Showing posts with label Italy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Italy. Show all posts

Sunday, February 10, 2013

Having failed to use the regulatory powers it has, Bank of Italy asks for more powers

One of the signature features of our current global financial crisis is global financial regulators failing to properly exercise the regulatory powers they have and then, after having the global financial system crash under their watch, asking for a second chance with more regulatory powers.

The latest financial regulator to do this is the Bank of Italy with the Monte Paschi derivative scandal.

Regular readers know that without access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner the global financial system does not work because market participants cannot independently assess the risk of an investment and make a fully informed investment decision.

To make sure the global financial system works as designed under the FDR Framework, governments through their financial regulators are given the responsibility to ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information.

The Bank of Italy didn't fail to fulfill this responsibility once when it came to Monte Paschi, but it failed twice.

The first time it failed was when it knew about the derivatives in 2010, but failed to communicate this to the market.  The second time it failed was when it made a loan to Monte Paschi and again failed to communicate this to the market.

Both times, Monte Paschi's management used the Bank of Italy's silence to present itself to the market as being in much better financial shape than it was actually in.

In both cases, the Bank of Italy knew of information that market participants would need to properly assess the risk and solvency of Monte Paschi and that this information was not disclosed.

Regulatory failure doesn't get any worse than this.

Yet, there is the Bank of Italy trying to defend itself and saying that if it only had more regulatory authority it could do a better job.

What is needed is not more regulatory authority which leads to the substitution of complex rules and regulator oversight for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

What is needed is far less regulatory authority and far more emphasis on making sure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information.

For bank regulators, this means requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As reported by Reuters,

Bank of Italy Governor Ignazio Visco called on Saturday for more powers for bank regulators to step in and dismiss bad managers but defended his institution's oversight of the troubled Monte dei Paschi di Siena. 
Responding to criticism about banking oversight in the case of the Tuscan lender, Visco repeated that central bank supervisors had acted appropriately but asked for more scope to act in exceptional cases. 
"The supervisor should have the power to intervene when - based on solid evidence - it believes it is necessary to oppose the appointment of (bank) executives or to remove them," Visco, who also sits on the European Central Bank governing council, said in a speech to the Assiom-Forex conference in Bergamo. 
The comments echoed remarks from ECB President Mario Draghi... 
Monte dei Paschi, Italy's third largest bank, has been at the centre of a financial and political storm over a series of problematic derivatives contracts which has widened into a probe by magistrates into suspected bribery and false accounting....
The central bank has repeatedly defended its handling of the case and detailed a series of steps it took, including inspections of Monte dei Paschi in 2010 and 2011 but it says it has no police-style powers. 
Both regulators and the bank's new management said key evidence of problems with one of the opaque derivatives and structured finance trades at the heart of the case was not uncovered until last year....
As the Bank of Italy continued its efforts to clarify its actions regarding Monte dei Paschi, Saccomanni repeated that two securities lending operations in 2011 had been made to help the bank with liquidity strains.  

Friday, February 8, 2013

Italian bank derivative scandal shows that transparency and discretion in bank supervision cannot co-exist

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the lesson from the Monte Paschi derivative scandal is that transparency and discretion in bank supervision cannot co-exist and therefore, discretion must be ended.

This is an incredibly important point.

The choice we have is between a stable financial system based on transparency and market discipline or an unstable financial system based on opacity, complex rules and regulatory oversight.

In the stable financial system, investors are responsible for the losses on their investments and hence they have an incentive to use the information disclosed to independently assess the risk of each bank.  Specifically, investors link the amount of their exposure and the return they require on this exposure to each bank's risk.

This results in market discipline as banks with higher risk have to pay more to attract funds.  This also results in ending financial contagion as investors limit their risk to what they can afford to lose.

In an unstable financial system, investors are not responsible for the losses on their bank investments as they have to rely on bank supervision for the assessment and disclosure of risk at each bank.  Bank supervision that is concerned with the safety and soundness of the banking system and therefore exercises discretion in its disclosures about the riskiness of the banks.

This results in banks not being subject to market discipline as the price they are able to access funds at is substantially less than what it would be if investors had transparency and could assess the risk for themselves.

This also results in financial contagion as investors, including other banks, have far greater exposure to each other than they can afford to lose.

Finally, this results in moral hazard and the need to bailout the investors who relied on the bank supervisors' disclosure of the risk of each bank.

Your humble blogger thinks that a stable financial system is preferable.  Achieving this requires having the banks provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

I recognize that this will end the bank supervisors' information monopoly and will limit their ability to exercise discretion.  This is a feature and not a bug in a stable financial system.

There is no reason that bank supervisors should be able to exercise wide discretion.

As I have previously said, bank supervisors don't approve or disapprove of any exposure that a bank takes on.  Bank supervisors don't do this because they do not see it as their job to allocate capital across the economy.

Bank supervisors attempt to focus on one question:  does the bank have enough book capital to absorb the expected losses on its exposures.  Bank supervisors focus on this question because they are attempting to protect the taxpayers by limiting losses that the taxpayers might have to cover because of the deposit guarantee.

The irony here of course is that if banks are required to provide ultra transparency, the bank supervisors could harness the market's analytical power to assess the banks and market discipline to restrain the banks' risk taking.  Both of these would lower the risk to taxpayers of losses on deposit insurance.

Ultimately, the real issue bank supervisors would like discretion on is when to resolve a bank.

Bank supervisors would like this discretion because a bank can be insolvent (the market value of its assets is less than the book value of its liabilities) at one moment in time and can subsequently earn its way back to solvency (the market value of its assets exceeds the book value of its liabilities).

However, this discretion over when to resolve a bank is not needed in a stable financial system.

Requiring banks to provide ultra transparency is not incompatible with letting a bank continue operating and earn its way back to solvency.  In fact, ultra transparency helps in this situation by eliminating the possibility that bank management will 'gamble on redemption'.  An insolvent bank that takes on more risk would see its cost of funding rise substantially.

In a financial system with deposit guarantees and banks providing ultra transparency, the only banks that need to be resolved are the banks that cannot generate pre-banker bonus earnings.  All the rest of the banks should they be temporarily insolvent have the ability to earn their way back to solvency.

The recent trouble at Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena ... highlights potential vulnerabilities in plans for a new single European bank supervisor. 
The Tuscan lender, which bills itself as the world's oldest bank, used complex derivatives to tweak its balance sheet that have now triggered massive losses contributing to a €3.9 billion ($5.23 billion) black hole to be filled by taxpayers. Many of these derivative schemes are now the subject of judicial probes.
It wasn't the use of derivatives to tweak its balance sheet that was the problem, but rather that it hid the derivatives so that market participants did not know about them.  As a result, the bank's financial statements did not present a true picture of the bank's condition.
The Bank of Italy admitted its supervisors were aware of the schemes, fueling demands for a wider investigation. 
The Bank of Italy is under pressure because it exercised its discretion and it too did not disclose the existence of these derivatives.

So here is a bank supervisor with concerns about safety and soundness of the banking system supporting the mis-representation of the true level of risk at the bank.
In reality, the BOI's freedom for maneuver was limited. One problem was that the derivative deals did not violate accounting rules. 
While international accounting standards require that a seller of credit default swaps mark their position to market, that's not the case for "structured repos"—an innovative transaction that achieves the same effect—for which historical costs can be used. 
Monte dei Paschi took advantage of this loophole to issue structured repos, thereby spreading out accrued losses over a longer period even though the bank remained fully exposed to fluctuating liquidity risks. 
Thanks to this ruse, the bank posted a profit in 2009, enabling it to pay a dividend—which it had secretly promised to creditors that had subscribed to preferred shares used to bolster the capital base. 
Although the BOI was critical of the structured repos, it was hamstrung because no rule was broken.... 
The fact that the derivatives deals did not violate accounting rules does not mean that the Bank of Italy could have have publicly questioned the quality of Monte Paschi's earnings and mentioned the use of these structured repos in achieving these earnings.
But the way in which [the BOI] has handled the affair has led to allegations of subterfuge that have pulled in Mr. Draghi, now president of the European Central Bank. 
Those charges may be wide of the mark, but the political fuss is a timely reminder that bank supervision is a highly charged activity requiring delicate judgments to balance competing interests. 
One of the benefits of requiring banks to provide ultra transparency is that it eliminates the need for bank supervisors to balance competing interests.

With ultra transparency, bank supervisors can concentrate on protecting the taxpayers.
Mr. Draghi will be fully aware just how much more politically sensitive banking regulation will become when conducted cross-border by the ECB as part of the euro zone's proposed banking union. 
Indeed, the discretion required for bank supervision sits uncomfortably with the transparency the ECB deploys in the conduct of monetary policy where clear communication is essential to the management of expectations. 
By requiring banks to provide ultra transparency, we end bank supervision discretion.  As a result, the ECB can continue to provide clear communication about its conduct of monetary policy.

Thursday, February 7, 2013

Monte Paschi scandal provides more evidence bank supervision by regulators inadequate

On two separate fronts, the Monte Paschi scandal provided evidence that supervision by bank regulators is inadequate as a substitute for the combination of transparency and market discipline.

First, Mario Draghi said that the Bank of Italy did what it was suppose to do and could only have done more it granted additional powers.  Second, the Bank of Italy made a previously undisclosed loan to Monte Paschi in late 2011.

As reported by Reuters,
European Central Bank President Mario Draghi denied suggestions on Thursday that he had been lax in his oversight of the scandal-hit Monte dei Paschi when he was governor of the Bank of Italy....

In his first public comments on the crisis, Draghi told the ECB's monthly news conference in Frankfurt that the Bank of Italy had "done everything it should and appropriately and on time." 
As governor of the Bank of Italy at the time, Draghi was ultimately responsible for bank oversight prior to his departure for Frankfurt to head the ECB in November 2011....
Let's assume that Mr. Draghi is correct in his statement about the performance of the Bank of Italy.

This simply confirms that supervision by bank regulators doesn't work as a substitute for transparency and market discipline.

If banks were required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, the derivatives could not have been hidden as the counter-parties would have wanted them acknowledged so they could get the benefit of each deal.

While there are no legal restrictions that prevent banks from disclosing on a borrower privacy protected basis all of their current exposures, banks prefer not to do this.

Rather, banks prefer that the bank regulators, like the Bank of Italy, who have supervisory responsibility and the legal right to see all the useful, relevant information that is needed to assess the solvency and risk of the banks have a monopoly.

Why?

Because then the banks are not subjected to market discipline.  In fact, to the extent that the banking supervisors don't follow up aggressively on any problem, the banks are not subject to any discipline.
He said he had signed two reports into Monte Paschi by Bank of Italy inspectors, the first of which, from mid-2010, has been leaked to the press and raised several irregularities in Monte Paschi's operations and accounts....

Draghi said that as it does not have policing powers, the Bank of Italy was limited in its ability to counter fraud,
one of the charges which prosecutors have leveled at Monte Paschi's former management.
Keep in mind that it was always an option for the Bank of Italy to disclose to the market that it had found these irregularities involving derivatives.

By not disclosing its findings to the market, the Bank of Italy allowed Monte Paschi to present a false picture of its financial condition.
Facing several different questions on the historic lender, Draghi suggested that the Bank of Italy could have benefitted by having more powers to supervise effectively....
More supervisory powers wasn't going to change the failure of the Bank of Italy to disclose information that the market needed to properly assess the risk and solvency of Monte Paschi.

In fact, it can be argued that due to safety and soundness concerns, the Bank of Italy had an incentive to not disclose the derivative irregularities.

As reported by the Wall Street Journal, the Bank of Italy extended a secret loan of almost 2 billion euros to Monte Paschi in late 2011 as it was experiencing liquidity problems due to the derivatives that the Bank of Italy had not disclosed to the market.

Again, had Monte Paschi been required to provide ultra transparency everyone would have known about the loan.

Instead, it looks like the Bank of Italy intended that the loan should be hidden and Monte Paschi make false representation about its financial condition to the market.
Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, the 541-year-old Italian bank at the center of a burgeoning financial scandal, was so strapped for cash in late 2011 that it negotiated a covert loan of nearly €2 billion ($2.7 billion) from the Bank of Italy even as executives were publicly describing the lender's funding position as comfortable, according to the Bank of Italy and people familiar with the deal.
The bottom line and the reason there is a scandal is that Bank of Italy failed to disclose material information about Monte Paschi that market participants needed to have if they were to accurately assess the risk and solvency of the bank.

The lesson from the scandal is that bank regulators need to be stripped of their information monopoly by requiring all banks to provide ultra transparency.

At a minimum, this subjects the banks to market discipline and eliminates the possibility that bank regulators will fail to disclose material information.

Wednesday, February 6, 2013

Surprise! Derivatives involved in Monte Paschi's ill-fated acquisition

In an attempt to escape blame for not taking prompt action on the Monte Paschi derivatives it knew about, the Bank of Italy is trying to change the topic by saying they were lied to about a derivative involved in Monte Paschi's ill-fated acquisition.

This latest disclosure reaffirms why all banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Had this been the case, the counter-parties for the acquisition derivative would have noticed the Monte Paschi had not disclosed the derivative and would have alerted everyone to the omission.

Why?

Because the counter-parties want the derivative disclosed so they can get the benefit of the derivative.

As reported by Reuters,

Monte dei Paschi misled the Bank of Italy over a 1-billion euro hybrid instrument it used to partly fund its acquisition of rival bank Antonveneta, Siena prosecutors alleged in a document reviewed by Reuters on Wednesday. 
As part of their ongoing probe, prosecutors alleged in the document, dated February 1, that the Tuscan bank struck a deal which violated requirements set by the central bank over the hybrid financial instrument, known as FRESH 2008. 
Monte dei Paschi is being investigated for alleged wrongdoing relating to its 2008 acquisition of Antonveneta, a smaller rival. If proved correct, the allegations by prosecutors that Monte dei Paschi misled the Bank of Italy over the true nature of part of the financing it raised would undermine the basis on which the deal was approved....

Prosecutors alleged that the indemnity documents violated requirements set by the Bank of Italy by making the FRESH 2008 work like a bond rather than an hybrid equity instrument. Monte dei Paschi needed to show the Bank of Italy that it had sufficient equity capital in place to win approval for Antonveneta takeover. 
Based on the information officially received from the bank, the regulator allowed Monte dei Paschi to calculate those notes as core Tier 1 capital, a measure of a bank's financial strength which is closely monitored by regulators, boosting its financial base and allowing it to demonstrate it had sufficient capital to absorb the Antonveneta deal.
At best, this seems to confirm that Tier 1 capital is doesn't say much about a bank's financial strength.  At worse, this seems to confirm that Tier 1 capital is meaningless.

Wednesday, January 30, 2013

Monte dei Paschi scandal is all about lack of transparency

In summarizing the Monte dei Paschi derivatives scandal, Reuters highlights how the lack of transparency at the bank led directly to a lack of oversight either by the bank's senior management, its board or its financial regulators.

The lack of transparency contributed to this scandal at many levels.

The secret document at the heart of the Monte dei Paschi banking scandal lay for months in a concealed safe in a 14th century Tuscan palace....
Lack of transparency resulted in a secret derivative contract.  By definition, the counter-party to the contract knew of the document.

As I discussed in an earlier post, when all banks are required to provide ultra transparency and report on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details, a simple cross-check of exposures would have identified the existence of this contract.

Nomura and Deutsche Bank would have wanted to do this cross-check because they would have wanted to receive the benefit of the derivative contract.  If the other side doesn't acknowledge a deal, how do you enforce it?
The document found at the 540-year-old bank's head offices - which are appropriately in a restored ancient fortress - was a contract mandating Japanese bank Nomura to carry out deals on behalf of Monte dei Paschi.
How could Nomura carry out deals on the bank's behalf without anyone at the bank being aware of it?
It revealed that, unbeknown to the new management under Viola, two derivatives transactions known as "Alexandria" which had looked separate were in fact linked. This meant they should have received different accounting treatment, leading to heavy losses. 
This discovery prompted an internal inquiry that has, so far, revealed losses of up to 720 million euros ($977 million)....
What do these derivative contracts say and how much more could Monte dei Paschi lose?
The Bank of Italy is also under fire, with critics accusing it of lax oversight and lack of transparency about suspected financial irregularities at the Tuscan lender....
How is it that the Bank of Italy didn't notify the board and senior management of Monte dei Paschi and tell them to suspend all trading until the financial irregularities were fixed?
Whether the contract was deliberately hidden or simply forgotten, Monte dei Paschi's former top management seems to have had little idea of what traders in the finance department that negotiated such risky deals were doing - despite repeated complaints from internal auditors, according to senior sources with knowledge of the situation and documents seen by Reuters. 
Three years before the document was uncovered, Monte dei Paschi's own risk control unit and its audit committee had already expressed serious concerns to Vigni about the way the bank's finance department handled risky trades. 
Internal documents obtained by Reuters show an audit of the department in August and September 2009 had uncovered a "systematic overshooting of risk limits" in the management of the group's 24-billion euro proprietary portfolio. 
Proprietary trading involves a bank taking trading positions in securities such as stocks or bonds to make profits for itself, rather than trading on behalf of a customer. 
Close examination of the documents, which included letters addressed to Vigni outlining the internal auditors' misgivings, suggest that the finance department operated like a bank within a bank, entering into derivative trades and hedging bets that went wrong with little scrutiny from Vigni or then Chairman Giuseppe Mussari....

ex-finance department chief Gian Luca Baldassarri and his team were viewed as the real bosses inside the bank, with a weak understanding of markets among the top management allowing them to engage freely in opaque financial deals....
As we know, by definition derivatives are opaque.  
"The risk management unit constantly raised alarm bells," said a senior source with direct knowledge of the situation. "However, these were very powerful people."...
And what did the financial regulators do when the risk management unit raised alarm bells?
Baldassarri - who worked at the bank between 2001 and 2012 - and another Monte dei Paschi manager in London are referred to as "the five percent gang", according to a judicial document seen by Reuters. 
This document contains minutes of a 2008 interrogation conducted by a Milan magistrate of a former Dresdner Bank employee, Antonio Rizzo, as part of a separate Milan inquiry. 
The "five percent" label refers to a fixed fee that, according to Rizzo, the duo would ask for themselves for every financial transaction they managed to push through....
The former mid-level manager said Monte dei Paschi's top brass didn't grasp what the finance department was doing from its offices overlooking the Renaissance buildings of Siena. "They could do what they wanted because no one really understood what they were doing, neither Mussari nor Vigni," the official said....
Please recall that had the bank been required to provide ultra transparency, the lack of understanding by senior management would not have been so problematic.  Market participants would have pointed out the problem and exerted discipline to fix the situation.
Prosecutors are now also investigating "Alexandria", the complex 2009 structured transaction with Nomura, and two other deals - the 2008 "Santorini" trade with Deutsche Bank and the 2006 "Nota Italia" trade with JP Morgan. 
Deutsche has said its deal had been approved by Monte dei Paschi. JP Morgan declined comment. 
The documents obtained by Reuters do not refer specifically to the three derivative trades, which are alleged to have been used to conceal losses at Monte dei Paschi....
When banks are required to provide ultra transparency, they cannot conceal losses.
In addition to the internal audit committee and the risk management department, some board members also criticised the type and size of investments carried out by the finance department and the lack of accountability, sources said. 
In 2011, two board members - Francesco Gaetano Caltagirone and Axa representative Frederic Marie de Courtois d'Arcollieres - raised questions about what they said was an excessive exposure to Italian government bonds, according to a source close to the matter.... 
Monte dei Paschi's 25-billion euro Italian government bond portfolio made a net return of just 65 million euros in the first nine months of 2012 because of a fall in benchmark European interest rates. 
It would have made around 1 billion euros a year had the bank not carried out interest rate swaps in 2009 that moved almost the entire portfolio to floating rates, which fluctuate in line with the market, from fixed rates....
And who was the counter-party who receives the benefit of the fixed rate payments?  Is this deal part of the effort to conceal the losses?
"As in all banks there was a structure that could take risks and another one that was supposed to monitor that. As far as I know the Bank of Italy was aware of this model, and asked for changes. Probably this model was inadequate."
And who monitors that the bank is properly monitoring its risk?  With ultra transparency, it is the market.
A November 9, 2010 Bank of Italy report, also seen by Reuters, showed how inspectors from the central bank had raised concerns about risky derivatives trades after they visited the bank from May to August 2010. 
The inspectors specifically raised the deals with Nomura and Deutsche, which are now at the heart of the scandal.
The Bank of Italy - led until 2011 by Mario Draghi who is now the European Central Bank Chief - has said it realised the "true nature" of the contracts late last year, after Monte dei Paschi's new management discovered the document in the safe.
This highlights how the regulators' information monopoly makes the financial system unstable.  Clearly, the regulators did not realize the 'true nature' of the contracts.  The result is a bank scandal.

Had the bank been required to provide ultra transparency, market participants, including derivative experts, would have seen these deals and understood their 'true nature'.  

Italian bank derivative scandal ongoing reminder why banks should provide ultra transparency

As more information comes out about Monte Paschi's derivative scandal, the more the scandal confirms that banks must be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

Why?

Because bank regulators cannot be relied on to a) properly assess the risk of each bank, b) accurately communicate this risk to market participants and now c) effectively follow-up when banks engage in accounting irregularities.

As a result, market participants need the banks to provide ultra transparency so a) market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank and b) exert market discipline on the banks so that their accounting statements reflect the true financial condition of the bank.

From a Bloomberg article, we learn that even though it regulated Monte Paschi, the Bank of Italy did not think that it was responsible for 'policing' the bank even after it uncovered a previously unreported derivative transaction.

To say this is troubling is an understatement.

The Bank of Italy under former Governor Mario Draghi spotted accounting irregularities that allowed Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA to mask losses more than two years before the lender was forced to say it will have to restate profit. 
In 2010, “a problem came to light” on Monte Paschi’s booking of a structured deal called Santorini, Italy’s Rome- based central bank said in a report dated Jan. 28. 
The Bank of Italy alerted “other authorities” a year later and talks with those regulators, which it didn’t identify, haven’t concluded. It didn’t explain the delay in forcing the bank to disclose the information. 
The Bank of Italy’s account of Monte Paschi’s use of derivatives, released yesterday, calls into question its oversight of the world’s oldest bank, which is seeking the second taxpayer bailout in four years....  
“I would have expected the Bank of Italy to have requested transparency from Monte Paschi back in 2010 after reviewing the transactions,” said Carlo Alberto Carnevale-Maffe, professor of business strategy at Milan’s Bocconi University. “Hidden documents found recently wouldn’t have changed the substance of the original findings.”
Had all banks been required to provide ultra transparency, Monte Paschi wouldn't have "hidden documents" in the first place.

But assuming that Monte Paschi did not want to disclose the derivative deals, market participants, including regulators, could still have found out about these deals by looking at the disclosures made under ultra transparency by Monte Paschi's counter-parties.

With ultra transparency, the ability to look at the counter-parties' exposure details is a simple check and balance on each bank's disclosure of its exposure details.  This simple check and balance improves the reliability of each bank's financial statements.
The Bank of Italy said that as early as 2010 it sought daily liquidity reports from the lender as margin calls on Santorini drained funds. 
The regulator said a week ago Monte Paschi hid documents, impeding its analysis of the “true nature” of the company’s dealings. 
Regulatory oversight of Monte Paschi was “continuous and thorough” and the bank remains solid even with a capital shortfall and possible losses linked to structured deals, Finance Minister Vittorio Grilli said in parliament yesterday....
The highlighted text is a simple restatement of why market participants cannot rely on regulators to a) properly assess the risk of a bank and b) accurately communicate this risk.
Santorini helped Monte Paschi obscure a 367 million-euro loss from an older derivative contract with Deutsche Bank, according to more than 70 pages of documents outlining the deal and obtained by Bloomberg News. As part of the arrangement, the Italian lender made a losing bet on the value of the country’s government bonds. 
The bank’s new management is still trying to determine the extent to which Santorini and two other derivative deals were used to distort earnings. Monte Paschi never disclosed the effect of the 2008 deal in its annual reports. 
The bond bet was among transactions that drew the Bank of Italy’s scrutiny as early as 2009 as repo operations were “resulting in the absorption of high liquidity margins,” the regulator said in its Jan. 28 report....
The highlighted text shows why, in the absence of ultra transparency, bank financial statements cannot be relied on as they contain a) distortions in valuations that are done with regulatory approval such as suspension of mark-to-market accounting and creation of 'zombie loans' under regulatory forbearance and b) distortions in valuations by the banks themselves including not reporting the impact of derivative exposures or as shown by JP Morgan's Whale trade, understating losses.
Monte Paschi told the Bank of Italy in 2011 the structured deals were part of its “carry trade” strategies and weren’t submitted to its administrative body.... 
Italy’s third-largest bank and prosecutors are now reviewing three money-losing derivative deals, Santorini, Alexandria and Nota Italia. 
The lender said it discovered in October that former managers signed a “mandate agreement” with Nomura Holdings Inc. (8604) to cover losses on a mortgage-backed derivative called Alexandria with new, riskier derivatives. 
The hidden document, proving the link between the unprofitable Alexandria derivative with the new one, should have led the bank to book a loss of more than 200 million euros on the original transaction, instead of spreading it over the 30- year maturity of the new deal....

The Bank of Italy’s role isn’t to “police” Monte Paschi, the current governor, Ignazio Visco, 63, said Jan. 25 in an interview with Bloomberg Television in Davos, Switzerland. 
The Bank of Italy “summoned the senior management of Monte Paschi” and of the foundation that is its biggest shareholder in November 2011 “to make them face up to their responsibilities and ask Paschi to quickly and definitively turn around the way it conducts its business,” the report said.
The role of policing the banks actually belongs to the market.  However, market participants cannot police the banks so long as the financial regulators have a monopoly on all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.

By ending the regulators' information monopoly and requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency, market participants have access to the information they need to actually police the banks.
Monte Paschi risks further losses of as much as 500 million euros on a 2010 securitization of about 1.5 billion euros of real estate loans, dubbed “Chianti Classico,” weekly Panorama said today, citing documents that include minutes of board meetings from November and December of last year. ... 
“New derivative accounting policies are needed in Europe to avoid similar situations in the future,” said Giuseppe Di Taranto, professor of financial history at Rome’s Luiss University. “There’s too much room for interpretation under current rules.”
The new derivative accounting policy is that banks must disclose all of their derivative exposures.


Sunday, January 27, 2013

Italian bank involved in derivatives scandal seeks outside investor

Reuters reports that the Italian bank involved in the derivatives scandal is looking for an outside investor.

One might ask the question of could someone invest in that bank.  After all, the definition of investing involves being able to complete three steps:

  • Independently assess the risk and value the investment.  To do this, the investor needs access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner.
  • Compare the independent valuation to the price being shown by Wall Street.
  • Make a buy, hold or sell decision based on the difference between the independent valuation and the price shown by Wall Street.
In the case of the Italian bank, no investor can complete the first step because the bank does not disclose all of its global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

In fact, it took the bank several days to disclose the existence of $1 billion in losses on three derivative contracts.

Who knows what else is lurking on or off the bank's balance sheet.

This is not to say that someone might not be willing to place a bet on the contents of the 'black box' that is the Italian bank.  This is a gamble and not an investment.

The Italian bank highlights the simple fact that all banks are 'black boxes' and that it is impossible to invest in them.  One might gamble, but that is it.  The only way this will change is when banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.
Monte dei Paschi di Siena said on Sunday it was seeking a financial investor as the political storm over a derivatives scandal at the ailing bank intensified ahead of next month's Italian election. 
Italy's third-biggest lender, which needs state loans to stay afloat, this week revealed opaque derivatives trades, conducted between 2006 and 2009, that could cost it some 720 million euros. 
The scandal has turned the spotlight on Monte Paschi's close political ties with the centre left and on possible oversight failings by the Bank of Italy (BOI), then led by current European Central Bank chief Mario Draghi. 
"I would like to have a long-term financial investor," Monte Paschi Chairman Alessandro Profumo told Italian business daily Il Sole 24 Ore on Sunday. "Nationality is not a problem. The important thing is that it believes in our project"....
In fact, placing a bet on the Italian bank is entirely a question of belief as there are no facts available on which to make an informed decision.
Corriere della Sera daily on Sunday published excerpts from the minutes of Monte Paschi meetings in 2011 showing several board members expressing concern about the bank's portfolio, overladen with long-term Italian government bonds. 
"The situation is no longer sustainable, we must take steps to reduce these positions," said former vice chairman Francesco Caltagirone in September 2011 as Italian government bond yields soared during the apex of the euro zone debt crisis.... 
Monte Paschi's new management have said the main loss-making derivatives it uncovered involved Japanese bank Nomura and Deutsche Bank.

Thursday, January 24, 2013

Italian bank derivative scandal highlights need for banks to disclose their exposure details

While the financial industry cheerleaders have gathered at Davos to declare that the financial crisis is over, a derivative scandal involving Italy's oldest bank reminds us that the crisis won't end until the global banking system is fixed and this will not occur until banks are required to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

As Zero Hedge put it succinctly,
Naturally, the implication is that after 4 years of endless bailouts and "recovery", nobody has any clue still just what is on Europe's bank balance sheets. 
And the further implication is that if [the Italian bank involved in the derivative scandal] was doing it, everyone else was, of course, doing it, and much more dirty laundry is soon set to be uncovered...
As reported by Reuters,

European Central Bank President Mario Draghi is facing criticism over a scandal involving loss-making derivatives trades made by troubled Italian lender Monte dei Paschi di Siena while he was Italy's central bank governor.... 
Former Economy Minister Giulio Tremonti said in a tweet that it was "stupefying" that in his role as supervisor of Italy's banking system Draghi had failed to discover or prevent the trades, which took place between 2006 and 2009....
Current Economy Minister Vittorio Grilli avoided mentioning Draghi directly but stressed that it was not the government but the central bank that was responsible for bank supervision. 
"It wasn't us that did the controlling," he told reporters. "On the checks, all I will say is that it is the responsibility of the Bank of Italy." 
Underlining the gravity of the crisis, Italian President Giorgio Napolitano said Monte Paschi's latest problems were a "serious issue" but that he had "full confidence in the Bank of Italy." 
On Wednesday the central bank tried to deflect any criticism, saying the nature of the trades had been "kept hidden" and were only recently divulged by new management appointed last year to turn the bank around....
Please re-read the highlighted text again as it nicely summarizes why all banks must provide ultra transparency.

Until banks provide ultra transparency, market participants need to assume that the banks are hiding something.  Otherwise, they would disclose everything.
The deals under scrutiny are the so-called "Alexandria" trade with Japanese bank Nomura, the "Santorini" trade with Deutsche Bank and a derivative called "Nota Italia", with an unspecified bank.... 
Analysts fear eventual losses could be higher and have urged Monte Paschi to come clean on any other potential surprises....
Let me repeat that there is no reason to believe the management of Monte Paschi or any other banks when it says it has come clean unless the bank provides ultra transparency.
The effectiveness of the Bank of Italy's supervision is being increasingly questioned, despite the fact the country's lenders complain it is more stringent than other European regulators in its monitoring of the Italian financial industry. 
"One has to wonder what the Bank of Italy was doing given all the visits they've paid to Monte dei Paschi in recent months," said a source close to the situation. 
"If what they came here to look at was only the information publicly available in the bank's financial statements, they could have done that from Rome."
One of the lessons of the financial crisis is that market participants cannot rely on the financial regulators to provide an accurate assessment of the risk of a bank.  Even if the regulators properly assess the risk, they have concerns about the safety and soundness of the financial system that prevent them from communicating how bad the situation might be.

Requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency ends the dependence of market participants on the financial regulators.

There is a significant benefit to doing this.  Market participants become responsible for all gains and losses on their exposures as the have all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess the risk and solvency of each bank and make a fully informed investment decision.

Translation:  no more moral hazard over bailing out investors who relied on the financial regulators' representations about the solvency of a bank in making their investment decision.

Tuesday, November 6, 2012

Italy rejects bad bank

After the Irish experience with a bad bank, I expected the Spanish government to reject setting up a bad bank as a bad bank doesn't restore confidence in the banking system and only consumes the government's access to credit (the Irish experience).

Clearly, the Spanish government did not reject setting up the bad bank and by doing so has committed itself to continue to place the burden of the excess debt in the Spanish financial system on a real economy that cannot afford this burden.  The result will be further shrinkage of the real Spanish economy.

Bloomberg reports that Italy is getting ahead of the curve and is rejecting setting up a bad bank.  The reason Italy is rejecting the bad bank is it produces only negative consequences for Italy.

Italian Treasury officials rejected proposals to create a so-called bad bank to take non-performing loans off the books of the nation’s lenders amid concern the plan would strengthen the link between sovereign and bank debt, said people with knowledge of the matter. 
At least three restructuring advisers held talks with government officials about a bad bank that Italy could fund without seeking external aid, said the people, who declined to be identified because the discussions were private. The bad bank could hold 30 billion euros ($39 billion) to 100 billion euros of assets and lenders would receive government bonds in return for their bad loans, according to one person....
I am shocked! Shocked I tell you to see that bankers are out there pushing for a solution that benefits them and nobody else.

Regular readers know that a bad bank does not work because of the issue of how to value the assets taken off of the bank balance sheets and the question of how does anyone know that all the bad exposures were transferred.  [These problems undermined the US Treasury's plan to buy opaque, toxic assets from the banks.]

To address these problems requires the banks to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  With this information, market participants can independently value the exposures.

As a result, the market knows if the exposures are transferred at their market value or the bad bank pays too much (a boost to the banks at taxpayer expense).

If the exposures are transferred at market value, why bother with the bad bank in the first place as the banks have already written the loans down?
A bad bank is a tool the government could use to spur a turnaround in the country’s economy by easing funding needs among smaller banks that would allow them to boost lending, said the people.
This assumption is false.

It bears repeating that bank lending is independent of the bad debt on the bank balance sheet.  For proof, just look at how much lending the US Saving and Loans did during their crisis in the 1980s.

Bank lending is separate from how the loan is financed because the bank can sell the loan to other financial market participants like an insurer, pension fund, hedge fund...
Still, it could strengthen the link between government and bank debt, going against reforms including plans for a European banking union that seek to weaken that nexus that has exacerbated the region’s debt crisis. 
“The last thing Italy needs right now is a further strengthening of the links between the sovereign and the country’s banks,” said Nicholas Spiro, managing director of London-based Spiro Sovereign Strategy. “While Italian sovereign debt is a much safer asset class than a year ago, Italy is by no means out the woods and is seeking to differentiate itself favourably from Spain as much as possible.”
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Spiro's comment about not setting up a bad bank as a positive point of differentiation between Italy and Spain is telling.

If having a bad bank makes your sovereign debt a riskier asset class, then a government should simply not set up a bad bank.

It is worth repeating, given the design of a modern banking system, there is no need for setting up a government funded bad bank.  Between deposit guarantees and access to central bank funding, banks are capable of absorbing the losses on their bad debt and continue supporting the real economy even if they have low or negative book capital levels.

The reason banks can continue to support the real economy is the deposit guarantee effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.

Friday, October 12, 2012

Berlusconi ally: German banks created Europe's debt crisis

The Irish Independent ran an article in which an ally of former Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi said that the German banks created Europe's debt crisis and that austerity was making the Italian recession worse.
GERMAN banks created Europe's debt crisis and the cuts demanded of Italy are driving the economy deeper intorecession, the economic chief of former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's party said on Friday. 
Renato Brunetta, a leading voice on Italy's centre-right, also said an exit from the euro could not be ruled out if Rome were forced to remain on its rigid diet of budget austerity - a line often taken by Berlusconi and his allies but one on which they have shown no sign of acting....
Brunetta, who left office when Berlusconi fell at the height of the crisis last November, accused Monti - a technocrat appointed to run Italy until the polls - of pushing austerity to excess and strangling an already feeble economy, which the government expects to contract by 2.4 percent this year. 
"It doesn't even convince the markets," he told Reuters in his office in Berlusconi's Rome headquarters. "It's like those old diet ads. If I tell you I'm going to lose seven kilos in seven days, it's not credible, it leads to collapse."...
Brunetta had harsh words for policy decided at the euro zone level and although he denied being a eurosceptic, he said an exit from the euro could not be ruled out. 
"Who says it's impossible to leave the euro? There is an enormous amount of literature that says it's possible," he said....

"My thesis is that the crisis is a crisis in the euro, produced by German banks," he said, arguing that the euro zone was paying for their excessive exposure to high yielding paper. 
"I would like to see an investigation into the German banks," Brunetta said.... 
Brunetta's comments echo a long running argument over the relative responsibility in the crisis of the strained public finances of southern Europe or the bloated surpluses of the prosperous northern countries, especially Germany. 
"It's this Calvinist analysis. If you're poor, it's your fault, if you're rich, it's because God loves you," he said.
Interesting on a day when the EU won the Nobel Peace Prize.

Tuesday, May 15, 2012

Will Itallian banks provide ultra transparency to avoid a banking crisis

The Telegraph's Ambrose Evans-Pritchard looked at how the turmoil in Greece has increased the chances for an Italian banking crisis.

Hans Redeker from Morgan Stanley said the EU's mishandling of Greece has put Italy in grave danger. "The irrevocability of the eurozone is a valuable asset, and they are throwing it away. Global investors are preparing for the day Greece leaves," he said. 
The IMF said Italian bank exposure to the state is 32pc of GDP, including all forms of lending. "We are looking at this number very closely," said Mr Redeker. 
Almost half of this is owed to foreigners. Italy's central bank owes a further €278bn in 'Target2' claims to peers in Germany, Holland, Finland and Luxembourg, reflecting capital flight.
This reflects the on-going run on the Italian banks previously discussed on this blog.
Italy's former premier Romano Prodi said the EU risks instant contagion to Spain, Italy, and France if Greece leaves. "The whole house of cards will come down", he said 
Angelo Drusiani from Banca Albertini said the only way to avert catstrophe is to convert the European Central Bank into a lender of last resort. Otherwise Italy faces "massive devaluation, three to five years of hyperinflation, and unbearable unemployment." 
The ECB's emergency lending may have made matters worse, encouraging banks to buy their own states' debt. It has led to an incestous inter-linkange of fragile banking systems and fragile sovereign states, each propping the other up. Many of the banks used ECB money to buy state bonds until they need to roll over their own debt. They are now nursing stiff losses. 
Moody's downgraded 26 Italian lenders on Monday night saying the slump itself is the killer, joining a chorus of voices warning that too much austerity may be self-defeating. "Banks are vulnerable to the renewed recession in Italy, given their already elevated levels of problem loans and weakened profitability," it said. Moody's expects the economy to contract 1.9pc this year. 
The Italian Banking Association ABI accused Moody's of an "irresponsible, incomprehensible, and unjustifiable" smear. "Moody's decision is an attack on Italy, its companies, its families and its citizens," it said, calling on the EU authorities to clamp down "severely" on rating agencies. 
The agency said the "problem loans" of Italian banks have reached 9.3pc. The figure may be higher, given "concerns about the accuracy of reported non-performing loan measures." 
They depend on capital markets for 36pc of their funds. This source of finance has largely dried up.
If the Italian banks want to stop the deposit run and reopen the capital markets, they will have to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, concerns about the accuracy of reported non-performing loan measures disappears and market participants can independently assess the risk of each bank.