Showing posts with label Bank of England. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Bank of England. Show all posts

Monday, March 18, 2013

Primary difference between financial repression and deposit confiscation: speed

In an excellent Telegraph column, Ian Cowie looks at the depositor haircut in Cyprus to bailout its banking system as petty theft compared to what savers have been "stealthily robbed" robbed of by financial repression (think zero interest rate policies) to bailout the global financial system.

The primary difference, other than sheer quantity of money pilfered, is speed.

The depositor haircut happened over-night.  Financial repression has been going on since the beginning of the financial crisis.

Your humble blogger uses the word "primary" on purpose.  Both the depositor haircut and financial repression are the result of government policies to bailout the financial system by imposing its losses on savers/taxpayers.

Regular readers know the politicians are making a conscious decision to impose losses on savers/taxpayers and not on the bankers who caused the loss in the first place.  In fact, these bankers continue to be rewarded with nary an interruption in their bonuses.

Politicians are making a conscious decision because the banking system is designed to absorb losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue operating even though the banks have low or negative book capital levels.

Banks can do this because of the existence of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.    Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the banks' silent equity partner when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  As a result, banks have unlimited capital against which to continue lending.

Every day since the financial crisis began, politicians have made the decision to steal, whether through financial repression or a depositor haircut, from savers/taxpayers and give to the bankers rather than use the banking system as it is designed to be used.

I admit that having the banking system absorb the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system would be bad for banker cash bonuses.  However, given the choice between the government stealing from the savers/taxpayers or reducing banker cash bonuses (not necessarily the total size of banker bonuses), I opt for reducing banker cash bonuses.
Outrage about the Cyprus banks euro tax bail-out should not be allowed to obscure the fact that millions of savers in British banks have already lost much more of the real value or purchasing power of their money to prop up financial institutions closer to home. 
Savers in British banks and building societies have been stealthily robbed of more than £43bn of the real value of their savings since the Bank of England froze interest rates at 0.5pc four years ago. 
That's the total shrinkage of bank and building society depositors' purchasing power caused by inflation exceeding frozen interest rates, according to calculations by the pressure group Save Our Savers, following similar calculations by Yorkshire Building Society that the average saver has lost £2,500 in real terms since the credit crisis began. 
Both figures have got much bigger than they were a couple of years ago, as inflation has continued to run ahead of interest paid on deposits.  
Pensioners have suffered even more because higher than average proportions of their fixed incomes are spent on food and fuel. They are the largely silent victims of the Bank of England's policy of running negative real interest rates. 
But this slow-motion bank robbery is more difficult to describe than the short, sharp, smash-and-grab in Cyprus. So, despite the best efforts of this column to blow the whistle, more attention will be given to smaller losses for fewer people in Cyprus than millions of savers and pensioners who have lost much more in British banks and retirement funds. 
Suggested levies of 6.75 per cent of all deposits up to €100,000 (£86,500) and 9.9 per cent for larger deposits caused many savers in Cyprus to withdraw their money from banks over the weekend.... 
Elsewhere, Government sources stressed that deposits held in the London branches of Bank of Cyprus UK and Laiki Bank would not be subject to the new levy. Treasury sources said that “deposits in UK subsidiaries and branches [of Cypriot banks] aren’t affected” by the crisis. 
If only small savers with Britain’s high street banks and building societies could say the same. Nor are they the only victims to pay a high price for quantitative easing and QE’s aim of protecting over-stretched banks and borrowers at the expense of savers. 
Unfortunately, in a vicious seesaw effect, extra demand for gilts created by QE has pushed up the price of bonds, pushing down their yield or the income pensioners can obtain with their savings. Laith Khalaf of wealth managers Hargreaves Lansdown reckons annuity yields have fallen by about a fifth during the last four years. 
So savers of all descriptions are paying a high price for the Bank of England’s strategy of maintaining negative real interest rates. 
Sadly for the millions of victims of this slow-motion bank robbery in Britain, it remains too complex to explain on the front page or in TV bulletins and so much more coverage will be given to a relatively small scale smash and grab with fewer victims in Cyprus.

Thursday, March 7, 2013

BoE's Mervyn King: Lesson from history is to adopt Swedish Model for handling banks

As reported by Bloomberg, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, laid out in his testimony before the Parliament's Commission on Banking Standards that the lesson from history on how to handle a bank solvency led financial crisis is to adopt the Swedish Model.
He contrasted Japan’s failure to restructure its banking system with Sweden’s nationalization, overhaul and rapid return of its lenders to private ownership in the 1990s. 
RBS has crimped lending and growth in the U.K. since its bailout, King said. 
“The lessons of history show very clearly that it is not a good idea to have banks in the public sector for very long,” King said. “The financial markets realized that the losses out there don’t go away. It’s better to face up to it.”...
“The arguments for a restructuring sooner rather than later are powerful ones,” King said. “I’d be willing to lend my support. We shouldn’t worry about the consequential impact.”
Please re-read the highlighted text again as Sir Mervyn King has just championed your humble blogger's call for adoption of the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis.


It is unnecessary given the design of a modern banking system to take a bank into public ownership (which is what any form of bailout is) to restructured them and recapitalize them quickly.

By design, banks can operate and continue to support the real economy when they have low or even negative book capital levels.

Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.  Deposit insurance effectively makes the taxpayers the bank's silent equity partner when they have low or negative book capital levels.  This is what lets banks continue to operate and support the real economy.

What would force banks to restructure quickly is if banks were required to provide ultra transparency and disclose their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.  This level of disclosure is needed so that banks are subject to market discipline.

With this information, market participants can assess the risk the banks are taking and link the amount and price of their exposure to each bank to the risk it is taking.  It is this linkage between cost of funds and risk that is the driver of market discipline.

And why would market participants link the cost of funds to the risk each bank is taking?

Market participants know they are responsible for all losses on their investments as a result of having access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner to independently assess and make a fully informed investment decision.

Wednesday, March 6, 2013

BoE's Mervyn King: RBS must "accept losses" currently hiding on and off its balance sheet

At last, the facade bank regulators have constructed since the beginning of the global financial crisis about the solvency of the large global financial institutions has collapsed and with the facade's collapse the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis has gain acceptance.

In his testimony to the Parliament's commission on banking standards, Sir Mervyn King left no doubt that RBS is hiding so much in the way of bad debt on an off its balance sheet that it is impeding RBS' ability to continue to lend to the real economy.

Quite simply, if after five years of cleaning up its exposures, RBS has not managed to put its bad debt behind it, there is no reason to believe that any other Too Big to Fail bank has done so.

Regular readers know that the question know facing the bank regulators is do they ask for another taxpayer bailout of the banks or do they let the banks operate with low or negative book capital levels as they are designed to do?

Your humble blogger has championed since the beginning of the financial crisis letting the banks continue to operate as designed.  With the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding, there is no need to make the implicit role of the taxpayer as the banks' silent equity partner explicit through a bailout.

What is needed is that the banks be required to provide ultra transparency and disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this information, market participants can independently assess whether the banks have recognized all the losses on their bad debt.

More importantly, with this information, market participants can exert discipline on the banks so that they restrain their future risk taking and do not gamble on redemption while they are rebuilding their book capital levels through retention of 100% of pre-banker bonus earnings.

With ultra transparency in place and banks recognizing upfront all the losses on the excess public and private debt in the financial system, the real economy is poised to resume growing and the banks are positioned to provide the necessary lending to support this growth.

Sir Mervyn King has blown open the debate about the future of Royal Bank of Scotland by calling for the bailed out bank to be broken up into a good and bad bank, describing the current situation as a "nonsense". 
Less than a week after the Edinburgh-based bank insisted it could be ready for partial privatisation ahead of the election, the Bank of England governor laid bare his disagreement with the chancellor, George Osborne, over the future of RBS. 
In evidence before the banking standards commission, King said it was a "nonsense" that RBS, 82%-owned by the taxpayer, was run at "arm's length". 
"The whole idea of a bank being 82% owned by the taxpayer, run at arm's length from the government, is a nonsense. It cannot make any sense," King said. 
Labour created the current structure of UK Financial Investments to oversee the £45bn pumped into RBS and £20bn into Lloyds Banking Group during the 2008 banking crisis. It has been adopted by the coalition too. 
"I know it was put there for a good reason. People didn't want politicians running banks. But I think it would be a much better idea to accept that it should have been a temporary period of ownership only – to restructure the bank and put it back. The longer this has gone on the more difficult that's become," King said. He said nothing had been achieved at RBS, other than removing risk from its balance sheet....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Sir Mervyn King has summarized how little has been accomplished over the last 5 years with what is effectively a nationalized bank in terms of cleaning it up.  He refers to the risk removed from its balance sheet as positive, but leaves the distinct impression that there is plenty more risk still there.
The chancellor moved determinedly to stamp out any idea that he would use up to "£8bn or £9bn" of taxpayer funds to take control of the rest of RBS. He told Lawson there were "very considerable obstacles" to nationalising RBS in a move that cleared the way for the bailed out banks, including Lloyds Banking Group, to last week insist they were on course for privatisation....
And this is why banks need to be required to provide ultra transparency.

On the one hand, we have Sir Mervyn King saying the banks are still hiding significant quantities losses and risks on and off their balance sheets.  On the other hand, we have the banks saying they have addressed the losses, reduced their risks and are almost ready to return to the private market.

Who is right?

The only way to know is if the banks provide ultra transparency and market participants can independently assess the exposure details.

Without ultra transparency, the banks are happy to push for a return to the private market.  They know that returning to the market allows them to capture in their pay the subsidies their Too Big to Fail size confers on them.
King made clear he is concerned about the level of bad debts on the RBS books that could be impeding its ability to lend to small businesses. 
The idea being put forward by politicians such as Lawson is that with the creation of a bad bank, a cleaned up RBS might be more willing to lend and be easier to privatise, even at the potential cost of bad loans falling on the state. 
"I would certainly be prepared to lend my support to those who would argue that it is better to recognise it and we shouldn't worry about the consequential impact on the apparent scale of public debt," said King.
There is no consequential impact on the apparent scale of public debt if the banks are required to recapitalize themselves through retention of future earnings.
"The lessons of history is that we should face up to it – it's worth less than we thought and we should accept that and get back to finding a way to create a new RBS that could be a major lender to the UK economy," he said....
"The economic reality is that we must accept the losses. We should accept the reality that the state-owned banks are worth less than we thought." 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Sir Mervyn King has succinctly summarized why the Swedish Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis should be adopted.  Under this model, banks are required to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Tuesday, January 29, 2013

Pension experts: QE is a 'monumental' mistake

The Guardian reports that pension experts have gone before a Parliament committee and explained why the Bank of England's pursuit of quantitative easing (QE) has been a 'monumental' mistake and how the economy would recover if the BoE stopped pursuing all the related low interest rate policies.

Regular readers of this blog will be familiar with the arguments that the pension experts put forward on why QE should be abandoned as they were presented here first.

The Bank of England's policy of pumping money into the economy has been a "monumental mistake", pensions experts have warned . 
A committee of MPs heard that measures taken by the Bank to drive the economy had backfired by squeezing individuals' incomes – both pensioners and those in work – and forcing companies to divert cash into pension funds rather than investing.
I referred to these two economic headwinds as the retirement fund death spiral.  The trigger for the death spiral is the adoption of zero interest rate and related policies like QE.

Both individuals and companies move to offset the loss of earnings on their savings and reinforce the negative feedback loop.  Individuals do this by cutting back current consumption and saving more.  Companies offset the decline in earnings on pension funds by diverting cash rather than investing.

The actions by both individuals and companies reduce aggregate demand.  Since the BoE wants to boost aggregate demand, it pursues the low interest rate policies even more aggressively.  The result is a further drop in aggregate demand as both individuals and corporations move to offset the loss income.

That individuals change their spending and saving habits in the face of low interest rates has been known since the 1870s.  Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, even stated that interest rates should never be less than 2%.
Ros Altmann, pensions expert and director general of Saga, said current policies devalued pensioners' incomes, making them less willing to spend: "Quantitative easing and ultra-low interest rates have hampered the spending power of those in the economy who were not over-indebted and who would otherwise have spent money." ...
Altmann said ending the QE programme was much more likely to herald a period of growth than its introduction had done. "History will judge this as a monumental mistake," she said. "If we do not have any more quantitative easing, the economy will be freer to grow than if we do."
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ros Altmann has nicely summarized what your humble blogger has been saying about why zero interest rate policies never work to boost demand and why abandoning these policies would actually produce the growth in the economy that central bankers want.
Under the QE programme, the Bank of England has bought £375bn of UK government bonds, or gilts, with newly created electronic money. It now owns almost a third of all gilts in the market. This huge influx of demand has driven gilt prices higher and means yields, or the effective interest rates on them – which represent government borrowing costs – are at record low levels. 
That has the unintended consequence of pummelling pension funds, which use gilt yields to calculate their future liabilities. When gilt yields plummet, pension fund deficits effectively balloon. 
The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) estimated last year that QE had increased pension deficits by at least £90bn over the past three years. 
Current regulations mean companies must plug those holes. Mark Hyde Harrison, the chairman of NAPF, said businesses are now having to contribute to their pension schemes instead of investing for the future, which negates any positive impact of QE....
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Harrison has described the retirement fund death spiral triggered by zero interest rate policies.
QE has also reduced the incomes of recent retirees using their pension pot to buy an annuity, which sets the size of their income for life, as annuities are also linked to gilt yields. 
Altmann said monetary easing had acted like a "tax increase" on older people. She said the economy is in "unprecedented territory" and the gilt market had never been distorted in such a way. 
The Bank of England had not properly considered whether carrying out a policy which penalises certain sections of society is acceptable, because it has assumed that the path it has taken was the only option. 
QE is not creating growth and is hampering the spending of people who are not particularly burdened with debt because they are "worried about what's coming next," she said.
Please re-read the highlighted text as Ms. Altmann has made a very important point.  Specifically, the pursuit of zero interest rate policies including QE sends a message that undermines consumer confidence as these policies reflect the simple fact that central banks are still in crisis management mode.

Saturday, January 26, 2013

Is it time to grasp the debt restructuring nettle? Yes!

In his Telegraph column, Philip Aldrick puts the idea of pursuing the Swedish Model and requiring the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system squarely on the agenda in the UK.

He points out that the UK has pursued the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis for five years and the UK looks like it will match the Japan's experience of a lost decade of economic growth or worse.

The economic stagnation/decline is the direct result of the policies that are pursued as a result of choosing the Japanese Model and protecting bank book capital levels and banker bonuses at all costs.

These policies place the burden of the excess debt on the real economy.  To service this debt, the real economy has to divert capital that is needed for growth and reinvestment.  The result is at best a Japan-style economic slump.
Vincent Reinhart, Morgan Stanley’s chief economist who was a senior US Federal Reserve official and is the author of seminal papers on post-financial crisis responses, thinks there is an alternative, though. That there is a quicker way back to prosperity. 
Regular readers are familiar with my seminal work on this blog on how to respond to a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Mr. Reinhart confirms that adopting the Swedish Model restores prosperity quicker.  But then, anything is faster that the Japanese Model which as Japan is currently showing, doesn't work.
“A financial crisis is really about an enormous loss of wealth,” he told me at the Word Economic Forum in Davos. “And it’s only when you recognise that loss of wealth that you can set about rebuilding.” 
What he was talking about was writing down private sector debt – that of over-borrowed households, companies and banks.
According to the Bank of England, there may be as much as £60bn of unrecognised losses in the UK. 
Writing down that amount of debt would normally lead to an awful lot of pain – with some families losing their homes and jobs lost as companies go bust. But if the debts aren’t written down, the rest suffer too.
“If you buffer the people who made bad decisions from their wealth loss, then the people who didn’t make bad decisions suffer a wealth loss too,” Mr Reinhart said. 
That manifests itself in a long period of slow growth and - worst of all - youth unemployment.
Effectively, the innocent victims of the recession end up being the ones that also pay for it.
Confirmation that pursuing the Japanese Model makes the situation worse.  At the beginning of the financial crisis this was referred to as socializing the losses.

The politicians and bankers structured the socialization of the losses so well that the bankers didn't even suffer a significant interruption in their stream of bonus payments.
A little bit of honesty here from the political classes would go a long way, Mr Reinhart reckons. 
In the wake of a major financial crisis, he said, the authorities have two options: denial - letting banks, companies and households pretend they can service their debts and sparing them short-term pain. 
Or forcing writedowns upfront. Individuals would suffer and unemployment would almost inevitably rise, but the country would get over the hump quicker. 
“How long would those laid off be out of a job, though,” Mr Reinhart said optimistically.
As shown by Iceland, the recovery is very quick when the Swedish Model is adopted and banks are forced to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.
Effectively, his second option prescription is classic economic “creative destruction”. 
Mr Reinhart is not some misguided hairshirt ideologue, though. He has studied in detail the 15 biggest financial crises since the Second World War, and worked on the issue with the world’s foremost authorities – his wife Carmen and Harvard economist Ken Rogoff. 
According to his research, the “more successful economies were the ones where you recognise losses, take writedowns and get over it early”. 
“The incomplete recognition of losses means a prolonged period of below par growth.  
You never really grow your way out of a debt problem, you limp out. If that’s the case, you have to do QE1, QE2, QE infinity,” he said. 
Not clear that you can ever grow your way out of a debt problem except in an economics paper.

Mr. Reinhart's observation also confirms the prediction that your humble blogger made at the beginning of the financial crisis that the global economy would remain in a downward spiral (despite brief respites when aggressive fiscal and monetary stimulus is pursued) until such time as transparency was brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system.

When transparency is brought to all the opaque corners of the financial system, it drives the adoption of the Swedish Model.  Why?  Because market discipline forces the banks to recognize upfront the losses on the excess debt in the financial system.

Of course, this prediction and recommendation about how to handle a bank solvency led financial crisis occurred before Professors Rogoff and Reinhart started talking about financial crises and "This Time Its Different".  Their message was that regardless of what was done, it takes years to recover from a financial crisis.

This was precisely the message that the bankers wanted to hear and they repeated it constantly to the policymakers.  The result was the adoption of the Japanese Model.

Please note, that the work of Professors Rogoff and Reinhart was fundamentally flawed.  It assumes no learning curve in how to deal with bank solvency led financial crises.

In fact there was a significant learning curve.  In the 1870s, Walter Bagehot introduced the concept of a modern central bank.  In the 1930s, the FDR Administration introduced deposit insurance.  The combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank liquidity in fact makes adoption of the Swedish Model possible.

As shown first by the FDR Administration in breaking the back of the Great Depression and later by Sweden, pursuing the Swedish Model works and ends the bank solvency led financial crisis.  Of course, Iceland showed that even with a less than perfect implementation of the Swedish Model an economy can recover quickly from a bank solvency led financial crisis.
QE brings its own problems by distorting market behaviour and perpetuating the problem of “zombie banks, zombie companies, and zombie households”. 
“The attrition can last a really, really long time,” Mr Reinhart said, citing Japan’s two “lost decades”.
Confirmation of all the posts your humble blogger has written about the headwinds generated by zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies exceeding the benefits of pursuing these policies.
So where does that leave the UK? 
First, his argument suggests policymakers are not being entirely honest with the public. Patience is not the only option. Aggressive debt restructuring is another.
Your humble blogger has been pointing out the two options and why aggressive debt restructuring is the preferred choice.
The problem is, as Mr Reinhart pointed out, that the taxpayer would almost certainly have to step in – to recapitalise the banks as they wrote off billions of pounds of bad lending, or to protect households by capping their maximum loss. 
The US stepped into help householders in the 1930s under President Roosevelt, and the idea has been recently endorsed by the International Monetary Fund no less..
This is a classic example of economists not understanding how our financial system is designed.

Yes indeed, the US stepped in to help households in the 1930s.  The FDR Administration did this by creating deposit insurance.

It is the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding that allows banks to operate with low or negative book capital levels.  With deposit insurance, the taxpayers effectively become the banks 'silent equity partners' when the banks have low or negative book capital levels.  This allows the banks to both recognize the losses on the excess debt in the financial system and continue to operate and support the real economy.

Since the taxpayers are already the banks' silent equity partners when banks have low or negative book capital levels, there is never a reason to step in and recapitalize the banks.

Instead, the banks with a franchise capable of generating earnings before banker bonuses should retain 100% of their earnings until they have rebuilt their book capital levels.  The banks that do not have a franchise that is capable of generating earnings should be resolved.
According to Mr Reinhart, the instruction for banks to write down their assets would have to come from the financial regulator – in the UK in future, the Bank of England. 
But the decision would need to be made politically....
Mr. Reinhart is right that it is the politicians who have to make the decision to require the banks to recognize their losses.

It is the politicians who have to decide whether they put their country's citizens first or the bankers who fund their elections and retirements first.

To date, every day since the beginning of the financial crisis on August 9, 2007, the politicians have put the bankers ahead of the citizens.
Ideally, this would be when to use quantitative easing. The economy would suffer a brief shock as a result of the hurt households were feeling and as unviable businesses went bust. 
Low rates and cheap money would be the cushion to ease the blow.
It should also be combined with stimulative fiscal policies to be sure that the real economy fully recovers.
Instead, Mr Reinhart reckons, QE is being used because politicians are failing to take the big decisions: “Of the – say - 15 things that need to be done, QE is number 15. It’s just that the other 14 aren’t happening.” 
“I think of it like one of the old service comedies. The commander asks his troops to volunteer for a dangerous but vital mission and they all take a step back except one guy – the hapless hero. That’s the central bank. Because of the failure of politicians to address the real issues, you’re left with the hapless hero trying to do the right thing.” 
There is some evidence the UK is trying to grasp the debt restructuring nettle. 
The Bank of England is currently forcing banks to declare their hidden losses. But, the Treasury has made it crystal clear that the taxpayer will not be forking out a penny more, which will limit the policy’s effectiveness.
As much as £100bn of mortgage debt in the UK is in forbearance, where borrowers are struggling to keep up with their monthly payments even with interest rates at a record low, the Bank has estimated. The writedowns on that may not be huge, but when taken with overvalued commercial property and other hidden losses, it’s easy to get to a figure of £60bn of writedowns, using Bank calculations.
Forcing is too strong a word to describe the request from the Bank of England's Financial Policy Committee that banks disclose their hidden losses.

If the UK financial regulators were serious about forcing the declaration of the hidden losses, the financial regulators would enforce existing disclosure laws and require the banks to disclose on an ongoing basis their current global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

With this disclosure, market discipline would force the banks to recognize the losses on their dud exposures.
If there is a country that needs to address its private and banking sector debts, as well as the public ones, it is the UK. Mr Rogoff told me at Davos that “by and large Britain is having a typical post financial crisis period, exacerbated by the dependence on the financial sector and the eurozone”. 
In other words, we’ll grow anaemically for a decade at least. “Patience” is the authorities’ euphemism for what they used to call “a lost decade”. 
If that’s the choice they have taken, fair enough. But Britons – in particular the younger generation who can not get on the housing ladder and are struggling to find a proper job - deserve at the very least to be told there was another option.
Actually, the elderly who vote need to be told their is another option too.  After all it is their retirements that are being damaged by the pursuit of very low interest rate policies.

Tuesday, January 22, 2013

BoE's Mervyn King: banks not healthy until private investors willing to fund without central bank support

In his speech at the CBI Northern Ireland mid-winter dinner, Bank of England governor Mervyn King laid out the number one policy to pursue that would complement monetary stimulus was restoring confidence in the banks.

He then described a test for when this confidence had been restored.  Confidence had been restored when private investors were willing to "provide them with funds at reasonable spreads over Bank Rate without central bank support".

Regular readers know there is only one way to restore confidence in the banks:  transparency.

Specifically, requiring the banks to provide all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so that market participants can independently assess this information and make a fully informed decision.

Confidence in the banks will flow from the independent analysis by market participants because market participants trust their own analysis.

Since the beginning of the financial crisis, market participants have learned their lesson not to trust the financial regulators when they give the all clear signal about the level of risk at the banks.  First, the regulators missed the problems the banks faced leading up to the crisis.  Second, the regulators have repeatedly missed problems when they conduct stress tests and pronounce banks well capitalized that subsequently need to be bailed out or nationalized.

For banks, all the useful, relevant information that needs to be disclosed on an ongoing basis consists of their global asset, liability and off-balance sheet exposure details.

It is only with this information that market participants can independently assess the risk and solvency of each bank.  Market participants use their assessment to adjust both the price and amount of their exposure to each bank.

An example I frequently use for why ultra transparency is needed is the interbank lending market.  Currently, it is frozen as banks with deposits to lend cannot assess either the risk or solvency of banks looking to borrow.  With ultra transparency, banks with deposits to lend can make this assessment and subsequently lend to the banks looking to borrow.

If restoring confidence in the banks is the number one complementary policy, this can be easily done by simply requiring the banks to provide ultra transparency.  A requirement that the BoE can easily implement either through the Financial Policy Committee or its role as the banks' regulator.

So if we cannot rely on monetary stimulus alone, what additional policies should we consider? The right prescription now is a programme that complements monetary stimulus with measures to promote the necessary long-run rebalancing of the economy, enabling us to return eventually to more normal levels of interest rates. Only then can we return to a sustainable growth path. We must not be inactive, but we must be selective in order to be effective. 
What are those other policies? They come under three headings: restoring confidence in our banks, reforms to raise the future potential supply of our economy, and changes in the world economy and exchange rates.
Much has already been done to fix the banking system in this country. And there has been a real improvement in the position of UK banks. Capital ratios have risen, leverage has fallen, liquidity has improved, and bank funding costs have fallen sharply, especially since the announcement of the Funding for Lending Scheme last summer and an improvement in market sentiment towards the euro area. 
Banks are now overflowing with liquidity, largely as a result of the enormous increase in central bank reserves held by commercial banks. Yet there remains anxiety in markets about the resilience of UK banks.
Of course there is anxiety about the resilience of the UK banks.  These banks are 'black boxes' and nobody knows if they are solvent or not.

What the market does know is that between regulatory forbearance and changes to accounting rules it is highly likely that the banks are hiding large amounts of losses.  The fact that the banks are hiding large amounts of losses has been repeatedly confirmed by the banks themselves.

So it is no surprise that the market does not think they are solvent.

Ultimately, the only way to convince the market that the banks are solvent is if the banks provide ultra transparency.

Without ultra transparency, market participants must assume that the banks have something to hide and therefore they should stay away.
That is affecting the terms on which banks can obtain funding and so their ability to lend to the rest of the economy. Some argue that UK banks’ capital ratios compare favourably with many of their continental counterparts. They do, and we should welcome that.
Market participant anxiety about the solvency of the banks does not affect the banks' ability to lend.

The reason this is true is that banks can always sell the loans they make to other financial institutions including banks that are long deposits and are looking for loans, insurance companies and pension funds just to mention a few.
But there is only one simple test of whether UK banks now have sufficient capital. It is whether they can convince investors that it is safe to provide them with funding at reasonable spreads over Bank Rate without central bank support. 
As the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) noted in its recent Review, UK banks are still some way from being able to convince the market in this respect.
Until banks provide ultra transparency, they will never be able to convince the market that they are solvent or have sufficient capital.
Regulators ... are now working hard to ensure that banks are making adequate provisions for future losses, the likely costs of regulatory penalties and compensation to customers, and stating the riskiness of their assets in a more prudent way.
This lists highlights just some of the issues that cast doubt on the solvency of the UK's banks.

Conspicuously left off of this list is their manipulation of benchmark interest rates like Libor.  Clearly, banks face a sizable liability as every transaction based on the benchmark interest rate has someone who lost as a result of the manipulation.
A lesson from past crises, and also from this one, is that it is important to act now rather than hope that problems will go away of their own accord. 
True.  Until we have ultra transparency, there is no reason to believe that the banks will act now and recognize their losses.  Bankers have an incentive not to recognize their losses as they continue to receive bonuses made possible by delaying the recognition of the losses on and off their balance sheets.
As the FPC said last December, it is likely that banks will be required either to raise more capital or to restructure their businesses or exposures, and the FPC will review the position in March. 
There is no single remedy appropriate to all banks. 
With proper implementation, there is no reason why the two banks with significant state shareholdings could not largely be back in the private sector within a relatively short period. After all, in the United States banks that received state support are already back in private hands. 
Restoring our banking system to full – and transparent – health is only one of the structural changes that will be necessary to rebalance the economy.
Please note that Sir Mervyn King understands that transparency is needed for without it, it is impossible to restore the "banking system to full - and transparent - health".

Former BoE policymaker Adam Posen discovers groupthink at BoE

On his Financial Times blog, Andrew Hill looks at Adam Posen's attack on how the Bank of England operates and notes that the BoE is not the only economic institution that is prone to group-think.  Other examples he provides are the IMF and Treasury.

What do all three of these institutions share in common?  They employ a significant number of macro economists.  In particular, they employ neoclassical economists.

You might recall these neoclassical economists.  They are the economists who according to Nobel prize winning Professor Joseph Stiglitz built econometric models based on the "standard model" of the economy that assumed perfect transparency and left out the financial sector.

This combination of assumption and omission is very interesting as the banking sector had an incentive and ability to create opacity as opacity was a source of tremendous profit for the sector.

In short, the neoclassic economists were blind to the cause of our current financial crisis: opacity.

Of course, admitting that they were blind to the cause of the financial crisis would undermine their profession.  As a result, the neoclassical economists instinctively engage in group-think and become an obstacle to economic recovery by refusing to acknowledge that opacity was the problem.

More importantly, by refusing to acknowledge that opacity was the problem the neoclassical economists cannot champion addressing opacity.

Think about how many times a Bank of England official has talked about the need for restoring confidence in UK banks.

Of course, the problem is how to restore confidence in banks that are drowning in liquidity but that are 'black boxes' so everyone doubts their solvency.

Everyone knows that confidence in the financial system comes from transparency.  It is only when market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner that they can independently assess the banks.  Trusting in their independent assessment, confidence about the banks then returns.

However, when was the last time you saw a central bank economist call for banks to provide complete transparency?
Adam Posen’s attack on the management and culture of the Bank of England may be the strongest yet, but it is by no means the first – and won’t be the last – criticism of a persistent and dismaying lack of robust governance at the UK central bank. 
What is astonishing is that despite countless warnings – three independent reviews, several newspaper editorials and sundry MPs’ warnings – the central charge that the governor is over-mighty and under-governed still stands. 
It’s more than three years since the court of directors, the nearest the bank has to a board, was reformed to make it smaller, less ceremonial and, in theory, more capable of mounting a challenge to Sir Mervyn King. But, as Mr Posen, who served on the BoE’s monetary policy committee until August 2012, told members of parliament on Tuesday: 
Supervision of the executive was very lax and there was a very strong culture and precedent that, if the governor or the broader bank executive made a decision to do something … then it was seen [that] there was no point in challenging them. 
Hello, it is hard to mount a challenge to a decision when each of the participants on the Monetary Policy Committee has essentially the same training (a PhD in economics with a comfort level with neoclassical economics).
The bank is not the only economic institution that has suffered criticism of a culture that tends towards dangerous group-think. The International Monetary Fund and the UK Treasury (also criticised by Mr Posen for not taking the governor to task) were both prone to a lack of challenge and insularity, according to recent reports into why they failed to perform well in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the financial crisis....
The only way to end the insularity is to remove the economists from the committee that makes monetary policy decisions.  Economists at the Bank of England could "advise" on policy, but they could not vote on it.

So long as economists sit on the monetary policy committee, they will simply be engaging in the same debates they had over beer when they were graduate students.
It is, frankly, embarrassing that Britain’s highest profile institution of economic governance – which will soon receive a new governor, Mark Carney, and even more powers to oversee the financial system – still seems to have a free pass to ignore governance principles to which almost all listed companies in the land adhere.

Thursday, December 20, 2012

Why have economic forecasts overstated recovery since the beginning of financial crisis

In an interesting Guardian column, Robert Skidelsky looks at why economic forecasts since the beginning of the financial crisis have overstated the recovery and concludes that the assumptions underlying the forecasting models are wrong.

This is a point that your humble blogger has been making.

It has been known since the 1870s that there is a lower bound to effective monetary policy.  Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, set this lower bound at 2%.  He observed that below this rate, behavior would change.

Mark Twain explained exactly what this change in behavior would be when he observed that he was more concerned about the return of his money than the return on his money.  In short, keeping interest rates below 2% interferes with investor attitudes towards risk taking.

I have documented that rates below 2% also interfere with current consumption.  Savers offset the lack of return on their investments by deferring current consumption.  I call this the Retirement Plan Death Spiral.

Confirmation of this self-reinforcing downward spiral is easily seen with companies with defined benefit pension plans.  To offset the lack of earnings on the pension assets, these companies must contribute more money to the pension plans.  The result of this is less money for the companies to reinvest or grow their own business.  This in turn triggers lower return on pension assets ...

"Why did no one see the crisis coming?" Queen Elizabeth II asked economists during a visit to the London School of Economics at the end of 2008. Four years later, the repeated failure of economic forecasters to predict the depth and duration of the slump would have elicited a similar question from the Queen: why the overestimate of recovery?
For the record, I saw the crisis coming and my estimates of recovery have mirrored what has actually taken place.
Consider the facts. ...
Some forecasters are more pessimistic than others (the OBR has a particularly sunny disposition), but no one, it seems, has been pessimistic enough.
Unfortunately, I have been pessimistic enough.  I said at the outset of the financial crisis until we bring transparency to the opaque corners of the financial system and deal with the losses on the excess debt, the global economy would be in a downward spiral.  A downward spiral that vast quantities of fiscal and monetary stimulus is attempting to offset.
Economic forecasting is necessarily imprecise: too many things happen for forecasters to be able to foresee all of them. So judgment calls and best guesses are an inevitable part of "scientific" economic forecasts. 
But imprecision is one thing; the systematic overestimate of the economic recovery in Europe is quite another. 
Indeed, the figures have been repeatedly revised, even over quite short periods of time, casting strong doubt on the validity of the economic models being used. 
These models, and the institutions using them, rely on a built-in theory of the economy, which enables them to "assume" certain relationships. It is among these assumptions that the source of the errors must lie. 
Two key mistakes stand out. 
The models used by all of the forecasting organisations dramatically underestimated the fiscal multiplier: the impact of changes in government spending on output. 
Second, they overestimated the extent to which quantitative easing (QE) by the monetary authorities – that is, printing money – could counterbalance fiscal tightening. ...
Forecasting organisations are finally admitting they underestimated the fiscal multiplier. 
The OBR, reviewing its recent mistakes, accepted that "the average [fiscal] multiplier over the two years would have needed to be 1.3 – more than double our estimate – to fully explain the weak level of GDP in 2011-12". 
The IMF has conceded that "multipliers have actually been in the 0.9 and 1.7 range since the Great Recession". The effect of underestimating the fiscal multiplier has been systematic misjudgment of the damage that "fiscal consolidation" does to the economy.
Which is a polite way of saying that austerity is the equivalent of throwing gasoline on a fire.  It takes a bad situation and makes it worse.

Please recall that the argument for austerity is to reduce the government debt built up since the beginning of the financial crisis.  And why was there an increase in government debt?  To bail out the banks and protect their book capital levels and banker bonuses.

Effectively, the government socialized the losses in the financial system.  This puts the burden of the excess debt on the real economy as oppose to the financial system that is designed to absorb it.  Servicing this excess debt diverts capital from reinvestment and growth in the real economy.  This is what triggers the downward spiral.
This leads us to the second mistake. Forecasters assumed that monetary expansion would provide an effective antidote to fiscal contraction. The Bank of England hoped that by printing £375bn of new money, ($600bn ), it would stimulate total spending to the tune of £50bn, or 3% of GDP. 
But the evidence emerging from successive rounds of QE in the UK and the US suggests that while it did lower bond yields, the extra money was largely retained within the banking system, and never reached the real economy. This implies that the problem has mainly been a lack of demand for credit – reluctance on the part of businesses and households to borrow on almost any terms in a flat market.
Actually, the decline in demand doesn't just represent a lack of demand for credit.  It represents a decline in demand from savers.
These two mistakes compounded each other: if the negative impact of austerity on economic growth is greater than was originally assumed, and the positive impact of quantitative easing is weaker, then the policy mix favored by practically all European governments has been hugely wrong. 
There is much greater scope for fiscal stimulus to boost growth, and much smaller scope for monetary stimulus.
Actually, there is still significant scope for monetary stimulus.

The question is what monetary policies need to be followed to stimulate the economy?

Your humble blogger has been saying for years, listen to Walter Bagehot, reverse current zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies and raise interest rates back to 2%.  Demand should increase as savers can generate a return on their savings and can boost their current consumption.

At the same time, stimulative fiscal policies should continue to be pursued.  This complements monetary policy and reinforces growth in demand.

But what about the losses on the excess debt?  Have the financial system absorb these losses.
This is all quite technical, but it matters a great deal for the welfare of populations. 
All of these models assume outcomes on the basis of existing policies. Their consistent over-optimism about these policies' impact on economic growth validates pursuing them, and enables governments to claim that their remedies are "working," when they clearly are not. 
This is a cruel deception. 
Before they can do any good, the forecasters must go back to the drawing board, and ask themselves whether the theories of the economy underpinning their models are the right ones.

Monday, December 17, 2012

UBS warns about groupthink at Fed and other central banks

As reported on BusinessInsider, less than a week after your humble blogger discussed how groupthink has come to dominate the major central banks, UBS economists are now warning about groupthink.

The UBS economists observed that groupthink could lead to major policy errors.

Hint:  it already has in the form of zero interest rate and quantitative easing policies.

The Federal Reserve surprised observers last Wednesday by revolutionizing its strategy for communicating with the public on its monetary policy outlook through the introduction of the "Evans Rule." 
By adopting the Evans Rule, the Fed has now laid out thresholds that must be met before the central bank will consider raising interest rates, which have been held near zero since the financial crisis several years ago.... 
The change has been hailed by critics of the Fed – those who charge that the central bank has not done enough to stimulate the economy – as a crucial step toward tapping its full stimulative potential by more forcefully shaping market expectations.  
UBS economists Drew Matus and Sam Coffin do not share such a positive view of Wednesday's meeting as everyone else, however. 
In fact, Matus and Coffin suggest that contrary to popular belief, the Fed's latest decision actually makes things more dangerous for markets and the economy. 
In a note, the UBS economists warn clients, "Given that policy is now tied to the perceptions of a small group of individuals who all adhere to the same orthodoxy, this implies that monetary policy will continue to operate as a poor substitute for responsible fiscal policy and that the possibility of policy errors from such 'groupthink' remains a key risk for the foreseeable future."... 
Matus and Coffin conclude that a dangerous dynamic may be brewing inside the Fed:
In short, consistency is lacking and the FOMC is increasingly tone deaf. 
This may be because, within the Federal Reserve System, the hawks are primarily “freshwater” economists who are concerned about the ever expanding balance sheet.  
In contrast, most of the rest of the FOMC are either non-economists (the majority of the Board of Governors) or “saltwater” economists. These economists dominate not just the Fed, but a number of central banks around the world. 
As such, critiques are limited and critics outside the Fed often dismissed out of hand. 
 A characteristic of groupthink.
Given that policy is now tied to the perceptions of a small group of individuals who all adhere to the same orthodoxy, this implies that monetary policy will continue to operate as a poor substitute for responsible fiscal policy and that the possibility of policy errors from such “groupthink” remains a key risk for the foreseeable future. 
Meanwhile, with Richmond Fed President Jeffrey Lacker, the lone dissenter in several of the Fed's most recent policy decisions in 2012, set to become a non-voting member on the Committee in 2013, that groupthink may grow even stronger.
Groupthink among central bankers has been growing stronger since the beginning of the financial crisis.  Please note that they are all pursuing the same policies that Japan has shown failed over a 2+ decade period following its bank solvency led financial crisis.

Friday, December 14, 2012

The Bank of England tries to answer the Queen's question

During the Queen's tour of the Bank of England yesterday, one of the BoE's top financial policy experts tried to answer the question she asked at the beginning of the financial crisis of why if everything was going so well didn't anyone see the financial crisis coming.

According to a Guardian article, the answer was:
that as the global economy boomed in the pre-crisis years, the City had got "complacent" and many thought regulation wasn't necessary....
financial crises were a bit like earthquakes and flu pandemics in being rare and difficult to predict...
According to a Telegraph article, the answer was:
the City had got “complacent” because it thought risk was being managed better than it was, and the financial system had become too interconnected.
Please note that this response comes from an organization that was responsible for 'taking away the punchbowl just as the party starts going' and didn't fulfill this responsibility.

Complacency, a belief in less regulation, a thought that risk was being better managed and an interconnected financial system do not answer the question of why no one saw the financial crisis coming.

Each of these was a factor that contributed to the financial crisis, but was not a reason for the failure to predict the crisis.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger was among the handful of individuals who predicted the financial crisis.  Speaking solely for myself, the analysis behind the prediction was simple.

Since the Great Depression, the global financial system has been based on the FDR Framework and the combination of the philosophy of disclosure and the principle of caveat emptor (buyer beware).

Under the FDR Framework, financial regulators are responsible for transparency.  They have one task to accomplish:  ensure that market participants have access to all the useful, relevant information in an appropriate, timely manner so they can independently assess the risk and make a fully informed investment decision.

For their part, market participants are given one task to accomplish under the FDR Framework:  recognize that they are responsible for all gains and losses on their investment exposures under the principle of caveat emptor.  Since they cannot expect to be bailed out of their losses, market participants have a very strong incentive to use the information being disclosed.

This framework worked well and prevented a financial crisis for over 70 years until our current financial crisis occurred.

The reason the framework failed is that it was undermined by the regulators with the support of academic economists.

During the 1980s, regulators embraced both the efficient market hypothesis and the idea that markets were better at exerting discipline than regulators.  Unfortunately, they lost track of the fact that they were responsible for the one task that makes both the efficient market hypothesis and market discipline work: ensuring transparency.

That regulators failed to ensure transparency can be readily seen as banks are "black boxes" and structured finance securities are "brown paper bags".

To make matters worse, the regulators also injected opacity into the financial system.  This is best exemplified by the Basel bank capital requirements which were designed to hide the leverage that banks were taking on so the banks could offer a 'competitive' return on capital.

While this was going on, academic economists, knowing that the single necessary condition for the invisible hand to operate properly is that buyers know what they are buying, focused on the symptoms of opacity.  We had fabulous work done on lemons, accounting control fraud and information asymmetry.

Unfortunately, we had no work done on the role of opacity in undermining the stability of the financial system and why financial systems that become dominated by opacity are prone to a systemic financial crisis.

As a result, the academic economists were not publishing articles saying that there is a difference between light touch and no touch regulation.  The difference being that under light touch regulation regulators continue to perform their responsibility of ensuring transparency.

Predicting that a systemic financial crisis would occur was simple when one started to look at the size of the opaque corners of the financial system relative to the transparent parts of the financial system.  It was clear that some event would trigger market participants to focus on the simple fact that they could not independently assess the risk or value any of the opaque swaths of the financial system.

When the event occurred, PNB Paribas said it couldn't value subprime mortgage backed securities on August 9, 2007, the opacity in the financial system guaranteed it would be a systemic financial crisis.

In case you doubt my observation that opacity guaranteed a systemic financial crisis, how many times have you heard the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's observation that nobody could tell which banks were solvent and which banks were not?  An observation made when the triggering event was not about the banks, but rather was about valuing structured finance securities.
The Queen, who appeared quite animated during the discussion, said: "People got a bit lax … perhaps it is difficult to foresee [a financial crisis]."... 
"Is there another one coming?" the Duke of Edinburgh joked, before warning them: "Don't do it again."
If the Bank of England and other regulators took the Duke of Edinburgh's warning seriously, they would immediately bring transparency to all the opaque areas of the financial system.

Until this is done, the financial system remains highly likely to experience another systemic financial crisis.

Thursday, December 13, 2012

Governor of Reserve Bank of Australia lays out limitations of what central banks can do

In a must read speech (hat tip Zero Hedge) on the challenges of central banking, Glenn Stevens, the governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, laid out the limitations of what central banks can and cannot do.

  • Central banks can and did buy some time to address the problem of excess debt in the financial system that triggered our current financial crisis.


  • Central banks cannot fix the problem caused by this excess debt.

Mr. Stevens then noted that the policies adopted to buy time carry with them their own negative side-effects.

Regular readers know that your humble blogger has been saying that adopting the Japanese Model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis and its related monetary and fiscal policies was and is a mistake.

Under the Japanese Model, bank book capital levels and banker bonuses are protected at all costs.  This puts the burden of the excess debt on the real economy and results in, at best, a Japan-style economic slump or, at worst, a depression like Greece is experiencing.

I say the ongoing pursuit of the Japanese Model is a mistake because our modern banking system is designed to support a different model for handling a bank solvency led financial crisis:  the Swedish Model.

Under the Swedish Model, the banks are required to recognize upfront all the losses that they would realize if the excess debt went through the long process of default and foreclosure.  Subsequently, banks retain 100% of their pre-banker bonus earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.

Banks absorbing the losses on the excess debt protects the real economy as it does not take capital out of the real economy that is being used for reinvestment and growth and divert it for debt service.

Why don't policy makers need to foam the runway so that banks can absorb the losses gradually over time?

Modern banks are designed to continue operating and supporting the real economy even when they have low or negative book capital levels.  Banks can do this because of the combination of deposit insurance and access to central bank funding.

With deposit insurance, when banks have low or negative book capital levels, taxpayers effectively become the banks' silent equity partners.

Since the problem of excess debt in the financial system has not gone away since the beginning of the current financial crisis, the choice to continue pursuing the Japanese Model must be made every day by policy makers.

Since the problem of excess debt in the financial system has not gone away, the Swedish Model could still be adopted and the current financial crisis brought to an end.

That policy measures of any kind have their limitations is a theme with broader applications, especially for central banks. 
The central banks of major countries were certainly quite innovative in their responses to the unfolding crisis. Numerous programs to provide funding to private institutions, against vastly wider classes of collateral, were a key feature of the central bank response to the situation. 
In essence, when the private financial sector was suddenly under pressure to shrink its balance sheet, the central banks found themselves obliged to facilitate or slow the balance-sheet adjustment by changing the size of their own balance sheets. This is the appropriate response, as dictated by long traditions of central banking stretching back to Bagehot.
Your humble blogger has argued that the implementation of the central banks' policy response was and still is inappropriate.

Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, said that in their lender of last resort role, central banks are suppose to lend freely against good collateral at high interest rates.

So yes, central bank balance sheets should have expanded.

However, central banks didn't always lend against good collateral and they didn't lend at high interest rates.
Conceptually, at least initially, these balance-sheet operations could be seen as distinct from the overall monetary policy stance of the central bank. But as the crisis has gone on such distinctions have inevitably become much less clear as ‘conventional’ monetary policy reached its limits.
Bottom line, central bank balance sheets increased from both their role as lender of last resort and also from the use of unconventional monetary policies like quantitative easing.
It was fortuitous for some, perhaps, that the zero-lower bound on nominal interest rates – modern parlance for what we learned about as the ‘liquidity trap’ – had gone from being a text book curiosum to a real world problem in Japan in the 1990s. 
Japan subsequently pioneered the use of ‘quantitative easing’ in the modern era. This provided some experiential base for other central banks when the recession that unfolded from late 2008 was so deep that there was insufficient scope to cut interest rates in response....
Japan demonstrated that quantitative easing doesn't solve the underlying problem of excess debt that occurs with a bank solvency led financial crisis.

Japan also demonstrated that there are limits to how much time central banks can buy to address the problem of excess debt.
For the major countries a further dimension to what is happening is the blurring of the distinction between monetary and fiscal policy. 
Granted, central banks are not directly purchasing government debt at issue. But the size of secondary market purchases, and the share of the debt stock held by some central banks, are sufficiently large that it can only be concluded that central bank purchases are materially alleviating the market constraint on government borrowing....
Having adopted policies to distort the price of government debt in the hope of stimulating demand, central banks have become the market for government debt.
The problem will be the exit from these policies, and the restoration of the distinction between fiscal and monetary policy with the appropriate disciplines. 
The problem isn't a technical one: the central banks will be able to design appropriate technical modalities for reversing quantitative easing when needed.
Who is going to buy all this government debt?
The real issue is more likely to be that ending a lengthy period of guaranteed cheap funding for governments may prove politically difficult. There is history to suggest so. It is no surprise that some worry that we are heading some way back towards the world of the 1920s to 1960s where central banks were ‘captured’ by the Government of the day. 
Most fundamentally, the question is whether people are fully understanding of the limits to central banks' abilities. 
It is, to repeat, not to be critical of actions to date to wonder whether private market participants, and perhaps more importantly governments, recognise what central banks cannot do. 
Central banks can provide liquidity to shore up financial stability and they can buy time for borrowers to adjust. 
But they cannot, in the end, put government finances on a sustainable course and they cannot create the real resources that need to be found from somewhere to strengthen bank capital. They cannot costlessly correct earlier misallocation of real capital investment. They cannot shield people from the implications of having mis-assessed their own life-time budget constraints and as a result having consumed too much. They cannot combat the effects of population aging or drive the innovation that raises productivity and creates new markets. Nor can they, or should they, put themselves in the position of deciding what real resource transfers should take place between countries in a currency union. 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mr. Stevens summarizes why the Swedish Model needs to be adopted.

As shown most recently by Iceland and previously by the US in the Great Depression, under the Swedish Model,

  • Bank book capital levels are rebuilt through retained earnings and equity sales after all the losses on the excess debt have been realized.  While this is occurring, taxpayers act as the banks' silent equity partners.
  • People are protected to the extent that their debts are written down to what they can afford.  This process does not create equity for the borrowers.  Rather, it attempts to keep families in their homes (after all, who is going to buy and live in all these homes if they go through foreclosure).
  • The real economy continues to produce the innovations that raise productivity and create new markets.  It can do this because the capital it needs for reinvestment, R&D and growth is not diverted to cover the debt service on the excess debt in the financial system.
  • Retirement saving plans can continue without the negative impact of central banks pursuing monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing.

Wednesday, December 12, 2012

Groupthink and central bankers' search for new ideas

The Wall Street Journal ran an article that lays out why the leaders of the major economy central banks suffer from a combination of groupthink and defense of the PhD dissertation syndrome.
Every two months, more than a dozen bankers meet here on Sunday evenings to talk and dine on the 18th floor of a cylindrical building looking out on the Rhine. 
The dinner discussions on money and economics are more than academic. At the table are the chiefs of the world's biggest central banks, representing countries that annually produce more than $51 trillion of gross domestic product, three-quarters of the world's economic output. 
Of late, these secret talks have focused on global economic troubles and the aggressive measures by central banks to manage their national economies. 
Since 2007, central banks have flooded the world financial system with more than $11 trillion. Faced with weak recoveries and Europe's churning economic problems, the effort has accelerated. The biggest central banks plan to pump billions more into government bonds, mortgages and business loans. 
Their monetary strategy isn't found in standard textbooks. The central bankers are, in effect, conducting a high-stakes experiment, drawing in part on academic work by some of the men who studied and taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 1970s and 1980s. 
While many national governments, including the U.S., have failed to agree on fiscal policy—how best to balance tax revenues with spending during slow growth—the central bankers have forged their own path, independent of voters and politicians, bound by frequent conversations and relationships stretching back to university days.
Please re-read the highlighted text as it describes exactly the situation in which groupthink is most likely to occur.

The Wikipedia discussion of groupthink not only confirms this, but talks about signs that it has occurred.
Irving Janis led the initial research on the groupthink theory. In his first writing on groupthink in 1971, he defined the term as follows: 
I use the term groupthink as a quick and easy way to refer to the mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive ingroup that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. 
The WSJ article clearly shows that we have a 'cohesive ingroup' that was 'concurrence-seeking' as they are following the same monetary policies of zero interest rates and quantitative easing.
Groupthink is a term of the same order as the words in the newspeak vocabulary George Orwell used in his dismaying world of 1984. In that context, groupthink takes on an invidious connotation. Exactly such a connotation is intended, since the term refers to a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments as a result of group pressures....
Please re-read the highlighted text as it describes why these central bankers chose and continue pursuing monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing despite significant evidence that it doesn't work.

Each of these central bankers knew before the financial crisis began that
  • Walter Bagehot, the father of modern central banking, said in the 1870s that interest rates should not go below 2%; and
  • Japan has tried monetary policies that kept interest rates below 2% for almost 2 decades without success.  
For confirmation that the group knew these facts, prior to becoming chairmen of the Fed and the beginning of the financial crisis, Ben Bernanke even told the Japanese that their monetary policies weren't working.  The response of the Japanese was that it was easy to give this advice when you are not the one facing the financial crisis.

Despite knowing that keeping interest rates below 2% doesn't work and that the solution to a bank solvency led financial crisis is to adopt the Swedish Model, this group of central bankers chose to pursue monetary policies like zero interest rates and quantitative easing.

The policy choice of these central bankers fits Professor Janis' description as it reflects 'a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments' overriding a 'realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action'.
The main principle of groupthink, which I offer in the spirit of Parkinson's Law, is this: 
 The more amiability and esprit de corps there is among the members of a policy-making ingroup, the greater the danger that independent critical thinking will be replaced by groupthink, which is likely to result in irrational and dehumanizing actions directed against outgroups.
Professor Janis neatly summarizes what has and is still occurring in central banking.

For those who doubt this, Mr. Bernanke recently gave a speech in which he expressed his frustration with consumers for not doing what he wanted them to do.  Subsequently, the Fed announced quantitative easing till eternity.

This announcement was the equivalent in the world of groupthink to saying I am going to keep beating you until you stop crying.

The fact that the consumers did not do what he wanted them to do should have been a clear signal that he wasn't doing the right thing to get the outcome he wanted.

However, it appears the because he is so mired in groupthink Mr. Bernanke could not entertain this alternative.

Update

This comes from a previous post I did on Anna Schwartz, Milton Friedman's co-author.  Please note that it appears that her critique was dismissed as one would expect as a result of groupthink.


From Anna Schwartz's Wall Street Journal obituary,
Across six decades, she contributed strong work and commentary on economics, notably the financial system. In all her efforts to understand and explain financial behavior, Anna Schwartz focused on the system's primary need: stability. 
Which brings us to the present economic instability, on which Schwarz had opinions that deserve to be heard again. Statements she made to this newspaper in a Weekend Interview three and a half years ago, in her early 90s, ring with clarity and relevance to current difficulties: "The Fed has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity. That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are credible." 
Please re-read the highlighted text as Mrs. Schwartz has nicely summarized what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning of the bank solvency led financial crisis.

There is only one way to return 'stability' to the financial system and end uncertainty about the balance sheets of financial firms:  require ultra transparency and make the banks disclose on an on-going basis their current asset, liability and off balance sheet exposure details.

With this data, market participants can independently assess each bank and be confident in making buy, hold and sell decisions based on this assessment.

From her WSJ Weekend Interview,
She speaks with passion and just a hint of resignation about the current financial situation. And looking at how the authorities have handled it so far, she doesn't like what she sees... 
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke has called the 888-page "Monetary History" "the leading and most persuasive explanation of the worst economic disaster in American history."
Ms. Schwartz thinks that our central bankers and our Treasury Department are getting it wrong again. 
To understand why, one first has to understand the nature of the current "credit market disturbance," as Ms. Schwartz delicately calls it. We now hear almost every day that banks will not lend to each other, or will do so only at punitive interest rates. Credit spreads -- the difference between what it costs the government to borrow and what private-sector borrowers must pay -- are at historic highs. 
This is not due to a lack of money available to lend, Ms. Schwartz says, but to a lack of faith in the ability of borrowers to repay their debts. "The Fed," she argues, "has gone about as if the problem is a shortage of liquidity. That is not the basic problem. The basic problem for the markets is that [uncertainty] that the balance sheets of financial firms are credible." 
So even though the Fed has flooded the credit markets with cash, spreads haven't budged because banks don't know who is still solvent and who is not. 
An observation that also appeared in the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission report.
This uncertainty, says Ms. Schwartz, is "the basic problem in the credit market. Lending freezes up when lenders are uncertain that would-be borrowers have the resources to repay them. So to assume that the whole problem is inadequate liquidity bypasses the real issue."
Please re-read the highlighted text as it confirms what your humble blogger has been saying since the beginning that it is a bank solvency crisis.
In the 1930s, as Ms. Schwartz and Mr. Friedman argued in "A Monetary History," the country and the Federal Reserve were faced with a liquidity crisis in the banking sector. As banks failed, depositors became alarmed that they'd lose their money if their bank, too, failed. So bank runs began, and these became self-reinforcing: 
"If the borrowers hadn't withdrawn cash, they [the banks] would have been in good shape. But the Fed just sat by and did nothing, so bank after bank failed. And that only motivated depositors to withdraw funds from banks that were not in distress," deepening the crisis and causing still more failures. 
But "that's not what's going on in the market now," Ms. Schwartz says. Today, the banks have a problem on the asset side of their ledgers -- "all these exotic securities that the market does not know how to value." 
"Why are they 'toxic'?" Ms. Schwartz asks. "They're toxic because you cannot sell them, you don't know what they're worth, your balance sheet is not credible and the whole market freezes up. We don't know whom to lend to because we don't know who is sound. So if you could get rid of them, that would be an improvement."...
While Ms. Schwartz understands the need for valuing structured finance securities, she does not understand that they present the identical problem that banks present:  they are opaque.

The only way to answer which bank is solvent and which is not is to require ultra transparency.

The only way to value structured finance securities is to require observable event based reporting on the underlying assets.  Under this reporting, investors have access to current performance information as every activity like a payment or delinquency is reported before the beginning of the next business day after it occurs.
But in doing so, [Mr Paulson] shifted from trying to save the banking system to trying to save banks. These are not, Ms. Schwartz argues, the same thing. In fact, by keeping otherwise insolvent banks afloat, the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have actually prolonged the crisis. "They should not be recapitalizing firms that should be shut down." 
Rather, "firms that made wrong decisions should fail," she says bluntly. "You shouldn't rescue them. And once that's established as a principle, I think the market recognizes that it makes sense. Everything works much better when wrong decisions are punished and good decisions make you rich." The trouble is, "that's not the way the world has been going in recent years." 
Instead, we've been hearing for most of the past year about "systemic risk" -- the notion that allowing one firm to fail will cause a cascade that will take down otherwise healthy companies in its wake. 
Ms. Schwartz doesn't buy it. "It's very easy when you're a market participant," she notes with a smile, "to claim that you shouldn't shut down a firm that's in really bad straits because everybody else who has lent to it will be injured. Well, if they lent to a firm that they knew was pretty rocky, that's their responsibility. And if they have to be denied repayment of their loans, well, they wished it on themselves.The [government] doesn't have to save them, just as it didn't save the stockholders and the employees of Bear Stearns. Why should they be worried about the creditors? Creditors are no more worthy of being rescued than ordinary people, who are really innocent of what's been going on."
The reason the ultra transparency is needed is so that lenders can once again be responsible for their decisions.

So long as governments have a monopoly on the information disclosed under ultra transparency, there is a moral hazard.  The moral hazard is the need to bailout investors after the government says that a bank is solvent.
It takes real guts to let a large, powerful institution go down....
As your humble blogger has said many times, a modern banking system is designed so that banks can absorb all the losses on the excesses in the financial system without having to be closed down.  Between deposit insurance and access to central bank lending, banks have ample liquidity.

As a result, banks can continue to support the real economy and retain 100% of future pre-banker bonus earnings to rebuild their book capital levels.
In 2002, Mr. Bernanke, then a Federal Reserve Board governor, said in a speech in honor of Mr. Friedman's 90th birthday, "I would like to say to Milton and Anna: Regarding the Great Depression. You're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again."
"This was [his] claim to be worthy of running the Fed," she says. He was "familiar with history. He knew what had been done." But perhaps this is actually Mr. Bernanke's biggest problem. Today's crisis isn't a replay of the problem in the 1930s, but our central bankers have responded by using the tools they should have used then. They are fighting the last war. The result, she argues, has been failure. "I don't see that they've achieved what they should have been trying to achieve. So my verdict on this present Fed leadership is that they have not really done their job."
Which is not surprising because they are fighting a bank solvency crisis and not a bank liquidity crisis.

The solution to a bank solvency crisis is adopting the Swedish model with ultra transparency.