going to disappear, but the risk is that it becomes small, bespoke, and reverse-inquiry driven. That is, not a real solid market for funding the European economy,” said Ian Bell, head of the Prime Collateralized Securities Initiative.
PCS was launched in November with the aim of labeling ABS deals that comply with a set of standards relating to quality, transparency and simplicity. Mr. Bell noted the good news was PCS labels have been granted to 12 of all qualifying ABS transactions. The bad news was this is 75%-80% of what has been sold to investors.
As noted earlier, a PCS label is nothing more than sticking lipstick on a pig.  The label is awarded to structured finance securities with the same transparency as opaque, toxic subprime mortgage-backed securities.
The first step for ABS is restoring confidence....
Confidence in the financial system has always been associated with transparency.

Confidence is the result of investors having access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Confidence results because investors trust their own assessment.
The ECB said did not say how close it was to activating any program. If they do launch one, it wouldn’t be the first crisis-era plan to buy collaterized bank bonds. ... 
“The experience with the first covered bond purchase program can be useful. It was the announcement there that produced the most effect. The implementation was indispensable; without it, the effect would have been undone. But if the ECB were to announce something similar for ABS, it could also have a positive short-term impact,” said Francesco Papadia, former director general for market operations at the ECB....
General expectations are that this will not happen soon. Rabobank analysts summed up the gist of opinions: “We would still view such action as some way off if it does indeed take place at all.” 
But Mr. Draghi’s publically sounded what other officials have been stating for four months. Something needs to happen, and this is a realistic path. 
“It would be a big disappointment if nothing comes of this… I’d be surprised if nothing material develops,” Mr. Papadia said.
What is likely to result is the ECB becomes the gambler of last resort and takes onto its balance sheet more opaque, toxic securities.

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

China looking to expand its asset-backed securities market

Bloomberg reports that China is looking to expand its asset-backed securities market.  The big question is how will it do this?

Will it require that asset-backed securities provide observable event based reporting  so investors can know what they are buying and know what they own or will it allow the securities to provide out of date information that leaves buyers and sellers blindly gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag?

China may allow more firms to develop asset-backed securities businesses with the goal of boosting liquidity, the nation’s market regulator said. 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission will lower its threshold for securities companies to undertake such businesses, the CSRC said today on its website. Asset-backed securities could be based on accounts receivable, credit assets, bonds, stocks and commercial properties, it said. 
The CSRC issued draft rules for the asset-backed securities business today and asked for public feedback, according to the statement. 
China Development Bank Corp., the nation’s largest policy bank, sold 9.27 billion yuan ($1.5 billion) of asset-backed securities, the bank said Sept. 7, in the country’s first such sale since 2008. 
The difficulty of assessing risk in bonds that are backed by loans was a major contributor to the 2008 global financial crisis.

Thursday, February 21, 2013

Fitch: mortgage bonds need better transparency

According to a Wall Street Journal article, Fitch asserted that mortgage bonds need better transparency so that investors are protected and originators and issuers have an incentive to do a better job underwriting the mortgages.

Regular readers know that the transparency investors need in order to fully enforce the reps and warranties of each deal is observable event based reporting.  Under observable event based reporting, every activity like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral are reported to the investors before the beginning of the next business day.

With observable event based reporting, investors can know what they are buying and what they own.

As a result, they can enforce the reps and warranties for each mortgage that violates the terms of these reps and warranties as soon as the violation occurs.

Mortgage bond issuers that are relieving lenders of some potential liabilities may be exposing investors to additional risks of weak underwriting and defective loans, Fitch Ratings said in a report Wednesday. 
Fitch focused on proposals to recast the so-called representations and warranties in private mortgage-backed securities, which are legal testaments to the quality of the assets packaged into a securitization. 
Facing billions of dollars in claims over bubble-era mortgages that have caused investor losses, the issuers are trying to provide some degree of protection to lenders in the future, to the extent that investors will allow. 
Some rep and warrant provisions in recent residential mortgage-backed securities have provisions that Fitch "deems weak," the rating firm said in a statement. 
For example, some of the provisions relieve lenders from demands to repurchase faulty loans after fewer than 36 months, it said. 
"The balance between protecting both lenders and investors in new RMBS deals requires greater clarity and transparency so that investors remain protected and lenders remain incentivized to make sound underwriting decisions," Fitch said.

Wednesday, February 20, 2013

PIMCO shocked by prices paid to gamble on toxic RMBS

Bloomberg reports that JP Morgan is trying to bring a non-agency backed residential mortgage-backed security to market and PIMCO is shocked by the terms that gamblers are willing to accept to place their wager on these securities.

As everyone knows, residential mortgage-backed securities are opaque.  Therefore, buying these securities is simply blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.

Leading up to the financial crisis, buying these securities was a losing bet for the gamblers and selling these securities was a winning bet for Wall Street.

Since nothing has changed, most notably these securities still do not offer observable event based reporting under which all activities like a payment or default on the underlying assets are reported before the beginning of the next business day so market participants can know what they are buying or know what they own, there is no reason to believe the gamblers won't lose again.

Which is precisely why PIMCO cannot believe the prices paid by the gamblers.

JPMorgan Chase & Co. is seeking to sell securities tied to new U.S. home loans without government backing in its first offering since the financial crisis that the debt helped trigger. 
The deal may close this month, according to a person familiar with the discussions. 
Servicers of the underlying loans may include the New York-based lender, First Republic Bank and Johnson Bank, said the person, who asked not to be identified because terms aren’t set. 
The market for so-called non-agency mortgage securities is reviving as the Federal Reserve’s $85 billion a month of bond purchases help push investors to seek potentially higher returns. 
As deals accelerate, Pacific Investment Management Co. is questioning the prices paid. 
At the same time, a weakening of contract clauses that offer protection to investors if the loans don’t match their promised quality is stoking debate, said Kroll Bond Rating Agency analyst Glenn Costello. 
“There’s a pretty heavy dialogue going on right now between all participants in the market about what makes sense,” Costello, who is based in New York, said last week in a telephone interview....
What makes sense is that the deals provide observable event based reporting.
JPMorgan is telling investors its deal’s terms may allow some of the so-called representations and warranties about the mortgages from originators or itself to expire after 36 months to 60 months, the person said. Such contract clauses, which can be used to force loan repurchases, have led to billions of dollars of costs for banks on debt made during the housing boom. 
After Credit Suisse included so-called sunsets of 36 months on certain buyback promises in a November deal, Standard & Poor’s, the only grader to rate the bonds, said in a statement that the move didn’t affect its view of the debt’s risks. The ratings firm cited the “exceptionally high credit quality” of the loans and that all of them had been reviewed by third-party firms before being packaged into the securities.
Interesting to note the use of third-party firms to review the mortgages and the reluctance of the issuers to provide the data on the mortgages to all market participants so that investors can do their own independent assessment.

As everyone knows, one of the weak spots in securitization is the reliance on third parties making representations about the quality of the underlying collateral and the deal.  A prime example of this was the rating firms.

Yet, here is Wall Street trying to repackage and sell the same snake oil.
Rivals including Fitch Ratings, which publicly called S&P’s grades too high, are taking a more skeptical view. Changes such as sunset provisions and clauses that void loan-quality warranties if borrowers default after events such as job losses or illness generally should require greater so-called credit enhancement, said Rui Pereira, a managing director at Fitch. 
Credit enhancement can include some bonds taking losses before others, cash reserves or payments from the underlying assets that exceed coupons on the securities created. 
“Less investor-friendly provisions are something we need to take into account,” Pereira said last week in a telephone interview.

Issuers are seeking to move past a framework for representations and warranties provided by Redwood that represented a “gold standard,”Kathryn Kelbaugh, a senior analyst at Moody’s Investors Service, said last month during a panel discussion at a securitization conference in Las Vegas. 
In Redwood’s latest deal, it may sell a top-rated class as large as $561.2 million with a 2.5 percent coupon at about 102 cents on the dollar, a person familiar with that offering said today, asking not to be named because terms aren’t set. 
That compares with current prices of about 99 cents on the dollar for Fannie Mae-guaranteed 2.5 percent securities, according to Bloomberg data. 
Bonds issued in recent months by Redwood have been “insanely expensive” by comparison with Fannie Mae debt, Pimco’s Scott Simonsaid in an interview yesterday. 
“I can’t believe someone would pay anywhere near where they have sold them,” said Simon, the mortgage-bond head at Newport Beach, California-based Pimco, manager of the world’s largest mutual fund.
 It is hard to argue with Mr. Simon's observation about the Redwood deal or the prices gamblers are paying for other opaque residential mortgage-backed securities.

Thursday, February 14, 2013

Robert Shiller: Capitalism and Financial Innovation

At the 2012 CFA Institute Financial Analysts Seminar, Yale professor Robert Shiller laid out his views on capitalism and financial innovation.

Professor Shiller channeled his inner Gary Gorton, another Yale Professor whose work on informationally insensitive debt and safe assets your humble blogger has previously debunked, and talked about the benefits of financial innovation, in particular securitization.

According to Professor Shiller,
The ideas I posit are basically an appreciation of financial innovation. Today, cynicism and skepticism regarding financial innovation abound.
Your humble blogger is neither a cynic or a skeptic.  I simply subscribe to Yves Smith's maxim:  nobody on Wall Street is compensated for creating low margin, transparent products.

Financial innovation is primarily about how to create opacity so that the bankers can extract excess rent from investors who are gambling on the value of the opaque innovation rather than investing in a transparent investment.
Even former Fed chairman Paul Volcker contributes to these views. A couple years ago, he famously said that he couldn’t think of any useful financial innovation within recent memory besides ATMs. 
What Volcker says gets a big audience, but I couldn’t disagree with him more.
Which puts the burden on Professor Shiller to show a financial innovation that is actually useful for something other than extracting excess rent from investors (we'll get to that when he talks about securitization).
Our civilization is built on financial innovation. Finance begets and supports almost all activities; it makes the world turn in a modern and civilized way. 
Innovation is necessary if finance is to remain relevant as a means of achieving society’s goals. Perhaps what I have to say will help the finance community defend itself better and encourage finance professionals to assume personal responsibility for their role in making markets more efficient....
This is quite a statement as most people would think that it is the real economy and its inventions that built our civilization.

Finance certainly has a role in supporting the real economy, but it is not at all clear that it is financial innovation that lead the real economy and its inventions and built our civilization.
Securitization was an innovation that blew up in the latest crisis because the process was fraught with errors. 
The most notable error in securitization was in real estate—the subprime loan securitization, which blew up because people didn’t appreciate the risk that home prices would fall. 
It is misleading to say that people didn't appreciate the risk that home prices would fall as a drop in home prices is not what caused the losses on these securities.

What caused the losses was that the borrowers were not making payments on their mortgages.

Since the value of these securities is based on the ongoing payments on the mortgages, so long as the borrowers are paying on their mortgages, the security is performing regardless of what is happening to the price of the house the mortgage is secured against.

Perhaps Professor Shiller never heard the expression "opaque, toxic sub-prime mortgage-backed securities".


What made these securities so dangerous to investors' wealth was that opacity hid their true toxicity.

Specifically, the lack of observable event based reporting on all activities like a payment or delinquency on the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day made it impossible for market participants to know what they were buying or know what they owned.

Your humble blogger has demonstrated this numerous times using a Brown Paper Bag to represent a security using current industry disclosure practices and a Clear Plastic Bag to represent a security using observable event based reporting.

As a concept, however, securitization will survive because it is a means through which a large number of people benefit.
I happen to agree with Professor Shiller that securitization will survive.  The question is whether it will survive in its current opaque form that allows bankers to extract excess rent from investors or in a transparent form where it supports society.
Securitization is an innovation designed to solve an asymmetric information problem.
Actually, as Wall Street uses securitization, it is an innovation designed to create an asymmetric information problem.

The asymmetry is that Wall Street has the information on the current performance of the underlying collateral (they see these securities as if they are Clear Plastic Bags) and the rest of the market place has out of date performance information (they see these securities as they truly are, Brown Paper Bags).

This information asymmetry effectively lets Wall Street trade on tomorrow's news today.

As the financial crisis showed, Wall Street is more than willing to take advantage of this information asymmetry at the expense of the investors.
In the case of the mortgage market, mortgages and thus mortgage-backed bonds require a lot of analysis that many investors are unable to do, so without securitization, those investors would forgo investing in this market.
By securitizing mortgages, tranches of similar credit quality are created, allowing a large swath of the general investing population to buy mortgage-backed bonds that they otherwise would not buy. 
Professor Shiller's observation about the need for analysis reminds me of Professor Gorton's theory on informationally insensitive debt.

Professor Gorton cited bank deposits as an example of informationally insensitive debt.  There is one small problem with this example.  Bank deposits are insured and depositors are very sensitive to this fact.  Confirmation of this can be seen in Greece and Spain where doubts have arisen about whether deposit insurance will be honored and depositors have pulled their money.

Regular readers know that our financial system is based on the FDR Framework under which the government is responsible for ensuring that all useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner and investors are given the incentive to use this information as they are responsible for all losses on their investments.

Investors know this.  As a result, if investors cannot assess the information on the mortgages themselves, rather than forgo making an investment they simply engage third party experts who can assess the information.

Individuals hire portfolio managers.  Portfolio managers, if they or their organization cannot do the analysis themselves, hire third party experts.

The simple point is that if there is transparency and all the useful, relevant information is disclosed in an appropriate, timely manner, it is used by investors so they can make a fully informed investment decision for any type of investment.

Unfortunately, current securitizations are opaque and there is no information for investors to analyze.  As a result, buying or selling these securities is nothing more than gambling on the contents of a Brown Paper Bag.
Thus, mortgage securitization creates a financial market that allows many people to buy homes that they otherwise might not be able to buy, and it also lowers mortgage rates. 
Isn't one of the problems we have is that people bought houses that they couldn't afford?
The theory of finance involves asymmetric information as one of the elements that financial professionals have to engineer and design around. 
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Professor Shiller has effectively praised Wall Street for creating high margin, opaque products where Wall Street has an asymmetric information advantage.

What is good for society is when financial products are designed to eliminate asymmetric information.

Thursday, February 7, 2013

JP Morgan e-mails show with current loan-level performance information investors could have known how bad deals were

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, your humble blogger has been saying that if structured finance securities offer observable event based reporting on all activities like payments and delinquencies involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day, investors could know what they own or what they are buying.

The New York Times' Dealbook ran an article on JP Morgan where a series of e-mails confirms that observable event based reporting would allow investors to know what they own or what they are buying.

Equally importantly, the article establishes that observable event based reporting is necessary if the information advantage currently enjoyed by Wall Street is going to be eliminated.  Without this information advantage being eliminated, investors will be reluctant to return to this market as they recall how much money they lost due to Wall Street's use of this informational advantage.

When an outside analysis uncovered serious flaws with thousands of home loans, JPMorgan Chase executives found an easy fix. 
Rather than disclosing the full extent of problems like fraudulent home appraisals and overextended borrowers, the bank adjusted the critical reviews, according to documents filed early Tuesday in federal court in Manhattan. 
As a result, the mortgages, which JPMorgan bundled into complex securities, appeared healthier, making the deals more appealing to investors.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it nicely summarizes why observable event based reporting must be a requirement for all structured finance deals.
The trove of internal e-mails and employee interviews, filed as part of a lawsuit by one of the investors in the securities, offers a fresh glimpse into Wall Street’s mortgage machine, which churned out billions of dollars of securities that later imploded. 
The documents reveal that JPMorgan, as well as two firms the bank acquired during the credit crisis, Washington Mutual and Bear Stearns, flouted quality controls and ignored problems, sometimes hiding them entirely, in a quest for profit.
Let me repeat, the profits from Wall Street's information advantage comes from having tomorrow's news today.  Wall Street had access to observable event based reporting on the underlying mortgages and the investors did not.

When it comes to rewriting disclosure regulations for structured finance securities, Wall Street is protecting its access to tomorrow's news today.  It does this through the sell-side dominated industry trade groups, the American Securitization Forum (ASF) and the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME), that keep lobbying the global financial regulators to focus on data templates and NOT when the data is disclosed.
The lawsuit, which was filed by Dexia, a Belgian-French bank, is being closely watched on Wall Street. 
After suffering significant losses, Dexia sued JPMorgan and its affiliates in 2012, claiming it had been duped into buying $1.6 billion of troubled mortgage-backed securities. 
The latest documents could provide a window into a $200 billion case that looms over the entire industry. In that lawsuit, the Federal Housing Finance Agency, which oversees Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, has accused 17 banks of selling dubious mortgage securities to the two housing giants. At least 20 of the securities are also highlighted in the Dexia case, according to an analysis of court records....
The Dexia lawsuit centers on complex securities created by JPMorgan, Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual during the housing boom. As profits soared, the Wall Street firms scrambled to pump out more investments, even as questions emerged about their quality.... 
JPMorgan routinely hired Clayton Holdings and other third-party firms to examine home loans before they were packed into investments. Combing through the mortgages, the firms searched for problems like borrowers who had vastly overstated their incomes or appraisals that inflated property values. 
According to the court documents, an analysis for JPMorgan in September 2006 found that “nearly half of the sample pool” — or 214 loans — were “defective,” meaning they did not meet the underwriting standards. The borrowers’ incomes, the firms found, were dangerously low relative to the size of their mortgages. 
Another troubling report in 2006 discovered that thousands of borrowers had already fallen behind on their payments....
Please re-read the highlighted text as it shows that if the investors had access to the underlying mortgages on an observable event based reporting basis, they too could have known that the mortgages were bad.

Investors could have done the analysis for themselves or hired an expert like Clayton Holdings.

What is important here is that if there had been observable event based disclosure, these deals would never have been done on the terms they were done on.

Saturday, February 2, 2013

Mathbabe: Bill Gates is naive, data is not objective

In a terrific post with direct application to the ability to bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system like banks and structured finance securities, Mathbabe observes
rather than focusing on how individual models improve with more data, we need to worry more about which models and which data have been chosen in the first place, why that process is successful when it is, and – most importantly – who gets to decide what data is collected and what models are trained.... 
Bill Gates seems genuinely interested in tackling some big problems in the world, and I wish more people thought long and hard about how they could contribute like that. But the process he describes so lovingly is in fact highly fraught and dangerous. 
Don’t be fooled by the mathematical imprimatur: behind every model and every data set is a political process that chose that data and built that model and defined success for that model.
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Mathbabe has nicely summarized why letting the banks and the sell-side hijack the political process prevents transparency from ever being brought to the opaque 'black box' banks or the 'brown paper bag' structured finance securities.

In the case of structured finance securities, the sell-side through the industry trade lobbying organizations it controls set the agenda for bringing transparency to structured finance securities by trotting out the idea of 'data templates'.

By focusing attention on the data templates, the sell-side has been able to control the political process for bringing transparency to structured finance securities by taking many issues off the table.  These issues include 'when' data is disclosed and why not disclose all the data fields tracked by originators and servicers that are not protected by borrower privacy regulations.

The result as shown by a recent poll of investors conducted by Principia is that 59% of investors think that what is currently disclosed and what will be disclosed as a result of the efforts of the global regulatory community will not be sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.

Please re-read the previous paragraph in light of Mathbabe's observation: behind every model and every data set is a political process that chose that data and built that model and defined success for that model.

For the sell-side, success is defined as perpetuating opacity so that investors do not have the data they need to adequately perform due diligence.

The result is that anyone buying or selling structured finance securities is blindly gambling.

Of course, the exception to this is Wall Street which through its subsidiaries has access to all the data it needs on an observable event basis.

Thursday, January 31, 2013

Structured finance investors: current proposed disclosure standards inadequate

A 2012 Q4 survey of investors in asset-backed securities, mortgage-backed securities and structured credit securities by Principia reveals that 59% of these investors think that the proposed loan level disclosure standards will not be sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.

We asked investors whether the current standards for disclosure of loan level data, for example via the European DataWarehouse, Project RESTART, EDGAR or the BoE and ECB templates, will provide sufficient data to adequately perform due diligence on ABS/MBS/CDO investments.... 
59% remain unsure as to whether the new market standards will be sufficient. This is a general finding across all asset classes...
Please re-read the highlighted text and as you are doing so ask yourself what percentage of portfolio managers would say that IBM's disclosures are sufficient to adequately perform due diligence (your humble blogger would expect 90+% as no one refers to IBM as a 'black box').

Regular readers are not surprised by this survey result.  It confirms what your humble blogger has been saying about the sell-side and its lobbyists like ASF, AFME (formerly ESF) derailing efforts to bring greater transparency to structured finance securities.

Regular readers know that there are two aspects to disclosure:  what is disclosed and when it is disclosed.

To date, the sell-side has managed to prevent adequate loan level disclosure standards by focusing the discussion on what is disclosed in the specific data fields in the templates proposed by ESF, Project Restart, EDGAR, the BoE and the ECB.

While very time consuming, this whole discussion of specific data fields to include in the templates ignores a simple relevant fact: the data fields that should be disclosed are all the data fields tracked by the loan originator and servicer that are not borrower privacy protected.

The originator and servicer are experts and as such every field that they track is a field that they feel is important for monitoring and valuing the individual loan.  These experts wouldn't track a data field they didn't think was important because it costs them money.

However, even if the disclosure templates were thrown away and all the data fields tracked by the originators and servicers were provided to investors, this would not be a big enough change in disclosure to get remotely close to 90+% thinking the disclosure was sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.

The simple fact is that investors recognize that 'when' data is disclose is a critical factor in determining if the disclosure is adequate for performing due diligence.

Structured finance securities are created by setting aside specific assets for the benefit of the investors.  The physical equivalent of this would be to put these assets in a bag.

'When' addresses the question of is the bag paper or plastic.

It is a brown paper bag if 'when' is the same reporting frequency as exists for opaque subprime mortgage-backed securities.  This is the frequency that has been adopted by the sell-side and shows up in the European Data Warehouse and Project Restart.

The bag is plastic if 'when' is observable event based reporting under which all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying assets are reported to market participants before the beginning of the next business day.

It is only be adopting observable event based reporting with all the non-borrow privacy protected data fields tracked by the originators and servicers that 90+% of structured finance investors will think the disclosure was sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.

Other Interesting Observations

1) The investors have confessed that when it comes to buying ABS/MBS/CDO securities they are blindly gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag.

59% of investors are saying that the proposed standards are not sufficient to adequately perform due diligence.  If the proposed standards are not sufficient, what does that say about existing disclosure standards?

2) The proposed disclosure standards are unlikely to encourage former or new investors to buy ABS/MBS/CDO securities.

If 59% of existing investors see themselves as blindly gambling on the contents of a brown paper bag because of disclosure is not sufficient to adequately perform due diligence, why would former or new investors want to gamble too?


Tuesday, January 29, 2013

SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes: Sophisticated investors better at valuing contents of brown paper bag

In an astonishing report by Securitization Intelligence, in his keynote address at the ASF 2013 conference, SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes offered
his views on Regulation AB II’s requirement that private 144a offerings include elements of disclosure usually limited to publicly registered transactions, saying that he has previously expressed concern “that we were going too far in treating the private market just like the public market, and that, as a consequence of that, we may compromise the value that the private market brings to bear.” 
He added that the thought that the relative lack of legal protections for investors in the private-label market makes such disclosure requirements important is obviated in part by the sophistication of the investors in the space. 
“I remain unpersuaded that the fundamental reason that the securitization market has been struggling in the last few years is because we don’t have a piling on of regulatory demands,” he said. 
“That’s not to say there is not some room for improvement” in disclosure enhancements, but that the SEC could “end up undercutting the objective of trying to move the ball forward when it comes to the securitization market being conditioned to take off again.” 
To which Deutsch replied, on behalf of attendees who received less resolute answers from some regulatory panelists yesterday, “Hallelujah, brother.” [confirming that ASF is a sell-side dominated group and doesn't represent the buy-side's interests.]
As long as Commissioner Paredes brought up the issue, I thought I might describe exactly what disclosure requirements are needed for both publicly registered and private 144a offerings.

From my post, Turning lemon mortgage-backed securities into lemonade
Disclosure has two components:  what is disclosed and when it is disclosed.  I would like to focus on “when” it is disclosed. 
Everyone knows that structured finance securities involve taking specific assets, like mortgages, and setting them aside for the benefit of the investor.  The physical equivalent of this would be to put them into a bag.

Once the mortgages are in the bag, it is important to know what is in the bag currently. 
 Why? 
If an investor does not know what is in the bag currently, they cannot take the first step in the investment cycle.  
The first step is to independently assess the risk and value the underlying collateral so the investor can know what the investor is buying and, after buying, know what they own. 
The second step is to compare this independent assessment to the prices shown by Wall Street. 
The third and final step is to make a buy, hold or sell decision based on the difference between the investor’s independent valuation of the security and the price shown by Wall Street. 
Please note that without the ability to know what is in the bag currently, it is impossible to accurately assess what is going to come out of the bag eventually. The lack of knowing what is in the bag currently prevents investors from performing their own independent assessment and makes meaningless hiring an expert third party to do the assessment for them.  
Simply put, without current information of what is in the bag, investors cannot go through the investment cycle. 
Buying securities in the absence of an independent assessment is not investing.  Buying securities that cannot be independently assessed is the equivalent of blindly betting on the contents of a brown paper bag.  And, once the securities are purchased, the investor has no ability to know what they own. 
In case you doubt this, let me show it to you using a brown paper bag to hold the underlying collateral. 
On the first business day of last month, $100 went into the bag.  On the third business day of this month, a trustee report with granular level data was issued that showed the bag contained $75 at the end of the last month.  This was made up of 3 $20 bills and 3 $5 bills. 
So the question is:  what is in the bag currently? 
Based on the fact that $25 came out of the bag last month, there are a number of ways of guessing what is in the brown paper bag? First, we could guess that nothing has been taken out of the bag and it still holds $75. Or a $5 bill has been removed and left $70 in the bag.  Or a $20 bill has been removed and left $55 in the bag?  Or both a $5 bill and a $20 bill have been removed and left $50 in the bag? 
By simply asking what is in the brown paper bag currently, I have already created a $25 spread between the $75 a seller might reasonably value the contents of the brown paper bag at and the $50 a buyer might be willing to offer. 
Let me assure you that with this wide a spread, the contents of the brown paper bag are not going to sell. 
This valuation problem has been shown to be particularly acute for mortgage-backed securities since the beginning of the financial crisis.  At that time, buyers came to doubt the ability of the borrowers to make their future payments.  The more doubt, the more likely the market is to freeze as it is impossible to get buyers, who think that the bag is more likely to have $50, and sellers, who look at last month's performance and think the bag has $75, to agree on price. 
Another way we can approach asking what is currently in this brown paper bag is to use a sophisticated model.  We recognize that last month $25 came out of the bag.  This is roughly $0.85 per day.  So we can value the contents of the brown paper bag by multiplying the day of the month it is today by .85 and subtracting the resulting value from the end of the month value shown in the last trustee report. 
Today is the 6th, so the model suggests a value of $69.90 ($75 minus $5.10).  The price suggested by the model doesn't seem unreasonable if a $5 bill is removed from the bag. 
However, a buyer is significantly overpaying if there has been a sharper decline in the value of collateral in the bag and a $20 bill has been removed.  This is analogous to what happened with sub-prime mortgage-backed securities where there was a rapid decline in the value of the collateral. 
This problem of guessing what is in the bag would go away if we were talking about a clear plastic bag.  The investor would know what is in the bag currently as the contents of the bag can be seen and are a knowable fact. 
This is true whether the investor is Commissioner Paredes' sophisticated investor or not.
As a result, investors could independently assess the risk and value the collateral.  With this assessment, the investor “knows what they are buying” and "knows what they own". With this assessment, the investor can make an investment decision to buy, hold or sell based on the prices being shown by Wall Street. 
So turning the mortgage market from lemons to lemonade simply requires recognizing that it is a choice between “Paper or Plastic”.  With “Paper”, you get lemons.  With “Plastic”, you get lemonade. 
So how can each of the structured finance securities be put into the equivalent of a clear plastic bag? 
This can be easily done as the servicer information systems are designed to track and report on the underlying collateral on an observable event basis. 
With observable event based disclosure where all activities like a payment or delinquency involving the underlying collateral are reported before the beginning of the next business day, the investor knows what is in the bag currently. 
Observable event based disclosure is associated with a clear plastic bag.  All other frequencies of disclosure are associated with a brown paper bag and lemons.

Wednesday, January 23, 2013

What did Wall Street know and When did they know it when selling CDOs?

In an excellent article, Jesse Eisinger looks at the questions of what did Wall Street know and when did they know it as it relates to the construction and sale of subprime mortgage-backed CDOs.

Specifically, Mr. Eisinger focuses on Morgan Stanley and a particularly toxic CDO called Stack 2006-1.

Regular readers know that Wall Street had the equivalent of "tomorrow's new today" that it used in the construction of these CDOs.  The source of this information was their subprime mortgage origination and servicing platforms.

Specifically, whether they bought the mortgages from a third party or originate the mortgages themselves, the Wall Street firms knew just how quickly the quality of the underwriting of the mortgages was deteriorating.

From their servicing of the mortgages, Wall Street could see that the poorly underwritten mortgages were defaulting at a faster rate than the models used to value subprime mortgage-backed securities predicted.

Of course, Wall Street used this information to its advantage when it came to constructing and selling CDOs.

That is why the market for non-government guaranteed structured finance securities is frozen.  Investors are on a buyers' strike until such time as this informational advantage is eliminated.

The only way to eliminate Wall Street's informational advantage is to require that the structured finance securities provide observable event based information and report all activities like payments or defaults involving the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.

With this information, investors can know what they are buying and subsequently know what they own.  Otherwise, they are simply gambling on the value of the contents of a brown paper bag that Wall Street has sold to them at a price that is higher than the contents are worth.

As Mr. Eisinger describes it:

Hundreds of pages of internal Morgan Stanley documents, released publicly last week, shed much new light on what bankers knew at the height of the housing bubble and what they did with that secret knowledge. 
The lawsuit concerns a $500 million collateralized debt obligation called Stack 2006-1, created in the first half of 2006. Collections of mortgage-backed securities, C.D.O.'s were at the heart of the financial crisis. 
But the documents suggest a pattern of behavior larger than this one deal: People across the bank understood that the American housing market was in trouble. They took advantage of that knowledge to create and then bet against securities and then also to unload garbage investments on unsuspecting buyers. 
Morgan Stanley doesn't see the narrative as the plaintiffs do. The firm is fighting the lawsuit, contending that the buyers were sophisticated clients and could have known what was going on in the subprime market. 
The C.D.O. documents disclosed, albeit obliquely, that Morgan Stanley might bet against the securities, a strategy known as shorting. The firm did not pick the assets going into the deal (though it was able to veto any assets). And any shorting of the deal was part of a larger array of trades, both long and short. Indeed, Morgan Stanley owned a big piece of Stack, in addition to its short bet.....

In February 2006, Morgan Stanley began putting together the Stack C.D.O. According to an internal presentation, Stack "represents attractive business for Morgan Stanley." 
Why? In addition to fees, another bullet point listed: "Ability to short up to $325MM of credits into the C.D.O." In other words, Morgan Stanley could — and did — sell assets to the Stack C.D.O., intending to profit if the securities backed by those assets declined. The bank put on a $170 million bet against Stack, even as it was selling it. 
In the end, of the $500 million of assets backing the deal, $415 million ended up worthless....
It certainly helps when selecting assets to short if you have material information regarding their performance that the other side of the deal does not have.

Perhaps more importantly, the other side cannot get this material information unless it too happens to have a subprime mortgage origination and servicing platform.
Why might Morgan Stanley have bet against the deal? 
Did its traders develop a brilliant thesis by assessing the fundamentals of the housing market through careful analysis of the public data? 
The documents suggest something more troubling: Bankers found out that the housing market was diseased from their colleagues down the hall.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Eisinger nicely summarizes the source of Wall Street's informational advantage.  A source that would be able to provide insight into exactly what securities should be selected to maximize the profitability of the short.
Bankers were getting information from fellow employees conducting and receiving private assessments of the quality of the mortgages that the bank would purchase to back securities.
Readers might recall that Morgan Stanley owned a subprime mortgage origination and servicing firm called Saxon Capital.  The Wall Street Journal wrote about how information from Saxon informed Morgan Stanley's trades.
These reports weren't available to the public.
It would be crucial information for trading in securities backed by those kinds of mortgages.....
In fact, mortgage-backed securities are constructed to delay the public's access to data and give Wall Street a permanent information advantage.

By design, mortgage-backed securities report the performance of the underlying mortgages once per month.  These reports come out from 5 to 10 business days after the month ends.

Contrast this with the reports that a servicing firm generates.  They generate a report every single day.  At a minimum, Wall Street would know how all the loans in a deal performed several business days before investors and other market participants.

Wall Street showed with the CDOs that it was fully capable of using its access to "tomorrow's news today" to generate a lot of money.
Two of the employees who received those emails joined an internal hedge fund, headed by Howard Hubler, that was formed only the following month, in April 2006. 
As recounted in Michael Lewis's "The Big Short," Mr. Hubler infamously bet against the subprime market on Morgan Stanley's behalf, a fact that Morgan Stanley's chief financial officer conceded in late 2007. 
Mr. Hubler's group was supposed to be separate from the rest of Morgan Stanley, but the two bankers continued to receive similar information about the underlying market, according to the person briefed on the matter. 
At no point did they receive material, nonpublic information, a Morgan Stanley spokesman says. 
I struggle to see how the private assessments that the subprime market was imploding were immaterial.
It was not necessarily the private assessments that the subprime market was imploding that was material.  Rather, it was the data that showed the subprime market was imploding that was material.

Data that the origination and servicing platform would routinely generate.
But let's review what the documents suggest is the big picture. 
In the fall of 2005, bank employees share nonpublic assessments of how the subprime market is a house of tarot cards. 
In February 2006, the bank begins creating Stack in part so that it can bet against it. 
In April 2006, the bank creates its own internal hedge fund, led by Mr. Hubler, who shorts the subprime market. Among the traders in this internal shop are people who helped create Stack and other deals like it, and at least two employees who had access to the private due diligence reports. 
Mr. Hubler's group had no investment position in Stack, according to a person briefed on the matter, but it sure looks as if the bank saw what was coming and tried to position itself for a subprime market collapse. 
Finally, by early 2007, the bank appears to realize that the subprime market is cratering even worse that it expects. Even the supposedly safe pieces of C.D.O.'s that it owns, including its piece of Stack, are facing losses. So Morgan Stanley bankers set to scouring the world to peddle as a safe and sound investment what its own employees are internally deriding. 
Morgan Stanley declined to comment on whether it made money on its Stack investments over all. But it looks to have turned out well for the bank. In Stack, it managed to fob off a nuclear bomb to the Taiwanese bank.

BoE's Robert Jenkins: Stable banks need a stable financial system

In a Financial News column, Bank of England Financial Policy Committee member Robert Jenkins makes the argument that since the beginning of the financial crisis senior bankers have had a 'refresher course in basic banking' and are finally stumbling upon the simple fact that a new risk has emerged:  contagion.

Regular readers know that under the FDR Framework contagion is not a risk as market participants limit their interconnectedness to what they can afford to lose.

Why?

The FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).  As a result, market participants set the size of each of their exposures based on what they can afford to lose given the risk of each exposure.

Market participants do this because the combination provides them with access to all the useful, relevant information they need to independently assess the risk of each exposure and makes each market participant responsible for all losses on their exposures.

However, contagion is a risk in our current financial system as opacity across wide swathes of the financial system has led market participants to underestimate risk and therefore become too interconnected.

Contagion will remain a risk until such time as transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system including bank balance sheets and structured finance securities.
  • For banks, transparency takes the form of disclosing on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
  • For structured finance securities, transparency takes the form of disclosing on an observable event basis all activities like a payment or delinquency that involve the underlying collateral before the beginning of the next business day.
With transparency, market participants can go through the process of assessing the risk of each of heir exposures and, where appropriate, reducing their interconnectedness so that it properly reflects the risk of the exposure.
It took four years plus a string of scandals but in 2012 bankers began to acknowledge publicly their past failures and failings. 
Perhaps (some admitted), reputation was critical after all. Perhaps customers should not come last. Maybe, irreplaceable executives were more easily replaced than thought. Maybe some businesses really were too complex to manage. Maybe bonuses tied to risk-taking should not be paid until the risks taken had matured. And yes, in retrospect the industry could not be trusted to regulate itself. 
That these lessons had to be relearned by many highly paid professionals is disgraceful. That they are being learned at last is progress. 
May the momentum continue – for there are three banking basics yet to be grasped or if grasped, then embraced by many senior bankers. The first is that the financial institutions for which they are responsible require a more stable financial system. ... 
Since the advent of the crisis, the financial world has received a refresher course in the basics of banking. In 2007 we rediscovered credit risk; 2008 – liquidity risk; 2009 – market price risk; 2010/11 – sovereign risk. (And coming soon to a theatre near you: geopolitical risk.) 
These risks are not new but what has dawned is the degree to which the interconnectedness of the financial system now amplifies such threats. 
Thus balance sheet values for an otherwise sound institution may plunge because of the forced sale of assets by less sound members of the fraternity. Wholesale funding flees those suspected of weakness. Exposures to “risk-free” sovereign debt can tie vulnerable banks to vulnerable countries. And it does not stop there. Even those financial firms free from direct sovereign exposure remain at risk if their financial counter-parties are so exposed. 
Interconnectedness and the domino effects it can trigger are now a fact of financial life.
A fact of life that is created by opacity across wide swathes of the financial system.  And therefore, a fact of life that can be eliminated by restoring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.
As we have witnessed, the loss of confidence in large financial institutions can cause a loss of confidence in the system as a whole. Had AIG been allowed to fail, the impact would have been felt on both sides of the Atlantic. 
But here’s the rub: should (when) such threats return, the public may be in no mood to bail out the behemoths – and the public purse may be insufficient to do so.
Fortunately, there is no reason that the public should be called on to bail out the behemoths again.  By simply restoring transparency, all market participants can and will reduce their exposures to what they can afford to lose (recall market participants know that in return for access to all the useful, relevant information they are held responsible for all losses on their exposures).

Banks will also reduce their interconnectedness and exposures as market participants will exert restraint on their risk taking behavior.  This restraint will take the form of less access to and a higher cost of funding if the bank is seen as too risky because of its interconnectedness.
If banks need a sound and stable system in which to pursue success, it is equally true that a stable system depends on the perception that the most interconnected banks are sound and stable. This becomes all the more urgent with the prospective removal of government guarantees. 
Markets must believe that when faced with financial loss, banks will either: 1) be able to stand on their own two feet; or 2) be able to be closed down without sparking systemic contagion. Such confidence can come only from a system in which banks’ risk-taking is kept within their loss-absorbing ability. 
This in turn requires sharply less leverage than in the past and more loss-absorbing capital in the future.
What is required is the banks provide ultra transparency.

With ultra transparency, market participants can confirm that a bank is able to stand on its own two feet (in the 1930s, ultra transparency was in fact the sign that a bank could stand on its own two feet).

Requiring ultra transparency has several beneficial results besides increasing the stability of the financial system by reducing the interconnectedness of the market participants.  These benefits include lower leverage and higher loss-absorbing capital.