Showing posts with label Disclosure. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Disclosure. Show all posts

Monday, January 28, 2013

Ex-compliance officer makes case for banks providing transparency

In a must read interview on the Guardian, an ex-compliance officer talks about regulators, high-frequency trading and transparency.

His view of the impact of transparency on banks is
What's more, you cannot have a banking environment that is risk free, gives high returns while being highly transparent. That's logically impossible. If you're transparent in what you're doing then others will see it and get in on the action driving down returns.
And why is it necessary that banks generate high returns?  Isn't a low risk banking environment that is highly transparent preferable from the perspective of society?

His view on the fundamental reason that regulators are ineffective

My impression was that regulators were not always alive to how things work in practice. 
The ones I dealt with were often economists, essentially philosophers who had learned to build models. 
Why understand how things actually work in practice when you can just make assumptions to plug into models?  A classic example of this is the bank stress tests.  Is there any surprise that the banks can pass stress tests for capital adequacy and then need to be nationalized shortly thereafter.

Finally, he offers his perspective on high frequency trading
The effect of HFT on the trading floor is fascinating. You can't see the HFT programme, as it is embedded in the computers. So you notice it negatively, when traders complain because something isn't working. And you notice it when you're watching the order book on a screen, and you see movement when the programme buys or sells.
It's when there's a panic that you really realise just how strange and evanescent these programmes are. How do we access them? In the last resort people can actually rip out the cable from the computer. I've seen that happen, but it seems ridiculously primitive in such technological environments. 
No human being could ever do what computers now do with high frequency trading. No human being can see what HFT does. We can only see it afterwards, when it already has made its impact. 
This raises important questions for regulators. HFT is very difficult to corset, to manage. Regulators will probably never have the manpower to monitor all the data, to follow all transactions. So a significant portion is delegated to innovative technology. Many people I have interviewed are genuinely concerned over this.
Perhaps rather than trying to monitor high frequency trading, the regulators should ban it until such time as they are actually capable of monitoring it and making sure that its impact on the financial markets is positive.

By letting high frequency trading continue right now, the financial regulators are effectively gambling with the stability of the capital markets and the financial system.  A gamble that doesn't appear prudent to your humble blogger.

Transparency: to stop firms from gaming tax system, make them admit what they are doing

A Guardian article provides yet another example of requiring transparency and letting the benefits of sunshine clean up bad behavior.  In this case, the behavior being cleaned-up is the exercise in tax deferral.

Lloyd Blankfein, the boss of Goldman Sachs, is unrepentant about plans – now dropped – to help the bank's already highly paid traders avoid paying the top rate of income tax. 
To recap, Goldman had been thinking about deferring part-payment of bonuses from 2009, 2010 and 2011 into the new tax year to help recipients benefit from a fall in the top rate of tax from 50% to 45%. 
The firm surrendered only after Sir Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, said he found the idea "depressing" and Treasury minister Sajid Javid quietly intervened. 
There is, of course, nothing illegal about moving payments beyond 6 April, when the new tax year begins, but there is a question about whether it can be justified morally.... 
tax specialists at the likes of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG and Deloitte – all of whom have been called before the public accounts committee this week – should be forced to think about the advice they give to companies when it comes to "tax planning". The advice should comply not just with the letter of the law but the spirit too. ...
the government should seize upon an idea raised by the corporate governance body Pirc last week when it wrote to remuneration consultants to ask them what advice they have been giving about deferring bonuses. Crucially, Pirc suggested the consultants should advise clients to disclose any such wheezes in annual voluntary reports.... 
Embarrassment forced Goldman to reconsider its deferral plan. Being forced to admit to tax schemes for staff in annual reports may well prove to be an effective deterrent for others.

Friday, December 28, 2012

Ordinary folks losing faith in stocks

A must read AP article (hat tip Zero Hedge) discusses how ordinary folks are losing faith in stocks because of a lack of trust.
Andrew Neitlich is the last person you'd expect to be rattled by the stock market. 
He once worked as a financial analyst picking stocks for a mutual fund. He has huddled with dozens of CEOs in his current career as an executive coach. During the dot-com crash 12 years ago, he kept his wits and did not sell. 
But he's selling now. 
"You have to trust your government. You have to trust other governments. You have to trust Wall Street," says Neitlich, 47. "And I don't trust any of these." 
Defying decades of investment history, ordinary Americans are selling stocks for a fifth year in a row. The selling has not let up despite unprecedented measures by the Federal Reserve to persuade people to buy and the come-hither allure of a levitating market. Stock prices have doubled from March 2009, their low point during the Great Recession.
The Baupost Group summarizes how the Fed's efforts to force people to buy riskier assets undermines trust.
Finally, we must question the morality of Fed programs that trick people (as if they were Pavlov's dogs) into behaviors that are adverse to their own long-term best interest.  
What kind of government entity cajoles savers to spend, when years of under-saving and over-spending have left the consumer in terrible shape? 
What kind of entity tricks its citizens into paying higher and higher prices to buy stocks? 
What kind of entity drives the return on retiree's savings to zero for seven years (2008-2015 and counting) in order to rescue poorly managed banks? 
Regular readers know that trust in our financial system is the result of transparency.

This is why transparency is at the heart of the FDR Framework and the government is given one simple responsibility:  ensure market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess this information and make a fully informed investment decision.

Market participants are willing to accept either a gain or loss on their investment decision because they "trust" the independent assessment they performed or had a third party perform.

The financial crisis that started on August 9, 2007 showed both opacity across wide parts of the financial system and the degree to which the government has failed to perform its responsibility of ensuring transparency.

Up until August 9, 2007, investors were willing to "trust" the independent assessment of third parties like rating agencies and the government when it came to structured finance securities and banks.  After August 9, 2007, investors knew that neither of these entities could be trusted to provide an accurate assessment.

From the AP article, the result of this opacity and the governments failure to ensure transparency is
"People don't trust the market anymore," says financial historian Charles Geisst of Manhattan College. He says a "crisis of confidence" similar to one after the Crash of 1929 will keep people away from stocks for a generation or more.
So the collapse in trust among ordinary folks was completely predictable.

In fact, they have been adopting Mark Twain's non-trusting view on investing:  more concerned about the return of their capital than the return on their capital.  Remember, ordinary folks understand that under the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware), they are going to have to absorb any losses.

One of the entities that failed to ensure transparency was the Fed.  The Fed is responsible for regulation and supervision for the largest banks.  As the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane says of these banks, they are 'black boxes'.  Black boxes that leading up to the financial crisis the Fed insisted contained very little risk.

This is the same Fed that is now trying to force ordinary folks to take more risk by buying opaque securities that they don't trust.  And the Fed thinks this will work why?

Thursday, December 20, 2012

Banks convicted of fraud in Italian derivatives case

The Wall Street Journal reports that four banks including Deutsche Bank, JP Morgan and UBS were found guilty of fraud in selling derivative contracts to the city of Milan.

This case is interesting because it highlights the difference between a customer and a counter-party.

  • A bank customer relies on the bank to make recommendations that are in the customer's best interests.


  • A counter-party relies on the bank to disclose all the useful, relevant information and knows that it is responsible for assessing this information as it is entering into a trade with the bank where the counter-party is responsible for all gains and losses.
Please note, that a bank customer can be large enough to be considered a sophisticated investor, but might not understand that it is being treated as a counter-party.
An Italian judge convicted four big banks of fraud in the sale of derivatives contracts to the city of Milan in the mid 2000s, a criminal-case ruling that legal experts said could set a precedent for related civil cases across the country. 
Judge Oscar Magi fined UBS AG, UBSN.VX -1.11% Deutsche Bank AG,DBK.XE -0.50% J.P. Morgan Chase JPM -0.78% & Co. and Depfa Bank PLC, part of Germany's Hypo Real Estate Holding, €1 million ($1.32 million) each and gave nine of their employees suspended jail sentences of up to eight months. Mr. Magi also ordered that a combined €90 million be seized from the banks. 
During the trial, prosecutor Alfredo Robledo had argued that the banks defrauded Milan by tricking officials into believing the city would save money on its debt repayments by entering interest-rate swaps that affected payments on €1.68 billion of bonds it had sold in 2005. Mr. Robledo also said the city was defrauded because the banks didn't disclose that they made an aggregate total of around €90 million in profits from the deals. 
The four banks denied the charges during the trial. On Wednesday, the banks reiterated that neither they nor their employees had engaged in wrongdoing and said they would appeal their verdict. Italian law allows up to two appeals in criminal trials; during the appeals process, the financial penalties are likely to be suspended. 
"In JPMorgan's view, the evidence at trial demonstrated conclusively that the individuals behaved entirely honestly and appropriately throughout and that the transactions complied with Italian and English law," the bank said in a statement. The other banks issued similar statements....
In Italy, the ruling could prompt prosecutors in other cities to seek to press criminal charges against banks that entered into derivatives contracts in other municipalities. For much of the 2000s, a number of Italian cities entered into swaps linked to interest rates, seeking to hedge risk they had taken on by borrowing at a time when Italian and international banks were granting credit easily. 
Municipalities often got locked into deals—and future payments—that they scarcely understood or expected. In 2008, the government banned the use of derivatives by Italian municipalities. 
Municipalities have taken action in civil court against banks, alleging that they didn't properly disclose the risks of derivatives deals. In March, the four banks in Wednesday's verdict had settled with the city of Milan, agreeing to unwind the interest-rate swaps ahead of their maturity in 2032. 
"The sentence poses for the first time the issue of the need of transparency when dealing with public entities," Mr. Robledo said after the verdict was delivered. "There are tens of local authorities in this situation and they have never been assisted by adequate professional advice," 
Tommaso Iaquinta, a Milan-based lawyer who has worked on a number of cases involving local authorities, but not the Milan one, said the decision sets "a very dangerous precedent for the banking world." The decision could lead to more criminal cases, as well as additional civil action, Mr. Iaquinta said.

Monday, October 29, 2012

Judge rules names of individuals who rigged Libor at Barclays can be disclosed

As reported by the Telegraph, a UK judge has ruled that Barclays will have to disclose the names of the individuals who rigged Libor.

Barclays will be forced to disclose the names of staff involved in Libor rigging, following a damning court judgment over claims it mis-sold interest rate swaps to a care home operator.
The bank was chastised on Monday at the High Court in London by Lord Justice Flaux, who claimed Barclays was intentionally trying to hide the true scale of the Libor scandal, which has already seen the lender fined £290m.
Up until now, the true scale of the Libor scandal has not only been hidden by banks like Barclays, but also by the global financial regulators.
The criticisms came as Barclays faced a preliminary hearing, ahead of a trial, over allegations it mis-sold to a care home group complex interest rate derivatives that were in turn based on false Libor rates. 
Issuing a damning judgment, Lord Justice Flaux said Barclays’ objections to the Libor-rigging claims brought against it by Guardian Care Homes were “wholly without merit” and accused the bank of “misleading” customers.
Would banks ever mislead their customers?

Of course they would and we didn't need the Libor rate manipulation or CDOs like Abacus to know it. It has been well known since the Great Depression.

This is why we have a financial system based on the FDR Framework and the combination of the philosophy of disclosure with the principal of caveat emptor.

It is assumed that if disclosure of all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner is not required of the banks, they will not provide it and instead will mislead their customers.
Allowing the case to continue to trial, the judge described the bank’s attempts to dismiss the Libor aspects of the care home operator’s claim as “shadow boxing” and said they were “doomed to fail”. 
Guardian Care Homes’ lawsuit is seen as a test case for Libor-rigging claims and the court decision to allow the case to go to trial potentially opens the door to billions of pounds of legal actions against other banks involved in the rate-setting scandal. 
A level of exposure that calls into question the solvency of the banks involved.
Over a day-long hearing, Lord Justice Flaux repeatedly struck down Barclays’ objections and said the bank would be forced to disclose potentially embarrassing details, such as the identities of staff implicated in Libor manipulation. 
“[It] just seems perfectly obvious... that the people responsible for giving those instructions [manipulate Libor] must have known customers were being misled,” he said....
The judge has just provided an example of why transparency works so well.  By shining a bright light on bad behavior by bankers, it discourages them from engaging in bad behavior in the first place.
However, Lord Justice Flaux rejected the arguments and said Barclays would from next month have to begin providing the names of staff involved in Libor-rigging to Guardian Care Homes’ legal team.
“This is all shadow boxing. The real issue is they [Barclays] are trying to shut it down because they don’t like it,” he said.

Tuesday, August 14, 2012

Oil and gas fracking disclosures show why transparency cannot be left to industry or its trade groups

Bloomberg carried an article on disclosure of fracking wells by oil and gas firms that illustrates why transparency cannot be left to companies in the industry or their trade groups.

What the oil and gas industry has done parallels what has occurred in the financial sector with banks and structured finance securities.

Seeking to quell environmental concerns about the chemicals it shoots underground to extract oil and natural gas, Apache Corp. (APA) told shareholders in April that it disclosed information about “all the company’s U.S. hydraulic fracturing jobs” on a website last year. 
Actually, Apache’s transparency was shot through with cracks. 
In Texas and Oklahoma, the company reported chemicals it used on only about half its fracked wells via FracFocus.org, a voluntary website that oil and gas companies helped design amid calls for mandatory disclosure. 
Energy companies failed to list more than two out of every five fracked wells in eight U.S. states from April 11, 2011, when FracFocus began operating, through the end of last year, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. 
The gaps reveal shortcomings in the voluntary approach to transparency on the site, which has received funding from oil and gas trade groups and $1.5 million from the U.S. Department of Energy.
“FracFocus is just a fig leaf for the industry to be able to say they’re doing something in terms of disclosure,” said U.S. Representative Diana DeGette, a Colorado Democrat. DeGette, along with Pennsylvania Senator Robert Casey, introduced legislation in March 2011 that would require companies to disclose fracking chemicals. The bills haven’t advanced in either the House or Senate. 
With FracFocus, “companies that want to disclose can do it but the other ones don’t have to,” DeGette said.
 Kind of like Libor.
Bloomberg compared oil and gas well records from eight states -- Arkansas, Colorado, Louisiana, Montana, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah and Wyoming -- against disclosures that companies made for those states on FracFocus. While the state data didn’t reveal whether wells were fractured, regulators in each state said that at least 85 percent of their wells were fracked. The Congressional Research Service puts the national estimate at more than 90 percent. 
In the eight states, companies told regulators that 18,158 wells were readied for production or were newly producing from April 11, 2011 through Dec. 31, 2011. They disclosed 8,555 of them on FracFocus. If 85 percent of the total wells were fracked, that means 45 percent of the fracks weren’t disclosed on the website. 
Bloomberg’s analysis, covering states that accounted for 64 percent of U.S. gas production in 2010, shows the difficulty of getting a full picture of the industry’s transparency....
That difficulty is intentional as the industry doesn't want transparency.
Oil and gas companies have gotten better at listing their fractured wells on the website over time, said Dan Whitten, a spokesman for America’s Natural Gas Alliance, one of two industry groups that help pay operational costs for the website. Some states now require companies to make disclosures on FracFocus, he said. 
“ANGA operators are committed to transparency, and support public disclosure of the additives used in the hydraulic fracturing process,” Whitten said in an e-mail. “If you were to look at a complete timeframe of FracFocus, you would see a progressively higher rate of participation.”
Sounds a lot like the British Bankers' Association describing Libor.
Companies participating in the voluntary system agree to disclose information about wells on the website once they have been fractured, which is the start of the completion process. ....
At the same time, concerns center on the hundreds of chemicals -- including known carcinogens -- used in the process.
Homeowners in Pennsylvania, Texas and Wyoming have complained that their well water was contaminated with chemicals or methane gas from nearby frack jobs. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency last year linked the method to contaminated drinking water in Pavillion, Wyoming; the agency is now retesting some of those findings. The EPA has little authority to regulate fracking; Congress in 2005 stripped it of most such power....
Is there a parallel here to toxic mortgage-backed securities?
Oil and gas executives say the FracFocus website helps eliminate the need for any new federal oversight that might unify the regulatory approach.

“Rome wasn’t built in a day,” said Cal Cooper, manager of special projects for Apache. “This is a positive thing. It shows industry can get its act together and make things happen in a short amount of time.”....
Bringing transparency to the $15 trillion in structured finance securities could be accomplished in 18 months.  Seems like that is a much bigger IT effort than tracking oil and gas wells.

Friday, August 10, 2012

Paul Singer on regulation, Dodd-Frank and opacity

Courtesy of ZeroHedge, we have the following comments from Elliott Management's Paul Singer on regulation, the Dodd-Frank Act and on-going opacity in the banking system.

In his comments, Mr. Singer hits on many of the themes that are familiar to regular readers.  This is not surprising as Mr. Singer and your humble blogger used very similar reasoning to predict the financial crisis.

On regulation:
  • Opaque, overleveraged and vulnerable Financial Institutions which need to be propped up by the implicit or explicit guarantee of sovereigns does not make for a solid financial plumbing system for the global economy...this is a formula for power entrenchment, favoritism and shady deals behind closed doors.
On Dodd-Frank:
  • Not only will it fail to make the system safer, but we believe it will likely be an actual accelerant of the next financial crisis
  • Dodd-Frank was supposed to “fix” the American financial system and end “too big to fail.” Unfortunately, the law, born in a political steamroller, does the exact opposite: it will be the accelerant of the next crisis.
  • The 2008 crisis was episodic and took a while to get rolling. The next one could well be a black hole, and Dodd-Frank will bear responsibility for that.
On why Americans are angry:
  • The government, lacking deep understanding of these firms, wants to pretend that their gigantic efforts (most notably Dodd-Frank) actually fixed the situation. But we believe that citizens are angry at what their guts tell them (correctly, basically) about the special treatment and riskiness of Financial Institutions.
On public data reporting:
  • Decades ago, the balance sheets of the Financial Institutions contained most of the information you needed to know to understand their risks. Today the picture is profoundly different, predominantly due to the growth of leverage through derivatives....As a result, there is no major Financial Institution today whose financial statements provide a meaningful clue about the risks of the firm’s entire panoply of assets and liabilities including derivatives, nor how the firm’s performance, or even survival, will be affected by market movements in the future.

Sunday, July 15, 2012

Like Libor interest rates, were oil prices manipulated?

The Telegraph reported on how the same manipulation in self-reported prices that took place with Libor interest rates may have also taken place with oil prices.
Concerns are growing about the reliability of oil prices, after a report for the G20 found the market is wide open to “manipulation or distortion”. 
Traders from banks, oil companies or hedge funds have an “incentive” to distort the market and are likely to try to report false prices, it said..... 
Petrol retailers use oil price “benchmarks” to decide how much to pay for future supplies. 
The rate is calculated by data companies based on submissions from firms which trade oil on a daily basis – such as banks, hedge funds and energy companies. 
However, like Libor – the interest rate measure that Barclays was earlier this month found to have rigged – the market is unregulated and relies on the honesty of the firms to submit accurate data about all their trades.
Imagine that, an opaque pricing measure that relies on honesty of firms with a vested interest in acting as an oligopoly and manipulating the market.

This is another classic example of why benchmarks need to be based on actual trades.
This is one of the major concerns raised in the G20 report, published last month by the International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). 
In the study for global finance ministers, including George Osborne, the regulator warns that traders have opportunities to influence oil prices for their own profit. 
It points out that the whole market is “voluntary”, meaning banks and energy companies can choose which trades to make public. 
IOSCO says this “creates opportunity for a trader to submit a partial picture in order to influence the [price] to the trader’s advantage”....
Is there a regulator who is responsible for this market?
The price reporting agencies, Platts and Argus, argue they employ journalists to weed out false data submitted by oil traders. 
IOSCO says reporters are “well-aware that traders have an incentive to push the market one way or another and do not generally believe everything they are told”. 
However it points out this system is heavily reliant on the “experience and training” of journalists to make a judgement about what the oil price should be....
Why rely on judgement when historical facts could be used instead?
Lord Oakeshott, the former Liberal Democrat Treasury spokesman, said the oil price system ought to be examined in the wake of the Libor scandal. 
“Clearly it’s right we must shine a light on how other crucial benchmark prices are reported, especially when they affect the cost of living for millions of motorists,” he said....
Shining the bright light of transparency into the opaque corners of the financial system.
Simon Lewis, chief executive of the Global Financial Markets Association, has raised concerns about the “opaque” way the oil price is worked out. 
In a letter to IOSCO, he said price reporting agencies may not be as impartial as they claim, because they take fees from banks and oil companies to provide information.... 
Platts added that there are four main differences between oil prices and Libor – the quality of its data, its independence, competition between reporting agencies and the transparency of its methodology.
And one similarity, neither oil prices or Libor is based off of actual trade data that is made readily available to all market participants.

Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Thomas Curry, OCC and the other bank regulators discover need for ultra transparency

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, Thomas Curry and the OCC discovered the need for ultra transparency as a result of JP Morgan's $2+ billion credit default swap trading loss.

Under ultra transparency, JP Morgan would have been required to disclose on an on-going basis its current, global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this disclosure, the OCC and every other market participant could have seen what JP Morgan was doing and exerted discipline to restrain the risk taking implied by the position.
bank regulators said a lack of disclosure by J.P. Morgan regarding risks it was taking hampered efforts to prevent the trading losses of more than $2 billion the bank disclosed last month. 
Comptroller of the Currency Thomas Curry on Tuesday told the hearing that the regulator is probing the level of reporting provided by J.P. Morgan's Chief Investment Office, the unit responsible for the losses. 
"In hindsight, if the reporting were more robust or granular, we believe we may have had an inkling of the size, the potential complexity, the risk of the position," Mr. Curry said. "What we're looking at on a prospective basis is to make sure there's a robustness to the reporting" and risk management, he said.  
Mr. Curry acknowledged that the OCC only became concerned about J.P. Morgan's trading activities after news reports on the trades were published in early April.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Curry makes the case for a) requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and b) why this ultra transparency needs to be made available to all market participants so that they can assist the regulators in exerting discipline on the banks' risk taking.
The Federal Reserve's general counsel, Scott Alvarez, said that J.P. Morgan's managers "didn't have a good handle" on information about the risks the bank was taking. 
"We have to rely on the information that we get from the management of the organization," Mr. Alvarez said. 
The comptroller's office has said it learned of "risk factors" from J.P. Morgan's derivatives traders in early April. 
Further confirmation of the need to require banks to provide ultra transparency.
The Wall Street Journal reported April 5 that a trader at J.P. Morgan, known as the "London Whale," made large bets on credit derivatives. 
Rep. Spencer Bachus (R., Ala.) the panel's chairman, said the J.P. Morgan trades highlight weaknesses in the current structure of financial regulation, which he called excessively complicated. 
"Sitting before us today are five different regulators, all of whom have some supervisory responsibility over these trades and several of whom have examiners embedded at J.P. Morgan, but none of whom, apparently, was either aware of the bank's hedging strategy or raised concerns about it," he said.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Rep. Bachus makes the case for why banks need to provide ultra transparency and make it available to all market participants.  The more eyes, the more chances that someone will see a problem and raise a warning.

Monday, May 21, 2012

JP Morgan: Who knew what when? Who didn't know what and why?

In his Wall Street Journal Heard on the Street column, David Reilly looks at two important questions about JP Morgan's $2 billion trading loss:  Who knew what when?  Who didn't know what and why?

Your humble blogger would like to answer the second question.

The market did not know what was going on and the reason why is current disclosure practices that leave banks like JP Morgan resembling, in the words of the Bank of England's Andrew Haldane, 'black boxes'.


An example of this is Value at Risk which attempts to measure how much a firm could lose from a trade.
For Congress, questions about the bank's risk measures are particularly important. That is because issues around them also touch on the way banks manage capital and report risk to investors. 
In some cases, value-at-risk models help to determine how much capital banks hold against trading assets. That gives them leeway since these are internally generated models. 
The danger: Banks have an "incentive to game their model to lower their regulatory capital requirement," says former Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Chairman Sheila Bair. The risk grows if banks can tinker, as J.P. Morgan's episode shows may be possible. 
J.P. Morgan's experience is also a reminder that the risk measure varies among banks. Indeed, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in a quarterly report on derivatives activity, "cautioned" that the risk gauge can mislead. 
The OCC said that J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley calculate the measure with confidence there is a 95% chance that losses will be within the reading. If the firms used a 99% confidence level like "Bank of America and Citigroup,their Var estimates would be meaningfully higher," the OCC said. 
In light of that, J.P. Morgan is a reminder for both banks and investors that attempts to measure risk, let alone tame it, are fraught with hazard.
This is the reason that Jamie Dimon didn't want to see summary reports or analyzes of the trade, but rather wanted ultra transparency and the ability to see the trading position himself.  He wanted the detail data so he could see what was going on.

Thursday, April 12, 2012

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau adopting ultra transparency for mortgage servicing benefits consumers and investors

In a NY Times Dealbook article, Richard Cordray, director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, outlines the principles for mortgage servicing regulation and the goals of bringing ultra transparency to mortgage servicing.

The way that CFPB is going to bring ultra transparency is by requiring observable event based reporting.  Under observable event based reporting, every observable event, like a payment or delinquency, is reported on the business day it occurs or as soon as possible thereafter.

In addition, observable event based reporting requires accurate tracking of all the paperwork related to the mortgage -- signing the loan documents or transferring it to a covered bond or securitization trust is a reportable event.

Bringing ultra transparency to mortgage servicing through observable event based reporting has benefits both consumers and investors.

For example, investors benefits from having current data on the underlying mortgage performance on which to base their valuation of an RMBS security.  In addition, observable event based reporting allows market participants to monitor servicer performance for compliance with the Pooling and Servicing Agreement. 

The proposed CFPB rules include

  1. Proper handling of documentation including obtaining all signatures required for conveyance of the mortgage and note to the trust.
  2. Servicers would have to take a series of steps designed to optimize recovery to avoid foreclosure.  Each step must be documented as they are taken.  These steps would assure fair and equitable treatment of borrowers and investors while preserving rights at seniority levels.
  3. Removing structural disincentives to loss mitigation including conflicts of interest between first and second lien where same servicer is involved with both loans.  This includes alignment of servicer compensation and incentives with investors’.
From the NY Times Dealbook article,
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau on Tuesday outlined preliminary plans to address a lack of transparency and accountability among mortgage servicers. 
The new scrutiny will take aim at the industry’s aggressive tactics and sloppy record keeping that bedeviled homeowners in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The companies, typically arms of the nation’s biggest banks, collect payments and handle customer service for mortgage lenders. 
“The mortgage servicing rules we are considering reflect two basic, common-sense principles — no surprises and no runarounds,” Richard Cordray, director of bureau, said in a statement. “For too long, mortgage servicers have not been held accountable to their customers, and the result has been profoundly punishing to homeowners in distress.” 
The new regulation, Mr. Cordray said, would mandate “clear” monthly mortgage statements that break down a homeowner’s obligations by principal, interest, fees and the due date of the next payment. 
Under the plan, servicers would have to take a series of steps to avoid foreclosure. They would, for instance, need to warn a homeowner before their interest rate adjusted. And they would need to provide a list of alternative options for consumers who cannot afford their new bill.... 
The bureau’s proposals aim to take a proactive approach to preventing a repeat of those abuses. 
In a nod to consumer complaints, the bureau also hopes to address issues in mortgage bill processing. The plan would mandate that servicers credit bill payments immediately, keep “up-to-date and accessible” records and correct any errors promptly. The bureau would require mortgage servicers to respond to a consumer complaint within five days and complete an internal investigation within 30 days. 
“All of these rules would give consumers accurate and relevant information so they can understand what their servicer is doing, identify problems as early as possible, and take follow up actions before things start to snowball,” Mr. Cordray said.

Tuesday, April 3, 2012

Henry Blodget knows SEC's job is ensuring disclosure and not preventing stupid investment decisions

In his Business Insider column, Henry Blodget takes on Andrew Ross-Sorkin's NY Times Dealbook column on the JOBS Act and its repeal of disclosure requirements.

The essence of Ross-Sorkin's argument is that in the absence of disclosure, market participants are no longer investing, but blindly gambling. [A point that your humble blogger has been making about structured finance securities since before the financial crisis began.]

So Mr. Obama may want to weigh the fate of Groupon’s investors as he sits down on Thursday to put his signature on the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act....
The measure, known as the JOBS Act, is a well-intentioned bill with bipartisan support aimed at making it easier for small businesses to find investors early and to continue to grow in the public markets by lowering some of the bureaucratic barriers.... 
the legislation, in the name of creating jobs, dismantles some of the most basic protections for the most susceptible investors apt to be drawn into get-rich-quick scams and too-good-to-be-true investment “opportunities.”...
But it is awful for the investors, who rely on the transparency of the process.... 
Steve Case, the co-founder of AOL, was one of the biggest behind-the-scenes proponents of the JOBS Act ... As for criticism that the law goes too far in loosening disclosure rules, he said, “It’s not perfect,” but he added, “I’m confident we’ll strike the right balance.” 
Mr. Case also made the argument, correctly, that all regulation can’t protect everybody.... 
More important, however, he made a profound, perhaps inadvertent, remark about the business people’s state of mind on investing, suggesting that it still may be analogous to a casino. 
“I don’t want to sound flip about this, but you don’t have to be an accredited gambler to go to Las Vegas,” he said. “Anyone can walk into a casino and lose an unlimited amount of money.” He added, “I’d rather they invest that money.” 
Mr. Case is right: there are few built-in protections for gamblers. 
But investing is supposed to be different. 
Mr. Blodget focuses on the investment results experienced by the Groupon IPO investors and argues that repealing disclosure requirements is okay as the definition of a market is that for every trade there is a winner and a loser.

What just happened to Groupon investors?
Well, those who bought Groupon the IPO price or immediately after the IPO--and held onto it--have gotten demolished. 
So, we should tighten IPO regulations, not weaken them, right? 
Absolutely not. 
The reason investors lost money on Groupon, as well as Demand Media,Pandora, and other flame-out IPOs, is not that regulation failed. It's that the investors paid too much for the stocks.

The SEC gave Groupon a proctology exam before it went public. That didn't stop the stock from cratering. And it cratered long before the embarrassing earnings restatement Groupon announced last Friday. 
And it's not as though there wasn't a healthy diversity of opinion about Groupon's prospects before and after the IPO. 
Many analysts, including Jim Cramer and yours truly, were screaming from the rooftops that Groupon was overvalued--a crash waiting to happen.... 
Investors who bought Groupon on the IPO chose to ignore these warnings. Importantly, these Groupon bulls might have been right. That's what makes a market, after all. One investor on each side of the trade, one of whom is right, the other of whom is wrong.
Mr. Blodget knows that it is not the SEC's job to make investment recommendations or prevent investors from making what turn out to be stupid investment decisions.  It is the SEC's job to ensure that for each investment all the useful, relevant information is made available to market participants in an appropriate, timely manner.

The act of investing involves using this information in assessing the risk of and valuing an investment.

Without access to all the useful, relevant information, investors are not investing, but rather blindly gambling.

Monday, April 2, 2012

Absent ultra transparency, China discovers disclosure system no guarantee of protection

Reuters ran an interesting article on how China is looking at how to improve legislation governing its developing disclosure-based securities regulatory framework.

The goal is to increase transparency and improve investor protection.

Regular readers know that disclosure-based financial systems are stable only if investors have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can make fully informed investment decisions.

For all financial firms, all the useful, relevant information takes the form of ultra transparency.  Under ultra transparency, financial firms disclose on an ongoing basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Market participants need these details in order to assess the risk of each financial firm.  Then, based on this risk assessment, market participants adjust their exposure to what they can afford to lose given the risk of the financial firm.

Regular readers know that the FDR Framework is the fundamental building block for the stable disclosure-based financial system that China is looking to build.

China’s bourse regulators and the nation’s IPO watchdog, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, have been busy brainstorming improvements to legislation governing the disclosure requirements of listed companies in the PRC. 
Aiming to bring increased transparency and other investor protection merits often associated with a disclosure-based securities regulatory framework, the CSRC is contemplating models from Hong Kong, the United States and other jurisdictions where listed companies are required to publicly disclose corporate and financial statements in a timely manner.
It is ironic that China is studying US disclosure requirements in light of the recently passed JOBS Act that repealed these requirements for firms with less than $1 billion in revenue.

Previously, since the 1930s, the US had been the model for disclosure-based capital markets.

Now, consistent with the financial regulators allowing banks to hide losses on and off their balance sheet as part of implementing the Japanese model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis, the US is adopting the idea that capital markets work better when investors do not have access to the information they need to make a fully informed investment decision.
Recent fraud allegations involving U.S.-listed Chinese companies have highlighted shortcomings in a disclosure based system, particularly where securities regulators primarily rely on companies and their professional advisors to truthfully and accurately disclose information in filings. 
Although many of the accused companies appeared to comply with disclosure obligations, subsequent investigations produced allegations of material misstatements, omissions and even forgery of regulatory filings....
This is why your humble blogger has urged China to make its financial institutions the global model for disclosure by requiring them to provide ultra transparency.

Disclosing the data from which the financial statements are constructed materially reduces disclosure errors.
Disclosure alone, without regulatory authority to verify the authenticity of documents and hold listed companies responsible for violations of disclosure rules, may therefore be insufficient to protect investors. 
As the guardians of China’s capital markets move towards a disclosure-based system in securities regulation, they may well be looking to such enforcement gaps and considering efficient alternatives to protect investors when companies are accused of lying in disclosure documents.
By requiring disclosure of each financial institution's exposure details, China can instill market discipline in bank financial reporting while efficiently eliminating lying in disclosure documents.

Tuesday, March 20, 2012

Under Japanese model, repealing disclosure laws seems reasonable

One of the consequences of pursuing the Japanese models for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis is policymakers and financial regulators get comfortable with the idea that it is acceptable for banks to hide losses on and off their balance sheets.

It is a small step from this act of deception to the idea that maybe disclosure isn't needed for other firms.

With this small step, policymakers begin the repeal of the securities laws that were set in place in the 1930s.  Securities laws that were designed to prevent specific abuses that contributed to the Great Depression.

The last time our policymakers and financial regulators chose to repeal a 1930s era security law was Glass-Steagall and the separation of commercial and investment banking.  With the current financial crisis, we know how badly repealing that law has worked out.

In a Huffington Post column, Professor Simon Johnson takes on the notion of repealing disclosure requirements for small businesses.

With the so-called JOBS bill, on which the Senate is due to vote Tuesday, Congress is about to make the same kind of mistake again -- this time abandoning much of the 1930s-era securities legislation that both served investors well and helped make the US one of the best places in the world to raise capital. We find ourselves again on a bipartisan route to disaster....
The idea behind the JOBS bill is that our existing securities laws -- requiring a great deal of disclosure -- are significantly holding back the economy.
In practice, as discussed under the FDR Framework, that great deal of disclosure is the fundamental building block for our financial system.
The bill, HR3606, received bipartisan support in the House (only 23 Democrats voted against). The bill's title is JumpStart Our Business Startup Act, a clever slogan -- but also a complete misrepresentation. 
The premise is that the economy and startups are being held back by regulation, a favorite theme of House Republicans for the past 3 ½ years -- ignoring completely the banking crisis that caused the recession. Which regulations are supposedly to blame? 
The bill's proponents point out that Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) of stock are way down. 
That is true -- but that is also exactly what you should expect when the economy teeters on the brink of an economic depression and then struggles to recover because households' still have a great deal of debt. And the longer term trends over the past decade are global -- and much more about the declining profitability of small business, rather than the specifics of regulation in the US (see this testimony by Jay Ritter). 
Professor Ritter, a leading expert on IPOs, put it this way: 
"I do not think that the bills being considered will result in a flood of companies going public. I do not think that these bills will result in noticeably higher economic growth and job creation." 
In fact, he also argued that the measures under consideration "might be to reduce capital formation." 
Professor John Coates hit the nail on the head: 
"While the various proposals being considered have been characterized as promoting jobs and economic growth by reducing regulatory burdens and costs, it is better to understand them as changing, in similar ways, the balance that existing securities laws and regulations have struck between the transaction costs of raising capital, on the one hand, and the combined costs of fraud risk and asymmetric and unverifiable information, on the other hand." (See p.3 of this December 2011 testimony.) 
In other words, you will be ripped off more. Knowing this, any smart investor will want to be better compensated for investing in a particular firm - this raises, not lowers, the cost of capital.  
The effect on job creation is likely to be negative, not positive.
Sensible securities laws protect everyone -- including entrepreneurs who can raise capital more cheaply. The only people who lose out are those who prefer to run scams of various kinds.
Investor protection is good for growth and essential for sustaining capital markets....
But remember, the Japanese model explicitly involves banks, with the blessing of the financial regulators, not disclosing their true condition.

It is entirely consistent with the idea that deceiving investors is okay that legislation like this bill seems reasonable.
Perhaps the worst parts of the bill are those provisions that would allow "crowd-financing" exempt from the usual Securities and Exchange Commission disclosure requirements. 
A new venture could raise up to $1-2 million through internet solicitations, as long as no investor puts in more than $10,000 (section 301 of HR3606). 
The level of disclosure would be minimal and there would be no real penalties for outright lying. There would also be no effective oversight of such stock promotion - returning us precisely to the situation that prevailed in the 1920s. 
This might well pump up the value of particular stocks -- that was the experience of the 1920s, after all. But ephemeral stock market bubbles are not without real consequences. The crash of 1929 was made possible by the lack of constraints on what stock promoters could say and do. Combined with excessive leverage, this led directly to the Great Depression....
Where are the supposed guardians of our financial system?...
All of them have been captured by the process of implementing the Japanese model.

It is hard to defend disclosure when actively engaged in a massive cover-up of the banking system.
The securities industry special interests are naturally out in force ... Reports of the death of Wall Street lobbying power have been greatly exaggerated.
Financial deregulation was the result of decades-long delusion and bipartisan consensus. A major undermining of our securities law seems likely to take place on Tuesday - in a rushed moment of legislative madness.
Yet another victory for Wall Street's Opacity Protection Team.

Sunday, March 18, 2012

Market making versus proprietary trading; client versus counter-party

In theory, it should be easy to tell the difference between market making and proprietary trading.  As the discussion about the Volcker Rule shows, in practice it is not easy.

In theory, it should be easy to tell the difference between a client for which there is a fiduciary obligation and a counter-party.  In practice, due to the convergence between capital markets and banking it has not been easy.

For example, the Telegraph ran a series of articles on small businesses that believed they were required to enter into a derivatives contract in order to get a loan.

Is a small business borrower a client or a counter-party for the loan and derivative package?

If we were only to look at the loan, then the borrower is a client.  At a minimum, the bank has a fiduciary responsibility in the form of lender liability.

If we were only to look at the derivative contract, then the borrower is a counter-party.  They are taking a bet on interest rates.

As Frank Portnoy said about the confusion between client and counter-party in a Financial Times column
Both Mr Smith and Goldman stretch the word [client] to cover not only true client relationships in which the bank owes a fiduciary duty as an adviser but also pseudo client relationships in which the company is a market maker, trading with counterparties at arm’s length. 
Goldman’s “muppets” are pseudo clients at most – fellow gamblers around a poker table. Goldman will ensure that the rules of the game are accurately described – the financial equivalent of checking to be sure there are 52 cards in the deck. But it is not obliged to act in a disadvantaged counterparty’s best interests, any more than a savvy poker player is obliged to show a poor player his good cards.
It is clear from the Telegraph articles that the banks treated the small businesses as counter-parties and made the disclosures for counter-parties (the banks made available an individual from their capital markets area to answer questions from and market to the small businesses).

What was equally clear and far more important is that the small businesses did not know they were no longer being treated as clients, but rather had become counter-parties who the banks had the right to fleece.  It is one thing to be at the poker table knowingly.  It is quite another to be playing poker when you do not know it.

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

Is massive imbalance in Eurozone central banking system cause for concern?

Der Spiegel ran an interesting article that asks the question of 'is the massive imbalance in the Eurozone central banking system a cause for concern?"

The article focused on the fact that the German central bank has almost 500 billion euros of claims while the central banks of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy owe over 600 billion euros.

How is the system suppose to work?

Here's an example: A Greek business buys a truck from a German company. The Greek company's local bank in Thessaloniki transfers the payment for the truck to the German company's bank in Stuttgart. 
Because the payment is carried out through the two countries' central banks, this creates a liability on the part of Greece's central bank toward the ECB within the Target2 system, while the German Bundesbank now has a claim from the ECB for the same amount. 
The balance evens out when money flows from Germany to Greece, as happened most years before the crisis: The commercial bank in Greece would borrow the money it needed for its loan to the Greek business, for example, from a German bank.

What gave rise to the current imbalance?

But in a financial crisis, they can potentially lead to catastrophe because the cash flow between banks suddenly falters. This is what has happened since 2007:
  • Banks in all of the euro zone countries have had to hold onto their money. They withdrew from supposedly unstable countries, and loans that expired were not renewed.
  • The fears of the wealthy also came into play: Concerned that their money might soon lose its value, they began to pull out of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, then later Spain and Italy as well. This left banks in those countries with a smaller pool of savings they could pass on as loans.
  • The result of all this was that Greece and the other countries in crisis no longer had enough money to fund all of their imports. If Greek banks wanted to offer further loans, for example to pay for the purchase of German or Dutch products, they had to borrow from their central bank.
  • The central bank, in turn, simply created money out of nothing, charging it to the entire euro zone as an outstanding claim within the TARGET2 system. "These countries simply pull money off the printing press," Sinn complains.
Even worse, the central banks also grew increasingly lax in the collateral they required for loans they made to banks in their country. Whereas in the past they accepted only government bonds with top-level credit ratings, now they began to accept second and third-tier securities. 
This can be seen clearly in the statistics: Just between 2005 and 2010, the volume of securities accepted by central banks rose from €8 billion to €14 billion -- and has likely increased even more since then. 
Especially those banks in crisis countries, which are already reliant on their central banks, now submit even their worst securities. Greek banks, for example, have primarily their own country's sovereign bonds on their books. No one on the free market wants these securities, but the Greek central bank continues to accept them as collateral, issuing new money to the banks in exchange. 
"Private cash flow is replaced by public cash flow," Sinn explains. 
This becomes dangerous if those securities ever need to be used, for example if Greece leaves the monetary union or declares bankruptcy. At that point, Greek bonds would be valueless, and the probability that Greece's central bank will be able to repay its debts to the euro system becomes miniscule.

Naturally, the article asks what happens if one or more of the countries with a central bank that owes money leaves the Eurozone.  Could Germany through its central bank lose 500 billion euros?

The real answer is it depends.

It depends on whether or not the individual central banks are enforcing the Eurozone central banking system's collateral requirements or not.

Specifically, when the Eurozone central banking system lends to a bank against its collateral the Eurozone central banking system does not advance as much as the collateral is currently worth.  In fact, there is a schedule for the haircuts applied to the collateral.

It is my understanding that after the loan has been made, in theory, if the value of the collateral declines, the borrowing bank is suppose to provide additional collateral. [This is done to protect the Eurozone central banking system from risk should the value of the collateral decline.]

But are the national central banks requiring the posting of additional collateral in practice?

If yes, even if a country leaves the Eurozone, its central bank should have adequate collateral to ensure that it can repay what it owes to the Eurozone central banking system.

If no, then the Eurozone central banking system is exposed to and could have losses should one or more nations leave the Eurozone.

What caught my attention about the imbalance in the Eurozone central banking system was here is a classic example of disclosure (we know which national central banks are creditors or debtors) without transparency (we don't have the information needed to know if there is adequate collateral available to minimize the risk of loss).

Monday, March 5, 2012

Iceland trial is a victory for transparency and democracy

Like the Nyberg Report on Ireland's financial crisis, through a trial of its former Prime Minister, Iceland is exploring the extent of "the collapse of the people's trust in its country's politicians, institutions and financial system."

In her column in the Guardian, Alda Sigmundsdottir describes how this trial lets everyone understand exactly what happened that led up to the financial crisis.

As an Icelander, I found it chilling to watch the trial of my country's ex-prime minister Geir Haarde get under way. Haarde was PM of Iceland during and leading up to its economic meltdown in 2008, and is the first national leader to face charges over the global financial crisis.... 
Yet this trial is necessary. The Icelandic collapse was not just an economic collapse – it was also a moral collapse. It was a collapse of the people's trust in its country's politicians, institutions and financial system. It revealed to the vast majority of us that we'd had no idea of the extent of the political corruption and neglect that had lurked beneath the surface of our society for decades. 
This trial is not about Haarde.... No, this trial is about transparency and democracy. It is about the right of the people to hear from their highest elected representative about what really happened in the months and years leading up to the greatest man-made disaster this country has known.... 
We want to know what happened. A vast amount of information and data has been collected and analysed for this trial. That information contains answers to many of the burning questions that the Icelandic people need the answers to if we are to put the shock and trauma of the economic collapse behind us. 
At the beginning of the year, the current leader of the Independence party introduced a motion in parliament to have the charges against Haarde dismissed. Late last week, lawmakers voted by a narrow margin to press ahead with the trial. Had the vote gone the other way, the information and documents that will presumably surface during the trial might have been closed to the Icelandic people for decades to come. 
Indeed, the Independence party's vehement opposition to the trial did nothing but raise suspicion that there was something in those documents that the power elite wanted to keep hidden. With any luck, that suspicion will be eliminated.
Haarde's trial is a victory for transparency and democracy – those ideological concepts that are sweeping the world on the back of movements like the Arab spring and Occupy. 
His guilt or innocence is not the issue; his trial is a stepping-stone to a more open and just society. As to whether other nations should follow Iceland's example, I can only respond with a resounding yes. Let transparency, justice and truth guide the way to a new world order.

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

Money market mutual funds provide more transparency than banks

As banking regulators attempt to expand their turf and regulate the shadow banking system, I hope that they remember that some of the so-called shadow banks actually provide more transparency in their disclosures than do the heavily, regulated banks.

As Federated Investor's John Hawke observed in an American Banker column,
Volcker’s somewhat evocative characterization that [money market funds] are "truly hidden in the shadow of banking markets" conjures up an image of fly-by-night firms operating surreptitiously in the darkness of back alleys.  But with 30 million investors and $2.6 trillion in assets, MMFs are hardly unseen, hidden or surreptitious.  
Not only are they subject to significant control, examination and oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission, with detailed prospectus requirements for the issuance of their shares, demanding reporting requirements, regular surveillance, and substantial requirements as to liquidity, asset quality and maturities, but they must publicly and frequently disclose the contents of their portfolios, on their websites and in regulatory filings – down to the individual security level.  
And, of course, they must satisfy the standards and evaluations of the rating agencies, which in some respects are even more demanding. To suggest that MMFs exist in a hidden "shadow" world simply distorts reality. 
Please re-read how money market funds publicly disclose the contents of their portfolio down to the individual security level.  This reflects what a securities regulator thinks is necessary for a 'shadow bank', in this case the money market fund, to disclose so that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

Please note that even though they provide individual security level disclosure, money market mutual funds do not provide this disclosure frequently enough (under ultra transparency, it would be updated so it is always current).  In 2008, one of the funds had invested in Lehman and suffered losses.  Since investors did not know what that fund or the other funds owned at the time, there was a danger of a run on the funds.

Had there been ultra transparency, investors could have seen what the funds owned and realized that there was little reason for concern.

As the Bank of England's Paul Tucker observed, over the last 30 years, banks and capital markets have fused.  Unfortunately, bank disclosure has not adjusted to this change.

Bank disclosure reflects the combination of the fact that bank regulators have access to ultra transparency and the belief that therefore other market participants didn't need to have ultra transparency.  As a result, market participants must rely on the regulators to assess the risk of each bank and convey this risk to the market.

The financial crisis that began on August 9, 2007 has shown that bank regulators cannot be trusted to either properly assess the risk of each bank or convey the result of their assessment to the market.

As a result, the regulated banking sector needs to be subjected to similar disclosure requirements of the money market fund 'shadow banks' and have to report their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Saturday, January 21, 2012

How banks get away with inventing profits

The Guardian ran an interesting column on 'bankers now producing financial statements that would make Bernie Madoff blush'.

The key takeaway from the column is bank financial statements are meaningless.  This is further confirmation of the observation made by the OECD that bank capital ratios, which are based on balance sheet figures, are also meaningless.

As this blog has said repeatedly, the only way to restore confidence in the financial statements is by requiring banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can determine just how fictional the current bank financial statements are and the size of the adjustment these statements require to bring them back to reflecting reality.

The banking crisis is now out of control, made worse by the sloppy bailout structure. The format of the bailout, and the perverse incentives for managers created thereby, have encouraged senior executives to produce financial statements that are still exaggerating profits and capital to an extent that would make Bernie Madoff blush. 
Let me set out three examples of how bankers declare profits despite running loss-making operations as defined by prevailing UK company law, some of which were acknowledged by the Bank of England's Andy Haldane on Thursday: 
1. Underprovisioning for expected losses, resulting in loans being carried at more than their recoverable amounts.... 
2. Marking to model
Under IFRS rules, certain assets (primarily derivatives and heavily structured transactions), for which there is no market, are valued by analogous reference to a synthetic imagined market. The aforementioned Madoff employed this method of accounting. 
3. Fair valuing own debt 
A healthy banking system is characterised by a market environment in which all major entities strong enough to enjoy the revered accreditation "bank" are believed to be solvent. 
When confidence in a bank's solvency drops, the market price of that bank's debt falls. To wipe out a £1bn operating loss by recording a £2.3bn profit based on the assumption that the bank could repurchase all of its debt at the discounted market price is crazy. RBS did this in 2011 Q3.

Thursday, January 19, 2012

BoE's Andrew Haldane calls for 'radical rethink' in bank financial reporting

In a speech given at the Information for Better Markets Conference, the Bank of England's Executive Director for Financial Stability and Financial Policy Committee member Andrew Haldane called for a 'radical rethink' in bank financial reporting.

Mr. Haldane noted that

accounting rules for banks have bent with the financial stability wind in ways which have amplified investor and regulatory uncertainty.... But if we are to restore investor faith in banking sector balance sheets, nothing less than a radical rethink may be required.
As evidence of this, he looked at how

fair value accounting principles have gained ground when the going has been good, and lost
it when it has got tough.   From a financial stability perspective, this is a cause for concern.  To see why, consider how banks’ balance sheets then appear to investors.   
During the asset upswing, fair value gains ground.  Mark-to-market gains are booked as profits.  To the extent that asset prices are over-inflated, so too are the recorded profits of the banks.   
During the downswing, fair value principles are rolled back.  Potential losses are then hidden from view.  Today, some of the uncertainty around global bank valuations stems from the difficulty in gauging these losses, obscured by provisioning practices in banking books.  Regulators and investors alike fear the fog created by such forbearance. 


In sum, accounting rules in general, and fair value principles in particular, appear to have played a role in both over-egging the financial upswing and elongating the financial downswing.  They have tended to over-emphasise return in the boom and under-emphasise risk in the bust.  That is not a prudent approach.  Indeed, it is a pro-cyclical one.  
Regular readers know that one of the reasons your humble blogger wants banks to be required to provide ultra transparency is that this disclosure is the perfect complement to bank financial reporting because it eliminates pro-cyclicality.

When banks are required to disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, it is impossible for them to hide losses on the downswing, thus eliminating the fog of forbearance, and harder for them to be aggressive in booking mark-to-market gains on the upswing.

Market participants, including their competitors, know how to assess this data and value each position -- after all, many of the loans the competitors tried to book themselves.  As a result, market discipline will force the banks to be conservative in their financial reporting.