Showing posts with label Stress Tests. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Stress Tests. Show all posts

Monday, August 26, 2013

Why should ECB's bank asset quality review be believed?

Given Mario Draghi's commitment to do whatever it takes, why should the ECB's review of the asset quality at the EU banks be remotely believable?

Please recall, this is not the first time a governmental entity has overseen an asset quality review.  Previously, these reviews were done in Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain.

The result of these reviews was predictable.  The banks took additional reserves for potential losses and the governments declared their balance sheets had been cleaned up.

Of course, the banks were not required to disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details so that market participants could confirm that all their losses had been recognized.

A few savvy market participants recognized that this lack of transparency was the equivalent of waving a giant red flag and announcing that the banks were still hiding losses on and off their balance sheet.

These market participants' insight have always been confirmed as shortly after the asset reviews it would be shown that there were in fact many more losses hiding on and off the bank balance sheets.

This pattern has held true whether the asset review was carried out by the government itself or using an "independent" third party (accounting firm or BlackRock).

This pattern has also held true when the asset quality review has been combined with stress tests.

So your humble blogger's question stands: why in the absence of transparency would anyone believe the results of the ECB's asset quality review?

One of the downsides of the ECB running an asset quality review without requiring the banks to provide transparency is that ECB puts itself in the position of now having to accept as collateral any of the assets it reviewed and didn't require loss recognition on.

From a Financial Times article on the ECB's asset quality review,

Within a matter of weeks, assuming legislative go-ahead, the ECB is expected to establish its new “single supervisory mechanism”, hiring the 1,000 staff it will need to police the banks, and making its mark with a tough root-and-branch Asset Quality Review (AQR) to determine how truthful banks are being about the loans on their balance sheets....
Properly done, the exercise could quickly establish the ECB as a tough regulator and help restore investor faith in Europe’s lenders. A succession of botched stress tests over recent years and laggardly recapitalisation of troubled lenders have deterred investors from backing the sector. 
A credible AQR, followed immediately by a stress test to show how balance sheets would stand up to further trouble, would, it is hoped, convince the world that Europe’s lenders are as resilient as US banks okayed by the Federal Reserve’s annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR).
No one thinks the US banks are okay.  Everyone knows that as a result of the stress tests the US on an annual basis renews the vow made by then US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner when he pledged the full faith and credit of the US to keep the banks solvent.
All of which explains the flurry of preparations. 
Italy’s Intesa SanPaolo has been the most upfront about its desire to be ready for the ECB process. This month the bank revealed a “conservative” 30 per cent increase in the amount it has set aside to cover bad loans, undertaken explicitly “in the light of the [ECB’s] asset quality review”....
In the absence of exposure detail transparency, how would anyone know if a 30 percent increase in the amount set aside to cover bad loans is "conservative" or not?

Based on the history of Ireland, Greece,.... it is a fairly safe bet that this additional 30% will not be shown to be conservative and that much more in the way of losses will materialize.
The ECB exercise is set to implement new pan-European definitions of non-performing loans, standardising an NPL as anything that is 90 days past due, and also forcing banks to categorise all exposures to a single borrower as non-performing, even if only one of a number of loans is actually in default....
In the presence of regulatory forbearance which allows banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' and turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans, it is nice to have a standard, but the regulators have already undercut it.
Autonomous, an independent research house, predicts the changed definitions could increase problem loans by an average of 40 per cent – forcing weaker banks to raise fresh capital. Lenders in Germany, Austria and France could face the biggest shocks in the AQR....
I guess Autonomous doesn't see the 30% increase in loan loss reserves as conservative.
But a litany of ifs and buts still hangs over the whole process. Most immediately, it is still uncertain whether the EU will deliver the legal go-ahead to empower the ECB next month.  
More fundamentally, there is still disagreement about how to deal with a bank if it fails to plug a capital shortfall under its own steam. 
Here, too, Europe must learn from the US, where the government’s Tarp scheme injected capital as necessary back in 2009. For the ECB exercise to work, the sovereign-focused European Stability Mechanism must become a bank bail-out vehicle of last resort.
The issue for a bank fixing its book capital shortfall is can it generate earnings after all the losses have been realized.

If a bank can generate earnings after taking the losses on its dud exposures, it can recapitalize itself over time by simply retaining earnings.

If a bank cannot generate earnings after taking the losses on its dud exposures, it should be resolved.

Friday, August 16, 2013

ECB discovers why transparency into bank current exposure details needed

Reuters reports that the ECB has discovered why transparency into bank current exposure details is needed.
Policymakers at the European Central Bank had initially hoped that the asset review would feed into the stress tests in part because it is difficult to measure the sturdiness of a bank without knowing precisely the contents of its balance sheet.
Please re-read the highlighted text as your humble blogger has been saying this since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Without ultra transparency, there is simply no way of knowing if a bank is sturdy, as in solvent, or unstable, as in insolvent.

Without ultra transparency, stress tests are meaningless.

EU trying to harmonize definition of non-performing loan

Reuters reports that for the ECB's bank asset quality review test the EU is attempting to come up with one definition of what is a non-performing loan.

It is not surprising that there are several definitions of non-performing loans.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis bank, regulators have engaged in regulatory forbearance.  Under regulatory forbearance, banks are allowed to engage in 'extend and pretend' to turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans.

Naturally, each bank is going to engage in extend and pretend in a way that minimizes the non-performing loans on and off their balance sheets.

The current attempt to harmonize the definition of non-performing loans confirms what your humble blogger has said about the results of the bank regulator run stress tests as being meaningless.

The current attempt to harmonize the definition of non-performing loans also confirms what your humble blogger has been saying about the importance of requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With ultra transparency, regulatory forbearance and extend and pretend is ended.  Markets will exert discipline by rewarding banks that clean up their bad debt exposures.

Banks across the European Union will be asked to use a single definition for bad loans in the upcoming review of their loan books, a senior EU regulatory source told Reuters, making it harder for banks to conceal the state of their businesses behind local conventions.... 
A senior EBA source told Reuters a key feature of the asset quality review will be harmonizing the way banks categorize loans. EU supervisors use a host of different ways to classify troubled or non performing loans, making it difficult to compare across jurisdictions.... 
The 2011 version of the stress tests, which relied entirely on national supervisors' submissions and definitions, was widely criticized for finding that Europe's 70 largest banks collectively needed just 106 billion euros ($140.62 billion). 
The EBA is keen to ensure this round of stress tests has more credibility, and sees consistency of definitions and transparency of information as a key way of ensuring this.

Saturday, April 13, 2013

Deposits are not investments when banks aren't required to provide transparency

In his Telegraph column, Liam Halligan succinctly makes the point that deposits are not investments.

Regular readers know this is particularly true when banks are not required to provide transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

If depositors do not have the information needed to assess the risk of a bank and can reasonably rely on representations made the government (think passing a bank solvency stress test), they simply should never be included in a bail-in.

Investors in unsecured bank bonds or stock on the other hand are choosing to gamble on the solvency of the bank.  They are choosing to gamble because they are buying securities that are designed to place them at risk of losing their money.

The fact that investors in unsecured bank bonds or stock are blindly gambling because of the lack of transparency does not excuse them from the responsibility for losses on their investment exposures.

Rather, it suggests that these investors should instead practice the Wall Street Walk and find investments where there is transparency and they can assess the risk and value of the investment.

Yet as German Chancellor Angela Merkel quakes before her own increasingly outspoken electorate, with parliamentary opposition rising and federal elections looming in September, the screws are now being turned on Cyprus even more. 
How much can this Mediterranean mini-state take? Even before this latest cash demand, the Cypriot economy was officially forecast to shrink by an eye-watering 12pc over the next two years. 
Those with savings above €100,000 at the dominant Bank of Cyprus — including numerous local businesses, educational institutions and charities — are already in line to lose around two thirds of their deposits. 
With growth now likely to be even more negative, that horrendous asset-grab will be more draconian, with large savers at Laiki bank, the second biggest in Cyprus, likely to get nothing at all. 
At the risk of repeating myself, deposits are not investments. If you buy an equity or bond, exposing yourself to risk but also the prospect of a commercial return, then you stand to lose your money. Fair enough. 
If you put money in a bank, though, in a modern society that deposit should be guaranteed.  
To wilfully demonstrate otherwise is to incite deep social unrest, while undermining the very fabric of capitalism and wealth creation itself. 

Friday, March 15, 2013

Fed says less to JP Morgan's fortress balance sheet than meets the eye

In the defining moment for requiring banks to provide ultra transparency, the Federal Reserve questioned the capital plans for both JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs.

By doing so, the Fed told all market participants that there is decidedly less to JP Morgan's fortress balance sheet than meets the eye through current disclosure practices.

Your humble blogger cannot re-emphasize this enough, the Fed, with its access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner on JP Morgan, has said that JP Morgan's claim to having a fortress balance sheet is simply untrue.

What is the true condition of JP Morgan's (and Goldman's) balance sheet?

There is only one way for the market to find out.

The way to find out is to have these firms provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is only with this information that market participants can assess the true condition of JP Morgan (and Goldman).

Saturday, March 9, 2013

Can regulators really evaluate a Too Big to Fail bank?

Reuters ran an article in response to the results from the latest stress tests in which it explored the question of can regulators really evaluate a Too Big to Fail bank.
The newest stress tests for U.S. banks produced scores that are at odds with other measures of lenders' safety, in another sign that some institutions may be too big for regulators to understand and executives to manage. 
For example, Citigroup Inc, which has been bailed out multiple times by the U.S. government, showed up on the score sheets posted by the Federal Reserve on Thursday as being clearly safer than JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
That conclusion is at odds with the views of investors, bond analysts and credit-rating agencies, as well as when measured by a yardstick regulators themselves want to use in the future. 
"At the end of the day, there is a legitimate question about the ability of regulators to fully evaluate $2 trillion institutions because of the complexity and exposures they have," said Fred Cannon, director of U.S. research at Keefe, Bruyette & Woods.
Which of course raises the question of why the regulators don't require banks to provide ultra transparency so then the regulators can piggy-back off of the analytical work done by the market?

Your humble blogger assumes that, at a minimum, each of the banks is capable of analyzing its own exposure details.  So presumably, each of the banks should be capable of analyzing the exposure details of its competitors.

One of the benefits of providing ultra transparency is that we discover if this assumption is correct.

If it is not, that is okay because market discipline will be exerted on the banks that are too complex to understand to reduce their complexity until their banking competitors and other industry experts can assess them.
On Thursday, the Federal Reserve reported the latest results of the tests that began after the 2007-2009 financial crisis to determine if banks have enough capital to withstand a severe economic crisis. The Fed concluded that the banks are in "a much stronger position" than before the financial crisis in 2008. 
Really?  Where is the disclosure of the supporting exposure details by the banks so that this conclusion can be independently confirmed by market participants?
While experts are not arguing with the fact that the banks are better capitalized now and that the system is safer than it was in the run-up to the financial crisis, some of the numbers the regulators published left analysts and bank executives groping for explanations. 
The test raises questions about the ability of regulators to head off the next big threat to the financial system because of the complexity of the institutions.
Even more reason that the Too Big to Fail should be required to provide ultra transparency.

If a market participant questions the results of the stress test, with the information made available under ultra transparency, they can run the test themselves. 

Friday, March 8, 2013

Stress tests don't mean the banks are OK

In his Bloomberg editorial, Mark Whitehouse debunks the notion that passing the Fed's stress tests actually says that the banks are OK.

Mr. Whitehouse along with individuals like Professor Anat Admati would argue that the banks are not OK until such time as they a) pass the stress tests and b) have book capital equal to 20% of assets.

Regular readers know that you still don't know if the banks are OK if both of these conditions are met.

Why don't you know?  Because in the absence of ultra transparency and ongoing disclosure by each bank of its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, you don't have the information needed to independently confirm that the banks are OK.

Please recall that at the beginning of the financial crisis, for all practical purposes, bank financial reporting was rendered meaningless (a fact highlighted by the OECD).  This was the direct result of the suspension of mark-to-market accounting, the adoption of mark-to-unicorn (thank you Bloomberg's Jonathan Weil), and the adoption of regulatory forbearance under which the banks were allowed to engage in "extend and pretend" with their non-performing assets and create "zombie" loans.

There is a reason that the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane refers to banks as "black boxes".  Only management and the bank regulators know what is inside.  Nobody else does.

Now, would you trust management and the bank regulators to provide an accurate representation of their true financial condition?

I don't for a simple reason.  Until a bank provides ultra transparency (this was the industry standard as recently as the 1930s and signaled that a bank could stand on its own two feet), the bank's management is waving a big red flag saying they have something to hide.

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

With passing grades on their stress tests assured, big banks look to make mockery of capital regulations with big payout

Bloomberg reports that the Too Big to Fail US banks are preparing to unleash a tsunami of dividends and stock buybacks with the announcement by the Fed that they have once again passed a meaningless stress test.

The Dodd-Frank Act mandates annual stress tests to reassure the market that the moral obligation to bailout the banks is still in place.

Each year, the Fed recognizes that the safety and soundness of the financial system requires that it say the banks are adequately capitalized.  Naturally, the Fed sticks to this script even if the reality of the losses hidden on and off the bank balance sheet suggests otherwise.

By sticking to the script, the Fed obligates the US Treasury to bailout the banks should they encounter any solvency problems.  This obligation occurs because it is hard to stick investors with solvency related losses after the Fed has effectively recommended the banks as an investment.

Regular readers know that FDR specifically pointed out that the role of government is to never make an investment recommendation as doing so creates a moral obligation to bailout the investor.  Rather, it is the role of government to ensure that all the useful, relevant information is made available in an appropriate, timely manner.  Investors have an incentive to use this information as they are responsible for all losses on their investments.

Naturally, under the Geithner Doctrine (nothing should be done that would hurt the profits or reputation of a big or politically connected bank), the US government adopted incurring the moral obligation.  With this obligation, the government improves the profitability and reputation of the banks.

This year, the banks are turning their guns on making a mockery of bank capital regulations.  Having gamed the system to show high levels of capital, the banks are set to engage in massive payouts to shareholders.

The six largest U.S. banks may return almost $41 billion to investors in the next 12 months, the most since 2007, as regulators conclude firms have amassed enough capital to withstand another economic shock.....
The highlighted text nicely summarizes one of the most important failures in the response to the financial crisis.

Regulators are offering their opinion on whether the banks have enough capital or not to withstand another economic shock.

Please recall that these are the same regulators who missed the financial crisis.

Were it not for the moral obligation, actually it is more than that since then Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner pledged the full faith and credit of the US to supply the banks with all the capital they need, there would be no reason to bet on what is inside the black box banks.

However, with the downside eliminated by the US government, no reason not to gamble....
“You’ve gone from a few years ago, when the industry as a whole didn’t have enough capital, to the point where in the not- too-distant future, it’s going to have too much,” Jason Goldberg, a New York-based banking analyst at Barclays Plc, said in a telephone interview. The Fed’s endorsement is “a Good Housekeeping seal of approval.”
A seal of approval that FDR would say should never under any circumstances be provided by the government as it creates the obligation for the government to absorb the investors' losses.

Thursday, January 17, 2013

BoE's Andrew Haldane: have we solved 'TBTF'? No!

In an interesting article on VoxEU, the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane asks the question of have we solved the Too Big to Fail problem and answers with an emphatic 'no'.

Regular readers are not surprised by this answer as the only way to solve the TBTF problem is to require all banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

The reason ultra transparency solves the TBTF problem is it subjects the banks to market discipline.  Specifically, with this information, market participants can truly assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure accordingly.  The result is to link each bank's cost of funds to its risk.

Linking risk to each bank's cost of funds will put pressure on the banks to reduce their risk.  Pressure that banks will respond to by becoming smaller and more easily understood.  In short, market discipline will cause the TBTF to break themselves up into smaller units with less risk that the market places a higher value on (please note that this happened with corporate conglomerates).

Today, a bank's cost of funds is not related to its risk because the banks are in Mr. Haldane's words 'black boxes'.

Leading up to the financial crisis, market participants understood the banks were black boxes and turned to the financial regulators for insight into the risk of each bank.  The reason market participants turned to the financial regulators is they have a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information on each bank in an appropriate, timely manner.  Recall that the financial regulators have examiners at the banks 24/7/365.

One lesson from the financial crisis is that even if the examiners correctly assess the risk of each bank, the financial regulators will not communicate this risk to the market.  There are a number of reasons this occurs including political pressure and concerns over the safety and soundness of the financial system.

That financial regulators will not communicate the risk of each bank to the market has been shown time and time again with the bank stress tests.  We had banks throughout Europe collapse shortly after the financial regulators said they were well capitalized.  In the US, we had at least two banks who required a subsequent bailout.

It is interesting to note that besides the banks there is another part of the financial system that is Too Big to Fail:  the financial regulators.  Without ultra transparency, market participants are dependent on the financial regulators.  When the financial regulators fail, and they did because we had a bank solvency led financial crisis, the taxpayers bailed them out.

Not only that, but the policy responses since, like the Dodd-Frank Act, have increased the size and role of the financial regulators and made them even more TBTF.

Like the TBTF banks, financial regulators and their role is also cut down to size by requiring ultra transparency.  With ultra transparency, market participants can see if the financial regulators are doing what they are suppose to do.

Mr. Haldane's answer to the question of have we solved the TBTF problem:

No. 
That is not my pessimistic verdict; it is the market’s. Prior to the crisis, the 29 largest global banks benefitted from just over one notch of uplift from the ratings agencies due to expectations of state support. Today, those same global leviathans benefit from around three notches of implied support. Expectations of state support have risen threefold since the crisis began. 
This translates into a large implicit subsidy to the world’s biggest banks in the form of lower funding costs and higher profits. Prior to the crisis, this amounted to tens of billions of dollars each year. Today, it is hundreds of billions (Haldane 2012). In other words, if the market’s expectations are to be believed, the regulatory response to the crisis has not plugged the 'too-big-to-fail' sink.... 
What is certainly true is that, in the light of the crisis, regulation to quell the too-big-to-fail problem has come thick and (at least in regulatory terms) fast. This reform effort falls into roughly three categories: 
(a) Systemic surcharges: of additional capital levied on the world’s largest banks according to their size and connectivity. ... Last year, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) agreed a sliding scale of systemic surcharges for the world’s largest banks. The highest surcharge was set at 2.5% of capital. 
Yet therein lies the problem. Based on my estimates (Haldane 2012), a charge levied at this rate would leave the majority of the systemic externalities associated with the world’s biggest banks untouched. The reduction in default probabilities associated with lowering leverage by a percentage point or two would not offset the higher system-wide loss-given-default associated with the world’s largest banks. The systemic tax is being levied at rates which are too low...
If the banks were required to provide ultra transparency, there would be no need for complex rules like systemic surcharges.

Market participants could independently assess the banks' default probabilities, also known as risk.  The result would be the banks would be under pressure to reduce their risk as their cost of funds increases and makes much of their risk taking unprofitable.

As your humble blogger has said repeatedly, the combination of complex rules and regulatory oversight is an inferior substitute to transparency and market discipline.
(b) Resolution regimes: In principle, orderly resolution regimes for banks could lower the collateral costs of a big bank defaulting, thereby tackling at source these systemic externalities. .... A key component of these plans is the ability to impose losses on private creditors – so-called 'bail-in' – rather than have those losses borne by taxpayers. 
As with systemic surcharges, the issue here is not to so much the bail-in principle, but its application in practice. Bail-in, whether of big banks, sovereigns or companies, faces an acute time-consistency problem. Policymakers face a trade-off between placing losses on a narrow set of tax-payers today (bail-in) or spreading that risk across a wider set of tax-payers today and tomorrow (bail-out). 
A risk-averse, tax-smoothing government may tend towards the latter path – and historically has almost always done so, most notably in response to the present financial crisis. Next time may of course be different. But the market is sceptical.... 
As I have repeatedly said, the idea of bail-in completely misses how our financial systems were designed based on the FDR Framework.

Regular readers know that the FDR Framework combines the philosophy of disclosure with the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

There is no need to be discussing bail-in or bail-out under the FDR Framework because market participants know under the principle of caveat emptor that they are responsible for losses on their exposures.

By definition under the FDR Framework, all unsecured debt and equity holders are subject to losses if a bank is insolvent and the financial regulators close it.

The reason these debt and equity holders will exert discipline on bank management to limit the risk of the bank is to avoid these losses.

Please note, the FDR Framework only holds true so long as the governments ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  Given the financial regulators information monopoly, this is not currently true for banks.  Hence, the discussion of bail-in versus bail-out.  A discussion that is rendered moot by requiring banks to provide ultra transparency.
(c) Structural reform: One way of lessening that dilemma may be to act on the scale and structure of banking directly. Several recent regulatory reform initiatives have sought to do just that, notably the “Volcker rule” in the US, the 'Vickers proposals' in the UK and, most recently, the 'Liikanen plans' in Europe. While different in detail, each of these proposals shares a common objective: a degree of separation or segregation between investment and commercial banking activities. 
In principle, these ringfencing initiatives confer both ex-post (improved resolution) and ex-ante (improved risk management) benefits. Because they act on banking structure, they have a greater chance of proving time-consistent. While this is a clear step forward, those benefits are only as credible as the ringfence itself. The issue raised by some is whether, in practice, the ring-fence could prove permeable. Without care, today’s ring-fence could become tomorrow’s string vest. 
Again, ultra transparency addresses the issue of structural reform.  As I have previously said, regulation has two components:  the rule and the enforcement.

The Volcker Rule says that banks should not take proprietary bets.  By making the banks provide ultra transparency, market participants can assess the bank's positions and see if they are in compliance.

Oh, by the way, ultra transparency will also improves the banks' risk management.  Recall that market discipline has a bias towards banks taking less risk.
If each of these initiatives is necessary but none is individually or collectively sufficient to tackle too-big-to-fail, what is to be done? 
One solution might lie in strengthening these proposals. For example, re-sizing the capital surcharge, perhaps in line with quantitative estimates of the 'optimal' capital ratio (Miles et al (2012), Admati et al (2011)), would be one option for bearing down further on systemic externalities. 
Another more radical option, mooted recently by a number of commentators and policymakers, would be to place size limits on banks, either in relation to the financial system as a whole or, more coherently, relative to GDP (Hoenig (2012), Tarullo (2012)). 
Proposals of this type typically face two sets of criticism. 
The first, practical issue is how to calibrate an appropriate limit. ....
The second, empirical issue is whether size limits would erode the economies of scale and scope which might otherwise be associated with big banks....
What is to be done is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.

Contrary to what the banking industry lobbyists say, there is no limit on transparency as there are a number of market participants who are capable of assessing the exposure details from the global banks (not the least of which are the competitor global banks).
Too-big-to-fail is far from gone. It is even more important it is not forgotten.
And it won't be gone until the banks are required to provide ultra transparency so that they can be subject to market discipline and forced to reign in their risks.

Sunday, January 6, 2013

Matt Taibbi: US government lied about health of large US banks

In a Rolling Stones article, Matt Taibbi discusses how the US government adopted the policy of lying about the health of the large US banks.  In doing so, he makes the case for why the only way to restore trust in the banks and end the moral hazard of Too Big to Fail is if the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Regular readers are familiar with Yves Smith's Geithner Doctrine:
Nothing must be done that will hurt the profits or reputation of any bank that is pretty big or well-connected.
Mr. Taibbi sums up the result of implementing this doctrine:
It built a banking system that discriminates against community banks, makes Too Big to Fail banks even Too Bigger to Failier, increases risk, discourages sound business lending and punishes savings by making it even easier and more profitable to chase high-yield investments than to compete for small depositors. 
The bailout has also made lying on behalf of our biggest and most corrupt banks the official policy of the United States government. 
And if any one of those banks fails, it will cause another financial crisis, meaning we're essentially wedded to that policy for the rest of eternity – or at least until the markets call our bluff, which could happen any minute now.
In reaching this conclusion, Mr. Taibbi looks at how the US government handled the issue of reporting the true condition of the largest US banks since the beginning of the financial crisis.

In doing this, Mr. Taibbi shows why the financial regulators' information monopoly must be ended and banks must be required to provide ultra transparency.
The main reason banks didn't lend out bailout funds is actually pretty simple: Many of them needed the money just to survive.
Please recall that starting on August 9, 2007, the question asked globally was which banks are solvent and which banks are not.  This question could not be answered because the banks' current disclosure practices leave them, in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, resembling 'black boxes'.
Which leads to another of the bailout's broken promises – that taxpayer money would only be handed out to "viable" banks.
Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, said that the central bank's role as lender of last resort was to lend at high interest rates against good collateral to solvent banks.

What was obvious to all from the beginning of the financial crisis is that the global central banks were lending at low interest rates against even the most worthless collateral whether the banks were solvent or not for fear of financial contagion.

Regular readers know that the only way to end financial contagion is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency.  With this information, market participants can assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposure to the banks to what they can afford to lose.  As a result, the collapse of one bank does not bring down the entire financial system.

Please re-read the preceding as this is the necessary condition for ending our current financial crisis.

Your humble blogger is not alone in calling for this.  See the article "What's inside America's Banks' based on this blog written by Frank Portnoy and Jesse Eisinger as well as Nassim Taleb's call for an anti-fragile system.
Soon after TARP passed, Paulson and other officials announced the guidelines for their unilaterally changed bailout plan. Congress had approved $700 billion to buy up toxic mortgages, but $250 billion of the money was now shifted to direct capital injections for banks.... 
This new let's-just-fork-over-cash portion of the bailout was called the Capital Purchase Program. Under the CPP, nine of America's largest banks – including Citi, Wells Fargo, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Bank of America, State Street and Bank of New York Mellon – received $125 billion, or half of the funds being doled out. Since those nine firms accounted for 75 percent of all assets held in America's banks – $11 trillion – it made sense they would get the lion's share of the money. 
But in announcing the CPP, Paulson and Co. promised that they would only be stuffing cash into "healthy and viable" banks. This, at the core, was the entire justification for the bailout: That the huge infusion of taxpayer cash would not be used to rescue individual banks, but to kick-start the economy as a whole by helping healthy banks start lending again. 
This announcement marked the beginning of the legend that certain Wall Street banks only took the bailout money because they were forced to – they didn't need all those billions, you understand, they just did it for the good of the country. 
"We did not, at that point, need TARP," Chase chief Jamie Dimon later claimed, insisting that he only took the money "because we were asked to by the secretary of Treasury." Goldman chief Lloyd Blankfein similarly claimed that his bank never needed the money, and that he wouldn't have taken it if he'd known it was "this pregnant with potential for backlash." 
A joint statement by Paulson, Bernanke and FDIC chief Sheila Bair praised the nine leading banks as "healthy institutions" that were taking the cash only to "enhance the overall performance of the U.S. economy." 
But right after the bailouts began, soon-to-be Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner admitted to Barofsky, the inspector general, that he and his cohorts had picked the first nine bailout recipients because of their size, without bothering to assess their health and viability.
Paulson, meanwhile, later admitted that he had serious concerns about at least one of the nine firms he had publicly pronounced healthy. 
And in November 2009, Bernanke gave a closed-door interview to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, the body charged with investigating the causes of the economic meltdown, in which he admitted that 12 of the 13 most prominent financial companies in America were on the brink of failure during the time of the initial bailouts.
On the inside, at least, almost everyone connected with the bailout knew that the top banks were in deep trouble. "It became obvious pretty much as soon as I took the job that these companies weren't really healthy and viable," says Barofsky, who stepped down as TARP inspector in 2011.

Please re-read the highlighted text as it confirms what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis that the financial regulators chose not to communicate to the market their true assessment of the solvency of the banks.

This is very important as the financial regulators have a monopoly on the information that market participants need to assess the solvency of each bank.  If the financial regulators misrepresent the banks' financial condition, there is no way for market participants to properly adjust both the price and amount of capital they provide to the banks.

More importantly, once the government started lying about the condition of the banks, everyone knew it.

How?

Please notice that the interbank lending market froze at the beginning of the financial crisis because banks with deposits to lend could not determine which banks were solvent and could repay the loans and which were not.

The interbank lending market is still frozen.

This is the banks' way of telling the market that they are still concerned with the solvency of other banks because they know that they too are hiding losses on and off their balance sheets.

This early episode would prove to be a crucial moment in the history of the bailout. It set the precedent of the government allowing unhealthy banks to not only call themselves healthy, but to get the government to endorse their claims. 
Projecting an image of soundness was, to the government, more important than disclosing the truth. Officials like Geithner and Paulson seemed to genuinely believe that the market's fears about corruption in the banking system was a bigger problem than the corruption itself. 
Time and again, they justified TARP as a move needed to "bolster confidence" in the system – and a key to that effort was keeping the banks' insolvency a secret. In doing so, they created a bizarre new two-tiered financial market, divided between those who knew the truth about how bad things were and those who did not....
Please re-read the highlighted text because not only are the banks fighting to maintain opacity so they can continue to gamble and engage in bad behavior like manipulating Libor, but the government has committed itself to maintaining opacity.

As you can imagine, this effectively undermines the US financial system as it is based on the FDR Framework and its combination of the philosophy of disclosure and the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).
The sweeping impact of these crucial decisions has never been fully appreciated. 
In the years preceding the bailouts, banks like Citi had been perpetuating a kind of fraud upon the public by pretending to be far healthier than they really were. In some cases, the fraud was outright, as in the case of Lehman Brothers, which was using an arcane accounting trick to book tens of billions of loans as revenues each quarter, making it look like it had more cash than it really did. 
In other cases, the fraud was more indirect, as in the case of Citi, which in 2007 paid out the third-highest dividend in America – $10.7 billion – despite the fact that it had lost $9.8 billion in the fourth quarter of that year alone. 
The whole financial sector, in fact, had taken on Ponzi-like characteristics, as many banks were hugely dependent on a continual influx of new money from things like sales of subprime mortgages to cover up massive future liabilities from toxic investments that, sooner or later, were going to come to the surface. 
Now, instead of using the bailouts as a clear-the-air moment, the government decided to double down on such fraud, awarding healthy ratings to these failing banks and even twisting its numerical audits and assessments to fit the cooked-up narrative. 
A major component of the original TARP bailout was a promise to ensure "full and accurate accounting" by conducting regular­ "stress tests" of the bailout recipients. 
When Geithner announced his stress-test plan in February 2009, a reporter instantly blasted him with an obvious and damning question: Doesn't the fact that you have to conduct these tests prove that bank regulators, who should already know plenty about banks' solvency, actually have no idea who is solvent and who isn't?
The government did wind up conducting regular stress tests of all the major bailout recipients, but the methodology proved to be such an obvious joke that it was even lampooned on Saturday Night Live. (In the skit, Geithner abandons a planned numerical score system because it would unfairly penalize bankers who were "not good at banking.")  
In 2009, just after the first round of tests was released, it came out that the Fed had allowed banks to literally rejigger the numbers to make their bottom lines look better. When the Fed found Bank of America had a $50 billion capital hole, for instance, the bank persuaded examiners to cut that number by more than $15 billion because of what it said were "errors made by examiners in the analysis." Citigroup got its number slashed from $35 billion to $5.5 billion when the bank pleaded with the Fed to give it credit for "pending transactions." 
Such meaningless parodies of oversight continue to this day. Earlier this year, Regions Financial Corp. – a company that had failed to pay back $3.5 billion in TARP loans – passed its stress test. A subsequent analysis by Bloomberg View found that Regions was effectively $525 million in the red. Nonetheless, the bank's CEO proclaimed that the stress test "demonstrates the strength of our company." Shortly after the test was concluded, the bank issued $900 million in stock and said it planned on using the cash to pay back some of the money it had borrowed under TARP. 
This episode underscores a key feature of the bailout: the government's decision to use lies as a form of monetary aid. State hands over taxpayer money to functionally insolvent bank; state gives regulatory thumbs up to said bank; bank uses that thumbs up to sell stock; bank pays cash back to state. What's critical here is not that investors actually buy the Fed's bullshit accounting – all they have to do is believe the government will backstop Regions either way, healthy or not. "Clearly, the Fed wanted it to attract new investors," observed Bloomberg, "and those who put fresh capital into Regions this week believe the government won't let it die." 
Through behavior like this, the government has turned the entire financial system into a kind of vast confidence game – a Ponzi-like scam in which the value of just about everything in the system is inflated because of the widespread belief that the government will step in to prevent losses.... 
They're building an economy based not on real accounting and real numbers, but on belief. 
The time has come to stop doubling down and build an economy based on real accounting and real numbers.

Wednesday, October 24, 2012

Spain's bad bank to acquire troubled real estate loans at adverse scenario discount

Reuters reports that Spain's bad bank will acquire troubled real estate loans from the Spanish banking system using the discounts shown in the adverse scenario for the latest bank stress test.

Left unanswered is the question of is the price that the bad bank acquires the trouble real estate loans at greater than, equal to or less than the current market value of these loans.

If the price is greater than the current market value, the government is simply giving taxpayer money to the banks.

If the price is less than the current market value, the government is simply giving money to the private investors who are suppose to fund the bad bank.

The only way to answer this question is by having the banks disclose the loans to the market prior to their being sold to the bad bank.  With this disclosure, market participants could assess the value of these loans (this is after all, what markets are good at).
Lenders will face steep discounts to transfer property assets into Spain's so-called bad bank, to reflect a worsening economic and property market scenario, a source with knowledge of the process said. 
Newly built housing transferred to the bad bank will be valued at an average 52.2 percent discount to original book value, while second-hand housing will be discounted 47.5 percent, the source said on Tuesday.... 
The government has been setting up an asset management company, or bad bank, to take on up to 90 billion euros ($118 billion) of sour real estate assets sitting on lenders' books since a property bubble crashed in 2008. 
The bad bank is a condition for Spain to receive up to 100 billion euros European Union aid for crippled lenders.... 
"The lenders will have to take additional haircuts of 7 percent compared with the base scenario used in Oliver Wyman's stress test, bringing discounts very close to the assumptions used in the adverse scenario," the source told Reuters. 
In its stress tests of Spanish banks, Oliver Wyman applied writedowns of 45.2 percent on new housing under a base scenario for the economy, and 52.4 percent in a worst-case scenario envisioning 6.5 percent economic contraction over three years. 
For older housing, the consultancy projected losses of 40.5 percent in the base scenario - an economic downturn of 2 percent over two years, followed by a slight recovery - and discounts of 50 percent in the worst case. 
Bank have already made massive writedowns on property investments under two laws passed this year - provisioning 137 billion euros against losses on 307 billion euros of real estate exposure. 
The transfer price to the bad bank goes even further. 
The source also said lenders would be obliged to transfer undeveloped lots with average discounts of 85 percent of their original book value. 
Since peaking in 2007, housing prices have fallen around 30 percent, on average. The bottom of the market may still be two years off, analysts said, adding prices could fall a further 20-30 percent. 
A point your humble blogger made months ago.
The property crash left banks with 184 billion euros bad debt from real estate developers on their balance sheets, and the problems have spread to small businesses and other sectors. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as this is the result of trying to protect bank book capital levels and banker bonuses.  Protecting the banks and banker bonuses puts the burden of the bad debt on the real economy with clearly harmful results.
So, the bad bank's remit could be widened to include non-performing consumer loans, the economy ministry has said, as a deep-rooted recession causes more people to default. 
The European Central Bank, European Commission, International Monetary Fund and Spain's central bank have been discussing the design of the asset management company. 
The prices at which assets will be transferred must be low enough to attract private investors but not so low as to precipitate bigger losses for banks. 
Regular readers know I think the idea of a bad bank is flawed.

Investors in a bad bank require a higher return on their money than do banks on performing loans.  As a result, the loans have to be sold at a higher discount than the discount that is necessary to allow the borrower to service the loan.
While the bad bank has been designed to hold 90 billion euros of assets, the government expects the final size to be smaller. 
Antonio Carrascosa, managing director of Spain's bank restructuring fund (FROB), said last week the final size of the bad bank would be around 60-70 billion euros, implying average discounts on asset prices of more than 50 percent.

The government expects four nationalized lenders - Banco de Valencia (BVA.MC: Quote, Profile,Research, Stock Buzz), Bankia (BKIA.MC: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz), Catalunya Caixa (CX), and NovaGalicia Banco (NCG) to contribute the bulk of the assets to the bad bank.... 
Spain wants to keep its stake in the bad bank below 50 percent to avoid an impact on public debt, and expects private investors to own at least 55 percent. 
Banking sources told Reuters that Spain's healthy listed banks - BBVA (BBVA.MC: Quote, Profile,Research, Stock Buzz), Caixabank (CABK.MC: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) and Santander (SAN.MC: Quote, Profile, Research, Stock Buzz) - would likely be the biggest investors in the bad bank.
So let me see if I understand this, the nationalized banks are transferring troubled loans to a bad bank owned by the strongest banks in Spain.

Is there anyone besides me who thinks that the price the loans will be transferred at will be advantageous to the stronger banks and costly to the Spanish taxpayer?

Thursday, October 18, 2012

As predicted, latest round of Spain bank stress tests under-estimated losses

Bloomberg reports that the worst-case scenario in the latest round of Spain bank stress tests appears to be optimistic.

For regular readers, this is not surprising as your humble blogger predicted it.

It was not a tough prediction to make as the history of every bank stress test since the beginning of the current financial crisis has been to try to build confidence by making representations about the true condition of the banks that are shown to be false within 3 months.

Could someone explain to me how the situation is improved when the repeated failure of the stress tests appears to show that the policy makers and financial regulators are incompetent?

Anyhow, regular readers know that the next step will be a more 'rigorous' stress test.  This will be a loan level stress test.  Again, the findings of this stress test will indicate that the Spanish banks face bigger losses than previously estimated (probably in the 150 -200 billion euro range).

Spanish officials will claim that the results are definitive until they are shown to be wrong 3 months later.

As previously discussed, there are market participants who think the losses are in the 400 billion euro range.  This is not unreasonable given a 25% unemployment rate and an economy in recession.

Regular readers know that there is an easy way out of ever having to publicly announce the results of stress tests again.  Require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can independently assess each bank and determine the losses hidden on and off its balance sheet.  If they want, market participants can even run their own stress tests.

Based on the markets analysis, Spanish banks should be divided into two groups.

Group 1 includes those banks that have the capability of absorbing the losses and rebuilding their book capital through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.  These should be allowed to continue in operation.

Group 2 includes those banks that do not have the capability of absorbing the losses and rebuilding their book capital.  These banks should be resolved.

Spain’s banks face more loan losses as the pace of an economic slump risks turning a worst-case scenario dismissed in stress tests into reality. 
Bad loans as a proportion of total lending jumped to a record 10.5 percent in August from a restated 10.1 percent in July as 9.3 billion euros ($12.2 billion) of loans were newly classified as being in default, according to data published by the Bank of Spain on its website today. The ratio has climbed for 17 straight months from 0.72 percent in December 2006, before Spain’s property boom turned to bust. 
Spanish bank stress tests by management consultants Oliver Wyman have factored in an economic contraction totaling 6.5 percent from 2012 to 2014 in an adverse scenario that the government and Bank of Spain said has a probability of about 1 percent. Analysts at Nomura andCitigroup (C) Inc. disagree, saying spending cuts and economic conditions mean the worst-case outcome already looks feasible. 
“You can’t attach a 1 percent probability to a scenario that already looks realistic,” Silvio Peruzzo, a European area economist at Nomura inLondon, said in a telephone interview yesterday. Spain’s gross domestic product will shrink by 6.2 percent from 2012 to 2014, he estimated.... 
Lending in Spain’s banking system fell 1.1 percent in August from July and 5 percent from the same month a year earlier, the Bank of Spain said. 
Deposits dropped 1.1 percent in the month and 8.7 percent from a year ago....
The ongoing run on the banking system shows that nobody believes the results of the stress tests.  So as a means of restoring confidence, stress tests don't work.
Spain commissioned the review as part of terms for its European bailout.
A bailout that is totally unnecessary.

As discussed above, a modern banking system is designed so that countries don't have to bailout their banks.  Specifically, deposit guarantees make the taxpayers silent equity partners of the banks when the bank book capital levels drop to low or negative levels.
Spanish banks’ loan losses will continue to grow because of the deteriorating economic outlook and rising unemployment, said Ebrahim Rahbari, a London-based economist at Citigroup. He predicted a 5.8 percent contraction for Spain’s economy between 2012 and 2014. 
“The adverse scenario of the test looks closer to a forecast of economic performance over the next three years than a stress case,” Rahbari said in a phone interview. “That surely has consequences for loan-loss rates and the one we are most concerned about is household mortgages.”.... 
The default rate for 604 billion euros of Spanish home mortgages stood at 3.2 percent in June, according to the Bank of Spain. Banco Santander Chief Executive Officer Alfredo Saenz said in April that anyone saying mortgage defaults are a problem for Spanish banks was “saying something stupid.”...
I guess I was 'saying something stupid' back then.  However, I have been proven right.  Again.
The bad loans data published today by the Bank of Spain restated the bad loans ratio for July to 10.1 percent from a previously published 9.86 percent. The amount of bad loans was for July was restated to 173.2 billion euros from a previously published 169.3 billion euros.

Thursday, October 11, 2012

Fed stress tests confirm need for ultra transparency

The Wall Street Journal ran an interesting article on the Fed's bank stress tests.  What makes the article interesting is that it confirms your humble bloggers observation that ultra transparency is needed to evaluate the solvency of the banks.

Specifically, banks must be required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Please note the trends in the Fed's data requests from the first round of stress tests to the current round of stress tests:  more frequent and more granular.
One new frustration for big banks is that the information requested by the Fed is changing. 
This year the Fed began requiring banks to submit data on a monthly and quarterly basis, in addition to the annual submission. Banks must also submit much more granular information, including dozens of details about individual loans. 
Fed officials say the new data gives them the information they need to build their stress-test models and to see banks' risk-taking over time. 
The trend is clear:  the Fed is headed towards ultra transparency as they know it is the data they need in order to truly assess the solvency of each bank.
Banks say the Fed has asked them for too much, too fast. 
Some bankers, for instance, have complained the Fed now is demanding they include the physical address of properties backing loans on their books, not just the billing address for the borrower.  Not all banks, it turns out, have that information readily available....
The Fed has backed off some of its original requests after banks protested. 
For example, the Fed announced Sept. 28 that it wouldn't require chief financial officers to attest to the accuracy of the data submitted after banks and their trade groups argued that the still-evolving process was too fresh and confusing for any CFO to be able to be sure his bank had gotten it right. 
Banks needed more time to build up the systems and controls to report data reliably, the Fed said. 
The problem here is not the Fed's asking for detailed data.  The problem here is that these banks are blowing smoke about the capabilities of their information technology systems.

If banks lack critical information for managing a loan portfolio, like the physical address of the collateral, it should show up in their CAMEL rating as at least a 2 point increase in the rating (CAMEL ratings go from 1(best) to 5(close the bank's doors)).  Not knowing where the collateral is for a mortgage calls into question the quality of both the assets and management.

Based on the banks' difficulties in producing the requested data, requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency would be very useful.  Then, the Fed could simply download the data it wants.

Also please note that the banks complain about how the Fed conducts its analysis.  If there were ultra transparency, then each of the banks could analyze the other banks and we could see it their assessments produced similar conclusions as the Fed's.
The clash centers on the math regulators are using to produce the results. Bankers want more detail on how the calculations are made, and the Fed thus far has resisted disclosing more than it has already. 
A senior Fed supervision official, Timothy Clark, irked some bankers last month when he said at a private conference they wouldn't get additional information about the methodology, according to people who attended the event in Boston.  
Wells Fargo & Co. Treasurer Paul Ackerman said at the same conference that he still doesn't understand why the Fed's estimates are so different from Wells's.
With ultra transparency we could find out why the Fed's and Well's estimates differ so much and also what do other market participants think.  As an added bonus, with ultra transparency we can re-open the interbank lending market and eliminate fraud in calculating the Libor interest rate.

Monday, October 1, 2012

As predicted, analysts claim that Spain's stress test understated capital needs

As predicted by your humble blogger, in the absence of Spain's banks providing ultra transparency, analysts have concluded that Spain's banks need far more capital than the stress tests show.

The Telegraph reports that Moody's thinks Spanish banks might need over 100 billion euros (not exactly going out on a limb when some analysts were predicting 300+ billion euros several months ago).
The agency said banks would need between €70bn and €105bn “to maintain stability”.
What Moody's announcement did do is to undermine the credibility of the stress tests and open the floodgates for higher estimates of capital needs.

With these higher estimates in hand, Spain will do a loan by loan stress test and conclude that the average of these estimates is the amount of capital Spain's banks need (provided of course that Spain could find this capital; otherwise, the result will be lower).

Of course, this stress test will also not restore confidence in the Spanish banking system.  It won't restore confidence for the simple reason that there is still not ultra transparency and market participants cannot independently confirm the stress test results.

With no ability to confirm the results, analysts will assume that there is sometime to hide and predict even higher capital needs.  To date, this strategy has been successful in Ireland and Greece.  There is no reason to think that Spain will be different.

Test of Spain's latest bank stress test is whether investors willing to invest

In the aftermath of Spain's bank stress tests, are investors gullible enough to believe the numbers and invest in the banks that were represented as almost solvent?  Or will investors remember their experience with Bankia and stay far away?

Since Spanish banks do not provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, there is simply no transparency into the true condition of the banks so that market participants can independently assess their risk.

As a result, nobody can 'invest' in the banks today.  Rather, they can 'blindly bet' on the value of the contents of the black boxes the banks represent.

The last time investors were faced with this choice was Bankia.  Then, the institutional investors stayed away and the retail investors purchased the capital after being assured that it was as safe as their demand deposits.

Staying away turns out to have been the better decision as the value of the contents of the Bankia black box were worth significantly less than was represented.

So now we have our next example of the government trying to tell investors that it is 'safe' to buy the equity of a Spanish bank.  A Bloomberg article reports that Banco Popular Espanol SA is looking to raise 2.5 billion euros.

Why would anyone want to invest in this bank when even the government's stress test says the bank needs more capital than it is raising?

Banco Popular Espanol SA (POP) will seek to raise as much as 2.5 billion euros ($3.2 billion) from a stock sale and suspend its October dividend as the Spanish bank tries to cover a shortfall found in stress tests. The shares plunged. 
The bank expects to book a 2012 loss of 2.3 billion euros, compared with a previous estimate for a profit of 400 million euros, as it speeds up recognition of loan impairments and relies less than it previously planned on capital gains, Chief Financial Officer Jacobo Gonzalez-Robatto said on a webcast for analysts today....
While it is speeding up recognition of loan impairments, is there any reason to believe this covers all of its bad loans?

Unless Banco Popular is willing to provide ultra transparency to prove that all the bad loans are being addressed, it is highly likely that it has a considerable amount of bad loans that it is hiding.
The capital increase may be equivalent to 80 percent of the bank’s current market value. Popular, founded in 1926, is aiming to avoid taking state aid after a stress test on the Spanish banking system by consultant Oliver Wyman published on Sept. 28 showed the country’s sixth-biggest lender by assets had a capital shortfall of 3.22 billion euros in an adverse economic scenario. 
“Every man and his dog has known for a long time that Popular would need to raise capital, but it seems the only ones who didn’t were Popular’s management,” Simon Maughan, a financial industry strategist at Olivetree Securities in London, said by phone today....

“We are going to be generous in the rights issue, because that money is from our shareholders,” Gonzalez-Robatto said on today’s webcast. “We are going to invite our shareholders basically to join us in an extremely bright future for Banco Popular.”...
In the absence of ultra transparency, why would a shareholder want to double down and buy more shares in a bank where the bulk of its business is in a country where the economy is contracting, the government is implementing austerity and there is already 25% unemployment?
Popular will set up a so-called internal bad bank to manage soured real estate as it writes down 9.3 billion euros in 2012, an increase from the 7.7 billion euros in its business plan given in the second quarter of this year, Gonzalez-Robatto said....
They just discovered another 2.2 billion euros of bad real estate debt last quarter!
Investors must make clear their willingness to quickly relax financing terms for Spain’s stronger banks to show that the stress-test process is credible, Jose Manuel Campa, a former deputy finance minister, said in an interview. 
Actually, the stress test process was not credible.  That is why there is already another stress test process in the works that is based on a loan by loan 'review'.  That stress test will find at least twice as much capital is needed to restore solvency.

Of course, once that stress test is completed, the Spanish banks will still not be providing ultra transparency so there will be zero reason for investors to believe that the banks are not still hiding something and that their true condition is much worse.
“If we don’t see over the next month or six weeks a significant improvement in the ability to tap the markets by the banks that are considered solvent, regardless of the capital needs, I think that would be a major failure,” said Campa, who is now a professor at the University of Navarra’s IESE business school in Madrid.
 Based on the Bankia experience, there is no reason not to expect investors to stay away.

Friday, September 28, 2012

Following in Ireland's footsteps, Spain announces bank capital shortfall that reflects politics and not reality

As reported by Bloomberg, the Spanish banking system has a 59.3 billion euro capital shortfall.  A number that is entirely consistent with the 100 billion euro bailout Spain is seeking and entirely inconsistent with actual economic reality.

Regular readers are familiar with governments destroying their credibility by engaging in rounds of hiring third parties to estimate the losses and capital shortfall in the banking system.

The reason there are several rounds is that the markets don't find the estimates credible and, more importantly wonder, what are they hiding because they are not requiring the banks to disclose all of their exposure details.

This is at least Round 2 for Spain.  Would you find an estimate of a 59.3 billion euro capital shortfall credible when the Street is talking at least 150 billion euros?

Round 3 for Spain is already in the works.  This round will be a loan by loan review (BlackRock Solutions makes a lot of money for this analysis).  This round will come much closer to 150 billion euros.

But again the question will be what are the banks hiding?

The only way to restore trust in the banking system and the size of the capital shortfall is to require the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can calculate the losses at each bank.

More importantly, market participants can see which banks are capable of rebuilding book capital levels through retained earnings and which banks cannot.

Spain’s banks have a combined capital shortfall of 59.3 billion euros ($76.3 billion), according to a stress test designed to remove doubts about a financial industry pummeled by real estate losses. 
The Bankia (BKIA) group, a nationalized lender, had a 24.7 billion-euro capital deficit in the tests conducted by management consultants Oliver Wyman that also showed Banco Popular Espanol SA (POP) had a 3.22 billion-euro shortfall. The stress tests of 14 lenders showed no capital deficit for seven banks, including Banco Santander (SAN) SA, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA (BBVA) and Banco Sabadell SA. 
Spain commissioned the independent stress test as part of the conditions agreed in July for a European bailout of as much as 100 billion euros for its banking system, which has been saddled with more than 180 billion euros of losses linked to souring real estate assets. 
The attempt to show how its banks would bear an extreme scenario in which the economy would shrink for three years in a row is part of the government’s drive to show it is fixing Spain’s economy as it considers whether to seek a further rescue package from Europe. 
“These are important stepping stones on the way for Spain,” said Holger Schmieding, chief economist at Berenberg Bank in London, referring to the stress test. Even so, “there will always be people in the market who question the numbers,” he said.
So long as bank balance sheets are 'black boxes', it is reasonable to question the numbers.  Experience has shown that those who have said the situation is worse than the latest government estimates have always been proven right.

Update
From the Telegraph live:
Greek bad loans have hit a record of 57 billion euros, 25% of all loans.
Greek bank recap needs 50 billion euros.  Spanish 59.3 billion euros. 
Spain's figures are simply not credible despite what the official sector says (they said the same thing about Ireland too).


17.04 In a statement, the Bank of Spain said:QuoteThe 14 main Spanish banking groups (taking into account the integration processes currently under way) have participated in this test. The groups account for around 90% of the Spanish banking system’s assets.The results confirm that the Spanish banking sector is mostly solvent and viable, even in an extremely adverse and highly unlikely macroeconomic setting:• Seven banking groups, accounting for more than 62% of the analysed portion of the Spanish banking system’s credit portfolio, do not have additional capital needs.• Additional capital needs have been identified for the remaining groups, on top of those existing as at 31 December 2011, that amount to €59.3 billion when the integration processes under way and deferred tax assets are not taken into account. This amount falls to €53.75 billion when the mergers under way and the tax effects are considered.


17.10 Here is a breakdown of the banks' individual needs. The table shows that Santander is the strongest of the Spanish lenders. The lender exceeds the minimum capital requirements by at least €19bn. It's no surprise to see that Bankia is the weakest. The bank was nationalised in May.
In short: seven banks need cash. Seven don't.
The baseline scenario presumes a capital ratio requirement of 9pc for banks and a cumulative decline in real GDP of -1.7pc over the period to 2014, while the adverse scenario sees a capital ratio requirement of 6pc, which envisages a cumulative decline in GDP of -6.5% over the same period (Source: Bank of Spain/Oliver Wyman).

17.25 The European Commission has welcomed the results of the audit. In a statement, it said:QuoteThe capital needs for individual banks disclosed today are a key step in the process of restoring and strengthening the soundness of the Spanish banks. They will form the basis for the eventual recapitalisation of banks with the help of the programme. The necessary State aid provided to Spanish banks will be determined in the coming months. It will be based on today's published results. It will also reflect measures to be taken by the banks, such as the disposal of assets, other restructuring measures and tapping funding markets, and subordinated liability exercises. In addition, the capital shortfall of credit institutions receiving public funds will be adjusted as a consequence of the transfer of assets to the Asset Management Company.Banks with a capital shortfall will present recapitalisation plans. Upon approval of these recapitalisation plans by the Bank of Spain and the European Commission, banks requiring state aid will present restructuring or orderly resolution plans to the Spanish authorities, which will notify these to the European Commission for approval under EU state aid rules. Upon approval of these restructuring and/or orderly resolution plans, the recapitalisation of a first group of banks is scheduled to occur by November.

17.31 The European Banking Authority (EBA) has also welcomed the results. It said:QuoteThe assessment process and the stress test results disclosed today are a major step towards strengthening and restoring the soundness of the Spanish banking system, which is ultimately crucial for a sustained recovery of economic growth and employment.

17.39 While Jean-Claude Juncker, head of the EuroGroup, is "comforted" by the announcement. He issued this statement:QuoteThe final State aid provided to Spanish banks will be lower than the reported capital shortfall, given measures to be taken by the banks in accordance to their recapitalisation and restructuring plans.The assessment shows that the total financial assistance agreed in July should be more than adequate to cover the final capital needs, including a comfortable safety margin. It should ensure that the recapitalisation process of banks can proceed efficiently and in accordance with previously agreed timelines. I very much welcome that progress on implementing the commitments as defined in the Memorandum of Understanding is well on track. I am confident that the reforms attached to this financial agreement will contribute to ensuring a return of all parts of the Spanish banking sector to soundness and stability.
17.50 Christine Lagarde, managing director of the IMF, praised the audit's "thorough and transparent independent valuation of assets". 
It was a very thorough and transparent independent valuation of assets except of course that the banks did not provide exposure level detail so that the market participants could independently confirm the findings.




Monday, May 28, 2012

Bankia writedowns cast doubt on Spain's bank estimates

A Bloomberg article confirmed your humble blogger's prediction that the Spanish government would undermine its credibility by making misleading statements about the true extent of the troubled assets in the Spanish banking system.

Spain’s two-week effort to overhaul its lenders and estimate for what it will cost taxpayers may already look out of date. 
Economy Minister Luis de Guindos said May 11 that a law tightening provisioning rules, his second in three months, would require public funds of less than 15 billion euros ($19 billion).  
BFA-Bankia, the bank nationalized the same week, said on May 25 it was taking 8.5 billion euros of provisions on top of those demanded by the two decrees, as it sought a 19 billion- euro state bailout.... 
“They’ve done two reforms already and there will probably be more; I don’t know how many more,” Javier Diaz-Gimenez, a professor at the IESE business school in Madrid, said in a telephone interview. “They have zero credibility.”...
Please re-read the highlighted text because it summarizes why Spain and every other country must require their banks to provide ultra transparency.

It is only when the banks disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details that market participants have the information they need to independently assess the banks.  It is only when market participants can conduct an independent assessment that they trust they know the condition of a bank.
“They are trying to do the minimum all the time and kick the can down the road,” Juan Rubio-Ramirez, an economics professor at Duke University and visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, said by phone yesterday. 
This is a direct reflection of policymakers and financial regulators having adopted the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  The policies adopted under this model are all about kicking the can down the road and praying for a miracle to solve the problem.
Efforts so far have focused on assets linked to the real estate industry, while the government and executives including Banco Santander SA Chief Executive Alfredo Saenz have said that household mortgages don’t pose a risk. Spain’s unemployment rate exceeds 24 percent and the economy is suffering its second recession since 2009. 
“Mortgages get paid in good times and in bad,” Saenz said on April 27. “Anyone raising this problem as one of the issues for the Spanish financial system is saying something stupid.”
Bankia may have cast doubt on that position by setting aside another 2.2 billion euros in provisions for individual loans, most of which are residential mortgages.....

Unemployed people don't pay their mortgages after they have exhausted their savings.

As part of de Guindos’s latest overhaul, Spain has commissioned Oliver Wyman Ltd. and Roland Berger AG to carry out a stress test on all Spanish banks’ entire loan book. That will be followed by a detailed audit carried out by three companies. 
“There should be a higher level of non-real estate provisions, whether that’s done through legislation or informally on the back of this external review,” Nomura’s Quinn said in a telephone interview. “There will be pressure for every domestic Spanish bank, except Santander and BBVA, to raise capital if you assume the kind of provisioning we’ve seen in Bankia.”
In the absence of requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, neither the stress tests nor the detailed audit will restore the banks' or the government's credibility.