Showing posts with label Ultra Transparency. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ultra Transparency. Show all posts

Friday, September 20, 2013

London Whale trading scandal legacy is requirement banks disclose their exposure details

The JP Morgan London Whale trading scandal showed how important it is that all market participants, not just management and regulators, have access to each bank's current global exposure details.

For example, when everyone can see a bank's proprietary trades, banks don't make these bets.  JP Morgan demonstrated this fact by closing its position as quickly as possible after the position had been "leaked" to the marketplace.

In his Guardian column, Nils Pratley looks at how the trading scandal demonstrates that JP Morgan is too big to manage and too big for regulators to oversee.  If it is too big to manage or regulate, the logical conclusion is that it should be shrunk.

But how do you effectively shrink JP Morgan or other similar Too Big to Fail bank and exert restraint on it so it doesn't become a problem in the future?

By requiring the bank to provide transparency into its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details and letting the market exert discipline.

With transparency, the first thing to go are its proprietary bets, as oppose to the market making positions, as the bank doesn't want the market to trade against its bets.  Hence, we get compliance with the Volcker Rule without 500+ pages of regulations.

With transparency, the second thing to go are the thousands of subsidiaries that exist for regulatory or tax arbitrage.

In short, with transparency, market discipline gives each bank the incentive to reduce its risk profile and organizational complexity as the failure to do so results in a lower stock price and higher cost of funds.
Too big to manage? Too big to regulate? Both criticisms of JP Morgan should ring loud and true for readers of the various regulatory postmortems on the bank's "London Whale" trade. 
From chief executive Jamie Dimon's initial dismissal of the affair as a "tempest in a teapot" to the various botched internal investigations, this was a corporate calamity. 
And the worst part was JP Morgan's high-handed attempt to deceive regulators. The UK's Financial Conduct Authority says it was "deliberately misled" by London-based executives on one occasion. 
Please note that requiring exposure detail transparency would have prevented this entire scandal.

First, the bank wouldn't have made the proprietary bet.

Second, even if it did make the proprietary bet and take on the risk of the market trading against it, management would have been able to get a clear picture as it too could have seen the trades.

Third, there would have been no reason for management to lie to the regulators as the regulators could easily verify, with the assistance of other market participants, what they were being told by the bank.
Total fines of $920m (£574m), to add to the $6bn loss from the trading activities themselves, will destroy any lingering notion that JP Morgan was the smartest manager of risk on Wall Street. 
The FCA's report reveals the bank's almost comical inability to get a handle on its credit derivative exposures even after senior management realised there was a crisis.... 
Incompetence is one thing, of course. Misleading regulators is the serious part of this scandal. 
JP Morgan's behaviour was brazen and extraordinary. In a discussion with the UK regulator in March 2012, JP Morgan staff in London didn't mention that traders on the synthetic credit portfolio – the source of all the problems – had been told to stop trading. 
That was a basic piece of information to reveal. 
The following month, on a conference call, London executives said there had been no material changes to the portfolio since the March meeting. In fact, the portfolio was expected to lose a significant amount of money that very day, pushing losses for the year beyond $1bn, as London management had been told by their traders prior to the call with the regulator. 
Thus the FCA's damning assessment that it had been deliberately misled.

Thursday, September 19, 2013

As JP Morgan pays over $1 billion in fines today, it is worth noting bad behavior occurs across banking industry

As JP Morgan pays over $1 billion in fines today (including for lying about London credit default swap trade and for lying about credit card add-on products it charged for but didn't provide), it is worth noting that the fines are a cost of doing business and that this type of behavior cuts across the entire banking sector.

Regular readers know that the only way to change bank behavior for the better is to require transparency.  Specifically, transparency under which the banks disclose the current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Why transparency?

Because sunlight is the best disinfectant.  With exposure detail transparency, sunlight is shown on the banks and all of their activities.

Gone are the days of misleading or politically bullying their regulators as market participants can use this data to independently assess what banks are doing.  Based on this independent assessment, market participants can exert market discipline on the banks; something that has been absent for the last 40 years.

Zoe Williams nicely summarizes the bad behavior of the banking sector and why transparency is needed in her Guardian column.

Putting aside the people who just can't bear for this to be true, it is plain to everyone that the main high street banks are morally bankrupt. If only we could have bailed them out morally instead of financially – I feel sure our moral deficit would have been easier to pay down. 
Two scandals hit Barclays this week within 24 hours of each other – in one it is contesting a £50m fine for reckless Qatari fundraising that it hadn't told its shareholders about. In the other, it may have to repay £100m for mistakes (in its favour) made in personal loans. 
This doesn't tell us much we didn't already know. 
We knew from Liborand the mis-selling of personal protection insurance that cheating people has become peer-normalised among the main banks, and we know this has been going on since at least 2005. 
There has been a moral deficit since then, and the crash didn't make a dent in it. 
We also know, from those epic fines issued by the Financial Services Authority (now the FCA) over Libor, that much of the punishment is as good as meaningless. Money was just taken from one bank and distributed among the others. This only works if just one of them is crooked. When they all are, it's just a kitty....

We spend so much time talking about this titanic clash between the free market and the social state – yet ignore the fact that most of our major "markets" no longer operate as such. 
This is an oligarchy whose only governing authority is the administrator of wrist-slaps, and whose principles begin and end with the preservation of its jointly and severally managed profit. 
Which is to say that they're not competing against each other; they collaborate brilliantly – which would be sweet to watch were it not for the fact that they are working together the better to screw us. 
When you criticise a bank, you are often accused of the crime of "minding profit". I don't mind profit. But the system as it stands has come untethered from all the principles by which profit justifies itself. 
Buyers and sellers are only equal parties working towards mutually beneficial deals when both have all the relevant information. 
Generally we have no information and discover what the banks are up to roughly six years later, if at all....
[RBS] has all the garden variety failures that affect me personally as a customer – you can check them on a scorecard produced by Move Your Money – as well as occupying the hot epicentre of an FT diagram which details the causes of the 2008 financial crash. 
That was a complicated disaster, caused by bad lending, bad investments, risky funding structures, low capital, and mergers and acquisitions. RBS alone had a finger in every pie chart (it is actually a Venn diagram). 
So this institution is at the very heart of an event that has caused misery for millions of people, not to mention lobotomised our political culture...

Tuesday, September 17, 2013

Is Barclays raising capital simply to absorb existing losses on its balance sheet?

In its independent analysis of Barclays, PIRC, a UK institutional investor consultancy firm, raises the question of is the bank raising capital simply to cover losses that already exist on its balance sheet.

Regular readers know that this question would be easy to answer if banks like Barclays were required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants could independently assess the exposure details and determine if and where any losses might be.

Barclays AGM in April 2013 was against a backdrop of the company denying the PIRC analysis that it needed more capital due to overvalued assets, whilst at the same time seeking a general authority to issue new shares. 
The rights issue announced in July 2013 as a result is contrary to that denial and there will not be an EGM to give accountability for the rights issue and its reasons. 
Furthermore, inspection of the rights issue announcement reveals that the story in it does not quite stack up. Barclays is saying that its £5.8bn equity capital raising, is to reduce “leverage” (gearing). 
That might be the case in its IFRS accounts where it is not booking the £4.1bn losses that the PRA has identified and is the substantial reason for the rights issue. However, when adjusted for the loss, the proper accounts would show that the bulk of the equity capital raising is to deal with the overvalued assets. 
Therefore the substantial reason for the rights issue is not to reduce gearing it is funding the loss that the PRA has identified that Barclays is not putting through its IFRS books. The explanations not matching is inherently a problem with running two sets of books. 

UK banks received favorable accounting treatment from regulators

PIRC, a UK institutional investor consultancy firm, looked into how UK banks were required to report their financial statements since the beginning of the financial crisis.

What PIRC found is the regulators effectively broke the spirit if not the letter of the law by letting banks report financial statements that made the banks appear healthier than they were.

This is yet another example of why banks must be required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This disclosure minimizes the potential for banks to overstate their health as the statement can be independently verified by market participants.

Amidst the fallout of the banking crisis, where all of the failed banks appeared healthy by their accounts, is the question of quite why did the Financial Reporting Council quietly dissolve the legal entity the Accounting Standards Board (“ASB”), shortly afterwards, and subsume the functions within itself? 
PIRC has discovered tucked away at the back of the ASB’s yawningly long Statement of Principles, from 1999 (a very good year for very bad ideas) the very clear admission that the ASB had a systemic disregard for the law, because it thought it knew better. Or, quoting from the document, the ASB preferred to focus on “what is deemed to be right”. 
Given that “what is deemed to be right” included abolishing general provisions for bad debts, meaning that risky lending was overvalued in the balance sheet and underpriced for the risk, what was “deemed to be right” was in fact nothing less than reckless and wrong and illegal. 
The law that was being disregarded was the very simple rule that accounts must show whether any company is solvent or not. The full statement is below: 
“However, the development of the Statement has not been constrained by legal requirements because the Board believes that accounting practice evolves best if regard is had in documents such as the Statement of Principles to what is deemed to be right rather than what is required by law.”

Monday, September 16, 2013

CFTC's Chilton calls for better transparency of banks' commodity assets to stop market manipulation

Reuters reports that Bart Chilton, a member of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, has called for better transparency of banks' commodity exposures to end market manipulation.

And why is better transparency needed?

"It is still nearly impossible to figure out exactly what banks own," Chilton said in notes prepared for speaking in Michigan at an event on Saturday. 
"Unless we can see that, we can't reasonably and responsibly protect against market manipulations," he said.

Please re-read Mr. Chilton's comment as it confirms what your humble blogger has been saying about the need to bring transparency to banks since the beginning of the financial crisis.

In order to know exactly what banks own, banks must disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Saturday, September 14, 2013

Nucleus of our current financial crisis

The Financial Times put together a terrific graphic in which it lists the five main causes of bank and broker failure (bad lending, bad investments/trading, low capital, risky funding structure and M&A) and which combination of these causes brought down each bank or broker during our current financial crisis.

Your humble blogger likes this graphic because it is both very informative and because each of these causes was made possible by opacity.

The latter point bears repeating.  What made each of the causes of bank and broker failure possible was opacity.

Because of opacity, banks and brokers were not subject to market discipline that would have restrained the banks and brokers exposures to each cause of failure.

Let's look at how opacity works to allow bad lending.

When a bank has to disclose its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, market participants can assess both how the bank underwrites its loans and equally importantly how it charges for these loans.

Is the bank compensated for the risk it is taking on?  If not, market participants can exert market discipline by reducing their exposure to the bank and charging the bank more for funds.

With opacity, banks were free to engage in bad lending in the run-up to the financial crisis.

Let's look at how opacity works to allow low capital.

When a bank has to disclose its current global exposure details, market participants can assess the risk of the bank.  Market participants can then adjust their exposure to the bank based on this risk assessment to what they can afford to lose.

The result is a link between the risk a bank is taking and its stock price.

For example, banks with less capital will have a lower stock price for the same level of earnings as banks with higher levels of capital.  There is a natural bias for banks to have higher capital levels. In the 1930s, when disclosing a bank's exposure details was the sign of a bank that could stand on its own two feet, bank capital levels exceeded 20% of their exposures.

With opacity, banks were free to lower their capital levels as there was no link between the risk they were taking and their stock valuations.

The takeaway from the Financial Times' graphic is that the causes of the financial crisis could have been prevented if the banks had been required to provide transparency and disclose their current exposure details.

Wednesday, September 11, 2013

Post financial crisis policies promise chronic stagnation

In his Financial Times column, Satyajit Das observes about the policies adopted to deal with the financial crisis:
These policies will engineer a chronic stagnation, requiring continuous intervention to prevent rapid deterioration.
Mr. Das uses arguments that should be very familiar to readers to support this conclusion.

The arguments should be familiar because your humble blogger has been using them under the description of the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis since the beginning of the current crisis.
The collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing financial seizure was symptomatic of high debt levels, global imbalances, excessive financialisation and unfinanced social entitlements, which underpinned an economic model reliant on credit-driven consumption.
What made all of these conditions possible was opacity in the financial markets.

As a result of opacity, market participants were not able to independently assess risk.  Specifically, market participants could not independently assess the risk of banks, both commercial and investment, and structured finance securities.

Without an ability to independently assess risk, market participants relied on organizations, regulators and rating firms, that represented they had transparency and the ability to independently assess risk.

Unfortunately, even if these organizations were capable of accurately assessing risk, there were institutional reasons why they would not accurately communicate their assessment to the market.

Regulators do not accurately communicate risk because of fear of damaging the safety and soundness of their financial system.  Rating firms do not accurately communicate risk because they compete to be paid by the issuers for their ratings.

Regardless, the reliance on faulty risk assessments led to too much debt in the global financial system.
Surprisingly, little has changed. Unsurprisingly, activity has not equated to achievement. Since 2007, total public and private debt in major economies has increased not decreased, with higher public borrowing offsetting debt reductions by businesses and households. 
Debt levels have also risen in emerging countries from before the crisis....
The financial sector exists to support the real economy. Financial instruments, such as shares, bonds and their derivatives, are claims on real businesses. But over time, trading in the claims themselves has become more rewarding, leading to a disproportionate increase in the level of financial rather than real business activity. 
Regular readers will recall that modern banks are designed to protect the real economy from excess debt in the financial system.

Banks can protect the real economy because they have an ability to absorb upfront the losses on this excess debt and continue to operate.

Banks can continue to operate with low or negative book capital levels because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  When banks have low or negative book capital, deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner.  As a result, so long as a bank can generate earnings, it can continue operating while it rebuilds its book capital level.
The financial sector needs to be pared back to its utility function: making payments, matching savers and borrowers, and providing simple risk management tools.
Your humble blogger has repeatedly said that paring back the financial sector requires bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

JP Morgan has shown that I am right about this benefit of transparency.  JP Morgan showed this in its handling of the London "Whale" trade.  As soon as the market found out what JP Morgan's position was, it closed the position.

If banks were required to disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, there are a significant number of "positions" that they would quickly exit.  This includes proprietary trades as well as regulatory and tax arbitrages.
Instead of fundamental reform, policy makers are introducing complex capital, liquidity and trading controls of dubious efficacy that invite regulatory arbitrage.
Fundamental reform would have been bringing transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

Instead, we have what your humble blogger refers to as the substitution of technocratic financial regulation involving complex rules and regulatory oversight for transparency and market discipline.

As Christopher Whalen said of this substitution of technocratic financial regulation for transparency and market discipline,
The moral of the story of Lehman Brothers is that no amount of regulation can prevent acts of wanton stupidity, fraud, and greed in a free society. Expecting regulators to proactively prevent a financial crisis is at best wishful thinking.
Returning to Mr. Das.
Too-big-to-fail banks have become larger. Initiatives such as the central counterparty for derivatives have introduced complex interconnections and new systemic risks. ...
The real solution always required reducing debt, reversing imbalances, decreasing financialisation and modifying behaviours....
Transparency is the real solution.

By requiring banks to disclose their exposure details, markets would have been able to exert discipline on the banks so that they recognized their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

With transparency, financialization would have been decreased as market participants would then be in a position where they could independently assess the risk of the various products Wall Street and the City sell.  Many fewer of these products would be sold as market participants would see that the potential rewards from ownership did not compensate for the risk being taken.

Finally, transparency brings about behavior modification.  Sunlight is the best disinfectant of bad behavior by bankers.

Tuesday, September 10, 2013

Bank of England to develop secret warning system to prevent bank collapse

The Telegraph reports that the Financial Stability Board has called on the Bank of England to develop a  "secret warning system" to communicate to banks without telling investors and depositors that the banks are in danger of failing and need to raise capital.

A secret warning system highlights everything that is wrong with technocratic financial regulation and the substitution of complex rules and regulatory oversight for transparency and market discipline.

The whole idea behind a secret warning system is to keep from market participants knowledge about what the true condition of the bank is.  

Effectively, the regulators are lying in the belief that this protects the safety and soundness of the financial system.  This lying violates and undermines the FDR Framework on which our financial system is based.

Under the FDR Framework, governments are responsible for ensuring that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.  Market participants are given an incentive to use this information as they are responsible for all losses on their exposures.

Isn't the fact that a bank is in danger of failing useful, relevant information?

By conspiring with the banks to hide useful, relevant information, the financial regulators create a moral obligation to bailout the investors in the bust bank.

How can you make an investor take a loss when the government is hiding the information needed to make a fully informed investment decision?

Answer is you cannot.  This is why bailing out banks has proven irresistible to financial regulators.

By not ensuring transparency, financial regulators create another problem:  banks are not subject to market discipline.  There is no market discipline when investors do not have the information they need to independently assess the risk of a bank and adjust their exposure to the bank to what they can afford to lose given this level of risk.

When banks are not subject to market discipline, there is no restraint placed on them as they increase their risk and increase their chances of going bust.  If there is transparency, market participants can restrain risk taking by increasing the cost of funds to a bank to reflect an increase in risk.

Since before the financial crisis began, your humble blogger has been saying that we need to bring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

If there were transparency, financial regulators would directly add their voice in support of market discipline to keep banks from failing.  There would be no need for subtle suggestions to banks to raise more capital or lying to market participants.
The Bank of England needs to develop a secret warning system to tell struggling banks they are about to go bust, the global financial regulator has said. 
The Financial Stability Board, which is chaired by Bank Governor Mark Carney, has urged Britain’s regulators to find a way round disclosure rules that would complicate an instruction to raise capital or take other remedial action. 
Under the Bank’s “proactive intervention framework” (PIF), the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) will rate each bank’s “proximity to failure”. 
However, “the PRA has decided not to disclose the PIF rating to the firm concerned in order to avoid a situation in which the firm would then have to publicly disclose the rating,” the FSB noted. 
A public disclosure that the regulator believed a bank was close to collapse would potentially cause a calamitous collapse in confidence that would itself result with the lender’s failure.
If there were transparency, market participants would know the current condition of each bank and therefore a public disclosure would not trigger a calamitous collapse in confidence.

Furthermore, the experience of Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Portugal shows that with deposit insurance in place there are limited bank runs when everyone knows the banks to be insolvent.
However, the FSB said it was necessary for the regulator to ensure banks were “aware of any heightened concerns and accompanying intervention activities”. In order to do so, the PRA “should explore options to disclose the PIF rating to such firms without triggering public disclosure”.
FSB doesn't see a problem with the failure to disclose all useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

A clear sign of financial regulators having lost track of their primary responsibility under the FDR Framework.

Monday, September 9, 2013

Unfinished business in battle to fix banks...transparency

The Financial Times ran an interesting article in which it identified what it felt were the five principle reasons for bank failures ("low capital, weak funding structures, poor lending, poor trading investments and misguided mergers and acquisitions").

It concluded that 5 years after Lehman Brothers' collapse significant progress has been made using complex rules and regulatory oversight to address four of the reasons for bank failures and the fifth reason, poor lending, could not be addressed.

Left unsaid was the simple fact that transparency would successfully address all five of these reasons for bank failures.

Also left unsaid is the simple fact that it would not have taken five years to implement transparency and have each bank disclose on an ongoing basis its current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
In an attempt to gauge the merit of the glut of global reforms, the Financial Times has looked back at the 34 main banks and brokers that failed in the crisis, judging the principal reasons for failure from a menu of five – low capital; weak funding structures; poor lending; poor trading investments; and misguided mergers and acquisitions.
Each of these reasons is really a symptom of opacity.

For example, when banks don't have to disclose their current exposure details, they aren't subjected to market discipline to restrain their risk taking.  As a result, they reduce their capital levels in lock-step to what they can convince their regulators is adequate to handle any losses they might incur.

History shows that when banks disclose their current exposure details they have a higher level of book capital.  This higher level of book capital reflects both market discipline and the recognition that transparency requires a bank show it can stand on its own two feet.
Many failed for multiple reasons, though Royal Bank of Scotland is the only institution to which all five triggers applied. 
Any analysis of the precise causes of the global financial crisis, even after five years of reflection, is necessarily subjective. 
Please note, your humble blogger assessed and told everyone about the cause of the global financial crisis, opacity, before the crisis hit.
But if there were five main causes of failure, regulators can claim at least partial victory on four of them. 
Please re-read how the regulators can claim at least partial victory on addressing for of the five main causes of failure.

This is entirely unacceptable and is a damning indictment of complex rules and regulatory oversight.

By simply using the securities laws that have existed since 1930s, all five main causes of failure could have been addressed through requiring banks to provide transparency and disclose their current exposure details.
Capital levels in the system are more than three times higher than they were before the crisis as banks pre-empt the requirements of new Basel III global standards. 
Financing is more stable, with far less reliance on risky short-term market funding and new incoming rules demanding banks hold minimum levels of cash and safe assets. 
Big acquisitions are a thing of the past, too, with regulators making it clear such dealmaking is unwelcome. 
And the kind of complex structured investments that spread the contagion of US subprime mortgage losses around the world are close to extinct, the victim of regulators’ higher capital charges and banks’ lower risk appetites....
The one category of the FT’s five triggers of failure that is immune to regulation is bad lending – a perennial curse of banking since the Middle Ages and one that in the heat of the crisis, when the focus was on complex collateralised debt obligations, was often neglected. 
“The crisis was overspun as a markets problem,” says Robert Law, a former banks analyst and adviser to the UK’s recent parliamentary commission on banking standards. “There were major problems in traditional lending, too.” 
According to the FT’s analysis, this was the single biggest factor in the crisis. Of the 34 big banks that failed, three-quarters succumbed in large part because of the poor quality of basic lending – in particular to residential and commercial mortgage customers. 
There is little that the authorities can do directly in a market economy to curb foolish lending practices by private sector banks.
Authorities cannot do much directly about lending as they don't want to be in the position of allocating capital throughout the economy.

As a result, bank examiners don't approve or disapprove of any exposure taken or loan made by a bank.  Rather, bank examiners ask if the bank has enough capital to absorb any losses that are likely to result from the exposure or loan.

Hence, we have the following:
But reformers argue that a laser focus on capital, which can absorb losses, is the essential way to protect the system from further harm.
Unless regulators are willing to let banks take losses, something they have not done since the beginning of the financial crisis, capital is not the way to protect the system from further harm from foolish lending.

Rather, transparency is the way to protect the system from harm by foolish lending by private sector banks.  Transparency protects the system in two ways.

First, transparency allows market discipline which restrains banks making foolish loans in the first place.  It does this because market participants can see what loans the banks are making and can assess whether or not these loans are properly priced.

Second, transparency allows market participants to reduce their exposure to banks that make foolish loans.  By reducing their exposure to what they can afford to lose should a bank that makes foolish loans go under, market participants eliminate any possibility of contagion from the bank's failure.

Friday, September 6, 2013

BoE's Carney calling for clampdown on bank risk model to restore trust

Bloomberg reports that Bank of England Governor Mark Carney is calling for a clampdown on bank risk models to restore trust.

This call highlights the need for banks banks to disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  Without this disclosure, market participants are never going to trust bank financial statements as they have no idea what the banks, with the permission of their regulators, are hiding on and off their balance sheets.

As for a clampdown on bank risk models, this is a classic case of why complex rules combined with regulatory supervision doesn't provide the same benefit as transparency and market discipline.

In the world envisioned by Mr. Carney, all banks would value securities the same way.

Fortunately, this isn't the way the real world works.  There are legitimate business reasons why different banks would assess the risk of and value the same security differently (hint: this difference of opinion is what makes markets).

To have all banks assess the risk of and value securities in the same way would be to make the financial system more prone to instability.

If the mandated risk assessment and valuation proves faulty, then every bank is has a problem.  This doesn't add to stability, but rather instability.

Regular readers know that trust in the financial markets is a function of transparency.  By making the banks disclose their current exposure details, each market participant can independently assess the risk of and value of each bank's exposures.  Market participants trust their own assessment.

Based on this assessment, market participants can adjust their exposures based on the risk of each bank.  This subjects the banks to market discipline and adds an additional layer of robustness and stability to the financial system.

The additional layer of robustness and stability takes the form of market participants limiting their exposure to each bank to what they can afford to lose and ending the risk of financial contagion.

“The risk models that banks use to calculate their capital needs show worryingly large differences,” Carney, governor of the Bank of England, said in a letter yesterday to leaders from the Group of 20 nations meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia. “This must be addressed for depositors, investors, clients and authorities to have full confidence in the strength of bank balance sheets and their resilience during a downturn.”...

The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, an international regulators group, said in July that some lenders were backing investments with as much as 20 percent more capital than other banks. European banks generally apply lower risk weights to their holdings of bank-issued debt than lenders based elsewhere, the Basel group said. 
“Given large banks risk-weight based on internal models approved by supervisors and populated with their own historic data, it is not surprising that there is substantial inconsistency,” Bob Penn, financial regulation partner at law firm Allen & Overy LLP in London, said in an e-mail.

“Consistency is arguably a good thing here: but for so long as the Basel rules explicitly embed inconsistency it is hard to see how Mr. Carney’s call will be heard,” he said.

Thursday, September 5, 2013

UK's Financial Conduct Authority discovering transparency

Under the FDR Framework, governments are given the responsibility for ensuring that for each financial product or security market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can make a fully informed decision.

The UK's Financial Conduct Authority is learning what this means in the aftermath of the PPI mis-selling scandal.  As Yves Smith observed, no one on Wall Street is compensated for creating transparent, low margin products.  PPI was not an exception.

Phillip Inman points out in his Guardian column,

No amount of consumer education could undermine the efforts of high street banks desperate to sell PPI. It was a dangerous and fraudulent product that made fantastic profits for the banks. 
Try as they might, no single campaigner could block the marketing juggernaut designed to drive sales until more than half the working population had been sold one and the compensation bill topped £10bn. 
In the end it dawned on the government that only the regulator could fix the problem.
But the question is how could a regulator fix the problem of PPI or similar financial products or securities?
the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), has .... enshrined a policy of "temporary product intervention" that means regulators step in when it becomes obvious financial companies are bamboozling their customers. 
Such bamboozling is happening now on packaged current accounts, which banks sell typically for £10 a month with phone and travel insurance bolted on. The accounts are sold despite many customers not needing the extra products or not being able to make a claim. Complaints are pouring in. 
Speculation abounds that the FCA is about to announce a temporary product intervention, or in common parlance a clampdown, on their sale. 
Temporary product intervention is an after the fact solution.  The idea being to end the sale of a financial product before too much damage has been done to customers.

This is a flawed role for regulators for the simple reason that it doesn't prevent financial customers from being taken advantage of in the first place.  Rather it lets Wall Street/The City take advantage of their customers and hopes to end the most egregious practices.
There was a hint in the aftermath of the banking crash that regulators would go further and examine each and every new financial product for its potential to cause harm, but that was dropped.
In the US, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has been given the role of examining each and every new financial product for its potential to cause harm.

There are two problems with this solution.  First, Wall Street is very good at devising products that don't appear harmful but are actually toxic (see sub-prime loans).  Second, it takes away from consumers the responsibility for losses and therefore the incentive to assess if a financial product or security is right for them.

The solution that was adopted in the 1930s under the FDR Framework was to make the government responsible for ensuring the transparency of each product before it could be sold.

This means for every financial product or security all the useful and relevant information about the product or security must be disclose to the buyer before they make a purchase decision and they must have enough time to independently assess this information before making a purchase decision.

So the question becomes what is useful and relevant information.  An example of useful and relevant information when insurance is sold is what it takes to actually trigger the insurance.

Of course, if financial firms had to disclose this information, it is likely to end up in a newspaper with a financial expert explaining why nobody should buy the product because they are being ripped off.
Instead we have a system that hopes to stop bad dealing before too many customers become victims. 
As a compromise it is not the worst outcome. 
Actually, it is a compromise that doesn't need to be made.

The government just has to perform on its responsibility to ensure transparency.
However, it ignores the more fundamental point that the financial services industry is pathological in its pursuit of profit. As a result, most financial products are over-complicated and over-priced. 
As Yves Smith observed, financial products are designed to be opaque (over-complicated) and high margin (over-priced) because this is how bankers are compensated.
There are some competitive arenas like house insurance, but mostly our savings, investments and mortgage interest payments leach into the pockets of countless City folk. 
Five years after the crash, they have somehow clung to their bonuses and commissions, trail fees and termly payouts. 
Politicians, fearful that any move against the industry will depress profits, have rarely intervened. Ultimately they believe one of the UK's biggest taxpayers could wither away.
Bankers have clung to their lofty pay because politicians have adopted policies to let them retain their pay and regulators have failed in their responsibility to ensure transparency.
The OECD appears to be equally accepting of the finance industry's dominance. And just as the food industry blames individuals for getting fat, so the financial services industry is allowed to re-establish caveat emptor. 
After all, an "educated" consumer is one they can blame for their own misfortune.
Caveat emptor is part of the FDR Framework.  At the end of the day, bank customers have a responsibility for the results of the financial products they purchase.

With transparency, customers have the ability to do their homework and say no.
Yet when most people in the City fail to understand products sold in other parts of financial services industry, what chance do ordinary consumers have? 
The government hasn't just not upheld their responsibility with regards to ensuring transparency for consumer financial products, but also institutional products as well.  A classic example of this failure to ensure transparency are the opaque, toxic structured finance securities.
The OECD should attack the profiteering by financial services firms and demand simpler products, while dodgy products are regulated out of the system. 
Yes, there should be a demand for simpler products.

The way to assure these simpler products exists is by requiring transparency of all products.  Transparency reveals which products are dodgy and makes it easier for bank customers to avoid any exposure to these products. 

Wednesday, September 4, 2013

Der Spiegel: Bank reform still needed 5 years after crisis began

A must read Der Spiegel article makes the important point that five years after the beginning of the efforts to reform the international banking system the addition of complex rules and regulatory oversight has achieved nothing.

Regular readers know that the only way to fix the financial system is to require the banks to provide transparency.  Specifically, they need to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can assess the risk of each bank and limit their exposure to each bank to what the market participant can afford to lose given the risk of each bank.

When market participants limit their exposure based on the risk of each bank, contagion or the domino effect is ended.  Contagion is ended because each market participant has set their level of exposure to each bank to what they can afford to lose.  This means there is no reason to ever bailout a bank for fear of contagion.

At the same time, the bank's management becomes subject to market discipline.

Management knows if it increases the bank's risk passed a certain level, it will increase the cost of funds to the bank at the same time as it reduces the bank's access to funds.  This is bad for the bank's net income and share price.

Management also knows that if it reduces the bank's risk it will be rewarded.  Lower risk leads to a lower cost of funds.  A lower cost of funds tends to be good for a bank's net income and its share price.

This is how market discipline works.

Market discipline is something that the banks have not been subjected to for over forty years.  Instead, banks have been subjected to complex rules and regulatory oversight replacing transparency and market discipline.

The results have been predictable.  The banks have gamed the system and taken on far greater levels of risk than the markets would have permitted.

Banks were able to do this because regulators do not approve or disapprove of any exposure a bank takes on (they don't do this as it would mean the regulator was allocating capital across the economy).

Instead, the regulators try to estimate the probability of loss if there is a problem with an exposure and the amount of loss should the problem occur.  Regulators then compare this loss to the bank's book capital level to see if it can absorb the loss.

It is not surprising that Der Spiegel sees a need for bank reform.  Adding more complex rules and regulatory oversight does nothing to change the fundamental reason regulators were incapable of preventing the current financial crisis.

It is only when there is transparency that the next financial crisis can be prevented.

When asked whether he believes that the industry and lawmakers learned the right lessons from that tumultuous weekend in September 2008, he concludes soberly: "We would hardly be more effectively protected against a chain reaction today than we were five years ago.".... 
While it is certainly true that bank bailouts no longer have to be ironed out in hectic, nighttime crisis meetings, it is also true that large banks, especially in the United States, are raking in billions once again. 
But the new sheen is deceptive, because banks owe much of their comeback to ongoing support from governments and central banks. Instead of having to launch bailout operations worth billions, they have simply turned to a policy of slowly feeding the financial industry with cheap money.
Please re-read the previous paragraph as it confirms the adoption of the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  Under this model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.

As a result, governments feed money into the banks.  Some of this money is used to absorb losses and some is used to pay bonuses.
"In the euro zone, many banks would have trouble refinancing themselves without the help of the European Central Bank (ECB)," says Christoph Kaserer, a financial expert at the Technical University of Munich. 
According to Kaserer, a number of institutions are not sufficiently profitable to survive on their own in the long term.
Under the Swedish Model, banks are required to recognize upfront their losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Banks which are capable of generating earnings after recognition of their losses are allowed to continue operating.  Earnings are used to rebuild book capital levels.

Banks which are not able to generate earnings after recognition of their losses are closed.
The euro-zone countries, fearing the potentially uncontrollable consequences of liquidating ailing financial groups, have helped create so-called zombie banks. 
European banks are still burdened with massive bad loans left over from the financial crisis -- amounting to €136 billion ($180 billion) at Germany's Commerzbank alone. 
Analysts with the Royal Bank of Scotland estimate that the banks need to shed about €3.2 trillion in assets in the next three to five years, while at the same time generating €47 billion in fresh capital to be considered stable.
Please note that financial authorities cite fear of uncontrollable consequences, i.e. contagion, as the reason for adopting the Japanese Model and creating zombie banks.

This fear is entirely misplaced as market participants already have some idea of the size of the losses at each bank and which banks do and don't have the ability to generate earnings.

Rather than continue to feed money into banker bonuses, governments should be requiring each bank to provide transparency into their exposure details.  As discussed above, market participants could then assess the risk of each bank and adjust their exposures accordingly.

With the risk of financial contagion removed, regulators could then require the banks to take their losses and clean up the banking system.
If one of these shaky financial giants were to fall, it would likely spell the end of the banking sector's tentative recovery.... 
The banking sector's recovery is all smoke and mirrors.
In the last five years, there have in fact been a significant number of new guidelines, laws, drafts and recommendations. 
The banks were forced to increase the size of their financial cushions, for example, but they still aren't large enough. 
Regulators devised split banking systems designed to shield customer deposits from risky trading activities, but the concepts are half-baked and have yet to be fully implemented.... 
Bankers' bonuses were capped, but then their fixed salaries were increased dramatically. 
Regulators had vowed to rein in the rampant trade in derivatives among banks by requiring it to be conducted on supervised exchanges. Instead, the over-the-counter derivatives market has grown by 20 percent since 2009.
In short, complex regulations and regulatory oversight don't work.
Over the years, lawmakers have lost sight of the most important objectives of regulation. 
Secure savings deposits, a continuous supply of credit and a functioning payment transaction system are as important to an economy as intact water pipes or power grids. 
The point is to ensure that this supply functions properly. 
At the same time, governments and taxpayers cannot allow themselves to be held hostage by the banks, merely because they can guarantee a basic supply of capital. 
"What is needed is fundamental structural change, which, as in other industries, costs money. Lawmakers shy away from that," says Clemens Fuest, President of the Center for European Economic Research (ZEW).
The fundamental structural change needed is to bring transparency to the banks and the rest of the opaque corners of the financial system.

With transparency, banks are subject to market discipline and governments and taxpayers are no longer held hostage by the banks.
Financial industry executives take every opportunity to warn that if regulators take aim at financial groups, then businesses, savers and investors will ultimately suffer.... 
The beauty of requiring banks to provide transparency is it doesn't reduce their ability to provide loans, take deposits or support a functioning payment system.

Transparency addresses the issue of how much risk banks take by using market discipline to restrain risk taking.
At the same time, Jain sends out a warning to lawmakers not to overdo it with new legislation. "If all measures are implemented as planned, it could spell the end of 100 years of universal banking in Europe," Jain said in Frankfurt. His message seems to strike a chord.

Capital rules are a case in point. "Contrary to their political rhetoric, Germany, France and even Japan have blocked the acceptance of tougher requirements in international negotiations," says financial expert Harald Hau of the University of Geneva. Their goal, he adds, is to avoid putting their own, undercapitalized banks under pressure....
Please note that after 2+ decades, Japan is blocking capital rules because of its zombie banks.

This is a clear indicator that the Japanese Model is the wrong policy for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.  It is also a clear indicator that the EU, UK and US that also adopted the Japanese Model will not do any better.
"So far, this central problem has been neglected in the reform plans," says Jan-Pieter Krahnen of Frankfurt's Goethe University....
The bigger and less transparent the banks, the more reliable their guarantee that the government will bail them out if necessary. "The banks know that if they're complex enough, they'll be bailed out," says ZEW President Fuest.

That is why the solution is to require the banks to provide transparency.



Tuesday, September 3, 2013

Unlike transparency, debate rages over benefit of derivative reforms

The International Financing Review ran a terrific article on the question of does the benefit of the proposed reforms of the derivative market exceed their costs.

Unlike transparency, where the benefit is measured in trillions of dollars and the cost measured in single billions of dollars, the case for the proposed reforms of the derivative markets is not so clear cut.

This is not surprising.

The complex rules and regulatory oversight being brought to the derivatives market is a belt and suspender imperfect substitute for transparency and market discipline.

As an imperfect substitute, complex rules and regulatory oversight is much, much longer on costs with far more ambiguous benefits.

This is a very important point as Wall Street has turned to the court system to have complex rules and regulatory oversight thrown out when it cannot be shown that its benefits outweigh its costs.

The Macroeconomic Assessment Group on Derivatives – a body of prudential and securities regulators chaired by the Bank for International Settlements – calculated OTC derivatives reforms would boost annual GDP growth by as much as 0.13% by avoiding future derivatives-fuelled crises. 
Some derivatives experts have questioned the findings, though, which could even be cynically interpreted as an exercise in self-validation... 
Craig Pirrong, professor of finance at the University of Houston, argues the group’s analysis is fundamentally flawed, as it evaluates derivatives regulations in isolation of the rest of the financial system and fails to account for spillover effects to other market participants.... 
The MAGD report reckons the regulations stemming from the G20 mandate of increased capital requirements, central clearing and initial margin for uncleared trades should be enough to prevent derivatives exposures from sparking future crises “absent the remote possibility of a CCP failure”. 
Using CDS default data, the group calculates the annual probability of derivatives fuelling a financial crisis at 0.26%. The Basel Committee has previously estimated the median cost of financial crises is 60% of annual GDP, meaning the implementation of the reforms should boost annual GDP by 0.16%. 
Meanwhile, the costs to the economy of higher collateralisation and forcing banks to hold more capital will reduce annual GDP by 0.03% to 0.07% depending on the amount of netting that can be achieved through central clearing, the group calculates. 
But Pirrong argues this is an overly-simplified analysis of the impact of derivatives market regulations, which only examines part of the picture. Overall, the concern is derivatives reforms merely redistribute losses elsewhere in the financial system in a way that may still undermine market stability. 
“The reforms do dramatically reduce systemic risk in derivatives markets. But they also have the effect of promoting derivatives counterparties to the head of the bankruptcy queue, which inevitably means somebody else will get less money,” said Pirrong.

BoE's Carney would like bank reform that ends TBTF and fragmented regulation

Reuters reported that the Bank of England's governor, Mark Carney, is worried about the risk to economic growth from Too Big to Fail banks and fragmented banking regulation.

Regular readers know requiring banks to provide ultra transparency ends both the problem of Too Big to Fail and fragmented banking regulation.

If banks disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, they become subject to market discipline.

Market discipline occurs because market participants link a bank's cost of funds to their independent assessment of its risk level.  Market participants make this linkage because they limit their exposure to each bank based on what they can afford to lose given the risk of the bank.

When market participants limit their exposure to what they can afford to lose, then no bank is Too Big to Fail as there are no contagion effects from its failure.

Market discipline also addresses the issue of fragmented banking regulation.  Market participants will exert discipline on banks to restrain their risk taking while at the same time improving their liquidity and ability to absorb losses.

Bankers say privately that solving too-big-to-fail will be hard but that success would make other post-crisis reforms almost irrelevant as lenders would not act recklessly again in the knowledge there will be no more public rescues. 
Solving Too Big to Fail is easy: require banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global exposure details.

The banks realize that all of the complex regulation and regulatory oversight proposed and implemented since the beginning of the financial crisis is simply a reckless substitute for transparency.

It is reckless because complex rules and regulatory oversight failed in the run up to the current financial crisis and there is no reason to believe they won't fail again.
The slow progress has prompted some countries to take unilateral measures as trust among supervisors over banks is still not strong enough. 
The European Union is annoyed with U.S. plans to impose heavier capital requirements on foreign banks as a safeguard to keep its taxpayers off the hook if they get into trouble. 
Britain has also been criticised for putting pressure on foreign banks to become fully fledged subsidiaries and thus required to hold a pot of capital and cash locally. 
Carney said nationally focused policies could reduce global growth by hindering efficient allocation of capital and liquidity. 
"Reforms that strengthen the resilience of the national and global system can also prevent regulatory arbitrage, reduce contagion and reduce incentives to ring-fence national systems," Carney said.

Transparency is the ultimate reform in that it strengthens the resilience of the national and global financial system, prevents regulatory arbitrage, eliminates contagion and eliminates the need to ring-fence national systems.

Monday, September 2, 2013

Don't outsource bank risk management to global financial regulators

In an interesting ABA Banking Journal article, Dan Borge explains why he feels we should not outsource bank risk management to the global financial regulators.

Your humble blogger would offer a different reason for not outsourcing risk management to the bank regulators based on my experience working at the Federal Reserve and at a Too Big to Fail bank.

As demonstrated by our current global financial crisis, the global financial regulators are not very good at risk management and when they fail they have an irresistible urge to have the taxpayers pay for their failure.

By outsourcing bank risk management to the regulators, we interfere with how the financial markets are suppose to work.

For financial markets to work properly and risk to be restrained, banks must provide transparency into their current global exposure details.

With this information, market participants can independently assess the risk of and value each bank and adjust their exposures based on this assessment.  Then, bank management responds to market discipline as revealed through higher cost debt or lower equity share price that results from the adjustment in market participants' exposures and lower its risks.

Instead, we have a situation where financial markets don't work because risk management has been outsourced to regulators.

Leading up to the financial crisis and still to this day, banks have been allowed to remain opaque "black boxes".  As a result, they are not subject to market discipline.

Instead, banks are subject to regulatory discipline which they respond to by applying political pressure to get the regulators to back off or by gaming the financial regulations.

Regulators have besieged bankers with new and complex risk regulations in the aftermath of the financial crisis: Basel III; stress tests; risk-based compensation ... the list goes on. 
Whether all this regulation is making the financial system safer and healthier is debatable. 
But what is not debatable is that the regulators are taking a much more active role in asserting and enforcing their own notions of what constitutes excessive risk in banking.

Sunday, September 1, 2013

Who is holding the risk?

The Economist magazine raised an interesting question in 2003 when it reported on the lack of an answer to the question: who is holding lending risk?

Today, 6 years after the beginning of the global financial crisis, we still cannot answer the question of who is holding lending risk.

Regular readers know that the only way to answer the question of who is holding lending risk is to bring transparency into all the opaque corners of the financial system.

THE world's leading banks decided some years ago that lending is a mugs' game. 
They began to get rid of their loans, repackaging them and selling them off as securities, or getting others to re-insure their risk....
Alan Greenspan, chairman of America's Federal Reserve, said in a speech in May that this spreading of the banks' risks has made the financial sector more resilient, and individual institutions within it less vulnerable to shocks. 
It can indeed be argued that the world's financial system is safer if banks carry less of the overall credit risk. 
Their previous mismanagement of credit has caused so many damaging banking crises in the past; and banks, with their unique role in the payment system and the distribution of liquidity, are prone to systemic risk in a way that is not true of other financial institutions. Better, in that case, that they are strong, and that risks and losses are borne by a wider investment pool. 
Others, though, are less sanguine. They fear that credit losses, buried today, will show up in new places later, causing unpredictable damage deep in the world economy....

But analysts and central bankers do not have a complete picture of where the banks' risks have ended up. 
One thing is certain. Such risk does not neatly disappear into thin air. 
In a weak economy, bad debts increase and banks traditionally take a big hit. If they are not taking the hit in this economic slowdown, then somebody else is. 
Credit risk is like air in a squishy balloon. You can squeeze the balloon into any shape you like, but the air does not disappear.

Deutsche Bank's Monte Dei Paschi derivative shows why banks must disclose current exposure details

As Bloomberg reports, Deutsche Bank designed and sold a derivative to Monte dei Paschi so the large Italian bank could hide losses that it had already incurred.

The very fact that a bank could engage in a trade to hide its losses confirms the need for banks to provide ultra transparency.

By requiring banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, it eliminates the ability of banks to hide their losses.

Deutsche Bank AG (DBK) designed a derivative for Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA at the height of the financial crisis that obscured losses at the world’s oldest lender before it sought a taxpayer bailout. 
Germany’s largest bank loaned Monte Paschi (BMPS) about 1.5 billion euros ($2 billion) in December 2008 through the transaction, dubbed Project Santorini, according to more than 70 pages of documents outlining the deal and obtained by Bloomberg News. 
The trade helped Monte Paschi mitigate a 367 million-euro loss from an older derivative contract with Deutsche Bank. As part of the arrangement, the Italian lender made a losing bet on the value of the country’s government bonds, said six derivatives specialists who reviewed the files. 
“I can’t understand why any financial institution would engage in a trade like this for legitimate objectives,” said Frank Partnoy, a professor of law and finance at the University of San Diego who structured derivatives at Morgan Stanley and has read the files. “They shouldn’t ever be doing that.”...
Which is why banks should not operate behind a veil of opacity, but rather should have their entire business exposed to the best disinfectant of bad behavior: sunlight.
The Santorini transaction shows how investment banks devised opaque products that years later are leaving companies and taxpayers with losses. 
From the Greek government to the Italian town of Cassino, borrowers have lost money on bets that were skewed in banks’ favor. In December, an Italian judge convicted bankers at four firms, including Deutsche Bank, of fraud in arranging an interest-rate swap for the city of Milan....
Under the FDR Framework, government regulators are given responsibility for ensuring transparency.

Had banks been required to disclose the details of these opaque products, they probably wouldn't have sold them and the buyers probably wouldn't have purchased them.
“You have two banks gambling on regulatory action in late 2008, at a time of supposed crisis, and they are using overly complex and opaque derivatives to do it,” said Partnoy, the University of San Diego professor. “Deutsche Bank made a fortune for facilitating the trade. You can’t tell any of this from looking at their financial statements.”...
As your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the financial crisis, so long as banks are opaque "black boxes", bankers will engage in gambling.

Current disclosure rules for banks are not up to the task of preventing or exposing this gambling.  A point Professor Partnoy makes.

The only way to expose what is happening so that market participants have the information they need to assess each bank is to require ultra transparency and disclosure of each bank's exposure details.
Santorini “exemplifies the complex structuring, questionable internal decisions and lax external supervision rampant in the lead-up to the crisis and beyond,” Dempster said....
The only way to prevent this from recurring in the future is by restoring transparency to all the opaque corners of the financial system.  This includes bank balance sheets.
Monte Paschi shareholders haven’t been in a position to know about the bank’s derivative bets because its filings didn’t provide sufficient information on Santorini and its liquidation, according to two accountants in Italy who reviewed the documents....
Please re-read the previous paragraph because if shareholders aren't in a position to know about derivative bets, they aren't in a position to exert market discipline to prevent these bets in the first place.
“This transaction shows the complexity of banks’ balance sheets,” said Mark Williams, a former bank examiner for the Federal Reserve and now a lecturer at Boston University’s School of Management, who also reviewed the documents. “It leaves one wondering what other skeletons are in the closet.”
The only way to know what skeletons are in each bank's closet is to have them provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global exposure details.

Tuesday, August 27, 2013

UK bank demonstrates regulators' capital ratio conundrum

Regular readers know that your humble blogger thinks that bank capital requirements are incredibly dangerous (without transparency, they suggest banks are stronger and less risky than they really are) and bank capital requirements suffer from numerous problems like the fact that they are implemented on a pro-cyclical basis.

The Guardian carried an interesting article on this pro-cyclical implementation of capital requirements featuring Nationwide and the Bank of England.

The Bank of England has denied that its insistence on Nationwide holding a bigger capital cushion had forced the UK's largest building society to slow its launch of small business lending. 
The Bank of England's actions are pro-cyclical if in fact requiring the bank to hold more capital reduces its lending capacity and this reduced lending capacity has a negative impact on borrower access to funds for growth and reinvestment in the economy.
Nationwide admitted plans to expand lending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are unlikely to take effect until 2014 at the earliest. 
It said plans to begin lending to smaller firms were still under development but "moving slowly"; , it denied a report that it had shelved a planned launch date for later this year....
Where there is smoke, ....
The Bank of England refuted any suggestion that Nationwide's decision to hold off from a launch into the SME sector was due to its demands on capital strength. 
A very tough assertion to prove.
A spokesman added: "The plan agreed with Nationwide to meet the 3% leverage ratio in 2015 will not result in them restricting lending to the real economy. Therefore it is wrong to blame their SME decision on the regulator."...
Banks have a limited number of ways to increase their ratio of equity to assets.  They can retain earnings or sell stock to increase the amount of equity.  Alternatively, they can decrease the amount of assets on their balance sheets.

The Bank of England spokesman suggests that Nationwide intends to meet the 3% leverage ratio by retaining earnings and/or selling stock.
However, regulators warned the lender had rapidly expanded its mortgage business while still wrestling with an overhang of bad commercial property loans. 
It was rebuked in July by the regulator, the Prudential Regulatory Authority (PRA), for running an aggressive lending policy without adequate reserves to insure against a possible collapse.
So much for retaining earnings to increase equity.

To build up reserves, banks take a provision for loan loss as an expense through their income statement.  This drives down earnings, so there is a lower level of earnings that can be retained.

Apparently Nationwide is planning a stock offering if meeting the higher capital ratios is not going to reduce its lending capacity.

But can it sell stock?
Analysts at credit ratings firm Standard & Poor's followed with a warning that a doubling in the losses on commercial property loans to £450m weakened the lender's financial position. 
S&P downgraded Nationwide's credit rating this month and signalled that further downgrades could follow without a rapid improvement. 
"These impairment charges have hindered Nationwide's internal capital generation. As a result, we have revised down our assessment of its risk position to 'adequate' from 'strong'," it said.
In the absence of disclosure of Nationwide's current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, why would anyone buy stock in Nationwide?

Without this information, there is no way of knowing what additional losses might be hidden on and off its balance sheet.

So if Nationwide cannot increase its equity from either retained earnings or stock sale, then the only way to increase its leverage ratio is by decreasing its assets.

Decreasing assets strongly suggests a reduction in Nationwide's lending capacity and that it will be more difficult for borrowers to access credit for growth and reinvestment (i.e., sure as heck looks like regulator's requirement to increase capital levels is pro-cyclical and is making downturn in economy worse).

In banking, too much simplicity is dangerous

In his Financial Times editorial, Standard Chartered's chief executive, Peter Sands, puts forth a robust argument for why relying on too much simplicity in the form of bank capital requirements is dangerous for taxpayer wealth.

Simply, these capital requirements, whether specified as a leverage ratio or a risk-weighted ratio or a combination of the two, don't present a true picture of the risk that each bank is actually taking.

Regular readers know that the only way for market participants to assess the risk of each bank is if each bank discloses on an ongoing basis its current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  It is only with this information, that market participants have the data they need to actually assess each bank's risk.

As shown by our current financial crisis, when market participants cannot assess the risk the banks are taking, bad things happen to taxpayer wealth.  Specifically, policymakers and financial regulators find it irresistible to reach into the taxpayers' back pocket to bailout the banks and ensure the uninterrupted flow of bonuses to the bankers.

How can people trust banks using their own models when they are so opaque and produce such different results?
Only requiring banks to provide transparency eliminates this problem.

When market participants have access to the exposure detail data, market participants can use their own models to assess each of the banks.
This concern underpins the enthusiasm for the leverage ratio, and why some advocate a return to the so-called “standardised approach”. 
Under this approach, there are no sophisticated models – simply standard risk-weightings for different categories of asset that all banks have to apply. This gives the appearance of comparability, but it is entirely illusory. 
Massive differences in risk profile are simply smoothed out by very crude assumptions. 
Like the leverage ratio, it assumes lending to a start-up and an established multinational are equivalent risks, and takes no account of collateral. Indeed, imposing the standardised approach amounts to imposing a very poor model we know is wrong.
With transparency, the massive differences in risk profile are not smoothed out by very crude assumptions.

In fact. the massive differences in risk profile are exposed for all to see.
The standardised approach and leverage ratio share two characteristics. 
First, they simplify a complex reality. But the allure of simplicity should be resisted if the simplification so dangerously distorts and obscures the real picture. 
Your humble blogger agrees with Mr. Sands that the allure of the simplicity of capital ratios as a measure of bank solvency is a simplification that dangerously distorts and obscures the real picture.

Capital ratios are a form of regulatory opacity.

It is only with transparency into the underlying exposure details that a real picture of the risk each bank is taking can be seen.
Second, they narrow the difference in regulatory approach between risky and safe assets, creating perverse and powerful incentives for banks to run higher risk portfolios....
Your humble blogger agrees with Mr. Sands that capital ratios allow bankers to operate behind a veil of opacity and take on far more risk in their portfolios.

It is only with transparency into the underlying exposure details that market discipline can be exerted on the banks to restrain their risk taking.
The fact that different institutions give apparently similar assets different risk weightings is a real problem, and it has created a serious credibility gap. 
Some of the differences between model results are good, reflecting real variations in intrinsic risks and in the effectiveness of different banks’ risk-management approaches.
When each bank is required to disclose its current exposure details, the market gets to see which banks are being overly aggressive and which banks are being conservative in the management of their risks.

Monday, August 26, 2013

Why should ECB's bank asset quality review be believed?

Given Mario Draghi's commitment to do whatever it takes, why should the ECB's review of the asset quality at the EU banks be remotely believable?

Please recall, this is not the first time a governmental entity has overseen an asset quality review.  Previously, these reviews were done in Ireland, Greece, Cyprus, Portugal and Spain.

The result of these reviews was predictable.  The banks took additional reserves for potential losses and the governments declared their balance sheets had been cleaned up.

Of course, the banks were not required to disclose their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details so that market participants could confirm that all their losses had been recognized.

A few savvy market participants recognized that this lack of transparency was the equivalent of waving a giant red flag and announcing that the banks were still hiding losses on and off their balance sheet.

These market participants' insight have always been confirmed as shortly after the asset reviews it would be shown that there were in fact many more losses hiding on and off the bank balance sheets.

This pattern has held true whether the asset review was carried out by the government itself or using an "independent" third party (accounting firm or BlackRock).

This pattern has also held true when the asset quality review has been combined with stress tests.

So your humble blogger's question stands: why in the absence of transparency would anyone believe the results of the ECB's asset quality review?

One of the downsides of the ECB running an asset quality review without requiring the banks to provide transparency is that ECB puts itself in the position of now having to accept as collateral any of the assets it reviewed and didn't require loss recognition on.

From a Financial Times article on the ECB's asset quality review,

Within a matter of weeks, assuming legislative go-ahead, the ECB is expected to establish its new “single supervisory mechanism”, hiring the 1,000 staff it will need to police the banks, and making its mark with a tough root-and-branch Asset Quality Review (AQR) to determine how truthful banks are being about the loans on their balance sheets....
Properly done, the exercise could quickly establish the ECB as a tough regulator and help restore investor faith in Europe’s lenders. A succession of botched stress tests over recent years and laggardly recapitalisation of troubled lenders have deterred investors from backing the sector. 
A credible AQR, followed immediately by a stress test to show how balance sheets would stand up to further trouble, would, it is hoped, convince the world that Europe’s lenders are as resilient as US banks okayed by the Federal Reserve’s annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR).
No one thinks the US banks are okay.  Everyone knows that as a result of the stress tests the US on an annual basis renews the vow made by then US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner when he pledged the full faith and credit of the US to keep the banks solvent.
All of which explains the flurry of preparations. 
Italy’s Intesa SanPaolo has been the most upfront about its desire to be ready for the ECB process. This month the bank revealed a “conservative” 30 per cent increase in the amount it has set aside to cover bad loans, undertaken explicitly “in the light of the [ECB’s] asset quality review”....
In the absence of exposure detail transparency, how would anyone know if a 30 percent increase in the amount set aside to cover bad loans is "conservative" or not?

Based on the history of Ireland, Greece,.... it is a fairly safe bet that this additional 30% will not be shown to be conservative and that much more in the way of losses will materialize.
The ECB exercise is set to implement new pan-European definitions of non-performing loans, standardising an NPL as anything that is 90 days past due, and also forcing banks to categorise all exposures to a single borrower as non-performing, even if only one of a number of loans is actually in default....
In the presence of regulatory forbearance which allows banks to engage in 'extend and pretend' and turn non-performing loans into 'zombie' loans, it is nice to have a standard, but the regulators have already undercut it.
Autonomous, an independent research house, predicts the changed definitions could increase problem loans by an average of 40 per cent – forcing weaker banks to raise fresh capital. Lenders in Germany, Austria and France could face the biggest shocks in the AQR....
I guess Autonomous doesn't see the 30% increase in loan loss reserves as conservative.
But a litany of ifs and buts still hangs over the whole process. Most immediately, it is still uncertain whether the EU will deliver the legal go-ahead to empower the ECB next month.  
More fundamentally, there is still disagreement about how to deal with a bank if it fails to plug a capital shortfall under its own steam. 
Here, too, Europe must learn from the US, where the government’s Tarp scheme injected capital as necessary back in 2009. For the ECB exercise to work, the sovereign-focused European Stability Mechanism must become a bank bail-out vehicle of last resort.
The issue for a bank fixing its book capital shortfall is can it generate earnings after all the losses have been realized.

If a bank can generate earnings after taking the losses on its dud exposures, it can recapitalize itself over time by simply retaining earnings.

If a bank cannot generate earnings after taking the losses on its dud exposures, it should be resolved.